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Using the "F" Word: Federalism in Indonesia's Decentralization Discourse Author(s): Gabriele Ferrazzi Source: Publius, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Spring, 2000), pp. 63-85 Published by: Oxford University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3331088 . Accessed: 08/01/2011 01:06
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Using the "F"Word: Federalism in Indonesia's Decentralization Discourse

Gabriele Ferrazzi Brandon University
Indonesia cast off Dutch-imposed centralization federalismin favor of a unitary state. Soeharto's is tabooin theNew Order.In thecurrentreform the period,however, concept re-emerging, madefederalism butfederalismhas yet to be discussedin an open, inclusive, and balancedmanner. Decentralization policy is focused on the district, neglectingthepolitical demandsof the largerprovince. This policy is by of accompanied a confusedand misleadingofficial discoursethat is consistentwith the ideology power retentionand maintenance of patrimonial governance. As a result of greaterdemocratization the of polity,federalismis slowly enteringofficial discourse. Although its prospectsin the short termremain dim, supportmaygrowfor federalprincipleswithin Indonesia'sunitary structure.

The current reform period in Indonesia has unleashed a torrent of regional discontent. The centralization of power and resources is being reviled. Political upheaval has facilitated Timor Loro Sae's exit from the republic, plus secessionist movements in the provinces of Aceh, West Papua, and Riau. All provinces are demanding a better deal, making clear that wider forms of autonomy, and possibly federalism, may be the price to pay for national peace. Regional unrest has highlighted deep divisions and divergent interests in the nation. Polls indicate that the populace is deeply worried about separatism. There is pressure on the national government to hold Indonesia together, and yet come to terms with the root causes of regional dissatisfaction. Politicians are anxious not to preside over Indonesia's disintegration, but the new government of President Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) appears unable to generate a genuine dialogue. The president himself has great difficulty even uttering the word "federalism" when pressed to discuss the issue. This essay examines background on federalism in Indonesia to explain the strong resistance to the federal model. It draws on a review of government documents, proceedings of various public fora, participant observation, and personal interviews. Following a brief introduction to the analytical framework, the historical roots that shed light on center-region relations

AUTHOR'S NOTE: I wish to acknowledge Bernhard May, Luc de Meester, and Erita Nurhalim Zusammenarbeit team members to the Support for Decentralization Measures (Gesellschaft fur Technische project of the Government of Indonesia) for providing information and views that were helpful in updating the doctoral research work that underpins this article. ? Publius: TheJournal of Federalism 30:2 (Spring 2000)

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are examined in order to understand the center's tendencies toward unification and integration as tools for nation-building and domination. The current policy of emphasizing the smaller second-tier regions (more than 300 districts and cities), rather than the larger first-tier regions (26 provinces)' where federalist models might be more applicable, is placed in historical context. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK The treatment of discourse about the state should be linked to "sociostructural and historical factors that condition its organization and administration."2 For Indonesia, this means highlighting the state's patrimonial character and examining the debate on federalism in terms of the material interests of the dominant central elite. Patrimonialism Imperiled Decentralization has become a two-edged sword for the fractious postSoeharto elite. The reconstituted elite includes many of the same elements that made up the Soeharto elite. This is particularly true for the bureaucracy, where the patrimonial style of governance of the New Order continues to prevail. To gain legitimacy, a precious commodity today, the elite must undertake decentralization. In doing so, it is undercutting its power base and, thus, the sources of legal and extra-legal tributes that were commonplace in Soeharto's patrimonial regime.3 Herein lies the tension that infuses the regional autonomy policies of the government and the official discourse on alternate forms of decentralization. Compounding the tension is the significant degree of democratization yielded by the central elite in the early days of the reform movement that toppled the New Order. Exacted from the Soeharto elite as the price of staying in the game (avoiding revolution), the new freedoms are making the old communication strategies of the government less effective. As a result, the legitimacy of government policies is more difficult to earn, and this is evident in the government's decentralization policies. Reduced legitimacy threatens the elites' tenuous hold on power and the "tribute" streams that flow toward centralized power. Discourse Analysis The discourse analytical perspective is gaining attention, particularly due to its ability to link micro-level interaction to macro-contexts re'Having recently lost a province, Indonesia is making up for it by dividing provinces elsewhere, in West Papua (formerly IrianJaya) and Maluku; however, these controversial creations are in limbo. 2Andres Perez, "Legitimacy and the administrative capacity of the state: public administration in developing countries," InternationalReviewof AdministrativeSciences57 (December 1991): 646. 3Gabriele Ferrazzi, "Criteria for Transferring Functions to Sub-national Governments: Selection and Application in Indonesian Decentralization Initiatives," (Ph.D. diss., University of Guelph, 1998).

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search.4 It starts with the identification of actors and their interests and positions. Communication patterns can then be analyzed to note how the dominant ideology, political power, and governmental relations are sustained. In Indonesia, the lack of open high-level policy discussion is in part compensated by the ubiquitous seminar and workshop circuit, in the past largely sponsored or dominated by the government. The seminar/workshop approach to communication, persuasion, and mobilization has been taken up with gusto in the post-Soeharto period by civil society and quasi-government organizations. A more aggressive press is also generating more commentaries and exchanges that enlarge the political discourse, adding opportunities to note lexicon and rhetorical strategies of government officials and other players.5 Federalism's Meaning in theIndonesian Context If getting the form of the state right matters, it is unfortunate for Indonesia that most writings on the origins of federalism are historical explanations of "causes that impel various political units to come together to form a federal union."6 Little has been written on why and how unitary nations shed their unitary status for a federal form. The literature on federalism is especially sparse when it comes to experiences of "nation saving." Belgium is the notable exception, having recently completed a longjourney from a unitary to a federal structure, although the jury is still out on whether it will survive in its new form. Some international research and reflections on federalism can be useful to the Indonesian context. Ronald Wattsargues that federal nations under stress should forge a "strategythat combines both efforts to strengthen a federal focus of loyalty and an accommodation of the major concerns of disaffected Another insight is given by Cheryl Saunders in her reviewof regional groups."7 European experience. She cautions that "federalismis not created by federal institutions and rules alone, but depends also on attitudes towardsthe process of government. Thus, some of the advantages of federalism may be obtained without traditional federal structures. Equally,they may be lost in a country which otherwise is federal in form."8Analysismust go beyond outward appearance. As William Riker observed, "one does not decide on the merits of feder-

4See, for example, Teun A. van Dijk, "Discourse and Society: A New Journal for a New Research Focus," Discourseand Society1 (July 1990): 5-16. 5Fora description of these elements of discourse, seeJohn Gastil, "Undemocratic Discourse: A Review of Theory and Research on Political Discourse," Discourseand Society (October 1992): 469-500. 3 6Raphael Zariski, "The Establishment of the Kingdom of Italy as a Unitary State: A Case Study in Regime Formation," Publius: TheJournal of Federalism13 (Fall 1983): 1-19. 7Ronald L. Watts, ComparingFederal in Systems the 1990's (Kingston, ON: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen's University, 1996), p. 104. 8Quoted inJoachimJens Hesse and Vincent Wright, "Federalizing Europe: The Path to Adjustment," FederalizingEurope?The Cost, Benefits, and Preconditionsof FederalPolitical Systems,eds. Joachim Jens Hesse and Vincent Wright (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 378.

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alism by an examination of federalism in the abstract,but rather on its actual meaning for particularsocieties."9 One meaning that may have relevance to Indonesia is "federalism as covenant." In the same vein as Saunders, Daniel Elazar explained that federalism does not entail a quest for a particular set of institutions, but rather "a particular kind of relationship among the participants in political life."'? What is more important, then, are federal principles. In Elazar's view, the federal model can accommodate cultural cleavages by combining ethnicity and consent into both territorial (expressing cleavage) and non-territorial (crosscutting) polities. In Indonesia, federalism is debated in language that expresses competing visions and values."1 It is a fluid concept that has been linked with a variety of autonomy arrangements. It has been proposed as a balm for regional discontent and, at the other extreme, as a regional power grab that could lead to the "disintegration of the state." It is the appropriation of meaning and its rhetorical use that is of interest here, rather than the possible mechanics of establishing a federal system. The eventual meaning and connotations attached to the term will decide if the federal form will be adopted, and with what degree of power-sharing. FEDERALISM IMPOSED AND REJECTED There is wide agreement that the federal system briefly adopted by Indonesia in 1949-1950 was a Dutch imposition, and it may well have been a "divide and rule" strategy of the retreating Dutch. Its unpopularity is not in doubt, as indicated by George Kahin: The great majorityof Indonesianswere profoundlydissatisfiedwith the federal systemwith which they had been saddled by the Hague Agreement. In all fifteen Dutch-createdstates, this discontent soon began to manifestitself in spontaneous and widelybased popular demands for a scrappingof what was conceived to be an alien-imposedfederalismand the liquidationof these statesand their mergerwith the old Republic.'2 According to Kahin, this return to the unitary ideal as proclaimed in the 1945 constitution was also backed by supporters of federalism who wished to fashion their own form of federalism rather than live with "an artificial legacy of their old colonial master."

'William Riker, Federalism:Origin, Operation,Significance (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1964), p. 10. MatrixofModer Democracy Constitutional and CivilSociety-The (New Brunswick, '?DanielJ. Elazar, Covenant NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998), p. 302. "This is true in other countries as well. See, for example,John Kincaid, "Values and Value Tradeoffs in Federalism," Publius: TheJournalof Federalism (Spring 1995): 29-44. 25 "George McTurnin Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), p. 450.

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Understandably, the impulse of the founding "fathers" was to forge a unitary state to meld the diverse regions that were spanned by the Dutch colonial masters. The domino-style consolidation and eventual reintegration into a unitary state that occurred in 195013 were as much an elite response to power dynamics as they were the result of a widespread public awareness and favorable sentiments toward unitary governance. The subsequent difficulties faced in framing an alternate constitution to that agreed in The Hague (when Indonesia lived with a temporary constitution) attests to the lack of unanimity on the role and form of the state. The regional autonomy ceded in the 1950s did not satisfy the regions. Some regions considered it their right to be self-governed. In their view, coming together to seek independence did not encompass support for a centralized state.14 Regional unrest drew concessions from a weak central government (favorable laws on regional government for instance), but this turmoil was in turn a factor in Soekarno's decision to impose "Guided Democracy" in 1959, returning Indonesia to the 1945 unitary constitution; ironically, this was achieved in an even more constitutionally questionable style than the Dutch-imposed federal model.'5 The 1945 constitution guarantees the division of the country into "large and small" regions with consideration of the "consultative principle" and the traditional rights of special regions. This provided the basis for the New Order to establish provincial regions and smaller district regions'6 within them that were ostensibly autonomous and non-hierarchical in principle (achieved through Law 5/1974). Because regional autonomy is not explained in detail in the constitution, its bounds must be set in laws. Given the executive's extremely strong powers under the 1945 constitution,17 the president is thus empowered to determine the nature of regional autonomy. NEW ORDER DISCOURSE The New Order period, covering Soeharto's reign from 1965 to 1998, was a time of nation-building, characterized by the consolidation of power at the center and the elimination or reduction of resistance from any quarter.
'3For an account of the states' consolidation, see The Liang Gie, PertumbuhanPemerintahanDaerahDi Negara RepublikIndonesiaEdisi Kedua, Jilid I (Yogyakarta:Liberty, 1993), p. 192. "4TheDutch only overcame central Java in 1825-1830, all ofJava and much of Sumatra by 1850, and the Islamic Sultanate of Aceh and South Sulawesi by the first decade of the twentieth century. Submission to Dutch rule, and subsequently to the Indonesian central government, has never been ingrained in many parts of the archipelago. 15Indonesia's first vice-president, Mohammad Hatta, held Soekarno's decree on returning to the 1945 constitution to be unconstitutional; see Mohammad Hatta "Demokrasi Kita, Pustaka Antara," (Jakarta: Pustaka Antara Pt, 1966), p. 6, 17, 18, as reported in Muhammad Ridhwan Indra, The 1945 Constitution-A Human Creation(akarta: CV Haji Masagung, 1990), p. 27. '6Afterlosing East Timor, and splitting IrianJaya and Maluku (though these divisions may not "hold"), there were 29 provinces and more than 300 districts and cities (the latter are all commonly referred to as districts). '7For a description of these powers, see Muhammad Ridhwan Indra, The President'sPosition Underthe 1945 Constitution(Jakarta:CV Haji Masagung, 1989).

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The regions, particularly the provinces, were held in check, even as the rhetoric promised regional autonomy. Centralization Nation-Building as Soeharto continued Soekarno's drive to state consolidation and national integration. In practice, this meant centralization, evidenced in economic concentration, a suppressed civil society, and central government power over regional and local governments. Center-region relations were described in terms of regional autonomy, but the rhetoric was not supported by the facts. Over time, about 90 percent of government revenues accrued to the center. This imbalance gave rise to large central transfers, with conditions that greatly restricted regional autonomy. The center inexorably tightened its grip on the regions and villages. A resurgence in patrimonialism was also seen in the New Order.'8 Proximity to the center brought power and claims over resources. Legal and extra-legal resource streams became the life-blood of the politico-administrative system; retaining power was essential to central officials intent on exploiting public office. Decentralization had little chance of success in this context. Responding to foreign donors promoting greater regional autonomy, Indonesian officials maintained that "autonomy in Indonesia is not the same as the autonomy known in Palestine, Moro or Kashmir."'9 These references were primarilyuseful for their warning of impending strife, if the wrong type of autonomy was selected, as for their description of what the Indonesian type might be. The type of autonomy officials had in mind can, however, be gleaned from the 1993-1998 state policies: To strengthenthe unitarystateand smoothen nationaldevelopment,the implementationof governmentin the region is based on autonomythat and is real, dynamic,"harmonious," responsible,and in conformitywith of the capability the region in undertaking decentralized,deconcentrated and assistancetasks. The implementationof autonomousgovernancein the region should spur people's participationin developmentto encourage equitable development throughout the land to realize the National Ideal and strengthenNationalResilience.20

'8Benedict Anderson was an early proponent of the fit between the precolonialJavanese kingdom and Weber's patrimonial state; see Benedict Anderson, "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture," Cultureand Politics in Indonesia, eds. C. Holt et al. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972). See also Hans I. Bakker, "The Hindu-Javanese World View inJava: The Structural Roots of the Pancasila State," Managing eds. J. Bernardi, G. Forth and S. Niessen, (OtChangein SoutheastAsia: Local Identities, GlobalConnections, tawa: Canadian Council for Southeast Asian Studies XXI, 1995), pp. 189-205. For an argument on the Shadowsand Re-emerresurgence of patrimonialism, see Gabriele Ferrazzi and Hans I. Bakker, Of Vestiges, in ofPatrimonialPrebendalism theIndonesianPolity (University of Guelph, unpublished, gence: ThePersistence 1998). '9Soemitro Maskun, "Otonomi Daerah adalah Program Pemerintah," Prisma4 (April 1995): 44. '2 Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, Garis BesarHaluan Negara 1993-1998, (Jalarta: Republik Indonesia,1993), p. 26.

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By "real," officials meant that autonomy would only be given in accordance with capabilities to handle autonomy. By "harmonious,"policymakers meant that autonomy should strengthen rather than dissolve or corrode bonds between the center and the regions. By being "responsible," the regions recognized that autonomy is more of a duty than a right: the duty being to achieve national goals and strengthen the unity of the nation. In line with the above policy principles, the region is viewed as an "integral part" of the national entity: "Pusatpusatnya daerah, dan daerahdaerah pusat" (the center is the region's center, and the region is the center's region). This oft-repeated verity ultimately furnished justification for higher level control and incursion into the affairs of lower level governments. Thus, while legislation at times appeared to assign entire functions sectorally, subsequent regulations showed the Indonesian model to entail a more generic division of labor, with policy and regulations set at the center, provinces given coordination and supervision duties (as agents of the center), and the districts held responsible for implementation. As the former Minister for State Reform T. B. Silalahi reminded the regions, what is transferred is "only implementation," with the policy component to be still held by the center.21 District officials often liken this assignment of functions to a farm animal that has been entrusted to another's care, with the owner insisting that he must continue to hold onto the beast's tail (teruspegang ekornya) .22 This diminution of provincial and district autonomy was internalized over time by many regional officials.23 Discontent with decentralization did arise from a few bold lower level officials and some non-government actors. Though blunt at times, it was The Minister for State Reform, Sarwono always within limits. was quite direct in his warning about how decentralizaKusumaatmadja, tion in the early 1990s was to be interpreted: "This step is purely based on development efficiency and effectiveness. So don't politicize it."24Such warnings about decentralization issues merely reflected the broader political discourse, itself truncated. For example, in the context of the 1997 economic downturn, the military warned against politicizing the country's financial woes lest it lead to "instability."25 More subtle bounds were exin positive terms. For example, the general support of the military pressed for autonomy was invariably followed with the caution that autonomy must support the "unityof the nation," "national resilience," and "nationalism."26

21"Pemdaagar Sungguh-sungguh Mensukseskan Otonomi Daerah," Kompas,31 January 1995, p. 13. 22SeeFerrazzi, "Criteria for Transferring Functions to Sub-national Governments." 23See,for example, the comments of the EastJava governor in "Otonomi Perlu, tapi Bertahap," Kompas, 10 October 1990, p. 1. 24"PenataanKembali Otonomi DaerahJangan Dipolitisasi," Jawa Pos, 4January 1991, p. 1. 25"Don'tPoliticise Financial Woes,Jakarta Military Warns," Strait Times,28January 1998, p. 11. 26"L.B. Moerdani: Otonomi Harus Tunjang Ketahanan Nasional," Merdeka,13 May 1991, p. 1.

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Only in donor-supported fora could exploration that went beyond the official discourse be found. Even so, donors recognized the existing taboos and sensitivities and did not encourage any discussion of alternate models of state formation, but merely wider forms of autonomy.27 In general, the decentralization discussion in Indonesia was either internal (and not very transparent) or in the form of speeches at seminars, with little opportunity for interaction. The official decentralization dialogue, between the center and the regions, was low key and very fragmented, and not always intelligible. It was marked by explanations that placed the spotlight on the perceived weakness of the regions rather than on the failings of the central government. Central government charges that the regions were not "mampu" (mature) were common. Even (capable) or not "dewasa" officials who evidently chafed under the slow pace of decengovernment tralization nonetheless were forced to keep within the officially framed disand "maturecentre-immature region" analogies cussion.28The "father-child" were pervasive in the autonomy discourse,29 and reflected the broader discourse regarding the political maturity of the people or the regions. Soeharto's role as "Father of Development" (Bapak Pembangunan), a title officially bestowed upon him by the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), fed this analogy. Other terms used in relation to regional autonomy are also revealing. For instance, regions were expected to implement (melaksanakan) autonomy, and they were judged as doing this well or poorly. Here, autonomy is seen as a task, given by the center to the regions, that must be handled properly by the regions in conformity with central expectations. This formulation resonates with Law 5/1974 stating that the irresponsible approach to autonomy of the past would be supplanted by the principle that "autonomy is more of an obligation than a right." KeepingProvincesin Check Regional autonomy was given legislative attention in the New Order, but legal instruments were rarely translated into meaningful practice. Provinces and districts were autonomous largely in name. The key legislation designed to greatly enhance autonomy (Law 5/1974 and the follow-up Regulation 45/1992) emphasized the second-tier regions. Even so, little headway was achieved, though an effort was made to push ahead with a

'7See, for example, the work of projects like the Support for Decentralization Measures located in the Ministry of Home Affairs and supported by the German GTZ, and the Municipal Finance Project, located in the Ministry of Finance and supported by USAID. '8See, for example, J. B. Kristiadi, "Mencari Kriteria Alokasi Dana Regional-Prospek Kebijaksanaan yang Ideal," Prisma 8 (April 1991): 44-48. 29See,for example, the governor of West Sumatra, in his use of the analogy in relation to the second region governments, "Gubernur Sumbar Drs. Hasan Basri Durin akui: Masih Banyak Aparat Pemerintah di Daerah Ini Terjebak Pola Pikir Lama," Haluan, 15 February 1995, p. 1.

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pilot project focused on district autonomy.30 Notwithstanding the meager progress, the rationale for the emphasis on second-tier regions illustrates the political dynamics that underpin the stance toward federalism. The official reason for a district focus was, and presumably continues to be, that this level of government is "closest to the people."3' However, this can be only a partial explanation because the hamlet (dusun), village, and traditional multi-village organizations (e.g., Nagari in West Sumatra) are even "closer"to the people than districts. Flowing from this logic, any or all of these levels should be given autonomous status with greater emphasis than that of the province or districts. The average district (7,800 sq. km., with an average population of 670,000) is indeed a suitable level for many decisions and services, but its size nonetheless raises issues of externalities and administrative capacity. On the face of it, a good number of significant functions do not lend themselves to management by the district or lower levels (e.g., certain aspects of secondary and tertiary education and health care). Considerations of scale (size and population) provide strong arguments for the continued existence, or even the strengthening, of provincial autonomy. In official policy and discussion, however, the option of enhancing or even maintaining a strong provincial role was conspicuous for its absence. The more likely motivation of Indonesian policymakers for bypassing or reducing the autonomy of the province is likely to be twofold. First, secessionist, centrifugal, disintegrating forces are more easily generated in the provinces, requiring that they be kept in check. Second, the complexity of non-hierarchical autonomous regions is too great a burden; diminishing the provincial role reduces the complexity. The first rationale was rarely acknowledged or discussed in public fora.32 One argument in the public arenajustified the abolition of provincial autonomy by reference to history, holding that provinces were created by the Dutch, with no real roots in Indonesian tradition; the Mataram and Majapahit kingdoms only recognized district (kabupaten) and village (desa) autonomy.33Josef Riwu Kaho cites the fears and preferences expressed by Bung Hatta, a founder of the republic, regarding the problem of too many autonomous layers, the appropriateness of the scale of the district for connecting to the people, and the danger that will come from regional movements if the provincial level is retained.
30For an account of the 1995 district-autonomy pilot program, see Christoph Beier and Gabriele Ferrazzi, "The District Autonomy Pilot Program: A New Approach to Decentralization in Indonesia." Nord-SiidXI (April 1997): 94-101. 31See Republic of Indonesia, "Government Regulation Number 45/1992 concerning the implementation of regional autonomy with emphasis on Level II." 32One exception is Josef Riwu Kaho, "Jumlah Tingkatan Daerah Otonom: Suatu Analisis," (paper presented at the Seminar Terbatas Tentang Otonomi Daerah, Badan, Penelitian dan Pengembangan, Departemen Dalam Negeri,Jakarta, 8-9 Oktober 1990). 33Ibid., 19.

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Quite aside from the real level of autonomy afforded in ancient times, the above argument for neglecting or eliminating the autonomous status of the provinces does not come to terms with contemporary regional identity and power balance. As well, the argument neglects the fact that the perceived danger emanating from lower level governments also was the cause for scrapping the formal autonomy of a third level of government. The experiment with formal autonomy (through Law 1/1957) at the third regional level (tingkatIII) was stillborn because of fear that "the formation of the third autonomous region could be used to achieve certain intents by one certain political force, which could harm national stability."34 Here, is undoubtedly referring to the Communist force, one adept at Pamudji mass mobilization at the grass-roots. Hence, anti-provincial policies should be seen as part of a larger reaction; the target of anti-autonomy sentiment and policies emanating from the center is whatever entity has sufficient autonomy and/or potential political clout to challenge the center. There is little doubt that the chief concern in decentralization was the rebirth of regional power that could vie with that of the center. The growth in the number of provinces in the turbulent 1950s (16 new provinces were born between 1956 and 1960) had already worried Bung Hatta, who maintained that making provinces stronger would incite more groups to seek provincial status.35Ironically, this dilution of power through the formation of new provinces helped to keep the lid on the boiling regional pot. Nonetheless, the diluting effect of province creation did not work to appease existing provinces, and the center continued to fear the latent threat from all provinces. Appeasement of the regions turned to more politically repressive strategies under the New Order. In the wake of the failed "communist coup" of 1965, Soeharto felt that he had the opportunity to consolidate his power against political forces, including the regional elite calling for resources and power sharing. The taming of the provinces was achieved in a number of ways. At the rhetorical level, promises were made to enact laws that would give "real autonomy" to the regions (ostensibly to all regions, provinces, and districts or cities). At the same time however, the central government made clear the limits of autonomy, indicating that regional autonomy would no longer be the "broadest possible" (seluas-luasnya),as had been the case under prior regional government laws. According to the New Order government, "... based on experience to date, this term seemingly can give

34S. Pamudji, "TitikBerat Otonomi Pada Daerah Tingkat II (Landasan Pembinaan Sistem Pemerintahan Daerah Di Indonesia)," (paper presented at the Seminar Terbatas Tentang Otonomi Daerah, Badan, Penelitian dan Pengembangan, Departemen Dalam Negeri, Jakarta, 8-9 Oktober 1990), p. 8. 35Mohammad Hatta, "Demokrasi dan Autonomi," Harian Keng Po, 27 April 1957, in The Liang Gie, PertumbuhanPemerintahanDaerah Di Negara RepublikIndonesia, Edisi Kedua, Jilid I (Yogyakarta:Liberty, 1993), p. 301.

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rise to thought tendencies that can endanger the integrity of the Unitary State . . ."36The trauma of regional unrest weighed heavily on the New Order, and centralization, under the guise of a new kind of regional autonomy, was the answer. Hence, the modernized regional government law of 1974 made the provincial governor directly responsible to the central government and maintained the principle that the autonomy of provinces and districts is non-hierarchical (meaning, in essence, that both were beholden to the center; the province could not act as superior to the districts unless specifically tasked to do so). Furthermore, the future emphasis on regional autonomy would fall on the second-tier provinces, not on the firsttier provinces. The difficulties in working with parallel autonomous regions were felt throughout the New Order period. Through sheer intransigence, the provinces introduced uncertainty in decentralization initiatives, forcing the center to respond and adjust to different provincial wants and circumstances. This might be described as the essence of autonomy, but the center was ill prepared in practice (and psychologically) to make these adjustments for any level of government. Central government officials were also not happy about provinces being able to thumb their nose at the center, however rarely this occurred during the New Order period. The burden of trouble shooting frequent conflicts between the provinces and the second-tier regions imposed a heavy burden on the center.37 Confusion over the role of the provinces in supervising and controlling the lower levels was in part generated by the lack of clarity and operational consistency in the non-hierarchical concept.38 Furthermore, many officials were unclear about the technical guidance role the province ought to play in view of the existence of deconcentrated central units alongside them. In these conflicting and confusing situations, the second tier usually lost, in large part because the province felt like it was the senior of the two levels, a feeling no doubt supported by the dual/hierarchical role of the regional heads. This feeling of hierarchy in practice may also derive in part from the 1950s' formulation of decentralization laws,where the autonomous levels were clearly hierarchical.39

36Republik Indonesia, "Penjelasan Atas Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 5 Tahun 1974 Tentang Pokok-Pokok Pemerintahan Di Daerah," (Jakarta:Menteri Negara Sekretaris Negara), p. 2. 37See,for example, Mashuri Maschab, "Mengapa Tidak Satu Tingkat Daerah Otonom?" and Ichlasul Amal, "Otonomi Tingkat Dua," (paper presented at the Seminar Terbatas Tentang Otonomi Daerah, Badan, Penelitian dan Pengembangan, Departemen Dalam Negeri,Jakarta, 8-9 Oktober 1990). 38Thisdifficulty has been acknowledged by provincial officials if not the center; see the comments of governor of Bali, Ida Bagus Oka, "Fungsi Pemerintah Daerah Tingkat I Dalam Pelaksanaan Titik Berat Otonomi Pada Daerah Tingkat II," (paper delivered by the governor of Bali at the Seminar Otonomi Daerah,Jakarta, 16 April 1997). 39SeeIsmail Husin, "Daerah Besar Dan Daerah Kecil Dalam Sistem Pemerintahan Daerah Di Indonesia," (paper presented at the Seminar Terbatas Tentang Otonomi Daerah, Badan, Penelitian dan Pengembangan, Departemen Dalam Negeri, Jakarta, 8-9 Oktober 1990).

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By taking away the second tier from the provinces' jurisdiction, the center unwittingly committed itself to sorting out the meaning of non-hierarchical regional autonomy at the provincial and second-tier levels. Despite regional requests for clarification, an effective working model was never developed. It was only the continued command chain through the Kepala Wilayah (regional head as agent of the center) that "simplification" was attained during the New Order, at the expense of any real autonomy for the districts. Concerns about provincial power and about the complexities of multilevel non-hierarchical autonomy eventually pushed the policy of provincial subjugation to its logical conclusion; Soeharto and his officials, near the end of their reign, concluded that it would be best to relegate the province to the status of mere administrative territory (wilayah), shorn of its legislature and regional head (KepalaDaerah). The governor would then purely be the representative of the president in the province. This notion had been circulating in "captured" academic circles for some time,40 but was only aired forcefully when it received the backing of Rudini, then minister of home affairs,in 1990.41Rudini framed it as the only viable option through which the emphasis on autonomy could be realized on the second regional level. The tugging between the province and districts would be avoided because the functions would be divided between the center and the districts, with the province being merely the extension of the center, fulfilling a supervisory, guidance, and control function on behalf of the central government. A strong reaction to this "plan"came from provinces and some centrallevel stakeholders, with the result that this fast track toward enhanced district autonomy practically disappeared from official discourse. However, the general objective remained alive, guiding the long-term course of decentralization and regional autonomy. This can be seen in the districtautonomy pilot program of 1995, where the Ministry for State Reform whittled away at the autonomy of the provinces, and let it be known that this would continue until it was apparent to all that autonomy was no longer warranted at this level. Arguments for a stronger second-tier role have some validity, but in the New Order, they were the public face of a decision that had roots in the political commitment to deny the province a strong autonomous role, particularly vis-a-visthe second tier. Removing the autonomy of the province would indeed simplify the multiple-level autonomy conundrum, but it would

40B.Zainun, "Decentralization for Rural Development in Indonesia," Buildingfrom Below-LocalInitiain Development Asia and Pacific, ed. A. Bhatt et al., (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and the tivesforDecentralized Asia and Pacific Development Centre, 1988), 3:104-128. 4"Theidea "officially" came from the Litbangsection of Home Affairs, through the letter of its chair dated 4June 1990/No. 188.2.294/Litbang.

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be political suicide and a recipe for disaster if applied unilaterally and in the context of rising provincial expectations. HABIBIE'S REFORMS AND POLICY CONTINUITIES B. J. Habibie came to power in May 1998, when Soeharto stepped aside under immense student pressure and general unrest. While some democratic reforms were ceded, Habibie undertook other reforms not only to show his reformist colors but also to maintain the basic features of the patrimonial system of governance. Regional autonomy reforms were thus flawed, and the possibility of federalism was fiercely attacked by the "reform" government. ContinuedAversionto ProvincialAutonomy Soeharto's abdication in May 1998 in favor of his protege, Habibie, led to a transition government,42 national legislature (DPR), and people's assembly (MPR) that were eager to place some distance between themselves and the New Order, but were nonetheless short on legitimacy. To make his mark as a reformer, Habibie eagerly grasped at the decision of the special session of the MPR to move forward on decentralization.43 Although officials charged with drafting a new decentralization framework felt pressure to make some "breakthroughs," there was little discussion of the goals to be emphasized, and little time to embark on a policy-formulation process and preparation of operational instruments to make the effort both technically and politically acceptable. The president wanted his laws quickly, and he wanted to display these before the MPR and the nation in his accountability speech scheduled for late 1999. The regional government and center-region financial relations bills, rushed through parliamentary approval in May 1999,44 promised broad autonomy (otonomiyang luas) to the regions (but not the "broadest possible" autonomy). Despite some progressive elements, much continuity can be found with the New Order. The focus is again to be placed on district autonomy, while provincial autonomy is to be restricted (terbatas). The provincial legislature (DPRD) must still consult the choice of provincial head (governor) with the president. This is not the case with the district/city, where the Bupati and Walikota is freely chosen by the district and city legislature respectively. Deconcentrated functions given to the governor will be discharged through the same provincial agencies undertaking autonomous functions, inviting confusion and the dominance of vertical
42Lastingfrom May 1998 to November 1999. 43Republik Indonesia, "TAP MPR No. XV/MPR/1998" (regarding the Implementation of Regional Autonomy; aJust Regulation, Division and Utilization of National Resources and the Balancing of Center-Regional Finances within the framework of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia). 44Undang-undangtentang PemerintahanDaerah (regional government law) and Undang-undang tentang PerimbanganKeuangan antara PemerintahPusat dan Daerah (center-regional finances law).

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prerogatives in provincial decision-making. As well, the non-hierarchical principle between province and districts is made even more explicit than in the New Order laws. Federalism SellingAutonomywhileDiscrediting In the run up to the June 1998 elections, contending parties appeared reluctant to put forward alternatives to government decentralization policies. Only nine of the 48 approved parties canvassed by the daily Kompas made known their decentralization program.45 On the whole, these nine favored broader provincial autonomy. Another survey, eliciting views from both contesting and "unqualified" parties, revealed support for giving the provinces a larger role and share of resources. No party in either survey explicitly favored enhancing the autonomy of the second regional leveldistricts and cities-as preferred by the transition government.46 Most were, however, adamant (at least to be on record) about protecting the unitary state. It may even be that the pro-provincial sentiments of these new political actors were held largely unaware of past and intended government policies favoring the district. Regardless, the prompt allegiance to the unitary model suggests that the federalism taboo was still in place several months after Soeharto's fall. Public reaction to Habibie's decentralization framework was generally negative, for many reasons. Even before its approval, sixteen NGOs had gone on record as "refusing"the draft bill on regional government (among them OXFAM,Wahli, Mitra Tani, and PACT). The general objection raised was that the draft law was not prepared democratically, transparently, and with participation by the public.47 Many found the final version to be substantively weak, lacking in clarity, and overly dependent on government fiat.48 However, some government officials were perturbed by its radical departure from incremental decentralization, fearing that it was federal in nature and that it "has the potential to disintegrate the nation."49 Stakeholders reminded the government of the need for a wide public discourse, former Environment Minister Emil Salim among them.50 This was also the message conveyed informally by various donor agencies, though the message was not very insistent.

45Seespecial summary edition on the parties, Kompas,6 March 1999. 46GabrieleFerrazzi, Decentralization (Jakarta:Almanac of IndoneReform:Can it keepIndonesia together? sian Political Parties, 1999). 7"16LSM Tolak RUU Pemerintahan Daerah," Suara Pembaruan,3 March 1999, p. 15. 48See,for example, ArifAryman, director of Econit economic research agency in Antara, "Autonomy: Bill on Financial Balance Needs Revising, Says Observer," 7 April 1999; http://www.antara.co.id/rx/eng/ curr/national/ 1999/04/07/ANT28537.html. 49Cooperative Minister Adi Sasono in "Decentralization of State Finances Needs More Time," Bisnis Indonesia, 5 April 1999 (Netscape version). 50EmilSalim, "Otonomi Daerah," Kompas,11 Februari 1999, p. 2.

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Only two aspiring leaders broke rank with the elite and took a stand for federalism. Even so, Amien Rais, of the National Mandate Party (PAN), soon softened his stance, indicating that he merely supported a dialogue on the issue and that the federal model may not be the best for Indonesia.51Yuzril Mahendra, head of the Crescent Star Party (PBB), also backtracked and indicated support for strong provinces (40 of them) rather than the focus on the district as enshrined in the new laws.52The softening of positions undoubtedly was related to the backlash felt among the political elite, particularlyin the political party Golkar,who had come out strongly against Rais' position; the politically astute Rais and Mahendra apparently did not want to alienate Golkar-member support at later stages of a very fluid political process. Federalism has alwaysbeen a topic of discussion, albeit in hushed tones. This has even been true among government officials, though the latter were in the main sold on the mythologies of the New Order. The lay discussion was becoming more intense during the mid-1990s.53In the reform era, when the elite failed to respond to the emerging federalism discussion among the public, other stakeholders took up the challenge, no doubt emboldened by the drive toward a more democratic polity. Academics and other observers began to write about federalism, or autonomy versus federalism.54 A well-known freedom fighter, the late Romo Mangunwijaya, published a timely book dealing at length with the need for a federal system. In the book and later writings, he drew on the symbol of Bung Hatta, indicating that this founder of the republic favored a federalist spirit in regional autonomy, even if not explicitly a federal form.55 Romo suggested that a federal model was needed to ward off civil unrest and violence, but even he was soft in his call, allowing implementation to extend to the year 2045. Despite an early 1998 pledge that "debate on the federal model must be accommodated,"56 Ryaas Rasyid, the director general in Home Affairs responsible for regional autonomy, went on the offensive to champion the decentralization framework his Home Affairs team had prepared for President Habibie. Senior officials launched an information campaign to "so-

51See "Debat Golkar-PAN Siap Digelar di Teve," Republika,7 September 1998, p. 1. 52SeeYusril Izha Mahendra, "Perpolitkan Konsep Federal di Indonesia dan Konsekuensinya," Federalism untuk Indonesia, eds. Adnan B. Nasution, Harun Alrasid, and Ichlasul Amal (Jakarta:Kompas, 1999), pp. 154-164. 53These are impressions of the author, gained from nine years of cooperation with the Indonesian government at all levels, and through discussion with non-government stakeholders during this time. 54See,for example, Soedjati Djiwandono, "Isa Federal System Suitable for Indonesia?"Jakarta Post, 23 July 1998, p. 1; Cornelius Lay, "Sistem Presidentiil Masih Dibutuhkan 15-20 Tahun Lagi," Republika,15 August 1998 (Netscape version); and Amien Syam, "Semua Dati I Harus Diberi Otonomi Luas," Kompas, 24 August 1998, p. 8. 55Y. (Romo) Mangunwijaya, "Menyalamatkan Ketunggalan Negara," Federalism B. untuk Indonesia, pp. 32-43. 56See "Debat tentang Negara Federal Harus Diakomodasi," Kompas,27 August 1998, p. 6.

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cialize" the contents of the two key laws. RyaasRasyidstated that the "broadest possible autonomy" was given in the new laws,57evoking a concept that had currency in the 1950s. Quite aside from the fact that there is no such formulation in the laws, this slogan represented a distortion of history because the "broadest possible" autonomy concept related to a period when the weak center was forced to yield to key regional demands that were primarily provincial (e.g., the birth of certain provinces contiguous with historical bounds or that approximated Dutch "residency"borders).58 In a rebuttal of federalism, Rasyid explained to the public that federalism was not possible in Indonesia because federal nations could only be formed "byindependent nations deciding to come together to form a federation."59 To indicate the new laws' generous spirit, Andi Mallarangeng, also instrumental in the drafting effort, stated that these laws gave the regions "full sovereignty."60 During this exchange, as carried out in seminars and meetings with the press, the president kept a low profile, leaving his regional autonomy director general and party functionaries of Golkar to quell incipient discussion on federalism. Golkar attacked supporters of federalism with vigor, charging that disintegrating forces lay behind the desire to establish federalism. Akbar Tandjung, the party chairman, invoked the state ideology of Pancasila as the base for a unitary state and pledged to "oppose all efforts to establish a federal nation."61 By the end of Habibie's government, federalism had begun to emerge in the broader discourse, but could not be said to have become an acknowledged issue for deliberation within government. THE UNITY GOVERNMENT: USING THE "F" WORD Once the new government of President Gus Dur was in place (November 1999), some officials pressed for the immediate implementation of the Habibie laws.62However, key follow-up regulations did not exist, a fact that concerned some regions hopeful for quick action on decentralization.63

untuk Indonesia, pp. 1757AndiMallarangen and Ryaas Rasyid, "Otonomi dan Federalism," Federalism 31. in (Ithaca: Mod58See,for example, Gerald S. Maryanov, Decentralization Indonesia as a Political Problem ern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1958). 59"Otonomi Lebih Realistis daripada Federasi," Kompas,10 September 1998, p. 6. Daerah Tetap Mengandung Risiko," Kompas,21 September 1999, p. 17. 6"OOtonomi "6"Golkar Tolak Negara Federal," Kompas,1 September 1998, p. 6. 62Forinstance, Dewi Fortuna Anwar (former Habibie advisor and member of the Indonesian Institute of Science) and Andi Mallarangeng (an architect of the laws and lecturer in the Home Affairs Institute for Governmental Studies); see "Regional Discontent Threatens Unity,"Jakarta Post,24 October 1999, p. 1. 63Provincialand district officials gathered on 30 October 1999 to begin preparations for autonomy. They noted the lack of regulations and warned that if this was not corrected soon, it would lead to conflicts down the road (reported 30 October 1999 by Television Republik Indonesia, news program). The preparations to be taken were not made clear, and it is hard to see what the regions can do without being given a road map of some type.

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To expedite regional autonomy, the president established a new State Ministry for Regional Autonomy, and placed Ryaas Rasyid as minister. This signaled the importance of regional autonomy to the president, and indicated continuity with the Habibie government's regional government law, given that Rasyid had led its drafting as director general in the Ministry of Home Affairs. The new minister pledged to hasten the implementation of the new regional government and finance laws, and reassured the public with the comment that: "Autonomy can be the answer to all the problems of separatism. It can serve as an adhesive for the unitary state of Indonesia."64 Given that no districts are currently seeking nationhood,65 the minister's attention seems misplaced; adhesion is needed largely at the provincial level. The minister is undoubtedly aware of this reality, but is working within the persistent logic that provinces can best be kept in check by denying them a prominent role. To the rather uninformed press, the finalization of decentralization laws sounded like good news, even eliciting the hope that "it will postpone ... for the time being at least... the heated debate about federalism."66These sentiments were expressed by the JakartaPostin the same breath as reminders of provincial claims on resources and references to the upcoming decentralization of power "to the provinces,"67suggesting that some members of the press were still in the dark about the contents and implications of the new laws.68 The president's own pronouncements have been inconsistent or difficult to decipher, and perhaps they are meant to be opaque. He acknowledges that federalism may be needed, but is reluctant to use the term "federal system," given the unpleasant connotations this has for many Indonesians, particularly his vice president, Megawati Soekarnoputri. Hence, he sees a need to proceed cautiously, but apparently not clearly, holding that: "Even though granting total autonomy is not that different from a federal system, it is easier to swallow." His quandary is aptly captured in his concluding

64"Government Says Autonomy Law Ready in 2000," Jakarta Post, 23 November 1999 (Netscape version). 65District-level unrest or calls for independence have been rare but not unheard of in Indonesia's history. The district of Minahasa, in North Sulawesi, is probably the best example. Following the war of independence, the regional elite, led by the Persatuan Minahasa (Minahasan Unity) movement and the local leader Ratulangie (a nationalist) voiced their preference for "independence" within a federal Indonesian Republic; see Henley David, "Nationalism and Regionalism in Colonial Indonesia: The Case of Minahasa," Indonesia 55 (April 1993): 91-112. 'See editorial "Delay Not the Autonomy," Jakarta Post, 23 December 1999 (Netscape version). 67"RI Forced into Federal State by 2010,"Jakarta Post, 15 November 1999 (Netscape version). 8This kind of confusion could also stem from inappropriate English translations of the term daerah (region) which could mean province or district, and requires specification in Indonesian (unless ambiguity is sought). The fact that the terms remain unspecified may be an indication of how successfully the government has been able to muddle or avoid the issue of provincial autonomy.

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statement to the Japanese press, "I am trying to do something that cannot be expressed in words."69 The taboo on federalism, evident in the election campaign where few parties dared mention the term, is crumbling, but very slowly. The aversion to using the "f' word still felt by the president indicates that he does not wish to be perceived as soft on the forces of disintegration; maintaining territorial integrity is perhaps uppermost in the president's mind, at least on par with economic recovery. He has given his vice president the task of managing regional issues, but has kept the "Aceh" portfolio for himself, presumably in light of Aceh's strident demands for self-determination and their religious overtones. Gus Dur at first appeared to agree with the call for a referendum on independence,70 but then he explained that this meant only for religious matters. Finally, he allowed his minister for legal affairs, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, to state that there would be no referendum. In its place, the government would propose a "special autonomy" package for
Aceh.71

The ad hoc "special"autonomy packages put forth by the president have not arisen from any policy debate. He has pledged to Aceh province 75 percent of natural-resource revenues.72Another form of "special autonomy" is being promised to West Papua, and recently the state minister for regional autonomy has acknowledged the merits of Bali's claim for special autonomy. These accommodations appear to be unrealistic in terms of addressing regional equity and sustainable center-region arrangements.73 The pressure for provincial autonomy or federalism mounted early in Gus Dur's term. Provincial legislatures, more plural and powerful in the new political framework, began to rouse. The East Kalimantan legislature sent representatives to the national legislature to lobby for federalism in Indonesia. The East Kalimantan request stands the fear-mongering of the New Order on its head: "Weasked the House to take the concept of federalism into consideration in an attempt to maintain national unity
..

."74It is

a significant reversal that the fear of disintegration is now fuelling federalism proposals and discussion. Provincial legislators in South Sulawesi are also standing by proposals for a federal system, reached as a compromise

69Broughtto the author's attention by Bernhard May as quoted in TheStraitsTimes,22 Decemberl999. 70"Acehto Hold Referendum in Seven Months: President,"Jakarta Post, 16 November 1999 (Netscape version). ""DPRDiminta Prioritaskan Pembahasan Otonomi Khusus Aceh," Kompas, 23 December 1999 (Netscape version). 72"IndonesiansFear Domino Effect if Province Goes," Globeand Mail, 13 November 1999, p. A15. 73Thismessage, among others, was conveyed to the minster for regional autonomy by the donor community, see Advisory Working Group, Decentralizationin Indonesia:Managing the Risks, Maximizing the Benefits, Prepared by advisors from World Bank, UNDP, USAID, CIDA, GTZ, November 1999,Jakarta. Kalimantan Legislators Join Call for Federalism," Jakarta Post, 2 December 1999 (Netscape 74"East version).

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following student demonstrations in the streets of Makassarcalling for outright independence.75 Changes are also taking place among national politicians. The deputy chair of Golkar, Marwah Daud, after her party's poor showing (except in South Sulawesi and a few other regions) stated her intent to learn more about and push forward the cause of federalism.76 Akbar Tandjung, the hard-nosed Golkar chairman entrusted with discrediting federalism in the Habibie period, also experienced some kind of conversion. As chair of the national legislature (DPR), he announced that the two possible options to be offered to Aceh might be the federal option and the broadest possible autonomy (otonomiyang seluas-luasnya)within the unitary state.77 This has not been confirmed by the state minister for regional autonomy, but the latter did go some way toward acknowledging the dissonance between the new laws and Aceh's demands by putting forward several autonomy options for this province, one of which would focus on the province rather than on the districts and cities.78 Some senior government officials have broken ranks with the official "unitary-autonomy" line, on one occasion openly guessing about the date when federalism will come to Indonesia.79 The regional representative of the People's Legislative Assembly (MPR), a much more energetic body than in the past, organized a forum in early December 1999 on federalism versus a unitary state. These "national" politicians came out with the following results: the Aceh and West Papua province representatives did not feel that federalism would keep them in the union; Riau and East Kalimantan pressed for a federal form; and other representatives wavered or opposed federalism.80 Standing against any easing on the federal issue are formidable forces, namely, the Indonesian Democratic Partyfor Struggle (PDI-P) and the military. Led by Megawati Soekarnoputri, PDI-P has strenuously stated its opposition to federalism or any threat to the unitary state. It has sought to censure Amien Rais, now speaker of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), for advocating federalism.81In making the case for the unitary state, the PDI-P secretary-general stated: "It was proven that federalism was rejected by the people," alluding to the 1950 return to the unitary state. The enactment of the new laws would be "appropriate measures to counter fed-

75"BerceraiKita Runtuh," Gatra,6 November 1998, p. 42. 76"Marwah Daud Siap Mundur," Kompas,8 November 1999, p. 7. DPR Tolak Opsi Merdeka," Kompas,4 December 1999 (Netscape version). 77"Ketua 78"Ditawarkan Empat Alternatif-Ryaas Rasyid soal Otonomi untuk Aceh," Kompas,27 November 1999 (Netscape version). 79See comments by Anhar Gonggong, director of history and traditional values at the Ministry of National Education, who stated that preparations for a federal state should be complete by 2005, "RI Forced into Federal State by 2010,"Jakarta Post, 15 November 1999 (Netscape version). 80Privatecommunications with Luc de Meester, GTZ advisor for the Home Affairs based Support for Decentralization Measures project,Jakarta. 81See"PDI Perjuangan Seeks to Censure Amien," Jakarta Post, 30 November 1999 (Netscape version).

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eralism demands."82The yearning for taboo status for the concept of federalism seems evident in these statements. The Java/urban emphasis of the PDI-P is also clearly evident. It is not in touch with the outlying regions, nor is it very sensitive to the issue of decentralization. A respected traditional figure, YogyakartaGovernor Hamengku Buwono X, has been somewhat more thoughtful in his opposition to federalism. He warned the nation that: "Manyareas will form states based on ethnicity or religion ... They will demand independence and Indonesia will collapse."83

Looming in the background is the military. Still licking its wounds suffered in the last three years, it is nonetheless growling at efforts to "threaten the unity (persatuan) and unitary nature (kesatuan) and continuity of the nation (bangsa) and state (negara)."84 A federal state is clearly not favored by the military, making it the wild card in this intricate game. THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE DEBATE The post-election flurry of demands and protests over separation, federalism, or regional autonomy gave way to a steady murmur in the early months of 2000. The central government was unable to take full advantage of the relative respite. A "humanitarian pause" was reached with the Aceh freedom movement (GAM), but no agreement on the nature of the autonomy package ensued, and low-level violence continued. On the western front, West Papua convened a provincial forum in early June 2000 that culminated in a call for recognition of its "independent status." The autonomy package that was to preempt such demands remains undefined. The federal option continues to be raised in some quarters, but not by the government. GAM representatives have indicated that the federal option might be an acceptable compromise.85 Riau students continue to press their officials and the central government to consider various alternatives, including federalism.86 To relieve the pressure, the government has primarily tried to inculcate among officials the virtues of autonomy over federalism. On 23 February 2000, the minister of home affairs, Surjadi Soedirdja, opened his workshop for regional officials with the statement that "Indonesia is an einheidsstaat [unitary state], thus Indonesia does not have regions that are staats [states]. It cannot possibly happen that there can be regions that are states within

82"PDIPerjuangan Rules Out Option of Federal State," Jakarta Post, 13 December 1999 (Netscape version). vs. 83"Unitary Federal System Sized Up," Jakarta Post, 8 December 1999 (Netscape version). 84"Ada Upaya Merombak Bentuk Negara Kesatuan," Kompas,2 December 1999 (Netscape version). 85See "Pertemuan Bondan-Abdullah Terganggu 'Pemusatan' TNI GAM ingin negara federal," Suara Kaltim, 18 Maret 2000 (Netscape version). Riau Se-Indonesia Tuntut DPR," Riau Pos, 9 Maret 2000 (Netscape version). 86"Mahasiswa

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the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia."87 This truism posing for policy is vintage New Order rhetoric. The failure to embrace the discussions taking place outside government can only isolate policymakers and lead to political miscalculation. These simplistic warnings of "federation is disintegration" do a disservice to the complexity of Indonesia's history and are unlikely to withstand the kind of scrutiny that civil society is beginning to expect and mount of its own accord. The unofficial debate on federalism is being continued by non-government actors, principally in Jakarta. The national and regional press often returns to the theme, seeking views from officials, intellectuals, and technical advisors working in related donor-supported projects. Universities and foundations hold fora to discuss the option, usually in tandem with regional autonomy options. The press also is active in conducting panel discussions, often televised.88 Foreign advisors are no longer shy about voicing their views on the federal model. Some advisors openly speculate that the federal model "in principle can be applied to Indonesia," or that it is workable "if that is what the people want."89 Coming from advisors tasked with supporting the elaboration and implementation of the current "unitary" government's autonomy policies, these are significant admissions if not endorsements. Explicit support for federalism is found among senior researchers in the respected Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI). It recently collaborated with international parties (e.g., Hanns Seidel Foundation) to hold fora to enlarge the discussion,90 with the expressed intent to influence government policymaking. LIPI examined the question: "Is the unitary state to be identified with the unity of the nation, and is the federal state to be identified with the nation's disintegration?" Using a scientific forum to demystify government claims on decentralization is a marked departure from the New Order pattern of co-opted scientific effort for the purpose of state control and ideological dominance. The LIPI forum concluded that it might be possible to introduce a compromise position, one that perhaps the president himself is struggling to enunciate, where the unitary form is

87Translated from Indonesian by the author from the report found in "Pelaksanaan Otonomi Hendaknya tidak Timbulkan Konflik," Suara Pembaruan,23 February 2000, p. 2. 88Apublic debate was held in Hotel Meridien, Jakarta on 16 February 2000, titled "Antara Bentuk Negara Kesuatuan dan Federasi" (Between the Unitary and Federal Form of the State). 89See, for example, the views expressed by the members of the Gesellschaft ffir Technische Zusammenarbeit, the executing arm of the German government in the latter's cooperation in the Support for Decentralization Measures project of the Government of Indonesia. These are found in "Wawancara Dr. Bernhard May-Janggan Menunggu Daerah Berteriak," Integrasi, 2, 24-30 Januari 2000, pp. 12-17, and in "Otonomi Baik, Federal tidak Perlu-Ir. Luc de Meester, Penasehat Pengembangan Pemerintah Lokal dan Regional Depdagri," SorotanKhusus, 15Juni 1999, p. 69. 90See,for example, the proposal by LIPI to hold a seminar to compare the merits of the unitary versus the federal model for Indonesia; LIPI, "Seminar Internasional-Negara Kesatuan Versus Negara Federal: Mencari Bentuk Ideal Negara Indonesia Masa Depan," February 2000.

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kept but the state over time absorbs "some elements of a federal state system."91Although few states have approached federalism within the structure of a unitary state,92 it is likely that this separation of the "spirit"from the "form" of federalism could become the new field of debate, echoing Elazar's focus on the principles of federalism and Saunders' caution regarding making too much of structure. PROSPECTS FOR FEDERALISM IN INDONESIA Federalism fits with the enduring values and current plight of Indonesians. The essence of federalism, "the primacy of bargaining and negotiated coordination among several power centers,"93connects well with the Indonesian principle of "musyawarah mufakat"(consensus through deliberation). The covenant concept of federalism, concerned with ethical commitments and equitable material distribution between societal groups, resonates with the ideology of Pancasila. Yet, the pursuit of a federal system at this juncture could accentuate diversity and grievances, undermining a comprehensive shared sense of identification and belonging.94 Ethnic strife already poses a serious challenge to national unity. The transition to a federal system could exacerbate existing fractures, possibly precipitating secession and bloody conflict. Elazar's hopeful observations of the ability of federal systems to accommodate cultural cleavages might be too risky to test in Indonesia. It may well be that a strategy of new provincial and district creation, combined with sufficient autonomy for both, can also serve to recognize "local identities" and assuage aggrieved groups. A unitary state with an appropriate form of regional autonomy could be the less convulsive and safer route in the immediate future. The emerging exploration of "federalism within the unitary state" could lead to a "made in Indonesia" solution. Some Indonesian scholars wish to remedy the ineffectual regional representation at the center through the creation of a bicameral national legislature similar to the American system.95Another element of the solution could be tailored special autonomy deals with "separatist"provinces. The proposal for special autonomy submitted by Aceh government representatives (not necessarily approved by

9LIPI, "Resume and Recommendation of International Workshop on 'Unitary State versus Federal State: Searching for an Ideal Form for the Future of the Indonesian State'," Proceedings the International of 28-30 March 2000, p. 2. Workshop, 92SouthAfrica has skated close to a federal model within a unitary structure. Its new constitution is perhaps too young to be used as an example for others. Spain and Italy have had considerable regionalization, but continuing regional discontent over their constitutional arrangements persist. 93Daniel J. Elazar, "Federalism," InternationalEncyclopedia the Social Sciences(New York: Macmillan of Co. and The Free Press, 1968), 5:354. 94JamesMacPherson, "The Future of Federalism," Federalismand the New WorldOrder,ed. Stephen J. Randall and Roger Gibbins (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1994), p. 12. 95Thesescholars include the constitutional expert Harun Alrasid and political scientist Ramlan Surbakti; see Idris Kyrwan, KyrwanReport,15 June 2000.

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GAM, the separatist movement) approaches a loose confederation; only defense, foreign affairs, and monetary policy would be left to the center (along with a modest share of Aceh's revenues). West Papua separatists might find a similar compromise palatable. To the extent that the center cedes such forms of "autonomy,"other provinces might be emboldened to strike a better deal than that possible under the current regional autonomy laws that foresee only "restricted" autonomy for the provinces. A wider form of provincial autonomy for all provinces not involved in special deals (i.e., the "separatist" provinces) would likely ensue to stem chaotic and unstable asymmetrical autonomy. A national dialogue that examines the opportunities and dangers for autonomy and federal options would be salutary.96It is unlikely, however, that the government will encourage a broad dialogue. Autonomy will have to be won by the regions. While democracy in Indonesia is still taking root, restricted forms of regional autonomy will be preferred by the government. Regional autonomy in this context is a flexible vehicle to variably appease, disarm, and undercut the regions. It allows the basic features of the centralized patrimonial state to remain in place. Even as the president and minister for regional autonomy claim the political benefits of new laws and regulations for regional autonomy, central-level departments are undoubtedly readying themselves to diminish their effect.97 To the extent that the president maintains a large and politically diverse cabinet (to gain support from the many parties), he will feed centralism as the ministers or parties seek to gain control over policy and access to resources. The immediate victims of these central-level maneuvers will be the relatively weak districts or cities. The much-touted decentralization drive is likely to be frustrated or slowed in the short term. As democracy gathers strength, the unitary form of the state in this vast and populous archipelagic country will look increasingly out of step with the rest of the larger democracies. It seems inevitable that more fundamental and widely legitimized reforms than those offered to date will have to be fashioned to meet the challenge of national integrity. The new framework will need to better accommodate provincial interests and, at a minimum, be infused with elements or principles of a federal system.

96The historical record could be reappraised, and the myths about federalism could be dispelled. The contention that an established nation cannot restructure itself as a federation of states could be countered with the case of the incremental Belgium conversion to a federal state. Discussions being held in the United Kingdom, Sri Lanka, and Italy, all pertaining to the merits of a federal or quasi-federal state, indicate that the transformation is not deemed impossible by these nations. 97Requests from central departments and agencies for amendments or exceptions to government regulation 25/2000 on the distribution of functions are already trickling in to the minister for regional autonomy. Some departments are taking steps to fashion decentralization according to their own vision.