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About Me

cc tt tt rr rr ii ii nn nn ee ee ss ss About Me Christian

Atty. Christian "Kit" Villasis is a professor and BAR Reviewer on Remedial Law of several law Schools and Review Centers. Aside frombeing a litigation (civil and criminal) lawyer, Prof. Villasis has a diversified general law practice. He handles all aspects of corporate, commercial business and banking transactions, protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights, collection, admiralty and maritime practice, labor- management relations, election, administrative and local government cases, family cases, real estate transactions, land titles, deeds and conveyances, foreclosure of mortgages, taxation, regulatory compliance, etc.

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Thursday,August 30, 2012

They may not be ignored to suit the convenience of a party. Adjective law ensures the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice. Rules are not intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation. But they help provide for a vital system of justice where suitors may be heard following judicial procedure and in the correct forum. Public order and our system of justice are well served by a conscientious observance by the parties of the procedural rules (SAMAHAN

NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA HYATT (SAMASAH-NUWHRAIN), VS. HON. VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR BUENAVENTURA C. MAGSALIN AND HOTEL ENTERPRISES OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 172303, JUNE 6, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

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Monday,August 27, 2012

The Ombudsman is vested with the sole power to investigate and prosecute, motu proprio or upon the complaint of any person, any act or omission which appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient (Vergara v. Ombudsman, G.R.

No. 174567, March 12, 2009, 580 SCRA 693, 708.). It has the

Followers

Blog Archive

2012 (125)

ARE

THE

THE

SUS

INNOCENCE HIERARCHYOF EVIDENTIARY VALUES THETESTIMONYOFA HANDWRITING EXPERT, WHILE USEFU converted by Web2PDFConvert.com

discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given its attendant facts and circumstances, should be filed or not.

As explained in Esquivel v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 137237, September 17, 2002, 389: The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts. Settled is the rule that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise. Said exercise of powers is based upon his constitutional mandate and the courts will not interfere in its exercise. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman will grievously hamper the functions of the office and the courts, in much the same way that courts will be swamped if they had to review the exercise of discretion on the part of public prosecutors each time they decided to file an information or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.

(M.A. JIMENEZ ENTERPRISES, INC., VS. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN, JESUS P. CAMMAYO G.R. NO. 155307, JUNE 6, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

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Lis pendens, which literally means pending suit, refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment. Founded upon public policy and necessity, lis pendens is intended to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated, and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation. Its notice is an announcement to the whole world that a particular property is in litigation and serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property.

The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect: (1) to keep the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment to prevent the defeat of the final judgment by successive alienations; and (2) to bind a purchaser, bona fide or not, of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will promulgate subsequently. Once a notice of lis pendens has been duly registered, any subsequent transaction affecting the land involved would have to be subject to the

outcome of the litigation. (Vicente v. Avera, G.R. No. 169970,

Thus, the Supreme Court has held

January 20, 2009). x x x x

EX

D

OF

JUSTICEMARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: DOCTRINEOF IMMUTAB THEFACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE TRIALCOURT, converted by Web2PDFConvert.com

that one who buys land where there is a pending notice of lis pendens cannot invoke the right of a purchaser in good faith; neither can he have acquired better rights than those of his

predecessor in interest (TOP MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS CORPORATION VS. LUIS FAJARDO & THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAS PINAS CITY, G.R. NO. 150462, JUNE 15, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

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In Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R.

No. 132767, January 18, 2000, 322 SCRA 139.), petitioner landowner who was dissatisfied with the valuation made by LBP and DARAB, filed a petition for determination of just compensation in the RTC (SAC). However, the RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period for filing appeals from the orders of the DARAB. On appeal, the CA upheld the order of dismissal. When the case was elevated to the Supreme Court, it likewise affirmed the CA and declared that:

As we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals, this rule is an acknowledgment by the DARAB that the power to decide just compensation cases for the taking of lands under R.A. No. 6657 is vested in the courts. It is error to think that, because of Rule XIII, §11, the original and exclusive jurisdiction given to the courts to decide petitions for determination of just compensation has thereby been transformed into an appellate jurisdiction. It only means that, in accordance with settled principles

of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR as an administrative agency to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be

Agrarian Reform Program, but such determination is subject to challenge in the courts.

The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less “original and exclusive” because the question is first passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial proceedings are not a continuation of the administrative determination. For that matter, the law may provide that the decision of the DAR is final and unappealable. Nevertheless, resort to the courts cannot be foreclosed on the theory that courts are the guarantors of the legality of the administrative action (LAND BANK OF THE PHILS. VS. SEVERINO LISTANA, G.R. NO. 168105, JULY 27, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

AL. V s a p^ X mso-bidi-font-weight:bold'>DISTRIBUTION BUTTON MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES ET AL., G.R. NO. 155849,

paid for

the

lands

taken

under

the

Comprehensive

AFFIRMED

July (39)

June (10)

May (16)

2011 (89)

April (5) ► March (3) ► February (3) ► January (7) ► 2011 (89) converted by

AUGUST 31, 2011, BERSAMIN, J.).

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Sunday,August 26, 2012

A LAWYER MAY BE SUSPENDED OR DISBARRED FOR ANY MISCONDUCT SHOWING ANY FAULT OR DEFICIENCY IN HIS MORAL CHARACTER, HONESTY, PROBITY OR GOOD DEMEANOR (Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court). In Gonzales, the notary public who notarized the document despite the non- appearance of one of the signatories was meted the penalties of

revocation of his notarial commission and disqualification from re- appointment for two years. The notary in Gonzales was likewise

suspended from the practice of law for one year. x x x

found that by notarizing the questioned deed, the respondent in Gonzales engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. In the instant case, the Supreme Court held that respondent should similarly be meted the penalty of suspension and revocation of his notarial commission for having violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice (PACITA CAALIM-VERZONILLA VS. ATTY. VICTORIANO G. PASCUA, A.C. NO. 6655 , OCTOBER 11, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

The Court

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Friday,August 24, 2012

Section 31, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court then applicable provides: SEC. 31. Effect of redemption by judgment debtor, and a certificate to be delivered and recorded thereupon. To whom payments on redemption made.—If the judgment debtor redeem, he must make the same payments as are required to effect a redemption by a redemptioner, whereupon the effect of the sale is terminated and he is restored to his estate, and the person to whom the payment is made must execute and deliver to him a certificate of redemption acknowledged or approved before a notary public or other officer authorized to take acknowledgments of conveyances of real property. Such certificate must be filed and recorded in the

of conveyances of real property. Such certificate must be filed and recorded in the converted by

office of the registrar of deeds of the province in which the property is situated, and the registrar of deeds must note the record thereof on the margin of the record of the certificate of sale. The payments mentioned in this and the last preceding sections may be made to the purchaser or redemptioner, or for him to the officer who made the sale” (Emphasis supplied). (SPS. FRANCISCO D. YAP & WHELMA S. YAP VS. SPS. ZOSIMO DY, JR. & NATIVIDAD CHIU DY, G.R. NO. 171868, JULY 27, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

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Tuesday,August 21, 2012

In Florendo v. Paramount Insurance Corp., G.R. No. 167976, January 20, 2010, 610 SCRA 377, 384-385, citing Flexo Manufacturing Corporation v. Columbus Foods, Inc., 495 Phil. 254, 260 (2005) and Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay v. National Power Corp., G.R. No. 141447, May 4, 2006, 489 SCRA 401, 417. The Supreme Court held:

x x x “Good reasons,” it has been held, consist of compelling circumstances that justify immediate execution lest the judgment becomes illusory. The circumstances must be superior, outweighing the injury or damages that might result should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment. Lesser reasons would make of execution pending appeal, instead of an instrument of solicitude and justice, a tool of oppression and inequity.

“Good reason” as required by Section 2, Rule 39 of t h e Rules of Court does not necessarily mean unassailable and flawless basis but at the very least, it must be on solid footing. Dire financial conditions of the plaintiffs supported by mere self-serving statements as “good reason” for the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal does not stand on solid footing. It does not even stand on its own (NATIONAL POWER

CORPORATION VS. JUDGWE SANTOS ADIONG, JULY 27, 2011 VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

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MARTIN VILlARAMA, JR.: EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL IS NOT APPLICABLE IN A LAND REGISTRATION converted by Web2PDFConvert.com

PROCEEDING

EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL IS NOT APPLICABLE IN A LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDING. It is fraught with dangerous consequences. Innocent purchasers may be misled into purchasing real properties upon reliance on a judgment which may be reversed on appeal (TOP MANAGEMENT

PROGRAMS CORPORATION VS. LUIS FAJARDO & THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAS PINAS CITY, G.R. NO. 150462, JUNE 15, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

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Monday,August 20, 2012

An action is deemed an attack on a title when its objective is to nullify the title, thereby challenging the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct when the objective is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof (Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152627, September 16, 2005, 470 SCRA 99, 107-108 cited in ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF SAN FERNANDO PAMPANGA VS. FERNANDO SORIANO JR., ET AL., G.R. NO. 153829, AUGUST 17, 2011,VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

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To begin with, petitioner availed of the wrong remedy in filing a petition for review under Rule 45. Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution provides that decisions, orders or rulings of the Commission on Audit may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party (Reyes v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 125129, March 29, 1999, 305 SCRA 512, 516 cited in CANDELARIO L. VERZOSA, JR. VS. GUILERMO N. CARAGUE, G.R. NO. 157838, MARCH 8, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

VERZOSA, JR. VS. GUILERMO N. CARAGUE, G.R. NO. 157838, MARCH 8, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.). converted
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This is because a certiorari writ is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The appropriate course of action of the movant in such event is to file an answer and interpose as affirmative defenses the objections raised in the motion to dismiss. If, later, the decision of the trial judge is adverse, the movant may then elevate on appeal the same issues raised in the motion.

(Urethane Trading Specialist, Inc. v. Ong, G.R. No. 164632,

October 29, 2008, 570 SCRA 188, 191-192.)

The only exception to this rule is when the trial court gravely abused its discretion in denying the motion. ( See Nicolas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 175930-31 & 176010-11, February 11, 2008, 544 SCRA 324, 336 and Choa v. Choa, 441 Phil. 175, 182-183 (2002). This exception is, nevertheless, applied sparingly, and only in instances when there is a clear showing that the trial court exercised its judicial power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. ( Balo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129704, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 227, 234.)

Further, the abuse of the court's discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by, or to act at all in contemplation of, law. (ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF SAN FERNANDO PAMPANGA VS. FERNANDO SORIANO JR., ET AL., G.R. NO. 153829, AUGUST 17, 2011 , VILLARAMA, JR., J.:)

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Friday,August 10, 2012

Under the general rule in Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, when the terms of an agreement were reduced in writing, as in this case, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can be admitted other than the contents thereof. Rudlin argues that under Section 9, Rule 130, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the

9, Rule 130 , a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the

written agreement if it is put in issue in the pleading, "[t]he failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and the agreement of the parties thereto." Assuming as true Rudlin’s claim that Exhibit "7" failed to accurately reflect an intent of the parties to fix the total contract price at P6,006,965.00, Rudlin failed to avail of its right to seek the reformation of the instrument to the end that such true intention may be expressed.

Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid contract. (Lapulapu Foundation,

Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 466 Phil. 53, 62 (2004), citing MC Engineering, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104047, April 3, 2002, 380 SCRA 116, 137).

“SEC.

9. Evidence

of

written

agreements. — When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:

(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement; (b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto; (c) The validity of the written agreement; or (d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors-in-interest after the execution of the written agreement. The term "agreement" includes wills” (emphasis supplied).

Rudlin cannot invoke the exception under (a) or (b) of the

written contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms that the

contractual intention of the parties cannot be understood from

a mere reading of the instrument. In such a case, extrinsic

evidence of the subject matter of the contract, of the relations of the parties to each other, and of the facts and circumstances surrounding them when they entered into the contract may be received to enable the court to make a proper interpretation of the instrument." (Seaoil Petroleum

Corporation v. Autocorp Group, G.R. No. 164326, October 17, 2008, 569 SCRA 387, 396-397, citing Ortañez v. CA, 334 Phil. 514, 519-520 (1997) & Heirs of Amparo del Rosario v. Aurora Santos, et al., 194 Phil. 670, 687 (1981).

Under the fourth exception, however, Rudlin’s evidence

is

admissible to show the existence of such other terms agreed

to

by the parties after the execution of the contract. But apart

from the Bar Chart and Cash Flow Chart prepared by FBC, and the testimony of Rodolfo J. Lagera, no competent evidence was adduced by Rudlin to prove that the amount of P6,006,965.00

above

provision. Such exception obtains

only where

"the

of P6,006,965.00 above provision. Such exception obtains only where "the converted by Web2PDFConvert.com

stated therein as contract price was the actual decreased amount that FBC and Rudlin found mutually acceptable. As to the affidavits executed by Architect Quezon and his associate Roberto R. Antonio, the same do not serve as competent proof of the purported actual contract price as they did not testify thereon. Significantly, the June 5, 1986 Letter-Agreement did not at all mention the total contract price. Likewise, there is nothing in the various letters sent by Rudlin to FBC while construction was in progress and even subsequent to the execution of the said Letter-Agreement indicating that Rudlin corrected the contract price of P6,933,268.00 which FBC had repeatedly mentioned in its letters and documents (FINANCIAL

BUILDING CORPORATION VS. CORPORATION, BLOOMFIELD EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION, INC., RODOLFO J. LAGERA, MA. ERLINDA J. LAGERA AND JOSAPHAT R. BRAVANTE, RUDLIN INTERNATIONAL, G.R. NO. 164186, OCTOBER 4, 2010, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

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The question of whether a tenancy relationship exists is basically a question of fact which, as a general rule, is beyond the scope of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

The question of whether there was an implied tenancy and sharing are basically questions of fact and the findings of the Court of Appeals and the Boards a quo are, generally, entitled to respect and nondisturbance, as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Such findings of fact may be reviewed by the Court when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures, or if the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based. (ESTATE OF PASTOR M.

SAMSON VS. MERCEDES R. SUSANO & NORBERTO R. SUSANO, G.R. NO. 179024, MAY 30, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

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BE DONE THROUGH A PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 OF THE RULES OF

It is aphoristic that a re-examination of factual findings cannot be done through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court because this Court is not a trier of facts; it reviews only questions of law. The Supreme Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in the proceedings below. (Id. at 460-461.)

Now, superior courts are not triers of facts. When the findings of fact of the Ombudsman are supported by substantial evidence, it should be considered as conclusive.( Olivarez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 118533, October 4, 1995, 248 SCRA 700, 715). This Court recognizes the expertise and independence of the Ombudsman and will avoid interfering with its findings absent a finding of grave abuse of discretion.( See Jao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 104604 & 111223, October 6, 1995, 249 SCRA 35, 42 and Yabut v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 111304, June 17, 1994, 233 SCRA 310, 314.) Hence, being supported by substantial evidence, we find no reason to disturb the factual findings of the Ombudsman which are affirmed by the CA.

The general rule is that factual findings of the CA are not reviewable by this Court, we find that Olaivar’s case falls in one of the recognized exceptions laid down in jurisprudence since the CA’s findings regarding his liability are premised on the supposed absence of evidence but contradicted by the evidence on record.( See Hyatt Elevators and Escalators Corporation v. Cathedral Heights Building Complex Association, Inc., G.R. No. 173881, December 1, 2010, 636 SCRA 401, 405-

406.) (Gemma P. Cabalit vs. Commission on Audit-Region VII, G.R. No. 180236, Filadelfo S. Apit vs. Commission on Audit (COA) Legal and Adjudication, Region VII, G.R. No. 180341; LEONARDO G. OLAIVAR VS. HON. PRIMO C. MIRO ET AL., G.R. NO. 180342, JANUARY 17, 2012, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

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As a general rule, in petitions for review, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing questions of law which involves no examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts; it is not its function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again. (Heirs of Marcelino Cabal v. Cabal, G.R. No. 153625, July 31, 2006, 497 SCRA 301, 312, citing Hanopol v. Shoemart, Incorporated, G.R. Nos. 137774 & 148185, October 4, 2002, 390 SCRA 439, 447; St. Michael’s Institute v. Santos, G.R. No. 145280, December 4, 2001, 371 SCRA 383, 396; Go v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 158922, May 28, 2004, 430 SCRA 358, 364.) x x x x Accordingly, findings of fact of the appellate court affirming those of the trial court are generally conclusive on this Court.

Nonetheless, jurisprudence has recognized certain

generally conclusive on this Court. Nonetheless, jurisprudence has recognized certain converted by Web2PDFConvert.com

exceptions to the general rule that findings of the fact by the Court of Appeals are not reviewable by the Supreme Court. One such exception is when such findings are not sustained by the evidence. Sarmiento v. Yu, G.R. No. 141431, August 3, 2006, 497 SCRA 513, 517.

Another is when the judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension of facts or overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. (Estate of Edward Miller Grimm

v. Estate of Charles Parsons and Patrick C. Parsons, G.R. No.

citing

159810,

October

9,

2006,

504

SCRA

67,

75-76,

Sampayan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156360, January 14, 2005, 448 SCRA 220, 229.) (HEIRS OF MARGARITO PABAUS VS. HEIRS OF AMANDA YUTIAMCO, G.R. NO. 164356, JULY 27, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

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Wednesday,August 8, 2012

The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process, but merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the rules, failing in which the right to

appeal is lost. (Producers Bank of the Philippines v. Court of

Appeals, G.R. No. 126620, April 17, 2002, 381 SCRA 185, 197.)

(HEIRS OF AGAPATIO T. OLARTE AND ANGELA A. OLARTE ET AL. VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES ET AL., G.R. NO. 177995, JUNE 15, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

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The Supreme Court has held that mere reiteration of issues already passed upon by the court does not automatically make a motion for reconsideration pro forma. What is essential is compliance with the requisites of the Rules.

Indeed, in the cases where a motion for reconsideration was held to be pro forma, the motion was so held because (1) it was a second motion for reconsideration, or (2) it did not comply with the rule that the motion must specify the findings and conclusions

it did not comply with the rule that the motion must specify the findings and conclusions

alleged to be contrary to law or not supported by the evidence, or (3) it failed to substantiate the alleged errors, or (4) it merely alleged that the decision in question was contrary to law, or (5) the adverse party was not given notice thereof. (FERNANDO V. GONZALES VS. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 192856, MARCH 8, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

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It is a fundamental legal principle that adecision that has acquired inalitybecomesimmutableandunalterable,andmaynolongerbemodi iedin anyrespect,evenifthemodi icationismeanttocorrecterroneousconclusions offactandlaw,andwhetheritbemadebythecourtthatrendereditorbythe highestcourtoftheland. Theonlyexceptionstothegeneralruleon inalityof judgmentsaretheso-callednuncpro tuncentrieswhichcausenoprejudiceto any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the inality of the decision which render its execution unjust and inequitable

(Sacdalanv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.128967,May20,2004,428SCRA586,

599.xxxIndeed,litigationmustendandterminatesometimeandsomewhere,

even at the risk of occasional errors(Gallardo-Corro v. Gallardo, G.R. No. 136228, January 30, 2001 cited inLAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V.

SEVERINOLISTANA,G.R.NO.168105,JULY27,2011,VILLARAMA,JR.,J.).

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Saturday, July 28, 2012

Lis pendens, which literally means pending suit, refers to the jurisdiction,powerorcontrolwhichacourtacquiresoverpropertyinvolvedin asuit,pendingthecontinuanceoftheaction,anduntil inaljudgment. Founded uponpublicpolicyandnecessity,lispendensisintendedtokeeptheproperties inlitigationwithinthepowerofthecourtuntilthelitigationisterminated,and topreventthedefeatofthejudgmentordecreebysubsequentalienation. Its noticeisanannouncementtothewholeworldthataparticularpropertyisin litigationandservesasawarningthatonewhoacquiresaninterestoversaid propertydoessoathisownriskorthathegamblesontheresultofthelitigation oversaidproperty.(Associated Bankv.Pronstroller,G.R.No.148444,July 14, 2008,558SCRA113,133,citingRomero v.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.142406,

May16,2005,458SCRA483,492.)

The ilingofanoticeoflis pendenshas atwo-foldeffect:(1)tokeep thesubjectmatterofthelitigationwithinthepowerofthecourtuntiltheentry ofthe inaljudgmenttopreventthedefeatofthe inaljudgmentbysuccessive alienations;and(2)tobindapurchaser,bona ideornot,ofthelandsubjectof the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will promulgate

subsequently.Id.,citingRomerov.CourtofAppeals,id.at492-493andHeirsof

Eugenio Lopez, Sr. v. Enriquez,G.R.No.146262,January 21,2005,449SCRA

Heirsof Eugenio Lopez, Sr. v. Enriquez, G.R.No.146262,January 21,2005,449SCRA converted by Web2PDFConvert.com

173,186.

Once a notice oflis pendens has been duly registered, any subsequent transaction affecting the land involved would have to be

subjecttotheoutcomeofthelitigation.(Vicentev.Avera,G.R.No.169970,

January20,2009,576SCRA634,643.)

PetitionerbeingameretransfereeatthetimethedecisionoftheRTCof Pasig in Civil Case No. 35305 had become inal and executory on December 6, 1988,it isboundbythesaidjudgmentwhichorderedtheheirsofEmilioGregorio to convey Lots 1, 2, 3 & 4, Psu-204875 in favor of private respondent and Trinidad.

“Itistobenotedthatthenotationofthelispendensonthebackofthe owner’s duplicate is not mentioned for the purpose of constituting a constructive notice because usually such owner’s duplicate certi icate is presentedforthepurposeoftheannotationlater,andsometimesnotatalluntil [itis]orderedbythecourt.”(A.H.NoblejasandE.H.Noblejas,REGISTRATION

OFLANDTITLESANDDEEDS,2007Ed.,pp.436-437.)

Strictlyspeaking,thelispendensannotationisnottobereferredto“asa partof thedoctrineof notice;thepurchaserpendente liteisaffected,notby notice,butbecausethelaw doesnotallow litigatingpartiestogivetoothers, pendingthelitigation,rightstotheproperty indisputesoastoprejudicethe oppositeparty. Thedoctrinerestsuponpublicpolicy,notnotice.”(Id.at437, citing 2 Bouvier’s Law Dictionary and Concise Encyclopedia, p. 2033, SCRA Annotation on Civil Law, the Public Land Act and the Property Registration

Decree,1983Ed.,pp.118-119quotedinTiradov.Sevilla,G.R.No.84201,August

3,1990,188SCRA321,326-327.)

Thuswehaveheldthatonewhobuyslandwherethereisapending notice oflis pendens cannot invoke the right of a purchaser in good faith; neither can he have acquired better rights than those of his predecessor in

interest.(Yuv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.109078,December25,1995,251SCRA

509, 513-514, citingConstantino v. Espiritu,No. L-23268, June 30, 1972, 45 SCRA557,563andTanchoco v.Aquino,No.L-30670,September15,1987,154

SCRA1,15;seePhilippineNationalBankv.CourtofAppeals,No.L-34404,June

25,1980,98SCRA207,232.)(TOPMANAGEMENTPROGRAMSCORPORATION

VS.LUISFAJARDO&THEREGISTEROFDEEDSOFLASPINASCITY,G.R.NO.

150462,JUNE15,2011,VILLARAMA,JR.,J.).

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It is simply a condition affecting the form of the pleading, and non- compliancetherewithdoesnotnecessarilyrenderthepleadingfatallydefective. Veri icationissimplyintendedtosecureanassurancethattheallegationsinthe pleadingaretrueandcorrectandnottheproductoftheimaginationoramatterof speculation,andthatthepleadingis iledingoodfaith.Thecourtmayorder the correctionofthepleadingifveri icationislackingoractonthepleadingalthough it isnot veri ied,ifthe attending circumstancesare such that strict compliance

it isnot veri ied,ifthe attending circumstancesare such that strict compliance converted by Web2PDFConvert.com

with the rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served(MEDISERV, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL. G.R. NO.

161368,APRIL5,2010,FIRSTDIVISION,VILLARAMA,JR.,J.).

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