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required all ceasefire groups become border guard forces for the Myanmar military. Pressing matters like autonomy and political reconciliation for the Kachin and other ceasefire groups were off the table. Predictable, nearly all of the armed groups refused to amalgamate into the Myanmar military. The KIO forged new military alliances with the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA). On Nov. 4, 2010, twelve-ethnic armed groups formed the Committee for Establishing Federal Union (CEFU), the name was later changed to the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC). The UNFC, which KIO Lt.Gen Gouri Zau Seng was originally the deputy chair, rejected the flawed 2008 constitution and advocated a return to federalism promised under Aung Sans cabinet. The group formed a consensus that they would only negotiate with the government as whole, and to support each other territories from attacks by the Myanmar military. This consensus was short-lived. Soon after, most of the ethnic armed groups - with the exception the KIO - signed ceasefires with the government. On June, 9, 2011, the 17-year ceasefire between the KIO and the central government unraveled after the Myanmar Battalion 437 and 438 attacked a strategic KIA post at about 3 pm on June 9, 2011. The fighting happened close to Taping No. 1 and Taping No.2 hydro-power plants on the Taping River. An estimated 90% of the electricity generated by the hydro-power plants that was owned by the Chinese Datang Corporation would go to Yunnan based companies. Kachin state is rich in natural resources. Resources both the government and the KIO want to control. Under the previous ceasefire agreement the KIO were allowed to sell some of them. But the profits werent significant enough to address the rampant poverty afflicting the majority of the ethnic population. Furthermore, negotiations have been hindered by the fact that the central government has not given the Kachin any reason to believe he is sincere in its overtures for wanting peace (i.e. continues offensives against KIA). The government peace team meets with KIO leaders while at the same time the military attacks KIAs positions. The military has also been accused by rights groups of attacking villages and employing rape as a weapon of war. Since the 17-year ceasefire crumbled, the KIO and government peace team have officially met around six-times in Laja Yang, Maija Yang in Kachin State, and Ruili in Chinas Yunnan Province, and around three-times on the Thai/Myanmar border. But after all these meetings, neither party has able to see eye to eye. The government peace team wants to implement a new ceasefire before they are willing to discuss withdrawing their troops. But the KIO wants the government to withdraw from the frontline and their controlled territories before negotiations can move forward. KIO leaders say the conflict can be resolved through political means rather than a new ceasefire.
Meanwhile, the government continues to send reinforcements troops to the front line resulting in daily clashes between the KIA and government troops, with many civilian casualties. According to a report by Human Rights Watch, Burmas armed forces have committed serious abuses against ethnic Kachin. Burmese armed forces have been responsible for killings and attacks on civilians, using forced labor, and pillaging villages. The government, have accused the KIO, in their state-run media, of perpetuating acts of terrorism and violence against civilians, roads, bridges, railways and other nationally owned power holdings. For the peace negotiations, the government created three-stages for solving the ethnic armed struggle in the country. The first stage involves implementing state level peace negotiations; leading to a ceasefire. The second is union level peace negotiations. And the third stage takes place in an inclusive parliamentary meeting. But the KIO believe the governments peace negotiation plan will not end the conflict until political inequality between the two parties is resolved. Another roadblock for facilitating negotiations to end fighting between the KIO and central government is a disagreement over the location of meetings. The peace team prefers to meet inside Myanmar. For security reasons, the KIO want to meet outside of the country, near the Sino-Myanmar border. Another significant factor that has contributed to the negotiations failing is that the current government peace team, led by Minister U Aung Thaung doesnt have any real binding political power. Originally there were two peace teams, both of which were endorsed by President Thein Sein. One team led by U Aung Thaung and the other by Railway Minister U Aung Min. But on May 3, the peace team was changed, making President Thein Sein the chairperson and the vice-president became the chairman of the implementing committee. Ministers, U Aung Min, U Thein Zaw and Deputy Chief of Commander-in-Chief of Army Gen. Soe Win became part of the implementing committee now called the Peace Working Committee. According to the Myanmar Times talks between the KIA and the Tatmadaw wont take place. This is not a problem between the armies. It is just because of the governments policy; it does not want to solve the ethnic problems through political means and the government keeps neglecting the real meaning of union, said KIO spokesperson U La Nan in a recent email sent to the English language newspaper, on Oct. 17 Why has the government's peace team failed to make progress in negotiation with the KIO when they have successfully signed ceasefires with most of the other ethnic armed groups? For starters, the peace team hasnt invested much to improve relations between the government and the KIO. How can the KIO take the central government seriously when the military attack 3
their soldiers during meetings? Furthermore, is the government offering the KIO something any different than during the previous ceasefire? Last year President Thein Sein ordered the military to stop all their offensives against the KIA, but the fighting has continued. He blames the KIO, accusing them of failing to order their soldiers to stop attacking government troupes. The KIO respond that the clashes are ongoing because the Myanmar army keeps sending reinforcements to the front line leading to ongoing offences against the KIA and even civilians. Other armed groups, such as the Shan State Army (SSA-south), who have already signed ceasefires, were attacked by government troops only days after the signing took place. The government blamed this on the ambiguous demarcation of controlled territories. There are significant obstacles that block the road to peace. But if both sides dont take measures, which lead towards developing mutual trust amongst each other, then peace talks will be just talk. China, for the most part has been a silent contender in the ongoing conflict; content to quietly sit in the background while playing both sides. The recent forcible deportation of Kachin refugees back into the conflict zone may have been intended to put pressure on the KIO. If the Myanmar government wants to work for peace in the country they must be genuine in implementing real development for ethnic people, and not just for their own business interests. If the KIO is serious about serving the desires of its people they need to be willing to work towards solutions that lead towards lasting peace, which will give the region the opportunity to develop. Both the Myanmar government and KIO need to work towards building mutual trust amongst each other. They need to stop the accusations and blaming, and adopt a new way of thinking that will forge solutions to end the conflict. If both parties can reconcile their past grievances and build the necessary trust to move forward, only then can they navigate the bumpy road towards peace that lies ahead.
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References: 1. www.nmg-news.com 2. www.rfa.org/burmese/ 3. www.mizzima.com 4. www.burmaethnicstudies.net 5. http://burmese.voanews.com 6. Human Rights Watch 7. www.kachinnews.com 8. www.bbc.co.uk/burmese 9. www.news-eleven.com 10. www.thevoicemyanmar.com (interviewed with Gen. Gum Maw on Oct 1st, 2012)