Basic Guidelines in the Construction and Interpretation of Laws Legislative Intent a.

The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain the meaning and intention of the legislature. b. This meaning and intention must be sought first of all in the language of the statute itself. For it must be presumed that the means employed by the legislature to express its will are adequate to the purpose and do express that will correctly. c. Verba Legis If the language of the statute is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning, that meaning is conclusively presumed to be the meaning which the legislature intended to convey. d. Statute as a whole Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole and not merely of a particular provision. e. Spirit and Purpose of the Law When the interpretation of a statute according to the exact and literal import of its words would lead to absurd or mischievous consequences, or would thwart or contracvene the manifest purpose of the legislature in its enactment, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding or modifying, so far as may e necessary, the strict letter of the law. f. Implications Implication and intendments arising from the language of a statute are as much a part of it as if they had been expressed. But it is only the necessary implications which may thus be read into the statute. g. Casus Omissus When a statute makes specific provision in regard to several enumerated cases or objects, but omits to make any provision for a case or object which is analogous to those enumerated, or which stands upon the same reason, and is therefore within the general scope of the statute, and it appears that such case or object was omitted by inadvertence or because it was overlooked or unforeseen; such omissions or defects cannot be supplied by the courts. h. Stare Decisis A point of law already established will, generally, be followed by the same determining court and by all courts of lower rank in subsequent cases where the same legal issue is raised.

Construction and Interpretation of Words and Phrases a. When the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish (Ubi lex non distinguiti nec nos distinguere debemo) A general term or phrase should not be reduced into parts and one part distinguished from the other so as to justify its exclusion from the operation of the law. b. General terms may be restricted by specific words, with the result that the general language will be limited by specific language which indicates the statutes object and purpose. The rule is applicable only to cases wherein, except for one general term, all the items in an enumeration belong to or fall under one specific class. c. Ejusdem Generis Broad and comprehensive expressions in an act, such as and all others, or any others, are usually to be restricted to persons or things of the same kind or class with those specifically named in the preceding words (resorted to when legislative intent is uncertain). d. Express Mention and Implied Inclusion (Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius) The express mention of one person, thing, or consequence, is tantamount to an express exclusion of others. e. Associated Words (Noscitur A Sociis) When a word used in a statute is ambiguous or vague, its meaning may be made clear and specific by considering the company in which it is found and the meaning of the terms which are associated with it. f. Negative words and phrases regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are mere directory. g. Use of word may in the statute generally connotes a permissible thing, while the word shall is imperative. h. The word must in a statute, like shall, is not always imperative and may be consistent with an exercise of discretion. i. And means conjunction connecting words or phrases expressing the idea that the latter is to be added to or taken along with the first. j. Or is a disjunctive particle used to express as alternative or to give a choice of one among two or more things.

k. Computation of time A week means a period of seven consecutive days without regard to the day of the week on which it begins. l. Proviso is a clause or a part of a clause in the statute, the office of which is either to except something from the enacting clause, or to qualify or restrain its generality, or to exclude some possible ground of misinterpretation of its extent. Presumptions in aid of Construction and Interpretation a. In construing a doubtful or ambiguous statute, the Courts will presume that it was the intention of the legislature to enact a valid, sensible, and just law, and one which should change the prior law no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the act in question. b. Presumption against unconstitutionality conflict with the constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt; the burden of proving the invalidity of a law rests on those challenging it. c. Presumption against injustice Presume the good motives of the legislature; to render justice. d. Presumption against implied repeals Repeals of law by implication is not favored and that courts must generally assume their congruent application; the later statute must be so irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant with the existing law that they cannot be made to reconcile and stand together. e. Presumption against ineffectiveness f. Presumption against absurdity g. Presumption against violation of International Law Intrinsic aids in Construction and Interpretation a. The title of a law is a valuable intrinsic aid in determining legislative intent. b. Subtitle c. Preamble Extrinsic aids in Construction and Interpretation a. Extrinsic aids are therefore resorted to after exhausting all the available intrinsic aids and still there remains some ambiguity in the statute.

b. History of enactment, the reasons for the passage of the bill, and purposes to be accomplished by the measure. c. Opinions and rulings of officials of the government called upon to execute or implement administrative laws command much respect and weight. d. Contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by executive officers charged with implementing and enforcing the provisions of the statutes should be given controlling weight, unless such interpretation is clearly erroneous; actual proceedings to determine the construction of a statute of doubtful meaning. Strict and Liberal Construction and Interpretation of Statutes a. Penal Statutes Strictly against the state and in favor of the accused. b. Tax Statutes Strictly against the government and liberally in favor of the taxpayer. a. Exceptions Strictissimi Juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. c. Naturalization laws - rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. d. Insurance Law Contracts of Insurance are to be construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer.