Taada vs.

Tuvera FACTS: Due process was invoked by the Petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise provided as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. ISSUE: Whether or not the clause otherwise provided in Article 2 of Civil Code pertains to the necessity of publication. HELD: No, the clause otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication per se, which cannot in any event be omitted. Publication in full should be indispensable. Without such notice or publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignorantia Legis nonexcusat. The court, therefore, declares that presidential issuances of general application which have not been published shall have no force and effect, and the court ordered that the unpublished decrees be published in the Official Gazette immediately

People vs. Que Po Lay FACTS: The appellant was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of US dollars, US checks and US money orders amounting to about $7000 but failed to sell the same to the Central Bank as required under Circular No. 20.Circular No. 20 was issued in the year 1949 but was published in the Official Gazette only on Nov. 1951 after the act or omission imputed to Que Po Lay.Que Po Lay appealed from the decision of the lower court finding him guilty of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with Sec 34 of RA 265sentencing him to suffer 6 months imprisonment, pay fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. ISSUE: Whether or not publication of Circular 20 in the Official Gazette is needed for it to become effective and subject violators to corresponding penalties. HELD: It was held by the Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, that as a rule, circular and regulations of the Central Bank in question prescribing a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective. This is based on the theory that before the public is bound by its contents especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published for the people to be officially and specifically informed of such contents including its penalties. Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the decision appealed from and acquit the appellant, with costs de oficio.

Yaokasin vs. Commissioner of Customs FACTS: On May 27, 1988, the Philippine Coast Guard seized 9000 bags/ sacks of refined sugar, which were being unloaded from the M/V Tacloban, and turned them over to the custody of the Bureau of Customs. On June 7, 1988 the District Collector of Customs ordered the release of the seized sugar to the petitioner Yaokasin. On July 15, 1988, the Collector of Customs reversed his order to release the seized sugar since it is still subject for review by the Commissioner of Customs since it is adverse to the government citing the Customs Memorandum Order No. 20-87. This CMO implements Sec 12 of the Integrated Reorganization Plan, which is under P.D. No. 1, dated September 24, 1972. This section 12 states that a decision of a Collector of Customs in seizure and protest cases adverse to the government is subject to review by the Commissioner of Customs or the Secretary of Finance. When no decision is rendered after 30 days by either commisioner or secretary, the decision of the Collector of Customs shall become final and executory. The petitioner objected the applicability of the Sec. 12 of the reorganization plan and the CMO No. 20-87 on the ground that they had not been published in the Official Gazette. ISSUE: Whether or not the enforcement of the Sec. 12 of the Integrated Reorganization Plan and thereafter CMO No. 20-87 valid when these laws have not been published in the Official Gazette? HELD: Yes, CMO and Sec 12 of the Integrated Reorganization Plan is enforceable. The requirement of Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not apply to CMO No. 20-87 since it is only an administrative order of the Commissioner of Customs to his subordinates, namely the customs collectors. Also in the Commonwealth Act No. 638, which enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, states that administrative orders and proclamations shall be published except when these have no general applicability. CMO No. 2087 requiring collectors of customs to comply strictly with Section 12 of the Plan, is an issuance which is addressed only to particular persons or a class of persons, hence no general applicability therefore need not be published in the Official Gazette.

Bagatsing vs. Ramirez FACTS: The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7522, An Ordinance Regulating the Operation of Public Markets and Prescribing Fees for the Rentals of Stalls and Providing Penalties for Violation thereof and for other Purposes.Respondent were seeking the declaration of nullity of the Ordinance for the reason that a) the publication requirement under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila has not been complied with, b) the Market Committee was not given any participation in the enactment, c) Sec. 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act has been violated, and d) the ordinance would violate P.D. 7 prescribing the collection of fees and charges on livestock and animal products. ISSUE: Whether or not the Revised City Charter or the Local Tax Code shall govern the publication of tax ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila. HELD: The fact that one is a special law and the other a general law creates the presumption that the special law is to be considered an exception to the general. The Revised Charter of Manila speaks of ordinance in general whereas the Local Tax Code relates to ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges in particular. In regard therefore, the Local Tax Code controls.

National Marketing Corp. vs. Tecson FACTS: On 14 November 1955, defendants were ordered by the Court of First Instance of Manila to pay PRATRA, the sum of P7,200 plus 7% interest until the amount was fully paid until May 25, 1960. On 21 December 1965, Plaintiff filed a complaint against the same defendants for the revival of the judgment rendered in the initial case. Defendants moved to dismiss the said complaint, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof and prescription of action. The complaint was dismissed as having prescribed. ISSUE: Whether or not the date on which ten years from December 21, 1955 expired was considered to be December 21, 1965. HELD: NO, "When the laws speak of years ... it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each" according to Art. 13 of our Civil Code. 1960 and1964 being leap years, the month of February in both had 29 days, so that ten (10)years of 365 days each, or an aggregate of 3,650 days, from December 21, 1955,expired on December 19, 1965.

People vs. Sumilang FACTS: The petitioner was convicted of the crime of arson and sentenced to the indeterminate penalty from 5 years and 4 months and 21 days of prision correctional to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor. On appeal, both the CA and the SC affirmed the sentence of the lower court. Based on the records, a copy of the resolution of the Court denying the motion for reconsideration was mailed to the petitioners attorney. However, the attorney alleges in his petition that he did not receive the notice because then he was already hiding in the mountains of Laguna as a guerilla officer of the Markings guerilla. The attorney prays that the reading of the sentence be suspended and that petitioner be allowed to file whatever pleading that may be allowed by this Honorable Tribunal necessary for the protection of the rights of the petitioner. ISSUE: W/N the petition to suspend reading of sentence and to file pleading or motion should be granted. HELD: No, It is a well established rule of statutory construction that statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.

Salcedo vs. Carpio FACTS: Petitioners were appointed members of the Board of Dental Examiners. RA546 was approved and Sec. 1 thereof amended Sec. 10 of the Reorganization Act No. 4007. By virtue of this law, a Board of Dental Examiners was appointed by the President, whose terms directly overlapped and conflicted with that of the petitioners. ISSUE: Whether or not it was the intention of Congress, in enacting RA 546, to abolish all the pre-existing Boards of Examiners existing after the time of the enactment thereof. HELD: Appointment of the respondents is valid. It is obvious that it is the intention of Congress to do so, because the provisions of said Act are inconsistent with those of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Act No. 4007.In the case of Camacho vs. Court of Industrial Relations it was held that it is a well established rule recognized by all authorities without exception, that a retrospective or retroactive law is that which creates a new obligation, imposes anew duty or attaches a new disability in respect to a transaction already past; but that status is not made retrospective because it draws on antecedent facts for its operation, or in other words part of the requirements for its action and application is drawn from a time antedating its passage.

People vs. Tiu San FACTS: Petitioner, Tiu San alias Angel Gomez was denied certificate of naturalization on June 3, 1953 by the court due to his conviction on April 25, 1952 for a violation of a municipal ordinance of Lucena, Quezon that occurred during the intervening two years from promulgation of the decision for naturalization dated July 13, 1950 pursuant to R.A. No. 530. The petitioner alleged that, with reference to R.A. No. 530 Sec. 1 clause (3), this provision is not applicable to the case at bar since the violation of the aforementioned ordinance occurred prior to the enactment of the said R.A. No. 530. ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. 530 should be given retrospective effect? HELD: Yes, By virtue of Sec 4 of R.A. No. 530, except with reference to the date of the hearing of the petition for naturalization, the said Act was meant to have a retrospective operation. This section of the Act provides: This Act shall take effect upon its approval, and shall apply to cases pending in court and to those where the applicant has not yet taken the oath of citizenship...

Buyco vs. PNB FACTS: The petitioner was indebted to respondent which was secured by a mortgage of real property. Petitioner is a holder of Backpay Acknowledgment Certificate that is more than sufficient to cover the loan which he offered as payment for the deficit on April 24, 1956.Respondent denied the offered payment due to its amended Charter which provides that "...the authority herein granted shall not be used as regards backpay certificates", enacted on June 16, 1956 as RA 1576.Petitioner filed this case praying that the respondent be compelled to accept his Backpay Acknowledgment Certificate as payment of his obligation. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 1576 can be applied retroactively? HELD: No, "Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided" (Art. 4, New Civil Code).This has bearing on the case at bar inasmuch as the herein mentioned Act does not contain any provision regarding its retroactivity. Therefore, the present case should be governed by the law at the time the offer in question was made.

CHAVEZ vs. COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS FACTS: Aquilino de los Reyes bought of a parcel of Riceland with the intention of working it himself but he could not take possession of the land because the then incumbent tenant, Pablo Chavez, did not want to surrender the land to its new owner. According to Pablo Chavez his son Eugenio Chavez was working the land for him; he was 74 years of age already. Aquilino de los Reyes filed a petition with this Court against Pablo Chavez asking for authority to dispossess said tenant but suit was dismissed. Then, Pablo Chavez died of old age (senility) on October 21, 1958. When he died the law governing tenant and landowner relation is Republic Act No. 1199. Under this statute the tenancy relationship between the petitioner Chavez and respondent De los Reyes was terminated by reason of such death. On April 8, 1959 Eugenio Chavez filed a petition, this time R.A. No. 1199 was amended by R.A. No. 2263. Unlike R.A. No. 1199, he amendment provides for the continuance of the relationship in the event of the tenants death or incapacity between the landholder and one member of the tenants immediate farm household who is related to the tenant within the second degree of consanguinity and who shall cultivate the land himself personally. ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 2263 can be applied retroactively? HELD: No, Republic Act 2263 cannot be applied retroactively. Since the law in force on October 21, 1958, when the tenant Pablo Chavez died, was Republic Act 1199, under which the tenancy relationship between him and respondent De los Reyes was terminated by reason of such death, the subsequent enactment of Republic Act 2263 did not operate to confer upon petitioner any successional right to continue as tenant. In Ulpiendo v. CAR the Court ruled that The amendment to section 9, Republic Act No. 1199 by Republic Act No. 2263 providing for the continuance of the relationship in the event of the tenants death or incapacity between the landholder and one member of the tenants immediate farm household who is related to the tenant within the second degree of consanguinity and who shall cultivate the land himself personally which took effect on 19 June 1959, cannot be applied retroactively. To hold otherwise would lay open this particular provision of the law to the objection of unconstitutionality, on the ground that it impairs a substantive right that has already become vested.

TAC-AN vs COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: As payment for legal services, Eleuterio Acopiado and Maximino Acopiado conveyed a parcel of land to Tac-An through a document entitled, Deed of Quitclaim. After the execution of the deed, the Acopiados told TacAn that they were terminating his services. Moreover, Eleuterio sold his share of the land previously conveyed to Tac-An. On October 7, 1964, Tac-An filed a complaint praying that he will be declared owner of the land under consideration, that the sale of land belonging to Eluterio be nullified and that he be paid damages, attorneys fees, etc. But Court of Appeals voided the transfer of the land to Tac-An on the ground that the contract is not in accordance with the requirements of Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu for Contracts with Non-Christians. The Acopiados are Non-Christians, Section 145 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu applies. The petitioner asserts that the revocation of the approval which had been given by the Provincial Governor has no legal effect and cannot affect his right to the land which had already vested. The petitioner also argues that the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu was repealed on June 19, 1965 by Republic Act No, 4252, hence the approval of the Provincial Governor became unnecessary. ISSUE: Whether or not the requirements of Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu are still required? Held: When the Deed of Quitclaim was executed, Sections 145 and 146 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu were in full force and effect and since they were substantive in nature the repealing statute cannot be given retroactive effect. Hence, the requirements of Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu still required in contracts involving non-christians.

Eugenio vs. Drilon FACTS: Private Respondent purchased on installment basis from Petitioner, two lots. Private respondent suspended payment of his amortizations because of non-development on the property. Petitioner then sold one of the two lots to spouses Relevo and the title was registered under their name. Respondent prayed for annulment of sale and re conveyance of the lot to him. Applying P.D. 957 The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree, the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission ordered Petitioner to complete the development, reinstate Private Respondents purchase contract over one lot and immediately refund him of the payment (including interest) he made for the lot sold to the spouses. Petitioner claims that the Exec. Sec. erred in applying P.D. 957 saying it should have not been given retroactive effect and that non-development does not justify the nonpayment of the amortizations. ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion when he decided P.D. 957 will be given retroactive effect. HELD: No, Respondent Executive Secretary did not act with grave abuse of discretion and P.D. 957 is to give retroactive effect so as to cover even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976. P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, but such can be plainly inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law. The intent of the statute is the law.