Korenizatsiya: Ukrainization and the Soviet Response

Established during the beginning of Lenins regime, one of the most impacting and front running of the policies utilized by the Communist Party was Korenizatsiya, which consisted of granting more authority to the lower level governments and managements of titular nations in order to nativize these national entities. The resulting nationalistic sentiments from the Soviet Korenizatsiya policy implementation in Ukraine were unanticipated by the Soviet authorities, for Ukraine experienced a large scale cultural revival, as well as an unprecedented influx of migrants from the countryside into urban areas. Threatened by significant increase in Ukrainian participation in local administration and literature, the Soviets began to shut down the Ukrainization movement in Ukraine, for their Soviet prerogatives within the nation were unexpectedly being replaced by Ukrainian aims. Before coming to power following the October Revolution of 1917, the Bolshevik party formulated and fostered the early Soviet nationalities policy known as Korenizatsiya, the brain child of Joseph Stalin which he conceived after a trip to the ethnically diverse city of Vienna. A few of the many aims of this policy were to indigenize the people by enhancing the utilization of local languages within education and every day life, to appeal to the masses by implementing palatable national and ethnic policies, and to improve to overall image of the Soviet government so that eventually relations between the Soviets and their satellite populations would become harmonized, allowing for a smoother transition into Communism. The policy also called for the representation of local elites and intelligentsia in local government, as well as the establishment of a national language and literature.

Through the policy, Stalin effectively created the Soviet nationalities in what would be the greatest experiment in social engineering to date. Until Stalins implementation of Korenizatsiya, nationalism had never been so highly planned, and under the policy the republics enjoyed cultural autonomy as long as they didnt contradict the purpose and rule of the USSR. By solidifying the ethnic and lingual differences on the borders, the USSR successfully intensified the nationalities of its titular nations. As a self-proclaimed expert on the subject of nationhood, Stalin wrote many articles on the subject, defining nationhood as a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture.1 On April 3, 1922, Stalin was made general secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party, or the Bolshevik Party, from which he gained the platform from which he could dictate new reforms and policies, such as the Five Year Plan and collectivization of agriculture. Concerning Korenizatsiya, Stalin identified two main threats that could undermine the policy, namely Great Power Chauvinism (Russian Chauvinism) and intensified local nationalism. He spoke, however, of Russian Chauvinism holding more cause for worry: Great-Russian chauvinist spirit, which is becoming stronger and stronger owing to the N.E.P. In practice they find expression in an arrogantly disdainful and heartlessly bureaucratic attitude on the part of Russian Soviet officials towards the needs and requirements of the national republics. The multi-national Soviet state can become really durable, and the co-operation of the peoples within it really fraternal, only if these survivals are vigorously and irrevocably eradicated from the practice of our state
1

I.F. Stalin, Marxism and the National Question ,1913

institutions. Hence, the first immediate task of our Party is vigorously to combat the survivals of Great-Russian chauvinism.2 By stating that Russian Chauvinism posed the greatest threat, Stalin effectively sacrificed any form of Russian nationalism from his agenda. In testament to this, the Russians did not have their own Communist party, unlike the other national republics, and also lacked their own Academy of Sciences. However, this was because there was a sense that everything within the Soviet Union was available to the Russians by default. Stalins aversion to Russian Chauvinism was also a movement towards the policys goal of reversing the Russification that took place during the imperial period preceding the twentieth century, which in turn helped Stalin to extend his influence over the ethnic minorities in the titular nations. Following the implementation of the liberal Soviet nationalities policy of Korenizatsiya, Ukraine experienced an insurgence of nationalism at rate unanticipated by the Soviets. However, it seemed to the Ukrainians that this was not only sparked by the Soviets, but encouraged by them, for Stalin had said: It is clear that the Ukrainian nationality exists and that the development of its culture is a communist obligation. One should not go against history. " After the Russian Revolution of 1917, amidst the turmoil of the Russian empires dismantling, the Central Rada emerged, if only for the brief time period of a year, in order to assert Ukraines independence. However, this attempt was unsuccessful considering the amount of adversity the republic was facing with numerous invasions and attempts at occupation. Soon

after, the Central Rada was overthrown and replaced during Austro-German occupation with the
2

"National Factors in Party and State Affairs -- Theses for the Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), Approved by the Central Committee of the Party,"

Hetmanate, lead by Pavlo Skoropadsky, a general from the Ukrainized Russian Corps. Although the reign of the Hetmanate was brief, great steps in cultural implementation were taken in the printing of Ukrainian textbooks, and the founding of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. Skoropadsky was a very unpopular ruler, however, and soon after his appointment as Hetman a rebellion against him occurred. His opponents took on the name of the Directorate, which overthrew the Hetmanate, becoming the governing force of Ukraine. The Directorate went on to re-establish the Ukrainian Peoples Republic, but overall the attempts were unsuccessful, for the Directorate was dismantled in 1921. After having secured its territory following the skirmishes that lasted between 1917 and1921, Ukraine became a Soviet Ukraine, and joined the USSR in 1922. As the Bolsheviks took hold of Ukraine, Stalins Korenizatsiya began to take effect within the republic. A huge shift occurred in the teaching of Ukrainiantheir own language which many never had known because of the previous implementations of Russificationand the Ukrainian literacy rates began skyrocketing. Korenizatsiya presented the argument that, within a nation, language diversity fosters conflict, while language conformity fosters unity. In response to this, a four-fold Soviet educational system sprouted in Ukraine in which the goals were: to establish school system embracing all children; to promote spread of communist doctrines by integrating them into the curriculum; to nationalize the school system by introducing languages of minorities as the languages of instruction in schools attended by children of minorities; and to pave the way for eventual assimilation by providing for the study of Russian as a separate subject in the schools of the minorities. Mykola Skrypnyk, the Ukrainian Commissariat of Education, was the initiator of Ukrainization, at first within schools, promoting both the implementation of Ukrainian as a

prominent language in the country and the publishing of literature in the language. Although Skrypnyk was very involved in the cause of Ukrainization, he believed it was the fastest and most successful way to bring communism successfully into Ukraine, and he remained a steadfast opponent to Ukrainian nationalism. Ukrainian became institutionalized as a language within the schools, and within just a few years Skrypnyk achieved amazing results and high literacy rates. Soon enough, the language of Ukrainian became a primary language in modern urban society as a result of the Ukrainian peasant migration into the urbanized areas. Between 1920 and 1933, more ethnically Ukrainian peasants were leaving the countryside to live more urbanized lives. Considering Ukraine is a borderland, before the immigration from the country side occurred, many non-Ukrainians inhabited the cities. As the cities acquired more Ukrainians, Russian political control over the urban areas was threatened, for Ukrainianisation and the increased urbanization of Ukrainians signaled the imminent political de-Russification of the cities and of the major industrial areas. Considering the Soviet government's increased investment in urban industrial centers, many Ukrainians preferred being industrial workers rather than any other job, namely that of collective farmers. Workers received wages which were permanent and steady, and the collective farmers, who worked the same amount, received little to no income. The increase of people in the urban labor force between 1928 and 1932 was a direct result of the industrialization period, for land hunger, lack of animals, abundant labor supply and the country side and forced collectivization lured many to the cities.

The effects of Ukrainization were widespread, reaching into the Communist Party of

Ukraine, oblast governments, and even the Red Army. While most of these bodies had at first been Russian-speaking, they quickly transformed into Ukrainian-dominated forces. Also, despite the Soviet anti-religious campaign, the Ukrainians formed the Ukrainian National Orthodox Church, which the Soviets didnt see as a threat at first, considering they felt it could help them suppress Russian Orthodoxy. As a result, the church had little to no obstacles in its spread, and became very popular and well-practiced amongst the peasants, villages, and cities. Soviet authorities did not anticipate the massive amount of Ukrainians migrating, nor did they expect the political consequences that the expedited urban growth would foster. Since more Ukrainian peasants were entering the Ukrainian, previously Russified cities, the cities fell under the influence of Ukrainian communist nationalism. Now that the trade unions, local governments, bureaucracy, and the party itself were being supplied with actual Ukrainians, and not Russians, or Russian representatives, the cities now represented Ukrainian ideals instead of Soviet prerogatives. Perceiving Ukrainian nationalism as a real and potent threat to the Soviet Union, Stalin sent in Pavel Postyshev, secretary of the Bolshevik party, as his personal representative, along with reinforcements, to oversee the reversal of Ukrainization, forcefully and violently replacing it with the tried-and-true Russification. Postyshev effectively enforced the collectivization of agriculture, initiated purges of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, and played a huge role in the Holodomor. During his stay, he had Mykola Skrypnyk removed from his position of head of Education, and rather than recant his ways and policies, Skrypnyk resorted to suicide. The remainders of his Ukrainization policies were reversed, eliminating any element of policy that would support the promotion of Ukrainian as a language. The study of Russian was made mandatory.

However, the Soviets had another specific tool that they would eventually use to quell the uprising of Ukrainian nationalistic sentiments. The collective farms were founded as a result of Stalins implementation of Collectivization, in which agriculture would be controlled by the state and individual land and labor would be consolidated. It was hoped to modernize agriculture. The collectivization movement faced much opposition from the peasants who were given the work of planting and harvesting the shared crops, which Soviet authorities had hoped wouldnt happen, as they were wishing the work would be done voluntarily for the good of the communist cause. As a result, the Soviets had to forcefully implement the plan of collectivization. Peasants with no land-holdings were to be the ones who benefited most from the consolidation of agriculture. However, after the distribution of land after the revolution, there werent many peasants who didnt have land. These peasants with property were also opposed to collectivization, for it jeopardized their holdings, and they would have to sacrifice their personal possessions for the greater good of socialism. In Ukraine, the effects of collectivization were felt even more acutely, considering they had a long tradition in individual farming. Such peasants who owned land and used hired help in the harvesting for collective farming were deemed kulaks, or rich farmers. While they were the most despised rank of peasant amongst the Soviet authorities, there existed other ranks such as the bednyaks or poor peasants, and the seredniaks or middle-class ones, who were perceived as more loyal to the Soviet cause for they worked as they should.

Kulaks were ill-defined as a class, although Stalin had categorized them as enemies. Their unwillingness to farm frustrated the Soviet authorities, and if they did farm, they did it poorly, which yielded horrible crops. Eventually the kulaks were given lofty characteristics to be defined by: usage of hired labor, renting or lending agricultural equipment (rather, the ability to), involvement in finance and money-lending, or ownership of complex machinery or a mill. The characteristic concerning involvement in finance left a large majority of peasants to be classified as kulaks, for many peasants engaged in selling their surplus and personal transactions. Following the Russian Famine of 1928, the Soviet government introduced the policy of collectivization in 1929, which was the trigger of the conflict between the kulaks and the Soviets. Resisting the implementations of the collectivization, the peasantshereby categorized as kulaks acted out in any way, try to sabotage the policy however they could. Since livestock were to be collectivized live, they would either kill their own livestock to profit themselves by harvesting the meat or the hides, or they would kill in vain just to spite the Soviet policy. Along with killing millions of livestock, they would also attempt to sabotage the machinery involved in harvesting or refining the products, which the Soviets considered as capital investments. However, while these were horrible to begin with for the policy of collectivization, when the kulaks tried to sabotage it by attacking government members, Stalin decided to put a cap on the issue.

In a harsh speech concerning the kulaks, Stalin stated, From a policy of limiting the exploitative tendencies of the kulaks, we have gone over to a policy of liquidating the kulaks as a class." This was one example of the implementation of purges in order to rectify mistakes or wrongdoings within the Soviet Unionthis policy, however, was called dekulakization. The kulaks were sentenced to one of three fates: execution, sent to labor settlements, or deportation to work in farms in Central Asia or Siberia. Millions of kulaks died as a result of the executions, the conditions of transportation, or the harsh conditions at their labor camps. While collectivization was proving to be an ineffective way of harvesting, as it yielded horrible results, Ukraine was hardest hit considering it was the breadbasket of the region, as it produced nearly 50% of wheat for the Soviet Union. Grain deliveries were not reaching the expectations of the government, and as a result the Soviet government enforced the following sanctions on underperforming Ukrainian villages: ban on supply of any goods or food to the villages, requisition of any food or grain found on site, ban of any trade, and, lastly, the confiscation of all financial resources. These sanctions were carried out by none other than Pavel Postyshev, whom after the previous purges and the imposition of famine was known as the Hangman of Ukraine. The result was an estimated average of 5 million deaths, making the man-made Soviet Famine of 1932 to 1934, also known as the Holodomor, one of the most bizarre genocides to occur. Unlike the typical pattern of famine in which the cities are hit worse than the rural areas, this particular famine was the exact reversal. The seizure of grain and food from these people caused them to perish in one of the most fertile, fruitful regions in Eurasia. The desire to procure food to help in the rapid industrialization of the Soviet Union apparently outweighed the necessity of famine relief, for the Soviet authorities did not

acknowledge that there had been a famine. Grain had been of great importance to the Soviet Union, for it was a tool for several things, namely to help them obtain foreign exchange, provide a military war chest, and to feed urban workers. In order to achieve the level of industrialization he wanted, Stalin knew he had to import machinery, for which he needed foreign exchange, which is where he realized that the exportation of agricultural goods would be his best bet. The war chest was also necessary to build up food supplies for soldiers for what couldve been a war with Japan (which ended up being the Russo-Japanese war). For the industrial workers, who were the backbone of industrialization itself, the food had to be supplied to them as they worked as an incentive to come to work. The Soviets hid the famine for the obvious reason of maintaining prestige. By controlling the press and concealing the symptoms of the famine, news hardly escaped Russia concerning the Holodomor. Ultimately, Stalins implementation of Korenizatsiya prompted what looked like a great start to the formation of the Soviet Union. However, Ukraine, an overzealous republic excited over its ability to become nationalized, took it to a level in which Stalin felt threatened by their nationalist fervor. One step too far, and Stalin turned his own policy of Korenizatsiya on its tail, counteracting Ukrainization with the once-scorned Russification of old. The battle between the Russification and Ukrainization of Ukraine still echoes in the country to this day.

Sources

The Soviet Famine of 1932 to 1934, by Dana G. Dalrymple National Deviation in the Soviet Union, by John S. Reshetar, Jr Language and Education in the Soviet Ukraine, by Harold R. Weinstein Urban Growth and Ethnic Change in the Ukrainian SSR, by George Liber