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ChinasNavalModernizationand U.S.

Rebalancing:Implicationsfor StabilityintheSouthChinaSea
CarlyleA.Thayer

PLAN Luyang II-class Missile Destroyer Haikou 171 South Sea

Fleet

PapertoPanelon Militarization and Its Implications 4th International Workshop ontheSouthChinaSea cosponsoredbytheDiplomaticAcademyofVietnamandthe VietnamLawyersAssociation,HoChiMinhCity November1821,2012

ChinasNavalModernizationandU.S.StrategicRebalancing: ImplicationsforStabilityintheSouthChinaSea
CarlyleA.Thayer*
Introduction
This paper examines whether or not Chinas naval modernization and U.S. strategic rebalancinginEastAsiawillleadtoconflictintheSouthChinaSea.Thispaperisdividedinto six parts. Part 1 discusses Chinas maritime objectives. Part 2 analyses Chinas force capabilitydevelopmentwithaspecificfocusontheSouthSeaFleetandthedevelopmentof militaryinfrastructureonHainanIslandandtheParacelandSpratlyislands.Part3discusses the U.S. strategy of rebalancing its military forces in the AsiaPacific. Part 4 focuses on specific U.S. initiatives with Southeast Asias maritime states including the Philippines and Vietnam. Part five offers a net assessment of future force modernization trends and their impact on regional stability. Part 6, the conclusion, evaluates the prospects for maritime cooperation for regional security by reviewing (a) ChinaU.S. bilateral strategic dialogues and (b) current multilateral initiatives by the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Defence MinistersMeetingPlus,ASEANMaritimeForumandtheEastAsiaSummit.

Part1ChinasMaritimeObjectives
Chinas 2010 Defence White Paper enumerated four national defence objectives: (1) safeguarding national sovereignty, security and interests of national development; (2) maintaining social harmony and stability; (3) accelerating the modernization of national defenceandthearmedforces;and(4)maintainingworldpeaceandstability.1 Chinas military strategy to achieve these objectives is encapsulated in National Military Strategic Guidelines for the New Period that propounds an operational doctrine termed Active Defence.2 Chinas Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is tasked with three

CarlyleA.ThayerisEmeritusProfessor,TheUniversityofNewSouthWalesattheAustralianDefenceForce Academy,Canberra.Email:c.thayer@adfa.edu.au.
1

ThePeoplesRepublicofChina,StateCouncil,InformationOffice,ChinasNationalDefensein2010(Beijing: March2011).
2

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China 2011, A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Washington,D.C.2012).

essential missions: defeating invasion from the sea, defending territorial sovereignty, and protectingmaritimerights.Itprimaryareaofoperationsarefocusedonthesocalledfirst andsecondislandchains.Thefirstislandchainreferstothelineofislandsthatrunsnorth south from the Kuriles, Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia. The second island chain extends further east of Chinas coast and includes a line running northsouth from the Kuriles through Japan, the Bonins, the Marianas, the Carolines, and Indonesia. With respect to Chinas maritime domain, China pursues a defence doctrine known as OffshoreDefenceorNearSeasDefence.3TheNearSeasincludetheYellowSea,East ChinaSeaandSouthChinaSeaandareaPLANpriority. The PLAN is tasked with developing the capability to conduct six offensive/defensive maritime campaigns: blockade, antisea line of communication (SLOC), maritimeland attack,antiship,protectionofmaritimetransportation,andnavalbasedefence. Chinasphenomenaleconomicgrowthhasbeendrivenbyexportorientatedtrade.Thishas increased Chinas dependency on maritime routes to export goods and to import natural resources.Asaconsequence,ChinahasaninterestinprotectingvitaltraderoutesorSLOCs. Chinese defence analysts have expressed concern about what has been termed the MalaccadilemmathethreattoChinasnationalsecuritybytheclosureofnarrowstraits orchokepointsinSoutheastAsia.4 Chinasphenomenaleconomicgrowthalsofueledarisingdemandforresourcesandenergy. China claims most of the South China Sea on the basis of historic rights. Chinese officials claimthefishandotheraquaticresources,mineralsonthedeepseabedandhydrocarbons (oilandnaturalgas). Fivepointsmaybedrawnfromtheabovediscussion:

NanLi,TheEvolutionofChinasNavalStrategyandCapabilities:FromNearCoastandNearSeastoFar Seas, in Phillip C. Saunders, Christopher D. Yung, Michael Swaine and Andrew NienDzu Yang, eds., The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2011),109140.
4

ThomasM.Kane,ChineseGrandStrategyandMaritimePower(LondonandPortland:FrankCass,2002),127 128.

First, Chinas spectacular economic rise has provided the basis for increased defence spending that in turn has led to the transformation and modernization of all military services,includingthePLAN(seebelow).5Inmanyrespectsthisisanormaldevelopment. Second,ChinaplaceshighestpriorityonTaiwanandnationalreunification.AftertheTaiwan Straitscrisisof199596,whenChineseattemptstointimidateTaiwanresultedinU.S.naval intervention, China has sought to forestall future intervention by U.S. carrier forces by extendingitsnavalreachbeyondthefirsttothesecondislandchainbydevelopingwhatthe Pentagontermsantiaccess/areadenialcapabilities. Third, Chinas rise has raised the salience of protecting its major SLOCs from the Gulf of ArabiathroughtheSouthChinaSeatoitseasternseaboard. Fourth,ChineseresourcenationalismhasraisedtheimportanceoftheSouthChinaSeawith respect to oil, gas and mineral resources and sovereignty claims. Increasingly PLAN operationshaveextendedintothefarseasincludingtheSouthChinaSeawithaparticular focusonthewatersadjacenttothePhilippines. Fifth,asChinabecomesaglobalpowerwithwidespreadeconomicandpoliticalinterests,it willdevelopabluewaternavytoprotectitsinterestsmuchfurtherafield.

Part2ChinasForceCapabilityDevelopment
There are nine main elements to Chinas naval modernization program: antiship ballistic missiles,antishipcruisemissiles,submarines(conventionalandnuclear),aircraftcarriers, surface combatants, amphibious ships, landbased aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles, nuclear and electromagnetic pulse weapons and maritime surveillance and targeting systems.6 Five elements of PLAN modernization are of particular significance to the South SeaFleet:submarines,aircraftcarrier,surfacecombatants,amphibiousshipsandmaritime

For a discussion of Chinas defence spending consult: Joachim Hofbauer, Priscilla Hermann and Sneha Raghavan, Asian Defense Spending, 20002011: A Report of the CSIS DefenseIndustrial Initiatives Group (Washington,D.C.:CenterforStrategic&InternationalStudies,October2012),811.
6

RonaldORourke,ChinaNavalModernization:ImplicationsforU.S.NavyCapabilitiesBackgroundandIssues forCongress,CRSReportforCongress(Washington,D.C.:CongressionalResearchService,July31,2012),834. See also: Ronald ORourke, PLAN Force Structure: Submarines, Ships, Aircraft, in Phillip C. Saunders, Christopher D. Yung, Michael Swaine and Andrew NienDzu Yang, eds., The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities,EvolvingRoles(Washington,D.C.:NationalDefenseUniversityPress,2011),141174andAnthony H. Cordesman and Nicholas S. Yarosh, Chinese Military Modernization and Force Development: A Western Perspective.Washington,D.C.:CenterforStrategic&InternationalStudies,July30,2012,104130.

surveillance and targeting systems. The aircraft carrier, amphibious ships and maritime surveillanceandtargetingsystemsarediscussedbelow. In many respects Chinas defence transformation may be viewed as part of the normal process of military modernization brought on by technological developments such as the RevolutioninMilitaryAffairsandisdefensiveinorientation.7Forexample,Chinasnuclear forcemaybeviewedasadeterrenttoU.S.nuclearblackmail.Similarly,Chinasmilitarybuild upalongitseasterncoastmaybeviewedasadeterrenttopreventtheUnitedStatesfrom intervening in a Taiwan contingency as it did during the crisis of 199596. And Chinas developmentofbluewaternavymaybeviewedasanefforttoensurethesecurityofSLOCs andtoprotestChinasgrowingglobalinterests. TheUnitedStates,aswellasJapanandAustraliaamongotherregionalstates,havevoiced concerns that Chinas military build up is more than defensive. In the words of Admiral Mullen, the strategic intent behind Chinas development of new capabilities seem very focused on the United States Navy and our bases that are in that part of the world8 StrategicanalystsarguethatChinahasrecentlydevelopedpowerprojectioncapabilitiesout to the first island chain (Taiwan) and is now seeking to extend their range to the second islandchainwithafocusonGuam. Several of the factors promoting Chinas military modernization intersect with respect to Southeast Asias maritime domain and the South China Sea in particular. This is most evidentinthemodernizationoftheSouthSeaFleetandtheconstructionofamajornaval baseonHainanIslandonthenorthernreachesoftheSouthChinaSea. SouthSeaFleet ThePLANcurrentlyoperatesfournewclassesofdomesticallybuiltsubmarinesinaddition to the Russian Kiloclass conventional attack submarine (SS): Jin class or Type 094 nuclear

Fornuancedassessmentssee:MichaelD.Swaine,ChinasRegionalMilitaryPosture,andDavidM.Lampton, Chinas Rise in Asia Need Not Be at Americas Expense, in David Shambaugh, ed., Power Shift: China and AsiasNewDynamic(Berkeley,LosAngelesandLondon:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,2005),266285and306 326,respectively;EllisJoffe,TheRightSizeforChinasMilitary:ToWhatEnds?,AsianPolicy,4,July2007, 5760;MichaelR.Chambers,FramingtheProblem:ChinasThreatEnvironment,AsianPolicy,4,July2007, 6166; and David M. Finkelstein, Chinas National Military Strategy: An Overview of the Military strategic Guidelines,AsianPolicy,4,July2007,6772.
8

AdmiralMichaelMullen,RemarksandQ&AattheNavyLeagueSeaAirSpaceExposition,GaylordNational ResortandConferenceCenter,NationalHabor,Maryland,May4,2009.

poweredballisticmissile(SSBN);ShangclassorType093nuclearpowered(SSN);Yuanclass orType041(orType039A)SS;andtheSongclassorType039/039GSS.9Thesesubmarines are armed with one or more weapons systems including antiship cruise missiles (ASCM), wireguidedandwakehomingtorpedoesandmines.TheKiloclasssubsarearmedwiththe SN27 Sizzler ASCM. By the end of 2010 the PLAN had 31 relatively new modern attack submarines in commission. Given current production rates and life expectancy the PLAN could have a force of 75 modern submarines by 202024.10 China has accorded the South Sea Fleet new priority. The PLAN has redeployed its newest attack SSNs and SSBNs from theirtraditionalportofQingdaotoHainanIsland. The PLAN also deploys five new classes of indigenously build guided missile destroyers (DDG) in addition to the Russian Sovremennyclass: Luhu (Type 052), Luhai (Type 051B), Luyang(Type052B),LuyangII(Type052C)andLouzhou(Type051C).Asof2012,thePLAN hadfourteenofthesedestroyersundercommission;anadditionalsixLuyangIIdestroyers are currently under construction. Eight destroyers are currently deployed with the South SeaFleetincludingtheLuyangandLuyangIIclass.11 The PLAN deploys four classes of indigenously build frigates: Jiangwei I (Type 053 H2G), Jiangei II (Type 053H3), Jiangkai I (Type 054) and Jiangkai II (Type 054A).12 The PLAN currently has 28 of these frigates under commission. Fortyfour frigates of all types are currently deployed with the East Sea and South Sea Fleets.13 Of Chinas twentyeight amphibious ships, 26 are currently deployed with the East Sea and South Sea Fleets. The South Sea Fleet also is home of the largest marine battalion, amphibious platforms and Chinaslargesthospitalship.Accordingtoarecentstudy:
Somewhat surprisingly, as this text has shown, many of the newest DDGs, frigates, and submarines tend to be based in the South China Sea. This configuration does not necessarily supportaTaiwanconflict,butdoesmatchafuturemissionofescortingoilconvoystotheMiddle East, or asserting greater sovereignty over Chinese claims to the South China Sea. The Luyang
9

ORourke,ChinaNavalModernization,1015. ORourke,ChinaNavalModernization,15.

10 11

AndrewS.Erickson,ChinasModernizationofItsNavalandAirPowerCapabilities,inAshleyJ.Tellisand Travis Tanner, eds., Strategic Asia 201213: Chinas Military Challenge (Seattle and Washington: National BureauofAsianResearch,2012),99.
12 13

ORourke,ChinaNavalModernization,2526. Erickson,ChinasModernizationofItsNavalandAirPowerCapabilities,99.

7 DDGs 168 and 169 and the Luyang DDGs 170 and 171 form the core of two battle group formationsbasedatYulinfordistantoperations.14

ChinacommissionedtheVaryagaircraftcarrierthisyear.15TheVaryagisanoldshipandwill beusedprimarilyfortrainingpurposes.Chinahasbeguntrainingflightcrewstotakeoffand land on a carrier using a shore based mock up. The Varyag uses a sky jump to assist take offs. This limits the kinds of aircraft and payloads that can be launched. The Varyag can easilyembarkhelicopters.Chinaisalsodesigningandconstructingaspecialaircraftforthe carrier,theJ15.Evenwhenitisoperationalitwillonlyhavelimitedcapacities.IftheVaryag carrierisbasedatYulinNavalBase,asisexpected,itcouldbeusedtoexertseacontrolover theSouthChinaSea.ItisunlikelytheVaryagwillbefullyoperationaluntilafter2015with manyanalystssayingitwilltakelonger. TheSouthSeaFleetheadquartersatZhanjing,Guangdongprovince,formsthecentralhub ofamajorcomplexofstrategicspaceandtacticallongrangeradarsandcommunicationsto support operations in the South China Sea. These electronic systems link Woody Island, Fiery Cross Reef and other Chineseoccupied features with local and fleet commanders. Also, they are augmented by the combat and other electronic systems of PLAN warships, aircraft and paramilitary vessels. Zhanjiang and other ports on China southern coast are equipped with navigation aids as radio beacon navigation differential global positioning system (RBNDGPS). The South Sea Fleet HQ at Zhanjiang also maintains a radar and computervesseltrafficservice(VTS). HainanIsland Since the 1980s, China has maintained RBN aids at Haikou, Haifou and Sanya on Hainan Island.In1999,threenewRBNDGPSsystemswereactivatedatBaohujiao,YangpuandYulin Naval Base at Yalong Bay near Sanya. In addition, facilities at Dongfang and Haikou also operateradarandcomputervesseltrafficservices(VTS).In1965,Chinaconstructeditsfirst highpoweredlowfrequency(LF)stationonHainantosupportsubmarineoperations.One ofChinaveryfirsthighpoweredverylowfrequency(VLF)stationswasbuiltatYulinNaval Basetocommunicatewithsubmarineandsurfaceships.Hainanhousesseveralelectronic

14

JamesC.BussertandBruceA.Elleman,PeoplesLiberationArmyNavy:CombatSystemsTechnology,1949 2000(Annapolis:NavalInstitutePress,2011),189.ApictureoftheLuyangDDG171isfeaturedonthecoverof thispaper.


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ORourke,ChinaNavalModernization,1718

intelligence(ELINT)stations,includingoneonamountaintopinthesouthwestdirectedat Vietnam.16ThePLAsLingshuiAirBaseonthesoutheastcoastalsooperatesanELINTstation withanestimated1,000signalanalysts. The facilities at Yulin Naval Base include piers, docks and underground submarine pens.17 The PLAN stations several major surface combatants, amphibious landing craft, and conventionalandnuclearsubmarinesatYulin.ContinuedconstructionindicatesthatYalong will be able to accommodate larger advanced surface combatants such as assault ships, attack and ballistic missile submarines, and eventually one or more aircraft carriers. The South Sea Fleet has the important mission of securing the Strait of Qiongzhou to protect southernChinaandHainanIsland.Fromthisperspective,thedevelopmentofanavalbase atYalongmaybeseenasdefensiveinmotivation. However,astwoAmericannavalanalystshaveconcluded:
By homeporting new vessels in southern Hainan, China appears to be carrying out a naval strategy in the South China Sea of exerting regional maritime control incrementally. Extrapolating from the rapid growth of its communications, intelligence gathering, and naval supply structure on Hainan and its island bases in the South China Sea, China appears to have linkedthesebaseswithamodernelectroniccommunicationsnetwork.Manyoftheislandsand reefsoccupiedintheSCShaveafewbuildingsandafewantennaswitharudimentarypier.The only allpurpose base including aircraft shelters and support is located on Woody Island. Although crude, such outposts are being improved, if space is available, and could add to the PLANsoverallmobilityandabilitytooutmaneuveranyregionalcompetitors.18

ThedevelopmentoftheYulinNavalBaseraisesimportantquestionsaboutChinasstrategic intent. Continued construction at Yulin Naval Base suggest that it will be a major military basethatwillprovideChinawiththecapacitytosurgeexpeditionaryforcesintotheSouth China Sea and beyond. The Yulin base will also provide China with a forward presence to protectitsSLOCsthroughtheMalaccaandSingaporeStraits. NuclearPoweredBallisticMissileSubmarines(SSBNs) ThedevelopmentofanavalbaseinYalongBayhasstrategicimplicationsforthebalanceof powerintheAsiaPacific.AnalysisofconstructionactivitiesindicatesYulinNavalBasewillbe capable of housing nuclear submarines capable of launching intercontinental ballistic

16 17

BussertandElleman,PeoplesLiberationArmyNavy,142.

OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,MilitaryandSecurityDevelopmentsInvolvingthePeoplesRepublicof China2011,AReporttoCongressPursuanttotheNationalDefenseAuthorizationActforFiscalYear2000 (Washington,D.C.2012).


18

BussertandElleman,PeoplesLiberationArmyNavy,180.

missiles.Portionsofthebasearebeingbuiltundergroundtoprovidefacilitiesthatcannot beeasilymonitored.Thehardenedundergroundtunnels,forexample,canprotectvessels rangingfromSSNsuptoLuyangclassDDGs.Whenthesefacilitiesarecompletedtheywill provide China with the potential capability to station a substantial proportion of its submarinebased nuclear deterrent force there. The deployment of nuclear submarines, including ballistic missile submarines, will introduce a new geostrategic dimension to the regional balance of power. Chinese nuclear submarine deployments will attract the continuingattentionoftheU.S.Navyinconductingmilitarysurvey/intelligencegatheringin thewatersoffHainan. SatelliteimageryhasconfirmedthepresenceofasingleChineseType094Jinclassnuclear submarineatYalongsincelate2007.TheType094isasecondgenerationnuclearpowered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and represents Chinas most lethal naval strike weapon. This marks the first permanent deployment on an SSBN to Chinas South Sea Fleet. Five moreChineseJinclassSSBNsareexpectedtobecomeoperationalincomingyearsandYulin isexpectedtobecometheirhomebase. Chinasmostmodernstrategicnuclearsubmarineisnotyetfullyoperationalbutwhenitis the submarine is expected to carry twelve Sea Launched Ballistic Missiles. This class of submarine will be even more potent if China succeeds in equipping the missiles with multiple warheads. Chinese nuclear subs will be able to patrol and fire from concealed positions in deep waters off Hainan island if China can develop the necessary operational skills. NavalExercises China regularly conducts major naval exercises to showcase the growing prowess of the PLAN.In2010Chinaconductedthreemajornavalexercises.Thefirstexercisewasheldin earlyApril2010andinvolvedthelongrangedeploymentofsixteenwarshipsfromthePLAN drawnfromtheNorthSea,EastSeaandSouthSeaFleets.ThePLANflotillaconductedlive firingexercisesnorthofthePhilippinesbeforesteamingtowardtheMalaccaStraits.Upuntil thisexerciseChinasSouthSeaFleetwastheonlyfleettooperateintheSouthChinaSea. ThesecondnavalexercisewasconductedinlateJuly2010.Itwasthelargestofitskindand involvedtwelveofChinasmostmodernwarshipsfromeachofitsfleets.Thisexercisewas

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notable for the Chinese media coverage of live missile firings and the presence of senior commandersfromtheCentralMilitaryCommissionandthePLAChiefofStaff,GeneralChen Bingde.19 In November 2010 the PLA Marine Corps held the third major exercise in the SouthChinaSeainvolvingmorethan100ships,submarinesandaircraftand1,800marines. In July 2011, China conducted antisubmarine exercises off Hainan involving surface combatantsandlandingcraft.20InNovember2011,Chinaconductednavalexercisesinthe Western Pacific.21 In May 2012, the PLAN conducted tactical formation exercises and helicopter training missions involving two destroyers, two frigates and a Landing Platform Dock (LPD). The Type 071 LPD is one of the largest combat vessels in the PLAN and can embarkareinforcedbattalionofmarinesaswellaslandingcraftandmediumhelicopters. TheexerciseswasheldaboutmidwaybetweenTaiwanssoutheastcoastandLuzoninthe northernPhilippines.22 Chinese naval exercises in the East China Sea in October 2012 involved PLAN warships exercisingwiththeparamilitaryvesselsfromtheChinaMarineSurveillance(CMS)andthe Fishery Law Enforcement Command (FLEC). A total of eleven ships and eight aircraft took part.23AstatementissuedbythePLANEastSeaFleetnoted,Thisexercisewillsimulatea situationwhereforeignlawenforcementvesselsobstructandinterferewithourmaritime surveillanceandfisheriesadministrationvesselsonamissiontosafeguardmaritimerights andenforcethelaw.InthisexercisetheEastSeaFleetrespondedbydispatchingafrigate, hospital ship, tugboat and advanced fighters and helicopters for support, cover and emergency rescue.24 Although this particular exercise was held in the shadow of dispute overSenkakuIslanditholdsimplicationsforthePhilippinesandVietnamaswell. PLAN exercises can be viewed as a demonstration by China that it is now capable of deploying beyond the first island chain to the second. The implications are clear: China is

19 20 21 22 23 24

Xinhua,29July2010. China:navalexercisesinSouthChinaSea,AllVoices,June17,2011. TheEconomicTimes,November23,2011. J.MichaelCole,TaiwanmonitorsChinesenavalmoves,TaipeiTimes,May10,2012. EastChinaSeatension:Chinaconductsnavalexercises,BBCNewsAsia,October19,2012.

ArielZirulnick,ChinasnavalexercisesinEastChinaSeasendwarningtoregionalrivals,TheChristian ScienceMonitor,October19,2012.

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developingthecapacitytosustainlargernavaldeploymentsintheSpratlyarchipelagoand furthersouthforlongerperiods. CombatReadyPatrols On June 28, 2012, Geng Yangsheng, a spokesperson for Chinas Ministry of Defence, revealedthatChinahadcommencedcombatreadypatrolsindisputedwatersintheSouth ChinaSea.InreplytoaquestionaboutVietnamsrecentairpatrolsovertheSpratlyislands, GengstatedtheChinesemilitaryhasalreadysetupanormal,combatreadypatrolsystem inseasunderourcontroltoprotectnationalsovereigntyandoursecurityanddevelopment interests.25InanembarrassingincidentforChina,oneofitsfrigatesonroutinepatrolran aground near Half Moon Shoal near Palawan island on July 11, 2012.26 The frigate reportedly had been intimidating Philippine fishing craft found in the area. Six PLAN ships and smaller utility boats came to the frigates rescue and refloated it four days later. The frigateleftthearea.27 ThisisasignificantdevelopmentbecauseuptonowthePLANhasplayedarelativelylow key behindthescenes role in South China Sea incidents. Chinas surveillance patrols have beenmainlyconductedbyshipsbelongingtotheCMSforceortheFLEC. ParacelIslands Developments on Hainan have been paralleled by Chinas construction activities in the Paracel islands. In 1990, China constructed 1,200 foot runway on Woody island that has been extended twice to it present length of 7,874 feet. The airstrip on Woody Island can accommodate fighter aircraft such as the Su27 and Su30MKKs, H6 bombers and large supply transport aircraft. The facilities adjacent to the runway include four hangers. Air traffic is controlled by a Type 791 Xband precisionapproach radar. Other military infrastructureonWoodyIslandincludesnavaldockscapableofaccommodatingfrigatesand

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QuotedinZhaoShengnanandZhangYunbi,ChinaPledgestoprotectmaritimesovereignty,ChinaDaily, June 29, 2012 and Sutirtho Patranobis, China to set up new military base in south China sea, Hindustan Times,June28,2012.
26 27

AgenceFrancePresse,Chinanavyshipstrandedindisputedwaters,July13,2012.

ManuelMogatoandBenBlanchard,Chinafrigateheadshome,avertsS.ChinaSeastandoff,Reuters,July 15,2012;JimGomez,AssociatedPress,Chinaremovesgroundedwarship,easingseatensions,TheChristian Science Monitor, July 15, 2012; and Edward Wong, Freed From Shoals, Warship Heads Back to China, The NewYorkTimes,July16,2012.

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destroyersandafueldepot.PLAsoldiersarebasedonWoodyislandtoprotecttherunway andothermilitaryfacilities. China has also built militaryrelated facilities elsewhere in the Paracels. A weather station hasbeenbuiltonPattleIsland,whileRobertIslandhousesaradiobeacon,theonlybeacon south of Hainan. The docks on Duncan Island are being expanded. A Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)stationhasbeenoperatingonRockyIsland,thehighestpremonitory,since1995.28 Thisstationcouldprovideairorsurfacewarningandsupportairmissionsorshiptargeting. Open sources report that China may have stationed the HY2 antiship cruise missile on WoodyIsland.29 On July 19, 2012, Chinas Central Military Commission officially decided to establish a militarycommandinSanshaCityafteritselevationtoprefectureleveladministrativestatus. The garrison was placed under the PLA Hainan provincial subcommand within the Guangzhou Military Command. The Sansha military garrison has been assigned responsibilityfornationaldefencemobilization,militaryoperationsandreserves.According to Defence Ministry spokesperson Geng Yansheng, China may set up local military commandorgansinthecity[Sansha]accordingtorelevantregulations.30SeniorColonelCai Xihong was appointed commander of the Sansha garrison and Senior Colonel Liao Chaoyi wasnamedPoliticalCommissar.31 AccordingtoaJapanesesource,ChinasdecisiontoestablishasecurityareainSanshais consideredpreparationforfullscalemilitaryactionintheSouthChinaSea.32Thisviewis disputedbyretiredU.S.RearAdmiralMikeMcDevittwhoarguesthatamilitarygarrisonin Sanshawillnotaffectthemilitarybalanceorsignalimminenthostilities.McDevittpointsout thatanymajormilitaryoperationsintheSouthChinaSeawouldbemountedfromHainan wherethePLAhasmajorbases.AccordingtoMcDevitt,puttinggarrisonsonWoodyIsland

28 29 30

J.MichaelCole,ChinaDeployingMilitaryGarrison;toSouthChinaSea?,TheDiplomat,July23,2012 BillGeertz,WoodyIslandMissiles,TheWashingtonTimes,June15,2001.

Xinhua, Chinese military may establish presence in Sansha: defense spokesperson, Ministry of National Defence of the Peoples Republic of China, June 28, 2012. http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/2012 06/29/content_4381230.htm.
31 32

Chinastepsupclaimsoverworldsmostdisputedwaters,NationalPost,July27,2012. Chinashardlinestancecauseforgraveconcern,TheYomiuriShimbun,July26,2012.

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or elsewhere in the Paracels would effectively maroon these guys, so the only advantage wouldbejustshowingtheflagtosay,Weareserious.33 Accordingtoregionalsecurityspecialists,thestandingupofamilitarygarrisoncommandon WoodyIslanddoesnotrepresentanattempttobuildabaseforforwarddeploymentinto theSouthChinaSea.34Intheirview,theSanshamilitarygarrisonismerelyanadministrative response to the upgrading of Sansha to a prefecturelevel city. Military garrisons do not commandPLAmainforcecombatunits,PLANavyforPLAAirForceunits. SouthChinaSea ChinahasalsoconsolidateditsmilitarypresenceintheSouthChinaSeabyconstructionon several of the features it currently occupies.35 China occupied Mischief Reef in 1995 and builtitsfirststructuresintheSouthChinaSea.ThesewereexpandedinOctober1998with the addition of three octagonshaped wooden structures and two twostory concrete towers one at each end. The towers bristle with SATCOMM and HF antennae for communications. The towers are thought to house ELINT and radars. The facilities on MischiefReefhassincebeenupgradedwiththeconstructionoftwonewpiers,ahelicopter pad,anavynavigationradar,severalantiaircraftgunsandanantishipcruisemissilesystem (eithertheHY2orC801). A 200foot long concrete building was constructed on Fiery Cross Reef. It houses a naval High Frequency (HF) yagi radar antenna (Bean Sticks), two Electronic Counter Measures (ECM)radomes,andseveralwhipcommunicationandmastantennas.Thevariousantenna support different requirements, such as radio signal surveillance and Long Range (LR) communications. The facilities on Fiery Cross Reef also include satellite communication (SATCOMM)andmeteorologicaldishes.

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Kirk Spitzer, New Garrison, Old Troubles In The South China Seas, Battlefield, July 26, 2012. http://battlefield.blogs.time.com/2012/07/26/newgarrisonoldtroublesinthesouthchinasea. Another analystsargues,theSanshagarrisonhasminimaloperationalvaluebarringasignificantupgradeinnavaland air infrastructure to enable sustained operations and is mainly an example of Chinese coercive diplomacy. See:OrianaSkylarMastro,TheSanshaGarrison:ChinasDeliberateEscalationintheSouthChinaSea,Center foraNewAmericanSecurity,EastandSouthChinaSeaBulletinno.5,September2012.
34

Dennis J. Blasko and M. Taylor Fravel, Much Ado About The Sansha Garrison, The Diplomat, August 23, 2012.
35

JohnJ.Tkacik,InvestigatingtheChineseThreat,PartOne:MilitaryandEconomicAggression,Testimony fortheHouseCommitteeonForeignAffairs,March28,2012,1418.

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ChinesefacilitiesonJohnsonSouthReefincludefouroctagonshapedhutsandarectangular two story building on a concrete base supporting two towers. One SATCOMM and three mast head antennas are mounted on the roof. Chigua Reef contains an identical building structureplusawoodenbarracks.SubiReefhostsawoodenbarracks,atwostorybuilding withaSATCOMMantennaandahelicopterlandingpad. In summary, Chinese facilities in the South China Sea will give the PLAN an enhanced capability to exercise its sovereignty claims over this area. According to naval specialists, Althoughsmallinsize,ifnecessarythesefacilitiescouldsupportfutureChineseexpansion throughout the area, and could perhaps even support a limited naval conflict in this congestedregion.36 ChinasParamilitaryFleets Chinasmaritimesurveillancefleetisestimatedatmorethan300vesselsonlytwoofwhich, the Haixun 11 and Haixun 31, weighed more than 3,000 tons. In October 2010, China announceditwouldbuildthirtysixnewCMSvesselsformaritimelawenforcementoverthe next five years. In May 2011, the CMS announced it would recruit 1,000 more law enforcementofficials,bringingitstotaltoover10,000personnel.AndinJune2011,China announcedplanstoexpanditsmaritimesurveillanceforcetosixteenaircraftandatotalof 350vesselsby2015. ChinasobjectiveofenforcingitsjurisdictionintheSouthChinaSeathroughanincreasingly modern civilian enforcement fleet was highlighted in late July 2012 with the launching of theHaixun01.37TheHaixun01weighsinat5,418tonsanditslargestandmostcapableship inChinasmaritimesurveillancefleet.Itcantravel18,500kmwithoutrefuellingandreacha topspeedof37kmperhour.TheHaixun01iscapableofsupportinghelicopteroperations. Also,itcanberth200passengersandcomesequippedwithanemergencymedicalsurgery. Insum,Chinahasdevelopedanenhancedcapabilitytoexerciseitssovereigntyclaimsover theSouthChinaSeaandprotectitsvitalSLOCsthroughtheMalaccaandSingaporeStraitsas wellasthecapacitytosurgeexpeditionaryforcesintotheSouthChinaSeafromthesebases

36 37

BussertandElleman,PeoplesLiberationArmyNavy,145.

ChinaLaunchestheCountrysLargestandMostAdvancedPatrolVessel,TheMaritimeExecutive,July30, 2012.

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withaconsiderablyshortenedlogisticstail.Byextension,Chinawillalsohavethecapacityto interdict the same SLOCs on which Japan, Taiwan and South Korea are dependent. These developments portend a greater Chinese capacity to assert regional influence and to challengeU.S.navalsupremacy.

Part3U.S.StrategyofRebalancing
When the Obama Administration took office in 2009, it quickly asserted that the United StatesisbackinAsia.TheUnitedStatespromptlyaccededtotheASEANTreatyofAmity andCooperation,appointedapermanentambassadortotheASEANSecretariatandrevived theannualASEANUnitedStatesleadersmeeting.WhenChineseassertivenessintheSouth ChinaSearaisedregionalsecurityconcerns,boththeU.S.SecretaryofStateandSecretary ofDefenseusedvisitstotheregiontodeclarethattheUnitedStateshadanationalinterest insafetyofnavigationandoverflightintheSouthChinaSea. IndirectresponsetoChinesenavalmodernization,theU.S.deployedthirtyoneofitsfifty three fast attack submarines to the Pacific and stepped up its antisubmarine warfare program.EighteenoftheU.S.subsarehomeportedinPearlHarbor;theothersarebasedin Guam.38InlateJuneearlyJuly2010,inacalculateddemonstrationofnavalpower,theUSS Florida, USS Michigan, and USS Ohio submarines, simultaneously surfaced in Diego Garcia (IndianOcean),Busan(SouthKorea)andSubicBay(thePhilippines),respectively.39Eachof thesesubmarineshasbeenmodifiedtocarry154conventionalTomahawkcruisemissiles. AlloftheabovedevelopmenttookplacebeforetheformalannouncementthattheUnited Stateswouldrebalanceitsforces. This year the United States announced that with its withdrawal from Iraq and eventual withdrawal from Afghanistan, it will rebalance its force posture and quarantine defence cutsintheAsiaPacific.TheheightenedimportanceoftheAsiaPacificwasunderscoredin January 2012 with the release of a new national defense strategy, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership:Prioritiesfor21stCenturyDefense.Thisdocumentstated:
U.S.economicandsecurityinterestsareinextricablylinkedtodevelopmentsinthearcextending fromtheWesternPacificandEastAsiaintotheIndianOceanregionandSouthAsiacreatinga mixofevolvingchallengesandopportunities.Accordingly,whiletheU.S.militarywillcontinueto
38 39

NavyTimes,July21,2010. TheChosunIlbo,July8,2010andTimeMagazine,July8,2010.

16 contributetosecurityglobally,wewillofnecessityrebalancetowardtheAsiaPacificregion.Our relationshipswithAsianalliesandkeypartnersarecriticaltothefuturestabilityandgrowthof theregion.Wewillemphasizeourexistingalliances,whichprovideavitalfoundationforAsia Pacificsecurity.Wewillexpandournetworksofcooperationwithemergingpartnersthroughout the AsiaPacific to ensure collective capability and capacity for securing common interests [emphasisinoriginal].40

The United States also is developing an airsea battle concept to counter Chinas development of areadenial/antiaccess capabilities. The airsea battle concept is being drawn up to enable the United States to prevail in conflicts where areadenial/antiaccess capabilitiesarewelldeveloped.AccordingtothenewU.S.defensestrategyoneoftheten main missions for U.S. armed forces is to project power despite antiaccess/area denial challenges.41InresponsetoChinasuseofasymmetriccapabilities,includingelectronicand cyber warfare, ballistic and cruise missiles, advanced air defences, mining and other methods,tocomplicateouroperationalcalculus,theU.S.military
will invest as required to ensure its ability to operate effectively in antiaccess and area denial (A2/AD) environments. This will include implementing the Joint Operational Access Concept, sustaining our undersea capabilities, developing a new stealth bomber, improving missile defenses, and continuing efforts to enhance the resiliency and effectiveness of critical space basedcapabilities[emphasisinoriginal].42

New developments in U.S. military technology will see the introduction of more sophisticated undersea drones and unmanned systems for intelligence gathering, reconnaissance and surveillance such as Large Diameter Unmanned Underwater Vehicles and Persistent Littoral Undersea Surveillance Systems.43 According to Mark Valencia, the deploymentofthesenewsystemswillgeneratetensionsandmorefrequentcrises;they willproducedefensivereactionsandescalatorydynamics;andtheywillleadtolessstability inthemostaffectedregions,especiallyinAsia.44

40 41 42 43

SustainingU.S.GlobalLeadership:Prioritiesfor21 CenturyDefense(January2012),2. Ibid.,4. Ibid.,45.

st

In October 2012, the U.S. Navy successfully fired six Rafael Spike missiles from an unmanned surface st precision module (USV PEM) in the first demonstration of this capability. Navy Demonstrates 1 launch of SpikeMissilesfromUnmannedSurfaceVehicles,NAVSEAOfficeofCorporateCommunications,October26, 2012.
44

MarkJ.Valencia,TheSouthChinaSea,MilitaryActivitiesandtheLawoftheSea,Paperpresentedtothe International Conference on Major Law and Policy Issues in the South China Sea: European and American Perspectives,cosponsoredbytheInstituteofEuropeanandAmericanStudiesandtheCenterforAsiaPacific Studies,AcademiaSinica,Taipei,Taiwan,October78,2011.

17

Part4U.S.InitiativesinSoutheastAsia
Chinas increased military prowess also has implications for the South China Sea where Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei have conflicting territorial and maritime disputes with China. Chinas increasing assertiveness has raised regional security concerns aboutChinasstrategicintentionsanditschallengetoU.S.primacy.SeveralSoutheastAsian states have sought reassurance from the United States that it will continue to remain engaged in the region. The United States has responded to these concerns by declaring it has a national interest in the freedom and safety of navigation and over flight in the maritimecommonsandunimpededcommerce. The United States has responded to Chinas naval buildup and development of anti access/areadenialcapabilitiesbystrengtheningitspostureonGuam,steppingupweapons andequipmentsalestothePhilippines,negotiatingnewarrangementswithAustraliagiving theU.S.greateraccesstotrainingfacilitiesnearDarwin,andbasingCombatLittoralShipsin Singapore.45 ThePhilippines ChineseassertivenessinwatersclaimedbythePhilippinesledPresidentBenignoAquinoto takestepstorevitalizeitsalliancewiththeUnitedStatesandtoseekclarificationofwhether or not their 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) would apply in the case of conflict with ChinaintheSouthChinaSea. The Philippines policy of revitalizing its alliance with the U.S. has been reinforced by the Obama Administrations new defence policy of rebalancing towards the AsiaPacific. U.S. defence officials view support to improve the Philippines maritime capabilities as part of thestrategicrebalancingpolicy.AccordingtoDeputySecretaryforDefenseAshtonCarter, We are focused on building the Philippines maritime security presence and capabilities, andstrengtheningtheirmaritimedomainawareness.46 ThishasalreadyresultedinastepupinU.S.accesstothePhilippines.Forexample,between MayandOctober2012,fourU.S.Navynuclearsubmarines(SSNs)havemadeportcalls:USS

45

Craig Whitlock, Navys next stop in Asia will set China on edge, Checkpoint Washington, November 18, 2011
46

RemarksbyDeputySecretaryforDefense[Ashton]CarterattheWoodrowWilsonCenter,October2,2012.

18

North Carolina (May), USS Louisville (June), USS Hawaii (September) and USS Olympia (October). Vietnam TheUnitedStatesandVietnamhavesteppedupmodestdefencecooperationactivitiesto include flyoutstoU.S.aircraftcarrierstransitingtheSouthChinaSea,shiprepairs,anew senior leaders dialogue, signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on defence cooperationandtheinitiationoflowlevelnavalexchangeactivities. In 2009, Vietnamese defence officials began making highpublicity fly outs to U.S. aircraft carrierstransitingtheSouthChinaSeaoffVietnamseasternseaboard.Thefirsttookplace in April 2009 when Vietnamese officials landed on the USS John D. Stennis. This was followed by flyouts to the USS George Washington in August 2010, August 2011 and October 2012. In addition, in December 2009 Vietnams Defence Minister stopped off in HawiienroutetoWashington,D.C.Hewasphotographedpeeringthroughtheperiscopeof theUSSFlorida(SSGN),anuclearattacksubmarine.InAugust2010,Vietnamesediplomatic officials visited the newest U.S. aircraft carrier, the USS George H.W. Bush at Norfolk, to markthefifteenthanniversaryofdiplomaticrelations.Thisvisitcoincidedwiththeflyoutto theUSSGeorgeWashington,halfaworldaway. In 2009, Vietnams Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung dramatically announced that the commercialrepairfacilitiesatCamRanhBaywouldbeopentoallnaviesoftheworld.The U.S. was the first country to take up the offer. The following year the United States and Vietnam signed a contract for the minor maintenance and repair of U.S. Navy Maritime Sealift Command ships. Five ships were subsequently repaired: the USNS Richard E. Byrd underwentvoyagerepairsinFebruaryMarch2010,August2011,andJune2012;theUSNS WalterS.DiehlinOctober2011andtheUSNSRappahannockinFebruary2012.Thethree mostrecentrepairswerecarriedoutatcommercialfacilitiesinCamRanhBay. In August 2010, the USVietnam defense dialogue was upgraded to a Defense Policy Dialogue between officials at deputy minister level. The first meeting was held in Hanoi. VietnamwasrepresentedbyDeputyMinisterofNationalDefenceLt.Gen.NguyenChiVinh and the U.S. was represented by Robert Scher, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for South and Southeast Asia. The two sides agreed to cooperate in military exchanges and

19

training and collaboration in search and rescue and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. TheU.S.andVietnamsignedtheirfirstformalmilitaryagreement,aStatementofIntenton MilitaryMedicalCooperationonAugust1,2011;47andtheCommanderoftheU.S.7thFleet visitedHanoifourdayslater.Thesedevelopmentstookplaceimmediatelypriortothe2nd U.S.VietnamDefencePolicyDialogueheldinWashingtononSeptember19,2011.Deputy AssistantSecretaryofDefenceRobertScherandViceMinisterofNationalDefenceLt.Gen. NguyenChiVinhsignedthefirstformalMemorandumofUnderstanding(MOU)ondefence cooperation.TheMOUincludedfivepriorityareas:theestablishmentofaregularhighlevel dialogue between defence ministries; maritime security; search and rescue; studying and exchangingexperiencesonUnitedNationspeacekeeping;andhumanitarianassistanceand disasterrelief. In June 2012, Vietnam hosted Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta.48 Prior to his arrival in Hanoi, Secretary Panetta unexpectedly and symbolically stopped in Cam Ranh Bay to meetwiththecrewoftheUSNSRichardE.Byrdundergoingminorvoyagerepairs.Panettas visitledtospeculationthattheUnitedStatesNavymightreturntoCamRanh.Themeeting between the two defence ministers focused on the implementation of the 2010 MOU. Vietnams National Defence Minister General Phung Quang Thanh flagged future cooperation in addressing nontraditional security issues such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and search and rescue. He also noted a longstanding Vietnamese concern to elicit further support from the U.S. to address legacies from the Vietnam War (eg.AgentOrangeandunexplodedordnancedisposal).Healsorepeatedarequestthathe madeduringhisfirstvisittoWashingtoninDecember2009fortheU.S.toliftitsrestrictions onmilitarysalestoVietnam

Part5ForceModernizationTrends:ANewAssessment
Chinasmilitarymodernisationandtransformation,especiallynavalmodernisation,coupled withincreasedChineseassertivenessintheSouthChinaSea,hascreatedasecuritydilemma

47

TheStatementofIntenttocooperateinhealthisaprecursorforexchangesandresearchcollaborationin militarymedicine.
48

CarlyleA.Thayer,HanoiandthePentagon:ABuddingCourtship,U.S.NavalInstitute,June11,2012. http://news.usni.org/news-analysis/hanoi-and-pentagon-budding-courtship.

20

forSoutheastAsiasstates.49Chinaseffortstosafeguarditssecuritybydevelopingwhatit considersareasonableforcestructuretodetertheUnitedStateshascreatedinsecurityin severalASEANstatesduetoChinaslackoftransparency. ASEAN states have been circumspect in public statements but their concerns can be discernedbythesignificantriseindefenceexpendituresandthekindsofweaponsystems and platforms that they have acquired. Several regional states are developing their own antiaccess/areadenial capabilities.50 In addition, Southeast Asias arms procurements go beyond force modernisation and include the introduction of new capabilities that can be operated at extended ranges. It should be recognized, however, that not all of these new capabilities have been acquired in response to Chinas military build up. The subsections below reviews force modernization developments in the Philippines, Vietnam and elsewhereintheregion. ThePhilippines In 2011, in response to Chinese assertiveness in its EEZ and Kalayaan Island Group, the Philippines drew up a new defence strategy focused on both internal security operations andexternalterritorialdefence.TheAquinoAdministrationallocatedP11billiontosupport forcemodernisationoftheArmedForcesofthePhilippines(AFP).InMarch2011,AFPChief ofStaffGeneralEduardoObanannouncedplanstoupgradetheairfieldonPagAsaisland. TwomonthslateraPhilippinenavystudyrecommendedtheacquisitionofsubmarinesasa deterrentagainstfuturepotentialconflicts.51 InSeptember2011,PresidentAquinoannouncedthat4.95billionpesoswouldbeallocated to top up the defence budget.52 These funds were earmarked for the purchase a naval patrol vessel, six helicopters and other military equipment in order to secure the Malampayaoilandgasproject.In2012,thePhilippinegovernmentbeganimplementation of a fiveyear modernization program totalling P40 billion. In July 2012, the Philippines

49

Forarecentappreciationsee:AndrewShearer,SoutheastAsiaandAustralia:CaseStudiesinRespondingto Chinas Military Power, in Ashley J. Tellis and Travis Tanner, eds., Strategic Asia 201213: Chinas Military Challenge(SeattleandWashington:NationalBureauofAsianResearch,2012),241275.
50

RobertKarniol,VietnampreparestobetterprotectitsS.ChinaSeaclaims,TheStraitsTimes,January10, 2012.
51 52

PhilippineDailyInquirer,May17,2001. AgenceFrancePresse,September7,2011.

21

announced a U.S. $1.8billionfundtopurchasearefurbishedfrigate,C130aircraft,utility andcombathelicoptersaswellasotherdefenceequipment.53 In 201112, the Philippines took delivery of two former U.S. Coast Guard Weather Endurance Cutters. The first cutter has been assigned to operate in waters off Palawan in WesternCommandwiththemissionofprotectingthePhilippinesEEZ.ThePhilippinesalso expectstotakedeliveryofthreenewTaiwanmanufacturedMultiPurposeAttackCraftand procure a third U.S. Coast Guard Hamiltonclass Cutter.54 The Philippines has signed an agreement with Italys Defence Ministry to acquire military equipment, possibly including frigatesandaircraft. ThePhilippineshaspresentedthePentagonwithawishlistofnewequipmentincluding: coastal radar, longrange patrol aircraft, strategic sea lift vessels, three offshore patrol boats,twotofivenavalhelicopters,airdefenceradar,sixjettrainers,surfaceattackaircraft, antishipmissiles,andasubmarine.55 ThePhilippineshasalsoreachedouttoJapan,SouthKorea,FranceandtheUnitedKingdom for defence acquisitions. In September 2011, during President Aquinos visit to Tokyo, he and Prime Minister Noda agreed to strengthen maritime security ties by holding frequent highleveldefencediscussionsandbysteppingupcooperationbetweentheirCoastGuards anddefencerelatedauthorities.PrimeMinisterNodaagreedtoincreasetheinvolvement of Japans Coast Guard in training their Filipino counterparts.56 Following a visit by South Koreas President Lee Myungbak to Manila in November 2011, President Aquino announced that the Philippines would purchase military equipment form Seoul. The Department of National Defense was reported to be drawing up a list including aircraft, helicopters,boatsandothermilitaryequipment. Vietnam In2009,inamajordevelopment,Vietnamannouncedthatitwouldprocuresixconventional

53 54 55

ManuelMogato,PhilippinesRefusestoBudgeonSouthChinaSeaRow,Reuters,July23,2012. Reuters,April13,2011andAFP,September3,2011.

The Philippine Star, August 24, 2011. For a discussion of U.S. arms sales and transfers to the Philippines consult: Ronald ORourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: IssuesforCongress,CRSReportforCongress(Washington,D.C.:CongressionalResearchService,October22, 2012),4042.
56

TheWallStreetJournal,September28,2011.

22

diesel powered Kiloclass submarines from Russia. These are scheduled to be delivered in 2014. The Kiloclass submarines are likely to be equipped with seaskimming 3M54 Klub antishipmissileswitharangeof300kilometres. In2011,Vietnamsteppedupitsforcemodernizationprogramwhenittookdeliveryoffour additionalSu30MK2multirolejetfighters.TheseareexpectedtobeequippedwiththeKh 59MK antiship cruise missile with a range of 115 km. Vietnam currently has on order sixteen more Su30MK2 jet fighters.57 Also in 2011, Vietnam also took delivery of two Gephardclass guided missile stealth frigates armed with Kh35E antiship missiles with a rangeof130kmandtwoSvetlyakclassmissilePatrolBoats.58Inaddition,Vietnamlaunched itsfirstindigenouslybuiltOceanPatrolVesselandtrooptransport.59InOctober,whileona tour of the Netherlands, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung gave his approval for the purchase of four Sigmaclass corvettes, two of which are slated for construction in Vietnam.60 In2011,VietnambeefedupitscoastaldefencesbyacquiringitssecondBastionlandbased antiship ballistic missile system. Vietnam reportedly has acquired Israeli Extended Range ArtilleryMunitionsballisticmissileseffectivebeyond150km.InOctober2011,President TruongTanSangmadeastatevisittoIndiaandrequestedIndianassistanceinfourareas: submarinetraining,conversiontrainingforpilotstoflySukhoi30s,transferofmediumsized patrolboats,andmodernizationofportfacilitiesatNhaTrang.61Thelocalmediareported that India was considering whether or not to sell Vietnam its BrahMos supersonic cruise missile.62InFebruary2012,RussiaannounceditwillcoproducetheUranantishipmissile (SSN25Switchblade)withVietnam.63 InNovember2011,Vietnamannounceda$3.3billiondefencebudgetfor2012,areported riseof35%over2010.AccordingtoIHSJanesVietnamsannualnavalprocurementbudget

57 58

ThanhNienNews,July3,2011.

The Voice of Russia, June 22, 2011; BBC Vietnamese Service, August 24, 2011 and October 25, 2011; and InterfaxAVN,October11,2011.
59 60 61 62 63

BBCVietnameseService,October3,2011. BBCVietnameseService,October18,2011. TheHindu,November9,2011. BusinessInsider,September20,2011. RIANovosti,February15,2012.

23

hasincreasedby150%since2008toUS$276millionin2011.Thenavalbudgetisprojected toriseto$400millionby2015.64Vietnamisseekingtodevelopanantisubmarinewarfare capabilitybyacquiringeithertheU.S.P3OrionoftheSpanishAirbusMilitaryC295.65 Regional66 According to one noted regional security analyst, naval acquisitions in Asia have become especiallydisturbing,withundeniablesignsofactionreactiondynamicsandNortheastAsia inparticulariswitnessinganemergingnavalarmsrace.67Defenceanalystsestimatethat 86 submarines will be added to the fleets in the AsiaPacific by 2020 of which 30 will be Chinese.68 China currently has the largest submarine fleet and most extensive plans to expand its numbers including the Type 095 nuclear attack submarine (SSN) and Type 094 JinclassSSBN.ChinaisexpectedtobasebothattackandballisticmissilesubmarinesatYulin Naval Base on Hainan Island. This prospect has led Australia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and the United States to step up investment in their antisubmarine warfare capabilities. Security analysts warn that the proliferation of submarine fleets may be destabilizing in times of tensions and crises due to the complexities of command and control. In Southeast Asia the conventional submarine has become the new hallmark of naval acquisitions. Vietnams purchase of Kiloclass submarines is part of a regional trend.69 Indonesia, the first country in Southeast Asia to acquire submarines, has indicated it will replace them with newer South Korean models. Indonesia reportedly will boost defence spendingby35%in2012.70Singaporehasupgradeditssubmarinefleetbytakingdeliveryof

64 65 66

QuotedinTheEconomicTimes,November14,2011. AviationWeek,February17,2012.

Richard A. Bitzinger, Recent Developments in Naval and Maritime Modernization in the AsiaPacific: Implications for Regional Security, in Phillip C. Saunders, Christopher D. Yung, Michael Swaine and Andrew NienDzu Yang, eds., The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2011), 2340 and Richard A. Bitzinger, Military Modernization in the AsiaPacific: AssessingNewCapabilities,inStrategicAsia201011:AsiasRisingPowerandAmericasContinuedPurpose (SeattleandWashington,D.C.:NationalBureauofAsianResearch,2010),79111.
67

DesmondBall,AsiasNavalArmsRace,Paperpresentedtothe25 AsiaPacificRoundtable,ISISMalaysia, KualaLumpur,29May1June2011.


68 69 70

th

BusinessWeek,November25,2011. AviationWeek,February17,2012. AlJazeera.net,November7,2011.

24

twoArcherclasssubmarinesin2011.71Singaporereportedlyisinthemarketforfourorfive P3COrionmaritimepatrolaircraft.72MalaysiahasacquiredtwoScorpeneclasssubmarines. Both the Singaporean and Malaysian submarines are equipped with Air Independent Propulsion systems. Thailand and the Philippines are currently considering acquiring their ownconventionalsubmarines. Regionalforcemodernizationhasandwillcontinuetoresultintheintroductionofincreased numbers of warships equipped with new technologies and weapons systems. A recent review of regional force modernization over the last decade highlights the introduction of new capabilities such as standoff precisionstrike, longrange airborne and undersea attack, stealth, mobility and expeditionary warfare and, above all, new capacities when it comes to greatly improved command, control communications, computing, intelligence, surveillanceandreconnaissance(C4ISR)networks.73Thisreviewconcludes,newtypesof armaments promise to significantly upgrade and modernize the manner of war fighting in theregion[and]fundamentallychangetheconceptandconductofwarfare.74 In summary, Southeast Asias arms buying spree, although largely intended for defensive purposes, may have a destabilising impact on regional security. According to Vice Admiral ScottSwift,CommanderU.S.SeventhFleet,hisprimeconcernisnottheoutbreakofamajor conflict but any tactical trigger with strategic implications I do have concerns about a specificbrushupthatcouldresultinatacticalmiscalculation75Sofartherehavebeenfew ifanyindicationsthatthisissueisbeingeffectivelyaddressedbyASEANcentricmultilateral organizations.

Part6ProspectsforCooperationforRegionalSecurity
ThemajorchallengetoSoutheastAsiasstrategicinterestsisthepotentialforgreatpower rivalry to undermine ASEAN centrality and regional autonomy and contribute to regional

71 72 73

TheStraitsTimes,December3,2011. FlightGlobal,December15,2011.

Richard A. Bitzinger, A New Arms Race? Explaining Recent Southeast Asian Military Acquisitions, ContemporarySoutheastAsia,31(1),April2010,6364.
74 75

Bitzinger,ANewArmsRace?ExplainingRecentSoutheastAsianMilitaryAcquisitions,64.

QuotedbyStephenCoates,USPacificcommanderwarnsoftacticalerrors,TheChinaPost,November10, 2011. Admiral Smith also noted that he expected diplomacy to prevail in the event of a brushup and compromisetoprevail.

25

instability. Major power rivalry could impact directly on regional security in one of three ways:aconflictbetweenthemajorpowers,aconflictbetweenamajorpowerandalittoral state, and a conflict between a major power and a littoral state that draws in the other major power. Major power rivalry could impact indirectly on regional security by spilling over and affecting ASEAN cohesion resulting in individual members calculating whether alignmentwithamajorpowerisabetterguaranteeoftheirnationalsecuritythanASEAN multilateralism.ASEANstatescurrentlypreferabalanceamongthemajorpowersanddono wanttobecomeinvolvedinadisputebetweenthemorbeforcedtochoosesides. The subsections below consider whether China and the United States will be able to manage their relationship peacefully and the prospects for multilateral institutions in promotingmaritimecooperationforregionalsecurity (a)U.S.ChinaStrategicDefenceDialogues U.S.diplomaticinterventionintheSouthChinaSeaissuecoupledwithitsnewlyannounced policyofrebalancingitsglobalforceposturehasprovokedanegativeifnothostilereaction byChina.ChinaviewstheU.S.asanoutsidepowerwhoseinterventionwillonlycomplicate matters. At a recent conference hosted by the Australian Chief of Army, PLA Lt. Gen. Ren Haiquanofferedthisbluntassessment:
Some countries pursue strategies such as rebalance to the AsiaPacific and looking East and areincreasingtheirstrategicinvestment.SeveralcountriesdonotletgotheColdWarmentality. They are consolidating military alliance system in Asia Pacific and strengthening their military presenceandmilitarydeterrencecapability.76

The United States has repeatedly called on China to be more open about its military modernization and has repeatedly sought open militarytomilitary defence contacts to manage their relations. The Obama Administrations new defense strategy states with respecttoChina:
Overthelongterm,Chinasemergenceasaregionalpowerwillhavethepotentialtoaffectthe U.S. economy and our security in a variety of ways. Our two countries have a strong stake in peace and stability in East Asia and an interest in building a cooperative bilateral relationship. However, the growth of Chinas military power must be accompanied by greater clarity of its strategicintentionsinordertoavoidcausingfrictionintheregion.77
76

QuotedbyBrendanNicholson,ChinesetopbrassbagsUSinfluenceintheregion,TheAustralian,October 31,2012.
77

Ibid.,2.

26

The U.S. and China currently have nearly sixty mechanisms for coordination and collaborationonstrategicpolicyissues.TheObamaAdministrationhassoughttomanageits relationswithChinathroughnewmechanismssuchastheStrategicandEconomicDialogue S&ED)andConsultationsonAsiaPacificAffairs.Militaryrepresentativesareincludedboth aspartoftheS&EDprocessandtheseparateStrategicSecurityDialoguewithintheS&ED. ThePentagonconsistentlyhassoughttokeepchannelsofcommunicationopenwithChina through various bilateral dialogue mechanisms. A review of three key mechanisms Defense Consultative Talks (DCT), the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) and the Special Policy Dialogue/Defense Policy Coordination Talks (SPD/DPCT) demonstrates that it has been very difficult to isolate purely militarytomilitary contacts fromtheirpoliticalandstrategicsettings.Forexample,continuedU.S.armssalestoTaiwan and U.S. intelligence gathering in Chinas EEZ have caused China to suspend scheduled meetingsinprotest. What does a balance sheet on the performance of these multilateral mechanisms tell us aboutU.S.Chinamilitaryrelations?Ontheplussidethefollowingaccomplishmentscanbe noted: (1) exchange visits by highlevel defense officials (defense ministers and chiefs of defense forces); (2) regular Defense Consultation Talks; (3) continuing working level discussionsundertheMMCA(4)agreementonthe7pointconsensus;78(5)noseriousnaval incidents since the 2009 USNS Impeccable affair; (6) continuing exchange visits by senior officers (7) the initiation of a Strategic Security Dialogue as part of the S&ED process; (8) agreement to hold meetings between Coast Guards and (9) agreement on a new working grouptodraftprinciplesestablishingaframeworkformilitarytomilitarycooperation.79 OnthenegativesideitmustbenotedfirstthatU.S.Chinamilitarytomilitarycontactshave gone through cycles of cooperation and suspension. In 2009 a U.S. diplomatic cable reported a senior PLA official as observing, the defense relationship lags behind other aspects of the overall bilateral relationship and it is often caught in a vicious cycle of

78

The7pointconsensuswasreachedinOctober2009betweenSecretaryofDefenseRobertGatesandby GeneralXuCaihou,ViceChairmanoftheCentralMilitaryCommittee,inWashington,D.C.inOctober2009.
79

Carlyle A. Thayer, Enhancing Transparency? U.S.China MilitarytoMilitary Contacts and Strategic Dialogues,PresentationtoInternationalConferenceonTheU.S.andChinainRegionalSecurity:Implications forAsiaandEurope,cosponsoredbyStiftungWissenshaftundPolitikandKonradAdenauerStiftung,Berlin, FederalRepublicofGermany,June1819,2012,2122.

27

progress and suspension.80 The senior PLA official noted that with two exceptions all other suspensions in militarytomilitary relations were the result of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.ShirleyKannotesthatChinapromotesrepeatedcyclesofsuspendingcontactsand then leverages the timing of their resumption.81 U.S. defense officials view this as the politicizationofmilitarytomilitarycontacts. Second,sincemilitarytomilitarycontactswerefirstinitiatedin1980untilthepresent,the U.S.andChinahaveonlybeenabletoreachonemilitarytomilitaryagreement,theMMCA. Anevaluationofthehealthofthisagreementisnotgood.AseniorPLAofficialofferedthis evaluation, We signed the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) in 1998 butoverthepast11yearsthemechanismfailedtoplayaneffectiverole.82Areviewofthe MMCAwrittenbytheU.S.principalnegotiator,arguedthatitremainstheonlymiltomil agreementbetweenthesetwonationsandisofonlylimitedeffectivenessbecauseitisheld hostagebyChinaoverU.S.actionsincarryingoutourstatedobligationsundertheTaiwan RelationsAct.83 Third, there is not much evidence that militarytomilitary contacts and strategic dialogue havereducedstrategicmistrustandraisedtransparency.84Chineseofficialsrepeatedlyraise three obstacles to bilateral defence cooperation in their discussions with the United States:continuedU.S.armssalestoTaiwan,U.S.intelligencegatheringinChinasExclusive Economic Zone, and FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act restrictions on military interaction with the PLA. U.S. policy towards the South China Sea policy represents an additionmajorirritant. Inweighinguptheplusesandnegativesinthebilateralrelationshipthebottomlineisthat despite the deficits the United States and China will persist in engaging with each other.

80

2009U.S.ChinaDefenseConsultativeTalks(DCT),Session1:MilitarytoMilitaryRelations,U.S.Embassy, Beijing,July1,2009.
81

Shirley A. Kan, U.S.China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service,February10,2012,4.
82 83

2009U.S.ChinaDefenseConsultativeTalks(DCT)SmallGroupSession,U.S.Embassy,Beijing,July1,2009.

Bruce Lemkin, U.S.Taiwan Relations Are No Threat to China, Defense News, November 8, 2012. Lemkin wasDeputyUnderSecretaryoftheU.S.AirForce(InternationalAffairs)from200310
84

See the sobering review offered by Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, Addressing U.S.China Strategic Distrust,JohnL.ThorntonChinaCenterMonographSeriesNo.4,Washington,DC:TheJohnL.ThorntonChina CenteratBrookings,March2012,733.

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Bothsidesunderstandthatmilitarytomilitarycontactsareacriticalcomponentofbilateral engagement. Without such interaction there is a risk that mistrust between the two militariescouldspilloverandhaveamajornegativeimpactonbilateralrelationsingeneral. It is likely that strategic mistrust will persist through lack of greater transparency and militarytomilitary relations will continue to exhibit elements of cooperation and contention. When incidents and disputes arise between the two militaries, the civilian leadershipwillintervene,asithasinthepast,toresetbilateralrelations. (b)CurrentMultilateralInitiatives TheEastAsiansecurityarchitectureiscurrentlyevolvingasaresultoftheexpansionofthe EastAsiaSummit(EAS)in2011toincludetheUnitedStatesandRussianFederation.Atthe 2011 EAS informal leaders retreat, sixteen of its eighteen members raised concerns over maritime security issues. China was the only country to argue that the EAS was not an appropriatevenueforsuchdiscussions.Nevertheless,theEASChairsconcludingsummary notedthatmaritimesecurityhasbeenestablishedasalegitimateagendaitem. Forthenewregionalsecurityarchitecturetobeeffectivetheremustbesomestreamlining of policy advice to the EAS from other multilateral arrangements currently considering maritime security issues. There are a number of overlapping arrangements under the auspices of ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum charged with maritime security and SouthChinaSeaissues: ASEANDefenceMinistersMeeting(ADMM).TheASEANDefenceMinistersmetforthe firsttimeinMay2006andbegantheprocessofinstitutionalizingdefencecooperation on a regional basis. The ASEAN Defence Ministers are now sectoral members of the ASEANPoliticalSecurityCouncilestablishedunderASEANsCharter.TheADMMbrought under its umbrella what had been separate informal meetings of the ASEAN service chiefs(army,navyandairandmilitaryintelligence)thathadbeenconductedoutsidethe official ASEAN framework. At the 4th ADMM in May 2010, in a first step to address maritime security issues, it was agreed that ASEAN navies would cooperate to patrol theirmaritimeboundaries. ASEANNavyChiefsMeeting(ANCM).Maritimesecurityissuesfallunderthepurviewof theANCM.TheprospectofpracticalcooperationamongASEANnaviesdoesnotappear

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good. At the ANCM5 in Vietnam in 2011 there was disagreement over a number of issuesincludingtheformalnameofthemeeting,howoftenitshouldmeet,conducting joint patrols, and a proposal for an ASEAN communications protocol when navy ships passedeachotheratsea. ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus). The ADMM was expanded in October 2010 to include eight of ASEANs dialogue partners: Australia, China, India, Japan,NewZealand,Russia,SouthKoreaandtheUnitedStates.Atthismeetingitwas agreed that the ADMM Plus would meet every three years with the second meeting scheduled for Brunei in 2013. It has since been decided that the ADMM Plus will now meeteverytwoyearsfrom2013.TheinauguralADMMPlusmeetingsetuptheASEAN DefenceSeniorsMeetingPlus(ADSOMPlus)andfiveExpertWorkingGroups(maritime security, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, peacekeeping, military medicine and counterterrorism). ADMMPlusExpertWorkingGrouponMaritimeSecurity(EWGonMS).TheEWGonMS isscheduledtomeettwiceayearandreportitsdeliberationstotheADSOMPlus.The ADMMPlusEWGonMSiscochairedbyMalaysiaandAustralia.Ithelditsfirstmeeting inPerthinJuly2011anddiscussedinformationsharing.ThetermsofreferenceforEWG onMSwereapprovedinOctober2011.InFebruary2012,Malaysiahostedthesecond EWG on MS that focused on specific initiatives for practical cooperation and capacity building.MalaysiatabledaConceptPaperonestablishingamechanismtosupportthe workandimplementthedecisionsoftheEWGonMS. ASEANMaritimeForum(AMF).ASEANestablishedtheAMFin2010underthetermsof the ASEAN Political Security Community Blueprint.85 The second meeting of the AMF washeldinThailandinAugust2011andproposedexpandingitsmembershiptoinclude dialogue partners in a separate meeting (AMF Plus). The AMF is focused on a comprehensiveapproachtomaritimeissuesandhassofarnotdealtwithSouthChina Seaissuesindetail.86TheAMFheldanexpandedmeetingin2012withtheinclusionof thepluseightdialoguepartners.

85 86

HanoiPlanofActiontoImplementtheASEANRegionalForumVisionStatement,May20,2010,Point3.
th

Chairs Statement of the 19 ASEAN Summit, Bali, 17 November 2011, Points 1417 (Maritime Cooperation).

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ARF InterSessional Meeting on Maritime Security (ARF ISM on Maritime Security). In 2009,theASEANRegionalForumestablishedtheARFISMonMSandlaterapprovedits Work Plan at the at the 44th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in July 2011.87 The ISM on MaritimeSecurityfocusesoninformationsharing,capacitybuilding,andtrainingrather thanpracticalactivitiessuchasSouthChinaSeaCBMs.

Theevolutionoftheregionalsecurityarchitectureisatanascentstageanditisunclearhow anexpandedEASwillrelatetothealreadyexistingmultilateralsecurityinstitutions.Onthe one hand, the current evolution of the regional security architecture may be viewed as a positive development since it brings together all the major actors, including the U.S. and China at head of state/government level. On the other hand, if China feels that the other externalpowersareganginguponit,theEASprocessmaybecomedeadlocked.Oftheeight dialoguepartners,fiveareeitheralliesorclosestrategicpartners(U.S.,Japan,SouthKorea, Australia,NewZealand).

Conclusion
WhataretheprospectsforfuturecooperationovermaritimesecurityandSouthChinaSea issues?ThefuturesecurityenvironmentoftheSouthChinaSearegionwillbeinfluencedby five major overlapping trends. These trends contain both stabilizing and destabilizing elements.Thefivetrendsare: U.S.Chinastrategicrivalry Regionalforcemodernization Increasedregionalmaritimeenforcementcapabilities Evolutionoftheregionalsecurityarchitecture ChinaASEANdiscussionsontheSouthChinaSea

China(andpossiblytheUnitedStates)isundergoingapowershiftasanewgenerationof leaders takes office. In the shortterm, strategic mistrust will continue to influence their bilateralrelationsandanymaritimesecurityincidentcouldbeviewedasachallengetothe new leadership. Over the longer term, however, the top leaders of China and the United

87

ASEANRegionalForum,DraftOutlineofaWorkPlanonMaritimeSecurity:ATemplateforDiscussion,2 ARF ISM on Maritime Security, Auckland, 2931 March 2010; CoChairs Summary of the Third ARF Inter th th Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security, Tokyo, Japan, 1415 February 2011; and 44 AM/PMC/18 ARF, th Indonesia2011,ChairsStatement,18 ASEANRegionalForum,23July2011,Bali,Indonesia,Point41.

nd

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Statescanbeexpectedtomeetandsetobjectivesandprioritiesfortheirrelationship.Major powerrelationswillcontinuetoreflectcontentionandcooperation. Chineseandregionalforcemodernizationprograms,coupledwiththeincreaseinmaritime enforcement capabilities by China and regional states, represent potentially destabilising trends. Chinas growing naval power will not eliminate Southeast Asias security dilemma. The most disturbing trend is Chinas increased reliance on citizen fishing fleets and state paramilitaryforcestoconcentrateinadisputedareainordertoassertChinesejurisdiction. RecentjointexercisesbetweenthePLANandCMS/FLECvesselsareparticularlyunsettling. ChineseassertivenesshasprovokedtheU.S.torebalanceitsforcepostureandincreaseits presence in the South China Sea. The South China Seas contested waters will become increasinglycongestedraisingthepossibilityofanaccidentalmishap. Intheshorttermitisunlikelythattheevolvingregionalsecurityarchitecturewillbeableto effectively manage challenges to maritime security. The ASEANcentric regional security architecture is an inchoate mixture of multilateral mechanisms with overlapping responsibilities.ASEANDefenceMinistershavenotbeenparticularlyproactiveinaddressing maritimesecurityissues.TheASEANRegionalForumcanonlypromoteconfidencebuilding measures; preventive diplomacy is barely on the horizon. The ADMM Plus process shows somesignsofprogress,butitisproceedingattooslowapace.Itremainstobeseenhow the defence ministers will respond to proposals from their Expert Working Groups. The ADMMPlusmustmeetannuallyandreporttotheEAStobeeffective.SincetheEASworks onthebasisofconsensus,itwilltakesometimebeforeagreementisreachedonwhetheror how to streamline the regions existing multilateral security institutions. Strategic distrust between China and the United States is likely to hamstring the EAS and prevent it from takingeffectiveaction. Finally,ASEANChinadiscussionsonaCodeofConductappearaselusiveasever.ASEANand ChinaarepresentlyfocusedonimplementingtheDOCGuidelines.Theyhaveyettoinitiatea single cooperative project, and even if they do, there is no guarantee that confidence buildingmeasureswillspilloveraneffectpracticalmeasurestoaddressmaritimesecurity issues.RisingChinesedomesticnationalismhasbecomeparticularlyjingoisticandislikelyto scuttle any diplomatic effort that is perceived as undermining Chinas indisputable

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sovereignty over the South China Sea. Domestic nationalists have a natural ally in the PLA.88 Insum,SoutheastAsiaisripeforrivalrybutnotarmedconflictduetostrategicmistrust betweenarisingandincreasinglymilitarilypowerfulChinaandaUnitedStatescommitted to maintaining the present balance of power. These two powers will continue both to cooperateandcontend.TensionsintheirrelationswillbetransmittedtoSoutheastAsiaand pose challenges to ASEAN as its seeks to become a more cohesive and unified political securitycommunity. ThesecurityenvironmentinSoutheastAsiawillcontinuetobecharacterisedbyintractable sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea, rising resource nationalism, and potentially destabilizingregionalforcemodernizationprograms.Asaresult,regionalsealanesareset tobecomemorecrowded,contestedandvulnerabletoarmedstrife.89

88

WillyLam,ChinasHawksinCommand,TheWallStreetJournal,July1,2012;MichaelSheridan,Controlof PLA at heart of Chinas power struggle, The Australian, July 2, 2012; David Lague, Reuters, Chinas Hawks GainingSwayinSouthChinaSeaDispute,JakartaGlobe,July26,2012;YohanesSulaiman,ChinaPutsOna ShowofStrength,ButOnePartySystemShowingWeaknesses,JakartaGlobe,August1,2012;Chinamilitary strength put on display, Sky News, August 2, 2012; and Michael Sainsbury, Hu sets in motion train of succession,TheWeekendAustralian,August45,2012.
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RoryMedcalfandRaoulHeinrichs,CrisisandConfidence:MajorPowersandMaritimeSecurityinIndoPacific Asia(Sydney:LowyInstituteforInternationalPolicy,June2011),3.