Continuation of RA 6715

continuation of RA 6715
Sec. 12. Article 223 of the same Code is amended to read as follows:
"Article 223. Appeal. - Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless
appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such
decisions, awards, or orders. Such appeal may be entertained only on any of the following grounds:
"(a) If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor Arbiter;
"(b) If the decision, order or award was secured through fraud or coercion, including graft and
corruption;
"(c) If made purely on questions of law; and
"(d) If serious errors in the findings of facts are raised which would cause grave or irreparable damage or
injury to the appellant.
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only
upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the
Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.
In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as
the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The
employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to
his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting
of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein.
To discourage frivolous or dilatory appeals, the Commission or the Labor Arbiter shall impose reasonable
penalty, including fines or censures, upon the erring parties.
In all cases, the appellant shall furnish a copy of the memorandum of appeal to the other party who shall
file an answer not later than ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof.
The Commission shall decide all cases within twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of the answer of the
appellee.
"The decision of the Commission shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt
thereof by the parties.
Any law enforcement agency may be deputized by the Secretary of Labor and Employment or the
Commission in the enforcement of decisions, awards, or orders."
Article 224. Execution of decisions, orders, or awards. - (a) The Secretary of Labor and Employment or
any Regional Director, the Commission or any Labor Arbiter or Med-Arbiter, or the voluntary arbitrator or
panel of voluntary arbitrators may, motu propio or on motion of any interested party, issue a writ of
execution on a judgment within five (5) years from the date it becomes final and executory, requiring a
sheriff or a duly deputized officer to execute or enforce final decisions, orders or awards of the Secretary
of Labor and Employment or Regional Director, the Commission, or the Labor Arbiter or Med-Arbiter, or
voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators. In any case, it shall be the duty of the responsible
officer to separately furnish immediately the counsels of record and the parties with copies of said
decisions, orders and awards. Failure to comply with the duty prescribed herein shall subject such
responsible officer to appropriate administrative sanctions.
(b) The Secretary of Labor and Employment, and the Chairman of the Commission may designate special
sheriffs and take any measure under existing laws to ensure compliance with their decisions, orders or
awards and those of Labor Arbiters and voluntary arbitrators or panel of voluntary arbitrators, including
the imposition of administrative fines which shall not be less than five hundred pesos (P500.00) nor more
than ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00)."
Sec. 14. The second paragraph of Article 226 of the same Code is likewise hereby amended to read as
follows:
"The Bureau shall have fifteen (15) calendar days to act on labor cases before it, subject to extension by
agreement of the parties."
Sec. 15. Articles 230, 231 and 232 of the same Code are amended to read as follows:
Article 230. Appointment of bureau personnel. - The Secretary of Labor and Employment may appoint, in
addition to the present personnel of the Bureau and the Industrial Relations Divisions, such number of
examiners and other assistants as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this Code."
"Article 231. Registry of unions and file of collective agreements. - The Bureau shall keep a registry of
legitimate labor organizations.
"The Bureau shall also maintain a file of all collective bargaining agreements and other related
agreements and records of settlement of labor disputes, and copies of orders and decisions of voluntary
arbitrators or panel of voluntary arbitrators. The file shall be open and accessible to interested parties
under conditions prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, provided that no specific
information submitted in confidence shall be disclosed unless authorized by the Secretary, or when it is at
issue in any judicial litigation or when public interest or national security so requires.
Within thirty (30) days from the execution of a collective bargaining agreement, the parties shall submit
copies of the same directly to the Bureau or the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor and
Employment for registration accompanied with verified proofs of its posting in two conspicuous places in
the place of work and ratification by the majority of all the workers in the bargaining unit. The Bureau or
Regional Offices shall act upon the application for registration of such collective bargaining agreement
within five (5) calendar days from receipt thereof. The Regional Offices shall furnish the Bureau with a
copy of the collective bargaining agreement within five (5) days from its submission.
The Bureau or Regional Office shall assess the employer for every collective bargaining agreement a
registration fee of not less than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or in any other amount as may be
deemed appropriate and necessary by the Secretary of Labor and Employment for the effective and
efficient administration of the voluntary arbitration program. Any amount collected under this provision
shall accrue to the Special Voluntary Arbitration Fund.
The Bureau shall also maintain a file, and shall undertake or assist in the publication, of all final decisions,
orders and awards of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, Regional Directors and the Commission."
Article 232. Prohibition on certification. - The Bureau shall not entertain any petition for certification
election or any other action which may disturb the administration of duly registered existing collective
bargaining agreements affecting the parties except under Articles 253, 253-A and 256 of this Code.
Sec. 16. Paragraphs (c) and (j) of Article 241 of the same Code are amended to read as follows:
(c) The members shall directly elect their officers in the local union, as well as their national officers in
the national union or federation to which they or their local union is affiliated, by secret ballot at intervals
of five (5) years. No qualification requirement for candidacy to any position shall be imposed other than
membership in good standing in subject labor organization. The secretary or any other responsible union
officer shall furnish the Secretary of Labor and Employment with a list of the newly-elected officers,
together with the appointive officers or agents who are entrusted with the handling of funds within thirty
(30) calendar days after the election of officers or from the occurrence of any change in the list of
officers of the labor organization;
"(j) Every income or revenue of the organization shall be evidenced by a record showing its source, and
every expenditure of its funds shall be evidenced by a receipt from the person to whom the payment is
made, which shall state the date, place and purpose of such payment. Such record or receipt shall form
part of the financial records of the organization.
"Any action involving the funds of the organization shall prescribe after three (3) years from the date of
submission of the annual financial report to the Department of Labor and Employment or from the date
the same should have been submitted as required by law, whichever comes earlier: Provided, That this
provision shall apply only to a legitimate labor organization which has submitted the financial report
requirements under this Code: Provided, further, That failure of any labor organization to comply with the
periodic financial reports required by law and such rules and regulations promulgated thereunder six (6)
months after the effectivity of this Act shall automatically result in the cancellation of union registration of
such labor organization.'
"Article 242. Rights of legitimate labor organizations. - A legitimate labor organization shall have the
right:
"(a) To act as the representative of its members for the purpose of collective bargaining;
"(b) To be certified as the exclusive representative of all the employees in an appropriate collective
bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining;
"(c) To be furnished by the employer, upon written request, with his annual audited financial statements,
including the balance sheet and the profit and loss statement, within thirty (30) calendar days from the
date of receipt of the request, after the union has been duly recognized by the employer or certified as
the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in the bargaining unit, or within sixty
(60) calendar days before, or during the collective bargaining negotiation.
"(d) To own property, real or personal, for the use and benefit of the labor organization and its members;
"(e) To sue and be sued in its registered name; and
"(f) To undertake all other activities designed to benefit the organization and its members, including
cooperative, housing welfare and other projects not contrary to law.
"Notwithstanding any provision of a general or special law to the contrary, the income, and the properties
of legitimate labor organizations, including grants, endowments, gifts, donations and contributions they
may receive from fraternal and similar organizations, local or foreign, which are actually, directly and
exclusively used for their lawful purposes, shall be free from taxes, duties and other assessments. The
exemptions provided herein may be withdrawn only by a special law expressly repealing this provision."
Sec. 18. Article 245 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"Article 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of supervisory
employees. - Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization.
Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file
employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own."
Sec. 19. The third paragraph of Article 247 of the same Code, as amended, is further amended to read as
follows:
"Subject to the exercise by the President or by the Secretary of Labor and Employment of the powers
vested in them by Articles 263 and 264 of this Code, the civil aspects of all cases involving unfair labor
practices, which may include claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages, attorney's
fees and other affirmative relief, shall be under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters. The Labor Arbiters
shall give utmost priority to the hearing and resolution of all cases involving unfair labor practices. They
shall resolve such cases within thirty (30) calendar days from the time they are submitted for decision."
"Article 250. Procedure in collective bargaining. - The following procedures shall be observed in collective
bargaining:
"(a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement it shall serve a written notice upon the other party
with a statement of its proposals. The other party shall make a reply thereto not later than ten (10)
calendar days from receipt of such notice;
"(b) Should differences arise on the basis of such notice and reply, either party may request for a
conference which shall begin not later than ten (10) calendar days from the date of request;
"(c) If the dispute is not settled, the Board shall intervene upon request of either or both parties or at its
own initiative and immediately call the parties to conciliation meetings. The Board shall have the power to
issue subpoenas requiring the attendance of the parties to such meetings. It shall be the duty of the
parties to participate fully and promptly in the conciliation meetings the Board may call;
"(d) During the conciliation proceedings in the Board, the parties are prohibited from doing any act which
may disrupt or impede the early settlement of the disputes; and
"(e) The Board shall exert all efforts to settle disputes amicably and encourage the parties to submit their
case to a voluntary arbitrator."
Sec. 21. There shall be incorporated after Article 253 of the same Code a new article which shall read as
follows:
"Article 253-A. Terms of a collective bargaining agreement. - Any collective bargaining agreement that
the parties may enter into shall, insofar as the representation aspect is concerned, be for a term of five
(5) years. No petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent shall be
entertained and no certification election shall be conducted by the Department of Labor and Employment
outside of the sixty-day period immediately before the date of expiry of such five year term of the
collective bargaining agreement. All other provisions of the collective bargaining agreement shall be
renegotiated not later than three (3) years after its execution. Any agreement on such other provisions of
the collective bargaining agreement entered into within six (6) months from the date of expiry of the
term of such other provisions as fixed in the collective bargaining agreement, shall retroact to the day
immediately following such date. If any such agreement is entered into beyond six months, the parties
shall agree on the duration of retroactivity thereof. In case of a deadlock in the renegotiation of the
collective bargaining agreement, the parties may exercise their rights under this Code."
Sec. 22. Article 255 of the Labor Code, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Article 255. Exclusive bargaining representation and workers' participation in policy and decision-making.
- The labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate
collective bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the
purpose of collective bargaining. However, an individual employee or group of employees shall have the
right at any time to present grievances to their employer.
"Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, workers shall have the right, subject to such rules
and regulations as the Secretary of Labor and Employment may promulgate, to participate in policy and
decision-making processes of the establishment where they are employed insofar as said processes will
directly affect their rights, benefits and welfare. For this purpose, workers and employers may form labor-
management councils: Provided, That the representatives of the workers in such labor-management
councils shall be elected by at least the majority of all employees in said establishment."
Sec. 23. Article 256 of the same Code, as amended, is further amended to read as follows:
"Article 256. Representation issue in organized establishments. - In organized establishments, when a

verified petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent is filed before the
Department of Labor and Employment within the sixty-day period before the expiration of a collective
bargaining agreement, the Med-Arbiter shall automatically order an election by secret ballot when the
verified petition is supported by the written consent of at least twenty-five percent (25%) of all the
employees in the bargaining unit to ascertain the will of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit.
To have a valid election, at least a majority of all eligible voters in the unit must have cast their votes.
The labor union receiving the majority of the valid votes cast shall be certified as the exclusive bargaining
agent of all the workers in the unit. When an election which provides for three or more choices results in
no choice receiving a majority of the valid votes cast, a run-off election shall be conducted between the
labor unions receiving the two highest number of votes: Provided, That the total number of votes for all
contending unions is at least fifty per cent (50%) of the number of votes cast.
At the expiration of the freedom period, the employer shall continue to recognize the majority status of
the incumbent bargaining agent where no petition for certification election is filed."
Article 257. Petitions in unorganized establishment. - In any establishment where there is no certified
bargaining agent, a certification election shall automatically be conducted by the Med-Arbiter upon the
filing of a petition by a legitimate labor organization."
Section 25. Article 259 of the same Code is also hereby amended to read as follows:
Article 259. Appeal from certification election orders. - Any party to an election may appeal the order or
results of the election as determined by the Med-Arbiter directly to the Secretary of Labor and
Employment on the ground that the rules and regulations or parts thereof established by the Secretary of
Labor and Employment for the conduct of the election have been violated. Such appeal shall be decided
within fifteen (15) calendar days.
Sec. 26. There shall be incorporated after Article 259 of the same Code a new chapter to read as follows:
TITLE VIII-A
Grievance Machinery and Voluntary Arbitration
"Article 260. Grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration. - The parties to a collective bargaining
agreement shall include therein provisions that will ensure the mutual observance of its terms and
conditions. They shall establish a machinery for the adjustment and resolution of grievances arising from
the interpretation or implementation of their collective bargaining agreement and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies.
"All grievances submitted to the grievance machinery which are not settled within seven (7) calendar
days from the date of its submission shall automatically be referred to voluntary arbitration prescribed in
the collective bargaining agreement.
"For this purpose, parties to a collective bargaining agreement shall name and designate in advance a
voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators, or include in the agreement a procedure for the
selection of such voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators, preferably from the listing of
qualified voluntary arbitrators duly accredited by the Board. In case the parties fail to select a voluntary
arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators, the Board shall designate the voluntary arbitrator or panel of
voluntary arbitrators, as may be necessary, pursuant to the selection procedure agreed upon in the
collective bargaining agreement, which shall act with the same force and effect as if the voluntary
arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators have been selected by the parties as described above."
"Article 261. Jurisdiction of voluntary arbitrator and panel of voluntary arbitrators. - The voluntary
arbitrator or panel of arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all
unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the collective bargaining
agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies
referred to in the immediately preceding Article. Accordingly, violations of a collective bargaining
agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice
and shall be resolved as grievances under the collective bargaining agreement. For purposes of this
Article, gross violations of a collective bargaining agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal
to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement.
"The Commission, its Regional Offices and the Regional Directors of the Department of Labor and
Employment shall not entertain disputes, grievances or matters under the exclusive and original
jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators and shall immediately dispose and
refer the same to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitration provided in the collective bargaining
agreement."
"Article 262. Jurisdiction over other labor disputes. - The voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary
arbitrators, upon agreement of the parties, shall also hear and decide all other labor disputes including
unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks.
"Article 262-A. Procedures. - The voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators shall have the
power to hold hearings, receive evidences and take whatever action is necessary to resolve the issue or
issues subject of the dispute, including efforts to effect a voluntary settlement between parties.
"All parties to the dispute shall be entitled to attend the arbitration proceedings. The attendance of any
third party or the exclusion of any witness from the proceedings shall be determined by the voluntary
arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators. Hearings may be adjourned for cause or upon agreement by
the parties.
"Unless the parties agree otherwise, it shall be mandatory for the voluntary arbitrator or panel of
voluntary arbitrators to render an award or decision within twenty (20) calendar days from the date of
submission of the dispute to voluntary arbitration. "The award or decision of the voluntary arbitrator or
panel of voluntary arbitrators shall contain the facts and the law on which it is based. It shall be final and
executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties.
"Upon motion of any interested party, the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators or the
Labor Arbiter in the region where the movant resides, in case of the absence or incapacity of the
voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators for any reason, may issue a writ of execution
requiring either the sheriff of the Commission or regular courts or any public official whom the parties
may designate in the submission agreement to execute the final decision, order or award.
"Article 262-B. Cost of voluntary arbitration and voluntary arbitrator's fee. - The parties to a collective
bargaining agreement shall provide therein a proportionate sharing scheme on the cost of voluntary
arbitration including the voluntary arbitrator's fee. The fixing of fee of voluntary arbitrators, or panel of
voluntary arbitrators, whether shouldered wholly by the parties or subsidized by the Special Voluntary
Arbitration Fund, shall take into account the following factors:
"(a) Nature of the case;
"(b) Time consumed in hearing the case;
"(c) Professional standing of the voluntary arbitrator;
"(d) Capacity to pay of the parties; and
"(e) Fees provided for in the Revised Rules of Court."
Sec. 27. Paragraphs (g) and (i) of Article 263 of the same code, as amended, are hereby further
amended to read as follows:
"(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an
industry, indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume
jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory
arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended
or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already
taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall
immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all
workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of
Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to
ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same.
"In line with the national concern for and the highest aspect accorded to the right of patients to life and
health, strikes and lockouts in hospitals, clinics and similar medical institutions shall, to every extent
possible, be avoided, and all serious efforts, not only by labor and management but government as well,
be exhausted to substantially minimize, if not prevent their adverse effects on such life and health,
through the exercise, however legitimate, by labor of its right to strike and by management to lockout. In
labor disputes adversely affecting the continued operation of such hospitals, clinics, or medical
institutions, it shall be the duty of the striking union or locking-out employer to provide and maintain an
effective skeletal work force of medical and other health personnel, whose movement and services shall
be unhampered and unrestricted, as are necessary to ensure the proper and adequate protection of the
life and health of its patients, most especially emergency cases, for the duration of the strike or lockout.
In such cases, therefore, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may immediately assume, within
twenty four (24) hours from knowledge of the occurrence of such a strike or lockout, jurisdiction over the
same or certify it to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. For this purpose, the contending parties
are strictly enjoined to comply with such orders, prohibitions and/or injunctions as are issued by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission, under pain of immediate disciplinary action,
including dismissal or loss of employment status or payment by the locking-out employer of backwages,
damages and other affirmative relief, even criminal prosecution against either or both of them.
"The foregoing notwithstanding, the President of the Philippines shall not be precluded from determining
the industries that, in his opinion, are indispensable to the national interest, and from intervening at any
time and assuming jurisdiction over any labor dispute in such industries in order to settle or terminate the
same.
"(i) The Secretary of Labor and Employment, the Commission or the voluntary arbitrator or panel of
voluntary arbitrators shall decide or resolve the dispute within thirty (30) calendar days from the date of
the assumption of jurisdiction or the certification or submission of the dispute, as the case may be. The
decision of the President, the Secretary of Labor and Employment, the Commission or the voluntary
arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators shall be final and executory ten (10) calendar days after
receipt thereof by the parties."
Sec. 28. There is hereby incorporated in lieu of Article 265 of the same Code, which was repealed by
Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, a new provision to read as follows:
"Article 265. Improved offer balloting. - In an effort to settle a strike, the Department of Labor and
Management shall conduct a referendum by secret balloting on the improved offer of the employer on or
before the 30th day of the strike. When at least a majority of the union members vote to accept the
improved offer, the striking workers shall immediately return to work and the employer shall thereupon
readmit them upon the signing of the agreement.
"In case of a lockout, the Department of Labor and Employment shall also conduct a referendum by
secret balloting on the reduced offer of the union on or before the 30th day of the lockout. When at least
a majority of the board of directors or trustees or the partners holding the controlling interest in the case
of a partnership vote to accept the reduced offer, the workers shall immediately return to work and the
employer shall thereupon readmit them upon the signing of the agreement."
"Article 269. Prohibition against aliens; Exceptions. - All aliens, natural or juridical, as well as all foreign
organizations are strictly prohibited from engaging directly or indirectly in all forms of trade union
activities without prejudice to normal contacts between Philippine labor unions and recognized
international labor centers: Provided, however, That aliens working in the country with valid permits
issued by the Department of Labor and Employment, may exercise the right to self-organization and join
or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining: Provided,
further, That said aliens are nationals of a country which grants the same or similar rights to Filipino
workers."
Sec. 30. Paragraph (a) of Article 272 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Article 272. Penalties. - (a) Any person violating any of the provisions of Article 264 of this Code shall be
punished by a fine of not less than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) nor more than ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00) and/or imprisonment for not less than three (3) months nor more than three (3) years, or
both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court. Prosecution under this provision shall
preclude prosecution for the same act under the Revised Penal Code, and vice-versa."
"Article 274. Visitorial power. - The Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized
representative is hereby empowered to inquire into financial activities of legitimate labor organizations
upon the filing of a complaint under oath and duly supported by the written consent of at least twenty
percent (20%) of the total membership of the labor organization concerned and to examine their books
of accounts and other records to determine compliance or non-compliance with the law and to prosecute
any violations of the law and the union constitution and by-laws: Provided, That such inquiry or
examination shall not be conducted during the sixty (60) days freedom period nor within thirty (30) days
immediately preceding the date of election of union officials."
Sec. 32. Article 275 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Article 275. Tripartism and tripartite conferences. - (a) Tripartism in labor relations is hereby declared a
State policy. Towards this end, workers and employers shall, as far as practicable, be represented in
decision and policy-making bodies of the government.
"(b) The Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives may from time to
time call a national, regional, or industrial tripartite conference of representatives of government, workers
and employers for the consideration and adoption of voluntary codes of principles designed to promote
industrial peace based on social justice or to align labor movement relations with established priorities in
economic and social development. In calling such conference, the Secretary of Labor and Employment
may consult with accredited representatives of workers and employers."
Sec. 33. Paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (f), (h), and (i) of Article 277 of the same Code, as amended, is further
amended to read as follows:
"(a) All unions are authorized to collect reasonable membership fees, union dues, assessments and fines
and other contributions for labor education and research, mutual death and hospitalization benefits,
welfare fund, strike fund and credit and cooperative undertakings.
"(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right to be protected
against dismissal except for a just or authorized cause and without prejudice to the requirement of notice
under Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be
terminated a written notice containing a statement of the causes for termination and shall afford the
latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he
so desires in accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by
the Department of Labor and Employment. Any decision taken by the employer shall be without prejudice
to the right of the worker to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the
regional branch of the National Labor Relations Commission. The burden of proving that the termination
was for a valid or authorized cause shall rest on the employer. The Secretary of Labor and Employment
may suspend the effects of the termination pending resolution of the dispute in the event of a prima facie
finding by the appropriate official of the Department of Labor and Employment before whom such dispute
is pending that the termination may cause a serious labor dispute or is in implementation of a mass lay-
off.
"(c) Any employee, whether employed for a definite period or not, shall, beginning on his first day of
service, be considered an employee for purposes of membership in any labor union.
"(f) A Special Voluntary Arbitration Fund is hereby established in the Board to subsidize the cost of
voluntary arbitration in cases involving the interpretation and implementation of the collective bargaining
agreement, including the arbitrator's fees, and for such other related purposes to promote and develop
voluntary arbitration. The Board shall administer the Special Voluntary Arbitration Fund in accordance
with the guidelines it may adopt upon the recommendation of the Council, which guidelines shall be
subject to the approval of the Secretary of Labor and Employment. Continuing funds needed for this
purpose in the initial yearly amount of fifteen million pesos (P15,000,000.00) shall be provided in the
1989 and subsequent annual General Appropriations Acts.
"The amount of subsidy in appropriate cases shall be determined by the Board in accordance with
established guidelines issued by it upon the recommendation of the Council.
"The fund shall also be utilized for the operation of the Council, the training and education of voluntary
arbitrators, and the promotion and the development of a comprehensive voluntary arbitration program.
"(h) In establishments where no legitimate labor organization exists, labor-management committees may
be formed voluntarily by workers and employers for the purpose of promoting industrial peace. The
Department of Labor and Management shall endeavor to enlighten and educate the workers and
employers on their rights and responsibilities through labor education with emphasis on the policy thrusts
of this Code.
"(i) To ensure speedy labor justice, the periods provided in this Code within which decisions or
resolutions of labor relations cases or matters should be rendered shall be mandatory. For this purpose, a
case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading or
memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself, or the Labor Arbiter
or the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations or Med-Arbiter, or the Regional Director.
"Upon expiration of the corresponding period, a certification stating why a decision or resolution has not
been rendered within the said period shall be issued forthwith by the Chairman of the Commission, the
Executive Labor Arbiter, or the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations or Med-Arbiter, or the Regional
Director, as the case may be, and a copy thereof served upon the parties.
"Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the aforesaid officials shall, without prejudice
to any liability which may have been incurred as a consequence thereof, see to it that the case or matter
shall be decided or resolved without any further delay."
Sec. 34. Article 279 of the Labor Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
"ARTICLE 279. Security of Tenure. - In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate
the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An Employee who is
unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement."
Sec. 35. Equity of the Incumbent. - Incumbent career officials and rank-and-file employees of the
National Labor Relations Commission not otherwise affected by this Act shall continue to hold office
without need of reappointment. However, consistent with the need to professionalize the higher level of
its officialdom invested with adjudicatory powers and salaries or emoluments, all positions of the
Commissioners, Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters of the present National Labor Relations
Commissions are hereby declared vacant. However, subject officials shall continue to temporarily
discharge their duties and functions until their successors shall have been duly appointed and qualified.
Sec. 36. Rule-Making Authority. - The Secretary of Labor and Employment is hereby authorized to
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to implement the provisions of this Act.
Sec. 37. Funding. - Funds needed to carry out the provisions of this Act shall be taken from the available
funds in the Department of Labor and Employment and shall thereafter be included in subsequent annual
General Appropriations Acts.
Sec. 38. Repealing Cause. - All laws, decrees, executive orders, letters of implementations, rules and
regulations or part or parts thereof inconsistent with any provision of this Act are hereby repealed,
modified, superseded or amended accordingly.
Sec. 39. Separability Clause. - If any provision of this Act or the application of such provision to any
person or circumstance is held invalid for any reason, the remainder of this Act or the application of such
provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
Sec. 40. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette
or in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation, whichever comes earlier.
Approved: March 2, 1989

Republic Act No. 9231
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELIMINATION OF THE WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOR AND
AFFORDING STRONGER PROTECTION FOR THE WORKING CHILD, AMENDING FOR THIS
PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACTNO. 7610, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "SPECIAL
PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AGAINST CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION
ACT"
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1. Sec. 2 of Republic Act No. 7610, as amended, otherwise known as the "Special Protection of
Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act", is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 2. Declaration of State Policy and Principles. - It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to
provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and
discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to their development including child labor and its worst
forms; provide sanctions for their commission and carry out a program for prevention and deterrence of
and crisis intervention in situations of child abuse, exploitation and discrimination. The State shall
intervene on behalf of the child when the parent, guardian, teacher or person having care or custody of
the child fails or is unable to protect the child against abuse, exploitation and discrimination or when such
acts against the child are committed by the said parent, guardian, teacher or person having care and
custody of the same.
"It shall be the policy of the State to protect and rehabilitate children gravely threatened or endangered
by circumstances which affect or will affect their survival and normal development and over which they
have no control.
"The best interests of children shall be the paramount consideration in all actions concerning them,
whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities, and legislative bodies, consistent with the principle of First Call for Children as enunciated in
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Every effort shall be exerted to promote the
welfare of children and enhance their opportunities for a useful and happy life."
Sec. 2. Sec. 12 of the same Act, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 2. Employment of Children - Children below fifteen (15) years of age shall not be employed except:
"1) When a child works directly under the sole responsibility of his/her parents or legal guardian and
where only members of his/her family are employed: Provided, however, That his/her employment
neither endangers his/her life, safety, health, and morals, nor impairs his/her normal development:
Provided, further, That the parent or legal guardian shall provide the said child with the prescribed
primary and/or secondary education; or
"2) Where a child's employment or participation in public entertainment or information through cinema,
theater, radio, television or other forms of media is essential: Provided, That the employment contract is
concluded by the child's parents or legal guardian, with the express agreement of the child concerned, if
possible, and the approval of the Department of Labor and Employment: Provided, further, That the
following requirements in all instances are strictly complied with:
"(a) The employer shall ensure the protection, health, safety, morals and normal development of the
child;
"(b) The employer shall institute measures to prevent the child's exploitation or discrimination taking into
account the system and level of remuneration, and the duration and arrangement of working time; and
"(c) The employer shall formulate and implement, subject to the approval and supervision of competent
authorities, a continuing program for training and skills acquisition of the child.
"In the above-exceptional cases where any such child may be employed, the employer shall first secure,
before engaging such child, a work permit from the Department of Labor and Employment which shall
ensure observance of the above requirements.
"For purposes of this Article, the term "child" shall apply to all persons under eighteen (18) years of age."
Sec. 3. The same Act, as amended, is hereby further amended by adding new sections to be
denominated as Sections 12-A, 12-B, 12-C, and 12-D to read as follows:
"Sec. 2-A. Hours of Work of a Working Child. - Under the exceptions provided in Sec. 12 of this Act, as
amended:
"(1) A child below fifteen (15) years of age may be allowed to work for not more than twenty (20) hours
a week: Provided, That the work shall not be more than four (4) hours at any given day;
"(2) A child fifteen (15) years of age but below eighteen (18) shall not be allowed to work for more than
eight (8) hours a day, and in no case beyond forty (40) hours a week;
"(3) No child below fifteen (15) years of age shall be allowed to work between eight o'clock in the
evening and six o'clock in the morning of the following day and no child fifteen (15) years of age but
below eighteen (18) shall be allowed to work between ten o'clock in the evening and six o'clock in the
morning of the following day."
"Sec. 12-B. Ownership, Usage and Administration of the Working Child's Income. - The wages, salaries,
earnings and other income of the working child shall belong to him/her in ownership and shall be set
aside primarily for his/her support, education or skills acquisition and secondarily to the collective needs
of the family: Provided, That not more than twenty percent (20%) of the child's income may be used for
the collective needs of the family.
"The income of the working child and/or the property acquired through the work of the child shall be
administered by both parents. In the absence or incapacity of either of the parents, the other parent shall
administer the same. In case both parents are absent or incapacitated, the order of preference on
parental authority as provided for under the Family Code shall apply.
"Sec. 12-C. Trust Fund to Preserve Part of the Working Child's Income. - The parent or legal guardian of
a working child below eighteen (18) years of age shall set up a trust fund for at least thirty percent
(30%) of the earnings of the child whose wages and salaries from work and other income amount to at
least two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) annually, for which he/she shall render a semi-annual
accounting of the fund to the Department of Labor and Employment, in compliance with the provisions of
this Act. The child shall have full control over the trust fund upon reaching the age of majority.
"Sec. 12-D. Prohibition Against Worst Forms of Child Labor. - No child shall be engaged in the worst
forms of child labor. The phrase "worst forms of child labor" shall refer to any of the following:
"(1) All forms of slavery, as defined under the "Anti-trafficking in Persons Act of 2003", or practices
similar to slavery such as sale and trafficking of children, debt bondage and serfdom and forced or
compulsory labor, including recruitment of children for use in armed conflict; or
"(2) The use, procuring, offering or exposing of a child for prostitution, for the production of pornography
or for pornographic performances; or
"(3) The use, procuring or offering of a child for illegal or illicit activities, including the production and
trafficking of dangerous drugs and volatile substances prohibited under existing laws; or
"(4) Work which, by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is hazardous or likely to be
harmful to the health, safety or morals of children, such that it:
"a) Debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being; or
"b) Exposes the child to physical, emotional or sexual abuse, or is found to be highly stressful
psychologically or may prejudice morals; or
"c) Is performed underground, underwater or at dangerous heights; or
"d) Involves the use of dangerous machinery, equipment and tools such as power-driven or explosive
power-actuated tools; or
"e) Exposes the child to physical danger such as, but not limited to the dangerous feats of balancing,
physical strength or contortion, or which requires the manual transport of heavy loads; or
"f) Is performed in an unhealthy environment exposing the child to hazardous working conditions,
elements, substances, co-agents or processes involving ionizing, radiation, fire, flammable substances,
noxious components and the like, or to extreme temperatures, noise levels, or vibrations; or
"g) Is performed under particularly difficult conditions; or
"h) Exposes the child to biological agents such as bacteria, fungi, viruses, protozoans, nematodes and
other parasites; or
"i) Involves the manufacture or handling of explosives and other pyrotechnic products."
Sec. 4. Sec. 13 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 13. Access to Education and Training for Working Children - "a) No child shall be deprived of formal
or non-formal education. In all cases of employment allowed in this Act, the employer shall provide a
working child with access to at least primary and secondary education.
"b) To ensure and guarantee the access of the working child to education and training, the Department
of Education (DEPED) shall: (1) formulate, promulgate, and implement relevant and effective course
designs and educational programs; (2) conduct the necessary training for the implementation of the
appropriate curriculum for the purpose; (3) ensure the availability of the needed educational facilities and
materials; and (4) conduct continuing research and development program for the necessary and relevant
alternative education of the working child.
"c) The DEPED shall promulgate a course design under its non-formal education program aimed at
promoting the intellectual, moral and vocational efficiency of working children who have not undergone
or finished elementary or secondary education. Such course design shall integrate the learning process
deemed most effective under given circumstances."
"Sec. 14. Prohibition on the Employment of Children in Certain Advertisements. - No child shall be
employed as a model in any advertisement directly or indirectly promoting alcoholic beverages,
intoxicating drinks, tobacco and its byproducts, gambling or any form of violence or pornography."
Sec. 6. Sec. 16 of the same Act, is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 16. Penal Provisions -
"a) Any employer who violates Sections 12, 12-A, and Sec. 14 of this act, as amended, shall be penalized
by imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years or a fine of not less than Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) but not more than Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) or both at
the discretion of the court.
"b) Any person who violates the provision of Sec. 12-D of this act or the employer of the subcontractor
who employs, or the one who facilitates the employment of a child in hazardous work, shall suffer the
penalty of a fine of not less than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) but not more than One
million pesos (P1,000,000.00), or imprisonment of not less than twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
"c) Any person who violates Sections 12-D(1) and 12-D(2) shall be prosecuted and penalized in
accordance with the penalty provided for by R. A. 9208 otherwise known as the "Anti-trafficking in
Persons Act of 2003": Provided, That Such penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period.
"d) Any person who violates Sec. 12-D (3) shall be prosecuted and penalized in accordance with R.A.
9165, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002"; Provided, That such
penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period.
"e) If a corporation commits any of the violations aforecited, the board of directors/trustees and officers,
which include the president, treasurer and secretary of the said corporation who participated in or
knowingly allowed the violation, shall be penalized accordingly as provided for under this Sec. .
"f) Parents, biological or by legal fiction, and legal guardians found to be violating Sections 12, 12-A, 12-B
and 12-C of this Act shall pay a fine of not less than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) but not more than
One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00), or be required to render community service for not less
than thirty (30) days but not more than one (1) year, or both such fine and community service at the
discretion of the court: Provided, That the maximum length of community service shall be imposed on
parents or legal guardians who have violated the provisions of this Act three (3) times; Provided, further,
That in addition to the community service, the penalty of imprisonment of thirty (30) days but not more
than one (1) year or both at the discretion of the court, shall be imposed on the parents or legal
guardians who have violated the provisions of this Act more than three (3) times.
"g) The Secretary, of Labor and Employment or his/her duly authorized representative may, after due
notice and hearing, order the closure of any business firm or establishment found to have violated any of
the provisions of this Act more than three (3) times. He/she shall likewise order the immediate closure of
such firm or establishment if:
"(1) The violation of any provision of this Act has resulted in the death, insanity or serious physical injury
of a child employed in such establishment; or
"(2) Such firm or establishment is engaged or employed in prostitution or in obscene or lewd shows.
"h) In case of such closure, the employer shall be required to pay the employee(s) the separation pay
and other monetary benefits provided for by law."
Sec. 7. The same Act is hereby further amended by adding a new section to be denominated as Sec. 16-
A, to read as follows:
"Sec. 16-A. Trust Fund from Fines and Penalties - The fine imposed by the court shall be treated as a
Trust Fund, administered by the Department of Labor and Employment and disbursed exclusively for the
needs, including the costs of rehabilitation and reintegration into the mainstream of society of the
working children who are victims of the violations of this Act, and for the programs and projects that will
prevent acts of child labor."
"Sec. 27. Who May File a Complaint - Complaints on cases of unlawful acts committed against children as
enumerated herein may be filed by the following:
"(a) Offended party;
"(b) Parents or guardians;
"(c) Ascendant or collateral relative within the third degree of consanguinity;

"(d) Officer, social worker or representative of a licensed child-caring institution;
"(e) Officer or social worker of the Department of Social Welfare and Development;
"(f) Barangay chairman of the place where the violation occurred, where the child is residing or
employed; or
"(g) At least three (3) concerned, responsible citizens where the violation occurred."
Section 9. The same Act is hereby further amended by adding new sections to Sec. 16 to be denominated
as Sections 16-A, 16-B and 16-C to read as follows:
"Sec. 16-A. Jurisdiction - The family courts shall have original jurisdiction over all cases involving offenses
punishable under this Act: Provided, That in cities or provinces where there are no family courts yet, the
regional trial courts and the municipal trial courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction depending on the
penalties prescribed for the offense charged.
"The preliminary investigation of cases filed under this Act shall be terminated within a period of thirty
(30) days from the date of filing.
"If the preliminary investigation establishes a prima facie case, then the corresponding information shall
be filed in court within forty eight (48) hours from the termination of the investigation.
"Trial of cases under this Act shall be terminated by the court not later than ninety (90) days from the
date of filing of information. Decision on said cases shall be rendered within a period of fifteen (15) days
from the date of submission of the case.
"Sec. 15. Exemptions from Filing Fees. - When the victim of child labor institutes a separate civil action
for the recovery of civil damages, he/she shall be exempt from payment of filing fees.
"Sec. 16-C. Access to Immediate Legal, Medical and Psycho-Social Services - The working child shall have
the right to free legal, medical and psycho-social services to be provided by the State."
Sec. 10. Implementing Rules and Regulations - The Secretary of Labor and Employment, in coordination
with the Committees on Labor and Employment of both Houses of Congress, shall issue the necessary
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) to effectively implement the provisions of this Act, in
consultation with concerned public and private sectors, within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of this
Act.
Such rules and regulations shall take effect upon their publication in two (2) national newspapers of
general circulation.
Sec. 11. Separability Clause. - If any provision of this Act is declared invalid or unconstitutional, the
validity of the remaining provisions hereof shall remain in full force and effect.
Sec. 12. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, or rules inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Sec. 13. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days from the date of its complete publication
in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: December 19, 200

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE REHABILITATION, SELF-DEVELOPMENT AND SELF-RELIANCE
OF DISABLED PERSONS AND THEIR INTEGRATION INTO THE MAINSTREAM OF SOCIETY
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
TITLE I. GENERAL PROVISIONS
CHAPTER I
Basic Principle
SECTION 1. Title. This Act shall be known and cited as the "Magna Carta for Disabled Persons"
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy The grant of the rights and privileges for disabled persons shall be
guided by the following principles:
a) Disabled persons are part of Philippine society, thus the State shall give full support to the
improvement of the total well-being of disabled persons and their integration into the mainstream of
society. Toward this end, the State shall adopt policies ensuring the rehabilitation, self-development and
self-reliance of disabled persons. It shall develop their skills and potentials to enable them to compete
favorably for available opportunities.
b) Disabled persons have the same rights as other people to take their proper place in society. They
should be able to live freely and as independently as possible. This must be the concern of everyone
the family, community and all government and nongovernment organizations. Disabled persons' rights
must never be perceived as welfare services by the Government.
c) The rehabilitation of the disabled persons shall be the concern of the Government in order to foster
their capacity to attain a more meaningful, productive and satisfying life. To reach out to a greater
number of disabled persons, the rehabilitation services and benefits shall be expanded beyond the
traditional urban-based centers to community based programs, that will ensure full participation of
different sectors as supported by national and local government agencies.
d) The State also recognizes the role of the private sector in promoting the welfare of disabled persons
and shall encourage partnership in programs that address their needs and concerns.
e) To facilitate integration of disabled persons into the mainstream of society, the State shall advocate for
and encourage respect for disabled persons. The State shall exert all efforts to remove all social, cultural,
economic, environmental and attitudinal barriers that are prejudicial to disabled persons.
SECTION 3. Coverage. This Act shall cover all disabled persons and, to the extent herein provided,
departments, offices and agencies of the National Government or nongovernment organizations involved
in the attainment of the objectives of this Act.
SECTION 4. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Act, these terms are defined as follows:
a) Disabled persons are those suffering from restriction or different abilities, as a result of a mental,
physical or sensory impairment, to perform an activity in the manner or within the range considered
normal for a human being;
b) Impairment is any loss, diminution or aberration of psychological, physiological, or anatomical

structure or function;
c) Disability shall mean 1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
psychological, physiological or anatomical function of an individual or activities of such individual; 2) a
record of such an impairment; or 3) being regarded as having such an impairment;
d) Handicap refers to a disadvantage for a given individual, resulting from an impairment or a disability,
that limits or prevents the function or activity, that is considered normal given the age and sex of the
individual;
e) Rehabilitation is an integrated approach to physical, social, cultural, spiritual, educational and

vocational measures that create conditions for the individual to attain the highest possible level of
functional ability;
f) Social Barriers refer to the characteristics of institutions, whether legal, economic, cultural, recreational
or other, any human group, community, or society which limit the fullest possible participation of disabled
persons in the life of the group. Social barriers include negative attitudes which tend to single out and
exclude disabled persons and which distort roles and inter-personal relationships;
g) Auxiliary Aids and Services include:
1) qualified interpreters or other effective methods of delivering materials to individuals with hearing
impairments;
2) qualified readers, taped tests, or other effective methods of delivering materials to individuals with
visual impairments;
3) acquisition or modification of equipment or devices; and
4) other similar services and actions or all types of aids and services that facilitate the learning process of
people with mental disability.
h) Reasonable Accommodation include 1) improvement of existing facilities used by employees in order

to render these readily accessible to and usable by disabled persons; and 2) modification of work
schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices,
appropriate adjustments or modifications of examinations, training materials or company policies, rules
and regulations, the provision of auxiliary aids and services, and other similar accommodations for
disabled persons;
i) Sheltered Employment refers to the provision of productive work for disabled persons through
workshops providing special facilities, income-producing projects or homework schemes with a view to
giving them the opportunity to earn a living thus enabling them to acquire a working capacity required in
open industry;
j) Auxiliary Social Services are the supportive activities in the delivery of social services to the
marginalized sectors of society;
k) Marginalized Disabled Persons refer to disabled persons who lack access to rehabilitative services and
opportunities to be able to participate fully in socioeconomic activities and who have no means of
livelihood and whose incomes fall below the poverty threshold;
l) Qualified Individual with a Disability shall mean an individual with a disability who, with or without
reasonable accommodations, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such
individual holds or desires. However, consideration shall be given to the employer's judgment as to what
functions of a job are essential, and if an employer has prepared a written description before advertising
or interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the essential
functions of the job;
m) Readily Achievable means a goal can be easily attained and carried out without much difficulty or
expense. In determining whether an action is readily achievable, factors to be considered include
1) the nature and cost of the action;
2) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the action; the number of persons
employed at such facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise of such action
upon the operation of the facility;
3) the overall financial resources of the covered entity with respect to the number of its employees; the
number, type and location of its facilities; and
4) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the composition, structure and
functions of the work force of such entity; the geographic separateness, administrative or fiscal
relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the covered entity.
n) Public Transportation means transportation by air, land and sea that provides the public with general
or special service on a regular and continuing basis;
o) Covered Entity means an employer, employment agency, labor organization or joint-labor

management committee; and
p) Commerce shall be taken to mean as travel, trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or

communication among the provinces or between any foreign country or any territory or possession and
any province.
AN ACT DECLARING SEXUAL HARASSMENT UNLAWFUL IN THE EMPLOYMENT, EDUCATION
OR TRAINING ENVIRONMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995."
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall value the dignity of every individual, enhance the
development of its human resources, guarantee full respect for human rights, and uphold the dignity of
workers, employees, applicants for employment, students or those undergoing training, instruction or
education. Towards this end, all forms of sexual harassment in the employment, education or training
environment are hereby declared unlawful.
Section 3. Work, Education or Training -Related, Sexual Harassment Defined. - Work, education or
training-related sexual harassment is committed by an employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent
of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority,
influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or education environment, demands,
requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand,
request or requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said Act.
(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when:
(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or
continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms of
conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting,
segregating or classifying the employee which in any way would discriminate, deprive ordiminish
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee;
(2) The above acts would impair the employee's rights or privileges under existing labor laws; or
(3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employee.
(b) In an education or training environment, sexual harassment is committed:
(1) Against one who is under the care, custody or supervision of the offender;
(2) Against one whose education, training, apprenticeship or tutorship is entrusted to the offender;
(3) When the sexual favor is made a condition to the giving of a passing grade, or the granting of honors
and scholarships, or the payment of a stipend, allowance or other benefits, privileges, or consideration;
or
(4) When the sexual advances result in an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the student,
trainee or apprentice.
Any person who directs or induces another to commit any act of sexual harassment as herein defined, or
who cooperates in the commission thereof by another without which it would not have been committed,
shall also be held liable under this Act.
Sec. 4. Duty of the Employer or Head of Office in a Work-related, Education or Training Environment. - It
shall be the duty of the employer or the head of the work-related, educational or training environment or
institution, to prevent or deter the commission of acts of sexual harassment and to provide the
procedures for the resolution, settlement or prosecution of acts of sexual harassment. Towards this end,
the employer or head of office shall:
(a) Promulgate appropriate rules and regulations in consultation with and joint1y approved by the
employees or students or trainees, through their duly designated representatives, prescribing the
procedure for the investigation of sexual harassment cases and the administrative sanctions therefor.
Administrative sanctions shall not be a bar to prosecution in the proper courts for unlawful acts of sexual
harassment.
The said rules and regulations issued pursuant to this subsection (a) shall include, among others,
guidelines on proper decorum in the workplace and educational or training institutions.
(b) Create a committee on decorum and investigation of cases on sexual harassment. The committee
shall conduct meetings, as the case may be, with officers and employees, teachers, instructors,
professors, coaches, trainors, and students or trainees to increase understanding and prevent incidents of
sexual harassment. It shall also conduct the investigation of alleged cases constituting sexual
harassment.
In the case of a work-related environment, the committee shall be composed of at least one (1)
representative each from the management, the union, if any, the employees from the supervisory rank,
and from the rank and file employees.
In the case of the educational or training institution, the committee shall be composed of at least one (1)
representative from the administration, the trainors, instructors, professors or coaches and students or
trainees, as the case may be.
The employer or head of office, educational or training institution shall disseminate or post a copy of this
Act for the information of all concerned.
Sec. 5. Liability of the Employer, Head of Office, Educational or Training Institution. - The employer or
head of office, educational or training institution shall be solidarily liable for damages arising from the
acts of sexual harassment committed in the employment, education
or training environment if the employer or head of office, educational or training institution is informed of
such acts by the offended party and no immediate action is taken.
Sec. 6. Independent Action for Damages. - Nothing in this Act shall preclude the victim of work,
education or training-related sexual harassment from instituting a separate and independent action for
damages and other affirmative relief.
Sec. 7. Penalties. - Any person who violates the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be penalized
by imprisonment of not less than one (1) month nor more than six (6) months, or a fine of not less than
Ten thousand pesos (P10,000) nor more than Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000), or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
Any action arising from the violation of the provisions of this Act shall prescribe in three (3) years.
Sec. 8. Separability Clause. - If any portion or provision of this Act is declared void or unconstitutional,
the remaining portions or provisions hereof shall not be affected by such declaration.
Section 9. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, other issuances, or parts
thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Sec. 10. Effectivity Clause.- This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its complete publication in at
least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: February 14, 1995

AN ACT TO INSTITUTE THE POLICIES OF OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT AND ESTABLISH A
HIGHER STANDARD OF PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF THE WELFARE OF MIGRANT
WORKERS, THEIR FAMILIES AND OVERSEAS FILIPINOS IN DISTRESS, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known and cited as the "Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995".
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policies.
(a) In the pursuit of an independent foreign policy and while considering national sovereignty, territorial
integrity, national interest and the right to self- determination paramount in its relations with other
states, the State shall, at all times, uphold the dignity of its citizens whether in country or overseas, in
general, and Filipino migrant workers, in particular.
(b) The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and
promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. Towards this end, the State
shall provide adequate and timely social, economic and legal services to Filipino migrant workers.
(c) While recognizing the significant contribution of Filipino migrant workers to the national economy
through their foreign exchange remittances, the State does not promote overseas employment as a
means to sustain economic growth an achieve national development. The existence of the overseas
employment program rests solely on the assurance that the dignity and fundamental human rights and
freedoms of the Filipino citizen shall not, at any time, be compromised or violated. The State, therefore,
shall continuously create local employment opportunities and promote the equitable distribution of wealth
and the benefits of development.
(d) The State affirms the fundamental equality before the law of women and men and the significant role
of women in nation-building. Recognizing the contribution of overseas migrant women workers and their
particular vulnerabilities, the State shall apply gender sensitive criteria in the formulation and
implementation of policies and programs affecting migrant workers and the composition of bodies tasked
for the welfare of migrant workers.
(e) Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied
to any person by reason of poverty. In this regard, it is imperative that an effective mechanism be
instituted to ensure that the rights and interest of distressed overseas Filipinos, in general, and Filipino
migrant workers, in particular, documented or undocumented, are adequately protected and
safeguarded.
(f) The right of Filipino migrant workers and all overseas Filipinos to participate in the democratic
decision-making processes of the State and to be represented in institutions relevant to overseas
employment is recognized and guaranteed.
(g) The State recognizes that the ultimate protection to all migrant workers is the possession of skills.
Pursuant to this and as soon as practicable, the government shall deploy and/or allow the deployment
only of skilled Filipino workers.
(h) Non-governmental organizations, duly recognized as legitimate, are partners of the State in the
protection of Filipino migrant workers and in the promotion of their welfare. The State shall cooperate
with them in a spirit of trust and mutual respect.
(i) Government fees and other administrative costs of recruitment, introduction, placement and
assistance to migrant workers shall be rendered free without prejudice to the provision of Sec. 36 hereof.
Nonetheless, the deployment of Filipino overseas workers, whether land- based or sea-based, by local
service contractors and manning agencies employing them shall be encouraged. Appropriate incentives
may be extended to them.
Sec. 3. Definitions. - For purposes of this Act:
(a) Migrant worker refers to a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a
remunerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a legal resident; to be used interchangeably with
overseas Filipino worker.
(b) Gender-sensitivity shall mean cognizance of the inequalities and inequities prevalent in society
between women and men and a commitment to address issues with concern for the respective interests
of the sexes.
(c) Overseas Filipinos refers to dependents of migrant workers and other Filipino nationals abroad who
are in distress as mentioned in Sec.s 24 and 26 of this Act.
I. DEPLOYMENT
Sec. 4. Deployment of Migrant Workers. - The State shall deploy overseas Filipino workers only in
countries where the rights of Filipino migrant workers are protected. The government recognizes any of
the following as a guarantee on the part of the receiving country for the protection and the rights of
overseas Filipino workers:
(a) It has existing labor and social laws protecting the rights of migrant workers;
(b) It is a signatory to multilateral conventions, declarations or resolutions relating to the protection of

migrant workers;
(c) It has concluded a bilateral agreement or arrangement with the government protecting the rights of
overseas Filipino workers; and
(d) It is taking positive, concrete measures to protect the rights of migrant workers.
Sec. 5. Termination or Ban on Deployment. - Notwithstanding the provisions of Sec. 4 hereof, the
government, in pursuit of the national interest or when public welfare so requires, may, at any time,
terminate or impose a ban on the deployment of migrant workers.
II. ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT
Sec. 6. Definition. - For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by
a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No.
442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any such non-
licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or
more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise include the following acts, whether
committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority:
(a) To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater than that specified in the schedule of
allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, or to make a worker pay any
amount greater than that actually received by him as a loan or advance;
(b) To furnish or publish any false notice or information or document in relation to recruitment or
employment;
(c) To give any false notice, testimony, information or document or commit any act of misrepresentation
for the purpose of securing a license or authority under the Labor Code;
(d) To induce or attempt to induce a worker already employed to quit his employment in order to offer
him another unless the transfer is designed to liberate a worker from oppressive terms and conditions of
employment;
(e) To influence or attempt to influence any person or entity not to employ any worker who has not
applied for employment through his agency;
(f) To engage in the recruitment or placement of workers in jobs harmful to public health or morality or
to the dignity of the Republic of the Philippines;
(g) To obstruct or attempt to obstruct inspection by the Secretary of Labor and Employment or by his
duly authorized representative;
(h) To fail to submit reports on the status of employment, placement vacancies, remittance of foreign
exchange earnings, separation from jobs, departures and such other matters or information as may be
required by the Secretary of Labor and Employment;
(i) To substitute or alter to the prejudice of the worker, employment contracts approved and verified by
the Department of Labor and Employment from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to
and including the period of the expiration of the same without the approval of the Department of Labor
and Employment;
(j) For an officer or agent of a recruitment or placement agency to become an officer or member of the
Board of any corporation engaged in travel agency or to be engaged directly or indirectly in the
management of a travel agency;
(k) To withhold or deny travel documents from applicant workers before departure for monetary or
financial considerations other than those authorized under the Labor Code and its implementing rules and
regulations;
(l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as determined by the Department of Labor and
Employment ; and
(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation and
processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place
without the worker's fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be
considered an offense involving economic sabotage.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more
persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed
against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.
The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals, accomplices and accessories. In
case of juridical persons, the officers having control, management or direction of their business shall be
liable.
Sec. 7. Penalties. -
(a) Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than
six (6) years and one (1) day but not more than twelve (12) years and a fine of not less than Two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) nor more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) nor more than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment
constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein.
Provided, however, That the maximum penalty shall be imposed if the person illegally recruited is less
than eighteen (18) years of age or committed by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority.
FIRST DIVISION
G & M PHILIPPINES, INC., G.R. No. 162308

Petitioner,
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,

- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
ROMIL V. CUAMBOT, Promulgated:

Respondent.
November 22, 2006
x------------------------------------ --------------x
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 64744, as well as the Resolution [2] dated February 20, 2004 denying the motion for
reconsideration thereof.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On November 7, 1994, respondent Romil V. Cuambot applied for deployment to Saudi Arabia as a car body builder
with petitioner G & M Philippines, Inc., a duly licensed placement and recruitment agency. Respondents application was duly
processed and he later signed a two-year employment contract to work at the Al Waha Workshop
in Unaizah City, Gassim, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. He left the country on January 5, 1995. However, respondent did not finish
his contract and returned to the Philippines barely six months later, on July 24, 1995. On July 26, 1995, he filed before the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint for unpaid wages, withheld salaries, refund of plane ticket and
repatriation bond, later amended to include illegal dismissal, claim for the unexpired portion of his employment contract, actual,
exemplary and moral damages, and attorneys fees. The complaint was docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-07-05252-95.
Respondent narrated that he began working for Mohd Al Motairi,[3] the President and General Manager of the
Al Waha Workshop, on January 8, 1995. Along with his Filipino co-workers, he was subjected to inhuman and unbearable
working conditions, to wit:
1. [He] was required to work from 7:00 oclock in the morning to 10:00 oclock in the evening everyday,
except Friday, or six (6) hours overtime work daily from the usual eight (8) working hours per day.
2. [He] was never paid x x x his monthly basic salary of 1,200 [Riyals] including his overtime pay for the
six (6) hours overtime work he rendered every working day during his work in Saudi Arabia except for
the amount of 100 [Riyals] given every month for his meal allowance;
3. [He] was subjected to serious insult by respondent Muthiri everytime he asked or demanded for his
salary; and,
4. [S]ome of complainants letters that were sent by his family were not given by
respondent Muthiri and/or his staff x x x.[4]
When respondent asked Motairi for his salary, he was told that since a huge sum had been paid to the agency for his
recruitment and deployment, he would only be paid after the said amount had already been recovered. He was also told that his
salary was only 800 Saudi Riyals (SAR) per month, in contrast to the SAR1200 that was promised him under the
contract. Motairi warned that he would be sent home the next time he demanded for his salary. Due to his familys incessant
letters asking for financial support, however, respondent mustered the courage to again demand for his salaries during the second
week of July 1996. True to his word, Motairi ordered him to pack up and leave. He was able to purchase his plane ticket only
through the contributions of his fellow Filipinos. Motairi even accompanied him to the airport when he bought his plane ticket. In
the meantime, his wife had been making inquiries about him.
To corroborate his claims, respondent submitted the following documents: an undated letter[5] he had written addressed
to the Philippine Labor Attach in Riyadh, with Arabic translation;[6] his wifes letter[7] dated June 28, 1995 addressed to the
Gulangco Monteverde Agency, Manila Head Office, asking for a favor to help [her] husband to come home as early as
possible; a fax message[8] dated July 17, 1995 from a representative of the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to a
counterpart in Riyadh, asking for assistance to locate respondent; [9] and the
reply[10] from the Riyadh LBP representative requesting for contact numbers to facilitate communication with respondent.
Respondent further claimed that his employers actuations violated Articles 83 and 103 of the Labor Code. While he
was entitled to terminate his employment in accordance with Article 285 (b) due to the treatment he received, he did not exercise
this right. He was nevertheless illegally dismissed by his employer when he tried to collect the salaries due him. Respondent
further claimed that the reduction of his monthly salary from SAR1,200 to SAR800 and petitioners failure to furnish him a copy
of the employment contract before his departure amounted to prohibited practices under Article 34 (i) and (k) of the Labor Code.
Respondent prayed for the following relief:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, complainant most respectfully prays unto this Honorable Office
that the instant complaint be given due course and that a decision be rendered in his favor and against
respondents G & M (Phils.), Inc., Alwaha (sic) Workshop and/or Muhamd (sic) Muthiri, as follows:
(1) Ordering the respondents to pay, jointly and severally, complainant the unpaid
salaries and overtime pay in the amounts of P61,560.00 and P66,484.80,
respectively, including interests, until the same will be fully paid;
(2) Ordering the respondents to pay, jointly and severally, complainant[s] salary for
the unexpired portion of the contract in the amount of P184,680.00, including
interests, until the same will be fully paid;
(3) Ordering the respondents to pay, jointly and severally, complainant[s] actual
expenses which he incurred in applying for the job, including expenses in leaving
for the job, including expenses in leaving for Saudi Arabia and plane ticket, as well
as repatriation bond and incidental expenses in going home to the Philippines in
the amounts of P49,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively, including interests, until
the same will be fully paid;
(4) Ordering the respondents to pay, jointly and severally, complainant moral
damages in the amount of P150,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount
ofP150,000.00, including interests, until the same will be fully paid;
(5) Ordering the respondents to pay, jointly and severally, complainant for and as
attorneys fees in the amount of P68,172.48 or the amount equivalent to 10% of
the total amount of the foregoing claims and damages that may be awarded by the
Honorable Office to the complainant.[11]
In its position paper, petitioner alleged that respondent was deployed for overseas work as car body builder for its
Principal Golden Wings Est. for General Services and Recruitment in Saudi Arabia for an employment period of 24 months, with
a monthly salary of US$400.00.[12] It insisted that respondent was religiously paid his salaries as they fell due. After working for
a little over seven months, respondent pleaded with his employer to be allowed to return home since there were family problems
he had to settle personally. Respondent even submitted a resignation letter [13] dated July 23, 1995.
To support its claim that respondent had been paid his salaries as they fell due, petitioner submitted in evidence copies
of seven payslip[14]authenticated by the Philippine Labor Attach in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Petitioner asserted that since
respondent only worked for a little over seven months and did not finish his contract, he should pay the cost of the plane ticket. It
pointed out that according to the standard employment contract, the employer would provide the employee with a free plane
ticket for the flight home only if the worker finishes his contract.
Respondent countered that his signatures in the purported payslips were forged. He denied having received his salaries
for the said period, except only for the SAR100 as monthly allowance. He pointed out that the authentication of the alleged pay
slips and resignation letter before the labor attach in Riyadh is immaterial, since the documents themselves were falsified.
Respondent further claimed that petitioner required him to pay a P10,000.00 placement fee and that he had to
borrow P2,000.00 from a relative. He was then told that the amount would be considered as an advance payment and that the
balance would be deducted from his salary. He was not, however, given any receipt. He insisted that the employment contract
which he signed indicated that he was supposed to receive a monthly salary of SAR1,200 for working eight hours a day,
excluding overtime pay. He was repeatedly promised to be furnished a copy of the contract and was later told that it would be
given to his wife, Minda. However, she was also given the run-around and was told that the contract had already been given to
her husband.
To counter the allegation of forgery, petitioner claimed that there was a great possibility that respondent had changed
his signature while abroad so that he could file a complaint for illegal dismissal upon his return. The argument that the stroke and
handwriting on the payslip was written by one and the same person is mere conjecture, as respondent could have requested
someone, i.e., the cashier, to prepare the resignation letter for him. While it is the employer who fills up the pay slip, respondent
could have asked another employee to prepare the resignation letter, particularly if he (respondent) did not know how to phrase it
himself. Moreover, it could not be presumed that the payslip and resignation letter were prepared by one and the same person, as
respondent is not a handwriting expert. Petitioner further pointed out that respondent has different signatures, not only in the
pleadings submitted before the Labor Arbiter, but also in respondents personal documents.
On January 30, 1997, Labor Arbiter Jose De Vera ruled in favor of respondent on the following ratiocination:
What convinced this Arbitration Branch about the unreliability of the complainants signature in
the payslip is the close semblance of the handwritings in the payslips and the handwritings in the purported
handwritten resignation of the complainant. It unmistakably appears to this Arbitration Branch that
the payslips as well as the handwritten letter-resignation were prepared by one and the same person. If it were
true that the handwritten letter-resignation was prepared by the complainant, it follows that he also prepared
thepayslips because the handwritings in both documents are exactly the same and identical. But [this] is quite
unbelievable that complainant himself as the payee prepared the payslipswith the corresponding entries
therein in his own handwriting. Under the circumstances, the only logical conclusion is that both
the payslips and the handwritten letter-resignation were prepared and signed by one and the same person
definitely not the complainant.
With the foregoing findings and conclusions, this Arbitration Branch is of the well-considered view
that complainant was not paid his salaries from January 5, 1995 up to July 23, 1995 and that he was
unjustifiably dismissed from his employment when he repeatedly demanded for his unpaid salaries.
Respondents are, therefore, liable to pay the complainant his salaries from January 5, 1995 up to July 23,
1995 which amount to US$2,640.00 (US$400 x 6.6 mos). Further, respondents are also liable to the
complainant for the latters salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract up to the maximum of three (3)
months pursuant to Section 10 of RA 8042, which amount to US$1,200.00. Respondents must also refund
complainants plane fare for his return flight. And finally, being compelled to litigate his claims, it is but just
and x x x that complainant must be awarded attorneys fees at the rate of ten percent (10%) of the judgment
award.
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
respondents to pay complainant the aggregate sum of US$3,840.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency at
the exchange rate prevailing at the time of payment, and to refund complainants plane fare for his return
flight. Further, respondents are ordered to pay complainant attorneys fees at the rate of Ten percent (10%) of
the foregoing judgment award.[15]
Petitioner appealed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC, alleging that the Labor Arbiter, not being a
handwriting expert, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in finding for respondent. In its
Decision[16] dated December 9, 1997, the NLRC upheld this contention and remanded the case to the Arbitration Branch of
origin for referral to the government agency concerned for calligraphy examination of the questioned documents.[17]
The case was then re-raffled to Labor Arbiter Enrico Angelo Portillo. On September 11, 1998, the parties agreed to a
resetting to enable petitioner to secure the original copies of documents from its foreign principal. However, on December 9,
1998, the parties agreed to submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings and on the evidence on record.
This time, the complaint was dismissed for lack of merit. According to Labor Arbiter Portillo, aside from respondents
bare allegations, he failed to substantiate his claim of poor working conditions and long hours of employment. The fact that he
executed a handwritten resignation letter is enough evidence of the fact that he voluntarily resigned from work. Moreover,
respondent failed to submit any evidence to refute the pay slips duly signed and authenticated by the labor attach in Saudi
Arabia, inasmuch as their probative value cannot be impugned by mere self-serving allegations. The Labor Arbiter concluded
that as between the oral allegations of workers that they were not paid monetary benefits and the documentary evidence presented
by employer, the latter should prevail. [18]
Respondent appealed the decision before the NLRC, alleging that the Labor Arbiter failed to consider the genuineness
of the signature which appears in the purported resignation letter dated July 23, 1995, as well as those that appear in the seven
pay slips. He insisted that these documents should have been endorsed to the National Bureau of Investigation Questioned
Documents Division or the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for calligraphy examination.
The NLRC dismissed the appeal for lack of merit in a Resolution [19] dated December 27, 2000. It held that the
questioned documents could not be endorsed to the agency concerned since mere photocopies had been submitted in evidence.
The records also revealed that petitioner had communicated to the foreign employer abroad, who sent the original copies, but
there was no response from respondent. It also stressed that during the December 9, 1998 hearing, the parties agreed to submit the
case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings and the evidence on record; if respondent had wanted to have the documents
endorsed to the NBI or the PNP, he should have insisted that the documents be examined by a handwriting expert of the
government. Thus, respondent wasestopped from assailing the Labor Arbiters ruling.
Unsatisfied, respondent elevated the matter to the CA via petition for certiorari. He pointed out that he merely acceded
to the submission of the case for resolution due to the inordinate delays in the case. Moreover, the questioned documents were
within petitioners control, and it was petitioner that repeatedly failed to produce the original copies.
The CA reversed the ruling of the NLRC. According to the appellate court, a visual examination of the questioned
signatures would instantly reveal significant differences in the handwriting movement, stroke, and structure, as well as the quality
of lines of the signatures; Labor Arbiter Portillo committed patent error in examining the signatures, and it is the decision of
Labor Arbiter De Vera which must be upheld. The CA also pointed out the initial ruling of the NLRC (Second Division) dated
December 9, 1997 which set aside the earlier decision of Labor Arbiter De Vera included a special directive to the Arbitration
Branch of origin to endorse the questioned documents for calligraphy examination. However, respondent Cuambot failed to
produce original copies of the documents; hence, Labor Arbiter Portillo proceeded with the case and ruled in favor of
petitioner G.M.Phils. The dispositive portion of the CA ruling reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly,
the assailed Resolutions dated 27 December 2000 and 12 February 2001, respectively, of the NLRC Second
Division are hereby SET ASIDE and the Decision dated 20 February 1997 rendered by Labor Arbiter Jose
De Vera is herebyREINSTATED.[20]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied for lack of merit in its Resolution[21] dated February
20, 2004.
Hence, the present petition, where petitioner claims that
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A MATTER OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT LABOR
ARBITER ENRICO PORTILLO GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION WHEN HE HELD THAT THE
SIGNATURES APPEARING ON THE QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS ARE THOSE OF THE
PETITIONER.[22]
Petitioner points out that most of the signatures which Labor Arbiter De Vera used as standards for comparison with the
signatures appearing on the questioned documents were those in the pleadings filed by the respondent long after the questioned
documents had been supposedly signed by him. It claims that respondent affixed his signatures on the pleadings in question and
intentionally made them different from his true signature so that he could later on conveniently impugn their authenticity.
Petitioner claims that had Labor Arbiter De Vera taken pains in considering these circumstances, he could have determined that
respondent may have actually intentionally given a different name and slightly changed his signature in his application, which
name and signature he used when he signed the questioned letter of resignation and payslips, only to conveniently disown the
same when he came back to the country to file the present case.[23] Thus, according to petitioner, the CA clearly committed a
palpable error of law when it reversed the ruling of the NLRC, which in turn affirmed Labor Arbiter Portillos decision.
For his part, respondent contends that petitioners arguments were already raised in the pleadings filed before Labor
Arbiter De Vera which had already been passed upon squarely in the Labor Arbiters Decision of January 30, 1997.
The determinative issues in this case are essentially factual in nature - (a) whether the signatures of respondent in
the payslips are mere forgeries, and (b) whether respondent executed the resignation letter. Generally, it is not our function to
review findings of fact. However, in case of a divergence in the findings and conclusions of the NLRC on the one hand, and those
of the Labor Arbiter and the CA on the other, the Court may examine the evidence presented by the parties to determine whether
or not the employee was illegally dismissed or voluntarily resigned from employment.[24] The instant case thus falls within the
exception.
We have carefully examined the evidence on record and find that the petition must fail.
In its Decision[25] dated December 9, 1997, the NLRC had ordered the case remanded to the Labor Arbiter precisely so
that the questioned documents purportedly signed/executed by respondent could be subjected to calligraphy examination by
experts. It is precisely where a judgment or ruling fails to make findings of fact that the case may be remanded to the lower
tribunal to enable it to determine them.[26] However, instead of referring the questioned documents to the NBI or the PNP as
mandated by the Commissions ruling, Labor Arbiter Portillo proceeded to rule in favor of petitioner, concluding that
respondents signatures were not forged, and as such, respondents separation from employment was purely voluntary. In fine,
then, the Labor Arbiter gravely abused his discretion when he ruled in favor of petitioner without abiding by the Commissions
directive.
We note, however, that a remand of the case at this juncture would only result in unnecessary delay, especially
considering that this case has been pending since 1995. Indeed, it is this Courts duty to settle, whenever possible, the entire
controversy in a single proceeding, leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. [27] Hence, the case shall be
fully resolved on its merits.
We find that petitioners failure to submit the original copies of the pay slips and the resignation letter raises doubts as
to the veracity of its claim that they were actually signed/penned by respondent. The failure of a party to produce the original
copy of the document which is in issue has been taken against such party, and has even been considered as a mere bargaining
chip, a dilatory tactic so that such party would be granted the opportunity to adducecontroverting evidence.[28] In fact, petitioner
did not even present in evidence the original copy of the employment contract, much less a machine copy, giving credence to
respondents claim that he was not at all given a copy of the employment contract after he signed it. What petitioner presented
was a mere photocopy of the OCW Info Sheet[29] issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration as well as the
Personal Data Sheet[30] which respondent filled up. It bears stressing that the original copies of all these documents, including the
employment contract, were in the possession of petitioner, or, at the very least, petitioners principal.
Moreover, as correctly noted by the CA, the opinions of handwriting experts, although helpful in the examination of
forged documents because of the technical procedure involved in the analysis, are not binding upon the courts.[31] As such, resort
to these experts is not mandatory or indispensable to the examination or the comparison of handwriting. A finding of forgery
does not depend entirely on the testimonies of handwriting experts, because the judge must conduct an independent examination
of the questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity. [32] No less than Section 22, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make a comparison of the disputed handwriting with
writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered or proved to be genuine to the
satisfaction of the judge. Indeed, the authenticity of signatures is not a highly technical issue in the same sense that questions
concerning, e.g., quantum physics or topology, or molecular biology, would constitute matters of a highly technical nature. The
opinion of a handwriting expert on the genuineness of a questioned signature is certainly much less compelling upon a judge than
an opinion rendered by a specialist on a highly technical issue.[33]
Even a cursory perusal of the resignation letter[34] and the handwritten pay slips will readily show that they were written
by only one person. A mere layman will immediately notice that the strokes and letters in the documents are very similar, if not
identical, to one another. It is also quite apparent from a comparison of the signatures in the pay slips that they are inconsistent,
irregular, with uneven and faltering strokes.
We also find it unbelievable that after having waited for so long to be deployed to Saudi Arabia and with the hopes of
opportunity to earn a better living within his reach, respondent would just suddenly decide to abandon his work and go home due
to family problems. At the very least, respondent could have at least specified the reason or elaborated on the details of such an
urgent matter so as not to jeopardize future employment opportunities.
That respondent also filed the complaint immediately gives more credence to his claim that he was illegally dismissed.
He arrived in the Philippines onJuly 24, 1995, and immediately filed his complaint for illegal dismissal two days later, on July
26, 1995.
We are not impervious of petitioners claim that respondent could have asked another person to execute the resignation
letter for him. However, petitioner failed to present even an affidavit from a representative of its foreign principal in order to
support this allegation.
Indeed, the rule is that all doubts in the implementation and the interpretation of the Labor Code shall be resolved in
favor of labor,[35] in order to give effect to the policy of the State to afford protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure
equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers, and to
assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of
work.[36] We reiterate the following pronouncement in Nicario v. National Labor Relations Commission:[37]
It is a well-settled doctrine, that if doubts exist between the evidence presented by the
employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter. It is a time-
honored rule that in controversies between a laborer and his master, doubts reasonably arising from
the evidence, or in the interpretation of agreements and writing should be resolved in the formers
favor. The policy is to extend the doctrine to a greater number of employees who can avail of the
benefits under the law, which is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid
and protection of labor.
Moreover, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. The reason for the rule is that the pertinent personnel
files, payrolls, records, remittances and other similar documents which will show that overtime, differentials, service incentive
leave, and other claims of workers have been paid are not in the possession of the worker but in the custody and absolute
control of the employer. Thus, the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged with payment
falls on the debtor, in accordance with the rule that one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. [38]Only when the debtor
introduces evidence that the obligation has been extinguished does the burden shift to the creditor, who is then under a duty of
producing evidence to show why payment does not extinguish the obligation. [39] In this case, petitioner was unable to present
ample evidence to prove its claim that respondent had received all his salaries and benefits in full.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 64744 is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
CEBU METAL CORPORATION, G. R. No. 154463

P e t i t i o n e r,
Present:
- versus - P AN G A N I B A N , C J ,
Chairman,
Y NAR E S - S A NT I AG O
GREGORIO ROBERT SALILING, ELIAS AU ST R I A - M AR T I NE Z ,
B O L I D O , M A N U E L A L Q U I Z A , a n d B E NJ I E C AL L E J O , SR . , a n d
AMPARADO, C H I C O - N AZ AR I O , J J .
R e s p o n d e n t s.
Promulgated:
Se p t e m b e r 5 , 2 0 0 6
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The Case
Th i s i s a p e t i t i o n fo r r e v i e w o n c e r t i o r a r i u n d e r R u l e 4 5 o f t h e R u l e s o f C o u r t s e e ki n g t h e
r e ve r s a l o f t h e D e c i s i o n [ 1 ] d a t e d 1 8 F e b r u a r y 2 0 0 2 , a n d t h e R e s o l u t i o n [ 2 ] d a t e d 2 7 J u n e 2 0 0 2 ,
r e n d e r e d b y t h e C o u r t o f Ap p e a l s i n C A - G . R . S P N o . 6 6 4 8 0 , wh i c h a n n u l l e d a n d s e t a s i d e t h e
d e c i s i o n [ 3 ] d a t e d 9 O c t o b e r 2 0 0 0 , a n d r e s o l u t i o n [ 4 ] d a t e d 2 J u l y 2 0 0 1 , o f t h e N a t i o n a l La b o r R e l a t i o n s
C o m m i s s i o n ( N LR C ) i n N LR C C a s e N o . V - 0 0 0 8 4 0 - 9 9 . I n i t s d e c i s i o n , t h e N LR C r e v e r s e d a n d s e t
a s i d e t h e d e c i s i o n [ 5 ] d a t e d 2 7 M a y 1 9 9 9 o f L a b o r A r b i t e r J e s u s N . R o d r i gu e z , J r . i n f a vo r o f
c o mp l a i n a n t e m p l o ye e s , h e r e i n r e s p o n d e n t s G r e go r i o S a l i l i n g, E l i a s B o l i d o , M a n u e l A l q u i z a a n d
Benjie Amparado, RAB Case No. 06 -01-10019-97.
The Facts
Parties herein are somewhat at variance with respect to the basic facts of the case at bar.
The facts of the case as recounted [6] by petitioner Cebu Metal Corporation are as follows:
R e s p o n d e n t ( C e b u M e t a l C o r p o r a t i o n ) i s a c o r p o r a t i o n e n g a ge
( s i c ) i n b u yi n g a n d s e l l i n g o f s c r a p i r o n x x x. I n t h e B a c o l o d B r a n c h ,
i t h a s t h r e e r e gu l a r ( 3 ) e m p l o ye e s h o l d i n g s u c h p o s i t i o n s a s O f f i c e r -
i n - C h a r g e , a s c a l e r a n d a ya r d m a n , x x x w h o s e s a l a r i e s a r e p a i d
d i r e c t l y b y i t s m a i n o f f i c e i n C e b u w h i l e o t h e r s a r e u n d e r t a ki n g
p a ki a o wo r k i n t h e u n l o a d i n g o f s c r a p i r o n fo r s t o c kp i l i n g.
Among those workers who presented for work in the unloading of scrap iron
in the area are the unemployed persons or trisicad drivers standing by in the vicinity
some of whom are the herein complainants x x x Gregorio Robert Saliling, Elias
B o l i d o , M a n u e l A l q u i z a , B e n j i e Am p a r a d o a n d n o n - c o m p l a i n a n t s A r n e l Al l e r a , E l i s e o
Torralba or any other persons who wanted to augment their income aside from their
regular jobs. Robert Gregorio Sal iling started working in 1996, Elias Bolido on (sic)
October 1995 while Manuel Alquiza and Benjie Amparado, on (sic) February 1996.
As compensation for their services, these workers including the herein

complainants are paid at the rate of P15.00 per ton for which each person can
unload at least two (2) to three (3) tons per hour or can earn at least P240.00 to
P360.00 in eight (8) hours if work is only available which payment necessarily
i n c l u d e s c o s t o f l i v i n g a l l o w a n c e ( C O L A) a n d 1 3 t h - m o n t h p a y .
x x x x
Petitioner company further elaborated [7] on the nature of its business and the circumstances
surrounding the employment of respondent co mplainants, to wit:
The Bacolod buying station is mainly a stockyard where scrap metal delivered
by its suppliers are stockpiled.
The supply of scrap metal is not steady as it depends upon many factors,
such as availability of supplies, price, competition and demand among others. There
are therefore (sic) instances when in a single week , one or two trucks of scrap metal
are delivered while there are weeks when not a single truck of scrap metal are
delivered although there may also be weeks when quite a number of trucks are
d e l i v e r e d t o t h e s t o c k y a r d x x x. T h e a r r i v a l s o f t h e s e t r u c k s a n d t h e d e l i v e r i e s o f
scrap metal are not regular and the schedules of deliveries x x x to the stockyard x x
x are not known before hand by the respondent (petitioner company).
x x x [t]he trucks used in the delivery of scrap metal are owned and/or
rented by the different suppliers of scrap metal. Thes e trucks have their own driver
a n d t r u c k b o y s e m p l o y e d b y t h e s e d i f f e r e n t s u p p l i e r s . So m e t i m e s , t h e s e t r u c k s d o
not have any truck boys, and in these instances, the respondent hires the services of
people for the purpose of unloading the scrap metal from t hese trucks.
It is for this reason that the unloaders hired by the respondent to unload the
scrap metal from these trucks are basically seasonal workers. They are hired only
whenever there are trucks of suppliers of scrap metal that deliver scrap metal t o the
yard of the respondent and these trucks happen not to have any accompanying truck
boys. Whoever are available and whoever are willing to help unload x x x on a
p a r t i c u l a r o c c a s i o n a r e h i r e d t o u n l o a d x x x.
Usually, there is a leader for a particul ar group who is tasked to unload the
scrap metal from a particular truck. It is this leader who distributes the individual
take of each member of the particular group unloading the scrap metal from a
particular truck.
I n c o n t r a s t , r e s p o n d e n t c o m p l a i n a n t s , G r e g o r i o S a l i l i n g , E l i a s B o l i d o , M a n u e l Al q u i z a a n d
Benjie Amparado, in their position paper [8]submitted to the Labor Arbiter, narrate:
1. T h a t c o m p l a i n a n t s G r e g o r i o Sa l i l i n g w a s e m p l o y e d b y d e f e n d a n t
Corporation x x x in 1988, complainant Elias Bolido was hired in 1992 and
c o m p l a i n a n t B e n j i e A m p a r a d o w a s h i r e d b y r e s p o n d e n t i n 1 9 9 4 ; x x x.
2. The aforesaid complainants, from the time they were employed by

respondent, they received their salary on (sic) the following rate:
GREGORIO ROBERT SALILING ------- P5.00/hour in 1988

5.00/hour in 1989
6.00/hour in 1990
7.00/hour in 1991
7.00/hour in 1992
7.00/hour in 1993
7.00/hour in 1994
7.50/hour in 1995
8.75/hour in 1996
ELIAS BOLIDO ------- P100.00/day in 1992

7.00/hour in 1993
7.00/hour in 1994
7.50/hour in 1995
8.75/hour in 1996
BENJIE AMPARADO ------- P7.00/hour in 1994

7.50/hour in 1995
8.75/hour in 1996
3. That the aforesaid complainants never received any other benefits

from the respondent, except the amount indicated above; (sic) They received the
sum of P10.93 per hour in case of overtime work, but they never received additional
benefits in case, (sic) they worked on Saturdays, Sundays, and H olidays;
Complainants likewise never received 13 th month pay, holiday pay, incentive

leave pay, bonuses and other labor benefits;
4. C o m p l a i n a n t s w e r e r e q u i r e d t o w o r k f r o m 8 : 0 0 A. M . t o 1 2 : 0 0 n o o n
and from 1:00 P.M. to 5:00 P.M. or for eight hou rs a day; seven days a week and
thirty days a month;
5. When these complainants demanded from respondent for the increase

of their salary, respondent through Marlon got irritated and instructed complainants
to stop working, thus, complainants, effe ctive December 1996 were precluded from
e n t e r i n g r e s p o n d e n t l o a d i n g a n d u n l o a d i n g c o m p o u n d x x x.
On 10 January 1997, respondent complainants filed a Complaint[9] before the Regional

Arbitration Branch No VI, Bacolod City for underpayment of wages and non -payment of the following
benefits: 1) 13th month pay; 2) holiday pay; and 3) service incentive leave pay.
On 6 March 1998, respondent complainants manifested [10] that they were including in their
c o m p l a i n t a g a i n s t p e t i t i o n e r c o m p a n y , t h e c l a i m f o r i l l e g a l d i s m i s s a l . Su c h b e l a t e d f i l i n g w a s a l l e g e d
to have been due to the fact that they were only dismissed after the filing of their complaint.
On 27 May 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision[11] the dispositive of which reads:
C O N F O R M A B L Y T O T H E F O R E G O I NG , r e s p o n d e n t C e b u M e t a l C o r p o r a t i o n ,
t h r o u g h i t s m a n a g e r , M A R L O N R AD E N, i s h e r e b y o r d e r e d t o R E I N ST AT E c o m p l a i n a n t s
to their former positions with backwages limited to one (1) year and 13 th month
pay, ERA and COLA as follows:
N A M E O F C O M P L A I N A N T S:
1. G r e g o r i o R o b e r t Sa l i l i n g
A) Backwages ----- P42,238.30
B) 13th Month Pay ----- 7,912.34
C) ERA ----- 1,139.83
D) COLA ----- 12,961.91
TOTAL ----- P64,252.38
2. Elias Bolido
A) Backwages ----- P42,238.30
B) 13th Month Pay ----- 7,912.34
C) ERA ----- 1,139.83
D) COLA ----- 12,961.91
TOTAL ----- P64,252.38
3. Manuel Alquiza
A) Backwages ----- P42,238.30
B) 13th Month Pay ----- 7,912.34
C) ERA ----- 1,139.83
D) COLA ----- 12,961.91
TOTAL ----- P64,252.38
4. Benjie Amparado
A) Backwages ----- P42,238.30
B) 13th Month Pay ----- 7,912.34
C) ERA ----- 1,139.83
D) COLA ----- 12,961.91
TOTAL ----- P64,252.38
GRAND TOTAL -------- P257,009.52
In case reinstatement is no longer feasible, complainants are to be given

separation pay equivalent to fifteen (15) days to be given for every year of service.
Attorneys fees of five percent (5%) of the total judgment award of the
a m o u n t o f T w e l v e T h o u s a n d E i g h t H u n d r e d f i f t y P e s o s a n d Fo r t y - E i g h t C e n t a v o s
(P12,850.48) is also awarded.
I n o r d e r i n g t h e r e i n s t a t e m e n t o f r e s p o n d e n t c o m p l a i n a n t s , t h e L a b o r Ar b i t e r f o u n d t h e m t o
have been illegally dismissed from their employment with petitioner company. The decision
explained that:
Regarding the second issue which is illegal dismissal, we find the same
meritorious. Under Article 280 of the Labor Code, complainants are regular
employees since they are engaged to perform activities which are necessary and
d e s i r a b l e i n t h e u s u a l b u s i n e s s o r t r a d e o f t h e e m p l o y e r , ( s i c ) x x x. C o m p l a i n a n t s
job of loading, unloading and stockpiling scrap iron is necessary and part of the
business of respondent. Since compl ainants were dismissed without cause and due
process of law, they are entitled to reinstatement with backwages limited to one (1)
year.
A g g r i e v e d , p e t i t i o n e r c o m p a n y a p p e a l e d t h e f o r e g o i n g d e c i s i o n t o t h e NL R C .
I n a D e c i s i o n [ 1 2 ] p r o m u l g a t e d o n 9 O c t o b e r 2 0 0 0 , t h e Fo u r t h D i v i s i o n o f t h e
NLRC reversed and set aside the ruling of the Labor Arbiter. Instead, the Commis sion held that
respondent complainants were not regular employees of petitioner company, thus, they could not
have been illegally dismissed. The order of reversal was based on the Commissions finding that the
petty cash vouchers[13] submitted bypetitioner company confirmed the fact that unloaders were
paid on pakiao or task basis at P15.00 per metric ton. The Commission further rationalized that
with the irregular nature of the work involved, the stoppage and resumption of which depended
solely on the availability or supply of scrap metal, it necessarily follows that after the job of
unloading was completed and unloaders were paid the cont ract price, the latters working
relationship with petitioner company legally ended. They were then free to offer their services to
others.
A s a n a s i d e , t h e C o m m i s s i o n o b s e r v e d t h a t i t w a s e r r o n e o u s f o r t h e L a b o r Ar b i t e r t o r u l e o n
the question of whethe r or not respondent complainants were illegally dismissed since the
complaint filed on 10 January 1997 failed to include such matter. To be sure, the complaint merely
imputed the following causes of action: 1) underpayment of wages; and 2) non -payment of a)
1 3 t h m o n t h p a y ; b ) h o l i d a y p a y ; a n d c ) s e r v i c e i n c e n t i v e l e a v e p a y . No w h e r e w a s t h e m a t t e r o f i l l e g a l
dismissal written on the same. The issue was formally brought up only on 6 March 1998, via a
Manifestation, long after the filing of the parties respe ctive position papers.
In view of the above, the Commission declared that respondent complainants invalidly raised
t h e i s s u e o f i l l e g a l d i s m i s s a l i n t h e p o s i t i o n p a p e r t h e y f i l e d b e f o r e t h e L a b o r Ar b i t e r .
Dissatisfied by the above, it was the turn of r espondent complainants to challenge the same
but this time before the Court of Appeals.
In a Decision dated 18 February 2002, the Court of Appeals annulled and set aside the
a s s a i l e d d e c i s i o n o f t h e N L R C . S a i d D e c i s i o n w a s g r o u n d e d e xc l u s i ve l y o n t h e a r g u m e n t t h a t t h e
Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing and setting aside the Decision of the
L a b o r A r b i t e r s i n c e p e t i t i o n e r c o m p a n y d i d n o t m a k e a n i s s u e o u t o f t h e L a b o r Ar b i t e r s a c t i o n i n
ruling on a cause of action, i.e., illegal dismissal, not specifically stated in the complaint. Stated
differently, the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in ruling on an issue that was allegedly not raised
on appeal before it.
The Court of Appeals decision ended in this wise:
W H E R E F O R E , f o r e g o i n g p r e m i s e s c o n s i d e r e d , t h e P E T I T I O N H AV I N G M E R I T i s
h e r e b y G I V E N D U E C O U R S E . R E SU L T A NT L Y , t h e c h a l l e n g e d d e c i s i o n o f P u b l i c
R e s p o n d e n t N a t i o n a l L a b o r R e l a t i o n s C o m m i s s i o n i s h e r e b y AN N U L L E D A ND SE T A SI D E
A N D T H E J U D G M E N T O F T H E L AB O R AR B I T E R I N R A B - C A SE No . 0 6 - 0 1 - 1 0 0 1 9 - 9 7
REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
The Issues
I t s M ot i on f or R e c on s i d e r a t i on h a v i n g b e e n d e n i e d [ 1 4 ] , p e t i t i o n e r c o m p a n y n o w c o m e s t o t h i s
C o u r t i m p u t i n g t h e f o l l o w i n g e r r o r s o n t h e C o u r t o f Ap p e a l s :
I.
T H E C O U R T O F A P P E A L S E R R E D I N H O L D I N G T H AT T H E N AT I O N AL L AB O R R E L AT I O NS
C O M M I S S I O N F O U R T H D I V I S I O N , C E B U C I T Y H AD NO AU T H O R I T Y T O D I S M I S S P R I V AT E
R E S P O N D E N T S C L A I M S F O R I L L E G AL D I S M I S SAL A ND O T H E R M O NE Y C L AI M S;
II.
T H E C O U R T O F A P P E A L S E R R E D I N H O L D I N G T H AT T H E N AT I O N AL L AB O R R E L AT I O NS
C O M M I S S I O N F O U R T H D I V I S I O N, C E B U C I T Y H AD NO A U T H O R I T Y T O R E V E R SE T H E
LABOR ARBITERS DECISION; and
III.
T H E C O U R T O F A P P E A L S E R R E D I N G R A NT I NG T H E P E T I T I O N FO R C E R T I O R A R I I N C A
G . R . S P . N O . 6 6 4 8 0 A N D I N A N NU L I N G ( s i c ) T H E D E C I S I O N O F T H E N AT I O NAL L AB O R
RELATIONS COMMISSION.
I n e s s e n c e , t h e i s s u e f o r r e s o l u t i o n i n t h e c a s e a t b a r i s w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e C o u r t o f Ap p e a l s
c o m m i t t e d r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r i n r u l i n g t h a t t h e NL R C h a d n o a u t h o r i t y t o a d j u d i c a t e o n a n i s s u e n o t
properly raised in petitioner companys Memorandum on Appeal.
Petitioner company posits that contrary to the argument of the appellate court, the main or
primary reason for the reversal of the Labor Arbiters decision was the finding that respondent
complainants could not be regarded, based on the facts of the case and the evidence presented, as
regular employees of petitioner company.
Conversely, respondent complainants allege that an appellate court has no power to resolve
an unassigned error that does not affect the courts jurisdiction or is an error that is neither plain
nor clerical. Likewise, they contend that there is nothing to show that petitioner company made an
issue of the Labor Arbiters action in ruling on a cause of action not specifically stated in the
complaint.
T h e C ou r t s R u l i n g
We find merit in the petition.
I t w a s p l a i n e r r o r f o r t h e C o u r t o f Ap p e a l s t o a n n u l a n d s e t a s i d e t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e NL R C o n
the lone reason that the latter dismissed Petitioners appeal on the basis of an issue not raised by
P r i v a t e R e s p o n d e n t i n i t s a p p e a l x x x. [ 1 5 ] A p a i n s t a k i n g r e v i e w o f t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e NL R C w i l l
readily reveal that the Commissions finding that respondent complainants were not regular
e m p l o y e e s w a s t h e r a i s on d ' t r e f o r t h e s u b s e q u e n t t u r n a r o u n d o f t h e s t a t e o f a f f a i r s .
W h a t t h e N L R C m a d e u s e o f t o r e v e r s e t h e L a b o r Ar b i t e r s d e c i s i o n w a s p r e c i s e l y t h e
conclusion of the latter that respondent complainants were regular employees of petitioner
company. According to the Commission, such conclusion was predicated merely on the consideration
that respondent complainants were performing activities necessary and desirable to the business or
trade of their employer. Based on the facts of the case and th e evidence presented by the parties to
the case at bar, however, the NLRC arrived at a divergent conclusion, which we fully agree in. We
quote with approval its disquisition:
It is interesting to note that the Labor Arbiter had given credence and
probative value to the Petty Cash Vouchers submitted by the respondents. Thus he
said:
T h e p e t t y c a s h v o u c h e r s ( An n e xe s 1 t o 1 - A - 6 2 , r e s p o n d e n t s
position paper) show that complainants are not paid on hourly or
daily basis as they would like this offi ce to believe but on pakiao or
task basis at P15.00 per metric ton. There is no basis then for
complainants to claim that they are underpaid since there is no
minimum wage in this type of work. Complainants earnings depend
upon their own diligence and s peed in unloading and stockpiling
scrap iron. More importantly, it depends upon the availability of
scrap iron to be unloaded and stockpiled.
The above findings validate respondents position as to the nature of

complainants work. Their services are ne eded only when scrap metals are delivered
which occurs only one or twice a week or sometimes no delivery at all in a given
week. The irregular nature of work, stoppage of work and then work again depending
on the supply of scrap metal has not been denied b y complainants. On the contrary
t h e y e v e n a d m i t t e d t h e s a m e i n t h e i r R e p l y t o r e s p o n d e n t s A p p e a l . x x x. I n d e e d , i t
would be unjust to require respondent to maintain complainants in the payroll even
if there is no more work to be done. To do so would make complainants privileged
retainers who collect payment from their employer for work not done. This is
extremely unfair and amount to cuddling of labor at the expense of management. [16]
I t s h o u l d b e r e m e m b e r e d t h a t T h e P h i l i p p i n e C o n s t i t u t i o n , w h i l e i n e xo r a b l y c o m m i t t e d
towards the protection of the working class from exploitation and unfair treatment, nevertheless
mandates the policy of soc ial justice so as to strike a balance between an avowed predilection for
labor, on the one hand, and the maintenance of the legal rights of capital, the proverbial hen that
lays the golden egg, on the other. Indeed, we should not be unmindful of the legal norm that justice
is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed with in the light of established facts, the
applicable law, and existing jurisprudence. [17]
Under the circumstances abovestated:
x x x there can be no illegal dismissal to speak of. Besides, complainants

cannot claim regularity in the hiring every time a truck comes loaded with scrap
metal. This is confirmed in the Petty cash Vouchers which are in the names of
different leaders who apportion the amount earned among his members. [18]
And, quite telling is the fact that not every truck delivery of scrap metal requires the
services of respondent complainants when a particular truck is accompanied by its own unloader.
And whenever required, respondent complainants were not always the ones contracted to under take
the unloading of the trucks since the work was offered to whomever were available at a given time.
F i n a l l y , t h e j u d g m e n t o f t h e C o m m i s s i o n t h a t t h e L a b o r Ar b i t e r a c t e d i n c o r r e c t l y i n r u l i n g o n
a cause of action, i.e., illegal dismissal, not specific ally stated in the complaint, did not
constitute grave abuse of discretion on its part.
It is well settled that an act of a court or tribunal may only be considered to have been done
in grave abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a capricio us or whimsical exercise of
judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. [19] The abuse of discretion must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined or to a ct at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
power and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. [20]
In the case at bar, from the preceding definition, it is quite apparent that no grave abuse of
discretion can be attributed to the NLRC. Its decision simply expressed an observation, to wit:
Moreover, We note that in the complaint filed last January 10, 1997, the
issue of illegal dismissal was not raised as a cause of action although it was later
d i s c u s s e d i n t h e i r p o s i t i o n p a p e r f i l e d o n J a n u a r y 1 2 , 1 9 9 8 . x x x. [ E m p h a s i s
supplied.]
T h e u s e o f t h e w o r d m or e o v e r c l e a r l y e x p r e s s e s N L R C s p o s i t i o n i n t r e a t i n g t h e m a t t e r o f t h e n o n -
inclusion of the issue of illegal dismissal in the complaint merely as an add -on, adjunct or a
supplement to its finding that respondent complainants were not regular employees of petitioner
company.
At any rate, the Court is clothed with authority to review matters, even if they are not
assigned as errors in their appeal, if it finds that their considerati on is necessary in arriving at a just
decision of the case.[21]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision
dated 18 February 2002, and the Resolution dated 27 June 2002, both rendered by the Court of
A p p e a l s i n C A - G . R . S P N o . 6 6 4 8 0 , a r e h e r e b y R E V E R SE D a n d SE T AS I D E . Ac c o r d i n g l y , t h e D e c i s i o n o f
t h e N L R C d a t e d 9 O c t o b e r 2 0 0 0 i s R E I N ST AT E D . C o s t s a g a i n s t r e s p o n d e n t c o m p l a i n a n t s .
SO O R D E R E D .

Continuation of RA 6715

Enviado por

Dados do documento

Descrição original:

Título original

Direitos autorais

Formatos disponíveis

Compartilhar este documento

Compartilhar ou incorporar documento

Opções de compartilhamento

Você considera este documento útil?

Este conteúdo é inapropriado?

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

Continuation of RA 6715

Enviado por

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

continuation of RA 6715

"(c) If made purely on questions of law; and

"(e) To sue and be sued in its registered name; and

"Article 256. Representation issue in organized establishments. - In organized establishments, when a

"(a) Nature of the case;

"(b) Time consumed in hearing the case;

"(c) Professional standing of the voluntary arbitrator;

"(d) Capacity to pay of the parties; and

"(e) Fees provided for in the Revised Rules of Court."

Approved: March 2, 1989

"c) Is performed underground, underwater or at dangerous heights; or

"g) Is performed under particularly difficult conditions; or

Sec. 4. Sec. 13 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 5. Sec. 14 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 6. Sec. 16 of the same Act, is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 16. Penal Provisions -

Sec. 8. Sec. 27 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"(a) Offended party;

"(b) Parents or guardians;

"(c) Ascendant or collateral relative within the third degree of consanguinity;

Approved: December 19, 200

Republic Act No. 7277

b) Impairment is any loss, diminution or aberration of psychological, physiological, or anatomical

e) Rehabilitation is an integrated approach to physical, social, cultural, spiritual, educational and

g) Auxiliary Aids and Services include:

3) acquisition or modification of equipment or devices; and

h) Reasonable Accommodation include 1) improvement of existing facilities used by employees in order

1) the nature and cost of the action;

o) Covered Entity means an employer, employment agency, labor organization or joint-labor

p) Commerce shall be taken to mean as travel, trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or

(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when:

(b) In an education or training environment, sexual harassment is committed:

Approved: February 14, 1995

Republic Act No. 8042

Sec. 3. Definitions. - For purposes of this Act:

(b) It is a signatory to multilateral conventions, declarations or resolutions relating to the protection of

II. ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT

G & M PHILIPPINES, INC., G.R. No. 162308

PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,

ROMIL V. CUAMBOT, Promulgated:

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Respondent prayed for the following relief:

Hence, the present petition, where petitioner claims that

CEBU METAL CORPORATION, G. R. No. 154463

As compensation for their services, these workers including the herein

2. The aforesaid complainants, from the time they were employed by

GREGORIO ROBERT SALILING ------- P5.00/hour in 1988

ELIAS BOLIDO ------- P100.00/day in 1992

BENJIE AMPARADO ------- P7.00/hour in 1994

3. That the aforesaid complainants never received any other benefits

Complainants likewise never received 13 th month pay, holiday pay, incentive

5. When these complainants demanded from respondent for the increase

On 10 January 1997, respondent complainants filed a Complaint[9] before the Regional

GRAND TOTAL -------- P257,009.52

In case reinstatement is no longer feasible, complainants are to be given

The Court of Appeals decision ended in this wise:

We find merit in the petition.

The above findings validate respondents position as to the nature of

Under the circumstances abovestated:

x x x there can be no illegal dismissal to speak of. Besides, complainants

Você também pode gostar