WIDE AREA BLACKOUT (AN ELECTRICAL DISASTER)

1. INTRODUCTION:
Power Systems are characterized as a large complex system covering vast areas, connecting National/continental grids, highly nonlinear and high order systems. In general, a power system network comprises of generators, loads, buses and transmission lines. All generators and loads are connected to the buses. The transmission lines are the link between all the buses which were connected to the generators and the loads. The power flows from the generators through the transmission lines reaching the loads at various points. The flow of power through each transmission line is controlled by controllers namely transformers, capacitors and others. In order to obtain a stable power system network, all generators rotational speed is required to be synchronized. Failure to meet synchronization will cause the system to go into an unstable state and power outages. The stability, reliability and security of power system are the concerned issues in any developing country like India due to the lessons from the blackout. Stability of a power system is affected by three factors: Characteristics of the physical system: 1. the integrated generation, transmission and distribution system 2. protection and control systems Business structures of owning and operating entities The regulatory framework(CERC in India)

2. WHAT IS BLACKOUT?
A blackout refers to the total loss of power to an area and is the most severe form of power outage that can occur in a power system. Blackouts which results in power stations tripping are particularly difficult to recover quickly. Outages may last from a few minutes to a few weeks depending on 1. The nature of the blackout and 2. 2.The configuration of the electrical network Blackout in a power system would result the entire high voltage transmission grid to force out of service, thereby isolating the load it would normally serve. Grid failure also results almost simultaneous loss of multiple generating units or plants.
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July 2012 India blackout:

Dark shaded- power outages on 30 July mild shaded- affected on 31 July 2012 States on the northern grid: Delhi, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand States on the eastern grid: Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, West Bengal States on the northeast grid: Arunanchal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim

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3. JULY 2012 INDIA BLACKOUT:

It is considered as the largest power outage in history as number of people affected. Occurred as two separate events on 30th and 31st July 2012 and affected over 620 million people, half of India's population and about 9% of the population. Spread across 22 states in Northern, Eastern, and Northeast India, and estimated 32 giga watts of generating capacity was taken offline
Sequence of events:

At 02:35 IST (on 30th July), the 400 kV Bina-Gwalior line tripped. As this line fed into the AgraBareilly transmission section, the station also tripped, and power failures cascaded through the grid. All major power stations were shut down in the affected states, causing an estimated shortage of 32 GW. On the day of the collapse, some states had attempted to draw more power than permitted due to the higher consumption. Spokesperson of PGCIL and the Northern Regional Load Dispatch Centre (NRLDC) stated that Uttar Pradesh, Punjab and Haryana were the states responsible for the overdraw. A senior director for an Indian power company described the outage as "a fairly large breakdown that exposed major technical faults in Indias grid system. Something went terribly wrong which caused the backup safety systems to fail." It took 15 hours to restore 80% of service. On 31st July The system failed again at 13:02 IST , due to a relay problem near the TajMahal. As a result, power stations across the affected parts of India again went offline. NTPC Ltd. stopped 38% of its generation capacity. However, the following regions were not affected at all:

Narora and Simbhaoli in Uttar Pradesh parts of Delhi such as Badarpur areas served by Sterlite and Ib Thermal Power Station (most of western Orissa) most of the Kolkata municipal area(CESC)

1st August According to the officials of Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Limited, the 400 kV double circuit line between Gwalior and Agra faced "dangerous overloading" on the evening of August 1 and could have triggered another power outage. The tripping was prevented when the power persons realized that the line load had reached 800 MW and scaled it down to 600 MW by cutting off the electricity to many parts that were fed by this line.
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4. WHY JULY 2012 BLACKOUT??

I. Weak Inter-regional Corridors due to multiple outages: The system was weakened by multiple outages of transmission lines in the WR-NR interface. Effectively, 400 kV BinaGwalior-Agra (one circuit) was the only main AC circuit available between WR-NR interface prior to the grid disturbance. High Loading on 400 kV Bina-Gwalior-Agra link: The overdraw by some of the NR utilities, utilizing Unscheduled Interchange (UI), contributed to high loading on this tie line. Inadequate response by SLDCs to the instructions of RLDCs to reduce overdraws by the NR utilities and underdrawal/excess generation by the WR utilities. Loss of 400 kV Bina-Gwalior link: Since the interregional interface was very weak, tripping of 400 kV Bina-Gwalior line on zone-3 protection of distance relay caused the NR system to separate from the WR. This happened due to load encroachment (high loading of line resulting in high line current and low bus voltage).

II.

III. IV.

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Analysis of occurrence of blackout:

Blackouts seem to progress with some regularity. The progressions of blackouts can be divided into several phases. The diagram shown in Figure clearly describes five phases which are: Existence of a stressed power system or preconditions Initiating events or multiple power outages Inappropriate control action Cascade events Loss of synchronism and finally blackout

Existence of a stressed power system:

Different preconditions happened before blackouts can be classified according to their common characteristics. The classification is carried out as follows: 1. System condition is stressful in summer peak and winter peak. 2. Aging equipments in power substations are working over their life time and such system become unstable during the emergency condition. 3. Inadequate reactive power reserve i.e. lacking of reactive power decreases the flexibility of voltage control, which may increase the risk of voltage collapse. 4. Some important equipment out of service leads the system to a stressful condition.

Initiating events or multiple power outages

Initiating events are various in different blackouts. These events can directly cause blackout or can worsen the system condition which may indirectly lead to blackout. Short-circuit, overload, protection hidden failure are the usual initiating events, and other events such as loss of generator sometimes can also be initiating events. The cascade is a dynamic phenomenon. It can be triggered by the initiating events. These initiating events can cause power oscillations and voltage fluctuations which may result in high currents and low voltages. The high currents and low voltages can be detected by other lines and be treated as faults. The lines and the generators can trip to protect themselves from damage, which may lead more and more lines and generators to become out of order.

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Besides power oscillations and voltage fluctuations, line overloads also can cause cascade. When a line is tripped, due to an overload, the neighbour lines can become overload and be tripped.

Inappropriate control action And Cascade events

We can divide the period of cascade events into 1. steady-state progression and 2. High-speed cascade.

Steady-state progression In the period of steady-state progression, the progression of the cascade events is slow, and the system can keep balance between the generation and the consummation. During this period, the major incident is the cascade overload. Because of the slow speed of the worsening of the situation in the period of steady-state progression, it may be a good opportunity for the system operator to take actions to stop the spread of the cascade overload and then, prevent the occurrence of blackout. High-speed cascade In high-speed cascade, the balance between the generation and the consumption may be broken, series of system equipments may be tripped rapidly, and system collapse can happen in a very short time. In the period of high-speed cascade, it is generally too late for the system operator to take actions to stop the rapid progression of blackout. Loss of synchronism and finally blackout

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WIDE AREA BLACKOUT (AN ELECTRICAL DISASTER)

5. PREVENTING BLACKOUT:
5.1 Long Term plans: 5.1.1Adequate transmission access to load centers 5.1.2Sufficient generation margin 5.1.3. Real Time Monitoring: Tools: - Synchrophasors And Dynamic Simulation using Dynamic Security Assessment (DSA) Synchrophasors Synchrophasors (fig shown below) are fast sub-second rate power system measurements such as three-phase voltages and currents, frequency, and rate of change of frequency. These measurements are time-stamped to a common global time reference. This provides synchronized real-time monitoring of multiple remote points on the electrical grid and also provides monitoring of fast dynamic grid behavior. Synchrophasors are measured by Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs). A PMU can be a dedicated device, a meter, or any measuring device that can accept a global time reference and properly time-stamp the power system measurements. Because Synchrophasors provide an instantaneous synchronized view of the grids state, we can identify and locate abnormal behaviors more quickly. They also monitor the fast dynamic behavior of the grid. The control center has a snapshot of the grid with fast sub-second measurements that are synchronized. This allows for introduction of a new generation of innovative Energy Management System (EMS) software to analyze abnormal as well as dynamic behavior and to take corrective action automatically without operator intervention.

Dynamic Security Assessment (DSA): Dynamic security assessment plays a critical role in the competitive market today. Fast and accurate assessment which allows the remedy actions to be carried as soon as possible is the key to what the power system engineers need today.

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Fig: Synchrophasors

Fig: Dynamic Security Assessment

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5.1.4 Distributed Generation: Distributed generation is less vulnerable to outages since there are so many local sources of power supply. Critical loads are better protected when nearby multiple sources (hybrid generations) are available. Computer and industrial processes require backup power to prevent secondary problems caused by loss of power and it can be achieved by DG. Independent energy systems can use failure-resistant sources like multi-day fuel tanks or natural gas pipelines or may use PV cells, WEGs, Stream turbine from a small local stream and Tidal energy which are renewable sources of electrical energy. When islanding of multiple power sources occurs, DG is a safety concern for power line workers; as its robustness ensures power stability. It offers significant economic, environmental and security benefits as well as cost effective

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5.2 Short Term Plans:

5.2.1 SPECIAL PROTECTIVE MEASURES: Best practices for electrical engineers in order to prevent blackout have been discussed in the following points. Network Operators and Service Providers should conduct periodic verification of the synchronization plan and the diversity of timing links, power feeds and alarms. Network Operators and Service Providers should continue to emphasize the need for local procedures and contingency plans for power emergencies. Network Operators and Service Providers should ensure that engineering, design, and installation processes address how new network elements are integrated into the synchronization plan. Remote power maintenance systems should be secured to prevent, detect and contain any unauthorized access, modification or use. Redundancy must be provided, so that no single point alarm system failure will lead to a battery plant outage. Provision for test detailed action plans to address emergency situations, such as when both the commercial AC power and the standby engine fails to start in a plant. Provision for a minimum of 3 hours battery reserve for central offices equipped with fully automatic standby systems. Provision for temperature compensation on the rectifiers or some method to detect/prevent thermal runaway. Multiple smaller battery plants should be used in place of single very large plants serving multiple switches. Protective covers and warning signs on all vulnerable circuit breakers should be provided. DC fusing levels throughout the power supply and distribution system, especially at the main primary distribution board (to avoid over fusing or under fusing) should be verified periodically. All new power equipment, including batteries should conform to NEBS.
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5.2.2 FACT DEVICES:

FACTS devices possess the following technological attributes for which they can be used for preventing blackout. Provide dynamic reactive power support and voltage control. Reduce the need for construction of new transmission lines, capacitors, reactors, etc which Mitigate environmental and regulatory concerns. Improve aesthetics by reducing the need for construction of new facilities such as transmission lines. Improve system stability. Control real and reactive power flow. Mitigate potential Sub-Synchronous Resonance problems. FACTS device used in practice: Unified Power Flow Controller (UPFC) Thyristor Controlled Series Capacitor (TCSC) Thyristor Controlled Phase Angle regulator (TCPAR) Static Condenser (STATCON) Static Synchronous Series Compensator (SSSC)

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5.3 Preventing BLACKOUT summary:

Good design and operating practices can minimize the occurrence and impact of widespread outages i.e. there is a need of formation of ductile power system rather a brittle one. Ductile system suppresses the initiatory disturbance at the same occurring point where as a brittle system spreads it all over. Ductile system is based uponReliability criteria Robust stability controls, Coordinated emergency controls, Real-time system monitoring and control and Need for a single entity with overall responsibility for security of entire interconnected system

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6. Why blackout is a disaster??

Electric power is Essential resource of national security. It affects: a) Finance b) Transportation c) Food and water supply d) Health and welfare e) Communications f) Research

g) Heating and cooling h) Illumination i) Computer and electronics

j) Industries k) Commercial enterprise and many more.thus Impact of wide area on grid and public life is countless Some highlighted issues published in newspapers due to July blackout Three lakh passengers, 300 trains stranded in eight states 200 miners stuck in West Bengal mines More than 300 million people, about 25% of India's population, were without power. Railways and some airports were shut down until 08:00. Passenger trains were shut down and traffic signals were non-operational. Several hospitals reported interruptions in health services Water treatment plants were shut down for several hours Millions were unable to draw water from bore wells powered by electric pumps. Lifts in multi-storey buildings, and movement of vehicular traffic halted

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7. CONCLUSION:
After discussing all these corners of blackout there arises a question Will there be a blackout in future??? No because we Engineers tend to learn from the past events i.e. dont repeat those mistakes ... But power systems and equipments are usually prepared to the last (rather than future) war Improvements in communications and coordination between NLDC, SLDC, RLDC and generating stations all over India ... But new challenges are looking ahead.

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8. REFERENCES:
Websites: I. II. III. http://www.powermin.nic.in August 2012 http://wikipedia.org/India_blackouts www.ieee.org

Books: I. Power System Analysis by Grainger and Stevenson

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