Framwork Ver 4

International Workshop Agreement
IWA 6
Guidelines for the management of drinking water utilities under emergency or crisis conditions
Reference number IWA 6:2007(E)
ISO 2007 All rights reserved
IWA 6:2007(E)
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ISO 2007 All rights reserved. Unless otherwise specified, no part of this publication may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and microfilm, without permission in writing from either ISO at the address below or ISO's member body in the country of the requester. ISO copyright office Case postale 56 CH-1211 Geneva 20 Tel. + 41 22 749 01 11 Fax + 41 22 749 09 47 E-mail copyright@iso.ch Web www.iso.ch Printed in Switzerland
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Contents
Page
Foreword.............................................................................................................................................................iv Background .........................................................................................................................................................v Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................vi 1 2 3 Scope ......................................................................................................................................................1 Terms and definitions ...........................................................................................................................1 Framework for management of a water incident................................................................................4
Annex A .............................................................................................................................................................13 Annex B .............................................................................................................................................................16 Annex C .............................................................................................................................................................17 Annex D (informative) Technological instruments and means for ensuring drinking water security .....20 Annex E (informative) Standardization of models for water distribution systems security .....................25 Bibliography ......................................................................................................................................................30
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IWA 6:2007(E)
Foreword
ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) is a worldwide federation of national standards bodies (ISO member bodies). ISO's technical work is normally carried out through ISO technical committees in which each ISO member body has the right to be represented. International organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO, also take part in the work. In order to respond to urgent market requirements, ISO has also introduced the possibility of preparing documents through a workshop mechanism, external to its normal committee processes. These documents are published by ISO as International Workshop Agreements. Proposals to hold such workshops may come from any source and are subject to approval by the ISO Technical Management Board which also designates an ISO member body to assist the proposer in the organization of the workshop. International Workshop Agreements are approved by consensus amongst the individual participants in such workshops. Although it is permissible that competing International Workshop Agreements exist on the same subject, an International Workshop Agreement shall not conflict with an existing ISO or IEC standard. An International Workshop Agreement is reviewed after three years, under the responsibility of the member body designated by the Technical Management Board, in order to decide whether it will be confirmed for a further three years, transferred to an ISO technical body for revision, or withdrawn. If the International Workshop Agreement is confirmed, it is reviewed again after a further three years, at which time it must be either revised by the relevant ISO technical body or withdrawn. Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this International Workshop Agreement may be the subject of patent rights. ISO shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights. International Workshop Agreement IWA 6 was drafted at a workshop organized jointly by Israel's Water Authority and The Standards Institution of Israel (SII), and held in October 2007 and is still to be approved Appreciation is extended to Israel's Water Authority and The Standards Institution of Israel for both the organization of the workshop and the preparation of this International Workshop Agreement.
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Background
The standards Institution of Israel (SII) has identified the area of water technologies and water security as critical and crucial for communities, countries and society as a whole because of the dwindling of water sources and the increase of water needs. To address this issue, SII proposed to develop an ISO International Workshop Agreement (IWA) on water security, producing a framework which would constitute a basis for the justification of establishing a SC within the framework of ISO TC 224 or for developing standards in other TCs. . This request was approved by the ISO Technical Management Board (TMB). This document is SII's proposed draft IWA on water security and consists of an introduction, a framework for the management of water incidents, and annexes on technological instruments and means for ensuring drinking water security, and on models for water distribution systems security. This document includes the introduction and the description of the management elements required for a drinking water utility or facility. In the annexes, there is a broader and in-depth elaboration on the products and means and on the models. Within the scope of the activity of The Standards Institution of Israel (SII) to be the leader in the standardization on the subject of water security, three working groups were appointed to examine the possibility of standardization on the subject of water security as preparatory activity to the IWA: working group on the subject of means; working group on the subject of models; working group on the subject of management of a water crisis incident
This document attempts to examine and select those possible standardization subjects on the topic of management of a water incident. It was decided at the International workshop held in Tel-Aviv 2007 to examine the standardization in regard to two aspects: The general aspect, that examines the possibility of preparing a standard, "A water incident Management system for a water utility" and standards for other areas that are associated with the management of a water incident in a water utility and that identify technologies means and procedures that may assist and support the processes of management of a water incident in a water utility. The more detailed aspect, as a result of the general aspect, that will identify possible standards for technologies, means and procedures that contribute to management of a water incident.
A water utility that is interested in adopting a standard for management of a water incident should first determine what is the minimum level of service that it wishes or is required to provide to its consumers and as a consequence, define the means .of meeting this level of service in emergency and crisis situations. These activities should comply with the requirements established by the relevant authorities.
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Introduction
0.1 General
Water is the source of life, without which the human species cannot survive on the face of the earth. Nevertheless, a majority of the countries do not know how to maintain the desired level of water quantity and water quality which is the most precious and important of all natural resources. Impairment of the drinking water would change the level of life of the affected population in the immediate period while in the medium-term period, it would affect their ability to survive. Any tampering done to the water that causes massive illness and unplanned interruption in the water supply on a continuous basis in a large area would have complicated psychological effects on the relevant population creating a public panic situation that will demand the local drinking water utilities and the authorities to operate extensive emergency systems in the affected area. Severe damage that has impact on the quantity or to the quality of drinking water that would cause a major disaster as a result of an intentional disruption or destruction from a natural disaster or an operating fault would severely interrupt the living quality in the affected area and in its vicinity. The destructive influence of such damage to drinking water could significantly deviate from the damaged geographic area and have a wide spread effect, mainly regarding panic and harm to the feeling of safety of the citizens. The water utilities act within the context of increasing security risks and threats, more stringent legislation and regulation, heightened awareness of the need for adequate emergency response and remediation planning, concerns of interested and affected parties, and the need to assure operational continuity,
0.2
Main threats to the drinking water supply systems
The result of the occurrence of each of the threats on the partial or full sudden interruption of the drinking water supply in large residential areas and for an extended period of time will be defined as a water crisis that requires the operation of local and national emergency systems at various extents and levels according to the actual damage and assessment of possible damages. In extreme occurrences the possibility exists that the water crisis could continue for a long period of time, during which the supply of drinking water to the residents will come from alternate sources that were not damaged or contaminated. The effects of each of the threats may be local, regional or national according to the preparedness and the professional and operational capability of the parties responsible for reducing the extent of the water crisis, its severity and its length as much as possible. Potential threats to drinking water supply systems can be natural or man-made intentional or non-intentional; they are characterized by any interruption of essential infrastructure, materials, service or personnel, without which the locally agreed level of service cannot be attained.
0.3
Prevention and treatment
Water utilities supplying drinking water have a primary function to be prepared for providing a continuous response during all stages of the incident. The preparedness of drinking water utilities that bear the responsibility to prevent impairment to the water installations and their vigilance level is a necessary condition for providing an appropriate and effective answer for treatment of water incidences and water crises. Drinking water utilities shall be prepared to provide a response at all times through coordination with local and national bodies to minimize damages and to ensure the continued supply of water to the users. The following scheme demonstrates the value of being prepared on the consequences of a water incident.
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Scheme 1: Effectiveness of Emergency or Crisis Management
0.4
Standardization in drinking water supply security issues
Comprehensive guidelines in the form of International standards for the management of drinking water utilities under emergency and crisis conditions may be desirable and have not yet been developed NOTE CEN TC 164 started officially a project on the same subject. NOTE: Standardization for water security take into consideration processes and procedures as defined in other international organization's documents i.e. WHO. While the management of drinking water utilities under emergency and crisis conditions have to meet national or regional requirements of relevant authorities, the outputs of the development of International Standards could assist them. Some terminology standards on these issues are under development and should be considered when developing water security standards. Other standards for technologies, means and processes applicable in the operational aspects of the implementation of the management of the emergency and crisis may need to be developed.
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International Workshop Agreement
IWA 6:2007(E)
Guidelines for the management of drinking water utilities under emergency or crisis conditions
Scope
This International Workshop Agreement is intended to identify and chart the complex of critical systems that are of great significance to the subject of drinking water security. Its purpose is to set in motion a continuous process for the establishment of accepted International Standards on management systems, technological means, processes that will be put into effect and will complement, in terms of standardization, the technological means, preparedness and means of dealing with the various threats on the drinking water systems. This International Workshop Agreement provides the essential elements for a water utility, or any body responsible for the management of any part of the water supply system, to be prepared and ready to manage a water incident. It also provides a roadmap for possible relevant International Standards that could be useful and could be developed.
Terms and definitions
For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply: 2.1
consequence outcome of an event NOTE 1: There can be more than one consequence from one event NOTE 2: Consequences can range from positive to negative. NOTE 3: Consequences can be expressed qualitatively or quantitatively.
[ISO/IEC Guide 73]
2.2
crisis
any incident(s), human-caused or natural, that may result in water supply disruption or contamination and that requires urgent attention and action to protect life, property, or environment. 2.3 disaster event that causes great damage or loss 2.4 disruption incident, whether anticipated (e.g., hurricane) or unanticipated (e.g., a blackout or earthquake) which disrupts the normal course of operations at a water utility.
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NOTE: A disruption can be caused by either positive or negative factors that will disrupt normal operations. 2.5 emergency sudden, urgent, usually unexpected occurrence or event requiring immediate action NOTE: An emergency is usually a disruptive event or condition that can often be anticipated or prepared for but seldom exactly foreseen. 2.6 exercising evaluating programs, rehearsing the roles of team members and staff and testing the recovery of an organizations systems (e.g. technology, telephony, administration) NOTE 1: Exercises include activities performed for the purpose of training and conditioning team members and personnel in appropriate responses with the goal of achieving maximum performance NOTE 2: An exercise can involve invoking operational response and recovery procedures, but is more likely to involve the simulation of an incident, announced or unannounced, in which participants role-play in order to assess what issues might arise, prior to a real invocation. 2.7 event occurrence of a particular set of circumstances NOTE 1: The event can be certain or uncertain NOTE 2: The event can be a single occurrence or a series of occurrences. NOTE 3: The probability associated with the event can be estimated for a given period of time. [ISO/IEC Guide 73]
2.8 impact
evaluated consequence of a particular outcome
2.9 incident
event that might be, or could lead to, an operational interruption, disruption, loss, emergency or crisis
2.10 incident management plan

clearly defined and documented plan of action for use at the time of an incident or disruption, typically covering the key personnel, resources, services and actions needed to implement the incident management process
2.11 mitigation
limitation of any negative consequence of a particular incident
2.12 prevention
measures that enable an organization to avoid, preclude, or limit the impact of a disruption 2.13
probability
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extent to which an event is likely to occur NOTE 1: ISO 3534-1:1993, definition 1.1 gives the mathematical definition of probability as a real number in the scale of 0 to 1 attached to a random event. It can be related to a long-run relative frequency of occurrence or to a degree of belief that an event will occur. For a high degree of belief, the probability is near 1. NOTE 2: Frequency rather than probability may be used to describe risk. NOTE 3: Degrees of belief about probability can be chosen as classes or ranks, such as
- rare/unlikely/moderate/likely/almost certain, or - incredible/improbable/remote/occasional/probable/frequent.
[ISO/IEC Guide 73] 2.14
response program
plan, processes, and resources to perform the activities and services necessary to preserve and protect life, property, operations, and critical assets NOTE: Response steps generally include incident recognition, notification, assessment, declaration, plan execution, communications, and resources management
2.15
risk combination of the probability of an event and its consequences NOTE 1: The term risk is generally used only when there is at least the possibility of negative consequences. NOTE 2: In some situations, risk arises from the possibility of deviation from the expected outcome or event. [ISO/IEC Guide 73] 2.16 risk acceptance decision to accept risk NOTE 1: The verb to accept is chosen to convey the idea that acceptance has its basic dictionary meaning. NOTE 2: Risk acceptance depends on the risk criteria. [ISO/IEC Guide 73] 2.17 risk assessment overall process of risk identification, analysis and evaluation NOTE: Risk assessment involves the process of identifying internal and external threats and vulnerabilities, identifying the likelihood of an event arising from such threats or vulnerabilities, defining critical functions necessary to continue the organizations operations, defining the controls in place necessary to reduce exposure, and evaluating the cost of such controls
2.18
risk communication
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exchange or sharing of information about risk between the decision-maker and other stakeholders NOTE: The information can relate to the existence, nature, form, probability, severity, acceptability, treatment or other aspects of risk. [ISO/IEC Guide 73] 2.19 risk management coordinated activities to direct and control an organization with regard to risk NOTE: Risk management generally includes risk assessment, risk treatment, risk acceptance and risk communication. [ISO/IEC Guide 73] 2.20 risk reduction actions taken to lessen the probability, negative consequences, or both, associated with a risk. [ISO/IEC Guide 73] 2.21 risk communication exchange or sharing of information about risk between the decision-maker and other stakeholders NOTE: The information can relate to the existence, nature, form, probability, severity, acceptability, treatment or other aspects of risk. [ISO/IEC Guide 73]
2.22
threat potential cause of an unwanted incident, which may result in harm to individuals, a system or organization, the environment or the community 2.23 top management directors and officers of an organization that can ensure effective management systems, including financial monitoring and control systems, have been put in place to protect assets, earning capacity and the reputation of the organization
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3.1
Framework for management of a water incident

Importance of a management system
General
3.1.1
A normal supply of water is essential to the maintenance of public health, safety and the economy. Contamination or disruption of the water supply system may become a health, economic and environmental danger.
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Water utilities of all sizes and types have become increasingly aware of the need to achieve and demonstrate proactive security performance related to their physical facilities, services, activities, products, supply chains, and operational continuity... Applying high-level management standards would enable organizations to manage and improve their security performance and, at the same time, meet their legal obligations. A high-level management standard should be applicable to all types and sizes of water utilities and to accommodate diverse geographical, cultural, and social conditions. A high-level management standard for water emergency management provides a broad approach to the need of a water utility to get the assurance that its security and continuity preparedness, emergency, contingency plans and performance not only meets, but will also continue to meet, its legal and policy requirements. The application of such standard for water emergency management would provide a framework for the development of tools to help water utilities to prepare for, cope and manage an incident or event that occurs as a result of a water emergency situation. . The purpose of a standard for water emergency management is to provide a minimal base line for developing and implementing incident preparedness and operational continuity within a water utility and to provide confidence in organization-to-community, business-to-business and organization-to-customer/client dealings. The standard is a tool to allow water utilities, whether public or private, to consider if the commercial products used for water emergency (crisis) management, include all the factors and steps necessary to prepare for an unintentionally, intentionally, and naturally caused incident (crisis, disruption, disaster, or emergency) so that by the use of the products it can manage and survive the incident and take the appropriate actions to help ensure the organizations continued viability and safe drinking water supply. The standard includes the elements of the different stages of a water emergency, that is; the stages of threat definition, preparation and mitigation of potential incidents and disruptions in order to avoid suspension of critical operations and services, or if operations and services are disrupted, the stages necessary in order that they resume operations and services as soon as possible, that is, defining actions and activities to be performed by a water utility during the stages of a water incident, first and final response stage and system rehabilitation stage. In addition, the extended disruption of the water supply may cause both health and sanitary problems. It is obvious that harm to the regular water supply constitutes an acute problem (the problem can be circumvented by the supply of drinking water in bottles, tankers, etc.). The water disruption to large populated areas paralyzes the sanitary and waste system and can cause sanitary problems leading to the outbreak of an epidemic. 3.1.2 Elements involved in management of an incident in a water company
The essence of management of a water incident by a water utility includes several stages and components, which should be independent of the specific water utility or the neighbourhood in which it operates. The stages shall be suitable for a modern water utility in a developed country that supplies specific quantities of water to a specific amount of consumers. The stages shall also be suitable for an outdated water utility in a developed or underdeveloped country where the professional level of the management and the employees is relatively low. In segmenting a water incident, five stages can be identified. The involvement and actions of the water utility changes in each stage and consequently the expertise, the extent of involvement of external parties and the potential effect on the water utility and its interest parties differ at each stage. Definition of the stages in the correct manner serves as the bases for analysis of the needs and functions applicable to the water utility and accordingly, the possibility allows the determination, in a responsible and uniform manner, of the extent of the resources required, the establishment of a suitable organization infrastructure, the writing of procedures for each of the stages, characterization of the communication channels necessary for internal communication within the organization and with those having an interest outside the organization, characterization and procurement of means in an intelligent manner, etc. The five stages are: Threat definition and Risk assessment;
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Preparedness; Response stage; Recovery stage; Lessons learned and review of the whole management system (back to stage 1)
The management methodology should be based on the PDCA (Plan-Do-Check-Act) Model (see figure 1). The PDCA model is sometimes referred to as the APCI: (Assess-Protect-Confirm-Improve) Model.
Plan Act Check

Figure 1 - PDCA Model
Do
Plan establish the objectives, procedures and processes necessary to deliver improvements in accordance with the organizations security needs and should be based on the threat definitions and risk assessment; Do implement the procedures and processes; Check monitor and measure procedures and processes against the relevant risks; Act take actions to continually improve the preparedness of the water utility.
The adaptation of this model to water security is:
Figure 2 The Water Incident Management Cycle
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3.2
3.2.1
Stages in a water security incident

Threat Definition and Risk assessment
The basis for constructing a plan to contend with a water security incident in a water utility is identification and definition of the threats and conducting a survey of the effect of the threats on the operation of the water utility, on its interest parties and on the environment while being concerned with adhering to the requirements of the regulator and additional requirements. The definition of a threat is anything (action, material, etc.) that may endanger and/or harm people, the organization and its goals, level of service to the consumers, to its interest parties and to the environment. In order that the definition of the threat is acknowledged, it must consist of the following: a) type of threat: i.e. war, terror, human errors, natural catastrophes; b) the various components of each threat: chemical, biological, radioactive components, interruption of regular water supply, etc.; c) levels of concentrations of the various threats and the risk classes; d) possible scenarios of the occurrence of the incident and its significance on the water supply system, the consumers and the community and societal services; e) assessment of the initial dangers and tools for assessing the dangers according to the abovementioned scenarios. The output of this stage is a list of threats (natural or man made) to the water supply system prioritized by a risk analysis and vulnerability assessment. 3.2.2 Preparedness
The preparedness does not depend on a specific incident or a type and character of the incident but is a stage that begins with establishment and design and an entry of the water utility into its routine activity and ends when the operation of the company deviates from its routine activity regardless of the reason. On the occasion of an incident, the preparedness is halted and the water utility passes onto the incident stage. At the end of the incident stage, the plant returns to the preparedness. The stage is not always the same in the various departments in the water utility but is unique to the department level or possibly to the function. In addition, one group in a water utility may be in the preparedness while simultaneously, another group will be dealing with an incident. The preparedness for a water incident is defined as the time when a security incident in the organization is not being dealt with. A water utility in which there is awareness to the serious effects that can occur due to the occurrence of a water security incident that was not dealt with within a short time and in a proper manner, uses the preparedness to reinforce the organizational policy in preparation for a water security incident. Strengthening the policy can be accomplished by establishing targets and goals, by preparations and combining suitable controls, maintaining a process lessons learned and the process of constant improvement. In the preparedness, the water utility should take good advantage of the preparation, inspection and implementation time of appropriate management systems that support not only in the routine operation of the water utility systems but also of elements related to water security. Suitable procedures shall be prepared for prevention, reaction, treatment and recovery of the water utility from a water security incident while fulfilling the requirements of the regulator and of other requirements and meeting the service levels as established by the water utility. The top management of the water utility shall take action to characterize, purchase and install technologies that support the management culture and the procedures prepared, establish appropriate technologies for the physical and logical security of the water utility's facilities and water monitoring, establish a routine for monitoring the various means installed to deal with a water security incident, prepare plans for training personnel and for drills of the water utility in anticipation of a water security incident.
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In order for the water utility top management to decide what means are required, it should consider the reference threats, policy, targets and goals. The sequences to deal with a crisis in order to minimize the consequences should be set as follows: the prevention of a water security incident; followed by acts of confinement, cleansing and recovery of the system that should be of a second sequence and finally response to the situation requiring assistance of external bodies such as neighbouring water utilities, authorities or governing bodies. In the preparedness stage, the following elements should be considered. (keep a list with headings of paragraphs, worded for generic issues and put developments in annexes precising that these are examples, and for what type of water systems: 2 annexes are recommended: cases of contamination, cases of disruptions possibility to merge b, c and d change the order of the paragraphs) a) Management and operational procedures The water utility shall prepare and maintain a folder of procedures for management of all stages of a water crisis incident in accordance with that given in this document. b) Physical protection systems - This element is crucial for 2 aspects which are the physical barrier that stops or delays an intruder and the means to detect, record and guide the responders to the foreign object or persons. Warning systems for water contamination This element indicates the possibility of foreign substance in the water that could be hazardous. . Emergency operations centre This element constitutes the physical and functional element of controlling all elements in a crisis. Redundancy of the essential components of the system necessary for the supply of alternative water through the water supply system. Contingencies The water utility shall prepare contingency plans and make all the necessary preparations for the distribution of water not through the existing water supply system. Interfaces with other emergency and environmental and public safety and health organisations. Identification and care of critical customers and critical service areas Interface with users and citizens This element addresses the need to communicate with the public and other stake-holders. Model for effective placement of water monitoring systems and for indicating spread of the contamination in the water supply system This element is to improve the capability to respond effectively and efficiently to a crisis and reduce damage. Training program and qualification Exercises to demonstrate competence.
c)
d)
e)
f)
g) h) i)
j)
k) l)
A comprehensive list of these elements is in Annex A. 3.2.3 Response stage
The response stage should put into effective implementation the procedures defined during the preparedness stage. A comprehensive list of relevant elements is in Annex B
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3.2.4
Recovery stage
3.2.4.1 It is important that the recovery management be through the use of a procedure that sets reasonable recovery goals (cleanliness levels, etc.) intermediate goals (if necessary), application of a recovery process in an effective and responsible manner and the establishment of actions and necessary recovery means. A comprehensive list of relevant elements is in Annex C 3.2.5 Lessons learned and review of the whole management system (back to stage 1)
To improve the level of competence of the water utility regarding its preparedness for a water crisis, a essential stage is the going through a lessons learning process and implementing them within the management framework. The elements of this stage should include among other elements, management reviews, establishing a process for preventive and corrective actions.
3.3
3.3.1
Subjects for which detailed standards could be prepared

Standard for management of an incident
A standard for an incident management system should be general and encompassing while specific standards shall be written for equipment, procedures, activities and the various plans required to manage an incident in the most effective manner. This standard should determine the activities and their order, the equipment required to be installed, locations and manner of installation and the procedures to be included in them in order to be able to manage a water incident in an effective manner. A standard for an incident management system refers to the requirements of a water utility during the various stages of handling of the incident, namely: a) Threat definition and Risk assessment; b) c) d) e) Preparedness; Response stage; Recovery stage; Lessons learned and review of the whole management system (back to stage 1)
A standard for an incident management system must define the components that have to be dealt with within the framework of the standard and also what is the level of all the components from the standpoint of their indispensability for meeting the standard. These level are as follows: essential; desirable; worthwhile. Standards for on-line monitoring instrumentation
3.3.2
Standards for on-line monitoring instrumentation installed in a water supply system for detection and identification of pollutants (specific, experimental, biological, algorithmic for detecting deviations in the water quality, etc.). Continuous monitoring instruments for detection and identification of pollutants in water may be of several types, as follows: instrumentation for monitoring of specific materials in water;
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instrumentation for "water toxicity (experimental, biological)" monitoring; algorithms that learn the relationships between the changes that occur in the reading of "routine" parameters for water quality measured in water systems by commercial instrumentation available today on the market.
The considerations for the selection of the types of instrumentation to be installed, or of the possibility of combining some of the abovementioned types of instrumentation depends on the characteristics of the water system and the threats being considered. Since the principles of detection and identification pollutants in water vary according to each of the abovementioned groups, the performance and requirements from the instruments for water security purposes are different than the requirements from the same instruments when used for monitoring the quality and water supply during normal operation. Since the subject of development of instrumentation and software for a water supply system that is suitable for detection and identification of parameters in water that imperil water security is in an intensive stage of development around the world, this is the time to set standards for the development of this kind of instrumentation. 3.3.3 Models for setting the locations and the number of instruments to be assembled in the water supply system according to their characteristics There is a need to decide on the most desirable location for installation of instrumentation for detection and identification in water. It is clear that it is not economically feasible to install an unlimited number of instruments. It is desirable that an optimization model shall determine the number and location of the various instruments to be installed in the water supply system. The specification of the requirements from such a model may be achieved by preparing standardization that defines the essence of the model, the answers expected from it, the level of accuracy desired, etc. 3.3.4 Models for the definition of the contamination area and forecasting its spread as a function of time, and the performance of actions to limit its coverage One of the most important actions in the case of a water contamination incident is to reduce the size of the coverage of the contaminated area in the water supply system and to confine it. This kind of action is essential for reducing both the damage that may occur due to occurrence of the incident and to reduce the geographic extent of the water supply system that has to be cleansed, rinsed and decontaminated after occurrence of the incident. These actions are complex and take a long time and, therefore, reduction of the damaged area reduces the time that a water supply system cannot supply water to the consumers. Decreasing the time that water does not reach consumers through the system is of utmost importance in the management of an incident and in control of the affected population. In order to achieve a reduction in the spread of the contaminated area in the most effective manner, hydraulic models shall be developed to plan for hydraulic functions that reduce and confine the area as much as possible. The municipal water supply systems are complex because of the many possibilities of flow through the municipal piping. There are few instruments that are capable of feeding essential information for the operation of a model in real time. There is, however, a reason to define through a standard, the minimum requirements from a hydraulic model that can predict the spread of a contaminated area and the location of a contaminated area in a municipal water supply system with a reasonable level of accuracy (what is a reasonable level of accuracy?).
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3.3.5 Models for the cleansing, disinfecting and recovery processes of the water supply systems affected If a water crisis occurs, one of the important things in handling the incident effectively is the speed in which the water supply system can return to routine operation. The operations involved in rinsing, cleansing, disinfecting and verifying the serviceability of sections of the water system affected by the incident, are difficult, take a lot of time and involve massive human resources and means. Therefore, it is important that the actions involved in dealing with an incident are efficient by using hydraulic models that can guide the water utility management in the preparation of an efficient program for draining and rinsing the water supply systems. There is, however, a reason to define through a standard, the minimum requirements from a hydraulic model intended to improve the efficiency of the water drainage actions in order to clean sections of the water supply system that were affected by pollutants in the water crisis incident. 3.3.6 Standards for water pollutant detection and identification equipment in the field (field kits and others) In order to speed up the handling of a water crisis incident, it is desirable to receive quick answers, as far as possible relating to the quality of the water suspected of being contaminated in a water crisis incident. For this purpose, there are several field kits for testing water in the field. Also, there are additional kits under development around the world. The performance and requirements of field kits relative to water security and the quality of water due to water incidents have to be characterized. The optimum way to characterize them is by preparing a standard that defines the requirements of kits according to the purpose of the tests. 3.3.7 Definition of the requirements for the control and operation centre (command and control centre) Management of a water crisis incident has to be conducted from an operations centre that is at a geographic site where all the functions taking part in management of the incident are concentrated and where all the relevant data of the water crisis is concentrated and analyzed. At such an operations centre, there has to be appropriate space for the function of the incident manager and the staff assisting him. Furthermore, there should be appropriate space for the creation of a situation report and evaluation of the operational picture including action plans to follow up. All the necessary equipment for receiving and transmitting raw or processed information and giving operational directions to the teams in the field should be available in the operations centre. There is a need to define the structure and the elements of the operations centre according to the various levels of the water companies and the threat to them. This should be done in an optimal manner by writing standards for the operations centre. 3.3.8 Definition of public relations requirements during an incident (including means)
Definition of public relations requirements during an incident including the means shall be prepared for public relations during an incident such as: information centre; telephone centre for receiving calls from the public.
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One of the most problematic elements in the management of a water crisis incident is to reduce the element of panic in the public. This element arises from public uncertainty of the water supply to its homes. If the public panics, the work of the incident management team will increase sevenfold due to the turmoil and harm to the public order. Therefore, it is very important to keep panic as low as possible by an effective, and quick public relations process. Therefore, appropriate means and personnel shall be made available in advance for rapid action of the abovementioned public relations system, including a public information centre, a telephone centre for receiving calls from the public and taking advantage of the mass communication means to transmit the messages to the public by careful and regular notices, as deemed necessary. A standard should be prepared that defines the elements to be taken into account in order to establish an effective public relations procedure, describes it functions, situations in which it is put to work, techniques of operation and personnel training. 3.3.9 Risk assessment
Within the framework of water utility preparations to deal with a water crisis incident, risk surveys and the establishment of the vulnerabilities in the system are necessary. Likewise, teams and procedures for conducting risk assessment during and after the occurrence of an incident shall be prepared in advance. 3.3.10 Planning for an alternate water supply by means of the existing water network including setting priorities During a water crisis, the need may arise to supply alternate water to the consumers through a water supply network from water sources other than those normally used. For this purpose, emergency water supply situations shall be defined, the amounts supplied per individual in each situation and what are the alternative means to be prepared to supply water from alternative sources. Furthermore, plans for the operation of an alternative water supply shall be prepared in advance and tested. All the abovementioned definitions can be written in a standard that establishes the requirements to plan and enable an alternative water supply to consumers during a water crisis. 3.3.11 Procedure for water distribution not through the existing water network, and the priorities (handicapped population, etc.) including means to secure the water distribution points. During a water crisis, a need may arise to supply alternate water to consumers not through the existing water supply network but by external means, e.g. water distribution from tankers and bottles or other containers. In order that such an operation can take place during a water crisis, there is a need for planning and organizing beforehand and testing prior to the occurrence of an incident. Distribution stations, temporary distribution points, warehouses with a water stock, warehouses with water containers and tankers, vehicles, human resources, distribution system etc. have to be prepared. The requirements for a distribution plan during a water crisis can be defined through an appropriate standard. 3.3.12 Means of communication and alternate communication methods in case of collapse of the communication network
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Annex A
Preparedness Stage List of Elements

A.1 Management and operational procedures The water utility shall prepare and maintain a folder of procedures for management of all stages of a water crisis incident in accordance with that given in this document.
A.2 Physical protection systems - In order to prevent the access of unauthorized persons to sensitive areas within the water utility, protection is necessary. The protection will prevent the physical access of those who are not authorized and, therefore, to reduce the probability of damage to the water utility. Physical and electronic means are available that provide protection to the various components of the water supply system: pools, reservoirs, drillings, accessories, piping, etc. The considerations in the selection of means for physical protection shall be: risk assessment and proven and approved means recommended by an authoritative technical expert or that conform to the appropriate standards. In addition, the performance of the water utility workers and of the forces that respond on an immediate basis shall be taken into consideration. Some of the electronic means may be used to document the incident for the purpose of locating the reasons for the fault and to constitute part of the basis for the lessons learned process after the incident.
A.3 Warning systems for water contamination The water utility shall supply water of a quantity and quality required for its customers and verify that unfit water does not reach the public. The possible factors for contamination of drinking water are many and varied, e.g. an accident in the chlorine system, a malicious act (terror) and natural disasters. In the preparedness, there is need for the installation of continuous monitoring instrumentation within the water supply system while considering all its components (reservoirs, tanks and pools, pumping stations, transport piping, etc.). The purpose of this instrumentation is to check, detect, identify and provide a warning. The instrumentation shall operate for the detection of pollutants in co ordinance with the reference threat and risk assessment performed by the water utility. Installation and use of this instrumentation shall be supported by appropriate operation procedures to be executed on the receipt of a warning. The procurement, installation and maintenance specifications of these means shall be in accordance with the recommendations of a authoritative technical expert or in accordance with standards for instrumentation of this type.
A.4 Emergency operations centre The water utility shall set up a control centre for water security incidents that will comprise a means for effective management of an incident. The centre shall be capable of activating the responsible persons and the decision makers 24 hours a day, will maintain communication and control means, etc. The function of the centre shall be defined for the various stages of a water incident according to the manner of activity of the water utility. The water utility shall rely on standards or definitions prepared by certified professional persons who have been approved to deal with this matter by the official parties.
A.5 Redundancy of the essential components of the system necessary for the supply of alternative water through the water supply system. Based on the water utility risk assessment, it is required to prepare plans for an alternative supply of water. The water utility should check and prepare plans for resuming its capability to supply water on the basis of the existing system during a water security incident based upon the back-up of alternative water sources, of fuel oil generators, of flexible and portable piping, fuel, etc.
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Appropriate procedures and skilled personnel shall be available and exercises shall be conducted to maintain the necessary level of capability.
A.6 Contingencies Furthermore, the water utility shall prepare contingency plans and make all the necessary preparations for the distribution of water not through the existing water supply system. The plans shall include the definition of procedures, allocation of resources and means, timetables, service measures and the level of preparedness and level of means storage required in order to supply alternative water under this situation. It will not always be possible for the water utility to maintain the necessary preparedness and, therefore, the water utility shall act to create a network of external organizations and bodies who have the capability to assist in the water distribution. Water distribution in situations where the existing network cannot be used shall be carried out by means of tankers, tanks, bottles of water, etc. One of the solutions is making the customers of the water utility aware of the possibility and explaining to them the need to store water in their homes, in bottles or tanks, for an emergency.
A.7 Interfaces with other emergency and environmental and public safety and health organisations There is a trend for a water security incident that was not confined in time, to develop into a disaster with serious consequences on the population and on the environment. The water utility shall do its utmost to confine the incident at the stages of initial inception and to reduce the amount of damage to the population and the environment. However, it is not always possible. Often, the involvement of the authorities with its agencies and organizations is necessary. The water utility has to prepare lists of external parties and organizations, within its information network, including means of communicating with them, contact person(s), fields of responsibility and in what instances should contact be made, etc. The list should be updated periodically according to the decision of the water utility top management and should be checked within the routine periodic exercises.
A.8 Identification and care of critical customers and critical service areas
A.9 Interface with users and citizens The customers of a water utility are many and varied and are concerned about the capability of the plant to supply drinking water during an attack. Besides the physical effect of the lack of drinking water, there is also a psychological effect of development into a panic situation. The water utility has to be organized to reduce the psychological effect by providing reliable and reassuring information of the readiness and capability of the company to prevent and deal with a water security incident to its interest parties. Circulation of the information to the interest parties and to the public in general shall be done through proper publicity. The water utility shall act to implement the definitions on the basis of existing infrastructures or by the establishment of infrastructures in accordance with the procedure. In any case, the public relations mechanism of the water utility shall be drilled within the framework of the periodic exercises.
A.10 Model for effective placement of water monitoring systems and for indicating spread of the contamination in the water supply system In order to effectively and in an efficient manner take advantage of the water monitoring systems, a definition of the manner of determining their location within the water systems is necessary. There are a large number of parameters, some generic such as the water system structure and regulation, and some dependent on the policies of the water utility such as a budget and confidence level. The water utility shall use an optimization model for placement of the monitoring equipment such that a suitable level of contamination control in the water and its location within the preparedness be ascertained in order to ensure an immediate indication that contamination has occurred with an indication of the contamination location and a reliable conjecture of the pollutant source. Preparation of a standard for models that establish the contamination location and the number of instruments required for it, will constitute a
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tool that will aid the water utility in its groundwork for a water security incident. In addition, when contamination occurs within a water system, the water utility should be prepared to hamper the spread of the contamination, to confine it and simultaneously to continue to supply water of suitable drinking quality for its consumers. In order to develop an infrastructure for handling a water contamination incident, the water utility is required to plan the water transport systems and the systems for control of the water flow such that the contamination can be contained within a reasonable period of time and the harm to the customers and its interest parties be minimal. In order to plan its systems, a water utility has to make use of a model for forecasting the contamination spread within the water systems of the water utility. Preparation of a standard to model the definition of a contamination stain and forecasting its spread as a function of time constitutes an important tool for the water utility in its preparedness to perform actions for handling an incident where the contamination has spread to the drinking water system.
A.11 Training program and qualification The water utility shall verify that there are plans for personnel training on the subject of preparation for an incident and its management. The training sessions shall match the various functions in addition to general training for all plant employees shall be given. The water utility shall maintain a list and follow-up of the qualification level of the various staff members and of the personnel in general.
A.12 Exercises
The water utility shall prepare and maintain programs for simulations and for drilling the systems and personnel at the various levels. The programs shall contain details of the drills for personnel, reports and the participants in the drill (including external organizations) according to the qualification level required. The extent and frequency of the drills shall be defined by the water utility with consideration of the requirements of the regulator and other requirements, the risk analysis conducted by the water utility and in accordance with the water utility policy.
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Annex B
Response Stage List of Elements

B.1 The water company shall define the requirements to deal with the immediate response and complementary stage of the incident which shall include (but not be limited to) the following areas: B.1.1 means and trained personnel required to present an immediate and complementary response to an event at the staff level and at the field operations level; B.1.2 operations procedures for the abovementioned personnel and means; B.1.3 procedures for the supervision and control centre; B.1.4 a procedure for establishing the incident manager and chain of command in the water supply plant and the directives to manage the incident; B.1.5 a procedure for communications and interaction with bodies external to the water company that are involved in the handling of an incident at its various intensities at the staff level and the field level; B.1.6 a procedure for directing sampling teams, field tests and specific laboratories during an emergency; B.1.7 operating and applying models to reduce the spread of the contamination area in the water supply system; B.1.8 methods to perform periodical, and final risk assessment; B.1.9 a procedure for supplying alternate water through the existing water supply network, including priorities for implementation; B.1.10 a procedure for water distribution not through the existing water supply network and priorities such as handicapped populations, etc. including means of securing the water distribution points;
B.1.11 methods of communication and alternate communication in the case of collapse of the communication
networks.
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Annex C
Recovery Stage relevant procedures

C.1 According to the intermediate phase of the recovery stage, a relevant list of procedures is given below. C.1.1 Procedures for planning the recovery stage have to include the following: 1) The characteristics of the contaminated site/system: these characteristics shall be obtained by means of a survey that determines in detail the extent and boundary of the contaminated area. The survey will define the risks involved in the specific type of pollutant and its stability in a water system. Furthermore, the survey will describe the contaminated system components (pipes, sediments in the system, etc.). Definition of the restoration goals: depending on the results of the survey, an assessment shall be conducted of the sanitary and environmental dangers as a result of the contamination. The main purpose of the restoration shall be defined together with intermediate goals, if necessary. Restoration alternatives: based on the goals defined, a restoration method shall be selected with emphasis on the prevention of harm to the public health and minimizing environmental damage. The restoration method shall suit the type and concentration of the pollutant, the purification requirements and the character of the restored system. The knowledge and equipment gap shall be complemented, as required together with a practical examination of the treatment technology on a small scale. Selection of restoration method: based on the technological review and the most suitable restoration method, the parties responsible and the work teams shall be selected. The various stages and the contamination/cleanliness levels to be achieved at each stage shall be defined. As required, alternate solutions for supplying water on an intermediate and long term basis shall be found. Planning procedure: the planning procedure shall contain clear criteria for determining the order of priorities in the restoration process. These criteria shall include, among others, risk to the public health and the environment due to the contamination, the resulting panic, obtaining alternate sources and ways to supply water, the affected population size due to the lack of capability to supply water to a specific section, the time estimated for restoration, etc.
2)
3)
4)
5)
C.1.2 Drainage, cleaning and disinfecting procedures Following the contamination of the water supply system, the supply system, in most cases, will have to be drained and the contaminated water removed. Already in the preparatory stage, physical means shall be available for draining the water supply pipelines. When dealing with the restoration of a supply system, there are two difficult choices for the decision makers: 1) 2) to treat the water prior to emptying the system and delay the restoration process, or not to treat the water, shorten the processing time and cause environmental contamination.
The draining procedure should include decision tools for draining, obtaining approvals and the cooperation of the regulator. The procedure shall define the maximum contamination levels of the water to be drained. These levels shall be consistent with the health and environmental risks involved in the draining and the type of pollutant (e.g. draining contaminated water can endanger the aquifer). Where the contamination levels exceed those established, the procedure shall define the method of treatment and reduction of the concentrations to levels that permit their removal. The cleansing and disinfectant procedure shall define the levels to be achieved in order to complete the restoration process at the different levels. These levels shall be set according to the type of use of the water and of the pollutant. Also, cleanliness grades, disinfection time after
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restoration and concentration of the disinfecting material shall be established. The cleanliness level and the method of disinfecting shall comply with the requirements of the body certified for it. C.1.3 Procedures for activating the work team to repair the damaged water supply systems, including methods to establish repair priorities Following a contamination incident, it is important to return the system to normal as fast as possible. The recovery operations and the repairs are, in general, complex operations requiring a concentrated effort of relatively large number of skilled personnel. The procedure for directing the work teams shall define the teams for operation during an incident and the party responsible for directing these teams. The procedure shall define the basic equipment that should be constantly available for these teams. This equipment shall include, among others, antiseptics, sections of lines, pumps, etc. The water utility shall maintain stock of equipment necessary for recovery of a supply system. The order of priorities shall depend on the risk assessment in the design stage. All the activities shall be planned in the design file whose content shall be defined by this procedure. C.1.4 Procedure for establishing the use of external resources as reinforcement for the repair teams of the water supply system The recovery process can be a complex one requiring means beyond those existing in the water utility. In order to restore the system, support of external parties will be needed to assist in the repair of the supply system. The procedure will establish the means of communications; arrange (in advance) backup teams to contact according to the type of incident and ensure that these teams are available when needed. The procedure shall define, among others, the manner of working with neighbouring water utilities, engineering companies and contractors. All the activity shall be prepared in a planning file whose content shall be defined by this procedure. C.1.5 Procedures for sampling water following the recovery and the transfer of these samples to the relevant laboratories After completion of the recovery stage, the water system shall resume normal operation, only after the contamination levels in the system have been checked in order that they do not endanger public health in the short and long terms and do not cause unnecessary dangers to the environment. The sampling procedures shall include the methods and the extent of system sampling prior to resuming normal operation and shall include sampling of all sections of the contaminated system. The procedures shall define the manner of collecting and testing the samples. Collection and testing of the samples shall be in accordance with accepted sampling and analysis standards of water samples and in accordance with the requirements of the certified party. The procedures shall define the laboratories authorized for water testing according to the type of contamination (chemical, biological and radioactive) and shall define the means of communication, manner of delivering the samples, manner of receiving the results, etc. C.1.6 Procedure for receiving approval to operate the system in stages and/or full operation (approving authorities, permit for partial use, etc.) In order to resume the water supply of various qualities: water fit for drinking at the end of the treatment and water unfit for drinking as the intermediate stage, permits shall be issued by the authority certified to provide them. Receipt of the permit shall be according to the procedure that will arrange the activities and the data to be transmitted to the certified authority. The procedure shall regulate the type of permits (type of use the water is suitable for) and the details that have to be transmitted with each permit. The procedure regulates the data collection (sanitary survey), manner of transmission to the approving authority and the manner of receiving the reply from the relevant authority.
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C.1.7 Procedure for the public relations system The recovery process requires effective and continuous communication with the population. The recovery process is complex may take a large time period and necessitate long water interruptions. In some cases, cooperation will be required of the public for the drainage and rinsing of the lines. In other cases, low quality water will be supplied for an interim period. The public relations process has an important function in maintaining the cooperation of the public, reduction of interference to the normal life routine and prevention of unnecessary panic. The procedure for directing the publicity campaign shall define the authorized/responsible levels for contact with the public, the operating methods of the public relations process, when to put this process into operation, type of information to be transmitted depending on the cases, etc. C.1.8 Final risk assessment At the end of the recovery activity, a final risk assessment shall be conducted that includes the effectiveness of the recovery operation, the cleanliness levels of the system after the recovery and rinsing operations, the risk levels to the public health in the short and long terms, the risk level to the environment, etc. This assessment shall be based on an extensive and comprehensive sampling survey that includes all the sections of the restored system. A final risk assessment procedure shall establish, according to the contamination level, the level of responsibility for management of the assessment, the regulatory parties that should take part in this assessment and the approvals for resuming the water supply subject to the regulatory authorities.
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Annex D (informative) Technological instruments and means for ensuring drinking water security
D.1 General
D.1.1 The purpose of this annex is to describe in detail a series of recommended standards of technological instruments and means for ensuring drinking water security within the framework of the overall document to be presented at the IWA. D.1.2 The field of drinking water security in a water supply system is divided into three essential parts: 1) 2) water source: groundwater; surface water; water installations: treatment plant, open water reservoirs, drinking water pools, pumping stations and water wells. water supply network with all its components, from water reservoirs, wells and pools, to the customers themselves; the overall water supply system, in the majority of cases, is handled by several jurisdictions.
3)
D.1.3 Analysis of the initiated threats (terror and war) on drinking water as presented in the Introduction to the overall document shows that the main weak points are in the various types of water installation arrangements and in the water supply distribution network in the circles nearest to the end users. D.1.4 The short-term actions should strive to significantly improve the protective arrangement of the various water installations. In parallel, a multi-year plan and large investment in resources should be implemented for ensuring the protection of the water supply lines. D.1.5 Analysis of the critical implications of a response to a water poisoning event clearly indicate that the first priority should be to invest resources for prevention of the incident and minimizing the extent of damage as much as possible.
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D.2 Main insights

D.2.1 There is considerable difficulty in accomplishing effective contamination of large water reservoirs (natural and constructed) due to the small ratio between the quantity of poison and the volume of water in the reservoir, type of poison and its solubility. However, it is obvious that various steps have to be taken to prevent/obstruct the possibility of contamination in these reservoirs. Attempts to contaminate these reservoirs, even if ineffective, can cause mass panic. D.2.2 There are a variety of means today to detect and identify contaminants in water, some by technological means of continuous monitoring and some require taking water samples to laboratory testing, which may take from minutes to several hours, respectively. Viable integrated Early Warning Systems (EWSs) that meet all the desired characteristics (detection of both chemical and biological threats in real time) and can be routinely used are several years away. Some individual components are available currently; however, others need further development. An EWS can be an important tool to avoid or mitigate the impacts of an intentional contamination event in time to allow an effective local response that reduces or eliminates adverse impacts. An integrated EWS includes sensors to detect the contaminant; systems to transmit, compile, and analyze data; links for communication and notification; and protocols for decision making and emergency response. The Homeland Protection Act of 2002[11] specifically calls for the investigation and use of Early Warning Systems (EWS) for water security reasons. The EWS is a screening tool for detecting changes in source water and distribution system water quality. Because Biological EWS (BEWS) measure toxicity, they provide an important complement to available chemical monitoring technology. While the detection of chemical substances in environmental samples does not necessarily indicate toxicity or biological hazard, the absence of specific chemical analytes does not necessarily indicate the absence of toxicity. Biological measures of water quality may detect materials that analytical chemistry techniques cannot detect, because of inadequate detection limits or methodological limitations. More importantly, biological measures can detect unsuspected materials and evaluate the toxic action of mixtures of multiple chemicals. As noted by Cairns and Mount (1990)[7]: No instrument has yet been devised that can measure toxicity! Chemical concentrations can be measured with an instrument but only living material can be used to measure toxicity. Neither traditional toxicity tests nor chemical-specific sensors can provide comprehensive, real-time information on toxic events in an aquatic system. A suite of time-relevant biological and physical/chemical water quality monitors applied in an EWS can provide timely information to aid decision-makers in the management and protection of water resources. Current biological water quality monitors use fish, bivalves, arthropods, and bacteria and are capable of detecting contaminants at relatively short time periods (minutes to hours). Strategic placement of water quality monitors at both source water and distribution system locations of high vulnerability, likely targets, and control points may detect the presence of unsuspected chemicals or toxic interactions occurring as a result of spills, legal or illegal discharges, or intentional introductions. D.2.3 The second security tier includes the rapid detection and identification of contaminants in drinking water, especially in water pools and supply lines, prior to reaching the consumers. However, this line of security cannot prevent contaminated drinking water from reaching some of the consumers nor the contamination of parts of the drinking water supply network. The conclusion is, therefore, to test and give high priority to technological instruments and means that can effectively support the first security tier whose aim is to prevent/disrupt the contamination of water installations and to completely prevent the supply of drinking water to consumers from installations that show a positive indication of a poisoning attempt and/or a terrorist attack. D.2.4 The necessary response to an incident of poisoning of a water installation should be immediate. In most cases, this requires the complete obstruction of the emergence of water from the affected installation to prevent the flow of poisoned (or suspected of being contaminated) water to the consumers. The capability to
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create an assembly of technological instruments and means that identify the contamination attempt or actual poisoning of the pool and to immediately and confidently prevent the continued supply of water from this drinking water installation is a strategic capability. Together with effective and reliable publicity, panic and anxiety of the population can also be prevented.
D.2.5 It is of great importance that this immediate response system be autonomous, without any conditions of
"remote decisions", due to the response time factor being critical and due to the immense damage to the communication from the individual installation to the control centre. Based on experience from large scale incidents, even where there is no intentional attack on the wireless/cellular communication infrastructure, the function of the communication systems are disrupted and in some cases, cease to operate for various periods of time. D.2.6 The technological response of making drinking water installations secure shall be through defining priorities according to an analysis of the risk level and determination of criteria that refer to the geographic location of the water installations and exact location of the individual water installation (at a distant point, open field, within a community/an installation, in proximity to security forces, population, size of installation, redundancy of water installation). This shall be performed by the authorized parties in cooperation with the water supply companies and plants. D.2.7 From the above introduction, we can infer that there is great importance in advancing the protection and security of drinking water installations by means of establishing appropriate International Standards within the ISO framework for technological instruments and means whose application, within the overall preparation for making drinking water secure, will bring a significant improvement in the preparedness against the threat of drinking water poisoning through the use of severe standards as required in this sensitive and problematic field.
D.3 Table of technological tools and means

D.3.1 Technological tools and means are divided into two essential groups:
a) primary security tier physical protection: 1) perimeter fence: a) b) c) d) e) f) g) 2) 3) 4) 5) distance from the installation/pool; gate locking mechanism, control and entry; depth of fence in the ground; concrete base strip; fence height; type of fence; warning sensors;
locking control room; lock/obstruction of stairway/ladders to roof of installation/pool; fence around installation/pool roof; protection of personnel entrances;
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6) 7)
protection of ventilation openings; volume/motion/ray/acoustic/magnetic and other sensors in the installation/pool/yard, stairway, ladders, roof and openings; day/night visual systems of the outer/inner perimeter of the installation/pool; optimal linkage between the various sensing systems and establishment of redundant operations;
8) 9)
10) visual and other sensing systems for early identification of attempts to penetrate the installation (at locations with a high security sensitivity); 11) communication systems to distant control rooms; b) secondary security tier on line/off line monitoring systems: 1) 2) various types of monitoring systems for continuous/non-continuous control of the water quality; future linkage of continuous monitoring systems with autonomous response systems (after obtaining the capability of performing continuous monitoring for positive/significant level of detection of drinking water contamination at a level that necessitates shutting down the supply of water from this installation); linkage of monitoring systems for initial verification/rejection of poisoning/contamination (at the present limitation of pollutants and biological warfare agents).
3)
D.3.2 Response systems response of security force, technological system for immediate automatic response. a) Response of security force In most cases, a security force, on foot/mobile will be on duty whose purpose is to prevent an attack/capture the attackers/perform in the area according to instructions of the certified authorities. The response time of the security forces will generally be too long to fully prevent poisoning of the water installation/pool. In terrorist actions, the security force has to take into consideration that the attacking forces will operate in such a manner to prevent them from reaching the installation and disrupting their operation. Without minimizing the importance of this force, it is recognized that its success in fully preventing the poisoning task, is relatively low. No doubt that the performance of patrols and their visible presence in the area of water installations is a deterrent and may cause those planning a potential attack to consider the possibility of transferring their attack to a water installation judged by them to be a "weak link". Technological system as an automatic instantaneous response (from a security body): 1) A security system combining electronic technology and a hydraulic valve having suitable properties and which is an integral part of the first security ring and which has the option to interface with the second security ring of continuous monitoring means. Purpose of the system: to prevent any possibility of harm to civilian life during a poisoning attempt (terrorist or criminal) of drinking water pools and installations. Principle of operation: unequivocal identification of a "positive indication" of a breach into a pool/installation by analysis of several indications received simultaneously from several electronic sensors installed in the first security ring around and in the pool/installation. Establishing the operational logic for the definition of a "positive indication" shall be based on assessment of a concrete situation in each pool/installation together with analysis of the relevant dangers and threats. On receipt of a "positive indication", the highly reliable security valve shall be operated instantaneously and halt the flow of water from the pool/installation. This part shall be in full coordination with the technical personnel of the water supply company.
b)
2)
3)
4)
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5)
The criteria and operational characteristics required from the security valve system: i) Capability of instantaneous closing of the valve on receipt of a "positive indication" independent of an external decision/communication (a "positive indication" is 2 4 signals as determined in advance). Furthermore, the security valve can be closed from a remote centre on the decision and judgment of the control centre. High reliability level Not more than one false alarm per year (an alarm causing the valve to close). The protective means of the security valve system must unequivocally guarantee that the system cannot be disabled or the valve opened prior to, during or after an attack. Any attempt to impair parts of the valve in communication between the valve and the electronic control box or in the electronic system shall trigger a closing of the valve. Operation of the security valve shall not be affected by an electrical interruption due to a fault or intentional damage. The physical construction of the security valve shall be such that any intentional attempt to disable/damage/interfere with its hydraulic operation shall trigger a closing of the valve (N.C. principle).
ii)
iii)
iv) Opening of the valve after its closing shall be only by an authorized party in the field, only by means of a smart card and secret code/biometric identification. There shall be no possibility of manual opening of the security valve. v) The security valve system shall have the potential of connection to additional sensors (chlorine level, turbidity, pH, etc.) and future detectors for continuous monitoring.
vi) The electronic system shall support the security valve and permit its regular operation (closing during an incident on receipt of a "positive indication") even during the lack of an external energy source based upon a standby system for 72 hours. vii) The security valve system shall have the option to receive a remote (control centre) closing command during a necessity to halt the exit of water from the installation/pool in the case of an earthquake and/or an initiated decision of a certified party for closing the valve. viii) Indications that are part of the logic for closing the valve shall be immediately transmitted to the control centre even before a "positive indication" is created.
D.4 Summary
D.4.1 This annex is presented as background information for the purpose of international standardization for electronic instruments for drinking water security systems. D.4.2 The description given in this annex is the beginning. During the work of the professional committee, additional technological instruments and means will be found, which for the establishment of international standardization for them, that will have a significant effect on the improvement of the drinking water security field. D.4.3 There is a vast importance in the work that we are doing in this field that has direct influence on the saving of life during an incident of water poisoning. The standardization shall be "differentiating" and present a high level of requirements that require all the manufacturers of technological instruments and means to invest time and budget resources in research and development in order to ensure compliance with rigorous standards that must be followed to establish a life saving system.
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Annex E (informative) Standardization of models for water distribution systems security
E.1 General
E.1.1 A water distribution system is a collection of hydraulic control elements connected together to convey quantities of water from sources to consumers. Such a system can be described as a graph with the nodes representing the sources and consumers, and the arcs - the connecting elements: pipes, pumps, valves, tanks, etc. The behaviour of a water distribution system is governed by: a) b) c) the physical laws which describe flow and water quality distributions; the consumers demands; and the system's layout.
E.1.2 Management problems associated with water distribution systems can be classified into: a) b) c) layout (system connectivity/topology); design (system sizing given a layout); and operation (system operation given a design), with reliability/risk and water quality considerations integrally related to all three.
E.1.3 Following the events of 9/11 2001 in the US, the world public awareness to possible terrorist attacks on water supply systems has increased dramatically, causing the security of drinking water distribution systems to become a major concern around the globe, and raising to the foremost new modelling challenges associated with the enhancement of water distribution systems security through modelling. As water distribution systems are typically comprised of tanks, pipes, and pumps delivering treated water from treatment plants to consumers, even a moderate system may contain hundreds of kilometres of pipes and numerous delivery points, which make such systems inherently vulnerable. E.1.4 The threats on a water distribution system can be partitioned into three major groups according to the resulted means of their enhanced security: a) b) a direct attack on main infrastructure: dams, treatment plants, storage reservoirs, pipelines, etc.; a cyber attack disabling the functionality of the water utility SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) system, taking over control of key components which might result water outages or insufficiently treated water, changing or overriding protocol codes, etc.; and a deliberate chemical or biological contaminant injection at one of the system nodes.
c)
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E.1.5 The threat of a direct attack on a major water supply system infrastructure is addressed by improving the system's physical security (i.e., additional alarms, locks, fencing, surveillance cameras, guarding, etc.), which can be assessed by comparing the resulted degree of risk reduction to cost. The American Water Works Association (AWWA) provided comprehensive physical security guidance (AWWA, 2004[3]) aimed at enhancing water utilities to tailor a physical security policy to their own specific needs. E.1.6 The threat of a cyber attack can be minimized by employing several basic activities, such as (AWWA, 2004[3]): establishing an optical isolator between communication networks allowing for only one way data traffic; use a Router to restrict data transfer to a small number of destinations as regulated by an Access Control List (ACL); use Firewalls; install anti-virus software on all servers and workstations and configure for daily virus pattern updates; restrict access to the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system control room; etc. E.1.7 A deliberate chemical or biological contaminant injection is the most difficult threat to address, both because of the uncertainty of the type of the injected contaminant and its consequences, and as of the uncertainty of the location and injection time. Principally a pollutant can be injected at any water distribution system connection (node) using a pump or a mobile pressurized tank. Although backflow preventers provide an obstacle to such actions, they do not exist at all connections, and at some might not be functional. E.1.8 Obviously, if all the system nodes could be reliably monitored then the maximum level of safety would have been gained. This is clearly not the case, thus an on-line contaminant monitoring system (OCMS) should be considered (ASCE, 2004[2]) as the major tool to reduce the likelihood of a deliberate contaminant intrusion. An OCMS should be designed to detect random contamination events and to provide information on the location of the contaminants within the system, including an estimation of the injection characteristics (i.e. contaminant type, injection time and duration, concentration, and injected mass flow rate). Once the type of the contaminant and its characteristics are discovered, a containment strategy can be implemented to minimize the pollutant spread throughout the system, and to suggest for the system's portions that need to be flushed. E.1.9 However, although an OCMS is recognized as the appropriate solution to a deliberate contaminant intrusion, much of the basic scientific and engineering knowledge needed to construct an effective OCMS are yet partially available: a) the monitoring/sensors instrumentation tools required to accomplish the detection task are still missing (i.e., only surrogate measures such as residual chlorine, pH, turbidity, conductivity, etc., can be effectively monitored), knowledge of the injected contaminants impacts on public health, and models for the sensors locations, which although published in the research literature are still not fully implemented.
b) c)
E.1.10 The problems associated with enhancing the security of water distribution systems through modelling can be classified into four categories: a) b) c) d) placement of sensors; identification of sources of pollution; pollutant containment and recovery to normal operation; and on-line pollutant detection by the use of algorithms that are based on the interaction and interdependence between on-line readings of surrogate parameters.
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E.1.11 The objective of this document is to suggest a standards framework for enhancing the security of water distribution systems through modelling. In the following sections a brief literature review is provided for the above three problems, followed by a suggested framework for standardization.
E.2 Literature review

E.2.1 Placement of sensors
Lee and Deininger (1992)[16] were the first to address the problem of sensors locations, although not purely from a security perspective, by maximizing the coverage of the demands using an integer programming model, where the demand coverage referred to the proportion of the network demand monitored by a sensor at a particular node. The main limitation of Lee and Deininger's method is in the high computational time required to handle real sized networks. Some improvements were suggested by Kumar et al. (1997)[13] who solved the Lee and Deininger problem using a greedy heuristic-based algorithm. Kessler et al. (1998)[12] proposed the idea of a level of exposure pollution matrix where the level of exposure is measured by the volume of consumed contaminated water prior to detection above a threshold concentration. The optimal sensors location problem was solved using a set covering graph theory algorithm. Woo et al. (2001)[28] developed a sensors location design model by linking EPANET (USEPA, 2002)[27] with an integer programming scheme. Al-Zahrani and Moeid (2001)[1] followed Lee and Deininger's approach using a genetic algorithm (Holland 1975[10], Goldberg 1989[9]) scheme to optimize the sensors locations. Ostfeld and Salomons (2004)[17] extended Kessler et al. (1998)[12] and Ostfeld et al. (2004)[18] to multiple demand loadings and unsteady water quality propagations. Ostfeld and Salomons (2005)[19] extended Ostfeld and Salomons (2004)[17] by introducing uncertainties to the demands and the injected contaminations, and by explicitly incorporating the sensors detection sensitivity and the sensors response time. The sensor design objectives outlined above include the detection likelihood and the volume of consumed contaminated water. However, other objectives such as the extent of contamination, the time to detection, the population exposed to contamination, and the population at risk can also be measures for the ability of a contaminant warning system to perform its task (Berger-Wolf et al., 2005[4]; Berry et al., 2005[5], 2006[6]; Propato, 2006[24]; Carr et al., 2006[8]; Shastri and Diwekar, 2006[26]; Ostfeld et al., 2006[20]).
E.2.2 Identification of sources of pollution

Shang et al. (2002)[26] suggested an input-output model which provides information about the relationships between water quality at input and output locations by tracking water parcels and moving them simultaneously along their paths. Laird et al. (2005)[14] presented an origin tracking algorithm for solving the inverse problem of contamination source identification based on a non-linear programming framework. Laird et al. (2006)[15] addressed the non-uniqueness difficulty of the outcome of the non-linear model of Laird at al. (2005)[14] by incorporating a mixed-integer quadratic program to refine the solutions provided by the non-linear formulation. Preis and Ostfeld (2006a[22], 2006b[23]) introduced methods for solving the contamination source identification problem: a hybrid approach using a coupled Model Trees Linear Programming scheme (Preis and Ostfeld, 2006a[22]); and a genetic algorithm EPANET framework (Preis and Ostfeld, 2006b[23]).
E.2.3 Pollutant containment and recovery to normal operation

Modelling of the system pollutant containment and recovery to normal operation is in its early stages of research. Poulin at al. (2006)[21] introduced an algorithm, based on a set of heuristic operational and safety rules to isolate contaminated zones, for: a) b) c) minimizing the risk that contaminated water is consumed; identification of the network valves to be closed to safely contain the contaminated water; and definition of a set of operations to efficiently flush the contaminated water from the network to return to normal operation.
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The model was demonstrated on the Town of Valcourt water distribution system.
E.3 Framework for water distribution systems security modelling standardization

E.3.1 General
A necessity for the application of any of the models described above is an available calibrated water distribution systems simulation model for the water distribution systems in hand, for both quantity (pressure) and water quality. A water distribution system quantity simulation model calculates the flows in the network, the resulting pressures at the system nodes, and the water level trajectories in the tanks, using either the Darcy-Weisbach or the HazenWilliams head loss equations. The simulation models available differ in their mathematical method of solution of the governing equations of flow (Kirchoff's Law No. 1) and energy (Kirchoff's Law No. 2), and in the Graphical User Interface (GUI) provided to the user. Generally speaking all of the water distribution system quantity commercial computerized simulation models are capable of fulfilling their task of simulating the systems flows, pressures, and tank water levels at sufficient accuracy. The calculation of the water quality distributions along the pipes, at the system nodes, and in the tanks is a much more complicated task. The most used computer program for simulating flows, pressures, and water quality distributions is EPANET (USEPA, 2002)[27]. Mathematical calibration is the process of determining the coefficient values appearing in the equations of a model such that results produced by the model with these coefficients agree closely with a set of measured data in the context of a selected objective function. The basic approach in mathematical calibration is usually the same: an objective or a merit function is designed to measure the agreement between measured data and a mathematical model outcome for a particular choice of the coefficient set. An objective function is conventionally arranged such that small values represent close agreement. The calibration process adjusts the coefficient values within their feasible domains in the direction of minimizing the objective function. The calibration process is thus a constrained minimization problem. A common calibration technique in water distribution systems is to compare tank/reservoir levels from a computerized simulation model against measured tank levels for a given time period using SCADA data. The pipe roughness, water demands, and pump controls should be adjusted in the simulation model until the model results match closely with the actual measurements. Taking into consideration that drinking water distribution systems differ very much in size, in technological level of the system and its operation, in financial capabilities and so on, it is clear that not all water systems will be able or willing to apply models to their systems and probably many systems will be able or willing to apply only part of the proposed models. Therefore, the models should be labelled according to the importance and difficulties of their implementation in water systems. In our view, the models should be divided into three different categories: indispensable; recommended; good to have
E.3.2 Framework for a hydraulic model standard

A calibrated hydraulic simulation model a model that meets the requirements of allowable deviations of pressures, flow rates and levels for an extended period of time (in a test of measured values against calculated values, at various selected nodes in the system), at a suitable resolution level of consumption nodes (each consumption node in the network will not represent more than a specific number of residents).
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E.3.3 Framework for a water quality model standard

A calibrated simulation model for water quality for stored and not-stored parameters used in the calibrated hydraulic model (that meets the requirements of allowable deviations of measured values against calculated values for an extended period of time at various selected nodes in the system).
E.3.4 Framework for a standard for water safety models

Using the calibrated hydraulic model and the calibrated water quality model: a) Location (design) problem By running a set of contamination scenarios (injection time, location, duration, injection flow), the level of contamination exposure to consumers will not be higher than a specific value, with a high probability from the given value, until the first indication of the monitoring station. Problem of pollutant source detection The probability is high from a given value for pollutant source detection in the network (injection time, location, duration, injection flow) for a set of pollutant events from the first indication of the monitoring station. Recovery problem A minimum number of operations (valve closing, flushing) to return to normal from the first indication of the monitoring station. Detection problem Assuming that the appearance of a pollutant in flowing water in the system will also cause certain changes in part of the continuously measured parameters in the water supply system (such as residual chlorine, turbidity, pH, electrical conductivity, pressure, etc.) and on the assumption that an algorithm can be found that will correlate between the changes taking place (or not) (in the readings of these parameters on the occurrence of the appearance of a pollutant in the water), these types of algorithms can be applied in the water supply system in which sensors are installed for continuous measurement of the "normal" parameters of water quality and pressure, all this in order to detect the entry of pollutants into the water in real time
b)
c)
d)
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Bibliography
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Al-Zahrani M. and Moied K. (2001). "Locating optimum water quality monitoring stations in water distribution system." In Bridging the Gap: Meeting the Worlds Water and Environmental Resources Challenges, Proceedings of the EWRI-ASCE annual conference on Water Resources Planning and Management, published on CD. ASCE (2004). "Guidelines for designing an on-line contaminant monitoring http://www.asce.org/static/1/wise.cfm#MonitoringSystem (accessed 11 July 2007). system."
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AWWA (2004). "Security guidance for water utilities." http://www.awwa.org/science/wise/ (accessed 11 July 2007). Berger-Wolf T., Hart W., and Saia J. (2005). "Discrete sensor placement problems in distribution networks." Mathematical and Computer Modelling, Vol. 42, No. 13, pp. 1385-1396. Berry J. W., Fleischer L., Hart W. E., Phillips C. A., and Watson J. P. (2005). "Sensor placement in municipal water networks." Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management Division, ASCE, Vol. 131, No. 3, pp. 237-244. Berry J. W., Hart W. E., Phillips C. A., Uber J. G., and Watson J. P. (2006). "Sensor placement in municipal water networks with temporal integer programming models." Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management Division, ASCE, Vol. 132, No. 4, pp. 218-224. Cairns, J. Jr., Mount, D.I. (1990), "Aquatic toxicology." Environ. Sci. Technol. 24 (2), pp. 154 161. Carr R., Greenberg H., Hart W. E., Konjevod G., Lauer E., Lin H., Morrison T., and Phillips C. A. (2006). "Robust optimization of contaminant sensor placement for community water systems." Mathematical Programming, Vol. 107, No. 1, pp. 337-356. Goldberg D. E. (1989). "Genetic algorithms in search, optimization, and machine learning." AddisonWesley, New York. Holland J. H. (1975). "Adaptation in natural and artificial systems." The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor. Homeland Protection Act (2002) Kessler A., Ostfeld A., and Sinai, G. (1998). "Detecting accidental contaminations in municipal water networks." Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management Division, ASCE, Vol. 124, No. 4, pp. 192-198. Kumar A., Kansal M. L., and Arora G. (1997). "Identification of monitoring stations in water distribution system." Journal of Environmental Engineering, ASCE, Vol. 123, No. 8, pp. 746-752. Laird C. D., Biegler L. T., van Bloemen Waanders B. G., and Bartlet R. A. (2005). "Contamination source determination for water networks." Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management Division, ASCE, Vol. 131, No. 3, pp. 125-134. Laird C. D., Biegler L. T., van Bloemen Waanders B. G. (2006). "Mixed-integer approach for obtaining unique solutions in source inversion of water networks." Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management Division, ASCE, Vol. 132, No. 4, pp. 242-251. Lee B. and Deininger R. (1992). "Optimal locations of monitoring stations in water distribution system." Journal of Environmental Engineering, ASCE, Vol. 118, No. 1, pp. 4-16.
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Ostfeld A. and Salomons E. (2004). "Optimal layout of early warning detection stations for water distribution systems security." Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management Division, ASCE, Vol. 130, No. 5, pp. 377-385. Ostfeld A., Kessler A., and Goldberg I. (2004). "A contaminant detection system for early warning in water distribution networks." Engineering Optimization, Vol. 36, No. 5, pp. 525-538. Ostfeld A. and Salomons E. (2005). "Securing water distribution systems using on-line contamination monitoring." Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management Division, ASCE, Vol. 131, No. 5, pp. 402-405. Ostfeld A., Uber J. G., and Salomons E. (2006). "Battle of the Water Sensor Networks (BWSN): A Design Challenge for Engineers and Algorithms." 8th Annual International Symposium on Water Distribution Systems Analysis, Cincinnati, Ohio, USA, published on CD. Available on line at: http://www.esnips.com/web/ostfeld (accessed 11 July 2007) Poulin A., Mailhot A., Grondin P., Delorme L., and Villeneuve J.-P. (2006). "Optimization of operational response to contamination in water networks." 8th Annual International Symposium on Water Distribution Systems Analysis, Cincinnati, Ohio, USA, published on CD. Preis A. and Ostfeld A. (2006a). "Contamination source identification in water systems: a hybrid model trees - linear programming scheme." Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management Division, ASCE, Vol. 132, No. 4, pp. 263-273. Preis A. and Ostfeld A. (2006b). "Optimal sensors layout for contamination source identification in water distribution systems." 8th Annual International Symposium on Water Distribution Systems Analysis, Cincinnati, Ohio, USA, published on CD. Propato M. (2006). "Contamination warning in water networks: general mixed-integer linear models for sensor location design." Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management Division, ASCE, Vol. 132, No. 4, pp. 225-233. Shang F., Uber J. G., and Polycarpou M. M. (2002). "Practical back-tracking algorithm for water distribution system analysis." Journal of Environmental Engineering, ASCE, Vol. 128, No. 5, pp. 441450. Shastri Y. and Diwekar U. (2006). "Sensor placement in water networks: a stochastic programming approach." Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management Division, ASCE, Vol. 132, No. 3, pp. 192-203. USEPA (2002). "EPANET 2.0." Available on line at: www.epa.gov/ORD/NRMRL/wswrd/epanet.html (accessed 11 July 2007). Woo H. M., Yoon J. H., and Choi D.Y. (2001). "Optimal monitoring sites based on water quality and quantity in water distribution systems." In Bridging the Gap: Meeting the Worlds Water and Environmental Resources Challenges, Proceedings of the ASCE annual conference on Water Resources Planning and Management, published on CD.
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International Workshop Agreement

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Main threats to the drinking water supply systems

Prevention and treatment

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Scheme 1: Effectiveness of Emergency or Crisis Management

Standardization in drinking water supply security issues

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International Workshop Agreement

Terms and definitions

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2.10 incident management plan

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[ISO/IEC Guide 73] 2.14

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Framework for management of a water incident

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Plan Act Check

The adaptation of this model to water security is:

Figure 2 The Water Incident Management Cycle

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Stages in a water security incident

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A comprehensive list of these elements is in Annex A. 3.2.3 Response stage

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Subjects for which detailed standards could be prepared

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Preparedness Stage List of Elements

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Response Stage List of Elements

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Recovery Stage relevant procedures

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D.2 Main insights

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D.3 Table of technological tools and means

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Annex E (informative) Standardization of models for water distribution systems security

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E.2 Literature review

E.2.2 Identification of sources of pollution

E.2.3 Pollutant containment and recovery to normal operation

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E.3 Framework for water distribution systems security modelling standardization

E.3.2 Framework for a hydraulic model standard

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