1.)GALLARDO vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT G.R. No. L-67742 October 29, 1987 I.

Parties: MELITON GALLARDO and TERESA VILLANUEVA, petitioners HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MARTA VILLANUEVA VDA. DE AGANA, VISITACION AGANA KIPPING, PEDRO V. AGANA, MARCELO V. AGANA, JR., TERESITA AGANA SANTOS and JESUS V. AGANA, respondents. Petitioners were nephew and niece of the late Pedro Villanueva (owner of the subject land). The private respondent Marta Villanueva vda. de Agana, daughter of Pedro Villanueva. II. Prior Proceeding: The Court of First Instance of Laguna rendered its decision declaring the deed of sale of August 10, 1937, as well as the reconstituted transfer certificate of title of petitioners, void ab initio. The Intermediate Appellate Court, on May 22, 1984, affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court III. Theories of the Parties: Petitioners contentions. Petitioner claimed that the aforestated land was sold to them in a private document, an unnotarized deed of sale written in Tagalog (Annex "B" of the complaint) that was allegedly signed by the late Pedro Villanueva conveying and transferring the property in question in favor of the petitioners. Petitioners claim that the sale although not in a public document, is nevertheless valid and binding according to jurisprudence wherein Court ruled that even a verbal contract of sale of real estate produces legal effects between the parties. Respondents contentions. As the respondent court aptly stated in its decision True, as argued by appellants, a private conveyance of registered property is valid as between the parties. However, the only right the vendee of registered property in a private document is to compel through court processes the vendor to execute a deed of conveyance sufficient in law for purposes of registration. Plaintiffsappellants' reliance on Article 1356 of the Civil Code is unfortunate. The general rule enunciated in said Art. 1356 is that contracts are obligatory, in whatever form they may

have been entered, provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present. The next sentence provides the exception, requiring a contract to be in some form when the law so requires for validity or enforceability. Said law is Section 127 of Act 496 which requires, among other things, that the conveyance be executed "before the judge of a court of record or clerk of a court of record or a notary public or a justice of the peace, who shall certify such acknowledgment substantially in form next hereinafter stated" was violated in this case. IV. Objective of the Parties: Petitioners To set aside or reverse the decision * of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) promulgated on May 22, 1984 in AC-G.R. CV No. 69946 entitled Meliton Gallardo and Teresa Villanueva v. Marta Villanueva vda. de Agana, et al. (Rollo, p. 37) affirming the decision **of the Court of First Instance of Laguna 8th Judicial District, Branch II, Sta. Cruz, Laguna (now Regional Trial Court, Sta. Cruz, Laguna) dated January 20, 1982, which dismissed the complaint for Quieting of Title in Civil Case No. SC-1492 and declared the plaintiff's (petitioner's herein) Re-constituted Transfer Certificate of Title RT-6293 (No. 23350) as null and void (Record on Appeal, pp. 215-216). Respondents For the Intermediate Appellate Court decision be AFFIRMED in declaring the deed of sale of August 10, 1937, as well as the reconstituted transfer certificate of title of petitioners, void ab initio. V. Key Facts: 1. The subject matter of this controversy involves a parcel of land situated in Cavinti, Laguna consisting of 81,300 square meters, more or less, initially covered by an original Certificate of Title No. 2262, issued on April 2, 1924 owned and registered in the name of the late Pedro Villanueva (former Justice of the Peace of the Municipal Court, Cavinti, Laguna). 2. The Original Certificate of Title was cancelled on the basis of the private document of sale (Exhibit "B" an unnotarized deed of sale written in Tagalog, that was allegedly signed by the late Pedro Villanueva conveying and transferring the property in question in favor of the petitioners.) and a new certificate of title was issued in the name of the petitioners covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT- 6293 (No. 23350) 3. During the Second World War, the records as well as the Office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna, where the original of their new transfer certificate of title was kept,

were completely burned. Accordingly, by virtue of an Affidavit of Reconstitution dated December 2, 1958 (Record on Appeal, Annex "DD," pp. 41-42) and upon presentation of the Owner's Duplicate Certificate of Title, the title was administratively reconstituted and the Register of Deeds of Laguna issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-6293 (No. 23350) in the name of the petitioners (Record on Appeal, Annex "B", pp. 7). 4. On November 17, 1976, defendant Marta Villanueva together with Pedro Villanueva, Jr., and Restituto R. Villanueva executed and filed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna. When petitioners learned of this Affidavit of Adverse Claim, attempt was made to settle said controversy amicably, but they failed. So, petitioners instituted court suit against the private respondent and her husband, Dr. Marcelo S. Agana, Sr. by filing a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages with the Court of First Instance of Laguna on February 3, 1977. 5. The trial court found that said private document (Exhibit "B") was null and void and that it was signed by somebody else not Pedro Villanueva. Such findings of fact besides being based on the records, were sustained by the Court of Appeals.

lands as though made in accordance with the more prolix forms heretofore in use. It is therefore evident that Exhibit "E" in the case at bar is definitely not registerable under the Land Registration Act. Also, the contention that ownership over registered property may be acquired by prescription or adverse possession is absolutely without merit. No title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered owner but also against his hereditary successors. IX. Disposition: Petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is AFFIRMED. 2.)CASE ANALYSIS GR No. L-68533, May 23, 1986 Director of Lands and Director of Forest Development, petitioners vs. Mariano Funtilar, Magdalena Funtilar, Heirs of Felipe Rocete and Intermediate Appellate Court, respondents I. Parties a. Petitioners Director of Lands and Director of Forest Development, petitioners b. Respondents Mariano Funtilar, Magdalena Funtilar, Heirs of Felipe Rocete and Intermediate Appellate Court

II. Prior Proceedings VI. Issue: Whether or not there was a valid reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-6293 (No. 23350) issued in the names of petitioners. VII. Holdings: No. Section 127 of Act 496 which requires, among other things, that the conveyance be executed "before the judge of a court of record or clerk of a court of record or a notary public or a justice of the peace, who shall certify such acknowledgment substantially in form next hereinafter stated was violated in this case. VIII. Ratio Decidendi: The action of the Register of Deeds of Laguna in allowing the registration of the private deed of sale was unauthorized and did not lend a bit of validity to the defective private document of sale. With reference to the special law, Section 127 of the Land Registration Act, Act 496 Deeds of Conveyance, ... affecting lands, whether registered under this act or unregistered shall be sufficient in law when made substantially in accordance with the following forms, and shall be as effective to convey, encumber, ... or bind the Trial Court (The private respondents delivered the owners of the parcel of land) *the petitioners filed an appeal to IAC Intermediate Appellate Court (The decision of the trial court was affirmed by the IAC) petitioners filed a petition to review the decision of the IAC to the Supreme Court Supreme Court-

III. Theories of the Parties Petitioners1) that neither of the respondents possessed sufficient title of the land 2) that neither of them have been in open, continuous, exclusive possession and occupation of the land for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of the application 3) that the land is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines Respondents1) they have registrable title on account of their possession since time immemorial

2) that there was no actual survey of the land applied for and he is entitled to registration IV. Objective of the Parties PetitionersThey wanted to recover the parcel of land RespondentsThey wanted to have a peaceful ownership and to have a land title under their name The land was a part of the property originally belonging to one Candida Fernandez until she died in 1936. The respondents were the grandchildren of Fernandez and her heirs under the Tax Declaration No. 9622 with an area of 30 hectares. Sometime in 1940, the parcel of land was forfeited in favor of the government for failure to pay real estate taxes. But Vitaliano Aguirre one of the 3 children of Fernandez and the administrator of the property redeemed the land and a final deed of sale was executed by the Provincial Treasurer of Tayabas. It had been agreed among the heirs that the property would first be held by Vitaliano until such time that partition among them was effected. The respondents later partitioned the property among themselves. Then an ocular inspection conducted by the trial court because the property was found to actually contain an area of 22.6773 hectares and there were more than 100 coconut trees with ages over 30 years old, and 1400 coconut trees on the land. The Director of Lands and Director of Forest Development filed an opposition. VI. Issue/s a. Whether or not the respondents are not entitled to registration. b. Whether or not the parcel of land is unalienable. VII. Holdings and Findings The court held that respondents are hereby declared as owners of the parcel of land described according to the Plan Psu-215779. VIII. Ratio Decidendi A certification was issued by the District Forester thatsaid parcel of land falls within alienable and disposable In view of thereof, this office interposes no objection in behalf of the Director Forestry for the registration and/or confirmation of title on the property mentioned xxx. The land sought to be registered was alienable and disposable 33 years ago. It is not forest land. It has been possessed and cultivated by the respondents and their predecessors for at least 3 generations. IX. Disposition The Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision of the appellate court. V. Key Facts

GR. No. 50422, February 8, 1989 PARTIES Petitioners (heirs/ claimants)Nicolas Arradaza, Marcelino arradaza, Oprecilo Arradaza, Catalina Arradaza, Miguela Arradaza, Lilia Arradaza, Melchor Arradaza and Cerlito Arradaza. Private Respondent (new owner property/ vendee)- Melchor Larrazabal. of the

PRIOR PROCEEDINGS Court of First Instance of Leyte (Regional Trial Court), Branch V, Ormoc City dismissing plaintiffs (herein petitioners) complaint and adjudicating the land in litigation in favor of defendant (herein respondent) plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals Court of Appeals affirms the decision of Regional Trial Court and denies the petitioners motion for reconsideration. THEORIES OF THE PARTIES Petitioners- They contended that under the factual milieu of the case which involves registered land, title to which was, the sale made by their father (Ignacio Arradaza) when he was already a widower and with no liquidation of the conjugal partnership ever made was invalid, null and void ab initio and inexistent insofar as it included as their shares who are the children of Marcelina Quirino. He (Ignacio) could not have legally and validly sold the whole of the land, for one-half thereof proindiviso had automatically passed by succession to the heirs of Marcelina Quirino. They concluded that the defect of inexistence of a contract, like that of the sale by their father who could not have transmitted any title of ownership over the other half belonging to his wife for it had already passed to her heirs who are the petitioners, is permanent and incurable. Hence, it could not be cured by ratification and prescription. Therefore, they have the right and legal standing to recover the one- half (1/2) of the land in dispute as their share for being the children of the late Ignacio Arradaza by his wife Marcelina Quirino. Respondent- He contended that prescription has set in because the predecessors-in-interest of petitioners were not registered owners protected by Act 496. He asserts that when the transaction that gave rise to the present action occurred on October 21, 1947 the Code of Civil Procedure was still in force. The prescriptive period was only ten (10) years irrespective of the good or bad faith of Estelita M. Bangloy (vendor of the property that was sold to private respondent) who took possession of the land as of that date, she then completed the period of ten (10) years in 1957 and acquired absolute title by prescription pursuant to Article 1116 of the New Civil Code. Private respondent claims that he can avail himself of such prescription acquired by his predecessor. Therefore, he is the legal owner of the land and the petitioners can no longer recover the property in dispute since it was already prescribed. OBJECTIVES Petitioners- to recover their pro-indiviso one-half (1/2) share of the land as heirs of Ignacio Arradaza and Marcelina Quirino, and to exercise the right of legal redemption over one-half (1/2) of the property sold by their deceased father while he was already a widower on October 21, 1947. Respondent- To be the legal owner of the property (land in Ormoc, Leyte) in dispute and have the legal possession of such.

3.)Case Analysis Arradaza,et.al. vs. Court of Appeals and Larrazabal

FACTS The petitioners are the legitimate children of spouses Ignacio Arradaza and Marcelina Quirino who died on 1974 respectively. In 1941, Ignacio Arradaza and Marcelina Quirino purchased from spouses Gervacio Villas and Jovita Tabudlong a piece of land located in Ormoc, Leyte. The deed of sale was lost during the war and all efforts to recover it proved futile. The Arradazas paid the taxes thereon prewar, but in the cadastral hearings, the land was adjudicated to the vendor spouses for failure of the vendee spouse to claim it. Original Certificate of Title No. 35901 was therefore issued in the name of Gervacio Villas and Jovita Tabudlong but they recognized the vendee spouses as the real owners of the land. While Marcelina Quirino was still living, Ignacio Arradaza mortgaged the land to Estelita Magalona for a period of five (5) years. On October 21, 1947, after the death of Marcelina Quirino, Ignacio Arradaza sold the same land to mortgagee Estelita Magalona Bangloy. Consequently she took over possession of the land, declared it for taxation purpose and paid taxes thereon. On 1963 while the land was still in the name of spouses Villas, private respondent Larrazabal purchased the property from Estelita Magalona Bangloy. This was evidenced by a "Deed of Sale of a Parcel of Land" executed by Bangloy in favor of Larrazabal and Bangloy, together with a "Deed of Sale" executed by Arradaza in favor of Bangloy, as well as the "Deed of Quitclaim" executed by the registered owners spouses Villas whereby the spouses renounced their rights, participation, title and ownership in favor of Ignacio Arradaza, which quitclaim was further affirm firmed by Villas in an affidavit on 1974, that he sold the land to him. These documents were registered on April 18, 1963 in the Office of the Register of Deeds. As a consequence, Original Certificate of Title No. 35901 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 4581 was issued in the name of private respondent Melchor Larrazabal and the land was declared for taxation purposes. Thereafter, after twety- seven (27) years the petitioners pursue a legal action to enforce their alleged claim to the recovery and possession of one- half (1/2) of the land in dispute as their share for being the children of the late Ignacio Arradaza by his wife Marcelina Quirino. ISSUE Issue of Law Whether or not the action of petitioners has prescribed and is barred by the statute of limitations. HOLDINGS An examination of the record clearly and readily shows that the statute of limitation has stepped in and that the petitioners are guilty of laches and that the property has been in possession of private respondent who is a purchaser in good faith and for value. The time-honored rule anchored on public policy is that relief will be denied to a litigant whose claim or demand has become 'stale' or who has acquiesced for an unreasonable length of time, or who has not been vigilant or who has slept on his rights either by negligence, folly or inattention. LACHES- law. Undue delay in claiming privilege or asserting a right. (Culpable negligence)

RATIO DECIDENDI Under the law then in force, the prescriptive period is only ten (10) years, irrespective of the good or bad faith of the possessor. Inasmuch as under the transitory provision of the New Civil Code, prescription already running before the effectivity thereof shall be governed by the laws previously in force, the prescriptive period in the present case was completed on October 21, 1957, Melchor Larrazabal having derived his title from Estelita M. Bangloy may avail himself of such defense. The alleged deed of sale in favor of plaintiffs' predecessors-in-interest is not a shield against prescription since the said document from the Villas uses was not registered and is not therefore protected by Act 496. In the case at bar, both the legal defense of prescription and the equitable defense of laches clearly lie against the plaintiff's right, if any, to recover the ownership and possession of the land. DISPOSITION IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

4.)FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v ESTRELLA QUERMIT I. Parties a. Far East Bank and Trust Company; petitioner b. Estrella Quermit; respondent II. Prior Proceedings Respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, a complaint demanding payment of the certificates of deposit including interest earned, with damages against petitioner Bank in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The trial court rendered judgment in favor respondent. Petitioner then appealed the case to the Court of Appeals which, nonetheless, affirmed the decision of the trial court with the modification that FEBTC was solely liable for the amounts adjudged in the prior decision. The Bank President and FEBTC-Harrison Plaza Branch Manager were not held solidarily liable with the FEBTC because the latter has a personality separate from its officers and stockholders. Hence this recourse to the SC. III. Theories of the Parties Petitioners Theory Petitioner Bank claimed that it was not liable to pay the value of the four

Certificates of Deposit including the interest thereon because respondents husband had already withdrawn the money from deposit. Petitioner alleged that it gave respondents late husband Dominador an accommodation to allow him to withdraw Estrellas deposit. Petitioner presented certified true copies of document showing that the payments were in fact made. Petitioner further claimed that it did not demand the surrender of the certificates of deposit since respondents husband was one of the banks senior managers. Respondents Theory Respondent claimed that money in deposit could not have been withdrawn since the subject certificates of deposit were still her possession and have not been indorsed or delivered to petitioner Bank. IV. Objectives of the Parties Petitioners Objective Respondent sought to have the decision of the Court of Appeals reversed, that is, it be not made liable to pay the value of the Certificates of Deposit and the interest earned thereon. Respondents Objective Petitioner sought to have the decision of the Court of Appeals affirmed, for her to be paid the value of the Certificates of Deposit plus accrued interests. She likewise sought to be entitled to the payment of exemplary and moral damages. V. Key Facts Respondent opened a dollar savings account in petitioners Harrison Plaza Branch for which she was issued four (4) Certificates of Deposit representing the amount of $15,000 each. Respondent thereafter went to the USA to accompany her husband for medical treatment. When she returned to the Philippines after her husband dies, she went to petitioner FEBTC to withdraw her deposit but to her dismay, she was told that her husband had already withdrawn the money in deposit. Despite respondents letters requesting the payment including the interests earned, petitioner refused to act on her demands. VI. Issue of Law Whether or not petitioner Bank was liable to the value of the four Certificates, including the interest thereon as well as mortal and exemplary damages, attorneys and appearance fees VII. Holding Yes, petitioner FEBTC is liable of the valued of the four Certificates, including the interest thereon as well as mortal and exemplary damages, attorneys and appearance fees

VIII.

Ratio Decidendi A certificate of deposit is defined as a written acknowledgment by a bank or banker of the receipt of a sum of money on deposit which the bank or banker promises to pay to the depositor, to the order of the depositor, or to some other person or his order, whereby the relation of debtor and creditor between the bank and the depositor is created. The principle that payment, in order to discharge a debt, must be made to someone authorized to receive it is applicable to the payment of certificates of deposit. Thus, a bank will be protected in making payment to the holder of a certificate indorsed by the payee, unless it has notice of the invalidity of the indorsement or the holder's want of title. A bank acts at its peril when it pays deposits evidenced by a certificate of deposit, without its production and surrender after proper indorsement. As a rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Even where the plaintiff must allege non-payment, the general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove payment. The debtor has the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged by payment. In this case, the certificates of deposit were clearly marked payable to "bearer," which means, to "the person in possession of an instrument, document of title or security payable to bearer or indorsed in blank." Petitioner should not have paid respondent's husband or any third party without requiring the surrender of the certificates of deposit. Petitioner claims that it did not demand the surrender of the subject certificates of deposit since respondent's husband, Dominador Querimit, was one of the bank's senior managers. But even long after respondent's husband had allegedly been paid respondent's deposit and before his retirement from service, the FEBTC never required him to deliver the certificates of deposit in question. Moreover, the accommodation given to respondent's husband was made in violation of the bank's policies and procedures. Petitioner FEBTC thus failed to exercise that degree of diligence required by the nature of its business. Because the business of banks is impressed with public interest, the degree of diligence required of banks is more than that of a good father of the family or of an ordinary business firm. The fiduciary nature of their relationship with their depositors requires them to treat the accounts of their clients with the highest degree of care. A bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care whether such accounts consist only of a few hundred pesos or of millions of pesos. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of

obligation is demandable. Petitioner failed to prove payment of the subject certificates of deposit issued to the respondent and, therefore, remains liable for the value of the dollar deposits indicated thereon with accrued interest Respondent is entitled to moral damages because of the mental anguish and humiliation she suffered as a result of the wrongful refusal of the FEBTC to pay her even after she had delivered the certificates of deposit. In addition, petitioner FEBTC should pay respondent exemplary damages, which the trial court imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. Finally, respondent is entitled to attorney's fees since petitioner's act or omission compelled her to incur expenses to protect her interest, making such award just and equitable. However, the Court found the award of attorney's fees to be excessive and it accordingly reduced it to P20,000.00. IX. Disposition The assailed Decision making petitioner liable for the value of four (4) Certificates of Deposit plus accrued interest, with moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees was affirmed with modification that the award of attorneys fees be reduced from P100,000 to P20,000. 5.)CASE ANALYSIS Title: Mataas Na Lupa Tenants Assoc., Inc., Nicolas Aglipay and those mentioned in Annex A of complaint, petitioners, vs. Carlos Dimayuga and Juliana Diez Vda. De Gabriel, respondents. G.R. No. L-32049, June 25, 1984 I-PARTIES Petitioners: Mataas Na Lupa Tenants Assoc. Inc., headed by Nicholas Aglipay-> tenants-lessees of the parcel of land which is the subject of litigation/Civil case. Respondents: Juliana Diez Vda. de Gabriel->lessor, the original owner of the parcel of land being leased to the petitioners. Carlos Dimayuga->the buyer/the person to whom the property was sold. II- PRIOR PROCEEDINGS Petitioners filed a complaint for the exercise of preferential rights with the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV alleging that the Contract of Sale executed by Juliana Diez Vda. De Gabriel with Carlos Dimayuga is expressly prohibited by law as it is mandated for the respondent to execute such sale to petitioners. Therefore said contract should be declared null and void. The lower court ruled in favor of the respondents, ordering the dismissal of the case on the ground that petitioners failed to state a cause of action. Thus petitioners resorted to the petition of certiorari for the review of the said order before the SC. III- THEORIES OF THE PARTIES The petitioners claims that on May 14, 1968, without giving notice to them or informing them of

the transaction, Juliana Diez Vda. de Gabriel sold the parcel of land to respondent Carlos Dimayuga. They invoke their right vested by R.A. 1162, as amended by R.A. 2342 and 3516, tenants have a preferential right to buy the lands they are renting within Metro Manila, provided there are at least 40 tenants, regardless of non expropriability or size of the land in question. The aforesaid provision further requires the respondent to offer the sale of the land to petitioner unless the latter renounces their rights in a public instrument. Making the sale executed by respondents illegal. Respondent Vda. de Gabriel claimed the land subject of the complaint is not a landed estate, and not being such, the same cannot be expropriated , and not being expropriable, no preferential rights could be availed of by the tenants. While respondent Dimayuga claims that plaintiffs had no personality to initiate the action since the Land Tenure Administration possessed the power to institute the proper expropriation proceedings before the competent court and that the subject complaint sated no cause of action against respondents. IV- OBJECTIVE The petitioner prays that the contract of sale be declared null and void and that respondent Vda. de Gabriel to execute a deed of sale in favor of petitioners at the same price and conditions followed in the contract with respondent Dimayuga, plus attorney's fees and damages. Respondent prays for the dismissal of the complaint, that the plaintiffs be ejected from the property and for other remedies. V- KEY FACTS For more than ten years prior to 1959, the petitioners have been occupants of a parcel of land (with their 110 houses built thereon-110 tenant families) formerly owned by Vda. de Gabriel to whom petitioners have been paying their rents for the lease thereof, but who, on May 14, 1968, without notice to petitioners, sold the same to respondent Dimayuga, who in turn mortgaged the same to her for the balance of the purchase price. On the discovery of the sale the petitioner filed a complaint for the exercise of their preferential rights before the CFI. And that pursuant to R.A. 1162, as amended by R.A. 2342 a parcel of land in Manila and suburbs , with at least 50 houses of tenants erected thereon and actually leased to said tenants for at least 10 years prior to June 20 , 1959, may not be sold by the land owner to any person other than such tenants, unless the latter renounced their rights in a public instrument. Which means, respondent Vda. de Gabriel sold the land to respondent Dimayuga without the said tenantsappellants having renounced their preferential rights in a public instrument. Their complaint also states that since the aforesaid contract of sale is expressly prohibited by law, the same be declared null and void and for Vda. De Gabriel to execute a deed of sale in their favor because they are likewise willing to purchase said land at the same price and on the same terms and conditions observed in the contract of sale with respondent Dimayuga. On January 31, 1969, respondent Vda. De Gabriel filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint is not a land estate and not being such, the same cannot be expropriated and that no preferential rights can be availed of by the tenants. On february 6, 1969, Dimayuga filed his answer admitting therein certain factual allegations, denied

some averments, interposed the affirmative defense that plaintiffs had no personality to initiate the action, that the subject complaint stated no cause of action against respondent and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and other remedies. Plaintiffs filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss, maintaining that R.A. 1162, as amended by R.A. 2342 does not refer to landed estates, but to any piece of land occupied by more than 50 families leasing the same for more than 10 years prior to June 20, 1959; that their preferential right is independent of the expropriability of the land; that therefore, said rights may be exercised even if land is not expropriable pursuant to the police power of the State for the general welfare. On october 30, 1969, the CFI issued the subject order which found respondent's motion to dismiss well-taken and thereby dismisses complaint. After a series of motions, reply, rejoinder, surrejoinder, and answer between both parties, the lower court issued it's order of may 11, 1970 dismissing petitioners appeal. Petitioner thus resorted to this petition. VI- ISSUES Whether or not the contract of sale is null and void. Whether or not the petitioners may invoke their preferential rights as tenants. VII- HOLDINGS The Court finds that the said sale was made illegally and therefore void. The court also finds that petitioners' case falls with in the law thus they may invoke their preferential right. VIII- Ratiodecidendi The R.A. 1162 as amended by R.A. 2342 and 3516 set forth the following conditions-that of offering first the sale of the land to petitioners and the latter's renunciation in a public instrument-were not met when the land was sold to respondent Dimayuga. Evidently, said sale is illegal and therefore void. The 1973 Constitution section 6, article II emphasizes the stewardship concept that such private property is supposed to be held by the individual only as trustee for the people in general, who are its real owners. As a mere steward, the individual must exercise his right to the property not for his own exclusive and selfish benefit but for the good of the entire community. P.D. 1157 Proclaiming Urban Land Reform in the Philippines and Providing for the Implenting Machinery thereof. superseded R.A. 1152, 2342,3516. This decree is firmly based on sec. 6 of art. II of the 1973 constitution undoubtedly adopts and crystallizes the greater number of people criterion when it speaks of tenants and residents in declared urban land reform zones or areas without mention of the land area covered by such zones. The focus therefore, is on people who would benefit and not on the size of the land involved. Under section 6 of which also states that tenant-families have been vested the right of first refusal to purchase of the land within a reasonable time and reasonable price subject to the rules and regulations of the Ministry of Human Settlements. It is further supported by PD 1967 which evidently include Mataas na Lupa, the land in controversy with in the Urban Land Reform Zone. IX- DISPOSITION

The order issued by the CFI is hereby set aside and the Ministry of Human Settlements is hereby directed to facilitate and administer the implementation of the rights of the petitioner. Cost against respondents.

6.)Dole vs Maritime Company of the Phil 1. Parties Dole Philippines Inc. plaintiff-appellant Claims for loss and damage to a shipment of machine parts sought to be enforced by consignee against Maritime Company of the Philippines Maritime Company of the Philippines defendantappellee Held liable by plaintiff-appellant to pay claim for loss of machine parts they negligently shipped

2. Prior Proceedings RTC Dismissed the first two cases filed by DOLE due to lack of cause of action. The third cause of action which covered the cargo subject of this case now was likewise dismissed but without prejudice as it was not covered by the settlement CA Where the action for damages by plaintiff-appelle was instituted

3. Theories of the Parties Plaintiff-appellant DOLE the cargo subject of the instant case was discharged in Dadiangas unto the custody of the consignee on December 18,1971 , thus, defendant is liable for damages caused by its negligence The corresponding claim for damages sustained by the cargo was filed by plaintiff with defendant vessel on May 4,1972 Defendant-appellee Maritime Inc - the complaint in the subsequent action Maritime filed an answer pleading inter alia the affirmative defense of prescription under the provisions of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, and following pre-trial, moved for a preliminary hearing on said defense. It provides that : .. the carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all liability in respect of loss or damage unless suit is brought within one year after delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered; Provided, That, if a notice of loss or damage, either apparent or conceded, is not given as provided for in this section, that fact shall not affect or prejudice the right of the shipper to bring suit within one year after the delivery of the goods or the

date when the goods should have been delivered. 4. Objectives of the Parties Plaintiff DOLE To claim for loss and damages to a shipment of machine parts negligently enforced by defendant appellee Defendant Maritime To be absolved from the payment of damages to plaintiff DOLE on the ground of the provision in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act which implies that under the given circumstances of the instant case, they have no liability to what plaintiff claims to them 5. Key Facts The cargo subject of the instant case was discharged in Dadiangas unto the custody of the consignee on December 18, 1971 The corresponding claim for damages sustained by the cargo was filed by the plaintiff on May 4 , 1972 The plaintiff filed a civil case embodying 3 causes of action involving 3 different shipments The third cause of action is now the subject of this present litigation Defendant Maritime Inc said that they are not anymore liable for the damages because the allowance of one year to institute such action had already lapsed 6. Issue Whether or not Article 1155 of the Civil Code providing that the prescription of actions is interrupted by the making of an extrajudicial written demand by the creditor is applicable to actions brought under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. 7. Holdings

These arguments might merit weightier consideration were it not for the fact that the question has already received a definitive answer, adverse to the position taken by Dole, in The Yek Tong Lin Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. vs. American President Lines, Inc. 15 There, in a parallel factual situation, where suit to recover for damage to cargo shipped by vessel from Tokyo to Manila was filed more than two years after the consignee's receipt of the cargo, this Court rejected the contention that an extrajudicial demand toiled the prescriptive period provided for in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, viz: In the second assignment of error plaintiff-appellant argues that it was error for the court a quo not to have considered the action of plaintiffappellant suspended by the extrajudicial demand which took place, according to defendant's own motion to dismiss on August 22, 1952. We notice that while plaintiff avoids stating any date when the goods arrived in Manila, it relies upon the allegation made in the motion to dismiss that a protest was filed on August 22, 1952 which goes to show that plaintiff-appellant's counsel has not been laying the facts squarely before the court for the consideration of the merits of the case. We have already decided that in a case governed by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, the general provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure on prescription should not be made to apply.

8. Ratio Decidendi No different result would obtain even if the Court were to accept the proposition that a written extrajudicial demand does toll prescription under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. The demand in this instance would be the claim for damage-filed by Dole with Maritime on May 4, 1972. The effect of that demand would have been to renew the oneyear prescriptive period from the date of its making. Stated otherwise, under Dole's theory, when its claim was received by Maritime, the one-year prescriptive period was interrupted "tolled" would be the more precise term and began to run anew from May 4, 1972, affording Dole another period of one (1) year counted from that date within which to institute action on its claim for damage. Unfortunately, Dole let the new period lapse without filing action. It instituted Civil Case No. 91043 only on June 11, 1973, more than one month after that period has expired and its right of action had prescribed. Dole's contention that the prescriptive period "*** remained tolled as of May 4, 1972 *** (and that) in legal contemplation *** (the) case (Civil Case No. 96353) was filed on January 6, 1975 *** well within the one-year prescriptive period in Sec. 3(6) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act." equates tolling with indefinite suspension. It is clearly fallacious and merits no consideration.

Dole concedes that its action is subject to the one-year period of limitation prescribe in the above-cited provision. The substance of its argument is that since the provisions of the Civil Code are, by express mandate of said Code, suppletory of deficiencies in the Code of Commerce and special laws in matters governed by the latter, and there being "*** a patent deficiency *** with respect to the tolling of the prescriptive period ***" provided for in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, prescription under said Act is subject to the provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code on tolling and because Dole's claim for loss or damage made on May 4, 1972 amounted to a written extrajudicial demand which would toll or interrupt prescription under Article 1155, it operated to toll prescription also in actions under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. To much the same effect is the further argument based on Article 1176 of the Civil Code which provides that the rights and obligations of common carriers shag be governed by the Code of Commerce and by special laws in all matters not regulated by the Civil Code.

9. Disposition WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant, Dole Philippines, Inc. 7.)22. PDCP v. IAC G.R. No. 73198 September 2, 1992 Case Analysis I. Parties: Private Development Corporation of the Philippines (PDCP), petitioner. The Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC), public respondent and Ernesto C. Del Rosario, private respondent. Petitioner and private respondent, as President of a corporation (DATICOR), had a contractual relationship (because of a loan agreement) wherein petitioner was the creditor while respondent was the debtor. II. Prior Proceeding: PDCP initiated extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings against a parcel of land owned by Del Rosario and (another extra-judicial foreclosure) against parcels of land owned by the corporation (DATICOR) headed by same private respondent. Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila. The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioner. Said decision was appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court. However, pending CFI (Manila)resolution, Del Rosario sought a restraining order from another branch of the Regional Trial Court in Manila. Also, Del Rosario filed another civil case of writ of injunction in the Court of First Instance of Davao Oriental so as to prevent PCDP from foreclosing its DATICOR properties on Davao. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC). Set aside CFIs decision.[OR overruled the trial courts decision.] To wit, the Intermediate Appellate Court: declared void and of no effect the stipulations of interest in the loan agreement between DATICOR and PDCP, as if the loan agreement is without stipulation as to payment of interest. . Hence this appeal case in the SC. III. Theories of the Parties: Petitioners contentions. That DATICOR entered into a loan agreement by which it incurred an outstanding balance justifying the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings. 213 SCRA 282

That Del Rosario is not a party-in-interest in the case. That the cause of action of Del Rosario is barred by prescription and that there is a pending case before the CFI Davao. Private respondents contentions. That the stipulations on the interest of the loan agreement are contrary to law (being violative of the Usury Law) therefore the loan agreement must be annulled. That PDCPs extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings are not justified. PDCP must also be made liable for damages. IV. Objective of the Parties: Petitioner. Granting of the extra-judicial proceedings to satisfy the unpaid balance in the loan agreement.

foreclosure outstanding

Private respondent. Annulment of the loan agreement and be awarded damages. V. Key Facts: Davao Timber Corporation (DATICOR) and Private Development Corporation of the Philippines (PDCP) entered into a loan agreement in foreign currency and in peso. It was stipulated in the loan agreement, that the foreign currency loan was to be pain with an interest rate of eleven and threefourths (11-%) per cent per annum on the disbursed amount of the foreign currency; and the peso loan at the rate of twelve (12%) per cent per annum on the disbursed amount of the peso loan outstanding, commencing on the several dates on which disbursements of the proceeds of loan are made. The loans were originally secured by a first mortgage executed by Ernesto del Rosario, President of DATICOR, in his personal capacity, and his sister, as third party mortgagors on a parcel of land which they owned in common. The land was later on partitioned by the siblings. Thereafter, PDCP executed a partial release of mortgage on the parcel of land owned by del Rosarios sister and caused the DATICOR to execute an additional mortgage of five parcel of land consisting prime industrial lands with buildings thereon. DATICOR also executed a Deed of Chattel Mortgage on the machineries and equipment attached to the land in Davao Oriental as added security for said loan. Additional fees and charges were added to the loan interest so that, according to PDCP, DATICOR still has an outstanding balance of almost Php 11 million despite payingPhp 3 million ofthe original Php 4.4 million loan. PDCP then initiated extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings against the mortgage properties of DATICOR. Private respondent then filed a complaint against the PDCP for violation of the Usury Law, annulment of contract and damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction the Court of First Instance (Manila) and Court of First Instance (Davao). In the course of the trial, PDCP contended that DATICOR entered into a loan agreement by which it incurred an outstanding balance justifying the extra-judicial foreclosure

proceedings, that Del Rosario is not a partyin-interest in the case, that the cause of action of Del Rosario is barred by prescription and that there is a pending case before the CFI Davao. VI. Issues Identified by the Court: Whether or not the assailed loan agreement is valid. Whether or not petitioners contentions are valid. VII. Holdings:

Intermediate Appellate Court decision that it declared void and of no effect the stipulations of interest in the loan agreement between DATICOR and PDCP, as if the loan agreement is without stipulationas to payment of interest. is affirmed. 8.) Narciso Buenaventura and Maria Buenaventura vs. Manotok Realty, inc. GR 50837 Dec.28 1992 Case analysis:

No, the loan agreement is contrary to law hence it is null and void. The loan agreement was entered into when the prevailing law applicable is Usury Law, as amended by P.D. No. 116. Petitioners contentions are not valid. As to the contention that Del Rosario is not a party-in-interest in the case: Del Rosario mortgaged his properties in his personal capacity to secure the debt of DATICOR. As such, the creditor, PDCP, may proceed against Del Rosario or DATICOR or both of them simultaneously for the payment of the loan or for the performance of obligation. In fact, PDCP filed for the foreclosure of the real properties belonging to Del Rosario. As to the contention that the cause of action of Del Rosario is barred by prescription and that there is a pending case before the CFI Davao: Article 1957 of the Civil Code provides: contracts and stipulations under any cloak or device whatever, intended to circumvent the law against usury shall be void. Furthermore, Article 1410 provides: The action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe. The aforesaid articles therefore state that all usurious stipulations are void and as such, action to annul such usurious stipulations does not prescribe. The principle of litispendenciais not applicable to the case at bar. The first case (CFI Manila) was against a natural person (Del Rosario), while the second (CFI Davao), against a juridical person (DATICOR). Clearly, there is no identity of parties, hence litispendencia cannot apply. VIII. Ratio Decidendi: The usury law , as amended by Presidential Decree 116, fixed all interest rates for all loans with maturity of more than 360 days at twelve (12%) per cent per annum including premiums, fines and penalties. It is to be noted that PDCP was charging penalties at the rate of two (2%) per cent per month or an effective rate of twenty four (24) per cent per month on the peso loan and one-half (1/2%) per cent per month or an effective (nalingawangarusuword narate) six (6%) per cent per annum on the foreign currency loan. It is therefore very clear that PDCP has been charging and imposing interests in violation of the prevailing usury laws. IX. Disposition: The decision appealed from is affirmed in toto. OR

Parties: Petitioner: Narciso Buenaventura and Maria Buenaventura (successors of Emeteria Buenaventura) Respondents: Lorenzo Caina and Francisca Caina (siblings of Emetria Buenaventura), National Housing Authority (NHA-formerly PHHC, sold land to Lorenzo and Francisca), Francisco Custodio (buyer of land from Lorenzo and Francisca), Manotok Realty (buyer of land from Francisco Custodio) Prior proceedings: On December 1976, petitioner filed a complaint entitled Narciso Buenaventura and Maria Buenaventura vs. Lorenzo Cainta, Francisca Cainta, National Housing Authority, Fransisco Custodio, and Manotok Realty for Annulment of Titles, Contracts and/or Sales, Reconveyance and Damages in the CFI of Caloocan City. Respondent Manotok Realty subsequently filed a motion to dismiss on ground of prescription; however petitioner filed for opposition. Respondent filed motion for reconsideration but was denied. Aggrieved, respondent filed petition to Court of Appeals, which the latter court ordered the dismissal of petitioners complaint on the ground of prescription. Petioner filed a motion for reconsideration in CA but was to no avail. Hence, this instant petition. Theories: Petitioner: action for reconveyance based on grounds of fraud and simulation of contracts, hence cannot be subject of prescription. Respondent: complaint was filed after more than 10 years from the issuance of the transfer certificate, thus has prescribed. Objectives: Petitioner: annulment of titles, contracts and/or sales, reconveyance and damages. Respondent: dismissal of the case Key Facts: Julian Caina was a tenant of a land owned by the Republic of the Philippines, and said land was to be resold to qualified tenants. Julian had a brother named Justo Caina. Justo had 3 children named Emetria Caina Buenaventura, Lorenzo Caina and Francisca Caina. NHA (formerly PHHC) was designated with the task of selling and transferring lots to qualified tenants and their heirs. When PHHC executed a deed of sale to the land of Julian on 1965, the latter had been survived by her brother Justo. Justo has also been survived by Lorenzo, Francisca and Emetrias successors namely Narciso and Maria as Emetria had already died. However, when the deed of sale came, it was only given to Lorenzo and Francisca excluding Narciso and Maria. On January 1966, Lorenzo and Francisca sold the land to Francisco Custudio, and the latter executed a deed of sale in favor of Manotok Realty on the same year. On December 1976, petitioners filed this complaint for annulment of titles, contracts and/or sale, reconveyance and damages.

Issue: Wheter or not prescription?

the

complaint

is

barred

by

against them. The defendants invoke their right to cancel OCT NO.8916. VI- ISSUES WON, the land could no longer be reconveyed to plaintiffs since they had been transferred to purchasers who bought them in good faith and value. WON, petitioners can invoke the doctrine of conclusiveness and indivisibility of titles issued under the torrens system. VII HOLDINGS As record shows, petitioners bought the property when it was still unregistered land. The defense of having purchased the property in good faith may be availed of only where registered land is involved and the buyer had relied in good faith on the clear title of the registered owner. The court a quo did not sustain the defense of the laches and prescription put up by the defendants, since it was not shown that the plaintiffs were guilty of negligence or slept their rights. VIII RATIO DECIDENDI One who purchases an unregistered land does so at his peril. the claim of having bought the land in good faith, without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, the property would not protect him if it turns out that the seller does not actually own the property. Under Art. 494 of the new civil code, prescription generally does not run in favor of a co-heir or co-owner as long as, he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. While an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years, the rule does not apply where a fiduciary relation exists and the trustee recognizes the trust. 10.)CASE ANALYSIS Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. AnianoDesierto I. Parties PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS represented by MAGTANGGOL C. GUNIGUNDO, PCGG CHAIRMAN, ORLANDO C. SALVADOR petitioners. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, OMBUDSMAN; JOSE Z. OSIAS; PACIFICO E. MARCOS; EDUARDO V. ROMUALDEZ; FERNANDO C. ORDOVEZA; and JUANITO ORDOVEZA, respondents. II. Prior Proceedings The case was filed in the Office of the Ombudsman and was dismissed on the ground of prescription. III. Theories of the Parties Ombudsman Disierto contends that he did not commit grave abuse of discretion and that the offenses with which the respondents were charged had already prescribed. Gunigundo argues that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion and the respondents offenses had not yet prescribed. IV. Objective of the Parties

Holdings: Yes. The complaint

is barred

by prescription.

Ratio Decedendi: The action of the petitioner had already prescribed since when the PHHC executed a deed of sale on January 26, 1966 to Lorenzo and Francisca and petioners complaint was only filed on December 28, 1976, the complaint was already beyond 10 years. Action for reconveyance must be filed by the defrauded party within 10 years from the date of issuance of title, otherwise the action prescribes. Case Analysis 9.)David vs Bandin I-PARTIES Felipe David & Antonina David (Plaintiff-appellant) Eulogio Bandin (Gregorio,Raymundo,Valentin Briones,Sofa Briones & Agapito Ramos (defendantappellee) II- PRIOR PROCEEDINGS: CFI of Rizal Branch VIII in Pasay City -Complaint was filed by the respondents for the recovery & partition of the property Trial court - where the decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring however, that certain parties could no longer be reconveyed, since they had been transferred to purchasers who bought them in good faith. CA both plaintiffs and defendants were ot satisfied with the decision of TC. Hence, a review for certiorari. III - THEORIES OF THE PARTIES: Plaintiff-appellant contend that the CA erred in holding that they are buyers in bad faith Defendant-appellee want to modify the decision of the trial court that they are purchasers in good faith IV OBJECTIVES OF THE PARTIES Plaintiff wants a cancellation of OCT NO.8916 and all subsequent transfer certificates of title derived therefrom. Defendant wants to reconvey their 2/3 pro-indiviso share of the land. V- KEY FACTS The plaintiffs, spouses Felipe David & Antonia David purchased portions of the Laong property consisting of 15,000 sq.m. from spouses Gregorio & Mary Venturanza who in turn purchased the property from Juanita Martin vda de Lucena, on Sept. 23,1959, at the time both purchases took place, the property in question was still an unregistered land. The land was registered in the name of Juanita Martin in 1971, to whom was issued OCT NO.8916. the portion sold to the spouses Felipe and Antonia David is presently covered by TCT no. 372092. The trial court, however found that Candida Ramos ,until her death on Feb. 15,1955, administered the Laong property, and that plaintiff appellants were given their shares of fruits thereof though irregular at times, depending on the amount of harvest. So, They sent a letter of demand to the heirs of Candida Ramos, and filed a complaint

Ombudsman Disiertos objective is not to undergo preliminary investigation. Gunigundo aim to set aside the resolution of 14 May 1996 and the order of 19 May 1997 of the Ombudsman. V. Key Facts On 8 October 1992, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13, creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans. On 9 November 1992, President Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 61 directing the COMMITTEE to "include in its investigation, inventory, and study all nonperforming loans which shall embrace both behest and nonbehest loans. On 2 March 1996, the COMMITTEE through Orlando O. Salvador, the PCGG consultant detailed with the COMMITTEE, filed with the OMBUDSMAN a sworn complaint against the Directors of PSI and the Directors of the Development Bank of the Philippines who approved the loans for violation of paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019.

complainant and the respondents to resolve the case on its merits and on the issue of the date of discovery of the offense.

VIII.Ratio Decidendi

The OMBUDSMAN's reliance on Dinsay is misplaced. The estafa committed by the accused was known to the offended party from the very start; hence, it could even be said that the commission and the discovery of the offense were simultaneous. 20 Neither is People v. Sandiganbayan 21 of any help to OMBUDSMAN. We ruled therein that the prescriptive period commenced to run from the filing of the application for the following reasons: The theory of the Prosecution that the prescriptive period should not commence upon the filing of Paredes' application because no one could have known about it except Paredes and Lands Inspector Luison, is not correct for, as the Sandiganbayan pointedly observed: it is not only the Lands Inspector who passes upon the disposability of public land . . . other public officials pass upon the application for a free patent including the location of the land and, therefore, the disposable character thereof (p. 30, Rollo). Indeed, practically all the department personnel, who had a hand in processing and approving the application, namely: (1) the lands inspector who inspected the land to ascertain its location and occupancy; (2) the surveyor who prepared its technical description; (3) the regional director who assessed the application and determined the land classification; (4) the Director of Lands who prepared the free patent; and (5) the Department Secretary who signed it, could not have helped "discovering" that the subject of the application was nondisposable public agricultural land. People v. Duqu is more in point, and what was stated there stands reiteration: In the nature of things, acts made criminal by special laws are frequently not immoral or obviously criminal in themselves; for this reason, the applicable statute requires that if the violation of the special law is not known at the time, the prescription begins to run only from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts. In the case at bar the OMBUDSMAN forthwith dismissed the complaint in Case No. OMB-0-96-0968 without even requiring the respondents to submit their counteraffidavits and solely on the basis of the dates the alleged behest loans were granted, or the dates of the commission of the alleged offense was committed. IX. Fallo

VI. Issue

In the resolution dated 14 May 1996 and approved on 9 June 1996, the OMBUDSMAN dismissed the complaint in OMB-0-96-0968 on the ground of prescription. Relying on People v. Dinsay, a case decided by the Court of Appeals, he ratiocinated that since the questioned transactions were evidenced by public instruments and were thus open for the perusal of the public, the prescriptive period commenced to run from the time of the commission of the crime, not from the discovery thereof. Reckoning the prescriptive period from 1969, 1970, 1975, and 1978, when the disputed transactions were entered into, the OMBUDSMAN ruled that the offenses with which respondents were charged had already prescribed.

Whether or not Ombudsman AnianoDisierto committed grave abuse of discretion. VII. Holding Since the computation of the prescriptive period for the filing of the criminal action should commence from the discovery of the offense, the OMBUDSMAN clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing outright Case No. OMB-0-96-0968. It should have first received the evidence from the

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition, and SETTING ASIDE the resolution of 14 May 1996 and the Order of 19 May 1997 of the public respondent OMBUDSMAN in Case No. OMB-0-960968.

the above petition on the following grounds: (a) the case was not referred to the barangay concerned for confrontation and mediation, as mandated by P. D. 1508; (b) there has been a decision previously rendered which involved the same parties over the same cause of action (obviously referring to the decision in Civil Case No. SM-975); and (c) the action is between members of the same family and no earnest efforts towards a compromise have been exerted (Records, pp. 60-63). The said motion to dismiss elicited an opposition from the petitioners (Rec., p. 79-83). 14. For their part, defendants Reynaldo Diaz and Remedios Diaz-Sandel filed their separate motion to dismiss, grounded, as follows: (a) the lower court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case; (b) the complaint states no cause of action against them; (c) the cause of action of the petitioners is already barred by a prior judgment; (d) the case is between members of the same family and no earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made; and (e) the present case will not in any way terminate the uncertainty or controversy between the parties as any declaration or construction of the rights of the parties is not necessary and proper (Rec., pp. 84-89).

The OMBUDSMAN is hereby directed to proceed with the preliminary investigation of the case OMB-0-96-0968 taking into account the foregoing disquisitions 11.)PARTIES: QUIRINO MATEO MATEO, petitioners, and MATIAS

DOROTEA DIAZ; REYNALDO DIAZ; REMEDIOS DIAZ; ADORACION DIAZ; NORBERTO DIAZ; YOLANDA CRUZ; OSCAR CRUZ; ESTER CRUZ; NENITA CRUZ; PRIMO POLICARPIO; GAVINO POLICARPIO; FLORENTINA POLICARPIO; MAURO POLICARPIO; and MIGUEL POLICARPIO, respondents.

OBJECTIVES OF THE PARTIES: .Petitioners: that their petition for declaratory relief be granted Respondents: that the petition of the petitioners be dismissed

PRIOR PROCEEDINGS: This petition for review via certiorari ,raises the question of whether or not the equitable doctrine of laches may override a provision of the Land Registration Act on imprescriptibility of title to registered land. The case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals [2] affirming that of the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan, at Malolos. The trial court ruled that prescription and laches are applicable against the petitioners, that real actions over immovable prescribe after thirty (30) years, that ownership can be acquired through possession in good faith and with just title for a period of ten (10) years, and that ownership may be acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years without need of just title or of good faith.

KEY FACTS: The spouses Canuto Mateo and Simeona (Simona) Manuel-Mateo, during their marital union, were blessed with two (2) daughters, namely: CORNELIA MATEO and FELISA MATEO. In time, Cornelia will marry Ulpiano Diaz with whom she will have the following children, to wit: DOROTEA, REYNALDO, REMEDIOS, ADORACION and NORBERTO, all surnamed DIAZ. On the other hand, FELISA MATEO will eventually marry Cirilo Policarpio and they will raise the following children, namely: PRIMO, GAVINO, FLORENTINA, MAURO and MIGUEL, all surnamed POLICARPIO. Likewise, Cornelia will eventually have the following grandchildren, to wit: YOLANDA, OSCAR, ESTER and NENITA, all surnamed CRUZ. Canuto Mateo died sometime in 1898. Not long thereafter, his widow Simeona will take in a second husband in the person of CLARO MATEO, a first cousin of Canuto. And out of their marital union, the spouses Claro Mateo and Simeona Manuel-Mateo will have two (2) sons, to wit: QUIRINO MATEO and MATIAS MATEO, the plaintiffs-appellants herein. The property involved in the controversy is an 11hectare Riceland located at Bulak, Sta. Maria, Bulacan and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 206 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan on October 21, 1910 in the name of Claro Mateo, married to Simeona Manuel. Claro Mateo died on September 8, 1932, while Simeona Manuel-Mateo died on October 18, 1948.

THEORIES OF THE PARTIES: On April 1, 1987, in the Regional Trial Court at Malolos, Bulacan, Quirino Mateo and Matias Mateo commenced the present suit, which was originally a PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF, against (1) Dorotea Diaz, Reynaldo Diaz, Remedios Diaz, Adoracion Diaz and Norberto Diaz, the children of the late Cornelia Mateo-Diaz; (2) Yolanda Cruz, Oscar Cruz, Ester Cruz and Nenita Cruz, the grandchildren of Cornelia; and (3) Primo Policarpio, Gavino Policarpio, Florentina Polica rpio, MauroPolicarpio and Miguel Policarpio, the children of the late Felisa Mateo-Policarpio. The petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 165-SM-87. On June 16, 1987, the defendants Diazes, Cruzes and Policarpios, with the exception of Doroteo Diaz, Reynaldo Diaz and Remedios Diaz-Sandel, filed a motion to dismiss

On June 12, 1951, the children of Simeon ManuelMateo in her two (2) previous marriages, namely: Cornelia Mateo-Diaz, Felisa MateoPolicarpio, Quirino Mateo andMatias Mateo, executed a document entitled KATIBAYAN NG PAGHAHATI-HATI NG LUPA (Exhibit B, 2/28/89, List of Exhibits, p. 60), whereunder they divided among themselves three (3) separate parcels of land all located at Bulak, Sta. Maria, Bulacan which they had inherited from their parents. These properties were then covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 3556, 3794 and 3849. It is not clear if these properties are part and parcel of that property covered by OCT No. 206. On February 15, 1979, in San Carlos City, Pangasinan, the brothers Quirino Mateo and Matias Mateo executed a DEED OF EXTRAJUDICIAL PARTITION (Exh. B, 12/22/81, List of Exhibits, p. 62), whereunder they partitioned between themselves alone, to the exclusion of their half-sisters Cornelia Mateo-Diaz and FelisaMateoPolicarpio, that 11-hectare parcel of Riceland covered by OCT No. 206. It was not explained if, at the time the brothers executed the deed, any or both of their half-sisters were already dead. In any event, the deed of extra-judicial partition was duly published in a daily newspaper, the Balita. It was through this newspaper publication that the children of both Cornelia Mateo-Diaz and Felisa Mateo-Policarpio learned about the deed of extra-judicial partition executed by their uncles. Sometime in 1981, some of the children and grandchildren of Cornelia and Felisa, namely: Reynaldo Diaz, Miguel Policarpio, Dorotea DiazPerez, Felicidad Diaz-Mercadel, Maxima and Yolanda Cruz represented by Oscar Cruz, and Ricardo Nolasco, filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Extra-Judicial Partition with Damages against their uncles Quirino Mateo and Matias Mateo. Filed in the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Bulacan, the complaint was docketed thereat as Civil Case No. SM-975 (Exh. 15 sur-rebuttal). At the same time, a criminal information was filed at the proper court in San Carlos City, Pangasinan charging Quirino Mateo and Matias Mateo with falsification of public document.

Attached to the motion is the intended amended complaint where Reynaldo Diaz and Remedios DiazSandel had been dropped as party-defendants 18. In the said amended complaint, the plaintiffs Mateo brothers (Quirino and Matias alleged 2. The late Claro Mateo, was the absolute and exclusive owner of a parcel of land with an area of around eleven (11) hectares situated at Bulac, Sta. Maria, Bulacan and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. In an order dated November 28, 1988 the lower court granted the Motion to Admit Complaint in Lieu of Petition and accordingly admitted the amended complaint On September 8, 1989, the defendants filed their Amended Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim (Rec., pp. 199-203), wherethey raised the following special and affirmative defenses: That the cause of action, if any, has already prescribed and also the petitioners are guilty of laches;

ISSUE: Whether or not prescription and the equitable principle of laches are applicable in derogation of the title of the registered owner

HOLDING: Petition granted. prescription and the equitable principle of laches are not applicable in derogation of the title of the registered owner

RATIO DECIDENDI: The land involved is registered under the Torrens system in the name of petitioners father Claro Mateo. There is no question raised with respect to the validity of the title. The factual issue now raised is that petitioners had slept on their rights and had not taken any positive step to assert their rights and interests over the land covered by OCT No. 206. The records will show that immediately after petitioners discovered the existence of OCT No. 206 in 1977 or 1978, they took steps to assert their rights thereto. They divided the land between the two of them in an extra-judicial partition. Then petitioners filed the case below to recover ownership and possession as the only surviving children of the original owner, the late Claro Mateo. In St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc. v. Cleofas,itwas ruled that a party who had filed immediately a case as soon as he discovered that the land in question was covered by a transfer certificate in the name of another person is not guilty of laches. In J. M. Tuason & Co. v. Aguirre, the SCruled that an action to recover possession of a registered land never prescribes in view of the provision of Section 44 of Act No. 496,to the effect that no title to registered land in derogation to that of a registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.

On August 27, 1987, the lower court issued an order dropping Reynaldo Diaz and Remedios DiazSandel as party-defendants in the case (Rec., p. 93). On December 4, 1987, defendant Dorotea Diaz filed her answer with compulsory counterclaim On October 11, 1988, the petitioners filed a Motion to Admit Complaint in Lieu of Petition, therein alleging that: 1.The evidence adduced and still to be adduced show the necessity of amending the petition into an ordinary complaint, so that the evidence could conform with the allegations of the cause of action sought to be established. 2. The conversion of the petition to an ordinary complaint would not affect the basic cause of action and defense of the defendants.

In fact, there is a host of jurisprudence that hold that prescription and laches could not apply to registered land covered by the Torrens system. With more reason are these principles applicable to laches, which is an equitable principle. Laches may not prevail against a specific provision of law, since equity, which has been defined as justice outside legality is applied in the absence of and not against statutory law or rules of procedure.[9] On the other hand, the heirs of the registered owner are not estopped from claiming their fathers property, since they merely stepped into the shoes of the previous owners. In Barcelona v. Barcelona,te SC held that: The property in litigation, being registered land under the provisions of Act 496, is not subject to prescription, and it may not be claimed that imprescriptibility is in favor only of the registered owner, because as we have held in the cases of Teofila de Guinoo, et al., v. Court of Appeals, (97 Phil. 235) and Gil Atun, et al., v. Eusebio Nuez (97 Phil. 762), prescription is unavailing not only against the registered owner, but also against his hereditary successors because the latter merely step into the shoes of the decedent by operation of law and are merely the continuation of the personality of their predecessor in interest.

the assessments is within the prescriptive period which court action may be brought. Private respondents contentions. -That taxpayer failed to report n full his capital gains on the sales of land and that omission of income justified the imposition of 50% surcharge. -That there can no longer be an inquiry on merit of the original case. -That petitioners request for reinvestigation tolled the prescriptive period of five years within which court action may be brought. Moreover, the issue of prescription should have been raised in the tax court. IV. Objective of the Parties: Petitioner. To assailed the trial court's decision; to reinvestigate the assessments in the tax court. Respondent, To affirmed the rendered decision dismissing the appeal by petitioner. V. Key Facts:

DISPOSITION: The Court reverses the decision of the Court of Appeal .The Court remands the case to the trial court for determination of the heirs of Claro Mateo in a proper proceeding. 12.). Basa v. Republic G.R. No.L-45277 August 5, 1985 Case Analysis I. Parties:

In a demand letter dated August 31, 1967, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed against Augusto Basa deficiency income taxes for 1957 to 1960 totaling P16,353.12.*-The deficiencies were based on the taxpayer's failure to report in full his capital gains on the sales of land. This omission or under declaration of income justified the imposition of 50% surcharge. The taxpayer did not contest the assessments in the Tax Court. On the assumption that the assessments had become final and incontestable; the Commissioner on September 3, 1975 sued the taxpayer in the Manila Court of First Instance for the collection of said amount. The trial court in a decision affirmed the assessments and ordered Basa to pay P16,353.12 plus 5% surcharge and one percent monthly interest from August 31, 1967 to August 31, 1970.Instead of appealing to this Court directly, Basa tried to appeal to the Court of Appeals. He did not perfect his appeal within the prescriptive period. The trial court dismissed it. Then Basa filed the instant special civil action of certiorari wherein he assailed the trial court's decision. VI. Issues:

Augusto Basa, taxpayer,petitioner. Republic of the Philippines,represented by the SolicitorGeneral,and Judge Guillermo F. Villasor,respondent II. Prior Proceeding:

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed the deficiency income taxes of Augusto Basa. Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila. -Affirmed the assessments in the tax court and ordered petitioner to pay. -Said decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals -Dismissed the appeal made by the petitioner. -Petitioner filed the instant special civil action of certiorari wherein he assailed the trial court's decision Supreme Court - The trial court's judgment is affirmed. III. Theories of the Parties: Petitioners contentions. -That the assessments were contestable; that the court action made by him for the reinvestigation of

Whether or not the issue of prescription raised by petitioner has basis. Whether or not the decision rendered by the CFI is final and executory. Whether or not the petition is devoid of merit.

VII.

Holdings:

-No, the issue of prescription raised by him is baseless. The issue of prescription raised by him is baseless. The assessments were predicated on the fact that his income tax returns, if not fraudulent, were false because he under declared his income. In such a case, the deficiency assessments may be made within ten years after the discovery of the falsity or omission. The court action should be instituted within five years after the assessment but this period is suspended during the time that the

Commission is prohibited from instituting a court action. -Yes, the decision rendered by the CFI is final and executory. The taxpayers failure to appeal to the CTA in due time made the assessment in question final, executory and demandable. Hence, there can no longer be an inquiry on merits of the original case. -Yes. The petition is devoid of merit. The trial court acted within its jurisdiction in rendering its decision and dismissing Basa's appeal. He should have appealed to this Court. His failure to do so rendered the decision final and executory. He has no cause of action for certiorari. VIII. Ratio Decidendi:

I. PARTIES: Bernarda S. Canonizado, wife, plaintiff/petitioner Hon. Judge Regina G. Ordonez-Benitez presiding Judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court Manila, respondent and Atty. Cesar R. Canonizado, husband, and defendant/respondent. II. PRIOR PROCEEDINGS: Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court ordered issuance of an alias writ of execution for the enforcement of a decision ordering the payment of past support and to order payment of current support in favor of the petitioner. Court of Appeals - appealed judgment of JDRC with modifications. III. THEORIES OF THE PARTIES Petitioner Bernarda contends that she and her daughter have the right to payment of current support. Respondent Cesar contends that his obligation to support has terminated since recipients no longer need it for subsistence. IV. OBJECTIVES OF THE PARTIES Petitioner prays for the issuance of an alias writ of execution to compel the respondent judge to issue an order for the payment of past and current support. Respondents prays for dismissal of the petition. V. KEY FACTS: Petitioner Bernarda (wife) filed for a financial support, for her and for her daughter, against the respondent husband Cesar. Bothe the JDRC and CA decided in favor of the petitioner. Cesar however was not able to faithfully comply with his obligations in the payment of support. In consideration to the respondent husband, petitioner entered into series of compromise agreements with the former, however, still, despite his solemn accord never made any effort to update his payment of arrears in support of the petitioner which have long been overdue. Because of this, petitioner filed a petition to require the respondent to pay current support based on the decisions of September 1968 and January 1969. Respondent opposed contending that his obligation to support has terminated. VI. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to support up to the present. VII. Holding: No. VIII. RATIO: Article 303 (3) of the New Civil Code provides that the obligation to give support shall also ceae when the recipient may engage in a trade, profession, or industry, or has obtained work, or has improved his fortune in such a way that he no longer needs the allowance for his subsistence. When any of the above circumstances occurs, the support stops since the recipient no longer needs it for subsistence. It does not mean, however, that the obligation to give or the right to ask for support also ceases permanently because the lack of need for it may only be temporary. In other words, the above circumstances do not affect the right to support between spouses but only the action to make it demandable, such right being born from the law and created as such by the marriage tie. It subsists throughout the period that the marriage subsists. The matter of determining whether or not the petitioner is entitled to support up to the present is subject to the presentation of evidence both by the

** SEC. 332. Exceptions as to period of limitation of assessment and collection of taxes. In the case of a false or fraudulent return with intent to evade tax or of a failure to file a return, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for the collection of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any time within ten years after the discovery of the falsity, fraud, or omission. (c) Where the assessment of any internal revenue tax has been made within the period of limitation aboveprescribed such tax may be collected by distraint or levy or by a proceeding in court, but only if begun (1) within five years after the assessment of the tax, or (2) prior to the expiration of any period for collection agreed upon in writing by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the taxpayer before the expiration of such five-year period. The period so agreed upon may be extended by subsequent agreements in writing made before the expiration of the period previously agreed upon. SEC. 333. Suspension of running of statue.The running of the statute of limitations provided in section three hundred thirty-one or three hundred thirty-two on the making of assessments and the beginning of distraint or levy or a proceeding in court for collection, in respect of any deficiency, shall be suspended for the period during which the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is prohibited from making the assessment or beginning distraint or levy a proceeding in court, and for sixty days thereafter.

IX.

Disposition:

The Trial Courts judgment is affirmed. -The decision which dismisses the appeal made by the petitioner. TITLE: 13.) Canonizado vs. Benitez GR NO. L-49315 and 60966, February 20, 1984

petitioner and the respondent and is for the lower court to decide. A judgment of support is never final in the sense that not only can its amount be subject to increase or decrease but its demandability may also be suspended or re-enforced when appropriate circumstances exist. IX. DISPOSITION: Petition DISMISSED. The court is directed to set the case for hearings on whether or not there is a continuing need for current support. 14.)PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE AND GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY Vs. VALENCIA- BAGALACSA I. Parties: PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE AND GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner Judge Lore R. Valencia- Bagalacsa, and Eduardo Z. Lumaniog, Celso Z. Lumaniog and Rubben Z. Lumaniog, Respondents II. Prior Proceedings: Regional Trial Court of Libmanan, Camarines Sur,- in favour of the respondents Court of Appeals- find no grave abuse of discretion.

III. Theories of the Parties Petitioner That the respondent ValenciaBagalacsa committed grave abuse of discretion. Because the act of the private respondent had prescribed and guilty of laches. Respondent That Valencia- Bagalacsa did not commit grave abuse of description, IV. Objectives of the Parties Petitioner That the findings of the RTC and of the CA be reversed. Respondent to recover the sum of money against petitioner, since their father was insured in Life Insurance Policy No.1305486 V. Key Facts

On 20 June 1995, Eduardo, Celso and Ruben Z. Lumaniog, as legitimate children and forced heirs of their late father, Faustino Lumaniog, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Libmanan, Camarines Sur, complaint for recovery of sum of money against the Philippine American Life and General Insurance Company (Philamlife) alleging that: their father was insured by Philamlife

under Life Insurance Policy1305486 with a face value of P50,000.00; their father died of "coronary thrombosis" on 25 November 1980;on 22 June 1981, they claimed and continuously claimed for all the proceeds and interests under the life insurance policy in the amount of P641,000.00, despite repeated demands for payment and/or settlement of the claim due from Philamlife, the last of which is on 1 December 1994, Philamlife finally refused or disallowed said claim on 14 February 1995; and so, they filed their complaint. Philamlife filed an Answer with Counterclaim and Motion to Dismiss, contending that the cause of action had prescribed and that the Lumaniogs are guilty of laches; that it had denied the latter's claim in a letter dated 12 March 1982, signed by its then Assistant Vice President, Amado Dimalanta, on ground of concealment on the part of the deceased insured Faustino when he asserted in his application for insurance coverage that he had not been treated for indication of "chest pain, palpitation, high blood pressure, rheumatic fever, heart murmur, heart attack or other d i s o r d e r o f the heart or blood vessel" when in fact he was a known hypertensive since 1974; that the Lumaniogs sent a letter dated 25 May 1983 requesting for reconsideration of the denial; in a letter dated 11July 1983, it reiterated its decision to deny the claim for payment of the proceeds; more than 10 years later, or on 1 December 1994, it received a letter from Jose C. Claro, a provincial board member of the province of Camarines Sur, reiterating the early request for reconsideration which it denied in a letter dated 14 February1995. The Lumaniogs opposed the motion to dismiss. On 7 June 1996, the RTC issued an Order as to the necessity of trial on merits. Philamlife's motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC in its Order dated22 December 1997 upholding however in the same Order the claim of the Lumaniogs' counsel that the running of the 10year period was "stopped" on

25 May 1983 when they requested for a reconsideration of the denial and it was only on 14 February 1995 when Philamlife finally decided to deny their claim that the 10year period began to run. Philamlife filed a petition for certiorari (CA-GR 47885) in the Court of Appeals and after the comment of the Lumaniogs and reply of Philamlife, the appellate court rendered its Decision, dated30 April 1999, dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Philamlife filed the petition for review on certiorari. VI. Issues: Whether the complaint filed by the private respondents for payment of life insurance proceeds is already barred by prescription of action. Whether an extrajudicial demand made after an action has prescribed shall cause the revival of the action.

December 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Libmanan, Camarines Sur (Branch 56) and affirming its Order dated 20 June 1995. Said RTC was directed to proceed with dispatch with Civil Case L-787. 15.)I-PARTIES Luzon Surety Company, Inc., petitioner Intermediate Appellate Court, and Eugenia G. Puyat, Gil G. Puyat, Jr., Antonio G. Puyat, Vicente G. Puyat, Victor G. Puyat, Jesus-Puyat-Concepcion, Alfonso G. Puyat, And Eugenia Puyat-Joson, respondents. II-PRIOR JUDGMENT The Intermediate Appellate Court dismissed petitioners appeal that the prescription of an action is not counted from the expiration of the five-year period within which the judgment may be enforced by a mere motion but from the finality of that judgment. III-THEORIES OF THE PARTIES Petitioner asserts that the period of 10 years presented in the statute of limitations should be counted no from the finality of judgment but from the date of the finality of the revived judgment. Hence, its claim against the estate of Gil Puyat which was instituted on September 1, 1982 is within the ten-year prescriptive period since the judgment in the Civil Case No. 59506 on April 13, 1967 was revived by the judgment in Civil Case No. 93268 on May 24, 1974. The administrators of the estate of Gil Puyat (herein respondents), contend that the present action for claim filed by the petitioner is no longer enforceable for the reason that the revived judgment which was the last chance of the petitioner to secure a writ of execution of judgment, was not enforced. Hence, the present action to revive again the judgment is no longer enforceable. IV-OBJECTIVE OF THE PARTIES Petitioner seeks to reverse the decision of the IAC and enforce the judgment in Civil Case No. 93268 ordering defendant Gil Puyat to pay petitioner for the unpaid premiums and stamps, and attorneys fees and costs of suits. Respondents, on the other hand, seek to be free from the liability of paying the petitioner. V-KEY FACTS In Civil Case No. 59506, judgment was rendered against respondents to pay petitioner the amount of P20,000.00 with interest for premiums and stamps, became final on April 13, 1967. The judgment was not enforced so petitioner filed again a motion to revive the judgment docketed as Civil Case No. 93268 which became final on May 24, 1974. However, it was still not enforced. On March 28, 1981, Gil Puyat died, for this reason, petitioner filed another motion for the revival of the judgment on September 1, 1982, this time against the estate of Gil Puyat. The herein respondents, as administrators of the estate of Gil Puyat, argue that the present action for claim filed by the petitioner was already barred by laches on the ground that it was filed beyond the ten-year prescriptive period to file an action to enforce the judgment under Art.1144(3) of the New Civil Code. Petitioner, on the other hand, claims that the period of 10 years presented in the statute of limitations should not be counted from the date of the finality of the original judgment but from the date of the finality of the revived judgment which is the Civil Case No. 93268

VII. VIII.

Holding and Findings Partly granted. The decision of CA is reversed and set aside. Ratio Decidendi Philamlife had specifically alleged in the Answer that it had denied the L u m a n i o g s ' c l a i m p e r i t s letter dated 11 July 1983. Hence, due process demands t h a t i t b e g i v e n t h e opportunity to prove that the Lumaniogs had received said letter. Said letter is crucial to Philamlife's defence that the filing of the complaint for recovery of sum of money in June 1995 is beyond the 10-year prescriptive period. The RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion when, in resolving the motion for reconsideration of Philamlife, it arbitrarily ruled in its Order dated 12 December 1997, that the period of 10 years had not yet lapsed. It based its finding on a mere explanation of the Lumaniogs' counsel and not on evidence presented by the parties as to the date when to reckon the prescriptive period. The ruling of the RTC that the cause of action of the Lumaniogs had not prescribed is arbitrary and patently erroneous for not being founded on evidence on record, and therefore, the same is void. Consequently, while the Court of Appeals did not err in upholding the7 June 1986 Order of the RTC, it committed a reversible error when it declared that the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Order dated 12 December 1997. The Supreme Court thus partially granted the petition, setting aside the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 April 1999 insofar only as it upheld the RTC Order dated 12 December 1997. A new judgment was entered reversing and setting aside the Order dated 12

on May 24,1974 not Civil Case 59506 on April 13, 1967. Hence, the claim filed by petitioner on September 1, 1982, as alleged, was within the tenyear prescriptive period. VI-ISSUE Whether or not period to file an action pursuant to Art1144(3) commences to run from judgment. the ten-year prescriptive to enforce the judgment of the New Civil Code the finality of the revived

The SC sustained the decision of the dismissing the appeal of the petitioner that prescription of an action is not counted from expiration of the five-year period within which judgment may be enforced by a mere motion from the finality of that judgment.

IAC the the the but

VII-HOLDINGS The SC held that the 10-year prescriptive period commences from the finality of the original judgment, hence, petitioners action to file to enforce the revived judgment had already lapsed from the finality of the original judgment in Civil Case 59506 in April 13, 1967. VIII- RATIO DECIDENDI The crux of the controversy lies in the interpretation of Articles 1144(3) of the New Civil Code in relation to Section 6 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, Article 1144(3) provides: Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues. xxx xxx xxx 3. Upon judgment. while section 6 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 6. Execution of motion or by independent action. A judgment may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. in Philippine National Bank v. Deloso, the Court held that the ten-year prescriptive peyiod commences to run from the date of ftnality of the judgment and not from the expiration of five (5) years thereafter. The decision in Civil Case No. 59506 became final and executory on April 13, 1967. The judgment was not enforced. The petitioner instituted Civil Case No. 93268 within the prescriptive period to revive the judgment in Civil Case No. 59506. The revived judgment was rendered on May 24, 1974. This judgment became final and executory sometime in 1974. Again, this was not enforced. On September 1, 1982, the petitioner filed a claim in Special Proceedings No. Q-32291 before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal. What is sought is a second revival of the judgment that had become final in 1967. This can no longer be done due to the lapse of the allowable period. The decision in Philippine National Bank v. Deloso, supra, is the later and better interpretation of the law. We apply it to the instant case. We find that the right of the petitioner to enforce the judgment against Gil Puyat, an accomodation party and a defendant in Civil Case Nos. 59506 and 93268, filed on September 1, 1982 had already prescribed considering that more than ten (10) years had already elapsed from the finality of the original judgment on April 13, 1967. IX-DISPOSITION/FALLO

Proverb 12:1 Any who love knowledge want to be told when they are wrong. It is stupid to hate being corrected. 15.)PNB VS CA GR NO 116181, APRIL 17 199 Case Analysis I. Parties: PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner COURT OF APPEALS and CARMELO FLORES, respondents. II. Prior Proceeding: RTC rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant Philippine National Bank ordering PNB to pay Flores the sum of P 100,000.00 representing the amount of the check dishonored with interest, moral and exemplary damages

H.

Petitioner interposed an appeal with the respondent court where CA affirmed the decision of the trial court Hence this appeal case in the SC. III. Theories of the Parties: Petitioners contentions. That THE CA ERRED IN LAW IN HOLDING THAT, THE BEST EVIDENCE TO SHOW WHETHER MR. FLORES PAID THE PNB CASINO UNIT P900,040 OR P1,000,040 IN PURCHASING THE TWO MANAGERS CHECKS EACH WORTH P500,000 IS THE RECEIPT FOR P1,000,040. THAT MR. FLORES ACTUALLY PAID P900,040 AND NOT P1,000,040 FOR THE SUBJECT MANAGERS CHECKS. That a receipt is merely presumptive evidence and is not conclusive.

Private respondents contentions. That he paid the petitioner the amount of P1,000,040.00 when he purchased the two (2) managers checks worth (sic) P1,000,000.00 as clearly manifested in the receipt IV. Objective of the Parties: Petitioner.

To dishonor the receipt presented by Flores for they can present competent and relevant evidence to support its allegation in the answer that Mr. Flores actually paid P900,000.00 and not P1,000,040. That the court should recognize evidence of the particulars or the actual denominations of the money it received from Flores in exchange for its managerial checks.

Private respondent. To get the payment from petitioner for the encashment of the managers checks worth P1,000,000.00 with interest and exemplary damages. V. Key Facts:

made the basis of the approval of the purchased (sic) made. At any rate, the Court finds such pieces of evidence not only unconvincing but also selfdefeating in the light of the receipt, the accuracy, correctness and due execution of which was indubitably established. It is a cardinal rule in the law on evidence that the best proof of payment is the receipt.

Private respondent Carmelo H. Flores (Flores) purchased from petitioner at its Manila Pavilion Hotel unit, two (2) managers checks worth P500,000.00 each, paying a total of P1,000,040.00, including the service charge.1 A receipt for said amount was issued by the petitioner. Flores presented these checks at the unit of petitioner however petitioner refused to encash the checks After a lengthy discussion, it agreed to encash one (1) of the checks.3 However, it deferred the payment of the other check until after Flores agreed that it be broken down to five (5) managers checks of P 100,000.00 each. Furthermore, petitioner refused to encash one of the five checks until after it is cleared by the Manila Pavilion Hotel unit having no other option. Flores agreed to such an arrangement. However, upon his return to Manila, he made representations to petitioner through its Malate Branch so that the check may be encashed but to no avail Flores, thereafter, wrote a letter to his counsel informing the latter of the aforementioned events.A Formal Demand was made by private respondents counsel but petitioner persisted in its refusal to honor the check. In its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, petitioner insisted that only P900,000.00 and P40.00 bank charges were actually paid by Flores when he purchased the two (2) managers checks worth P1,000,000.00. It alleged that due to Flores demanding attitude and temper, petitioners money counter, Rowena Montes, who, at that time was still new at her job, made an error in good faith in issuing the receipt for P1,000,040.00.The actuations of Flores allegedly distracted the personnel manning the unit. Issues Identified by the Court:

VIII.

Ratio Decidendi:

A receipt is defined as:A written and signed acknowledgment that money has been paid or goods have been delivered. A receipt is merely presumptive evidence and is not conclusive. Since a receipt is a mere acknowledgment of payment, it may be subject to explanation or contradiction. A receipt may be used as evidence against one just as any other declaration or admission. A simple receipt not under seal is presumptive evidence only and may be rebutted or explained by other evidence of mistake in giving it, or of non-payment or of the circumstances under which it was given. While receipts are deemed to be the best evidence, they are not exclusive. Other evidence may be presented in lieu thereof if they are not available, as in case of loss, destruction or disappearance. The fact of payment may be established not only by documentary evidence, but also by parol evidence especially in civil cases where preponderance of evidence is the rule. Here respondents presented documentary as well as oral evidence which the Court of Appeals found to be sufficient, and this finding is final. IX. Disposition:

SC dismissed the petition and MODIFIED assailed decision of the lower court as only to damages: 1. The award of moral damages is reduced from P1,000,000.00 to P100,000.00; and 2. The award of exemplary damages is reduced from P1,000,000.00 to P25,000.00. 16.)FRANCISCO VS CA 122 SCRA 538 I. Parties: ADALIA FRANCISCO, petitioner COURT OF APPEALS , HERBY CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION ONG, respondents. II. Prior Proceeding: Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court in favor of private respondents. III. Theories of the Parties: Petitioners contentions. Petitioner claims that she was, in any event, authorized to sign Ongs name on the checks by virtue of the Certification executed by Ong in her favor giving her the authority to collect all the receivables of HCCC from the GSIS, including the questioned checks. Private respondents contentions. COMMERCIAL & AND JAIME C.

VI.

Whether or not the receipt will serve as best evidence to prove how much money Flores actually paid for the purchase of petitioners managers checks. VII. Holdings:

Yes, Although a receipt is not conclusive evidence, in the case at bench, an exhaustive review of the records fails to disclose any other evidence sufficient and strong enough to overturn the acknowledgment embodied in petitioners own receipt (as to the amount of money it actually received). Defendant even failed to adduce concrete evidence showing that the forms which were crumpled and retrieved from the waste basket were

Respondent Ong claims that he did not sign the questioned checks unlike what was said by petitioner. And that petitioner forged the signatures at the back of the questioned checks, without his knowledge and consent and so GSIS still owes the company ( Herby Commercial and Construction Corporation) the unpaid amount due for the construction of the housing project. IV. Objective of the Parties: Petitioner. That she be acquitted for the offense charges against her which is estafa with falsification of commercial documents. Private respondent. The present case was brought by private respondents for the recovery of P370,475.00, representing the total value of the seven checks, and for damages, attorneys fees, expenses of litigation and costs V. Key Facts:

Petitioner is liable. The Negotiable Instruments Law provides that where any person is under obligation to indorse in a representative capacity, he may indorse in such terms as to negative personal liability. An agent, when so signing, should indicate that he is merely signing in behalf of the principal and must disclose the name of his principal; otherwise he shall be held personally liable. Even assuming that Francisco was authorized by HCCC to sign Ong's name, still, Francisco did not indorse the instrument in accordance with law. Instead of signing Ong's name, Francisco should have signed her own name and expressly indicated that she was signing as an agent of HCCC. Thus, the Certification cannot be used by Francisco to validate her act of forgery. IX. Disposition

A. Francisco Realty & Development Corporation (AFRDC), of which petitioner Francisco is the president, entered into a Land Development and Construction Contract with private respondent Herby Commercial & Construction Corporation (HCCC), represented by its President and General Manager private respondent Ong. Under the contract, HCCC was to be paid on the basis of the completed houses and developed lands delivered to and accepted by AFRDC and the GSIS. Sometime in 1979, Ong discovered that Diaz and Francisco, the Vice-President of GSIS, had executed and signed seven checks of various dates and amounts payable to HCCC for completed and delivered work under the contract. Ong, however, claims that these checks were never delivered to HCCC. It turned out that Francisco forged the indorsement of Ong on the checks and indorsed the checks for a second time by signing her name at the back of the checks, petitioner then deposited said checks in her savings account. VI. Issue

The SC affirmed respondent courts decision affirming the decision of the trial court in favor of private respondents, with the modification that the interest upon the actual damages awarded shall be at six percent (6%) per annum, which interest rate shall be computed from the time of the filing of the complaint on November 19, 1979. However, the interest rate shall be twelve percent (12%) per annum from the time the judgment in this case becomes final and executory and until such amount is fully paid. The basis for computation of the six percent and twelve percent rates of interest shall be the amount of P370,475.00. No pronouncement as to costs. 17.)Rodil v. Benedicto Case Analysis I.Partie s Petitioners : TOMAS RODIL and the deceased spouse CATALINA CRUZ, substituted by her heirs, namely: VIVENCIO RODIL married to ZUEKO MATSUO CONSOLACION RODIL married to FRANCISCO HEMEDES DOMICIANO RODIL married to VIRGINIA MARALIT, CLARITA RODIL married to JUAN ALGIER NATALIA RODIL married to SILVINIANO ATIENZA, LYDIA RODIL married to CARLOS HORILLENO VEDASTO RODIL married to TESSIE MANGUBAT and CELIA RODIL married to MACARIO TIU JR. -claimants of the land in questioned/ registered owners of the land -asked for petition to order the issuance of writ of possession over the land Respondents: HON. JUDGE MARIANO V. BENEDICTO as Judge of the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NUEVA ECIJA, BRANCH V-GAPAN and the heirs of ALEJANDRO ABES, namely: ALEJO ABES, BIENVENIDO ABES, ROSITA ABES, married to MATEO MALLARI, FIDELA ABES, married to PONCIANO ATENIDO, DAVID ABES, MARCELO ABES, NICANOR ABES, SEVERINO ABES, JOVITA ABES, married to GIL CABRETA EUFROCINA ABES, married to ROMULO BOTE; LOURDES ABES, married to ALIPIO TAGNIPIS LUZ ABES, TEODORA ABES, EMITERIO ABES, JR., GREGORIO ABES, ERLINDA ABES, married to LUIS TAAL, RENATO ABES, ESTRELLITA TALPLACIDO REYNALDO ABES, TERESITA ABES, CAROLINA ABES, and FERNANDO ABES; the latter four who are minors are represented by their mother CRISPINA DOMINGO -The heirs of Alejandro Abes filed a petition for the review of the registration decree granted to the claimants and asked for the reconveyance of title of the land in question

Whether petitioner cannot be held liable on the questioned checks by virtue of the Certification executed by Ong giving her the authority to collect such checks from the GSIS. VII. Finding

Francisco forged the signature of Ong on the checks to make it appear as if Ong had indorsed said checks and that, after indorsing the checks for a second time by signing her name at the back of the checks, Francisco deposited said checks in her savings account with IBAA. The forgery was satisfactorily established in the trial court upon the strength of the findings of the NBI handwriting expert. Other than petitioners self-serving denials, there is nothing in the records to rebut the NBIs findings. Well-entrenched is the rule that findings of trial courts which are factual in nature, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, deserve to be respected and affirmed by the Supreme Court, provided it is supported by substantial evidence on record,as it is in the case at bench. VIII. Ratio Decidendi:

-The respondent judge denied the petition for the issuance of the writ of possession II.Prior Proceedings The Cadastral Court adjudicated the land in question in favor of the claimants and issued to the claimants the decree of registration, Original Certificate Title No. 0-1719. However, the heirs of Alejandro Abes filed a petition for review of the decree of registration but it was denied by the Court because of failure to overcome the evidence of the claimants. Months later, the heirs of Alejandro filed an action against the registered owners for the reconveyance of the title, alleging that the owners procured the registration through fraud, misrepresentation, and the use of falsified deeds of sale which was the same ground they urged in their petition for review of the cadastral decree. A motion for reconsideration was filed but denied by the court. Hence, an appeal was interposed by the court which rendered the judgment affirming the orders complained thereof. Upon the return of the records to the lower court, the owners filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession asking that they be placed in possession of the lots and that the heirs of Alejandro Abes be evicted therefrom. The respondent Judge issued an order granting the petition only with respect to Alejo Abes, Bienvenido Abes, Teodora Vda. de Abes, and Cornelio Abes and denied the same with respect to the other respondents stating that he is completely at a loss as to who, aside from Alejo Abes, Cornelio Abes, Bienvenido Abes, and Teodora Abes, among the said respondents were parties to the original cadastral proceeding or as to who were at least occupants of the properties in question prior to the issuance of the decree of registration. Pursuant to said order, a writ of possession was issued. Pursuant to the decision, Alejo Abes, Bienvenido Abes, Teodora Vda. de Abes and Cornelio Abes filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order upon the grounds that: (1) the petition for the issuance of a writ of possession was filed out of time; and (2) there is no allegation in the petition, and neither had it been proved, that the respondents were defeated in a registration proceeding, that the respondents were defeated in a registration proceeding, or that they were adversely occupying the land during the registration proceedings, or that they were unlawfully and adversely occupying the land at any time up to the issuance of the final decree, or that they were one of those against whom a writ of possession may be issued. Finding "that no allegation was made, neither was evidence adduced to the effect that the herein respondents have been d in default during the original registration proceedings; neither was it alleged or proved that the herein respondents were occupants of the land during the registration proceedings, or prior to the promulgation of the final decree of registration, circumstances by the existence of which a writ of possession may not be validly issued," the respondent Judge set aside the order and ordered the dissolution of the writ of possession issued pursuant thereto.

The owners filed a motion for the reconsideration of said order, but the respondent Judge denied the motion. III.Theories of the Parties Petitioners -that they are the registered owners of the said land Respondents -that they are the ones in actual legal possession of the land and that the decree of registration was procured by the registered owners through fraud IV.Objectives of theParties Petitioners -to be placed in possession of the land in question and that the heirs Alejandro be evicted Respondents -that the writ of possession be not granted to the claimants V.Key Facts A land was claimed and applied for by the petitioners in this case. The action was not contested so cadastral Court adjudicated the land in question in favor of the claimants and issued to the claimants the decree of registration, Original Certificate Title No. 0-1719. However, the heirs of Alejandro Abes filed a petition for review of the decree of registration but it was denied by the Court because of failure to overcome the evidence of the claimants. The heirs of Alejandro filed an action against the registered owners for the reconveyance of the title, alleging that the owners procured the registration through fraud, misrepresentation, and the use of falsified deeds of sale which was the same ground they urged in their petition for review of the cadastral decree. A motion for reconsideration was filed but denied by the court. Hence, an appeal was interposed by the court which rendered the judgment affirming the orders complained thereof. Upon the return of the records to the lower court, the owners filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession asking that they be placed in possession of the land in question and that the heirs of Alejandro Abes be evicted therefrom. The respondent Judge issued an order granting the petition only with respect to Alejo Abes, Bienvenido Abes, Teodora Vda. de Abes, and Cornelio Abes and denied the same with respect to the other respondents stating that he is completely at a loss as to who, aside from Alejo Abes, Cornelio Abes, Bienvenido Abes, and Teodora Abes, among the said respondents were parties to the original cadastral proceeding or as to who were at least occupants of the properties in question prior to the issuance of the decree of registration. Pursuant to said order, a writ of possession was issued. Pursuant to the decision, Alejo Abes, Bienvenido Abes, Teodora Vda. de Abes and Cornelio Abes filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order upon the grounds that: (1) the petition for the issuance of a writ of possession was filed out of time; and (2) there is no allegation in the petition, and neither had it been proved, that the respondents were defeated in a registration proceeding, that the respondents were defeated in a registration proceeding, or that they were adversely occupying the land during the registration proceedings, or that they were unlawfully and adversely occupying the land at any time up to the issuance of the final decree, or that they were one of those against whom a writ of possession may be issued. Finding "that no allegation was made, neither was evidence adduced to the effect that the herein respondents have been d in default during the

original registration proceedings; neither was it alleged or proved that the herein respondents were occupants of the land during the registration proceedings, or prior to the promulgation of the final decree of registration, circumstances by the existence of which a writ of possession may not be validly issued," the respondent Judge set aside the order and ordered the dissolution of the writ of possession issued pursuant thereto. The owners filed a motion for the reconsideration of said order, but the respondent Judge denied the motion. VI.Issue Whether or not the decision of the respondent judge erred in denying the petition for the issuance of a writ of possession VII.Holdings and Findings The Court said that the respondent judge committed an error in denying the petition for the issuance in the writ of possession. The findings of the respondent Judge that a writ of possession cannot be issued in the cadastral case because the respondents were not parties in said registration proceedings, or that they were not occupants of the land during the registration proceedings prior to the issuance of the final decree of registration is not supported by the evidence and law. The respondent heirs of Alejandro Abes cannot be said to be strangers to the registration proceedings. A cadastral proceeding is a proceeding in rem and against everybody, including the respondents herein, who are deemed included in the general order of default entered in the case. Besides, it appears that the said respondent heirs of Alejandro Abes filed a petition for the review of the decree of registration, thereby becoming a direct party in the registration proceedings by their voluntary appearance. The respondent heirs of Alejandro Abes cannot also be said to be not occupants of the land during the registration proceeding prior to the issuance of the final decree of registration. In their action for the reconveyance of title to the land in question, Alejo Abes and the other heirs of Alejandro Abes stated that their grandfather took possession personally, occupied and cultivated the aforementioned land, lived with his children and grandchildren therein, and that Alejandro Abes' children and grandchildren have continued in actual possession, occupation, and cultivation of the land. The respondent heirs of Alejandro Abes, being in possession of the lots in question, unlawfully and adversely, during the registration proceedings, may be judicially evicted by means of a writ of possession and it is the duty of the registration court to issue said writ when asked for by the successful claimant. VIII.Ratio Decidendi The Court ruled that the decision to deny the petition of the issuance of the writ of possession is incorrect. It categorically held that the right of the applicant or a subsequent purchaser to request for the issuance of a writ of possession of the land never prescribes. Authority for this theory is the provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that judgment may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but within 10 years. by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39). This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time

as provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person or a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom. Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39. regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action, except to place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land registration case, unless the adverse or losing party is in possession adverse or losing party, becomes final without any further action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an appear. IX.Disposition The Court granted the petition and the respondent judge or anyone acting in his stand is directed to issue and writ of possession over the land in question.