PATANI : INTERNAL COLONIALISM IN PATANI by Wan Kadir Che Man (former prof.

of Department of Political Scie nce, IIUM)

From Siam to Thailand: Increasing of Thai Nationalism and Muslims of Patani (1) LANGUAGE (2) DRESS (3) PRACTICES OF ISLAM WERE OUTLAWED THAI DRESS AND MANNERS WERE COMPULSORY Thailand was called Siam until 1939 and also from 1946 to 1949. In 1939 and agai n in 1949, it was changed to Thailand, a name which certain note of Thai-people nationalism. The incorporation of Patani, which was occurred in 1902, was "legit imized" by the British through Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909. Once incorporated, Patani was gradually transformed and divided into the present provinces of Narat hiwat, patani, and Yala. Satun, which was a district of Kedah (of Malaya), becam e the forth Malay-province of southern Thailand in exchange for the islands of L ang awi.Some Malay-Muslim leaders named this invasion as INTERNAL COLONIALISM. U nli e external colonialism did not rely on cost/benefit calculation. In external colony, the colonial masters would from time to time assess their cost/benefit factor. Once the cost exceeded the benefit, they would renounce the burden (see Connor 1972:319-55) In internal colonial practice, the incorporation of the area into the larger ent ity was considered as permanent; no other calculation and assessment were necess ary. In the case of Patani, Thai authorities regarded it as permanent territory of the Kingdom and they proceeded with their integration programs. One of the important integration policies devised by Thai government was the 192 1 Compulsory Primary Education Act, which required all Malay-Muslim children to attend Thai primary schools. It was geared to promote Thai language among the Ma lays and to prevent them from learning their own languageand custom. When the Th ai government ordered MALAY SCHOOLS TO BE CLOSED in 1923, an outbrea of protes ts occurred in the area. The promulgation of Thai Custom Decree in 1939 was another major attempt at inte gration. Under this decree, the Malay-Muslims were required to adopt Thai dress and manners. Fines and severe punishments were imposed upon those who bro e the rules. The situation worsened when in 1944 the use of the Malay language and cer tain practices of Islam were outlawed. In 1961, the Thai government promulgated a program of "educational improvement" in the Malay- Muslim provinces. The aim was to transform the traditional Islamic religious schools (pondo s) to modern, registered private Muslim schools. It wa s designed to lay a solid foundation of Thai education among Malay-Muslims in or der to cultivate consciousness and loyalty to Thai principal institutions -the n ation, the religion, and the monarchy. Because of the continuous efforts by Bang o to integrate and assimilate the Muslim provinces, some believed that the Mal ay-Muslims would not be able to retain their distinct identity as a Malay commun ity. Under Thai domination, they argued, TO BECOME "ADVANCED" MEANS TO BECOME TH AI. In general, Thai public schools are seen as not beneficial to Patani Muslims. In stead, they saw Thai public schools and educational system as a source of gradua l destruction of their identity, including religion, language, and history. Most of the young generation Muslims identify themselves as Thais, even though their grandfathers could not spea a single word of Thai. Many of them are unable to

summarized by Ismail Yurda o ismailyurda o @gmail.com

spea and write proper Malay. Those Malays who claim Thai identity do not realiz e the fact that Thai people in general do not regard them as Thais. Many Thai Bu ddhists in the area see them as neither Malay nor Thai but Patani Muslims. More importantly, some Muslims were aware that Thai education was rarely rewarded the m with suitable jobs and professions. Conflict Resolution The Thai government of different periods has used both policies of force and per suasion in order to neutralize the separatist activities. The responsibility of the counterinsurgency seems to rest mainly in the hands of the 4th Army region a s well as the local police force and provincial administrative officials. The us e of armed counterinsurgency by the 4th Army Region has continued until today, e ven though the results are not very impressive. This is not because the separati st fronts are strong militarily, but because they derive their support and sympa thy from Maly-Muslims who constitute the majority in the area. The 4th Army Region pursues a policy of persuasion by employing two main approa ches: direct negotiation and individual persuasion. The direct negotiation appro ach means that the army sends its officers to persuade a separatist group to sur render to the authorities by giving it amnesty, apart from certain personal bene fits such as employment in voluntary militia with monthly allowance and a piece of land some money to settle down. (Che Man 1995: 246). The direct negotiation approach had been quite successful in the view that there had been groups of Patani Muslims surrendering to the authorities from time to time. However, most of the so-called separatists who surrendered to Thai author ities were not members of the fronts; many of them were cmmon criminals or those who were dismissed by the fronts. In the case of individual persuasion approach , the authorities usually relied on Muslim government officials such as village and commune headmen, members of Provincial Council for Islamic Affairs, and Musl im judges to persuade the separatists to return to the fold of the law. This met hod was less successful because of several reasons. Firstly, separatists tended to believe that Muslim government officials have no power to eep their promises made. Secondly, they believed that Muslim government officials played such role only for their own personal gains. There were very few separatists surrendering to the authorities through this method. On the other hand, the separatist fronts have not been able to develop to a stro ng movement. This is due to many factors. Firstly, the movement consists of loos ely organized fronts whose strentgths dependent more on primordial sentiments an d religious motivation than on the principles of effective organization. Secondl y, factional conflicts occur among and within the fronts. The factional division s have deepened as disunity among the Muslim states sympathetic to the movement. Thirdly, the separatist fronts in the four southern provinces of Thailand have carried out a struggle against all odds. Thailand has been not only a strong sta te but also a state with long experience in dealing with minority communities. Finally, the present system of nation-state seems to prevent sovereign state f rom supporting any minority struggle against a recognized, established governme nt. In other words, national interests override ethnic loyalties or primordial s entiments. WHAT CAN THAI GOVERMENT DO? However, it is suggested that there are several measures in the form of short-an d-long term policies that the Thai government should pursue in order to improve the situation in the Muslim provinces. For the short-term measures, they include : posting able and honest government officials in the Muslim provinces; understa nding the culture and religion of the local people; and performing government du ties with fairness and justice. For the long-term measures, the central government must first recognize the fact

that the Malay-Muslims are not Thais and that they are indigenous people in the area. The Thai government should pursue the following policies towards them: pr ovide all the basic necessities similar to those of other areas; promote invest ments that are not in conflict with the local culture and tradition; furnish sui table education to young Muslims up to tertiary level; provide necessary medical and health care services to them; construct their enduring trust, understanding , and social participation; and avoid unnecessary suppressive policies towards M uslim community. The above-mentioned measures are indeed the application of formula of unity in d iversity. With this formula, the conflict in the area could be resolved, althoug h ethnic loyalties persist. In other words, the objective of the Malay-Muslim s truggle could be gradually changed from separatism to integration. CONCLUSION The incorporation of Patani into Thailand and the determination of the Thai gove rnment to carry out the integration programs have been viewed by the Malay-Musli ms as internal colonialism, which is regarded as the worst ind of colonial syst ems. This is because of the incorporation of an autonomous region into the large r entity is considered a permanent gain to the colonizers. In the case of Patani, its colonization was also legitimized by the British thro ugh the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909. This legitimacy became an important asset for the Thai government to proceed with their integration policies. However, eac h step of the integration process was met with vigorous resistance by the MalayMuslims. The most extreme form of resistance has been separatist movement. It is clear that the separatist activities in Patani in the last few decades wer e not primarily attributable to economic exploitation, as suggested by some writ ers, but a conflict of cultures. It was the continuation of centuries of confron tation between the Patani Muslims and Thai-Buddhist intruders. The Muslim separatist conflict is sustained by the believe that the continued ef forts of Thailand to consolidate its control over the Malay Muslim community wil l lead to the erosion of their cultural and religios way of life and the disappe arance of their identity. And it was stimulated by Thai policies of forced assim ilation. But the separatist movement has not been very successful due not only to faction alism and ineffective organization, but also the lac of international supports, particularly from the neighbouring and other Muslim governments. This is becaus e the international economic and political systems, which stress membership, pow er, and negotiation only among nation-states, appear to have discouraged minorit y communities from thin ing in separatist term. While some Malay Muslims have been gradually absorbed into Thai national system through the process of integration and modernization, policies that see to red ress the separatist problem through socio-economic measures fail to recognize th at minority communities tend to perceive their conflict not in social and econom ic terms, but in ethnic, religious, and nationalistic terms. While the governmen t regards separatist conflict as a threat to national integrity of Thailand, the Malay Muslim minorities regard the concept of self-determination as their basic right. Thus, separatist movement continues. Only with the application of unity in diversity formula, the Malay-Muslim separatist struggle could slowly be withe red away and be replaced by the process of national integration. (the paper of professor Wan Kadir Che Man Conflict and Conflict Resolution: M alay Muslim Liberation Movement in Thailand was submitted to the conference o n Conflicts and Conflict Resolution in the Muslim World, 18-19 February, 2004, in IIUM) References Che Man, W.K. 1990. Muslim Separatism: the Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand, Oxford University Press, Singapore and New Yor

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