Practice Court: Change of Name Ready to present compliance of jurisdictional facts, Your Honor.

Counsel: I move, Your Honor, that the petition be submitted for Judgment. Judge: Order. Counsel for the Petitioner moved in open court that the instant petition be submitted for judgment. Finding the motion to be meritorious, and without opposition by the state prosecutor, the petition is hereby submitted for judgment. So ordered. I move Your Honor that petitioners may be allowed to present the evidence ex-parte before the Clerk of Court. Court: Atty. Dejaresco, please go over the document and manifest if the xerox copy is a faithful reproduction of the original. So that we can mark the xerox copy in lieu of the original. Atty Djearesco: We manifest your honor, that the photocopy appears to be a faithful reproduction of the original." "The photocopy is a faithful reproduction of the original"?

The petition alleged that petitioner Felicisima Velarde and Lee Tieng, one of the respondents therein, had been having together as common-law spouses and without benefit of marriage since June, 1952 up to the filing of the petition; that as a result of such cohabitation, petitioner gave birth to the aforementioned minor children, which facts of birth were duly recorded in the Office of the Civil Registrar for the City of Naga; that the children's father Lee Tieng is familiarly called "Uping", his Christian name is "Alipio," and his mother's family name is "Wee", and because of these different names of Lee Tieng, his name was differently recorded in the birth certificates of petitioner's children; that when petitioner's oldest child Ruben Lee was born, petitioner told the attending nurse that she and Lee Tieng were married, without knowing that the information was to be used to fill up her child's birth certificate, with the result that in the birth certificate of said child, her civil status was indicated as "married", and the child was indicated as 'legitimate" and a "Chinese" citizen; that in the certificates of birth of petitioner's other children Cynthia, Reynaldo, Roger, Rolando and Romeo, petitioner was likewise` recorded as "married" instead of "single", in order to conform to the previous entries made in the birth certificate of her oldest child Ruben Lee, and all said children were likewise recorded as "legitimate" and "Chinese" citizens; that petitioner was likewise erroneously indicated as "Chinese" instead of "Filipina" in the birth certificates of her two sons Roger Lee and Romeo Lee, while her maternal surname was erroneously spelled "Olbila" and "Orbita"in the birth certificates of her two sons Roger Lee and Rolando Lee, respectively, when it should have been "Orbita"; that there was need to correct the erroneous entries in the birth certificates of petitioner's children to make them conform with the facts and to avoid difficulties in the school records of said children (and) when they start to exercise their duties as citizens of the Philippines; and that there were no other persons who had or claimed any interest in the subject matter of said petition for correction of entries in the Civil Registry. Petitioner Velarde, therefore, prayed that the trial court order the following corrections to be made in the records of the Civil Registry of Naga City. A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.1[Vide See Republic v. Hernandez, 323 Phil. 606, 637-638 (1996). ] Respondents reason for changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or analogous to, recognized grounds, however. In fine, the petitioner maintains that her correct name is Veronica Pao inasmuch as Veronica is her Christian name and Pao is the surname of her father. She does not, however, deny that the name of her father appearing in her birth certificate is Po Yu and not Pao Yu. She assigns the discrepancy to mere clerical error. An examination of her allegations reveal that her claim to the supposed correct name of Veronica Pao is predicated on the assumption that the correct name other father is Pao Yu and not Po Yu as recited in her own birth certificate. The assumption is baseless, absent any proof that the name other father in her birth certificate was entered erroneously. As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, until the name of her father is shown to have been registered in her birth certificate erroneously, there is no justification for allowing the petitioner to use the surname Pao. The corrections sought by the petitioner involve the very Identity of her parents. Surely, the propriety of such corrections should first be determined in a different proceeding more adversary in character than the summary case instituted by the petitioner with the trial court. Aside from the change of her name, the petitioner seeks a correction of entries in the civil registry for the benefit of her parents. This she may not do through a summary proceeding. The summary procedure for correction of the civil register under Rule 108 is confined to innocuous or clerical errors and not to a material change in the spelling of a surname as prayed for by the petitioner. 7 A clerical error must be apparent on the face of the record and should be capable of being corrected by reference to the record alone. 8 The petitioner seeks more than just the correction of a clerical error. Moreover, under Section 3 of Rule 108, when cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby should be made parties to the proceeding. An inspection of all the pleadings filed by the

petitioner with the trial court shows that the local civil registrar concerned was never made a party to the proceeding. Said civil registrar being an indispensable party, a final determination of the case cannot be made. 9 The procedure recited in Rule 103 regarding change of name and in Rule 108 concerning the cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry are separate and distinct. They may not be substituted one for the other for the sole purpose of expediency To hold otherwise would render nugatory the provisions of the Rules of Court allowing the change of one's name or the correction of entries in the civil registry only upon meritorious grounds. If both reliefs are to be sought in the same proceedings all the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 must be complied with. ~Republic vs Belmonte, G.R. No. L-32600 February 26, 1988 Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC DECISION October 31, 1964 G.R. No. L-19141 CHANGE OF NAME OF THE MINOR HENRY TOMELDEN, JUAN MALICDEM and SATURNINA AQUINO, petitioners-appellees, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant. Rufino V. Herrera for petitioners-appellees. Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor-appellant. , J.: The spouses Juan Malicdem and Saturnina Aquino filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan a petition for change of name of the minor Henry Tomelden to Henry Malicdem (Sp. Proc. No. 14080-II). It was alleged in the petition that they were the legitimate parents of said minor, but following the local belief that to break the chain of mortality of their children, which had been plaguing their family, their remaining child had to be sold, Henry was registered in the civil registry as the son of Lope Tomelden and Eugenia Aquino, Saturninas sister; that the minor has been living with them since birth, and although he uses the surname Tomelden he knows that petitioners are his real parents; and said minor, now wishes to use his true name Henry Malicdem. After due publication and notice to interested parties, the petition was heard, during which the petitioners, the minor, and Eugenia Aquino, who was named as his mother in the record of birth, testified to the facts alleged in the petition. Thereafter, the lower court, finding the minor to be the legitimate child of petitioners, granted the petition and allowed the change of his name from Henry Tomelden to Henry Malicdem. The Solicitor General interposed the present appeal, contending that it was error for the lower court to allow testimonial evidence, tending to establish that petitioners are Henrys parents, to override the entry, in the civil register showing that said minor is the son of Lope and Eugenia Tomelden. It is not denied that as recorded in the civil register, Henry appears to be the child of the Tomeldens. Petitioners, however, tried to explain the circumstance leading to such registration, which the lower court found to be credible. The action taken by the trial court is not erroneous. While it is true that the civil register is an official record, it must also be remembered that entries made therein are only prima facie evidence of the facts so stated (Art. 410, Civil Code). Thus, the correction or cancellation thereof, in proper cases and by judicial order, is allowed (Art. 412, Civil Code). In the instant case, the lower court, after weighing the evidence presented found that, notwithstanding the entry in the civil register, the minor is really the legitimate child of petitioners, and therefore, should bear the surname of his father. This is a finding of fact which is binding on this Court on an appeal directly taken to it. The Solicitor General also contends that if it is true that the minor is the legitimate child of the Malicdems, this proceeding is unnecessary and should have been dismissed as the legitimate child is entitled as of right, to bear the surname of his legitimate father. This same argument has already been disposed of contrary to the contention of the Solicitor General, in the case of Asensi, etc. v. Republic (G. R. No. L-18047, Dec. 26, 1963), wherein it was held that there could be no legal prohibition against such a petition, because it would only be a confirmation of a legal right, which although superfluous, is not against law, customs or morals. WHEREFORE, finding no error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs. So ordered. Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur. Regala, J., took no part.

Section 1. Article 177 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code of the Philippines", as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows: "Art. 177. Children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, or were so disqualified only because either or both of them were below eighteen (18) years of age, may be legitimated." "Art. 178. Legitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid marriage between parents. The annulment of a voidable marriage shall not affect the legitimation." ~REPUBLIC ACT. NO. 9858, Approved: DEC 20, 2009

Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court Manila

SECOND DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, -vsROSELIE ELOISA BRINGAS BOLANTE a.k.a. MARIA ELOISA BRINGAS BOLANTE, Respondent.

G.R. No. 160597 Promulgated: July 20, 2006

x-------------------------- --------------x

DECISION GARCIA, J.: In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Republic of the Philippines assails and seeks to set aside the decision2[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated October 21, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 74398 affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bangued, Abra in Special Proceeding Case No. 1916, a petition for change of name thereat commenced by herein respondent Roselie Eloisa Bringas Bolante also known as Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante.

In her petition before the RTC, respondent alleged, among other things, the following:

1.

That she is a Filipino, of legal age, married, born to spouses Floriano B. Bolante and Paula B. Bringas and a resident since birth of Bangued, Abra;

2.

That per records in the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar, Bangued, Abra, her registered name is Roselie Eloisa Bringas Bolante which name, as far as she can remember, she did not use but instead the name Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante; That the name Maria Eloisa appears in all her school as well as in her other public and private records; and That her married name is Maria Eloisa B. Bolante-Marbella.

3. 4.

Thus, to prevent confusion, Ms. Bolante prayed that her registered name be changed to conform to the name she has always carried and used. Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court ordered respondent, as petitioner thereat, to comply with the jurisdictional requirements of notice and publication, and set the hearing on February 20, 2001. At the scheduled February 20, 2001 initial hearing, the trial court issued an Order giving respondent five (5) days within which to file a written formal offer of evidence to establish jurisdictional facts and set the presentation of evidence proper on March 26, 2001. In the afternoon of February 20, respondent filed her "Offer of Evidence for Marking and Identification Purposes to Prove Jurisdictional Facts." 2[1] Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico and concurred in by Associate Justices Mariano C. del Castillo and Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente; Rollo, pp. 37-42.

On June 5, 2001, the branch clerk of court, acting upon the trial courts express March 26, 2001 directive for a resetting, issued a notice for a July 18, 2001 hearing. Following another resetting, what actually would be the initial hearing was, after notice, scheduled on September 25, 2001 and actually held. At that session, respondent presented and marked in evidence several documents without any objection on the part of herein petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), thru the duly deputized provincial prosecutor of Abra. Among the documents thus submitted and marked in evidence were the following:

Exh. A Exh. B Exh. C Exh. D Exh. E Exh. F Exh. F-I Exh. G Exh. H -

The Petition The Notice of Initial Hearing The Certificate of Posting The Appearance of the Solicitor General The Authority given to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor The Affidavit of Publication The Newspaper Clippings The Norluzonian Courier Another copy of Norluzonian Courier

Shortly after the trial court has declared its acquisition of jurisdiction over the case, respondent took the witness stand to state that the purpose of her petition was to have her registered name changed to that which she had actually been using thru the years. She also categorically stated she had not been accused of any crime under either her registered name or her present correct name. An excerpt of other portions of her testimony, as recited in the Republics petition which cited the decision of the trial court:

At the witness stand the petitioner [herein respondent Bolante] testified, among others, that she is now married to Jorge Marbella, Jr. and presently residing at Bliss Angad, Bangued, Abra since 1995 but before she resided in Zone 4, Bangued, Abra since birth. She presented her birth certificate and was marked as Exhibit J to establish such fact of birth and to effect that the name Roselie Eloisa B. Bolante entered therein is not her true and correct name but instead Maria Eloisa Bolante which she had been using during her school days, while being a government employee, and in all her public and private records. She presented her professional license issued by the Professional Regulation Commission, Certificate issued by the Philippine Institute of Certified Public Accountant and a 'Quick Count' document all issued in her name Maria Eloisa B. Marbella, which documents were marked as Exhibit K and Exhibit L and Exhibit M respectively. She likewise marked her marriage license as Exhibit N to prove her marriage xxx. xxx xxx xxx

On cross she stated that the purpose of filing the petition is that, she wanted to secure a passport and wanted that the same be issued in her correct name and that she would not have filed the petition was (sic) it not for the passport. On clarificatory question by the Court she said that her reason in filing the petition is her realization that there will be a complication upon her retirement.3[2] (Words in bracket added.) On January 23, 2002, the trial court rendered judgment granting the basic petition, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this petition is hereby approved and is granted by this Court for being meritorious.

The Municipal Registrar of Bangued, Abra, is hereby directed: a) To change the name of the petitioner in her record of birth from Roselie Eloisa Bringas Bolante to Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante; and, To record this decision in the Civil Registry in accordance with Registry Regulations.

b)

Furnish copy of this Order to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Bangued, Abra for recording and compliance. SO ORDERED.4[3] (Underscoring added)

In time, the Republic, through the OSG, went to the CA whereat its appellate recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 74398. In the herein assailed Decision of October 21, 2003,5[4] the appellate court affirmed in toto that of the trial court. Hence, the Republics present petition on the following issues:

3[2] 4[3] 5[4]

Rollo, pp. 18-19. Lifted from pp. 1 & 2 of the CA Decision; Rollo, pp. 37-38. See Note #1, supra.

I WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT'S SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH SEC. 3, RULE 103 OF THE RULES OF COURT IS SUFFICIENT TO VEST THE TRIAL COURT WITH JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE PETITION A QUO. II WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT'S BARE TESTIMONY, UNSUPPORTED BY ANY OTHER EVIDENCE, IS SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THAT THE CHANGE OF HER NAME IS NOT RESORTED FOR ILLEGAL PURPOSES. Sections 2 and 3, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court prescribe the procedural and jurisdictional requirements for a change of name. As we articulated in Republic v. Hon. Judge of Branch III of the CFI of Cebu,6[5] citing pertinent jurisprudence,7[6] non-compliance with these requirements would be fatal to the jurisdiction of the lower court to hear and determine a petition for change of name. The provisions adverted to are pertinently quoted hereunder:

SEC. 2. Contents of petition. - A petition for change of name shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall set forth: (a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing; (b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought; (c) The name asked for.

SEC. 3. Order for hearing. - If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the court, by an order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy of the order be published before the hearing at least once a week for three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper of general circulation published in the province, . The date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an election nor within four (4) months after the last publication of the notice. (Underscoring added.)

On the postulate that the initial hearing of a petition for a change of name cannot be set within four (4) months from the last publication of the notice of such hearing, petitioner submits at the threshold that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for want or defective publication. We are not persuaded. As gleaned from the records, the basic petition for change of name was filed on October 18, 2000 and set for hearing on February 20, 2001 via an Order issued on November 13, 2000. The notice of hearing was published in the November 23, and 30, 2000 and December 7, 2000 issues of the Norluzonian Courier. Counted from the last day, December 7, 2000, of publication of the Order, the initial hearing scheduled on February 20, 2001 is indeed within the four-month prohibited period prescribed under Section 3, Rule 103 of the Rules. The Court, as did the CA,8[7] must emphasize, however, that the trial court, evidently upon realizing the error committed respecting the 4-month limitation, lost no time in rectifying its mistake by rescheduling, with due notice to all concerned, the initial hearing for several times, finally settling for September 25, 2001. It is the Republics posture that the fact that the hearing took place on September 25, 2001, beyond the four-month prohibited period, did not cure the jurisdictional defect since notice of the September 25, 2001 setting went unpublished. Pressing on, the Republic would state and correctly so that the in rem nature of a change of name proceeding necessitates strict compliance with all jurisdictional requirements, particularly on publication, in order to vest the court with jurisdiction thereover.9[8]

6[5] 7[6] 8[7] 9[8]

217 Phil. 442 (1984). In the Matter of the Change of Name of Hermogenes Diangkina. Republic v. Reyes, 150-A Phil. 962 (1972); Republic v. Taada, 149 Phil. 506 (1971); Ng Yao Siong v. Republic, L-20306, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 483. Page 2 of CA Decision; Rollo, p. 38. Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97906, May 21, 1992, 209 SCRA 189.

The Court, to be sure, is fully aware that the required publication serves as notice to the whole world that the proceeding in question has for its object to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any and against the right sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.10[9] In the context of Section 3, Rule 103 of the Rules, publication is valid if the following requisites concur: (1) the petition and the copy of the order indicating the date and place for the hearing must be published; (2) the publication must be at least once a week for three successive weeks; and, (3) the publication must be in some newspaper of general circulation published in the province, as the court shall deem best. Another validating ingredient relates to the caveat against the petition being heard within 30 days prior to an election or within four (4) months after the last publication of the notice of the hearing. It cannot be over-emphasized that in a petition for change of name, any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the petition. Likewise, the Solicitor General or his deputy shall appear on behalf of the Government.11[10] The government, as an agency of the people, represents the public and, therefore, the Solicitor General, who appears on behalf of the government, effectively represents the public.12[11] In this case, the Solicitor General deputized the provincial prosecutor of Abra for the purpose of appearing in the trial on his behalf. As it were, the provincial prosecutor of Abra was fully apprised of the new dates of the initial hearing. Accordingly, there was no actual need for a republication of the initial notice of the hearing. Not lost on the Court is the fact that during the September 25, 2001 initial hearing which, to reiterate is already outside the 4-month limitation prescribed by the Rules, the provincial prosecutor of Abra interposed no objection as to the genuineness, authenticity, relevancy or sufficiency of the exhibits presented to prove the jurisdictional requirements exacted by the Rules. In a very real sense, therefore, the petitioner Republic fully and knowingly acquiesced in the jurisdiction of the trial court. The peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case and the requirements of fair dealing demand that we accord validity to the proceedings a quo. On the issue as to propriety of the desired change of name, we are guided by decisional law on the matter. As we have held, the State has an interest in the names borne by individuals for purposes of identification, and that changing ones name is a privilege and not a right. Accordingly, a person can be authorized to change his name appearing in either his certificate of birth or civil registry upon showing not only of reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change, but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. 13[12] Jurisprudence has recognized certain justifying grounds to warrant a change of name. Among these are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change will avoid confusion; (c) when one has been continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (d) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name will prejudice public interest.14[13] The matter of granting or denying petitions for change of name and the corollary issue of what is a proper and reasonable cause therefor rests on the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court; it need not be the best evidence available.15[14] What is involved in special proceedings for change of name is, to borrow from Republic v. Court of Appeals, 16[15] not a mere

matter of allowance or disallowance of the petition, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such determination being lodged in the courts.

With the view we take of the case, respondent's submission for a change of name is with proper and reasonable reason. As it were, she has, since she started schooling, used the given name and has been known as Maria Eloisa, albeit the name Roselie Eloisa is written on her birth record. Her scholastic records, as well as records in government offices, including that of her driver's license, professional license as a certified public accountant issued by the Professional Regulation Commission, and the "Quick Count" document of the COMELEC, all attest to her having used practically all her life the name Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante. The imperatives of avoiding confusion dictate that the instant petition is granted. But beyond practicalities, simple justice dictates that every person shall be allowed to avail himself of any opportunity to improve his social standing, provided he does so without causing prejudice or injury to the interests of the State or of other people.17[16] The OSG's argument that respondents bare testimony is insufficient to show that the requested name is not sought for any illegal purpose and/or in avoidance of any entanglement with the law deserves scant consideration. Surely, the issuance of a police and NBI clearance or like certification, while perhaps apropos, cannot, as the OSG suggests, be a convincing norm of ones good moral character or compelling evidence to prove that the change of name is not sought for any evil motive or fraudulent intent. Respondents open court testimony, given under pain of perjury and for which she was cross-examined, that she had not been accused of any crime under her registered name or under her present name (name that she is using) had convinced the trial court of the bona fides of her request for change of name. As the CA correctly ratiocinated:

10[9] 11[10] 12[11] 13[12] 14[13] 15[14] 16[15] 17[16]

Barco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120587, January 20, 2004, 420 SCRA 162. Rule 103, Sec. 4. Anti-Chinese League v. Felix, 77 Phil. 1012 (1947), cited in Republic v. Tan Keh, G.R. No. 144742, November 11, 2004, 442 SCRA 203. In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or Correction/Cancellation of Entry in Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, G.R. No. 159966, March 30, 2005, 454 SCRA 155. Republic v. Jose R. Hernadez, 323 Phil. 606 (1996). Ching v. Republic, 98 Phil. 1012 (1956); Oshita v. Republic, G.R. No. L-21180, March 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 700. Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97906, May 21, 1992, 209 SCRA 189. Supra note 9.

In the case at bar, petitioner [now respondent] seeks to change her registered name in order to avoid confusion having used a different name all her life. This is a valid ground under the afore-mentioned enumeration not to mention that the instant remedy presents the less cumbersome and most convenient way to set her records straight. Anent the contention of oppositor-appellant that petitioner failed to prove that the petition is not resorted to for an illegal purpose due to her inability to present NBI as well as police clearance to the effect that she has no derogatory records, due perusal of the requirements of Rule 103 reveals that it does not so provide such a quantum of proof to establish the fact that a petitioner has no derogatory records. This purpose, we think, is served upon the declaration and affirmation of the petitioner in open court that the petition is not to further fraud but for a legitimate purpose, coupled by the absence of any oppositor to the petition. There is yet no jurisprudence requiring a petitioner in a petition for a change of name to present NBI and police clearances to prove that the said petition is not resorted to for purpose of fraud. Until such time, we see no urgency to impose the requirements espoused by oppositor-appellant. (Word in bracket added). At bottom, petitioner Republic has not demonstrated that the allowance of the basic petition is whimsical or based on a consideration other than to avoid confusion. The trial court appears to have exercised its discretion judiciously when it granted the petition. Like the CA, the Court loathes to disturb the action thus taken. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 21, 2003 is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. ANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice