Republic vs.

Court of Appeals 131 SCRA 532 (1984) FACTS: The subject land in this case is situated 20 meters away from the shores of Laguna de Bay. Said land was owned by Benedicto del Rio. After the death of Benedicto, the land was acquired by his son Santos Del Rio. The private oppositors in this case sought and obtained permission from Santos Del Rio to construct duck houses on said land. The private oppositors, however, violated their agreement and instead constructed residential houses thereon. Santos then filed an ejectment suit against the private oppositors and later on sought to register the land. Meanwhile, private oppositors simultaneously filed their respective sales applications with Bureau of Lands, and they opposed Santos del Rios application for registration. The CFI of Laguna dismissed the application for registration. Applicant appealed and obtained a favourable judgment from the Court of Appeals. The Director of Lands and the private oppositors filed their respective petitions for review on said decision to the Supreme Court. The Director of Lands contends that since a portion of the land is covered with water four to five months a year, the same is part of the lake bed of Laguna de Bay and therefore it cannot be the subject of registration. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the parcel of land in question is public land; and 2. Whether or not applicant private respondent has registerable title to the land. HELD: The inundation of a portion of the land is not due to "flux and reflux of tides." It cannot be considered a foreshore land, hence it is not a public land and therefore capable of registration as private property provided that the applicant proves that he has a registerable title. The purpose of land registration under the Torrens System is not the acquisition of lands but only the registration of title which applicant already possesses over the land. While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property. Applicant by himself andthrough his father before him, has been in open, continuous, public, peaceful, exclusive and adverse possession of the disputed land for more than thirty (30) years and has presented tax declarations and tax receipts. Applicant has more than satisfied the legal requirements. Thus, he is clearly entitled to the registration in his favor of said land.

Capitol Subdivisions vs. Province of Negros Oriental 7 SCRA 60 (1963) FACTS: Lot 378, which is the subject matter of this case, is part of Hacienda Madalagan, registered under the name of Agustin Amenabar and Pilar Amenabar, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1776 issued in the name of the aforementioned in 1916. Sometime in 1920, the Amenabars sold the aforementioned Hacienda to Jose Benares for the purchase price of P300,000, payable in instalments. In 1924, the Original Certificate of Title issued in the name of the Amenabars was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, Benares obtained a Transfer Certificate of Title under his name. Meanwhile, in 1921, Benares mortgaged the Hacienda including Lot 378 to Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. And then later in 1926, he again mortgaged the Hacienda, including said Lot 378, on the Philippine National Bank, subject to the first mortgage held by the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. These transactions were duly recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental. The mortgage in favor of the Bank was subsequently foreclosed and the Bank acquired the Hacienda, including Lot 378, as purchaser at the foreclosure sale. Accordingly, the TCT in the name of Benares was cancelled and another TCT was issued in the name of the Bank. In 1935, the Bank agreed to sell the Hacienda to the son of Jose Benares, Carlos Benares, for the sum of P400,000, payable in annual installments, subject to the condition that the title will remain with the Bank until full payment. Thereafter, Carlos Benares transferred his rights, under his contract with the Bank, to plaintiff herein, which completed the payment of the installments due to the Bank in 1949. Hence, the Bank executed the corresponding deed of absolute sale to the plaintiff and a transfer certificate of title covering Lot 378 was issued. It should be noted that, despite the acquisition of the Hacienda in 1934 by the Bank, the latter did not take possession of the property for Jose Benares claimed to be entitled to retain it under an alleged right of lease. For this reason, the deed of promise to sell, executed by the Bank in favour of Carlos P. Benares, contained a caveat emptor stipulation. When, upon the execution of the deed of absolute sale 1949, plaintiff took steps to take possession the Hacienda and it was discovered that Lot 378 was the land occupied by the Provincial Hospital of Negros Occidental. Immediately thereafter, plaintiff made representations with or on October 4, 1949, plaintiff made representations with the proper officials to clarify the status of said occupation. Not being satisfied with the explanations given by said officials, it brought the present action on June 10, 1950.

In its answer, defendant maintained that it had acquired the lot in question in the year 1924-1925 through expropriation proceedings and that it took possession of the lost and began the construction of the provincial hospital thereon. They further claimed that for some reason beyond their comprehension, title was never transferred in its name and it was placed in its name only for assessment purposes. And that defendant acted in bad faith in purchasing the lot knowing that the provincial hospital was situated there and that he did not declare such property for assessment purposes only until 1950. ISSUE: Whether or not defendant herein had acquired the lot in question in the aforementioned expropriation proceedings. HELD: The Court held that defendant was not able to sufficiently prove that they have acquired the legal title over Lot 378. Several circumstances indicate that the expropriation had not been consummated. First, there, the entries in the docket pertaining to the expropriation case refer only to its filing and the publication in the newspaper of the notices. Second, there was an absence of a deed of assignment and of a TCT in favour of the Province as regards Lot 378. Third, the property was mortgaged to BacolodMurcia Milling Co. Lot 378 could not have been expropriated without the intervention of the Milling Co. And yet, the latter was not made a party in the expropriation proceedings. And fourth, a second mortgage was constituted in favour of the Back, which would not have accepted the mortgage had Lot 378 not belonged to the mortgagor. Neither could said lot have been expropriated without the Banks knowledge and participation. Furthermore, in the deed executed by the Bank promising to sell the Hacienda Mandalagan to Carlos Benares, it was explicitly stated that some particular lots had been expropriated by the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental, thus indicating, by necessary implication, that Lot 378 had not been expropriated.

CACHO v. COURT OF APPEALS GR No. 123361 March 3, 1997

FACTS: Demetria Cacho applied for the registration of two (2) parcels of land situated in Lanao, Moro Province. Both parcels were within the limits of the Military Reservation No. 43 known as Camp Overton. The application was tried and decided by Judge Jesse Jorge and he granted the petitioner (Cacho) the entitlement to the two (2) parcels of land. On June 29, 1978, Teofilo Cacho, the sole heir of the deceased Demetria Cacho filed for a petition for the reconstitution of the two (2) original certificates of title under RA 26. The petition was opposed to by the Republic of the Philippines, National Steel Corporation and the City of Iligan on the basis of the Regalian Doctrine that states that all lands of whatever classification belong to the State. The matter was elevated to the Court of Appeals (CA), the CA denied the petition for reconstitution of title and ordered that the decree of registration be reopened. Thus, the instant petition to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the honourable Court of Appeals erred in its decision to reopen the decrees issued by the Judge Jesse Jorge. HELD: A land registration proceeding is in rem. The decree of registration is binding upon and conclusive against all persons including the Government and its branches, irrespective of whether or not they were personally notified of the filing of the application, because all persons are considered as notified by the publication required by law. A decree of registration that has become final shall be deemed conclusive not only on the questions actually contested and determined but also upon all matters that might be litigated or decided in the land registration proceedings. It is no doubt that the decrees of registration had been issued and such decrees attained finality upon the lapse of one year from entry thereof. The decision of the CA to reopen the decrees previously issued runs counter to the very purpose of the Torrens System. It also constitutes a derogation of the Doctrine of Res Judicata. The decrees are res judicata and these are binding upon the whole world, the proceedings being in thenature of proceedings in rem. Such a requirement is impermissible assault upon the integrity and stability of the Torrens System of registration because it also effectively renders the decree inconclusive.

BARANDA v. GUSTILO GR No. 81163 September 26, 1988 FACTS: A parcel of land designated as Lot No. 4517 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta. Barbara, Iloilo covered by original certificate of title no. 6406 is the land subject of the dispute between petitioner (Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia) and respondents(Gregorio Perez, Maria Gotera and Susan Silao). Both parties claimed ownership and possession over the said land. However during the trial, it was found that the transfer certificate of title held by respondents was fraudulently acquired. So the transfer certificate of title was ordered to be put in the name of petitioners. In compliance with the order or the RTC, the Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso annotated the order declaring TCT T-25772 null and void, cancelled the same and issued new certificate of titles in the name of petitioners. However, by reason of a separate case pending in the Court of Appeals, a notice of lis pendens was annotated in the new certificate of title. This prompted the petitioners to move for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens in the new certificates. Judge Tito Gustilo then ordered the Acting Register of Deeds for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens but the Acting Register of Deeds filed a motion for reconsideration invoking Sec 77 of PD 1529. ISSUE: What is the nature of the duty of the Register of Deeds to annotate or annul a notice of lis pendens in a Torrens certificate of title? HELD: Judge Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the Acting Register of Deeds stand that the notice of lis pendens cannot be cancelled on the ground of pendency of the case in the Court of Appeals. The function of the Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds, encumbrances, instrument and the like is ministerial in nature. The acting register of deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motionfor reconsideration of the Judges Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens. Sec. 10 of PD 1529 states that: It shall be the duty of the register of deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the requisites for registration. If the instrument is not registerable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and in form the presentor or such denial in writing, stating the ground and reasons therefore, and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Sec 117 of this decree. On the other hand, Sec 117 of PD 117 states that: When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other instrument presented to him for registration or where any party in interest does not agree with the action taken by the Register of Deeds with reference to any such instrument, the question shall be submitted to the Commission of Land Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the party in interest thru the Register of Deeds.

Balbin v. Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur G.R. No. L-20611 May 8, 1969

FACTS: On November 15, 1961 petitioners presented to the register of deeds of Ilocos Sur a duplicate copy of the registered owner's certificate of title (OCT No. 548) and an instrument entitled "Deed of Donation inter-vivos," with the request that the same be annotated on the title. Under the terms of the instrument sought to be annotated one Cornelio Balbin, registered owner of the parcel of land described in OCT No. 548, appears to have donated inter-vivos an undivided two-thirds portion thereof in favor of petitioners. The register of deeds denied the requested annotation for being legally defective or otherwise not sufficient in law. It appears that previously annotated in the memorandum of encumbrances on the certificate are three separate sales of undivided portions of the land earlier executed by Cornelio Balbin in favor of three different buyers. Mainly because these three other co-owner's copies of the certificate of title No. 548 had not been presented by petitioners, the Register of Deeds refused to make the requested annotation. Unsatisfied, petitioners referred the matter to the Commissioner of Land Registration, who subsequently upheld the action of the Register of Deeds in a resolution dated April 10, 1962. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners should present the other three duplicate copies of the certificate of title, coming from the previous sales, before the register of deeds annotate their transaction. HELD: Yes. Section 55 of Act 496, which provides that "the production of the owner's duplicate certificate of title whenever any voluntary instrument is presented forregistration shall be conclusive authority from the registered owner to the register of deeds to make a memorandum of registration in accordance with such instrument obviously assumes that there is only one duplicate copy of the title in question, namely, that of the registered owner himself, such that its production whenever a voluntary instrument is presented constitutes sufficient authority from him for the register of deeds to make the corresponding memorandum of registration. In the case at bar, the three other copies of the title were in existence, presumably issued under section 43 of Act 496. As correctly observed by the Land Registration Commissioner, petitioners' claim that the issuance of those copies was unauthorized or illegal is beside the point, its legality being presumed until otherwise declared by a court of competent jurisdiction. There being several copies of the same title in existence, it is easy to see how their integrity may be adversely affected if an encumbrance, or an outright conveyance, is annotated on one copy and not on the others. The law itself refers to every copy authorized to be issued as a duplicate of the original, which means that both must contain identical entries of the transactions, particularly voluntary ones, affecting the land covered by the title. If this would not be followed, if different copies were permitted to carry differing annotations, the whole system of Torrens registration would cease to be reliable.

ALMIROL V. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF AGUSAN G.R. No. L-22486 March 20, 1968

FACTS: On June 28, 1961 Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of land situated in the municipality of Esperanza, province of Agusan, and covered by original certificate of title P-1237 in the name of "Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo." Sometime in May, 1962 Almirol went to the office of the Register of Deeds of Agusan in Butuan City to register the deed of sale and to secure in his name a transfer certificate of title. Registration was refused by the Register of Deeds upon the following grounds: 1.) That Original Certificate of Title No. P-1237 is registered in the name of Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo, and by legal presumption, is considered conjugal property; 2.) That in the sale of a conjugal property acquired after the effectivity of the New Civil Code it is necessary that both spouses sign the document; but 3.) Since, as in this case, the wife has already died when the sale was made, the surviving husband cannot dispose of the whole property without violating the existing law. In view of such refusal, Almirol went to the Court of First Instance of Agusan on a petition for mandamus to compel the Register of Deeds to register the deed of sale and to issue to him the corresponding transfer certificate of title. In its resolution of October 16, 1963 the lower court, declaring that the Mandamus does not lie because the adequate remedy is that provided by Section 4 of Rep. Act 1151 dismissed the petition, with costs against the petitioner. Hence, this present appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the Register of Deeds was justified in refusing to register the transaction appealed to by the petitioner.

HELD: No. Although the reasons relied upon by the respondent show a sincere desire on his part to maintain inviolate the law on succession and transmission of rights over real properties, these do not constitute legal grounds for his refusal to register the deed. Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the register of deeds todetermine; this function belongs properly to a court of competent jurisdiction. A register of deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of Republic Act 1151 from exercising his personal judgment and discretion when confronted with the problem of whether to register a deed or instrument on the ground that it is invalid. For under the said section, when he is in doubt as to the proper step to be taken with respect to any deed or other instrument presented to him for registration all that he is supposed to do is to submit and certify the question to the Commissioner of Land Registration who shall, after notice and hearing, enter an order prescribing the step to be taken on the doubtful question.

GALLARDO V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT G.R. No. L-67742 October 29, 1987

FACTS: Petitioners were nephew and niece of the late Pedro Villanueva and first cousin of the private respondent Marta Villanueva vda. de Agana, the latter being the daughter of Pedro Villanueva. The subject matter of this controversy involves a parcel of land situated in Cavinti, Laguna consisting of 81,300 square meters, more or less, initially covered by an original Certificate of Title No. 2262, issued on April 2, 1924owned and registered in the name of the late Pedro Villanueva. On August 10, 1937, petitioner claimed that the aforestated land was sold to them in a private document, an unnotarized deed of sale written in Tagalog that was allegedly signed by the late Pedro Villanueva conveying and transferring the property in question in favor of the petitioners. Subsequently, the Original Certificate of Title was cancelled and a new certificate of title was issued in the name of the petitioners covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT- 6293 (No. 23350) on January 4, 1944. On November 17, 1976, defendant Marta Villanueva together with Pedro Villanueva, Jr., and Restituto R.Villanueva executed and filed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna. When petitioners learned of this Affidavit of Adverse Claim, attempt was made to settle said controversy amicably, but they failed. So, petitioners instituted court suit against the private respondent and her husband, Dr. Marcelo S. Agana, Sr. by filing a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages with the Court of First Instance of Laguna on February 3, 1977. The Court of First Instance of Laguna rendered its decision declaring the deed of sale of August 10, 1937, as well as the reconstituted transfer certificate of title of petitioners, void ab initio. Thus, petitioners filed notice of appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court. However, the Intermediate Appellate Court, on May 22, 1984, affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of TitleNo. RT-6293 (No. 23350) issued in the names of petitioners.

HELD: No. Section 127 of Act 496 which requires, among other things, that the conveyance be executed "before the judge of a court of record or clerk of a court of record or a notary public or a justice of the peace, who shall certify such acknowledgment substantially in form next hereinafter stated was violated. The action of the Register of Deeds of Laguna in allowing the registration of the private deed of sale was unauthorized and did not lend a bit of validity to the defective private document of sale. With reference to the special law, Section 127 of the Land Registration Act, Act 496 Deeds of Conveyance, affecting lands, whether registered under this act or unregistered shall be sufficient in law when made substantially in accordance with the following forms, and shall be as effective to convey, encumber or bind the lands as though made in accordance with more prolix forms heretofore in use. It is therefore evident that Exhibit "E" in the case at bar is definitely not registerable under the Land Registration Act. Also, the contention that ownership over registered property may be acquired by prescription or adverse possession is absolutely without merit. No title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered owner but also against his hereditary successors.