1:11-cv-01441-JBM-JAG # 28

Page 1 of 19

Friday, 11 January, 2013 08:03:09 AM Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

E-FILED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

PEORIA DIVISION GENERAL PARKER, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) KEVIN LYONS, individually and in his ) official capacity as States Attorney for ) Peoria County; DEBBIE WOLFMEYER, ) individually and in her capacity as a ) Member of Peoria District 150 School ) Board; PEORIA COUNTY ) GOVERNMENT; and TENTH ) JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, ) ) Defendants. )

Case No. 11-cv-1441

ORDER & OPINION

This matter is before the Court on four Motions to Dismiss: one by Defendants Kevin Lyons and Peoria County (Lyons Motion) (Doc. 5), one by Defendant Tenth Judicial Circuit (Tenth Circuit Motion) (Doc. 9), one by Defendant Debbie Wolfmeyer (Wolfmeyer Motion) (Doc. 17), and one by Defendant Peoria School District 150 (District 150 Motion) (Doc. 19). Plaintiff has filed a Response to each of the Motions (Docs. 23, 22, 26, and 27, respectively). As explained in the following discussion, the Lyons Motion is granted in part and denied in part, the Tenth Circuit Motion is granted, the Wolfmeyer Motion is granted, Plaintiffs Response to the District 150 Motion is construed as a notice of voluntary dismissal, resulting in dismissal of all claims against District 150 without prejudice, and the District 150 Motion is therefore moot.

1:11-cv-01441-JBM-JAG # 28

Page 2 of 19

LEGAL STANDARDS Where a district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the case must be dismissed. Lack of subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised by a defendant in a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). In ruling on such a motion, a court may look beyond the pleadings and consider submitted evidence to determine the existence of jurisdiction when it is not clear from the face of the complaint. See Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir. 1999). Well-pleaded factual allegations must be accepted as true and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the plaintiffs favor. Id. A complaint may also be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). In stating a claim, a complaint must give notice of the claim, in a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To survive a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6), a plaintiffs complaint must contain sufficient detail to give notice of the claim, and the allegations must plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a speculative level. EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Though detailed factual allegations are not needed, a formulaic recitation of a cause of actions elements will not do. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545. At this stage, the court must treat all well-pleaded allegations as true and draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving party. In re marchFIRST Inc., 589 F.3d 901, 904 (7th Cir. 2009). If matters outside the pleadings are considered by a court, the motion must be treated as a motion for

1:11-cv-01441-JBM-JAG # 28

Page 3 of 19

summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). However, when a district court takes judicial notice of matters of public record, the motion to dismiss is not converted to a motion for summary judgment. Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 284 (7th Cir. 1994). Because Plaintiffs Complaint was filed pro se, it will be liberally construed. See Wilson v. Civil Town of Clayton, Ind., 839 F.2d 375, 378 (7th Cir. 1988). Further, a pro se plaintiff's civil rights complaint may only be dismissed if it is beyond doubt that there is no set of facts under which he could obtain relief. Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1103 (7th Cir. 1982). BACKGROUND1 Plaintiff filed the present case pro se,2 alleging constitutional violations based on the actions relating to his ban from running for a school board seat, and seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985. In 2010, Plaintiff, a black male, decided to run for a seat on the District 150 School Board in Peoria, Illinois. He filed a nominating petition on December 13, 2010, containing the requisite number of signatures. No objections were filed with the state Election Board; however, on February 21, 2011, less than a week before the ballots were to be printed, Plaintiff was served with a complaint for a state quo warranto3 action against him, seeking to have his name removed from the ballot and preventing him from running for the
1

Unless otherwise noted, the facts are taken from Plaintiffs Complaint and all reasonable inferences are drawn in his favor. 2 Plaintiff has since secured counsel and is currently represented. His counsel filed the responses to the Wolfmeyer Motion and the District 150 Motion, but the other two responses were filed before he was represented. 3 A quo warranto action is generally used to remove someone who holds office unlawfully, among other things. 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/18-101.
3

1:11-cv-01441-JBM-JAG # 28

Page 4 of 19

school board. The complaint, filed by the States Attorney at the time, Defendant Kevin Lyons, alleged that because of Plaintiffs felony theft convictions from 1984, he was ineligible to hold a school board seat under Illinois law. Two days later, after a hearing, the Peoria County Circuit Court found Plaintiff was ineligible to hold a seat on the school board, enjoined him from running, and ordered his name off the ballot. (Order, Case No. 11-CH-108, Doc. 17-2 at 4). The decision was affirmed by the Appellate Court of Illinois. (Order, Case No. 3-11-0140, Doc. 17-2 at 5). Defendant Wolfmeyer, a white woman, later won the school board seat for which Plaintiff had been a candidate. Plaintiff raises a number of claims in his Complaint, primarily alleging racial discrimination. In Count I, he brings a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim against Defendants Lyons and Peoria County, alleging that the state court proceedings and outcome were improper and unlawful. Count II is a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim against Defendants Lyons, Peoria County, and Tenth Judicial Circuit, alleging a class of one. This count asserts selective targeting against Plaintiff specifically, not as a representative of a group. Count III is a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim against Defendants Lyons, Wolfmeyer, Peoria County, and Tenth Judicial Circuit, based on racial

discrimination. Plaintiff alleges he was targeted to be removed from the school board election to preserve a white majority on the school board, and that white candidates for various local elected offices are or have been ineligible but were not subject to quo warranto actions or other challenges by the States Attorney. In Count IV, Plaintiff alleges a conspiracy to deprive him of his civil rights, and seeks

1:11-cv-01441-JBM-JAG # 28

Page 5 of 19

relief under 42 U.S.C. 1985. The claim is stated as Against Defendants Lyons, XXX, and Peoria County.4 Finally, Plaintiff alleges an implied right to run for public office that was violated, citing the First, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. This claim is stated as against Defendants Lyons, Wolfmeyer, Peoria County, and Tenth Judicial Circuit. He challenges the constitutionality of the state laws preventing someone with a prior felony conviction from running for school board, claiming that it disenfranchises the black community and that strict scrutiny should apply. TENTH CIRCUIT MOTION Defendant Tenth Judicial Circuit seeks to have the claims against it dismissed on multiple grounds. It argues: 1) Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, 2) the Tenth Judicial Circuit is not a suable entity, 3) Rooker-Feldman prevents the Court from having jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claims, and 4) the claims against it are barred by sovereign immunity. In response, Plaintiff states that he realized the Tenth Judicial Circuit was the wrong party, and seeks to amend his complaint to name the State of Illinois as the defendant in place of the Tenth Judicial Circuit. Though Plaintiff concedes the Tenth Judicial Circuit is the wrong party, the Court provides a brief explanation for dismissing all claims against it, particularly in light of Plaintiffs request to amend his complaint to substitute in a new defendant. Applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b), the capacity of an entity

Based on context and the only paragraph unique to this claim, it appears the XXX was supposed to be Defendant Wolfmeyer.
5

1:11-cv-01441-JBM-JAG # 28

Page 6 of 19

other than an individual or a corporation to be sued is determined by the law of the state of Illinois. Other federal district courts have held that Illinois circuit courts are not suable entities under Illinois law. E.g., Clay v. Friedman, 541 F.Supp 500, 504 (N.D. Ill. 1982). The Circuit Courts of Illinois are nothing more than a geographical division to determine which judges as a group will handle which cases. Id. Thus, the Tenth Judicial Circuit is not a suable entity under Illinois law and Rule 17(b), and all claims against it are dismissed. Plaintiff, realizing his error, seeks instead to name the State of Illinois as a party. Although a court should freely grant leave to amend under Rule 15(a), a court need not allow amendment if it would be futile. E.g., Bethany Pharmacal Co., Inc. v. QVC, Inc., 241 F.3d 854, 860-61 (7th Cir. 2001). Because the State of Illinois enjoys sovereign immunity, any claim against it would likely be dismissed. The Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity doctrine generally bar lawsuits against a state. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996). There are two exceptions to this rule: a state may waive immunity, or Congress may abrogate immunity to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Kroll v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 934 F.2d 904, 907 (7th Cir. 1991). There is no indication that either of these exceptions apply. Thus, it appears Plaintiffs amendment would be futile, and Plaintiffs motion to name the State of Illinois as a defendant is denied at this time. PLAINTIFFS VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL After Peoria School District 150s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 19) was filed, Plaintiff filed a document entitled Response to School District 150s Motion to

1:11-cv-01441-JBM-JAG # 28

Page 7 of 19

Dismiss (Doc. 27). However, instead of responding to any of District 150s arguments for why claims against it should be dismissed, Plaintiff respectfully request[ed] that he be allowed to voluntarily withdraw his Complaint against District 150, without prejudice. (Doc. 27 at 1). As such, the Court construes this Response as a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of claims against Defendant Peoria School District 150. Plaintiffs notice of voluntary dismissal is proper at this stage because no answer or motion for summary judgment has yet been filed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A). A court order is not required; the claims are simply dismissed without prejudice. See id. Even if Plaintiffs response were instead construed as a request for a court order dismissing the claims against District 150, as provided for in Rule 41(a)(2), the request is granted. District 150 will not be prejudiced by the dismissal, and no counterclaims have been filed. As a result, the claims against Defendant Peoria School District 150 are dismissed without prejudice. The District 150 Motion to Dismiss is therefore moot. WOLFMEYER MOTION Defendant Wolfmeyer seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs claims on three grounds: 1) she was improperly served in her individual capacity, requiring dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5), 2) Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and 3) Plaintiffs claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Because the Court finds the claims against Defendant Wolfmeyer should be dismissed on the second ground, the other grounds will not be addressed.

1:11-cv-01441-JBM-JAG # 28

Page 8 of 19

Defendant Wolfmeyer raises three arguments for why Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Defendant argues Plaintiff failed to allege she acted under color of state law or that she intentionally discriminated against him based on race. She also argues Plaintiff failed to allege the existence of a conspiracy. These three arguments boil down to the same point: under the pleading requirements, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to make plausible the claim that Defendant Wolfmeyer was part of a conspiracy with Defendant Lyons such that she could be liable under 42 U.S.C. 1983. For an individual to be liable under 1983, he or she must have acted under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State. 42 U.S.C. 1983. When a private defendant was engaged in a conspiracy with state officials to deprive a plaintiff of his constitutional rights, such conduct satisfies the under color of state law requirement. See, e.g., Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980). The plaintiff must plead more than a mere suspicion or a bare conclusion that a conspiracy existed. Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 2009). For a private individual to be liable under a conspiracy theory, the plaintiff must allege the parties, the general purpose, and the approximate date of the conspiracy. Loubser v. Thacker, 440 F.3d 439, 442 (7th Cir.2006). The plaintiff must also allege (1) a state official and private individual(s) reached an understanding to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights; and (2) those individual(s) were willful participant[s] in joint activity with the State or its agents. Reynolds v. Jamison, 488 F.3d 756, 764 (7th Cir.2007) (quoting Williams v. Seniff, 342 F.3d 774, 785 (7th Cir.2003)).

1:11-cv-01441-JBM-JAG # 28

Page 9 of 19

Reading Plaintiffs Complaint liberally and as a whole, his allegations still do not raise his claim above a speculative level. In the count specifically alleging conspiracy, Plaintiff states: The acts of racial discrimination described in Count III were part of a coordinated plan between Mr. Lyons and Mrs. Wolfmeyer to deny Mr. Parker election to the School Board and to ensure that Mrs. Wolfmeyer was elected instead. (Doc. 1 at 20-21). He alleges he had a history of speaking out about a perceived racial bias by local officials, and that Defendant Lyons and other members of the local Democratic party establishment in Peoria did not want him to be elected. (Doc. 1 at 4). He also alleges Defendants Lyons and Wolfmeyer wanted to keep a white majority on the Board. (Doc. 1 at 18). As the only alleged action by any conspirators, Plaintiff asserts Defendant Lyons chose to target him for removal from the ballot because of this racial animus. He also asserts that Defendant Lyons encouraged Defendant Wolfmeyer to run against Plaintiff. These are the only conspiracy-related allegations pertaining to Defendant Wolfmeyer. Plaintiffs pleadings are akin to the bare allegations that the Seventh Circuit has repeatedly held are insufficient to state a claim for conspiracy liability under 1983. He does not make the requisite allegations that Defendant Wolfmeyer intended to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights. There is no allegation or indication that Defendant Wolfmeyer had any illegitimate reason to run for the school board seat. Even assuming, arguendo, that Defendant Lyons encouraged her to run because of racial animus or selective targeting of Plaintiff, there is no allegation above a bare conclusion that Defendant Wolmeyer had the same intent. The existing allegations are speculative, and do not rise to the level of a plausible

1:11-cv-01441-JBM-JAG # 28

Page 10 of 19

claim. Therefore, the claims against Defendant Wolfmeyer must be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE With three of the five defendants dismissed, the Court now turns to the two arguments raised by Defendants Lyons and Peoria County in their joint Motion to Dismiss.5 The first of these issues is the argument that this Court lacks subjectmatter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs claims because of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. As a result, they argue, his claims should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes lower federal court jurisdiction over claims seeking review of state court judgments or over claims inextricably intertwined with state court determinations. Remer v. Burlington Area Sch. Dist., 205 F.3d 990, 996 (7th Cir. 2000). The doctrine comes from two Supreme Court cases: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). If a state court judgment itself is the cause of the injury, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents jurisdiction. Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 92 F.3d 506, 510 (7th Cir. 1996). Federal district courts do not have jurisdiction over these claims because the only federal

Though listed as a defendant for each count in the Complaint, the Court finds no allegations that Peoria County is independently liable because of its actions or policies. It appears Peoria County is only named as a necessary party under Carver v. Sheriff of LaSalle County, Ill., 324 F.3d 947, 948 (7th Cir. 2003), in which the court held a county in Illinois is a necessary party in any suit seeking damages from an independently elected county officer . . . in an official capacity. Unless otherwise indicated in an amended complaint, Peoria Countys liability will be limited to that capacity.
10

1:11-cv-01441-JBM-JAG # 28

Page 11 of 19

court that can review a state court judgment is the United States Supreme Court. Remer, 205 F.3d at 996. To determine whether a claim is barred by the doctrine, the key inquiry is whether the plaintiff seeks to have the state court judgment set aside. Ritter v. Ross, 992 F.2d 750, 754 (1993); see also Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (holding the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is confined to cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments (emphasis added)). Even if the state court judgment is wrong or unconstitutional, it cannot be reviewed by lower federal courts. E.g., Remer, 205 F.3d at 996. However, Rooker-Feldman is inapplicable when the plaintiff is not attacking a state court judgment. Jones v. Brennan, 465 F.3d 304, 305 (7th Cir. 2006). Claims which are independent of the state court judgment are not barred by the doctrine. See Kamilewicz, 92 F.3d at 510. For example, a claim based on an injury prior to the judgment that the state court failed to remedy is a distinct claim not barred by Rooker-Feldman. Long, 182 F.3d at 555. This is true even if the independent claim denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached. GASH Assocs. v. Vill. of Rosemont, Ill., 995 F.2d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993). Additionally, where a plaintiff had no reasonable opportunity to raise his arguments or claims during the state court proceedings because of state court rules or procedures, the federal court does not lack jurisdiction to hear them. Long, 182 F.3d at 558.

11

1:11-cv-01441-JBM-JAG # 28

Page 12 of 19

Count I, stated as a due process challenge based on the state proceedings that deprived Plaintiff of his rights to exercise all of the benefits and privileges of citizenship, including the right to run for public office, (Doc. 1 at 13), seems to be a classic example of a claim prohibited by Rooker-Feldman. He claims the quo warranto action was an arbitrary, unlawful, and unreasonable abuse of governmental power. (Doc. 1 at 15). This challenges the state court judgment, which explicitly held that state law prohibited Plaintiff from running for school board, and necessarily implicitly determined that the quo warranto action was a lawful and proper method for enjoining Plaintiff. (See Order, Doc. 17-2 at 4). It is settled that a plaintiff may not seek a reversal of a state court judgment simply by casting his complaint in the form of a civil rights action. Ritter, 992 F.2d at 754 (internal quotation marks omitted). Yet this seems to be what Plaintiff is doing; thus, his claim that the state court judgment was illegal is barred by RookerFeldman, and to the extent the relief he seeks is reversal of the state judgment,6 the Court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction. Count I is therefore dismissed without prejudice.7 Counts II and III are equal protection claims alleging that Plaintiff was targeted by Defendants, who wanted to keep him off the school board, and that

Though Plaintiff clearly believes the state judgment was wrong, the only relief he requests that appears to require reviewing the judgment is [t]hat the Court declare the election of [Defendant] Wolfmeyer to the School Board to be null and void, and that the Court order a new election to be held as soon as is feasible. This relief cannot be granted by this Court. 7 This dismissal without prejudice does not mean Plaintiff can re-plead this claim. Rather, a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is inherently without prejudice, as the merits of the claim cannot be considered by the Court.
12

1:11-cv-01441-JBM-JAG # 28

Page 13 of 19

other political candidates, who were white, and who Plaintiff argues would also be ineligible to hold office, were treated differently. Although Plaintiff maintains that the quo warranto action was unlawful and wrongly decided,8 in making his equal protection claim he is not arguing that the state judgment was wrong because other candidates were also ineligible. He does not seek reversal of the state judgment in this claim, and a finding for Plaintiff has no bearing on the validity of the state judgment. Cf. Rogers v. Ill. Dept of Corr. Special Evaluation Unit, 160 F. Supp. 2d 972, 980-81 ([A] person claiming selective prosecution in violation of equal protection does not have to show that he is not guilty . . . .). Such a claim is not subject to dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Two Seventh Circuit cases demonstrate this distinction. First, in a case in which the plaintiff, the owner of an apartment complex, claimed the government targeted it for housing law enforcement based on race of the tenants, the harm alleged was that they had to defend unsubstantiated lawsuits. Crestview Vill. Apartments v. U.S. Dept of Hous. & Urban Dev., 383 F.3d 552, 556 (7th Cir. 2004). The court reasoned that [a] finding by the district court that the defendants did, as Crestview alleges, conspire to bring unsubstantiated lawsuits would undermine the state courts implicit holding that the state action was justified, and that the injury

As discussed above, this claim, that the state judgment should be reversed, is clearly barred by Rooker-Feldman. Further discussion of his claims presumes an understanding that Count I is not before the Court. The fact that Plaintiff, in making his remaining claims, continues to deny the correctness of the state court judgment does not necessarily taint his other claims. See Long, 182 F.3d at 556 (It makes no difference that [Plaintiff] may also deny the correctness of the eviction order in pursuing these claims.).
13

1:11-cv-01441-JBM-JAG # 28

Page 14 of 19

was only complete after the state entered an order, implicitly finding the suit was not unsubstantiated. Id. In contrast, where the claim is based on facts prior to the judgment and not focused simply on the judgment itself, the claim is not barred by Rooker-Feldman. In the second case, an equal protection challenge to a decision to prosecute the plaintiff because he was a man and not to prosecute a similarly situated woman was not subject to Rooker-Feldman. Sides v. City of Champaign, 496 F.3d 820, 825 (7th Cir. 2007). The court explained: Arguments concerning events that precede the convictionarguments that would be equally strong (or weak) if Sides had been acquitted likewise are outside the scope of the RookerFeldman doctrine. All of the events that took place in connection with his arrest are in that category, as is the state actors' decision to press charges against Sides and require him to bear the expense and inconvenience of trial. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The harm Plaintiff appears to allege is that he was subject to Defendant Lyons attempts to prevent him from running for office because of his ineligibility to run for public office as an ex-felon, and similarly situated ineligible white local politicians and candidates were not. Thus, the claim is more similar to the one raised in Sides than the one in Crestview Village. The injury, for purposes of these claims, was not the state judgment itself, but Defendants actions and decision to target Plaintiff in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. It is a fine distinction, but an important one. Therefore, Counts II and III are not barred from this Court by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Plaintiffs other claims also fall outside the scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In Count IV, Plaintiff alleges a conspiracy between Defendants Lyons and
14

1:11-cv-01441-JBM-JAG # 28

Page 15 of 19

Wolfmeyer to prevent his election to the school board because of Plaintiffs race. For the same reasons the Court has jurisdiction over the related Counts II and III, Count IV is also not barred by Rooker-Feldman. However, as stated earlier in allowing Defendant Wolfmeyers Motion to Dismiss, the bare allegation of a conspiracy is insufficient under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as interpreted by Twombly. The bare assertion of a conspiracy without more amounts to nothing more than a formulaic recitation of the elements of a claim, and is insufficient to allege a conspiracy. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. For this reason, Count IV is clearly subject to dismissal. Finally, Count V, construed as a claim for violation of his implied right as an ex-felon to run for public office, is pled sufficiently to challenge as unconstitutional the state law preventing ex-felons from running for a seat on the school board. This type of claim does not implicate the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See, e.g., Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1298 (2011) ([A] state-court decision is not reviewable by lower federal courts, but a statute or rule governing the decision may be challenged in a federal action.). In summary, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine requires only one of Plaintiffs claims to be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Thus, Count I is dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.9 Plaintiffs remaining claims against Defendants Lyons and Peoria County are not barred by Rooker-Feldman.

As the Court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over these claims and arguments and are dismissed against all Defendants on this basis, they will not be considered in the remainder of this Order.
15

1:11-cv-01441-JBM-JAG # 28

Page 16 of 19

ISSUE PRECLUSION Defendants Lyons and Peoria County additionally seek to dismiss Plaintiffs claims on the ground that they are barred by issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel. They argue that Plaintiffs arguments were raised and decided by the state court in the quo warranto proceedings, and that Plaintiff is therefore precluded from raising the same issues again in this Court. (Doc. 6 at 5-7). Defendants seek dismissal on this ground pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Court takes judicial notice of the order entered in the Peoria County Circuit Court, the transcript of the hearing, and the order of the Illinois Appellate Court affirming the state trial court, all of which are matters of public record and submitted by Defendants. Other matters outside the pleading are not considered; therefore, the Motion is not converted to a motion for summary judgment. See Henson, 29 F.3d at 284. In determining the preclusive effect of a state court judgment, the law of the state from which the judgment came applies. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980). Thus, Illinois issue preclusion law controls. Issue preclusion applies when: (1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical with the one presented in the suit in question, (2) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior adjudication, and (3) the party against whom estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication. Gumma v. White, 833 N.E.2d 834, 843 (Ill. 2005). The issue must have been actually litigated in the prior case, and a decision on the issue must have been necessary to the judgment. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Savickas, 739 N.E.2d 445, 451 (Ill. 2000).

16

1:11-cv-01441-JBM-JAG # 28

Page 17 of 19

None of Plaintiffs arguments that survive dismissal under Rooker-Feldman are barred by issue preclusion. Defendants point to several issues they argue are barred by issue preclusion, and they are taken in turn. The first three issues are encompassed by the dismissal pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, discussed above. First, Plaintiffs argument that Illinois law does not bar felons from running for school board is a challenge to the state court judgment. That matter is appropriate for appellate review in state court,10 not for determination by this Court. Second, the issue of whether the state court had proper jurisdiction to hear the quo warranto challenge to Plaintiffs candidacy is an implicit part of the state court judgment and is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. Third, any argument that the state court action was untimely is similarly part of the state court judgment, and cannot be challenged in this Court. The remaining two issues that Defendants seek to preclude do not come within the requirements for issue preclusion because, as Plaintiff correctly notes, they were not decided by the state court. First, Plaintiffs argument that he was singled out for improper reasons was explicitly rejected as irrelevant by the state court. (Report of Proceedings, Case No. 11-CH-108, Doc. 6-1 at 75). Thus, the issue was not decided by the state court, and was therefore not necessary to the judgment. Plaintiff is not precluded from litigating this issue now. Second, and related, Plaintiffs argument that the quo warranto action was part of a conspiracy against him was not relevant to whether he was eligible for office, and was not

10

In fact, this issue was affirmed by the Appellate Court of Illinois. (Order, Case No. 3-11-0140, Doc. 17-2 at 5).
17

1:11-cv-01441-JBM-JAG # 28

Page 18 of 19

decided by the state court. Therefore, none of Plaintiffs arguments or claims are dismissed based on issue preclusion.11 REMAINING CLAIMS Though Plaintiffs remaining claims against Defendants Lyons and Peoria County are not dismissed, they are confusing and disorganized.12 They do not comport with the pleading requirements of Rule 8, such as the requirement that allegations be simple, concise, and direct. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). Additionally, some of the remaining claims would likely have been dismissed had a general 12(b)(6) argument been raised by Defendants Lyons and Peoria County. The Court is unconvinced that Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim of racial discrimination in Count III or a claim of conspiracy to deprive him of his rights in Count IV.13 Plaintiffs class-of-one equal protection claim is also questionable. See, e.g., LaBella Winnetka, Inc. v. Vill. of Winnetka, 628 F.3d 937, 941-43 (7th Cir. 2010). However, the Court will not sua sponte dismiss a claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See, e.g., Ricketts v. Midwest Nat. Bank, 874 F.2d 1177, 1185 (7th Cir. 1989). In Plaintiffs Response to the Wolfmeyer Motion, he asks for permission to amend his complaint to make his allegations clearer. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint clarifying his remaining claims, consistent with this The Court questions, however, whether claim preclusion (res judicata) could apply to some of Plaintiffs claims. If Defendants find this doctrine could bar any of Plaintiffs claims, they may raise the issue in a future motion to dismiss. 12 This is not to insult Plaintiff. His filings were of a higher quality than many pro se plaintiffs achieve. 13 This is particularly the case now that Defendant Wolfmeyer is dismissed from this suit.
18
11

1:11-cv-01441-JBM-JAG # 28

Page 19 of 19

Order and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants are invited to file an additional motion to dismiss after an amended complaint is filed. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Defendants Kevin Lyons and Peoria Countys Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 5) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, Defendant Tenth Judicial Circuit Courts Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 9) is GRANTED, Defendant Debbie Wolfmeyers Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 17) is GRANTED, Plaintiffs Notice of Voluntary Dismissal (Doc. 27) results in dismissal of all claims against District 150 without prejudice, and Defendant Peoria School District 150s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 19) is DENIED AS MOOT. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: 1. All claims against Defendants Tenth Judicial Circuit and Debbie Wolfmeyer are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 2. All claims against Defendant Peoria School District 150 are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 3. Count I is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 4. Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to file an amended complaint within twenty-one days as described in this Order.

Entered this 10th day of January, 2013.

s/ Joe B. McDade JOE BILLY McDADE United States Senior District Judge

19