Escolar Documentos
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Cultura Documentos
ISBN 978-0-307-98653-5
eISBN 978-0-307-98654-2
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First Edition
Whitey in custody
The night of his arrest Whitey Bulger was taken to the Boston Police
Department’s downtown station on Milk Street, where he was ques-
tioned briefly. The next morning, instead of robbing the Cambridge
bank, Whitey was headed to federal court for his arraignment. The
news of his capture spread quickly, with Boston’s newspapers running
photographs of him in police custody, his hair the color of black shoe
polish. The FBI put out a story that agents had been hot on Whitey’s
trail for days and had the “Revere spot under surveillance for several
nights and when two agents sighted the suspect there they called for
reinforcements.” The account of the arrest was not accurate, but one
that accomplished two goals: it made the bureau look smart and all-
knowing and shielded the fact that Paul Rico’s informant was the one
who had alerted them to the Reef Café, setting off the Sunday night
scramble.
Maintaining the confidentiality of informants— covering for
them, in other words—was paramount to the FBI. For any law enforce-
ment agency the whole business of gathering intelligence from will-
ing crime figures is premised on secrecy. Without it, the flow of
family had on hand. Under the circumstances, the best the Bulgers
could do was to line up an experienced and well-connected defense at-
torney, Theodore A. Glynn Jr. Glynn had served as a state representa-
tive during the early 1940s and later, in 1959, was appointed to the
Boston Municipal Court, eventually becoming chief justice of that
court.
Whitey had to sit tight behind bars, where he had plenty of time
to mull over his capture and to comprehend fully the reason for his
undoing: he’d been betrayed not just once but three times by fellow
criminal cohorts—first by Carl Smith, then by Ron Dermody, and
fi nally by Rico’s newly minted informant. The lessons would harden
in him like cement. From this moment on he would trust few and
demand supreme loyalty. Condemnation of informers reflected the
cultural values of his hometown Southie. His brother Bill later ad-
dressed this cultural truism. “We loathed informers,” Bill wrote later
in a memoir. “Our folklore bled with the names of informers who
had sold out their brethren to hangmen and worse in the lands of our
ancestors.”
But actions despicable in others Whitey saw differently when it
came to himself. He was facing a mountain of trouble—three armed
robberies in three states. It was not a case of being wayward in front of
the juvenile court, or of facing an assault charge in the district court in
South Boston. This was not a disciplinary board in the Air Force or the
local courts in Montana. Whitey had fallen hard, and he knew it. The
FBI had him—all because he was ratted out. Faced with the prospect of
spending a virtual lifetime behind bars, he had to do something to try
to improve his lot.
Whitey Bulger became an informer. He might tell himself he was
not the first to break rank. Carl Smith held that honor, and Whitey
might rationalize ratting on Smith as tit-for-tat. Indeed, there exists in
the crime world a maxim that ratting on a rat does not constitute rat-
ting. But it’s a pretzel logic informants usually adopt to justify their
betrayal. Criminals who refuse to talk under any circumstances,
known as the truly “stand-up guys,” dismiss the maxim as spin and
rank hypocrisy.
Besides, FBI records reveal Whitey did more than inform on his
informer Carl Smith. He admitted first that, yes, he robbed three banks
and, yes, Carl Smith and Ron Dermody were with him to rob the bank
his father was very strict with him and on occasions beat him severely.
This, however, had very little effect on him as he continued to misbe-
have in the community.”
Whitey was described as physically fit, who denied “use of drugs,
but admits drinking heavily at times.” His IQ was a very solid 113,
“which indicates above average intelligence.” In addition, “he has al-
ways been a leader.” For all Whitey’s intelligence and leadership poten-
tial, however, the probation officer did not hold out much hope. Whitey
Bulger, the report stated, was “a rather serious law violator to have at
large in the community. He would not hesitate to use a gun.” It pre-
dicted: “The prognosis for future behavior in society is poor.”
Beyond those conclusions, the report included a statement that a
reader might easily overlook amid the many stronger assertions. The
passage, in the section “Mental Condition,” stated that Whitey “knows
the difference between right and wrong; his actions have been in ac-
cord with his own choosing.” The comment, at first reading, seemed
benign enough— certainly nowhere near as eye-catching as if the com-
ment on his mental condition had called him a maniac or some other
category of madman. But the observation actually might have been the
most insightful in the entire report. It was a line that Dr. Hervey Cleck-
ley, the leading thinker of that era about psychopaths, could have
authored— essentially restating what he and other researchers of psy-
chopathy considered to be the core characteristic of a psychopath,
namely, a person without conscience, a person who knew the differ-
ence between right and wrong but who did not care one iota.
That, the report was saying in a nutshell, was Whitey.
In terms of the city’s crime news that spring and summer, Whitey
Bulger’s first major collision with the criminal justice system was over-
shadowed by buildup to the sensational trial of eight men in the Brink’s
case—what the media were billing “the most dramatic trial of the cen-
tury.” In January, as the six-year statute of limitations was about to
expire in the 1950 holdup, the FBI had made the bombshell announce-
ment that it had solved the robbery by turning one of the original sus-
pects into a cooperating witness. Joseph J. “Specks” O’Keefe had
“sung,” as the newspapers put it, and named the eight defendants slated
to go on trial later in 1956. The spring and early summer featured the
final pretrial wrangling between attorneys, and then, on August 6,
amid the 1950s version of a media circus, jury selection began. “Be-
cause of the notoriety attached to the $1,219,000 holdup of Brink’s Inc.,
in Boston’s North End on Jan. 17, 1950, the eyes of the nation—indeed,
the world, will be focused on the seventh floor, spacious, oak-paneled
courtroom,” the Boston Globe reported in its sprawling front-page cov-
erage, which included photographs of the accused, the judge, and a
drawing depicting the courtroom’s layout. Jury selection lasted nearly
a month and the trial itself spilled into early October, climaxing with
the jury’s unanimous guilty verdicts against all eight defendants.
Whitey did not yet have that kind of marquee power. The day of his
reckoning, Thursday, June 21, turned out, coincidentally, to be St.
Aloysius’s feast day, a celebration held on the date of the death, at age
twenty-three, of the patron saint of youth and innocence. St. Aloysius
died in 1591 while caring for the sick during a plague in Rome. He was
remembered for writing about entering the priesthood: “I am a piece of
twisted iron; I entered religion to get twisted straight.”
Whitey Bulger was brought to federal court—no St. Aloysius
he—under overcast skies, with a steady drizzle and fog encircling the
city by mid-afternoon. Bill Bulger, who would soon study law at Bos-
ton College Law School after earning his undergraduate degree, was
seated in the courtroom listening as each side made its recommenda-
tions to Judge Sweeney. Prosecutor Daniel Needham, citing Whitey’s
weaponry and the multiple robberies, called Whitey a “professional
bank robber” who should be sent away for twenty-five years. Whitey’s
lawyer, Theodore Glynn, urged the judge to impose a much shorter
sentence, which would offer a ray of hope to his client for a life after
prison. Glynn reminded the judge that Whitey had demonstrated
“some penitence” and had cooperated since his arrest. But the guilty
plea to all three robberies was all that was known publicly about the
extent of Whitey’s cooperation. Few in the courtroom that day, except
for the judge, the lawyers, and, likely, brother Bill, knew the rest of the
story—that Whitey and Jacquie McAuliffe’s informing had led to the
apprehension of Barchard and O’Brien.
Once he’d taken it all in, Judge Sweeney sentenced Whitey to a
twenty-year term in federal prison. The newspapers dutifully covered
the hearing. So. Boston Man Gets 20 Years for 3 Holdups, was the
headline in the Boston Globe, atop a brief account tucked in a single
column on the front page. No story questioned the sentence, not at
twenty years. For the first time in his life, Whitey was going to prison.
The hammer had dropped hard—a twenty-year sentence was bad.
But was it? In the context of three convictions, and compared to his
fellow robbers, Whitey actually did better than could have been ex-
pected. Whitey got a ten-year sentence for the Pawtucket holdup; his
partner Dermody, who, like Whitey, had confessed, was sentenced to
seventeen years. Whitey got a ten-year sentence for the Indiana holdup;
his partner Barchard, who also confessed, was sentenced to twenty
years. Only William L. O’Brien, Whitey’s partner in the Melrose
holdup, got a lesser sentence. Whitey got a ten-year sentence for Mel-
rose while O’Brien got an eight-year sentence. Prosecutor Needham
had joined O’Brien’s defense attorney and recommended leniency for
the Dorchester bricklayer and father of four who had no prior criminal
record. Judge Sweeney agreed: “It’s too bad that O’Brien with his intel-
ligence would get himself into a situation where he became a potential
killer.” Then there was the other informer, Carl Smith. Like Whitey,
Smith got a sentence of twenty years in Indiana, in a package settle-
ment of his crimes.
The bottom line for Whitey: he was sentenced to ten years for each
robbery, but the sentence became a twenty-year term because the judge
ruled that only one of the ten-year sentences was to run consecutively
with the others. Meanwhile, as said, Dermody got seventeen years for
his role in a single robbery; Barchard got twenty years for his role in a
single robbery. On its face, Whitey’s sentence was bad, but it might
have been far worse if not for his “cooperation.” Neither Whitey nor
Bill ever discussed publicly the impact Whitey’s informing had on
Judge Sweeney’s sentence. Whitey’s informing was buried for a half
century in government records. The only remark Bill Bulger ever made
about his brother’s day in federal court was a reference in his later
memoir to Judge Sweeney being “a strict but fair man.” With the ben-
efit of the fuller context, however, Bill Bulger’s observation connotes an
appreciation that things could have gone much worse for his brother.
The skies were blue and clear but the air was thick and the temperatures
climbed into the eighties on the day, Thursday, July 19, 1956, that
twenty-six-year-old Whitey Bulger arrived at the Atlanta Penitentiary
to begin his long stretch of hard time. The drive to the prison took
him to the outskirts of the city, through some quiet residential
small scars on knuckles of right hand.” The medical form also noted he
was missing some teeth, and it concluded that Whitey was in “general
good health” and ready for “regular duty.”
Whitey was ordered to get dressed in a loose-fitting pair of cover-
alls, and a photograph was taken to insert into his jacket. The mug shot
showed Whitey, his hair closely cropped, unsmiling. It seemed he was
trying to project a glare. But the result looked more vacant than tough.
And with the crew cut he seemed so young. In all, Whitey looked more
like a shell-shocked teen than a hardened criminal.