Simon Van Hoeymissen Geopolitical implications of EU enlargement for Russia

Introduction

In May of 2004 ten new states successfully concluded the accession process to gain membership to the EU. The bulk of these new member states were located in Central and Eastern Europe, and were formerly in the orbit of the Soviet Union. Together with the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) concluded in 2003, this was the formalization of a wider policy in which the EU and NATO tried to westernize their Eastern neighbors (Kobzova & Popescu 2011, 1). This evolution brought with it important implications for the geopolitical context of Europe and Russia. Today a newly assertive Moscow is promoting its interests in the region, while the EU is paralyzed by an economic and political crisis.

This paper aims to describe the geopolitical situation of the mutual neighborhood of Russia and the EU since the Soviet Union imploded. To do so, we will first explain how Russias geopolitical characteristics affected the development of the Russian empire and formed the baseline of its domestic and foreign policies throughout history. The analysis will then focus on the mutual neighborhood of Russia and the EU. Especially the role of fossil fuel transit between both actors will be emphasized here. Finally the ways in which the EUs enlargement of 2004 poses a geopolitical threat or blessing to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and Russia will be analyzed. A conclusion will then be made on the implications of EU expansion for Russia and CEE. The paper will end with a number of developments in the energy-sector which are likely to cause geopolitical problems, given Russias current international posture.

The role of geopolitics in Russian history

When looking at Russias geographical map, what immediately strikes any observer is the vastness of its continental territory. The country stretches across more than 160 degrees of longitude, and is demarcated by thousands of kilometers of continental borders. These types of landlocked powers are eternally insecure, and will never have sufficient territory to feel safe (Kaplan 2012, 162). This author claims this holds especially true in the case of Russia, since it does not enjoy the defense of natural barriers. Further aggravating the vulnerability of its landlocked location is the fact that most of the important Russian harbors are inaccessible during a large part of the year, due to the frost. The combination of an insecurity-fed need for natural buffer areas to fend off invading nomadic tribes and the pursuit of access to warm seas has been an important determinant in the formation and expansion of the Russian state and its foreign policy.

While Kaplan explains Moscows insatiable thirst for expansion, he falls short of linking it to its very elusive character. Indeed, geopolitics determines even the nature of the Russian policy. Russias main strategic predicament is anchored in what Jonathan Holslag (2006, 1) terms as its geopolitical spread position. What he means by this is that both the domestic and the foreign posture of Russia are determined by its huge geographic size. Russia has always been surrounded by vast regions onto which influence was asserted by European and Far Eastern powers. While Russia tends to bank toward European-style culture, politics and economy, its geology entails both a European and a Eurasian dimension.

Holslag sees these as the two extremes of a conceptual continuum on which Russia has been permanently redefining itself ever since the 19th century. From a Eurasianist perspective,

Russia considers itself as separate from the rest of the continent and sees itself surrounded by rivaling powers. The Russian Far East is in this respect a bastion against the other Eastern powers. The response to this perception is a realpolitik vis--vis the East and the West. From a Eurocentric vantage point Russia sees itself as part of Europe, tending toward interaction and open transit across its territorial borders. In its history a cyclical pattern is noticeable, because both positions consistently proved to be untenable in the long run (Holslag 2006, 4). While strict authoritarian realpolitik tended to erode its own power base, Russian episodes of rapprochement and liberalism were thwarted by the disability of European actors to uphold their end of the bargain.

We have seen how geopolitical concerns dictated Moscows dash to the South and the Far East, and how this in turn had an impact on its political character. But besides weighing down on Moscow, geography also grants the Kremlin a powerful weapon which permeates the current Russian political structure: fossil fuel reserves. There are huge reserves of oil and gas in the Western Siberian plateau and the Caucasus, as well as even larger prospective reserves in the Northern seas and Eastern Siberia. The resulting revenues are the key source of domestic stability and political survival of the elites. Furthermore they serve an important function in Moscows foreign policy. Indeed, [The Russian] geopolitical reach rises and falls to some extent with the price of oil and gas (Mankoff 2009, vii). The energy-issue has become particularly preponderant in EU-Russian relations, up to the point that it can be argued that Gazprom acts as the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry for Europe. Any assessment of EU-Russia relations needs to take the energy-issue at heart. We can conclude that geopolitics determined Russias expansionism and the cyclical nature of Russian politics, as well as gave it a tool to influence Europe through energy trade. This is the context in which

the EU-Russian relationship is embedded, and thus forms the backdrop of the EUs Eastern enlargement.

The geopolitics of the Russian-EU relationship

After the collapse of communism, both NATO and the EU opened up to the former Soviet states in an attempt to reinvent the transatlantic alliance and reunite Europe (Asmus 2008, 2). The goal was to consolidate democracy and to ensure stability in CEE-states (OBrennan 2006, 12), be it through providing economic and political support (through the EUs Partnership and Cooperation Agreements) or by the full inclusion of these states in the organizations. Even for those former Soviet republics that did not formally join these organizations, the enlargement set a positive precedent to strengthen ties with the West. These efforts made the region more stable than it has been since the Napoleonic era. Asmus also points out that NATO and the EU made considerable efforts to pull Russia toward the West by promoting democratic reforms while respecting its legitimate interests.

Despite these efforts, the results of this policy were mixed. While a complete breakdown of relations with Moscow was avoided and Moscows primary concern was the issue of NATO expansion, some competition between Russia and the EU always remained. Russias interference in CEE makes sense considering the dramatic alteration of its geopolitical position in this region, as described by Tumanov, Gasparishvili and Romanova (2011, 121). Firstly the common border with the EU had expanded considerably. The visa-regime of Russia and the EU that was put into place was particularly troublesome for the population in the border regions. The only exemption to this visa-regime was Kaliningrad oblast, which as of this point was a Russian enclave surrounded exclusively by EU member states. But even

here tensions persisted in such areas as transportation of goods, energy supply and fishing. Secondly the adoption of the acquis communautaire in CEE-states caused changes to or even the dismissal of some existing trade, economic, legal, and other agreements with Russia.

Indeed, contemporary CEE is blighted with three types of crises (Popescu and Wilson 2009, 2). The first is the crisis of weak statehood, rooted in secessionist forces and corruption. Secondly, the global economic slump threatens the viability of these economies and states. Finally and this is key for this paper, Russia is attempting to rebuild its sphere of influence, by undermining the sovereignty of these states. These authors claim that while the EU is content with sitting back and relying on the magnetism of its model, Russia is actively boosting its own attractiveness through concrete incentives. Although the mutual neighborhood has more extensive economic interdependence with the EU, it is Moscow that gains the most political influence by focusing investments in key areas such as energy and infrastructure.

As a result, a number of recent events took place in Eastern Europe which certainly fit Holslags cyclical history. After the attempts to integrate with the West in the 1990s went astray, an increasingly authoritarian Russia now seems to be banking toward a more realist and Eurasianist, or even Euro-Pacific policy (Trenin 2009, 1). Since 2006, Moscows policy towards the contested neighborhood has repeatedly cut off Europes vital fossil fuel provisions. Westphal (2009, 12) argues that technical details are key to understand the type of problems that Moscow faces when dealing with transit countries. For this paper, it suffices to point out that the Soviet-era gas transportation infrastructure was not designed to transport gas to Western Europe across national borders. This causes technical difficulties in operating the network internationally, which in turn leads to political tensions with transit countries.

In 2009 such a crisis occurred between Russia and Ukraine over alleged theft of Russian gas by Ukraine. Russia ended up decreasing the pressure on its pipelines, causing considerable shortages in Europe. This incident damaged Europes view of Russia and Ukraine as highly reliable energy suppliers particularly hard (Westphal 2009, 5). Russias turn to such realist energy policies made European states weary of their dependence on Russian gas and oil. In turn, any losses in European import security in turn damage Russias dominance on the European energy market. This implies that Russia may have inadvertently undermined its own export security. Moreover, the European Commissions decision to investigate Gazproms activities in Europe will only compound the problems facing the relation between the two.

Notwithstanding these types of tensions, policies of pragmatic engagement between the EU and Russia seem to have gained ground in recent years. In this vein, the opening of the North Stream and the start of construction of the South Stream gas pipeline serve to bypass traditional transit countries in the contested neighborhood. However, there is a geopolitical downside to these projects. Keeping in mind particularly Ukraines strategic importance for Moscow (not in the least for energy export security), this move makes it a lot more vulnerable to Russian pressure. The European consumers would no longer be collateral damage in case energy resources to Ukraine would be cut off once again. If Russia would be able to increase its influence in this region, it could have profound effects on the EU. In the optimistic case this could spur Russia to evolve once more into a more European-like state. By increasing its commitments in the neighborhood of the EU, it could embrace its European identity again. On the other hand, this development could also form a challenge for Europe, if Moscow expands its implicit revisionist policy. It is clear that geopolitical concerns in general, and notably energy security, should be taken into account when formulating an EU-policy towards Eastern Europe.

Conclusion

This paper started out by describing the importance of geopolitics in the creation of the Russian empire and the cyclical process in which Moscows contemporary posture is embedded. The preponderance of gas and oil in both the domestic and foreign policy has also been addressed. We then looked at how the West reacted to the collapse of communism. It tried to pull CEE in its sphere of influence to reunite the European continent. The results of these efforts were mixed. Although stability and democratic reforms did take place in these countries, Russia has regained the momentum. It is protecting its interests more assertively than the EU is and it is drawing the region more into its conservative orbit. Moreover, several crippling crises plague the contested area. Energy-trade plays a key role in these problems. Recent developments such as the South Stream and North Stream-pipelines have reduced the strategic importance of this contested area in the transfer of fossil fuel, but frictions between the Kremlin and Brussels over CEE will likely persist.

Rather than to focus on power balances and exclusive economic zones, Russia would be better off strengthening its ties to influential actors (Trenin 2009, 7). In the future most countries will have some domestic resources to meet their energy needs and can import the balance from suppliers in their own neighborhood. Energy prices will drop, and consequently, geopolitics will hinge less on oil and gas. Within the next five to ten years, regimes that are dependent on energy exports will see their power diminished (Tucker 2013, 1). Russia thus needs to anticipate this trend by rebalancing its economy to avert a Dutch disease-scenario. It should also diversify its foreign policy options. If it fails to implement these changes,

Moscow could lose its hold over peripheral areas such as CEE, as well as lose domestic legitimacy due to a collapsing economy.

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