This paper will be presented at the Conference, Islam, Trade and Culture: The Roles of the Arabs in Southeast

Asia, organized by the National Library of Singapore and the National University of Singapore. Singapore 10 & 11 April 2010.

A New Resurgence? The Balaw & Islamic Revival in Post-Soeharto Indonesia

Ismail Fajrie Alatas

The last decade of the twentieth century brought a new dynamic to Islam in Indonesia, which for most of the New Order era had been excluded from the political sphere. Over the 1990s Islam came to enjoy increasing state patronage, and this Islamization of the public sphere could not be separated from the emergence of a new Muslim middle class in the country. Although several works have been devoted to the study of Islamic revival, most of them only concern political expressions of Islam.1 In response to these works, Julia Howell argues that recent appreciation of sufism has also been an integral part of the revival and therefore should be incorporated to present a more complete picture of Islamic revival.2

See: Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); William R. Liddle, The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation, Journal of Asian Studies 55, 3 (1996): 613-34. 2 Julia Day Howell, Sufism and the Indonesian Islamic Revival, Journal of Asian Studies 60, 3 (2001): 701-29.

This paper illustrates the active roles of the Balaw in the Indonesian Islamic resurgence.3 Throughout the New Order, the Balaw had formed strong links with local kyais (religious scholar) managed by multiple regional educational and spiritual centers across Java. This paper observes such network between the Balaw and the kyais as it entered the late 1990s. I argue that by 1997, the social capital of the Balaw and the kyais swelled with increased public appreciation of their position, particularly through the proliferation and expansion of majelis taklim (MT/traditional Islamic study groups). This social capital was in turn used by the military in their attempt to control the chaotic political situation in Jakarta, following the resignation of Suharto in 1998. As partners of the military against pro-reform protesters, the Balaw and the kyais enjoyed an unprecedented level of publicity in the national media. This resulted in the ascension of the Balaw to prominence on the national stage as nationalist Muslim leaders. As the political situation normalized in 2000, however, the Balaw and their kyai networks were criticized for their political opportunism, which came to be seen as a liability for the emerging Balaw younger generation. Disassociating themselves from the old network, the younger Balaw regained popularity by establishing new forms of relationships to Indonesian Muslim youth, mediated by new technologies such as the internet and popular magazines. Such developments recast once again the public role of the Balaw in terms of that of what Michael Feener has called

Balaw is a term used to denote the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad who came from the Hadhramawt valley in South Arabia. They are known as scholars, saints and savants throughout the Indian Ocean rim, where they migrated and intermarried with local population. In Indonesia, they are usually referred to by the honorary title habib (pl. habaib) or sayyid. The Baalawi will be further discussed below.

mediated shaykhs, that is, of Muslim leaders whose authority is expressed in new ways with relation to both the form and content of contemporary consumer culture.4 The article is divided into three parts. The first focuses on the general outline of the late twentieth century Islamic revival in Indonesia while enriching it with a discussion on the Balaw and their relation to this phenomenon. The second part examines the politicization of the Balaw-kyai network by looking at the roles played by several Balaw following the resignation of Suharto. The last section observes the emergence of the younger generation of Balaw and the new kinds of networks that they have established. Before moving into these parts, however, it is imperative that we developed some understanding of who the Balaw are.

The Balaw and their Sufi Order Balaw (children of Alaw) is a term used to denote those descendants of the Prophet Muhammad (sda) who settled in the Hadhramaut valley of southern Yemen. As the formative history of the Balaw has been the subject of several monographs, it will not be discussed here.5 One vital development, however, does require some discussion; that of the institution of the Balaws own Sufi path (tarqa). In the thirteenth century a Balaw scholar, Muhammad b. Al (d. 1255) instituted the Tarqa Alawyya (the Balaw path). Engseng Ho defines this as a complex of constitutive elements consisting of a canon of saints, texts, rituals, sacred places and genealogies. To this can be added another element; the scholarly network in the form of iqd al-suhba (pledge of fellowship) binding people based on their

4 5

R. Michael Feener (Personal communication, July 2009). See: R.B. Serjeant, The Saiyids of Hadramawt (London: SOAS, 1957).

adherence to the tarqa. These elements combined to generate and transmit normative understandings of moral order. As a complex, the tarqa is a malleable discourse that evolves as it confronts new historical contexts.6 One example of the tarqas malleability was its articulation in terms of Prophetic piety by the Balaw luminary, Abd Allh b. Alaw al-Haddd (d. 1719). The eighteenth century was an era when practices of mysticism centered upon the ideals and precedence of the Prophet reached its peak in the Muslim world, as studies of hadth gained prominence.7 Al-Haddd delineated the tarqa as imitating the Prophet internally and externally by following the footsteps of the aslf (the Balaws pious predecessors) and studying the hadth.8 Articulating sufism in the contour of Prophetic piety afforded the Balaw a position of prestige. As heirs to the Prophet, they could present their intimate knowledge of the Prophets words and deeds through the silsila dhahabiyya (the golden chain), a chain of knowledge transmitted internally through the family from father to son without external mediation. As alHaddd remarked, They [the Balaw predecessors] became the inheritors of the Messenger And the commander of the faithful, Al And from the two grandsons (Hasan & Husayn), they inherited Then how many scholars and how many substitutes?9 Prophetic piety therefore, functioned as the doctrinal justification of the tarqa and validation of the Balaw elevated status. From its inception until early in the

Engseng Ho, The Graves of Tarim: Genealogy and Mobility across the Indian Ocean (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006) pp. 41-47. 7 Bernd Radtke, Sufism in the 18th Century: An Attempt at a Provisional Appraisal, Die Welt des Islams, 36, 3 (1996): 360. 8 See especially his famous work: Abd Allh b. Alaw al-Haddd, al-Nasih al-dniyya wa al-wasy almniyya (Tarim: Dr al-Hw, 1994). 9 Abd Allh b. Alaw al-Haddd, al-Durr al-manzm lidhaw al-uql wa al-fuhm (N.P. privately printed, 2003) p. 553.

twentieth century, the tarqa experienced substantial modifications. In subsequent sections, we will see how Prophetic piety was further reconceptualized and redeployed to strengthen the doctrinal basis of the tarqa in light of the challenge of Islamic reformism. By the eighteenth century, Balaw migrants had settled in various parts of Southeast Asia. Their prestigious genealogy and scholarly credentials accelerated their integration into local elite kinships, forming the Creole cultural nexus in the archipelago.10 The assimilation process however, was asymmetrical.11 Although the Balaw married local women, they did not marry their daughters to non-Balaw citing the doctrine of kafa (parity in marriageability). This served to assimilate the Balaw while simultaneously maintaining distinctiveness through carefully defined lines of descent. Indonesian independence brought about a new political framework for society in which the nation instructed its subjects to think, act and behave in a way conforming with the new ideals of the majority. This necessitated that those with foreign backgrounds such as the Arabs and the Chinese adapt and integrate themselves into the dominant culture. While for Javanese or Sumatrans, it was possible to be Indonesian while cherishing their ethnic and communitarian identities, such was not the case for those whose ancestors came from beyond the shores of the archipelago. In this context, several Indonesian-born Hadramis came to call for full integration into Indonesian society, a move which secured their citizenship in the new polity.12

10 11

For more information see: Ho, Graves of Tarim, chapter 6. Ibid., pp. 173-187. 12 Natalie Mobini-Kesheh, The Hadrami Awakening: Community and Identity in the Netherlands East Indies, 1900-1942 (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 1999).

For some Balaw, especially those with traditional education however, such a strategy was seen as problematic because of their adherence the Tarqa Alawyya that connected them to a Hadrami homeland. As the tarqa functioned to secure their genealogical identity, differentiate them from others, and nurture their diasporic consciousness, it also proved incompatible with the assimilationist logic of the nationstate. A self-conscious, creative adaptation and manipulation was therefore needed to secure their place in the wider imagination of Indonesian nationhood while protecting their genealogical eminence. Thus, several Balaw scholars began to reconfigure the tarqa in the early decades of the Indonesian republic. This was done through the reshaping of tarqa rituals, shifting emphases onto prophetic piety in an hadthi framework, and the institution of expanded Balaw textual community to include local scholars. Such shifts in discursive practices were sustained by the cultivation of religious networks binding the Balaw and local kyais.

Islamizing the State & Society Throughout the New Order period, organized and political Islam had been subjected to state control designed to obstruct it from becoming an opposition to the regime.13 The curtailment of Islam in the political sphere induced a re-channeling of its aspirations to different sectors of society. In the 1970s, Muslim youth and intellectuals began forming active groups among university students. Dissatisfied with state policy, threatened by the perceived Christianization of the society and inspired by international revivalist works, the latter groups began to engage in missionary

13

Anthony H. Johns, Indonesia: Islam and Cultural Experience. in John L. Esposito (Ed.), Islam in Asia: Religion, Politics and Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) p. 217.

activities, calling fellow students to observe Islamic cultural and educational activism. Such missionary activities sowed the seeds of Islamic revival in the country.14 In the late 1980s, Muslim intellectuals and the state made an effort to work together. The self-repositioning of several Muslim intellectuals enabled them to adopt a more accommodating stance vis--vis the state.15 In addition, the military politics of Suhartos relationship with General Benny Moerdani together with the rise of the Muslim middle class persuaded Suharto to begin working more closely with Muslim leaders.16 Consequently, Muslim intellectuals developed cordial relationships with the Indonesian state. The result was several state-directed initiatives facilitating Islamic

manifestations in the public sphere such as the establishment of Islamic banking systems and Muslim intellectual organizations, the application of Islamic family law, permission for women to wear the veil in public schools, the publication of Islamic magazines and the broadcasting of Islamic programs on television.17 The President himself made an extensively-televised pilgrimage to Mecca in 1990, a move seen by many as symbolizing Suhartos turn towards Islam. Within the military itself, there was the rise of what became known as the green faction, that is, generals who were known to be sympathetic to Islam.18 The 1990s, therefore, witnessed the Islamization of state and society. Whatever the reason for such maneuver, Suhartos move toward

14 15

Ibid., p. 218. Nurcholish Madjid, Islam di Indonesia dan Potensinya Sebagai Sumber Substansiasi Ideologi dan Etos Nasional, in Budhy Munawar-Rachman (Ed.), Kontekstualisasi Doktrin Islam dalam Sejarah (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1994) p. 577. 16 Robert W. Hefner, Islamization and Democratization in Indonesia, in Robert W. Hefner & Patricia Horvatich (Eds.), Islam in an Era of Nation States (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997) p. 104. 17 For more complete discussion see: Yudi Latif, Inteligensia Muslim dan Kuasa: Genealogi Inteligensia Muslim Indonesia abad ke-20 (Bandung: Mizan, 2005) chapter 6. 18 Hefner, Civil Islam, pp. 173-4.

Islam ushered in a more liberated atmosphere in which Indonesians began to feel more comfortable with public expressions of Islam. Islamic revival in Indonesia was not, however, solely a top-down phenomenon. Throughout the New Order period, there was a substantial enlargement of the santri component in society. On the back of the regimes policy stressing the need to belong to a formally recognized religion rode a widespread fear of being regarded as communist. With modernization, the social prestige of Javanism had waned tremendously, resulting in the santrinization of the younger members of abangan families.19 Such was especially the case with those who were enrolled in universities across the country. The enlargement of the santri resulted in vivid public manifestations of Islamic piety. One such manifestation was sufisms return to prominence, contrary to the predictions of scholars like Clifford Geertz, who argued that sufism would fade from the social landscape as Indonesia modernizes.20 The re-emergence of sufism, however, was substantially different from the past in that what became popular was not tarqabased sufism but more a set of intellectual and spiritual set of practices aimed at cultivating emotional states and internalizing ethical principles within oneself. The renaissance of Indonesian sufism was the result among others of the influence of Hamka, the popular Indonesian preacher, who advocated sufism without tarqa, thereby rehabilitating sufism from its previous excesses such as vows of obedience to spiritual mentors and the rigidity of sufi-orders.21 The new synthesis, highly accessible to the Muslim middle-class, presented sufism without elements which had previously
19 20

Liddle, The Islamic Turn, p. 624. Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960). 21 Howell, Sufism, p. 711.

been the sites of contention between modernists and traditionalists. Rather than curtailing individual reasoning, the new forms of sufism emphasized intellectual and spiritual pursuits. This phenomenon indexes the reconfiguration of sufism into more modern and reformist forms. At the same time, the reformists, previously vociferous critics of sufism, began to realize the potential value of the spirituality it offered. Consequently, both reformists and traditionalists repositioned their approach to sufism, softening the distinction between both religious orientations.22 From being peripheral to Islam in modern Indonesia, sufism re-emerged in different forms and successfully penetrated its centre. The practical consequence of this development was the proliferation of sufioriented movements and study-groups. Among the elites in Jakarta, many flocked to the intensive courses organized by the Paramadina foundation and the Tazkiya Sejati foundation which offered a range of intensive lessons on sufism. Both groups targeted the wealthy elite of Jakarta, emphasizing the intellectual and ethical elements of sufism. Another form of sufism without tarqa was the Pesantren Daarut Tauhid in Bandung, founded in 1987 by Abdullah Gymnastiar (Aa Gym). Addressing ethical and psychological problems, Gymnastiar drew his ideas from the classical texts of sufism as well as from the global genre of contemporary self-help and successful management books. In addition, throughout the 1990s, Indonesian bookshops were flooded by translations of sufi texts, facilitating societys further immersion in sufism.

22

Ibid., p. 713.

By 1997, the new forms of sufism enjoyed unprecedented popularity across society, mediated especially by Islamic programs on television. Communal dhikr (ritual chanting) associated with sufism enjoyed a resurgence throughout Indonesia.23 The participation in these rituals of prominent business people as well as celebrities increased steadily.24 Such gatherings were also held to support political events linked to the regime. For instance, a dhikr session attended by one thousand participants, including religious leaders and celebrities, was held to pray for the success of the General Session of the Peoples Consultative Assembly (SU-MPR).25 In the 1990s a program called Pesantren Kilat (instant pesantren) was introduced, aimed at amplifying Islamic spirituality among school students. Usually held in three days to a week during the annual school holidays, the program provided students the experience of life in a pesantren setting. They held communal dhikr, memorized the Quran, and learnt religious disciplines. The participation of schools in the program increased annually, reaching 200,000 during the 1997 holiday.26 While in 1996, 3.4 million students attended the program, the following year saw participation jump to 6 million.27 Previously seeming mysterious and rigid, sufism was transformed in the late 1990s to become more amenable to the spiritual needs of a modernized society. The Balaw actively took part in the Islamization of state and society. In the government-controlled Golkar party, two Balaw were elected as chairmen of the
23

Abu Ibrahim, Tedy Novan & Sumanto, Dzikir Recitation Gains Popularity, The Jakarta Post (11 August 1997). 24 Abu Ibrahim, Tedy Novan & Sumanto, Religious Revival Becomes a Trend Among Local Moslems, The Jakarta Post (12 August 1997). 25 Doa Umat Islam Ibukota Sukseskan SU MPR, Republika (22 September 1997). 26 Peserta Program Pesantren Kilat Meningkat, Suara Pembaruan (12 April 1997). 27 Enam Juta Siswa Ikuti Pesantren Kilat, Republika (19 July 1997).

greener (Islamic) Central Executive Board.28 Another Balaw, the Makassar-born Quraish Shihab assumed the rectorship of the Jakarta State Islamic Institute (IAIN), and in 1998 he was elevated to the position of Minister of Religious Affairs. As a popular Quranic exegete, Shihab had his own television program and his brother, the Harvard-educated Alwi Shihab, also had his own television show on sufism. On the entrepreneurial front, Fuad Mashyur, the director of Maktour travel agency organized a Pesantren Kilat trip to Mecca every holiday season. Mashyur claimed that in 1997 the package reached a peak, with 150 participants from around Indonesia. The fact that Maktour charged US$1.850 (Rp 4.3 million) per person meant that the package was tailored for the upper class.29 Another company dominated by the Balaw was the publishing house Mizan, directed by the Muslim intellectual Haidar Bagir. Mizan had been instrumental in the translation and publication of sufi texts, including the books of the eighteenth century Balaw luminary Abd Allh b. Alaw al-Haddd, as well as Shiite texts and a range of other works, broadening Indonesian conceptions of Prophetic piety.30 On the educational front, Bagir together with prominent Balaw such as Quraish Shihab, Muchsin Mohdar (the brother-in-law of B.J. Habibie) and Muchsin Idrus al-Hamid established the Internat al-Kausar, a modern boarding school synthesizing national and traditional religious educations in West Java.31 The Balaw, therefore, effectively and publicly tapped into the broader Islamic revival in Indonesia. Although none of
The two were Dr. Abdullah Alatas Fahmi & Ir. Fadhel Muhammad, see: Lineup of the New Board, The Jakarta Post (26 October 1993). 29 Mengisi Liburan: Umrah dan Pesantren Kilat di Mekkah, Republika (11 July 1997). 30 Allamah Sayyid Abdullah Haddad, Thariqah Menuju Kebahagiaan (Bandung: Mizan, 1989). This volume also featured a long essay by Baqirs father on the Balaw entitled Introduction to the Balaw. 31 Internat al Kausar: Mendidik Gaya Pesantren, Mengajar Gaya Sekolahan, Republika (25 April 1997).
28

these personalities made use of their Balaw status, it remains, however that the usage of surname revealed their identity to a Muslim middle class. These surnames, which refers to their clan patronymic such as Alatas, Assegaf and Shihab reveal their Balaw identity as these clans were known to most urban-based middle class Muslims. The more traditionally-oriented Balaw, meaning those who were educated in the traditional Islamic milieu and were known by the honorary title habib, also partook in the Islamic revival of the 1990s. Habib Ali b. Abdurrahman Assegaf, a learned son of the eminent Balaw scholar of Jakarta also had many students among the kyais throughout the city. In 1995 Assegaf utilized his network among the kyais to embark on a dawn prayer campaign.32 The campaign involved visiting a different mosque every Saturday to communally perform dawn prayer. Starting from few participants, the campaign developed into an enormous weekly gathering attended by thousands of participants. According to Assegaf, when he notified Suharto about the campaign, the president encouraged such action.33 After prayer, the gathering engages in dhikr, followed by a sermon by Assegaf, usually on topics such as Islamic piety and devotion. The dawn prayer campaign highlights the expansion of a traditional prayermeeting, maintained by the Balaw-kyai clientele relationship and facilitated by the state. Assegaf himself noted that such a gathering would have been unthinkable before the mid-1990s, underscoring the states importance in guaranteeing its success. By the end of 1997 Islamic revival and new appreciation of sufism without formal tarqa structures continued to rise and gain popularity among urban-based
Habib Ali bin Abdurrahman Assegaf: Mengatasi Krisis dengan Salat Subuh Berjemaah, al-Kisah, 22, II (25 Oktober 2004) p. 11. 33 Ibid., p. 12.
32

Indonesians. The line that formerly divided traditionalists and modernists became blurred as sufism was reinvented to suit the spiritual needs of urban-based Muslims. Such revival enabled the Balaw to tap into the prevalent mood, resulting in a fresh public appreciation of their prominence. The Balaw-kyai network continued to expand as it promoted sufi practices in conversation with the prevalent mood, and their augmented social capital eventually drew the attention of the state and military officials. On 31 December 1997, 70,000 Muslims in Jakarta attended a dhikr led by several influential Balaw and kyais together with the Governor and the Jakartas Chief of Police.34 As the sun was setting over Suhartos New Order, the Balaw enjoyed esteemed status in a genial relationship with the people and authorities. Soon, such liaisons proved to be decisive in the confrontation following the demise of the regime.

The Network Politicized The resignation of Suharto in May 1998 heralded a new era for Indonesia.35 The previously controlled public space was suddenly liberalized under pressure from proreform activists. The absence of state hegemony meant that dissenting political, cultural and religious agendas were freely articulated. In such atmosphere, Islam was caught between the political trajectories that divided the nation. Along with it, the Balaw took on a range of new religious and political roles.

34 35

Tabligh Akbar satu-satunya Acara Masal di Ibu Kota, Republika (2 January, 1998). For a further account on the fall of Suharto see: Donald K. Emmerson, Exit and Aftermath: The Crisis in 1997-98, in Donald K. Emmerson (ed.) Indonesia Beyond Soeharto: Polity, Economy, Transition (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999) pp. 295-344.

Following the resignation of Suharto, pro-reform student activists were divided. Most decided to call their action to a halt as their objective had been accomplished. Others, including those from Forum Kota (Forkot, a consortium of student organizations from several universities in Jakarta), claimed that the substitution of Suharto with his hand-picked successor B.J. Habibie did not amount to true reform as the latter was seen very much as part of the New Order.36 Consequently, Forkot continued to stage demonstrations against the new government. Habibies supporters soon formed a movement to counter Forkot which they named Komite Umat Islam untuk Reformasi Konstisional (Committee of the Islamic Community for Constitutional Reform/ KUIRK). Backed by several green generals, KUIRK unleashed a war of slogans against Forkot by equating political opposition to Habibie with being anti-Islam.37 Forkot was accused of forming an alliance between with the communists and the Christians, who were cast in conspiracy theories as the masterminds behind Reformasi student movements. In addition, the commander-inchief of the military, General Wiranto began a campaign, imploring Muslim leaders to support the government.38 These maneuvers drew Islam into the political discourse of Reformation in the early post-Suharto period. The atmosphere further heated up as the government planned to stage an Extraordinary Session of the Peoples Consultative Assembly (SI-MPR). This Extraordinary Session was convened to expedite the election to mid-1999.39 Forkot refused to recognize the session, calling it a political maneuver devised to legitimate
36

Kees van Dijk, A Country in Despair: Indonesia between 1997 and 2000 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2001) p. 212. 37 Ibid., p. 213. 38 Pangab Ajak tokoh Agama Dukung Pemerintahan Habibie, Republika (24 June, 1998). 39 Menunggu Perhelatan Politik dengan Jantung Berdegup, Gatra (14 November 1998) p. 28.

Habibies government. Forkots campaign was joined by several other student groups as well as activists and dissenters. Rallying a force of 47,000 supporters, Forkot and its backers staged daily demonstrations against the government.40 They were backed by several old generals formerly serving under Suharto who were known for their dissenting opinions. These generals, led by Kemal Idris and Ali Sadikin, as well as activists such as Sri Bintang Pamungkas, organized themselves into Barisan Nasional (National Coalition/Barnas).41 They refused to recognize the Extraordinary Session and proposed the establishment of a presidium consisting of community leaders and activists to organize Indonesias next democratic election. Against this background, the military decided to mount a pro-government force to balance the anti-government movements. The military saw potential in befriending the Balaw, recognizing their social capital and their ability to garner mass support. On 31 July, Habib Ali Assegaf announced that the pro-Habibie General Wiranto would be coming to his weekly dawn-prayer campaign, which would be held at the national Istiqlal mosque.42 Assegaf hoped that such an event would draw Muslims closer to the military. Known for his strong connection with local kyais, Assegaf successfully managed to gather 30,000 participants to the event, held on 2 August. Several Balaw and Kyais as well as the upper echelons of the military led by Wiranto attended the gathering. In his speech, Wiranto stressed the need for establishing closer brotherhood (ukhuwah) between Muslims and the military.43
40 41

Mereka yang Menentang Sidang Sandiwara, Tempo (30 November 1998) p. 49. Ketika Para Jenderal Tua Memimpin Gerakan, Gatra (28 November 1998) p. 27. 42 Pangab Akan Istighatsah di Istiqlal, Suara Karya (31 July, 1998). 43 Dari Shalat Subuh Bersama Rakyat-Ulama-Umara: Mari, Kesalahan Ini Kita Pikul Bersama, Republika (7 August, 1998).

Criticized by the media for attempting to drag religion into politics, Assegaf denounced the accusation by explaining the need for more intense communication between the Muslims and the military, highlighting his role as facilitator.44 This highly publicized event further polarized political constellation by appropriating religious dimensions into the conflict. On 17 August, Indonesian Independence Day, several Balaw including Habib Rizieq Syihab, Habib Idrus Jamalul-lail and Habib Ali Baagil, who was known for his closeness to Suhartos family and Wiranto, together with a number of kyais such as K.H. Cecep Bustomi, K.H. Damanhuri and K.H. Misbahul Anam met to discuss political developments in the country. The result of the meeting was the establishment of a paramilitary group, Islamic Defenders Front (FPI).45 Although FPI became better known subsequently for their violent actions against nightspots and entertainment venues, it is crucial to note that it was originally founded as a movement designed to garner Muslim support for Habibie. Allegedly, a number of high-ranking military officers as well as Habibies supporters were involved in the establishment of the movement, supplying financial backing and training.46 Although remaining in the background, rumors began to spread of Baagils role as the linkage connecting the military and FPI.47 Habib Rizieq became the chairman of the movement and began to enlist supporters for the first political crusade.48 FPI recruited supporters from among the traditional followers of the Balaw and the kyais, and joined other Islamic groups

44 45

Ini Bukan Gerakan Politik! Republika (7 August, 1998). Jajang Jahroni, Defending the Majesty of Islam: Indonesias Front Pembela Islam (FPI) 1998-2003, Studia Islamika 11, 2 (2004): 213. 46 Ibid., p. 215. 47 K.H. Abdul Hayyie Naim (Interview, 22/07/2009). 48 Jahroni, Defending the Majesty, p. 215.

to demonstrate their support for Habibie. The leaders clearly stated that their support for Habibie and the military was based solely on religious grounds.49 As with Assegafs campaign, the case of FPI illustrate the process by which the Balaw-kyai network was successfully exploited to secure Habibies political position. It also, however, projected the Balaw as a nationalist group concerned with the fate of the nation as exemplified in FPIs total allegiance to the Republic of Indonesia, which was fully integrated to the groups ideology.50 As several pro-Habibie Muslim groups began to consolidate, on 30 September the Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI) staged a rally at the Istiqlal mosque attended by 20,000 people. The outcome was the establishment of the Muslim Forum of the Upholders of Justice and the Constitution (Furkon).51 Among the leaders of Furkon was a retired military officer, Rear Admiral Adang Safaad. Another leader, Faisal Biki claimed that 100,000 Muslims were ready to defend the extraordinary session. One oral source indicates that the mastermind behind Furkon, who remained in the background, was Habib Ali Baagil.52 Equipped with a large amount of funding, Furkon established the Voluntary Security Guards (Pam-Swakarsa) by giving away money for those who agreed to be enlisted. Armed with sharpened bamboo poles and swords53, Pam-Swakarsa was ready to defend the extraordinary session from the proreform activists. Biki effectively enlisted thousands of people from among the
Ibid., p. 215. Ibid., p. 231. 51 Van Dijk, A Country in Despair, p. 335. The term furkon (Ar. furqn) carries a religious connotation meaning the criterion between right and wrong, thus in the Quran (2:185), the Quran is described as furqn, to judge between truth and falsehood. The usage of the term indicates the attempt to invest religious dimension into the political conflict. 52 K.H. Abdul Hayyie Naim (Interview, 22/07/2009). 53 The usage of bambu runcing (sharpened bamboo poles) is highly symbolic as it was this particular weapon that was used by the Indonesians to fight the Dutch colonizers. Bambu runcing is therefore, a potent symbol of Indonesian nationalism.
50 49

unemployed and the urban-poor.54Asked about the source of the funding, Biki named Wiranto and Golkar leader Abdul Gaffur, an accusation flatly denied by both.55 On 5 November 1998, less than a week before the Extraordinary Session, a mass meeting of 100,000 Muslims was organized at the Senayan Stadium. The meeting united all forces supporting Habibie, including Pam-Swakarsa under one umbrella and projected the struggle to secure the session as a Jihad.56 Two days before the meeting, a popular Balaw preacher, Habib Syaikh al-Jufri claimed that, far from being political, the rally was held to express concerns by Muslim over attempts to obstruct constitutional practice.57 During the mass meeting, an array of Balaw scholars, kyais and Muslim activists sat side by side. Among the Balaw were Habib Ali Assegaf and Habib Husein b. Ali Alatas. Balaw-linked kyais were also present. The mass meeting was organized by Abdul Rasyid Abdullah Syafei who came up with a new organization called the Friendship Forum of Ulama, Habaib and Islamic Public Figures (Forum Silaturahmi Ulama, Habaib dan Tokoh Masyarakat). Also at the meeting were activists linked to the modernist Masjumi such as Ahmad Soemargono and Husein Umar of DDII (Indonesian Islamic Missionary Council). The linkage between the Balaw and the Masjumi-oriented activists was mediated by Abdul Rasyid whose father was a pupil of several Balaw scholars as well as being a member of Masjumi. In his speech, K.H. Syaifuddin Amsyir stressed the need to secure a constitutional gathering while warning the military of attempts to divide

54 55

Pam Swakarsa: Aktor atau Korban? Tempo (30 November, 1998) p. 44. Ibid, p. 44. 56 Berjihad Mendukung Sidang, Tempo (30 November, 1998) p. 48. Furkon claimed that the progovernment forces to amount to 123,500 personnel 57 Apel Akbar Umat Islam, Suara Karya (3 November, 1998).

Muslims and the military.58 The meeting illustrated the persistence of the network and its enlargement to include the Masjumi-oriented activists, demonstrating its repoliticization in the post-Suharto Indonesia. The number of military and Pam-Swakarsa recruits guarding the parliament prevented student demonstrators from disrupting the session. Three students were killed and fifty were injured in their attempts to penetrate the blockade. Many were dismayed by the result of the extraordinary session for its failure to pass the act enabling the investigation to Suhartos wealth and diminishing militarys presence in the parliament.59 The session agreed to schedule a general election for mid 1999. Despite the ensuing chaos, the pro-Habibie groups successfully secured the Extraordinary Session. Between the session and the general election, this group of Balaw scholars continued in actively supporting Habibies re-election. Assegaf maintained dawnprayer gatherings attended by military and civil authorities as well as kyais.60 FPI persisted in supporting Habibie and enjoying the patronage of the military. Nothing was ever heard again of Furkon or the Pam-Swakarsa. The hope of several Balaw scholars was shattered when Habibies accountability speech was rejected by the new parliament, hindering him from any hope of securing a second term. This concluded the political debacle that briefly brought together several Muslim groups in support of Habibie.

58 59

Apel Akbar Umat Islam Dukung SI MPR, Republika (6 November, 1998). Tuduhan Makar Setelah Semanggi Berdarah, Gatra (21 November 1998) p. 27. 60 See: Islam tidak Ajarkan Dendam, Suara Karya (7 December 1998); Salat Subuh Se-Jabotabek Serukan Perdamaiaan, Media Indonesia (14 May 1999).

The politicization of the Balaw-kyai network indicates the adaptability of this clientele relationship to changing contexts, as testified by its reconfiguration as an alignment fighting a political cause. Although without a formal mass following, the network had proven its ability to build-up mass-base in a short period. Such flexibility differentiates informal ties from formal institutions. Being adaptable also meant that the network was able to expand to include other segments with disparate cultural backgrounds such as the DDII activists. In utilizing the network, the military could easily gather support informally without entailing heavy political and financial accountability for the actions of these third parties. The network, in a way was more invisible and could disappear overnight if the need presented itself. The events of 1998 brought the Balaw once again into the public spotlight. They were portrayed in the national media as Indonesian Islamic scholars with large followings, partaking in the shaping of the countrys future. Their speeches no longer consisted of discourses on belief and ritual practice but became structured under the framework of Indonesian nationhood, public affairs and common welfare. Illustrating the development of Balaws public face, in January 2000, one national magazine, Gatra placed the headline: What are you Looking for, oh Habib.61 The eleven-page report surveyed the Balaws activism in the national politics as well as discussing their background, their migration to Southeast Asia, even including their lineage all the way to Adam through Muhammad. This report illustrated the Balaws re-entry onto the national stage of Indonesia and their success in developing public and national personas.
61

Habib di Panggung Politik, Gatra (8 January 2000).

In the aftermath of the 1998 crisis, the Balaw had alienated themselves from most Indonesians, and public opinion began to cast them as political opportunists. Their image took more beatings by rumors stating that substantial amounts of money were involved in the consolidation of support for Habibie. This, together with FPIs violent raids against nightspots earned the Balaw increasing notoriety. Such was the situation faced by the younger generation of Balaw who began to emerge at the twilight of the twentieth century. As young scholars finding their place in society, the notoriety of their predecessors meant that the network became a liability. To secure their own position, therefore, they had to disassociate themselves from the network. None exemplified this new generation better than the young Habib Hasan Assegaf (b. 1974) who began to consolidate his own followers among the youth of Jakarta. In contrast to his predecessors, Hasan championed direct access to the youth without the mediation of local kyais. Such a maneuver enabled Hasan to construct his own power base in a way that could be appreciated by the younger generation.

Old Authority Cast Anew The negative image of the Balaw-kyai network following the 1998 political debacle, induced the emerging younger Balaw scholars to abandon the old ineffective clientele relationship. These young Balaw explored new ways of presenting the traditional form of Balaw authority to suit changing context. Such realities persuaded Habib Hasan Assegaf to found a modern movement utilizing technological advancement in order to bypass the traditional structure.

Observing the energy of the youth in student political activism across the country, Hasan seemingly understood that the way to re-secure the now feeble Balaw authority was to garner youth support. Thus in 2000, Hasan founded his own studygroup designed to facilitate his direct access to the youth. This group, solely organized and managed by the youth, developed into a mass weekly gathering attracting thousands of young urban Muslim from around Jakarta. Employing the internet and modern organizational structures, every week Hasan mobilized thousands of youth for mass recitals of the mawlid, and to listen to his preaching.62 The gathering, which began by motorcycle motorcade around South Jakarta, was highly visible and attractive to young Muslims. The name of study-group, Nurul Musthofa (Prophetic Light) referred to the sufi cosmological concept of the pre-existing light of Muhammad as direct manifestation of the Divine, which was then carried by the prophet and his descendants. The name symbolizes the old form of Balaw authority as the inheritor of the Prophetic light, projected through new means by Hasan. Originally from Bogor, West Java, Hasan studied under several Balaw scholars in Jakarta and Malang. When he was 19 years old, Hasan began to preach among the youth of the urban-poor scattered across the outskirts of Jakarta.63 His direct involvement with the youth resulted in his acquisition of a large following. An energetic speaker, who combined religious learning with showmanship aided by hightech sound amplification system, Hasan was successful in captivating his audience. The central message of his speeches is the imperative to establish connection to the prophetic light which can be attained by loving him and following his footsteps

62 63

Membahagiakan Anak Muda dan Orang Pinggiran, Al-Kisah, 23, II (21 November 2004) p. 19. Ibid.

through the mediations of his saintly descendants. Highlighting the special position of the Prophets descendants, Hasan presented the traditional authority of the Balaw to the new youthful constituents.64 In his gathering, Hasan discussed the notions of sainthood, mystical stations and miracles as well as introducing his audience to the Balaw saints in Indonesia and their genealogy. In addition, he organized visitations to the graves of Balaw saints around Jakarta. This combination of narratives, rituals, sites, genealogy and visitations, revived the sanctified Balaw map of Jakarta among his followers and in so doing, Hasan re-presented the old form of Balaw authority through new means and media.65 With Hasan, the old form of Balaw authority was re-presented through direct access to the youth facilitated by technological developments and modern organizational models. Although the means of conveying the authority changed, the form of authority itself remained the same. By doing so, Hasan was able to harness the support of the youth from the lower economic and educational backgrounds, excluding those with higher education. The reason for Hasans failure to garner support from the highly-educated youth was his inability to present his message in a way recognizable and palatable to the reformist religious discourses dominant among university students. The fragmentation of Islam into various ideologically conflicting groups meant that traditional scholarship ceased to be the only authoritative source of religious knowledge. Such was the case especially among the secular university educated students who were more attracted to Salafism and favoured direct access to the scriptures. With inclinations to international Islamist revivalist organizations such
64

Majelis Taklim Nurul Musthafa: Malam Surga bagi Kaum Musa, al-Kisah,17, II (29 August 2004). p. 89. 65 For this mechanism, see: Engseng Ho, Graves of Tarim, pp. 41-47.

as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb al-Tahrir, these students became increasingly hostile to local variants of Islam and pursued agendas of Islamizing Indonesian society. The fall of Suharto ushered in an era where these reformist and internationalist discourses could be freely articulated in public, exemplified by the founding of the Partai Keadilan (later on changed to Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), which won a significant number of votes in the 2004 general election.66 These new articulations of Islam were mostly critical of sufism and its forms of authority. Thus, for them, Hasans conception of hereditary privileges and authority couched in sufi vocabularies remained somewhat suspect. In fact for many of them, Hasans message could easily be critiqued as khuraft (superstitions). This meant that the old form of Balaw authority, as projected by Hasan, was no longer acceptable to most high-educated youth. In order to secure the Balaws position in the now fragmented Muslim community of Indonesia, a new reconfiguration of Balaw religious authority was needed. A solution to this dilemma was offered by a young Yemeni scholar Habib Umar b. Hafd (b. 1962) and his Indonesian Balaw student, Munzir al-Musawa (b. 1973). This new form of Balaw authority, was the result of an interaction between the dynamics of post-unification Yemen and domestic Indonesian fragmentation of Islamic authority facilitated by the re-opening of links between Indonesia and Hadramaut following the end of the Cold War.

66

Elizabeth Fuller Collins, Islam is the Solution: Dakwah and Democracy in Indonesia, Kultur 3, 1 (2003): 143-82.

The Verandah of Medina The unification of Yemen in 1990 resulted in relatively free political atmosphere where different Islamic groups sought to secure an ideological niche for themselves amidst intense public contestations over the countrys future and religio-political identity. One such group was the Salafi oriented al-Islah (reform) political party. Ideologically and financially indebted to Saudi Arabia, al-Islah presented themselves as the bearer of pristine Islam and launched virulent diatribes against traditionalist scholars with sufi orientations including the Balaw of Hadramaut. Sufism was portrayed as religious deviation, backward looking and the source of Muslim maladies. Similar to most places in the Muslim world then, in Yemen sufism came to finds itself on the defensive.67 The relatively free atmosphere in post-unification Yemen, however, also witnessed sufi revivals such as those spearheaded by Habib Umar b. Muhammad bin Hafidz who in 1996, founded a neo-traditional academy named Dar al-Mustafa in Tarim. Defending the Balaws position as the bearer of authentic Islam, Habib Umar embarked on a campaign of reviving sufism in Hadramaut after a long marginalization under the socialist regime.68 In addressing the Salafi condemnation of the Balaw for their alleged anthropolatry, grave worship and hereditary privileges, Habib Umar presented Tarqa Alawyya in the contours of prophetic piety, by emphasizing the centrality of hadth studies in the teachings of sufism. Such decisive re-imagination and re-shaping of the tarqa enabled Habib Umar to minimize the

Elizabeth Sirriyeh, Sufs and Anti-Sufis: The Defence, Rethinking and Rejection of Sufism in the Modern World (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 1999). 68 Alexander Knysh, The Tariqa on a Landcruiser: The Resurgence of Sufism in Yemen, The Middle East Journal 55, 3 (2001): 399-414.

67

importance of hagiographical narratives, ecstatic behavior and mysticism associated with sufism.69 Not only did he battle the Salafis in Yemen, but he also embarked on international tours introducing such more hadth-oriented sufism as a countermeasure to the global dominance of Salafism. One country that he has frequently visited since 1993 has been Indonesia, upon the invitation of prominent Indonesians.70 During his first visit to Indonesia, Habib Umar brought back with him forty young Indonesian Muslims to be educated in Hadramaut. By March 1997, it was reported that there were fifty Indonesian students, predominantly Balaw, studying in Tarm.71 Thus began the intellectual reconnection between Indonesia and Hadramaut. It is important to note, however, that this reconnection should not be seen simply as a rekindling of diasporic consciousness as it involves not only Balaw but non-Hadrami Indonesians as well. These students were treated as Indonesian international students and not as returning sons of migrants who were there only for the sake of education. In Habib Umars academy, these students also organized Indonesian students association, thereby differentiating them from local Hadramis. In 1998, the first cohort of Habib Umars students returned to Indonesia bringing with them the new re-imagined hadth-oriented sufism. Faced with the similar context of a free atmosphere and expanding Salafi activism in Indonesia, these students began to deploy new strategies to reconfigure Balaw religious authority in

Ibid. For example, the invitation of K.H. Solahudin Wahid, the brother of the former president Abdulrahman Wahid and the head of the prominent Tebuireng Pesantren. See: Solahudin Wahid, Ziarah ke Hadramaut, Republika (30 May 2008). 71 Santri Indonesia Mondok di Yaman, Republika (22 August, 1997).
70

69

a fashion more recognizable to the reformist Salafis. One of the most prominent and successful Balaw of this group is Habib Munzir al-Musawa. Born in Cipanas, West Java in 1973, Munzirs background was different from most Balaw scholars in Indonesia. His father was a New York University-educated journalist and except for him, all Munzirs siblings received secular education. After concluding high school, Munzir became increasingly interested in sufism and began to study under several Balaw and kyais in Jakarta. During Habib Umars visit to Indonesia in 1993, Munzir decided to follow him back to Hadramaut.72 Habib Umar became Munzirs source of authority and legitimacy. Upon returning to Jakarta, Munzir secured financial backing from several donors from among the Balaw and others and embarked on a missionary campaign across Java. At first, he utilized the traditional clientele relationship with kyais connected to the old network, supplying them with funds to organize oratory sessions in their localities. Although he succeeded in organizing heavily-attended sessions throughout Java and beyond, the campaigns did not manage to materialize into a self-sustaining movement and no continuity could be achieved. In addition, such a capital-intensive campaign speedily exhausted the funds Munzir was entrusted with, inviting donor suspicion.73 As his financial means decreased, the sessions also came to an abrupt end. Munzir came to a conclusion that the traditional clientele relationship between Balaw and kyai was no longer effective. Observing the roles played by the youth in mobilizing masses as well as the success of Hasan in establishing his own power-base, Munzir altered his strategy for

72 73

Munzir al-Musawa (Interview, 15/07/2009). Ibid.

direct access to Muslim youth. Avoiding the problematic legacies of the engagement of the older generation and their networks with the last gasps of the New Order Regime, Munzir established several small weekly youth study-groups in Jakarta. In 2000, Munzir set up a weekly gathering, Majelis Rosulullah (MR) in Jakarta, attended by an increasing number of youth. He also began to manage MR branches all over the country. By 2004, MR had fifty-four branches throughout the Archipelago.74 The name of Munzirs organization reflected the hadth-oriented sufism he inherited from Habib Umar. Observing the failure of Hasan to garner support from the Salafidominated Muslim students, Munzir was convinced that by presenting Tarqa Alawyya and the authority of the Balaw in a more scripturalist mode recognizable to the Salafis, he could win their hearts. Presenting the tarqa in a scripturalist form, however, did not mean that Munzir stripped it of its spiritual practices and liturgies. On the contrary, Munzir defended practices associated with sufism such as mawlid, intercession, and grave visitation by employing Prophetic hadths and Quranic exegesis subscribed to by the reformists. These positions are clearly set forth in Munzirs book, which explains Sufi practices and justified them scripturally.75 Referencing works used in reformist circles, Munzir construct his arguments in a form recognizable to the reformists. Further supporting his authority and credibility, the concluding part of the book listed several isnd he possessed, including a chain of the Sahh al-Bukhr. The deployment of isnd reinforced Munzirs legitimacy on matters scriptural. Munzir, therefore, personified the interaction of domestic Indonesian developments and the religious dynamics in post-unification Yemen.

74 75

Majelis Taklim Rasulullah: Penyeru Ajaran Nabi SAW, Al-Kisah, 4, III (27 February 2005) p. 87. Munzir al-Musawa, Kenalilah Aqidahmu (Jakarta: Majelis Rosulullah, n.d.).

While the book justifies sufi practices such as grave visitation by engaging with scriptural arguments, Munzir also organized grave visitations. He arranged public visitation to the graves of Balaw saints around Jakarta. Taking heed not to alienate his reformist students, he began this practice by visiting the national heroes cemetery (pahlawan nasional) and hosted a prayer session there.76 In his speech, Munzir reminded his followers of the heroes sacrifices for the nation, while simultaneously discussing the permissibility of grave visitation.77 Following the success of the public visitation to the heroes cemetery, Munzir brought his followers to the graves of Balaw saints. He was very cautious, however, to present these Balaw personalities not as saints but as Muslim activists and reformers. Thus, when visiting the grave of Habib Ali al-Habsji in Kwitang, Munzir discussed his social activism, missionary zeal, love for the nation and his adherence in following the Prophets footsteps.78 In other words, saints were portrayed not in a devotional manner but in more rationalized modes by presenting their achievements in this-worldly spheres of activity. A similar phenomenon in the broader context of contemporary Indonesian Islam has been discussed by Michael Feener in his discussion of the ways that more rationalized approaches to religious figures are transforming the process of veneration into what he called appreciation.79 The new appreciation of the sainthood of Balaw scholars provides a new space for communicating the saints worldly
76

In Indonesia, the title national heroes of Indonesia is given to the patriots who have made substantial contribution to the history of the nation. The conferment of the title is a highly formalized event officially declared by a Presidential Decision. Such process formed a rigid and formal canon of Indonesian national heroes. 77 Munzir al-Musawa (Interview, 15/07/2009). 78 Ibid. 79 R. Michael Feener, Shaykh Yusuf and the Appreciation of Muslim Saints in Modern Indonesia, Journal for Islamic Studies 18-19 (1998-1999): 112-131.

achievements, framed in the vocabularies of Prophetic piety and Indonesian nationalism as inspiration for others. In doing so, Munzir managed to incorporate Balaw sacred places and canon of saints into his mission without alienating any would-be reformist followers. Munzir employed the figure of the Prophet as the symbol of his organization. In this way Munzir, like al-Habsji and Ibn Jindan before him, worked to recast the religious authority of the Balaw in the mold of Prophetic piety. Munzir, however, presented a highly scripturalist form of Prophetic piety without explicit reference to the Balaw, preferring to use Sahh al-Bukhr, which is a text of Prophetic hadth highly revered by all Sunni Muslims. Taking the study of hadth as the foundation of his organization enabled Munzir to communicate with and be recognized by the reformist-oriented urban youth. The reconfiguration and re-presentation of Prophetic piety was clearly demonstrated in his weekly gathering where he meticulously combined sufi rituals with recitals of hadth texts. The session began by reciting the mawlid, accompanied by drums reflecting the articulation of Sufi metaphysics in the form of popular devotion to the Prophet. Following the mawlid, several hadth from the Sahh alBukhr were recited and Munzir delivered a verbal commentary on the hadths. Refraining from discussing sufi metaphysics, Munzirs orations discussed the hadths in relation to the problems faced by the Muslims in Indonesia.80 His emphasis on hadth-based prophetic piety was clearly expressed in Munzirs frequent statements of MRs objective: turning Jakarta into the veranda of Medina.81In doing so, he

80 81

Personal Observation (07/06/2009). Munzir al-Musawa (Interview, 15/07/2009).

successfully tied scriptural discourses to the more general Indonesian public discussions, thereby presenting Prophetic piety in communication with the idea of the common good. By recasting the tarqa in reformist fashion in communication with contemporary developments, Munzir successfully raised his popularity and secured his authority by capturing the scripturalist proclivities of the student demographic. Munzirs success however, was not solely the result of his reconfiguration of authority to suit the changing local context. More importantly, its success lies in the utilization of modern technology. Munzir actively utilized modern communications technology to further his missionary agenda and enlarge his following. For instance, in safeguarding his popularity, Munzir continued to manage direct access to his supporters mediated by the Internet. In his website, www.majelisrasulullah.org, Munzir administers a question-and-answer forum, where his supporters can contact him directly, enabling them to interact directly with and even express criticism to Munzir.82 This enables Munzir to continually re-adjust himself to the demands of his supporters.83 Apart from this, the website also features his speeches, reports and agendas, facilitating long-distance students and supporters. This intensive use of the internet indicates that Munzirs demographic target is largely that of middle-class, university-educated Muslim youth. Munzir thus epitomizes the new phenomenon of the mediated shaykh. The website also generates revenue for Munzirs organization. In his attempt to make MR an independent organization, Munzir produced jackets, key rings, books,

82 83

http://www.majelisrasulullah.org/ <viewed, 10/02/2010>. Munzir al-Musawa (Interview, 15/07/2009).

posters, drums and DVDs, all bearing the MR logo.84 Adopting modern marketing strategies enables Munzir to generate income while promoting his organization. For instance, most of his supporters wore MR jackets making the organization quite visible in public space. With Munzir, the tarqa was rearranged into a modern organization similar to that of fan clubs popular among the urban youth. Munzir, therefore, successfully constructed his movement to correspond with broader development of branding Islamic vision such the Manajemen Qalbu of Abdullah Gymnastiar. Such marketing schemes effectively communicate his organization in correspondence to Muslim consumerism in Indonesia. One manifestation of this Muslim consumerist culture can be seen in the popularity of new Muslim magazines. Following Suhartos resignation, the government reviewed the press regulations under which the Ministry of Information could revoke a publications permit (SIUPP). The streamlining of the SIUPP generated numerous new publications. During the first six months of the Habibie government alone, five hundred new permits were issued.85 Several Islamic magazines were released, most notably Sabili, a Salafi-oriented publication with a circulation of around 100,000.86 This new trend drove the Balaw entrepreneur Harun Musawa to found alKisah magazine in 2003. Started as a Muslim bimonthly with wide-ranging coverage, Harun came to consider the Balaw as a niche market. Surprisingly, when he tried to

http://www.majelisrasulullah.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1&Itemid=3&lang=id <viewed, 10/02/2010>. 85 Krishna Sen & David T. Hill, Media, Culture and Politics in Indonesia (Oxford: OUP, 2000) pp. 69-70. 86 Syamsu Rijal, Media and Islamism in Post-New Order Indonesia: The Case of Sabili, Studia Islamika 12, 3 (2005): 425-470.

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include stories of the Balaw saints, the market responded positively.87 Thus on its second year, al-Kisah posed photos of Balaw scholars on its cover.88 Again, the market responded positively and Musawas circulation agents requested that he continues to put Balaw scholars photos on the cover. From then on, al-Kisah became a popular magazine specially catering to Indonesian Muslims with sufiorientation and particularly those who recognize the Balaws religious authority. The contents of the magazine focuses on profiles of Balaw saints and scholars, reports and agendas of study-groups in Indonesia as well as articles on spiritual, legal, dream and theological consultations. Refraining from discussing political issues, alKisah mainly focuses on the world of the Balaw and their followers in Indonesia. To date, al-Kisahs circulation ranges from 60,000-90,000 per edition.89 Examining the section of the magazine called Friends of al-Kisah illustrates the magazines active readership though the information it provides:

Table 1: Age distribution al-Kisah active readership. Age Distribution Total Percentage 10-19 222 27% 20-29 546 66% 30-39 52 6% 40-49 1 0% 50-59 1 0% 60-69 1 0% Grand Total 823 100% Source: al-Kisah (January 2004 to September 2007)

87 88

Harun Musawa (Interview, 23/08/2009). The first issue to do so was no. 19/II (12/09/2004). 89 Harun Musawa (Interview, 23/08/2009).

Table 2: Regional distribution of al-Kisah active readership

Regional Distribution
Greater Jakarta West Java East Java Central Java South Sulaw esi North Sulaw esi West Sulaw esi Southeast Sulaw esi Central Sulaw esi West Sumatra North Sumatra

Source: al-Kisah (January 2004 to September 2007)

Table 3: Distribution of al-Kisah active readership according to educational level Educational Distribution Total Percentage Secondary School 37 8% High School 207 43% University 109 23% Post-Graduate 0 0% Diploma Program 28 6% Military 1 0% Pesantren 94 20% Grand Total 476 100% Source: al-Kisah (January 2004 to September 2007)

Although far from a complete and exhaustive source, the data can be useful in identifying al-kisahs active readership as being mostly young people (between 15-30 years old), living mainly in Java with high concentration in Jakarta and Central Java, educated in high schools and university. The educational distribution also indicates that the magazines active readership is made up predominantly of readers from nonpesantren backgrounds. Of 476 responding readers only 94 were educated in

pesantren. 244 respondents are still in school, whether secondary or high school and 137 are educated in tertiary institutions. Among the Muslim groups frequently covered by al-Kisah, Munzirs MR tops the list. Several articles discuss Munzir and his organization.90 The magazine also covers the visits of foreign scholars such as Habib Umar to MR, adding to the groups legitimacy.91 Another article tells a story of a delinquent boy, who repented after attending MR, and afterwards brought his whole family to attend.92 Such articles helped to construct the successful image of MR among the readership and expanded Munzirs popularity beyond Jakarta. For instance, a letter thanked the magazine for covering Munzir telling how through him, the writer had found the true path and asked the magazine to continue covering Munzir.93 Another letter requested the magazine to supply a pin-up photo of Munzir.94 A letter entitled Habib Munzir my Idol! asked the magazine to prepare a special section for transcript of Munzirs speeches.95 These examples underline the powerful mediating effect of the magazine to expand Munzirs credibility. Recasting his organization in a popular and marketable way attracted the attention of modern media such as al-Kisah, which in turn enabled Munzir to be publicly more-recognized and appreciated. Such functions previously operated by the kyais were now maintained by the media that catered to the

Two articles describe MR in details: Majelis Taklim Rasulullah: Penyeru Ajaran Nabi SAW, AlKisah, 4, III (27 February 2005); Habib Berjenggot Merah, al-Kisah, 9, IV (7 May 2006). Another article carries a biography of Munzir: Pembangkit Bagi Ahli Surga, al-Kisah, 3, V (11 February 2007). 91 Habib Umar bin Hafidz di Majelis Rasulullah SAW, al-Kisah, 6, IV (26 March 2006); Agama itu Mudah, Jangan Dipersulit, al-Kisah, 14, IV (16 July 2006). 92 Berjuang tak Kenal Lelah, al-Kisah, 21, III (23 October 2005). 93 Habib Munzir Idolaku, al-Kisah, 12, III (20 June 2005). 94 Bangga dengan Habib Munzir, al-Kisah, 16, III (14 August 2005). 95 Habib Munzir Idolaku!, al-Kisah, 9, IV (7 May 2006).

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increasingly consumerist Indonesian Muslims. This was a substantial departure from the earlier Balaw-kyai network, indicating a reconfiguration of religious authority in contemporary Indonesia. With the popularity of new Muslim magazines, however, scholar such as Munzir no longer needed to mediate the kyais and are instead themselves being mediated by magazines such as al-Kisah and by sufi-oriented websites. Thus Munzir epitomizes a different role from previous Balaw scholars, that of the mediated shaykh. That is, Munzir is a scholar whose authority is expressed in new ways with relation to both the form and content of contemporary consumer culture. With Al-Kisah therefore, the Balaw became established as an Indonesian popular phenomenon, indicating their successful integration to the wider public. Such integration into national dynamics was the result of the Balaw self-conscious effort to adapt to the changing social and political contexts of post-Suharto Indonesia. By continuously recasting their tarqa in a form attractive to the changing tastes of Indonesias Muslim public, the Balaw have managed to reconfigure their authority to suit the prevalent Islamic discourse. While formerly, the Balaw needed the kyais in establishing their authority, by the time of Munzir, such authority was generated instead by his ability to market his ideas to correspond with growing Muslim consumerism. By adapting to this changing notion of religious authority, Balaw scholars like Munzir are able to secure their own authority while at the same time become an integral part of contemporary Indonesian religious and cultural dynamics.

Conclusion On 20 March 2008, around 100,000 Indonesian Muslims gathered at the National Monument (Monas) to commemorate the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad. Organized by Habib Munzir al-Musawa, the celebration drew the participation of Muslim scholars, government and military officials as well as political leaders. The celebration reciting the mawlid written by the Hadrami Habib Umar b. Hafd, took on the slogan of Make our Muhammad the idol of todays youth (Jadikan Sayyidina Muhammad sebagai Idola Pemuda Masa Kini).96 The event symbolized the successful adaptation of the Balaw and their Tarqa Alawyya to the new cultural and political contexts of contemporary Indonesia. The ritual was a sufi liturgy conveying a message of Prophetic piety recognizable to Islamic reformists. The venue was the national monument, symbolizing the Balaws continuing commitment to Indonesian nationalism. The slogan, utilizing the vocabulary of contemporary popular cultural expressions such as Indonesian or American Idols, communicates the message in the idiom of rising Muslim consumerism. In this paper I have traced permutations of the Balaw in the context of the Islamic resurgence of the 1990s, which included the development of new appreciations of sufism. With Munzir the Balaw, who formerly constituted a diasporic community with their arcane and elitist sufi tradition, became an Indonesian popular phenomenon. This shift in the orientation of the sufi path obliges a rethinking on examining the Balaw as merely a diasporic Hadrami in post-colonial Indonesia. In this regard, this paper demonstrates some of the ways in which the history of the
96

Tabligh Akbar, Ribuan Orang Putihkan Monas, www.detik.com <viewed, 10/05/2008>.

Balaw was integrally linked to the development of other Muslim groups in the country. The surfacing, submergence, and resurfacing of the Balaw correspond with analogous developments in Indonesian Islam more generally. This calls into question the usefulness of continuing to approach the Hadramis in post-colonial Indonesia through the lenses of Diaspora Studies. It is my contention that the Balaw can be more productively viewed as part of Indonesian Islam than as a self-referential Hadrami diaspora. By escaping the diasporic framework of analysis, we are in a position to better appreciate the history of the Balaw, their success in integrating themselves with the dominant discourses of nationalism and Islamic reformism, in cementing social bonds with the kyais and other Indonesian Muslims, while at the same time maintaining their identity, heritage, and tradition in a coherent way. Through adaptation and creative manipulation of their discursive tradition, the Balaw came to be recognized as Indonesians albeit with a unique genealogical distinction. Adopting such positions enabled the Balaw to navigate the middle way in the ongoing creative tensions between assimilation and exceptionalism. ----------------

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Websites http://www.majelisrasulullah.org/ <viewed, 10 February 2010>. http://www.nurulmusthofa.org/ <viewed, 10 February 20010> http://www.detik.com/ <viewed, 10 May 2008> Interviews Abdul Hayyie Naim (Jakarta, 22 July 2009) Habib Munzir al-Musawa (Jakarta, 15 July 2009) Harun Musawa (Jakarta, 23 August 2009)