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a-*

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oxj.
1

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8

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\u25a0I.

iWy%Sm%M^ first priority target., vTOT^^vwia^ Generally r ';? airing;, oar -^taelcs selected the right targets and did not overlco-: any instairaticns, the bombing of-.which would havp ended the .*<var sooner. Explosives fae torie a. should have received more. attention. The. priority .vtfiich .we. put- on the , targets' was' not al ways ri giit either/ He also ffelt., that i.-G. .Farbeir plants had boen con;pai ati'v-oly spared for.^some particular reason,^

t^^tlfgfr !

'

t.

'

i"S*
\u25a0'\ ;.

*<^
'

spe

'

'

lirf^ald, Airframe, .engine and ball-bearing factories;. 143? Attacks on airfields vi/ere generally effective.. It was, repairs within -a short time. o'i'evor, very easy to matee", necessary hoy called this "the .race between the shovel- and the bomb" ("Wevtlauf zv/ischen Spaten und Bombe").

\u2666

'

raise and 'en gine-' factories, priority 14- 4 # As between _&irf should definitely, have been gi.v'eti \u25a0to -the..- Xat46r v ;At-tack-g'- on -airfrai Pcr.+ v U.^' s. WoW >o effective,, but conceritrated. attacks on engine fact (This,' incidentally ories -v/ould' hvs-ve crippled the GAP much! sooner. contrary' to the opinion of Prof, i^SSSERSCHMITj?, who was "ques is' tioned on this ::,nd other points and: claimed, that there is no difference in the importance of these two types of targets.)
j. .-.v,J

'

'fi

145/ Attacks on ball-bearing manufacture were, according to G-OERIrTGr, -none too effective. Ec offered three 'reasons for this: Dispersal, Underground factories, and above all, substitution' of
roller-be-.: .rings for bail-bearings.
t

'.

Synthetic^ Oil Works and Gainraunic^tioh L^nes. 146. . "-Then came attaclcs .on. two elements,
jines

which hurt us con sicerabiy. 'l With these words (fOJMifG -expressed the : damage done to the 'GAP "by our /attack^ on- Synthetic Oil Worfcs and-Communi cation /
:,
\u25a0

t.

': % Ml ;: s fhev; :;at^ac^s .'fev'Syti tlfeti'c; :-: Gli WQjfk&ji-^er e^. /-the- \u25a0mo.s^t-.e^fec.tiye:: i 0f::, .all :;s;tr i gior;.fe;o2ibin gt-ms-iM&:1b d:s:ij; ;d;eC;i fte in:;;'G-EEMAN"f f s Id'^f&btA & lie
\u25a0\u25a0 ;
\u25a0

av:warw !^

;ayailsbaifty;;o;f r :ji^ j4pitiu: /: ons tan i ;;C "bombing reduaiS; :"iih:d:..;a iif put
;

1L 48 : :;:Ea e G-Alf-;s chedulje ;- for : naXly'; -proyide;d avi ;$1 on :\ f 1 lie o prb;au :c-t;on of\u25a0\u25a0 jQQ:,(}QQ--^oti:Qr:^ feaye:';beeja \aiiiple :':" 9 prx)ducM on \u25a0; o f :-:1 60 ;Q0 0 :fton s^,in : ..the.- ; suiniiier J : i ,4; ;'*>% \u25a0'" Tthea r^ ave rage
' '
.-.\u25a0

, :wiati;o-n^
:

'

\u25a0

'

\u25a0

.tSnf :: :;arra'; as an .example :;of

effects he -related: llmt ,;In ;;th.e vEuesian .Campaign 3 yOOO sorties p&r:-day,^ad redneed ; : \u25a0-S'OOl ('on ,-e2oe;ptional'.Vis,js . :t.d 12Q)v -per -aat Mar: % -aate&^ ;
\u25a0

. .the
;

'

q f ,thrsv-::reluc:tion,: "

::1 -.,: b00=.5

:-^

-26,000

;.

;/:

;/.

; : '; ;': ;' v-. . \u25a0.-:'\u25a0 '-v^ \u25a0.;\u25a0,'::\u25a0. ->\u25a0\u25a0-' ;\u25a0.;\u25a0 \u25a0;>:'.-\u25a0. ":\u25a0"\u25a0 . . : \u25a0'.-"?\u25a0.' \u25a0'\u25a0'\u25a0\u25a0 :, \u25a0\u25a0'\u25a0'\u25a0 ;,, '" : -:'\;':-.; : ;'v^;.:.:. > -":: ; ' ,;-J.-'-'--v:^,- ; '- -'\u25a0.'\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0 V; '\u25a0'.>-":. ':-\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0';.: \u25a0'^.^\u25a0,;' ,;-J.-'-'--v:^, ';" \u25a0'\u25a0 : >-:: v:/:~-^ '.' "-^v .:" :'.^1 :''.v \u25a0'/\u25a0 V.;- ':. . ' .\u25a0'^'^ :-' \u25a0-^"/:.-/-. ?' 'v --." '?, ./ZL'p-C>',-: r. A GGiaceh'tra:bloii on oil targets; xn^preference" teV .our ;'; T poli.cy os 'boming "a,iror:aft;r and : ;lDaIl .beaming fec tories from '.: J^ainua-r^ :: ' g.^4i \u25a0; bn-; w-oula ,no ;t Jiav^e ridug try: ;to : rec p v:"cia?- su'f .' .': 1 tte d the :'s/g; -l: "cia? oil;targe ta-'i n.'-\u25a0^\u25a0y :'i;eieiit;ljx,:;tc>;pT^^ :s^^e::^m4^t-;V/st ::KQ.^s'* -' \ ln order ;to .niinimjZ the effect \u25a0of our a'f tacjks " wouid,!:;hav.e y ; #:^\u25a0\u25a0'ipi;^ had to be ,:sBo-t; : :cibwn v' :; ;

.^nt'ea^rL^
:

'

'
i>-::i

'

\u25a0

\u25a0

-.
\u25a0

'

:i

:"a,iro ft;and:lD

\u25a0

\u25a0

\u25a0

; ;

p\u25a0e^- :>da^ >^;^^Tae^;- :airc;r

Iha^e ;-:r.Gboyer^dv;s4^^"i: :^s

Tb.e disruption of dur communication lines has done more hv^m'tp us than the destruction of our factories*-" Our attacks on 151.
?!
N

*
-

r'

'X

\u25ba

a
(t

-<?

<

the German transportation system' bee nine p rticul^rly severe anal notice d^le jt : time when it vvas finally decided to build'? underground factories. The destruction of the transportation ;l:; l : prcvarc^d a contr action of industry which h^d previously scoter. been dispersed all over the country in underground factories.
moi)Z

Conclusion The following conclusion cm be dm-.n from G-OBRING's In ordoi to hamper the German Air Force most, the following order of targets should h ;ve heon observed-" c ) syn tli i Oil Vor&o et c b) Oornmunic tions. c ) Aero-engine .f r,c tor ie &., d ) Ai franre fac tor i ; :; r e:s . c) Ball-bearing factories ; :'\u25a0\u25a0 : f). Airfields..
st ,tevents*

152.

T5 fi ,g o4" "D.on ii

rjc<

\u0084

155. . . .G-QERINGr emphasized that they; were very relieved whenever we- failed to . bomb' the" same target ; in close succession and allowed . them. the breathing spell that they were praying for in order .to "a . " carry out, operationally vital repairs.. It- also; gVe ; them s.uffie:ient' time to s:lv.-ge and remove vital machine .tools. An. outstanding
FUEO: which, if it h^d been ;promptly repeated, would have -had ,air even, .more crippling, effect -than the '60% damage resulting from the one attach. . Both .GOERING- . md ERAUCHITSGH : ccnsidered the Allied \u0 84' raids on DBSSDEn- this February, when one blow followed the other in quick succession, the most . de.adly, most demoralizing and., t-here fore the most effective, series" of r ;.ids of the war

\u25a0

;\u25a0 154, -",Hp thing; i.s more terrible tha^i an attack wlii eh i made s on the "same target three times in a ro.vv. That really undermines the resistance of the -people. !!

CARPET BOBfIBINa ON TROOPS, -. l!?5. . ' -Carpet bombing on troop concentrations was as in the ease of ST. LO, very e'ffective^ On .one, occasion, tanks, assembling planned 'at to;ck on a grand scale were. severely hit , ..It . to:ol: for a. them six hours to reassemble, : thus rendering the intended at.ta.ci?: '" .\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0-\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0 \u25a0\u25a0 , impossible. . . . \u25a0\u25a0'\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0.\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0 . .'\u25a0
1
\u25a0

....

\u25a0

\u25a0

\u25a0

..

l UU.U i'J J- i.L.'ri.i-.-J.lliiri.v,UJ-L.L/V.'

Dispersal

of Industry .and,; [Jn-de-r ground Factories 156. The first step in counteracting the dam:ging; effect of a, step . \u25a0; our strategic bombing was the dispersal' of industry of the .'des proved, fatalabeeause which later~on, as outlined above :> truction of the 'G-erman railway system. , -\

\u25a0

\u25a0

GOERIHG- claimed that he favored the building :of under ground, tories. at an ec':,rly stage ,'.. "but w^s -.-frustrated at first ;; by the opposition put up. against this plan by the industry as' Industry, he claimed',; did-not realize in \u25a0 '; well a&' by expert-s'., Moreover, . ; the beginning the danger of our coming- air attacks. dispersal v/as much simpler than going- underground. The opposition of :the oil experts was based on the .claim' that much -too great ; /.; a risk was involved on account of . the danger of explosions.

157.

feg

>

Disc u s::s ion on tiiis ;subject gaye VG-OERING- another opportu jskecf-now It .r?s nit;/* f-o s'io; lie*, "humane" he really was. possible th .:_\u25a0\u25a0,. n a totalitarian; regime, the .opposition of d.i~.ls ocul: f l'jistr tte i plan decided upon by the Flihiung, lie answerEd; "I did not auit 'go send them to a cij4Stt#i^

153.*

t. %

\u25a0!t

H,

-L ll ' l

'

ilpf
> 1

"
give

iii m self

:av -iy 'by s. i : "After ng

11

the GAP would have been less vulnerable.. . But .even so without on 'the .'railway' system,' i^ie.GAE: would h:ive been com pletely underground hj the *fall 0f . 1945. ; .Production, particularly ox j- x irci" n t, raid hv^ bi vi on sul'St "1 sc^l*-. Th.c jioo't tion r^n.^u" Tor IIJilr, .lone _iiovided ioi the r.iiduf-?,cttoe Jone novided ivinuf ?,c ol bOO "1^- <^ , ' put ..until
our attacks
1

159. . GQZRING believed th :-t if the building of underground factories n.d been- carried out ;in 1942 and -19A5 instead of . 1,944,

At t'.Li,'^ turned out, v/liv n it finally v /~.s decided--to- fo i '.. F. : 3'i s ul v i.e. 1 nis "ib ; ot too hot on. cc !^ ground", 'It r> ft too 1 a, s / thc^i the Allied 2*r and forces S~ It(d TO 6'- ]T ir iM^-Olt ill iao- s tri -1 areas. x

I^o.

io* .J-\

'

C-mouflig
' ge -v;:;-.:.s of ten an ef-fective mean's ; of jTrot^c'tibn against air' attacks \u26 6. "You h..iv e. been fooled quite nicely by oar c.vaioufl-:ige and 'by .our dummy installations." c Tti many c;ues \u0084 mete id. of trying to repair damaged factories, essenti & production continued underneath the debris, at the same time . givinCD the illusion tli:t operations h..al c ome to a standstill and that

161.

\u0 84c

aimed

that

c:;moufl

the. plant li.-,,d been, abandoned. In these cases .very great' care was taken not to 'remove any more "debri s than ;was absolutely necessary for re& tax ting. operations , usually on a much, reduced scale.
:

. 162, Another ruse was. to start fires, far away from the real - . a target thereby deceiving a/c returning,, in follow-up -attacks.PART

v;
t

THE BATTLE OP BRlTiill

i i\(

T.TTr":'. OTi'VP V i\.;J.L'JU

~\ :LO.

:.t

Fleet,"

Thu P'/.rt. which the G-AP Vv'as^'to play in 'the-, preparation for .the eventual invasion of G-r r-~> ,t Sritain was to gain absolute air 'suroremacv" over the British T lea, and to destroy the British
\u25a0 \u25a0

British'

. :164, .Fighter, planes \u25a0cons-tit tutEd the only British sis set 'at \u25a0that time..' It was therefore the im ,of the GA.P to destroy the
Fighter Force.

lop. Trie tor the fail 165. The reason for tiie lailure to invade ENGLAND > according to GOIi.:RII\TGr,. 1 :.j in tie lacrk of stiff'icient shipping space .-. in particular completely insufficie Nt number of landing craft. \u25a0. If the German Navy would h ;:ve . h ,d the latter, the German Fighter Force, so .izOERING- believed would have been able, to r protect a. landing,. ,aa .jvKGLaHD had no bomber t. that time./ Once a'bridge head-had been established, . GOEE.IN O" as, sure that the invasion . would haye been, successf :il . Tlier c was nothing to off er ; effective resistance -? no army, no Flak, no bombers ; Only Volkssturm", he
\u25a0-I

c\

exclaimed
\u25a0

'in self

"

mockery.

GAF S'TRENCrTE AND LOSSES DURING THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN 166, During 'the Battle of. Britain the -.'GAG? strength In air craft, bombers, fighters, and fighter-bombers increased slightly* At any rate, -G-OEEING stated that, at the end of the Battle of a Britain- the ..G-AF had slightly more a/c than at the . beginning.
\u25a0

||!

1 T a , G VI 1c t-: 3c s dai i tliat battle, were .recording"' to

iig , w-jt^ /,, yiffU*. c ci.l not know even :,:approxim-:te fig-ares
i^o |i)^< iiir Eorce and said; \u25a0tiii-.'t he would have lyfvf '" &&?}f4 uHsiil mL* nfl v "sip H "fir "p t"! MS if laments on . -this subject; wi/iich, of course,

. jPj^i^,
15 7

Ai^Air

collection, production of bombers in 1940 tli.:.t of fighters about -400 a/c per month.

K-j-:"il|i FOR l? 8;, ;!T?lie : pl^n vfey

x
;

finally ..e QKV's' pol-icy : of van. entire; G-s ''BQ&gfk^:^rgm .; tlia "Wesif and -finally the OHL's policy of: an entiie G-o sellwader from the V/est' : ;bul.idi:ng c;:ap- ;\u25a0 bM,:; of :i- reserve for the coming Allied t^ifixn''< a reserve fto- -th;- eo mihg^llied " in^-.,s;ion ? :.; size--' xn^C&B J on :ma:d e\u25a0 i.lio:^mpQ,s sf fele '. 'to \u25a0carry out bombing on any size, n:.:5-3 it impossible to- carry able . scalo.; : Oon*|y.ently"> tlie a ttacks 'soon petered out. Consequently, th c att.LC.ks soon seal a
\u25a0

> ' tilEiETijii' aiisae^^f v r|<p#@^@ :i^, "tlie,'. swl-tcfe loamber to-: figliteir ;pr o Sue tioii> ;.J&e l&^*.;rfl^:uiai#mej3.^ for . nightfighters, the .wiwithdrawal production, the^GAr requirements for nigh tfght er s., the-, thdrawali thdrawal
\u25a0

'

- onV E(|LiM)',ori.gitet d
:
'\u25a0

,
\u25a0

-mou

\u25a0

\u25a0

TJT A"hf ;g.cx4.si; .

\u25a0-.

'\u25a0' \u25a0\u25a0

-\u25a0" 4.PWXng\' the i-as^ ipontho B G: QEEIKG V-"". -VMI69 , 4.PWX^g\ "tlxe 1-ast ;ipon t!lgs of 1944, 'G-'QERIHG v at:|a6l::

7^.

\u25a0

'"\u25a0\u25a0 T -'. ;V---.-"' .\u25a0r*T-^ : :2'\u-*2*5\5a0u2 a0 \u 5a0 \u25a0;^\0a52\- u u:00.:a52 ' : ; -=\u0084;.: .'\u25a0 ~&T yzX^M^Lits*,*:
\u25a0 \u25a0 \u25a0

\u25a0. \u25a0

\u25a0

\u25a0\u25a0:

-.\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0.\\uu25a0\u25a0"\u25a0.; 25a0

' . -..

\u25a0

\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0

;\u25a0

\u25a0\u25a0

: gM%figh ti^s ;Bhou;ld; -^/upon- .thfir:;:r'tu^ :^: : plan;: w,as, :;;dio;apprQed by Vg|fjjjt who believed that it was notfo;:re ? ..earrled \u25a06i%: only 'Otx worth the- .?ff or The idea ;.was) -4%era : a: very. siiiali; soel af te.r^ the faM+wce'. Mi "^the, ;Aixl^HSS. -offensive
:

ai|^4nrt 'BSgLAMIj; ;
;

\u25a0

planned
l

thi| bx ne his idea^was -tha-t G-erman . .. , ime'his idea v was -th^t t@%';h. a pt Bri;ti i sfe;, bOiHbet;S:";^n%le^ \u2landings in British.- bombers while 5a0\u25a0\u25a0DL-Ji %i3 .23t^'
4--;

another

mm^&Mmp^m

mm wm^m
\u25a0\u25a0

; \ 170. . There v?e re -extensive \u25a0reconaaissane'e ; flights ;; over v the' spring bf 1944 and in li^it^d^reooHna^s-sance was, -es,rmd ; ou;tv; shortly^be
c yV' ; with gooxj #eOU{Lt s:cr^u.i- j^ipg:w^B';:n: fuil re:Cohnai :sance-\of o;; ".We st-co^st potts aitd \u25a0X'ONS9Jf/-\aJt.^M(^h.d-; Q|)yng : of 1944. e ;
\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0

CTGIiATO Ports
-&i&

PART

VI

.THE .rgOl^Ty:? ,g A *VJI'AC& RJSSI&, v e .\u25a0\u25a0"\u25a0l7l :;--(^SRlK^y^;fee^i-ii^^:'"bei' ag busy. . with- hi;.s; Xuftwaf f: :,\u25a0 hadA :; -.^ idoas of Jafs own. Regarding "G-er; san: Foreign- Pp'l ray, and";had a^ plan- :
\u0084;

SHE

RgSSTjyB
,

CAMPfiIQM. A1B: fSE IPSBXAN,/ AJ3. -FORGE;

attaofe^n RUSSIA:
j

\u25a0a ;: seobnd.

-that^it. had become known ;that BUSS II intended G-a:apai.gn ,gfeii4t : BIKI AI-iV;.ana at: the^saaiC tiiie>.an -espah L slon/; to the;. South 'an the 4ireGtipn\bf . the : BiBMNELLES :. - :

i'72v

;| f-:;

||f - :::paid

.: ;

wh,o SpsniJ^rd s- : ,/ :as: WIBIB^ tG^arda the Germans \u0084nd gratefji^ for the assistance the Germans had;, given .them in their -"liberation : froni /i&Q&unam I and wo'iild : have x had ;'no. objeqtion%: , poy the. sajue .TvasQnj FRANCO >
would ;h \u0084ye'::i-gran ted'; the- ;:la|e- ;tha':- u;se; Q;f,;'Sp|ii'shi^
\u25a0tr^boatSv

af siihd :? S-QSBJW- :Bugg&B^m^ :that^ :;: te r:-th.e 173^ :v, 'WiSi-'thi in : -of :;iir?AHol^'--sOffie; :-E^^ defeat French : -wQUJ'-d allow,the .- &;erns 'to;- .Wo ye . through FE4HOE; :into SFAIi There the. :;Sermans; ' were . to- i?akb -O|.BEAjJf IEVfrom'j-the:;^rear-i :\u25a0 The
:

*-^^

j>

174, AWith GIBRALTAR lost diid -:dtli the B^EDA^IiLBS \u25a0. threat en o,d I by the Eijssi^ns j.-CrOSEING- furthermore counted. on using British s anti-Russian 'sentiraant aroused by the iattei" ! renewed att..\cls: on

4^vw-^mo&
/

Am& llllAi

".:\u25a0-"

\u25a0,;< \u25a0: ;\u25a0

iQ;/ODO- r- a\::fi|;?re

\u25a0

\u25a0

willeJi ;\ G-O:fel|; :;:i;ls^^:giit.;i me;lt :;/tls^fei.gS2:v.

:

v
.,

lle^e'^^i^;.'' ,;' ,; -^
:
\u25a0

;^v'^;:^

.a/c
"\u25a0'\u25a0'\u25a0:\u25a0 .'
;

1000 to 1500

at_any
\u25a0\u25a0'\u25a0
'
\u25a0

one
i :

a/c".
\u25a0'\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0>"'.\u25a0/

In certain array sectors, ihej had 1500 : 'time. -Int he BUG- (VISTULA) bridgehead they, flew
:.: ; '--v '
\u25a0\u25a0-\u25a0\u25a0'
\u25a0 \u25a0 \u25a0

. - 20002\u 5a0-.; v :: ;:.; '%

:
\u25a0

\u25a0; J^. ..I.' k i-. \u25a0'\u25a0p-30^';. \u25a0' r : ou/': >vv :.t;e:caH^

\u25a0;:;: .;

ficers f':\ : ;;,;''\u25a0\u25a0 Q-^r.man air-and -^gi-oiind 'offor /;^ .^ho-t' ix-;.i;t:Jh^d.-'no |;;;.bee n. Jf. - :--; ;
;
J
;

' '^'
;

:' 7: \u25a0gt^ted:':th^ t;/..tiiey ;were gr:e/:'.t;:;mas"ter& ;in;- the

':i'

e.

'^\u25a0".;

' '\u25a0 :\u25a0.'\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0. '. \u25a0.' \u25a0\u25a0 .\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0;\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0'\u25a0\u25a0 \u25a0. " ^\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0' .\u25a0' :'; G- c oasidered '.the- :Ru-sgi an -M&T:- Wp&&}.t q'a-Jd. c : 'poor ';. G'OBEIIf
'

'\u25a0

art;

o\ ;im^rQ^i:scitaon
belief.
\u25a0

: . \u25a0\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0.

\u25a0;\u25a0 ;: \u25a0; ;

,V

a&

we11,.:
;

/Hey'siatedjils
:

;.

have vde&Xt 'wi'tE;. tae: Russiaii Air.:F-orce : .easily

:;18^;,:
;!

iH:ie,'-- (leriiians could ; ::

'.\u25a0./ . ;.\u25a0.
\u25a0\,

:[\u25a0:\u25a0-.\u25a0\u25a0 \u25a0';. \u25a0\u25a0\u25a0

: :v. v. .2 \u25a0"\u25a0-\u25a0 'v '

' ;

v ; ,

/.'

\u25a0j^ "!r-:; --:; \u25a0-'\u25a0^feF.s ig^kH-'"'"^^.#^^J^X -.".j^O'SiSjlsS. ; ,;V.;,'. I)ue : to- \u25a0GrOEBiNG | : policy; s >' ?/ tii:e ;18^;, eneiiiy^S; ;4ir 'Force :Cir;s:t r:/ thexus:siahB lost r at' ';;:y.; ;---.i&oCjority;;Dti-;:ihe :; .grpund , ? mirxii^ tfee fi v three
;

:.\u25a0:

.\u25a0

2 f0Q 'day s

::

rfOQr

\u25a0

^\u:;:the;with,, "-.'\u25a0\u25a0: 25a0ai v;vast .':/. a.^c ,

:
I

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initially yery flight;/ :They /"became

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OF MOSCOW.

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was seriously .applied. It. just' a TOl??S^(^^l^i)lili||^je mM^'-- \u25a0'\u25a0\u25a0' by HITLER 1 s sarcastic" question: \u2666To you think that 'there is'"'a/- : ; >. Geschv/ader left in the G-AF that would have the courage to fly ; .' >'."\u25a0 - to aOSCOtf?" , . '.\u25a0"\u25a0""

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.- 184. Since RUSSIA offers very few strategical targets for an ; operational Air"Force on account of her dispersed industries and .". cities,- ...nd since she lacks conimuni-cation 'centers .and . marshalling j?xd:B in; the European and'- American sense GOE'RING in-tended to. ' undermine her military potentialities, with a concentrated blov/, . towards the cad qf March l-945y against ail "Russian electrical . * power stations. The code name for this operation w,as' "Eisenhammer.
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185, HITLER, however, discarded this plan in favor of attacks on the ODER bridges which ,in GOSRIHG's" opinion, were' futile as these bridges y/ere rebuilt within 3 days.
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;

RUSSIAN

AND AIR ?/W INTERROGATION METHODS, 186, The Russians were very poorly. informed about the GAP. They eagerly sought any information" on the subject, :.nd interro gated captured German airmen on all phases-, of the" GAP, 'but'their e valuation w....s poor. In addition to this-, their captives- were not :,ble members, of the Luftwaffe,.' . particul;:...rly

IN'TLL.^IG-SnCE

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107*
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GCERIIJG defined Russian methods 'of interrogation "Whip and candy 'but more whip than c.ndy."

with

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RUSSIA AND JAPAN. 183. In discussing the Russian campaign, GOERING ventured opinion regarding tine possibility of RUSSlA'S 'entry into the an war against OAPAN. He reasoned that RUSSlA, cannot afford to do -so without impairing her economical position. He' claimed th^t had always tried to get the best German engineers. RUSSIA With their help and with her own wealth in raw materials, RUSSIA, am bitious to. become the strongest econoiiiical power of the world, had built an enormous industry behind the URALS, In order to stay on :. competitive basis with the US/ RUSSIA will, according' to GOERIUG, not participate in the war against JAPAN. ',
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It must be emphasized that this reasoning, like almost everything else- GOI'RIHG- s.aid in connection with RUSSIA, springs' from the only sincere feeling' GOElNG- seemed to be capable of his h:-tred for RUSSIA and his hope that the war, which GERMANY has just lost h \u0084s not been the last one.
189,

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190. The old' Nazi methods .and tricks,- particularly the effort to create die-mention among the Allied powers, appear to h.ve _, survived the collapse of- the regime and se.em to continue to aasert > themselves even in a lost cause.
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-:

191 It might be Interesting in this connection -that -Qberst v. BF.AUCIIITSCH,- in discussing our victory, injected the remark:- "This time you \xon it." There v/as so much emphasis on the first two .wordi. th.it one coald not help but feel that he was thinking merely -of . one round' 'ln a -ai. r.teh which would -not be the last.
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PART VII..
Till;; JAPANESE 'THIS y'A^AJM.Jb'bii;

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192.

GO?^)RING

profes'-^Jp^Q-.acnomf

very little about ".the Japanese

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q^ / tha/ Me(;; -26-2 :be ;:

ttht;' :opinion'
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that :

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stiort.B2? route 'via ,Bli basing -their refus

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The

Ja-pan

General; KBSSEL, 'from

had renounced U-l:O--t.

the non

JAPANESE INTAKESI1 1I '. 204-. "Rather sarcastically ref for: know! e dgo GrOSRIN.G-..' related ; tha around showing a particular inters st allat ions

M:AIj{PA.

205,

MALTA, his answer

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206 ., He claimed
assault 'on MALSA .was
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there,

207, 'I* -diait

,t bo ti dc royr $oy d
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208. -us Itc li

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BARI, POIjTaV.A AND CQSSIGI 209, r. The.s.ucc

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th- t 't I,AIvT I'aoL ;r.s o a iisec ,:i

As to. th
thot :the Impending
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flown with them to ts findlngs *

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c upying . ICELAND:, iloweiver;v XOE-p :;* : could not attempt to iiiFc.de: , a vj e 1*,\u25a0 v^i re sh e c ould no t empl oy her Air.Force* The-German ' Navy was so inferior to the. British' jj'leet . tlaat it could 'not he ltdLor uiiu Britis dc.pt a<? \u25a0\u25a0! a o.i foi j^rot otioiu '-oreovor, OBRMANY was trying hard "to -^ V j*' Ai- u"V ou'o of the, vrii nd. an oocupGtion: of ICELAND would strategically nwi: called for -,n- \u25a0QGcupation of (jEEEHLAII) riti'-. t. jio :11t iia7e called for- a : occupation 'of, G-RBENLAHD too/ c ,lled This, -it was felt, would .find- little: underst&nding. in the United - \u25a0\u25a0...-\u25a0'\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0.'\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0 O . . . u^c \u25a0'.

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6;f 21 2 The .inv-::lg^^n' : . BGEWAY was successful' fe-eoause . th&re were same landing-:fielcli, even %hough theee^ V7er@., rather In addition, tile G-.a.F; coula. and diu-mV:.ke -use of frozen \lalces /V : A2ORES.. .'.;\u25a0 . "\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0 .\u25a0-.\u25a0:: : v -.-;: ;-'-- \u25a0;., : \u25a0\u25a0-\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0 \u25a0r'- :-\}~ ::' :^--::/ 'r'-: . :-. ;21;i>. : A .plan had also been undfer consideration.., .whereby the : ADOBES vr Gre to be invaded if and when the G-IBEALTAR 'pro ject had : . .; ;.a -, . ;.; .' : :/'\u25a0: been 'carried :out a
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CONCLUSION

Tae M ReichsmarsG]:iall n as' will be apparent' from ..the .length of triis= report, was willing enough -'to- talk :.nd to questions, .O'u certain \u25a0subjects dud, details, however, he was^not This, may' partly well informed, fee/ due toy/hat his Adjutant :;re?l;re as hfs "easy going nctisri ?1 ? but partly -also to his. Un furred to illingne to face unple^v^ant ifests;, which/ of ten led. his assist : !a; / .n-ts to coxicaa.l the truth fras aiia* : a a

214.
"

215, The abov:e leads' to another observation; oio/fc only did a his voariina/ stc,r, and HITLER* 8 constant interference, dampen his

laird wors, but' the once daring fighter ace and posi; war politician had, surrounded by outward conjf ort, wealth' and luxury,' be coioe soft and afraid' for his life,
ciysirat'or
\u25a0

G-OBKIHG-, still playing with the . idea of stepping into Siloes' and, for thi.s reason, atteinating to appease Ulai-iIiEE finally shied away from the final consequences v>iiich . -. top might, on tail. And it was mora like the. playing with SUC Q the idea whoaa lie exclaimed r "If 1 ever had to' use. an armored . Everybody knew that car^ then -this v/oula have been the moment. " my first sove would have been to do- -away with 'BORMAM.
\u25a0:

.216,

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HITLI|:R'b

his- ruthleso towards namely:- HI have never by citing- onr: of his own statements, signed n's death warrant, or .sent- anybody to a concentration camp, B^'lx?'? ri?\\i^> lISIY-xZI'* * unless,, of course,, it was a question , a of military necessity and es pecllQnoy. f? >
Jdps
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217. ,Eis 'ss'lf-cioceit

rem.ij.xied right to the very end and these unc! r him, can best Jfre illustrated

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ERIp M. WAR3UHG AC. It Col./. CoffiCianaiag.

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