6. Beltran v.

Secretary of Health, 476 SCRA 168 (2005) Facts: Petitioners comprise the majority of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Association of Blood Banks, a duly registered non-stock and non-profit association composed of free standing blood banks. Public respondent Secretary of Health is being sued in his capacity as the public official directly involved and charged with the enforcement and implementation of RA 7719 or the National Blood Service Act. Section 7 of RA 7719 provides phase-out of CommercialBlood Banks. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the said provision on the ground, among others, that such represents undue delegation if not outright abdication of the police power of the state. Issue: Whether or not RA 7719 is a valid exercise of police power Held: Petitions dismissed. The court upholds the validity of RA 7719. The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State. The health of the people is a primordial governmental concern. RA 7719 was enacted in the exercise of the States police power in order to promote and preserve public health and safety. Police power of the state is validly exercised if (a) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, requires the interference of the State; and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the objective sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals Police power is the State authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Thus, persons may be subject to certain kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general welfare of the State and to its fundamental aim of government, the rights of the individual may be subordinated. 7. YNOT vs IAC FACTS: The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of Executive Order No. 626-A which provides that the carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos. The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* 3 which upheld the trial court, ** and he has now come before us in this petition for review on certiorari. Compiled by ETC Constitution Part 2 Case Digests

ISSUES: Whether or not executive order no. 626-A is unconstitutional due misapplication of police power, violation of due process, and undue delegation of legislative power? HELD: The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A, amending the basic rule in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In the light of the tests mentioned, we hold with the Toribio Case that there is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion. But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing. We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat. Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government. This measure deprives the individual due process as granted by the Constitution. The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. This was felt necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an Compiled by ETC Constitution Part 2 Case Digests

"iron rule" laying down an implacable and immutable command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances may require. Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due process lest they confine themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they may need to vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated. The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. In the exceptional cases accepted, however. there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it. In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, 21 Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused. To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional. 8. National Development Company and New Agrix vs. Philippine Veterans Bank Facts: Agrix Marketing executed in favor of respondent a real estate mortgage over three parcels of land. Agrix later on went bankrupt. In order to rehabilitate the company, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree 1717 which mandated, among others, the extinguishing of all the mortgages Compiled by ETC Constitution Part 2 Case Digests

and liens attaching to the property of Agrix, and creating a Claims Committee to process claims against the company to be administered mainly by NDC. Respondent thereon filed a claim against the company before the Committee. Petitioners however filed a petition with the RTC of Calamba, Laguna invoking the provision of the law which cancels all mortgage liens against it. Respondent took measures to extrajudicially foreclose which the petitioners opposed by filing another case in the same court. These cases were consolidated. The RTC held in favor of the respondent on the ground of unconstitutionality of the decree; mainly violation of the separation of powers, impairment of obligation of contracts, and violation of the equal protection clause. Hence this petition. Issue: Is the respondent estopped from questioning the constitutionality of the law since they first abided by it by filing a claim with the Committee? Is PD 1717 unconstitutional? Ruling: On the issue of estoppel, the Court held that it could not apply in the present case since when the respondent filed his claim, President Marcos was the supreme ruler of the country and they could not question his acts even before the courts because of his absolute power over all government institutions when he was the President. The creation of New Agrix as mandated by the decree was also ruled as unconstitutional since it violated the prohibition that the Batasang Pambansa (Congress) shall not provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the government. PD 1717 was held as unconstitutional on the other grounds that it was an invalid exercise of police power, It had no lawful subject and no lawful method. It violated due process by extinguishing all mortgages and liens and interests which are property rights unjustly taken. It also violated the equal protection clause by lumping together all secured and unsecured creditors. It also impaired the obligation of contracts, even though it only involved purely private interests. 9. Gallego v Sandiganbayan (check yellow pad) 10. Estrada V. Sandiganbayan (red folder) 11. ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division) and the PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES, respondents. FACTS: The People of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed on July 12, 1989 an information before the anti-graft court charging the accused with violation of Section 5, Republic Act No. 3019,5 as amended. That on or about and during the period from July 16, 1975 to July 29, 1975, in Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, Alfredo T. Romualdez, brother-in-law of Ferdinand E. Marcos, former President of Compiled by ETC Constitution Part 2 Case Digests

the Philippines, and therefore, related to the latter by affinity within the third civil degree, did then and there willfully and unlawfully, and with evident bad faith, for the purpose of promoting his selfinterested and/or that of others, intervene directly or indirectly, in a contract between the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation (NASSCO), a government-owned and controlled corporation and the Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Company (BASECO), a private corporation, the majority stocks of which is owned by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, whereby the NASSCO sold, transferred and conveyed to the BASECO its ownership and all its titles and interests over all equipment and facilities including structures, buildings, shops, quarters, houses, plants and expendable and semi-expendable assets, located at the Engineer Island known as the Engineer Island Shops including some of its equipment and machineries from Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte needed by BASECO in its shipbuilding and ship repair program for the amount of P5,000,000.00. ISSUE: Whether the constitutional right of the petitioner to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was violated for not specifying the acts of intervention that he supposedly performed. HELD: The Court did not agree with the petitioner's contention. When allegations in the information are vague or indefinite, the remedy of the accused is not a motion to quash, but a motion for a bill of particulars. The pertinent provision in the Rules of Court is Section 9 of Rule 116, which we quote: "Section 9. Bill of particulars. -- The accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill of particulars to enable him properly to plead and prepare for trial. The motion shall specify the alleged defects of the complaint or information and the details desired." The rule merely requires the information to describe the offense with sufficient particularity as to apprise the accused of what they are being charged with and to enable the court to pronounce judgment. The particularity must be such that persons of ordinary intelligence may immediately know what is meant by the information. While it is fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged in the information, matters of evidence -- as distinguished from the facts essential to the nature of the offense -- need not be averred. Whatever facts and circumstances must necessarily be alleged are to be determined by reference to the definition and the essential elements of the specific crimes. In the instant case, a cursory reading of the Information shows that the elements of a violation of Section 5 of RA 3019 have been stated sufficiently. Likewise, the allegations describe the offense committed by petitioner with such particularity as to enable him to prepare an intelligent defense. Details of the acts he committed are evidentiary matters that need not be alleged in the Information. 12. Ong vs. Sandiganbayan Facts: This Petition for Certiorari,[1] dated December 13, 1996 seeks the nullification of the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated August 18, 1994[2] and October 22, 1996.[3] The first assailed Resolution denied petitioners motion to dismiss the petition for forfeiture filed against them, while the second questioned Resolution denied their motion for reconsideration. Congressman Bonifacio H. Gillego executed a Complaint-Affidavit[4] on February 4, 1992, claiming Compiled by ETC Constitution Part 2 Case Digests

that petitioner Jose U. Ong, then Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), has amassed properties worth disproportionately more than his lawful income. Issue: Is the respondent in forfeiture proceeding entitled of due process? Ruling: no, it is clarified therein that the doctrine laid down in Almeda v. Perez[32] that forfeiture proceedings are civil in nature applies purely to the procedural aspect of such proceedings and has no bearing on the substantial rights of the respondents therein. 13. BLAS F. OPLE v. RUBEN D. TORRES Facts: The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking of the right to privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of rights and the rightmost valued by civilized men." Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz :(1)it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and(2)it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion.A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation. Issue: WON the petitioner has the stand to assail the validity of A.O. No. 308 Ruling: YES Rationale: As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the standing to sue of the petitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that petitioner has no legal interest to uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power.

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As taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308. The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing rules of A.O.No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card. Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announced that representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have completed the guidelines for the national identification system. All signals from the respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait for the formality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that we tighten the rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an important constitutional principle and a fundamental right 14. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Facts: On May 5, 1992, this Court issued a Resolution in GR No. 104704, disqualifying Melchor Chavez, private respondent therein, from running for the Office of Senator in the May 11, 1992 elections. Petitioner filed an urgent motion with the Comelec praying that it (1) disseminate through the fastest available means this Courts Resolution dated May 5, 1992 to all regional election directors, provincial election supervisors, city and municipal election registrars, boards of election inspectors, the six (6) accredited political parties and the general public; and (2) order said election officials to delete the name of Melchor Chavez as printed in the certified list of candidates tally sheets, election returns and to count all votes cast for the disqualified Melchor, Chavez in favor of Francisco I. Chavez. On May 8, 1992, the Comelec issued Res. No. 92-1322 which resolved to delete the name of Melchor Chavez from the list of qualified candidates. However, it failed to order the crediting of all Chavez votes in favor of petitioner as well as the cancellation of Melchor Chavez name in the list of qualified candidates. Issue: Whether or not the law allows pre-proclamation controversy involving the election of the members of the Senate. Held: A simple reading of the petition would readily show that petitioner has no cause of action, the controversy presented being one in the nature of a pre-proclamation. While the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies involving local elective officials (Sec. 242, Omnibus Election Code), nevertheless, pre-proclamation cases are not allowed in elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives. Sec. 15 of Republic Act 7166 provides: For purposes of the elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives, no preproclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns or the certificate of canvass, as the case may be. However, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns before it. Compiled by ETC Constitution Part 2 Case Digests

15. LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., petitioner, vs. JAC LINER, INC., respondent. Facts: The City of Lucena enacted an ordinance which provides, inter alia, that: all buses, mini-buses and out-of-town passenger jeepneys shall be prohibited from entering the city and are hereby directed to proceed to the common terminal, for picking-up and/or dropping of their passengers; and (b) all temporary terminals in the City of Lucena are hereby declared inoperable starting from the effectivity of this ordinance. It also provides that all jeepneys, mini-buses, and buses shall use the grand central terminal of the city. JAC Liner, Inc. assailed the city ordinance as unconstitutional on the ground that, inter alia, the same constituted an invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of private property, and a violation of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies. Issue: Whether or not the ordinance satisfies the requisite of valid exercise of police power, i.e. lawful subject and lawful means. Held: The local government may be considered as having properly exercised its police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Otherwise stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of relieving traffic congestion in the City of Lucena, they involve public interest warranting the interference of the State. The first requisite for the proper exercise of police power is thus present. This leaves for determination the issue of whether the means employed by the Lucena Sangguniang Panlungsod to attain its professed objective were reasonably necessary and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The ordinances assailed herein are characterized by overbreadth. They go beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem. Additionally, since the compulsory use of the terminal operated by petitioner would subject the users thereof to fees, rentals and charges, such measure is unduly oppressive, as correctly found by the appellate court. What should have been done was to determine exactly where the problem lies and then to stop it right there. The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights. It is its reasonableness, not its effectiveness, which bears upon its constitutionality. If the constitutionality of a law were measured by its effectiveness, then even tyrannical laws may be justified whenever they happen to be effective.

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Compiled by ETC Constitution Part 2 Case Digests