ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

GENERAL PRINCIPLES:
Executive Secretary vs. Southwing President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, through Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo, issued EO156, entitled PROVIDING FOR A COMPREHENSIVE INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND DIRE CTIONS FOR THE MOTOR VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM AND ITS IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES. Article 2, Section 3.1 prohibits the importation into the country, inclusive of the Special Economic and Freeport Zone or the Subic Bay Freeport (SBF or Freepor t), of used motor vehicles, subject to a few exceptions. Respondents, Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc. (SOUTHWING), United Auctioneers, I nc. (UNITED AUCTIONEERS), Microvan, Inc. (MICROVAN), Subic Integrated Macro Ven tures Corporation (MACRO VENTURES), and Motor Vehicle Importers Association of S ubic Bay Freeport, Inc. (ASSOCIATION), filed actions for declaratory relief, pra ying that Art. 2, Sec. 3.1 of EO156 be declared unconstitutional because it was an unlawful usurpation of

legislative power vested by the Constitution with Cong ress it was decided in their favor. Hence, the current petition questioning the decision. Issue: Whether Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO156 is a valid exercise of the Presidents quasi-legislative power. Ruling: Art. 2, Sec. 3.1 of EO156 is void insofar as it is made applicable to the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area but valid insofar as it applies to the Philippine territory outside the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base. Police power is inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare of society. It is lodged primarily with the legislature. By virtue of valid delegation, it may also be exercised by the President and ad inistrative boards, as well as the law making bodies on all municipal levels, including the barangay. Quasi-legislative power authority delegated by the law-making body to the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of the law and implement legislative policy. Requisites for valid administrative issuance: Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature; This

requisite was satisfied by EO156, which as both constitutional and statutory bases. Sec. 28(2) of Art. VI of the Constitution provides that the Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such li mitation and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quot as, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government. Tariff and Customs Code, EO226 (Omnibus Investment Code), RA880 (Safeguard Measures Act; SMA) authorize the President, when general welfare and national security require, prohibiting imports of commodities. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; Difference between legislative rules and interpretative rules: Legislative rules subordinate legislation, crafted to implement a primary legislation. Interpretative rules which give no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. Notice and hearing is required when an administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render less cumbersome the implementation of the law and substantially increases the burden
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of those governed (legislative rules). EO156 is a legislative rule because it seeks to implement or execute primary legislative enactments intended to protect the domestic industry by imposing a ban on the importation of a specified product not previously subject to such prohibition. However, there being no objection from the respondents as to the procedure in the promulgation of EO156, presumption is that it duly complied with the procedure s and limitations imposed by law. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and The third requisite is not complied with as EO156 exceeded the scope of its application by extending the prohibition on the importation of used cars to the Free port (SBF), which RA7227 considers to some extent, a foreign territory.> RA7227 provided for the conversion of the Clark and Subic military reservations to a Subic Bay Freeport, wherein SBF enterprises may import and export freely. The subject matter of the laws authorizing the President to regulate or forbid importation of used motor vehicles, is the domestic industry or the customs territory that is the portion of the Philippines outside the SBF. It must be reasonable. Issuance of the ban

to protect the domestic industry is a reasonable exercise of police power. > The problem it seeks to solve is the deterioration of the local motor-manufacturing firms due to the influx of imported used motor vehicles. However, it becomes unreasonable when such ban applied to the SBF. > As long as the used motor vehicles do not enter the customs territory, the injury or harm sought to be prevented will not arise.

enforcement of its resolution because PRC and RTC is a co-equal body hence does not have any power to control each other or interfere with each others acts. PRC further invoke Sec 9 paragraph 3 of BP 129 saying that it is CA who has jurisdiction over the case not the RTC.

Issues: 1. W/N RTC AND PRC is of the same category, where RTC cannot pass upon the valid ity of the Admin Acts of the latter and it is CA who has proper jurisdiction not RTC. Lupangco vs. CA 2. W/N the Resolution is constitutional? Ruling: In October 1986 PRC issued Reso. No. 1.No, in order to invoke Sec 9 of BP 105 as part of the "Additional Instruction 129, there has to be a final order or to Examinees" to all those applying for ruling that resulted from proceedings admission to take the licensure wherein the administrative body examinations in accountancy. The involved quasi-judicial function. QUASIresolution embodied the following JUDICIAL function refers to action, provisions; "NO EXAMINEE SHALL discretion, etc. of public administrative ATTEND ANY REVIEW CLASSES, officers or bodies required to BRIEFING,CONFERENCE AND THE LIKE investigate facts or ascertain the CONDUCTED BY OR SHALL RECEIVE existence of facts, hold hearings and HANDOUT FROM ANY COLLEGE REVIEW draw conclusions from them as the basis CENTERS...DURING THE LAST 3 for their action. This DOES NOT cover DAYS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDDING EVERY rules and regulations of general EXAMINATION DAY". applIIcability issued by the Admin Body Petitioner (all reviewees preparing for to implement purely administrative the next licensure examinations in policies l accountancy) filed on their own behalf ike Reso. No. 105. and in behalf of all those similarly situated with RTC a complaint for SC further held that orders and injunction with prayer for the writ of resolutions of PRC fall within the general preliminary injunction against PRC to jurisdiction of RTC because of the restrain the latter for enforcing the absence of a provision in the law Resolution that is found to be creating the Commission that its orders unconstitutional. and resolutions are only appealable in PRC filed a motion to dismiss with CA on CA or SC. And since PRC is attached to the ground that the lower court had no the office of the President for general jurisdiction to review and enjoin the direction and coor 2

dination hence as settled in our jurisprudence, even the acts of the Office of the President may be reviewed by RTC. 2. No, Reso No. 105 is held to be unconstitutional. It is an axiom in ADMIN LAW that administrative authorities should not act rbitrarily and capriciously in t he issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations MUST BE REASONABLE and FAIRLY adapted to secure the end view. Res No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinee s right to liberty guaranteed in the constitution. It further violated the academic freedom of schools concerned

Biak na Bato vs. Tanco During the mining boom in 1933, a group of hopeful and enthusiastic individuals from the North, appeared to have located from November, 1933 to February, 1934 one hundred seventy (170) mining claims in hinterlands of the Cordillera Mountains in Sitios of Pasil and Balatoc, Municipality of Lubuagan, Mountain Province (now known as the Municipality of Balatoc, Province of Kalinga-Apayao). The land covered by said 170 mining claims is adjacent and surrounds the mining properties of Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc. On February 8, 1969, the petitioner Biak-na-Bato Mining Co. was created as a partnership in accordance with law. And on November 19, 1969, the locators, namely: Bernardo Ardiente, Emilio Peralta, Mario Villarica, Anastacio Cano and Salvador Ellone, each executed a Deed of Transfer of Mining Rights assigning,

transferri ng and conveying to the petitioner the mining claims covered by the aforesaid de clarations of location On December 4,1969, Biak-Na-Bato Mining Co. filed with the Bureau of Mines the application for lease and a petition for an order of lease survey of the aforementioned mining claims (Rollo,Ibid., p. 42). However, it received a notice of the letter of the Director of Mines refusing to issue the order of lease survey because the areas covered by the mining claims were allegedly in conflict with the four (4) groups of mining claims purportedly owned by the Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc. and Mountain Mines, Inc. (Rollo, Ibid., pp. 45-46). On January 12, 1970, Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company filed its separate protest with the Bureau of Mines against BalatocLubuagan Mines, Inc. In said protest, BiakNa-Bato Mining Company contests and disputes the right of Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines , Inc. to eleven (11) mining claims and the right of Mountain Mines, Inc. to another nine (9) mining claims (Rollo, Vol. I, Petition, p. 12). After the ocular inspection conducted by the Bureau of Mines inspection team, a report was submitted with topographic map and pictures of the improvements. According to the report, the ground works improvements and other form of assessment works in the mining properties of said respondents were significant and extensive, all evaluated and assessed at P582,996.60 (Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 621-690). The Director of Mines promulgated its decision in both cases, holding that as

against Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company, the Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc. and Mountain Mines, Inc., have a better right to the 170 mining claims of about 1,520 hectares located at the Cordillera Mountains, in Pasil, Municipality of Balatoc, Province of Kalinga-Apayao (Rollo, Annex "B", pp. 134-145). From the said decision of the Director of Mines, petitioner appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, docketed as DANR Case No. 3613 entitled "Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company vs. Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc." and DANR Case No. 3613-A entitled "Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company vs. Mountain Mines, Inc." (Rollo, Petition, p. 9). In its appeal, the Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company questioned the first ocular inspection report. The Secretary in the exercise of his appellate power and in justice to the petitioner ordered a second ocular inspection, after which the second inspection team submitted a report confirming the findings of the first ocular inspection team, and also reported that Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company despite opportunity afforded was not able to show its location in the area (Rollo, Vol. II, pp . 693-701). On September 17, 1971, the Secretary rendered his decision on the appeal, affirming the findings of facts of the Director of Mines and declaring Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc. and Baguio Mines, Inc. s mining area not open for relocation in 19 67-1968 and therefore Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company s locations null and void. The 3

Secretary also declared that its mining claims are table located, and therefore null and void, and that it had no legal personality to file the protest in the Bureau of Mines. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: ISSUE: W/N the contention of the petitioner is correct. HELD: As a general rule, under the principles of administrative law in force in this jurisdiction, decisions of administrative officers shall not be disturbed by the courts, except when the former have acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Findings of administrative officials and agencies who have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence (San Luis v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 261 [1989], Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. v. Lopez Enag e, 152 SCRA 80 [1987]) and are controlling on the reviewing authorities (Doruelo v. Ministry of National Defense, 169 SCRA 448 [1989]) because of their acknowledged expertise in the fields of specialization to which they are assigned. Even the courts of justice, including this Court, are bound by such findings in the absence of a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion, which is not present in this case at bar (Gordon v. Veridiano II, 167 SCRA 53 [1988]).

There is no question that the decision of the Director of Mines as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is substantially supported by evidence. Substantial evidence has been defined or construed to mean not necessarily preponderant proof as required in ordinary civil cases but such kind of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion (Castro v. CA, 169 SCRA 383 [1989]; Bagsican v. CA, 141 SCRA 226 [1980]; Lustre v. CAR, 10 SCRA 659 [1964]). PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the assailed decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is hereby AFFIRMED.

present ation of evidence, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that t he primary jurisdiction over the money claim is with the Commission on Audit (CO A). Issue: Who has primary jurisdiction over the case: COA/RTC?

Held: Merits of the case is well within the jurisdiction of COA. - Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, if a case is such that its determi nation requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of an administ rative body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding befor e resort to the courts is had, even if the matter is within their proper jurisdi ction. Euromed vs. Batangas - Under the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, it is well Province of Batangas: defendant; within the s cope of COA s authority respondent to take cases for liquidated claims, or Euro-Med Laboratories: plaintiff; those determined or readily petitioner determinable from vouchers, invoices and such other papers within re ach The Province of Batangas, through of COA s jurisdiction. the various authorized representatives - Both parties agreed that the of the government hospitals by Euro- transactions were governed by the Med Laboratories, were identified to Local Governmen t Code provisions have purchased various Intravenous on supply and property management Fluids (IVF) which were products of in which its implementing ru les and the petitioner. The res pondent was regulations are promulgated in COA s found to have an unpaid balance of Code. "the authority and power of t P487,662.80 which were evidenced he commission [on audit] shall by invoices recieved and signed by extend to and comprehend all defendant s authorized matters relating to xxxx the representatives. examination, audit, and settlement of all debts and claims of any sort due Over the course of the trial where from or owing to the Government or the petitioner s side concluded their 4

any of its subdivisions, agencies, and in strumentalities. xxxx" - Such matters are found to be not within the usual area of knowledge, experienc e and expertise of most judges but within the special competence of COA auditors and accountants. SC: Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 Void (Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 G.R. No. 192935 & G.R. No. 19303, December 7, 2010) At the dawn of his administration, President Noynoy signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission). The Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is created to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the administration of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Barely a month after the issuance of EO No. 1, two cases were filed before the SC assailing the validity and constitutionality of the said EO.

constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor. Biraogo argues that EO No. 1 is unconstitutional because there is no provision in the Constitution or any specific law that authorizes the President to create a truth commission. The second case is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of Representatives. PetitionersLegislators argue that the said Order is unconstitutional because the creation of a public office lies within the province of Congress and not with the executive branch of government.

The OSG also cites the recent case of Banda v. Ermita, where it was held that the President has the power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with his constitutionally granted power of control and by virtue of a valid delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes. The OSG concludes that the power of control necessarily includes the power to create offices. 1. Does the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the power to reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code? SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. The power to reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised The OSG counters that there is Administrative Code? Section 31 nothing exclusively legislative about contemplates reorganization as the creation by the President of a fact- limited by the following functional and finding body such as a truth structural lines: (1) restructuring the commission. Pointing to numerous internal organization of the Office of offices created by past presidents, it the President Proper by abolishing, argues that the authority of the consolidating or merging units thereof President to create public offices or transferring functions from one unit within the Office of the President to another; (2) transferring any Proper has long been recognized. function under the Office of the According to the OSG, the Executive, President to any other The first case is a special civil action just like the other two branches of Department/Agency or vice versa; or for prohibition instituted by petitioner government, possesses the inherent (3) transferring any agency under the Louis Biraogo in his capacity as a authority to create fact-finding Office of the President to any other citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails committees to assist it in the Department/Agency or vice versa. Executive Order No. 1 for being performance of its constitutionally Clearly, the provision refers to violative of the legislative power of mandated functions and in the reduction of personnel, consolidation Congress under Section 1, Article VI of exercise of its administrative of offices, or abolition thereof by the Constitution as it usurps the functions. reason of economy or redundancy of 5

functions. These point to situations where a body or an office is already existent but a modification or alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the negative.

have been faithfully executed.

On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of a public office, suffice it to say that there will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. Accordingly, there is no 2. May the President legally usurpation on the part of the create the Philippine Truth Executive of the power of Congress to Commission (PTC)? Is there a valid appropriate funds. Further, there is no delegation of power from need to specify the amount to be Congress empowering the earmarked for the operation of the President to create a public commission because, in the words of office? the Solicitor General, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Yes.The creation of the PTC finds Office of the President will be the very justification under Section 17, Article source of the funds for the VII of the Constitution, imposing upon commission. Moreover, since the the President the duty to ensure that amount that would be allocated to the the laws are faithfully executed. PTC shall be subject to existing Section 17 reads: auditing rules and regulations, there is no impropriety in the funding. Section 17. The President shall have 3. According to petitioners, E.O. control of all the executive No. 1 illegally amended the departments, bureaus, and offices. He Constitution and pertinent shall ensure that the laws be faithfully statutes when it vested the executed. Truth Commission with quasijudicial powers duplicating, if not Indeed, the Executive is given much superseding, those of the Office leeway in ensuring that our laws are of the Ombudsman created under faithfully executed. As stated above, the 1987 Constitution and the the powers of the President are not Department of Justice created limited to those specific powers under under the Administrative Code of the Constitution. One of the 1987. Is this correct? recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this No. Fact-finding is not adjudication constitutionally-mandated duty is the and it cannot be likened to the judicial power to create ad hoc committees. function of a court of justice, or even a This flows from the obvious need to quasi-judicial agency or office. ascertain facts and determine if laws Contrary to petitioners

apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the recommendation to prosecute is but a consequence of the overall task of the commission to conduct a fact-finding investigation. The actual prosecution of suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the merits of the charges against them, is certainly not a function given to the commission. The phrase, when in the course of its investigation, under Section 2(g), highlights this fact and gives credence to a contrary interpretation from that of the petitioners. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. 4. Petitioners argue that E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable. Are the petitioners correct? Yes! Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative power of the President, the Court finds difficulty in upholding 6

the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification. Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for

vindictiveness and selective retribution. Though the OSG enumerates several differences between the Arroyo administration and other past administrations, these distinctions are not substantial enough to merit the restriction of the investigation to the previous administration only.
M IA A( P t io e ) e it n r v . CA & s P a r a n a q ua th ritie e u o s (R s .) ep M IA Ao p e r a t e sth e NAIA Complex i n Paraaque E O No. 903 (MIAA C a r). h rte As ope rator , i a m iste t d in rs th e la d n , improvements and equipm ent within NAIA. In March 1997, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) issued Opin ion No. 061 to th e e c ffe t th t th a e Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC) withdrew The exem ption from re l a e ta s te ta x g n d ra te to M IA A under Section 21 o its f Ca h rt e T u , r. h s M IA A paid some o th f e re l e te a sta ta x a a yd e lre d u . In June 2001, i received t Final N otices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from Paraa que for th e ta ab x le y a e rs 1992 to 2001 e tim te s a d a P624 m n t illio . The City Treasurer of Paraaque issued notices of levy and w arrants of levy on th e A irport Lands and B ild s. u ing I t a o th a n d ls re te e to s ll a e t pb u lic a c n u tio th e Airp rt o Lands and Buildings should M IA A

fa il t pay th o e re l e te a sta ta x d lin u n e q e c y . Late r o n, the O G C C issued Opinion No. 147 c rify g la in its e rlie a r o in n p io . O G C C o r r e c t e dt c i sayin th g at Sec . 21 o f th e M IA A C h a r t e ris th e p o ro f th t M IA Ai s a e empt f r o m r e a l e ta x s te ta . x Thus M I A A f i l e d a p e t i t i o n with th e C A s e e k i n gto re tra s in th e Paraaque from i m p o s i n g re l a e te sta ta x o , le y g n v in a a st, g in and a u c t i o n in fo g r pb u lic sa le th e a o irp rt la d n s and b u i l d i n g s , b t th u is was di smi sse d fo r having been file d out of tim e. H ence, this present p titio . e n Paranaques C ontention: Section 193 o f the Local Government Code expressly w ithdre w t h e tax exem ption p rivile e gs o f government o w n e d and c o n t r o l l e d corp. upon. Resp on nts de also argu e that a b sic ru a le o f sta to tu ry c n o stru tio c n is th t a th e ep x re ss m ention of one p rso , e n th g in , o a r ct e clu e x ds a ll o e th rs. An in rn tio a te a n l a rp rt is n t i o o among the exceptions m entioned in Section 193 of the Local Governm e n C t ode Th . us, re spon nts de assert that M IA A cannot claim that the Airport Lands and Buildings are exem pt from r a e ta el s te ta . M IA A s x con ntion te : A irport Lands and B uild s ing are owned by the R ub ep lic. The gove rnm ent cannot tax it e . s lf The re ason for tax exem ption of public property is th t i s ta a n a t x tio would n o t in re to any p u b l i c advantage, u since in such a c a s e th tax e d tor is a o th ta eb ls e x c d r. re ito

Is u : s e W/N A irport Lands and Buildings of M IA A are exem pt from r a e ta el s te ta . H x eld: Yes. R eal estate tax assessm ents issued by the City of Paraaque a re v id o . 1 M IA A is Not a Government. Owned or C ontrolled C orporation M IA A is n t a government-owned o or controlled corp oration but an in stru e ta m n lity of the N ational Government and thus exem pt from lo a c l ta a n x tio . M IA A is n t a stock corporation o because i has no ca ital t p sto ck d ivid d in e to sh r s a e . M IA A has no stockholders or voting sh re . a s M IA A is a o n t a nonls o stock corporation because i t has no members. A non-stock corp oration must have members. M IA A is a government instrum entality vested w ith corp orate pow ers to perform e ic n ly ff ie t it s governmental fu c n n tio s. M IA Ai s lik e any o t h e r government instrum en t lit ; a y th e o ly d re c n iffe n e is th t a M IA Ai s veste d w ith co o te rp ra p e ow rs. When th e law v s e ts in a government instrum entality corp orate pow er, the instrum e n lity ta de os nt o become a corporation. U nless the government in stru e ta m n lity is organized as a stock or nonstock corporation, i rem t ains a governm ent instrum en t lit a y exercising not only governm ental but also corporate pow ers. Thus, M IA A ex e ise rc s th e governmental

powers of em inent dom ain, police authority and the levy in g of fe es and ch rg a es. At t h e same t i m e , M IA Ae x e r c i s e s all t h e pow ers of a c o r p o r a t i o n under the C orporation Law, i n s o f a r as these pow ers a re n t in o siste t o c n n w ith th e p v ro ision s o th f is Executive O r d e r . 2 A o . irp rt Lands and B u i l d i n g s of M IA Aa r e owned by t h e Republic a A o . irp rt Lands and Buildings are of Public D inion No one om can d u isp te th t p p rtie a ro e s o f pb u lic dominion mentioned in A le rtic 420 of the C ivil C ode , like roads, c n ls aa , riv rs e , to n , rre ts p rts and bridges o constru cte d by the State, are owned by th e S te ta . The term ports in d clu es seap rts o and a p rts ir o . The M IA A A irport Lands and B ild g u in s con stitu te a port constructed by th e St t . ae The A irport Lands and B ild s u ing are de voted to p blic u . The u se fa t th t th c a e MIAA c lle ts o c te in l rm a fe s and other e charges from the public does not remove the ch cter ara o f th e A o irp rt Lands and B ild g u in s a p p rtie s ro e s fo p b r u lic u . se The charg ing of fees to the p ublic d oes not d eterm ine the character of the p erty rop whe e th r i i t s of public dom inion or not. The te in l rm a fe s M IA A charges e c n titu o s te the bulk of the incom e that m aintains the operations of MIAA. b A o . irp rt Lands and B uildings are O utside the Commerce of Man The Court has also ruled that property of pu blic dom inion, being outside the commerce of

man, cannot be th e su je b ct o f an a c n u tio , le y v , encumbrance o d ps r is o it io n th u h ro g p b u lic o p a r riv te sale . Any encum brance, levy on e xe c u t i o n o a ctio n sale o any p r o p e r t y r u f of public dominion is void for b g co ein ntrary to pu blic po y lic . c M IA A is a Mere Tru e . ste of th e R pu e blic - Only the President of the R epublic can sign such deed of conveyance. d T n r . ra sfe to M IA Aw a s me ant to implement Reorganization The tra sfe n r o th f e A o irp rt Lands and Buildings from the Bureau of Air Transport a n to tio M IA A was not meant to tra s r n fe b n fic l e e ia ownership o th s f ee a s ts se fro m the R pu lic e b to MIAA. The purpose was m erely to reorganize a d is n iv io in th e Bureau of Air T n o tio ra sp rta n in to a se a p rate and autonomous body. The Republic re m ains the ben eficial owner of th e A irport Lands and B ild g u in s. M IA A it e s lf is owned so ly le by the R ub ep lic. e R a P p rty . el ro e Owned by th e R pu e blic is Not Taxable Sec 234 o th f e LG C p v e ro id s th t re l a a p p rty ro e owned by the Republic o th f e P il ipp es h in or any o its f p lit a o ic l subdivisions except when th e b n fic l e e ia use th r eof has been g n d e ra te , fo r co sid ra n n e tio o o e ise r th rw , to a taxable person follow ing are exem pted from payment o th f e re l p p rty a ro e ta . x However, p ortion s of the A irport Lands and B ild g u in s th t M IA A le s s a ae to p a riv te e titie n s a re n t exempt o from re l e ta a s te ta . x For exam ple, the land

area occupi ed by h n a a g rs th t M IA A le s s a ae to p a riv te c rp ra n o o tio s is s b c u je t to re l a e ta s te ta . x GSIS ( e it n r P t io e ) v. s Tresurer of M anila (Respondents) City

A s it to n llify u u a s it u to n llify u th e assessm ent of real prop erty taxes on ce tain r p ertie rop s b ngin elo g to p titio e e nr GSIS GSIS owns or used to own 2 parcels of land (Katigbak property and ConcepcionArr o e s p p rty c ro ro e ). T itle to th e ConcepcionArroceros property was tra s rre n fe d to th is Cu o rt in 2005 pursuant to Proclam ation No. 835. Both th e GSIS and th e M T C of M anila occupy the Concepcion-Arroceros property while the Katigbak property was under le s . ae The City Treasurer of M anila addressed a le r tte to GSIS Presid t en and General M anager inform ing them of the unp aid real prop erty taxes (from 1992 to 2002), brok en down a s fo w llo s: (a PhP 54,826,599.37 ) for the Katigbak property; and (b) PhP 48,498,917.01 for the Concepcion-Arroceros

p p rty ro e . They warned o th f e in lu n c sio o f th e p p rtie ro e s in a public auction in M anila should the unpaid taxes rem ain u s ttle . ne d GSIS wrote back em phasizing the G SIS exemp tio n from a ll k d in s o f ta e x s, in d g clu in re lty a ta e x s, u d r R A 8291. ne 2 days at r f e, GSIS file d a p titio e n fo c rtio ri r e ra and p h itio ro ib n fo a r s r i r eta ning r lie. e f Hoping fo th r e n llific tio u a n of the assessm ents and t h a t re o d n sp n e t is perm anently enjoined from p r o c e e d i n g s against G SIS p r o p e r t . GSIS would y la e t r amend its p titio 8 e n to in lu e c d th e fa t th t: c a (a ) th e Katigbak property has been le se a d to and occupied by the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC), which has con tra c a tu lly bound it e s lf t pay any re lty o a ta e x s th t a may be imposed on th e su je b ct p p rty ro e ; and (b) the Concepcion-Arroceros property is p artly occupie d by GSIS and partly occupied by th e M T C of M anila. RTC dism issed G SIS p titio . e n Is u s s e: W/N GSIS is exempt from re l p p rty a ro e ta a n x tio ; assum ing that i i t s so exempt, whether GSIS is lia le b fo re l r a p p rty ro e ta e x s fo its r p p rtie ro e s le s d to a ae ta a le xb e tity n ; and w hether the properties of GSIS are exem pt from le y v. H ld e : P titio e n is MERITOUS. Yes, GSIS is e e p x m t. GSIS is a government in tru e ta . s m n lity GSIS is n t a o

stock corporation because i t has no ca ita p l sto ck d id d in iv e to sh re a s and no stockholders or voting s a s h re . GSIS is a o n t a non-stock ls o corporation because i has no t members. The Republic owns properties under GSISs name. GSIS is b t a u mere tru e ste o th f e p p rtie ro e s. T is p rticu r h a la property arrangem ent is shown by th e fa t th t d o sal or c a isp conveyance of such are done th u h ro g th e a th rity u o o th f e P sid n re e t o th P ilip in s f e h p e. GSIS manages the funds for the life in u n e s ra c , re m n tire e t, s rv o h , u iv rs ip and d a ility is b b n fits ee o a f ll government employees and th ir e b n fic rie e e ia s. T is h c n o st it te u s an e s n l s e tia and va it l function that the governm ent, through one o its f ag n ie e c s o in tru e ta r s m n litie , s ought to perform . Thus t h e Republic guarantees th e fu lfillm n e t of th e o lig tio s b a n o th f e GSIS to it s members ( government employees and t h e i r b n fic rie ) e e ia s when theyre due. GSIS enjoys under it s c at r h re fu ll tax exem ption. As an i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y of the na n l tio a government, i i t s isl t ef n t lia le o b to pay r e a l estate taxes asse ssed by the City of M anila against its Katigbak and C o n c e p c i o n Arroceros p p rtie . ro e s Following th e "b n fic l e e ia u " se ru , le how ever, accrued real property taxes are du e from the Katigbak property, leased as it is t o a ta a le xb e tity n .

But th e co rre sponding lia ility b fo th r e payment thereof devolves on the taxab le b eficia en l u e . The Katigbak s r property cannot in any event be su je b ct o a pb f u lic a c n u tio sa , le notw ithstanding is t re alty tax de linqu cy. en Th is means that the City of M anila ha s to s tis a fy its ta x c im la by serving the accrued realty tax assessm ent on M H C as th e ta a le x b b n ficia e e l u r o th se f e Katigbak property and, in case of nonpaym en t through means , o e th r th n th a e sa le a p b t u lic a ctio o u n f th e le se a d p p rty ro e . P t io e it n is GRANTED .The RTC M anila decisions are R EVE R S ED and SET ASIDE. Tax a sessm s ents issued by the C ity of M anila are VOID, e ce t x p th t th a e re l a p p rty ro e tax assessm ent pertaining to the leased K atigbak property shall be v lid if s r e d on the M a ev anila H otel Corporation, as lessee that has a a ctu l and b eneficial use of i . t

QUASILEGISLATIVE POWERS:
Chiongbian vs. Orbos Pursuant to Article X Sec 18 of the 1987 Constitution, Congress passed RA No. 67

34 "The ORGANIC ACT for the AUTONOMOUS REGION in MUSLIM MINDANAO" calling for a plebescite to be held in 23 provinces. 4 provinces voted in favor of creating the Autonomous region and these are LANAO DEL SUR, MAGUINDANAO,SULU and TAWI-TAWI. Hence, in accordance to RA No. 6734 th ese 4 provinces became the ARMM. On the other hand, with respect to the remaining provinces who did not vote in f avor of creating ARMM. Artcle XIX Sec RA 6724 provides;"THAT ONLY THE PROVINCES A ND CITIES VOTING FAVORABLY IN SUCH PLEBISCITE SHALL BE INCLUDED IN ARMM AND THE PROVINCES WHO DID NOT VOTE FOR THE INCLUSION IN ARMM SHALL REMAIN IN THE EXISTIN G ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THE PRESIDENT MAY BY ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION, MERGE THE EXISTING REGIONS". Pursuant to the authority granted by the above provision, then President Cory Aq uino issued EO No. 429 "PROVIDING FOR THE REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMM" where in t hose who are not in favor in creating the ARMM where transferred (provinces of a certain region to another) some of which are;a. Misamis Occidental, at present p art of Region X will become part of Region IX. b. General Santos, at present par

t of Region XI, will become part of Region IX. c. Transfered the regional center of Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian. Petitioners, protested and challenges the validity of EO 429 contending that the re is not law which authorizes the President to make alterations on the existing structure of the governmental units in other words REORGANIZATION. And that the authority merge granted in RA 6724 does not include the authority to reorganize even if it does not affect the opportionment of the congressional representativ es. In addition, they contend that Aricle XIX Sec 13 of RA 6724 is unconstitution al for 1) it is invalid delegation of power by the Legislative to the President 2) the power granted is not expressed in the title of the law. Issues: 1. W/N Article XIX Sec 13 of RA 6724 is invalid because it contains no express s tandard to guide the President s discretion and whether the power given fairly e xpressed in the title of the statute. 2. W/N the power granted authorizes not just to merge but even the reorganizatio n of those who did not vote or not infavor to it. 3. W/N the power granted to the President includes the power to transfer the reg ional center of Region IX from Zamboanga to Pagadian since it should be the acts 10

of Congress.

mplicity, economy, and efficiency in the government to enable it to pursue Ruling: progr While the power to merge ams consistent with national goals for administrative regions is not accelerated social and economic expressly provide developme d for in the constitution, it is a power nt and to improve the services in the which has traditionally been transaction of public business. lodged wit 2. No, while Article XIX Sec 13 h the President to facilitate the provides that "THE PROVINCES AND exercise of the power of general CITIES WHI supervision o CH DO NOT VOTE FOR INCLUSION ver local governments (Article X sec IN THE AUTONOMOUS REGION 4 of the Constitution). The regions SHALL REMAIN IN THE THE EX themsel ISTING ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS" ves are not territorial and political This provision is subject to the divisions like provinces, qualification tha cities,municipal t the PRESIDENT MAY BY ities and barangays but are "mere ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION groupings of contagouos provinces for MERGE THE EXISTING REGIONS. adminstr This means that while non-assenting ative purposes. The power conferred provinces are to remain in the on the President is similar to the regions aas de power to signated upon the creation of the adjust municipal boundaries". Autonomous region, they may 1. No, A legislative standard nevertheless be re need not to be expressed. It may grouped with contiguous provinces simply be ga forming other regions as the thered or implied. Nor need it be exigency of admin found in the law challenged because istration may require. it may be 3. Yes, for administrative regions embodied in other statutes on the are mere "groupings of contiguous same subject as that of the provin challenged legisla ces for administrative purposes hence tion. And with respect to the power to are not territorial and political merge existing administrative subdivis regions, th ions like provinces, cities, e standard is to be found in the same municipalities and brgys. Therefore policy underlying the grant to the there is no bas Preside is that only Congress can determine nt in RA No. 5435 of the power to the region center. reorganize the Exec Department to " Promote si

Tanada vs. Tuvera Subject of the contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code, to which the petitione rs seek clarification. Art. 2 provides: Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the complet ion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provide d. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication. Issue: W/N publication is indispensable for the effectivity of laws. Ruling: Yes. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual 15day period shall be shortened or extended. unless otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the require ment of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. laws refer to all laws not only to those of general application, for strictly spea king all laws relate to the people in general although there are some that do no t apply them directly. Presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the ex ercise of legislative power when they are validly delegated by the legislature. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. No publication is required however for: 11

Interpretative regulation and those merely internal in nature regulating only th e personal of the administrative agency and not the public. Letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their d uties. The court also recognize that newpapers of general circulation, as compared to t he Official Gazette, could better perform the function of communicating the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider reade rship, and come out regularly. As the law however, requires publication in the Official Gazette, the Court leav es amending such to the legislature.

The NTC issued Billing Circular 136-2000 which promulgated rules and regulations on the billing of telecommunications services. Petitioners filed with the RTC a petition to declare the circular as unconstitutional. A motion to dismiss was filed by the NTC on the ground of petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss but on certiorari, the CA reversed RTC. Issue: Whether or not the Billing circular 13-6-2000 issued by NTC unconstitutional.

Held: Administrative bodies had (a) quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and (b) quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or ruleSMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. making power is the power to ET AL. V. NATIONAL make rules and regulations which TELECOMMUNICATIONS results in delegated legislation that COMMISSION (NTC) G.R. is within the confines of the 151908, August 12, 2003 granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of QUASI-LEGISLATIVE & QUASIpowers. To be valid, such rules and JUDICIAL POWERS; RULE ON regulations must conform to, and EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE be consistent with, the provisions REMEDIES; DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY of enabling statute. Quasi-judicial JURISDICTION;WHEN APPLICABLE or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear and Facts: determine questions of fact to

which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions, the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative body contravenes the law or the constitution is within the judicial power as defined by the Constitution which is the duty of the Courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there have been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. The NTC circular was issued pursuant to its quasilegislative or rule-making power. Hence, the action must be filed directly with the regular courts without requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies. Where the act of administrative agency was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, exhaustion
12

of administrative remedy is required, before going to court. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases involving specialized disputes, the same must be referred to an administrative agency of special competence pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. This doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an administrative body. In such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view.

and social security transactions shall be regulated by the PRN with the use of Biometrics Technology. The funding shall be sourced from the respective budgets of the concerned agencies like GSIS, SSS, NSO and others.

to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government, It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. It cannot be simplistically argued that Petitioner Bias Ople assailed the A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Order and prayed for Administrative Code of 1987 for the its nullification on two important former establishes for the first time a constitutional grounds: one, it is a National Computerized Identification usurpation of the power of Congress to Reference System. Nor is it correct to legislate, and two, it impermissibly argue that A.O. 308 is not a law for it intrudes on our citizens protected confers no right, imposes no.duty, zone of privacy. The petitioner claims affords no protection, and creates no that AO No. 308 is not a mere office. Under the assailed administrative order but a law and administrative order, a citizen cannot hence, beyond the power of the transact business with government President to issue. On the other hand, agencies delivering basic services to the respondents maintain that the the people without the contemplated President has merely exercised his identification card. Thus, without the administrative power in implementing ID, a citizen will have difficulty exerthe legislative policy of the cising his rights and enjoying his Administrative Code of 1987 and that privileges. Given this reality, the A.O. No. 308 is not a law for it confers contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no no right,imposes no duty, affords no right and imposes no duty cannot protection and creates no office. stand. Regarding the right of privacy, it is a right recognized and enshrined in the several provisions of our Constitution, and in our laws. Hence, it is the burden of government to show, that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. To note, what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No 308 which if implemented will put our peoples right to privacy in clear and present danger. It is noteworthy that A.O. No. 308 does 13

On the right of privacy, claims that A.O. No. 308 will infringe on the peoples right to be let alone while respondents deny such allegation. FACTS: Administrative Order No. 308 ISSUES: Whether or not A.O. No. 308 entitled Adoption ot a National Computerized Identification Reference encroaches on the law-making power System was issued by President Fidel of the legislative department; whether or not A.O. No. 308 infringes the V. Ramos and was published in four peoples right of privacy. newspapers of general circulation. It aims to establish a decentralized HELD:A.O. No. 308 involves a subject Identification Reference System that is not appropriate to be covered among the key basic services and by an administrative order. An social security providers. There shall administrative order is an ordinance be a Population Reference Number (PRN) for each individual and all basic issued by the President which relates Ople vs Torres et.al.; G.R. No. 127685, July23, 1998

riot state what specific biological characteristics and what particular biometrics technology shall be used to identify people who will seek its coverage; it does not state whether encoding of data is limited to biological information alone for identification purposes; and it does not state in clear and categorical terms how theses information gathered shall be handled. The A. 0. speaks of computer linkage which will give other governmental agencies access to the information. Yet, there are no controls to guard against leakage of information. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometric and computer technology cannot be downplayed.

return-to-work order, eight teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School were administratively charged, preventively suspended for 90 days pursuant to sec. 41, P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges.

charges; there had been violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission is empowered to investigate. ISSUE: * Whether or not CHR has jurisdiction to try and hear the issues involved HELD: The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and 14

When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating Committee, said teachers staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings. Eventually, Secretary Carino decreed dismissal from service of Esber and the suspension for 9 months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. In the meantime, a case was filed with RTC, raising the issue of violation of the right of the striking teachers to due ISIDRO CARIO vs. COMISSION ON process of law. The case was HUMAN RIGHTS G.R. No. 96681, eventually elevated to SC. Also in the December 2, 1991 meantime, the respondent teachers ISIDRO CARIO vs. COMISSION ON submitted sworn statements to HUMAN RIGHTS Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were G.R. No. 96681, December 2, 1991 participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their FACTS: replacement as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for Some 800 public school teachers reasons completely unknown to them. undertook mass concerted actions to protest the alleged failure of public While the case was pending with CHR, authorities to act upon their SC promulgated its resolution over the grievances. The mass actions cases filed with it earlier, upholding consisted in staying away from their the Sec. Carinos act of issuing the classes, converging at the Liwasang return-to-work orders. Despite this, Bonifacio, gathering in peacable CHR continued hearing its case and assemblies, etc. The Secretary of held that the striking teachers were Education served them with an order denied due process of law;they to return to work within 24 hours or should not have been replaced without face dismissal. For failure to heed the a chance to reply to the administrative

definitively, subject to such appeals or Investigate vs. Adjudicate modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the "Investigate," commonly understood, Commission does not have. means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, Power to Investigate study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study The Constitution clearly and closely: inquire into systematically. "to categorically grants to the search or inquire into: . . . to subject to Commission the power to investigate an official probe . . .: to conduct an all forms of human rights violations official inquiry." The purpose of involving civil and political rights. It investigation, of course, is to discover, can exercise that power on its own to find out, to learn, obtain initiative or on complaint of any information. Nowhere included or person. It may exercise that power intimated is the notion of settling, pursuant to such rules of procedure as deciding or resolving a controversy it may adopt and, in cases of involved in the facts inquired into by violations of said rules, cite for application of the law to the facts contempt in accordance with the Rules established by the inquiry. of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under The legal meaning of "investigate" is its authority, it may grant immunity essentially the same: "(t)o follow up from prosecution to any person whose step by step by patient inquiry or testimony or whose possession of observation. To trace or track; to documents or other evidence is search into; to examine and inquire necessary or convenient to determine into with care and accuracy; to find the truth. It may also request the out by careful inquisition; assistance of any department, bureau, examination; the taking of evidence; a office, or agency in the performance of legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an its functions, in the conduct of its investigation," "investigation" being in investigation or in extending such turn describe as "(a)n administrative remedy as may be required by its function, the exercise of which findings. ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an But it cannot try and decide cases (or inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the hear and determine causes) as courts discovery and collection of facts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies concerning a certain matter or do. To investigate is not to adjudicate matters." or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have "Adjudicate," commonly or popularly well understood and quite distinct understood, means to adjudge, meanings. arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary

defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ." In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) 15

whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions. Who has Power to Adjudicate? These are matters within the original jurisdiction of the Sec. of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the CSC. Manner of Appeal Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based on substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the respondents due process; and whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human rights violations involving civil and political rights," are matters which may be passed upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary Education himself, and in

Commission and eventually the Supreme Court.

entities that issue IDs as part of their functions under existing laws are required to adopt a uniform data Kilusang Mayo Uno vs. Directorcollection and format for their IDs. General of NEDA (G.R. No. 167798, There is no dispute that government 19 April 2006, penned by Justice entities can individually limit the Carpio) collection and recording of their data On 13 April 2005, President Gloria to the 14 specific items in Section 3 of Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive EO 420. There is also no dispute that Order No. 420, directing all these government entities can government agencies and individually adopt the ID format as government-owned and controlled specified in Section 3 of EO 420. Such corporations to adopt a uniform data an act is certainly within the authority collection and format for their existing of the heads or governing boards of identification (ID) systems. The EO the government entities that are was assailed as unconstitutional based already authorized under existing laws on the same grounds used in the to issue IDs. earlier case of Ople vs. Torres EO A unified ID system for all these 420 is a usurpation of legislative government entities can be achieved power by the President and that it is in either of two ways. First, the heads an infringement on the citizens of these existing government entities right to privacy. can enter into a memorandum of EO 420 is not a usurpation of agreement making their systems legislative power uniform. Second, the President may by Section 2 of EO 420 provides, executive or administrative order Coverage. All government direct the government entities under agencies and government-owned and the Executive department to adopt a controlled corporations issuing ID uniform ID data collection and format. cards to their members or constituents Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 shall be covered by this executive Constitution provides that the order. EO 420 applies only to President shall have control of all government entities that issue ID executive departments, bureaus and cards as part of their functions under offices. The same Section also existing laws. These government mandates the President to ensure entities have already been issuing ID that the laws be faithfully cards even prior to EO 420. Examples executed. of these government entities are the The act of issuing ID cards and GSIS, SSS, Philhealth, Mayors collecting the necessary personal data Office, LTO, PRC, and similar for imprinting on the ID card does not government entities. Section 1 of EO require legislation. What require 420 directs these government entities legislation are three aspects of a to adopt a unified multi-purpose government maintained ID card ID system. Thus, all government system. First, when the 16

implementation of an ID card system requires a special appropriation because there is no existing appropriation for such purpose. Second, when the ID card system is compulsory on all branches of government, including the independent constitutional commissions, as well as compulsory on all citizens whether they have a use for the ID card or not. Third, when the ID card system requires the collection and recording of personal data beyond what is routinely or usually required for such purpose, such that the citizens right to privacy is infringed. In the present case, EO 420 does not require any special appropriation because the existing ID card systems of government entities covered by EO 420 have the proper appropriation or funding. EO 420 is not compulsory on all branches of government and is not compulsory on all citizens. EO 420 does not establish a national ID card system. EO 420 does not compel all citizens to have an ID card. EO 420 requires a very narrow and focused collection and recording of personal data while safeguarding the confidentiality of such data. In fact, the data collected and recorded under EO 420 are far less than the data collected and recorded under the ID systems existing prior to EO 420. EO 420 does not infringe on the right to privacy The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government entities. All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and other government entities have been

issuing ID cards in the performance of their governmental functions. There have been no complaints from citizens that the ID cards of these government entities violate their right to privacy. In fact, petitioners in the present cases do not claim that the ID systems of government entities prior to EO 420 violate their right to privacy. Prior to EO 420, government entities had a free hand in determining the kind, nature and extent of data to be collected and stored for their ID systems. Under EO 420, government entities can collect and record only the 14 specific data mentioned in Section 3 of EO 420. In addition, government entities can show in their ID cards only eight of these specific data, seven less data than what the Supreme Courts ID shows. Also, prior to EO 420, there was no executive issuance to government entities prescribing safeguards on the collection, recording, and disclosure of personal identification data to protect the right to privacy. Now, under Section 5 of EO 420, certain safeguards are instituted. On its face, EO 420 shows no constitutional infirmity because it even narrowly limits the data that can be collected, recorded and shown compared to the existing ID systems of government entities. EO 420 further provides strict safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the data collected, in contrast to the prior ID systems which are bereft of strict administrative safeguards. Ople v. Torres is not authority to hold that EO 420 violates the right to privacy because in that case the assailed executive issuance, broadly

drawn and devoid of safeguards, was annulled solely on the ground that the subject matter required legislation. In contrast, EO 420 applies only to government entities that already maintain ID systems and issue ID cards pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws. EO 420 does not grant such government entities any power that they do not already possess under existing laws. The assailed executive issuance in Ople v. Torres sought to establish a National Computerized Identification Reference System, a national ID system that did not exist prior to the assailed executive issuance. Obviously, a national ID card system requires legislation because it creates a new national data collection and card issuance system where none existed before. KILUSANG MAYO UNO, et al. v. THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL of the NationalEconomic Development Authority, et al. G.R. No. 167798 and 167930, 19 April 2006, Carpio, J. (En Banc) Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution provides that the President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices. The same Section also mandates the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. Certainly, under this constitutional power of control, the President can direct all government entities, in the exercise of their functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID 17

data collection and ID format to achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and convenience to the public. The Presidents constitutional power of control is self- executing and does not need any implementing legislation. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 420 (E.O. 420), which requires all government agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations to adopt a uniform data collection and format for their existing identification (ID) systems. E.O. 420 seeks to consolidate the existing identification systems of different government agencies into one multi- purpose I.D. thereby reducing inconvenience to the public in their transactions with the government. The proposed uniform I.D. requires the following specific data: (1)name; (2)home address; (3)sex; (4)picture; (5)signature; (6)date of birth; (7)place of birth; (8)marital status; (9)name of parents; (10)height; (11)weight; (12)two index fingerprints and two thumbmarks; (13)any prominent feature, like a mole; and (14)Tax Identification Number (TIN). These consolidated petitions assail the constitutionality of E.O. 420 on the grounds that it is a usurpation of legislative powers by the President and it infringes on the citizens right to privacy.

ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not E.O. 420 is a usurpation of legislative powers by the President; and 2.) Whether or not E.O. 420 infringes on the citizens right to privacy

Second, the President may by executive or administrative order direct the government entities under the Executive department to adopt a uniform ID data collection and format. Section17, Article VII of the HELD: Constitution provides that the The petitions are DISMISSED. President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and E.O. 420 is an exercise of Executive offices. Certainly, under this power the Presidents constitutional constitutional power of control the power of control over the Executive President can direct all government department and also compliance by entities, in the exercise of their the President of the constitutional functions under existing laws, to adopt duty to ensure that the laws are a uniform ID data collection and ID faithfully executed. format to achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and E.O. 420 applies only to government convenience to the public. The entities that issue ID cards as part of Presidents constitutional power of their functions under existing laws. control is self-executing and does not These entities are required to adopt a need any implementing legislation. uniform data collection and format for Of course, this is limited to the their IDs in order to reduce costs, Executive branch of government and achieve efficiency and reliability, does not extend to the Judiciary or to insure compatibility, and provide the independent constitutional convenience to the people served commissions. Thus, E.O. 420 does not by government entities. A unified ID apply to the Judiciary, or to the system for all these government COMELEC. This only shows that E.O. entities can be achieved in either of 420 does not establish a national ID two ways. First, the heads of these system because legislation is needed existing government entities can enter to establish a single ID system that is into a memorandum of agreement compulsory for all branches of making their systems uniform. If the government. government entities can individually adopt a format for their own ID Sec. 17, Art. VII also mandates the pursuant to their regular functions President to ensure that the laws be under existing laws, they can also faithfully executed. There are several adopt by mutual agreement a uniform laws mandating government entities ID format. This is purely an to reduce costs, increase efficiency, administrative matter, and does not and in general, improve public involve the exercise of legislative services. The adoption of a uniform ID power. data collection and format under E.O. 18

420 is designed to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve public services. Thus, in issuing E.O. 420, the President is simply performing the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. In issuing E.O. 420, the President did not make, alter or repeal any law but merely implemented and executed existing laws.

The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government entities.

All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and other government entities covered by E.O. 420 have been issuing ID cards in the performance of their governmental functions. There have been no complaints from citizens that the ID What require legislation are three cards of these government entities aspects of a government maintained violate their right to privacy. There is ID card system: (1)when the even less basis to complain against implementation of an ID card system the unified ID system under E.O. 420. requires a special appropriation The data collected and stored for the because there is no existing unified ID system will be limited to appropriation for such purpose; only fourteen specific data, and the ID (2)when the ID card system is card itself will show only eight specific compulsory on all branches of data. The data collection, recording government, including the and ID card system under E.O. 420 will independent constitutional even require less data collected, commissions, as well as compulsory stored and revealed than under the on all citizens whether they have a disparate systems prior to E.O. 420. use for the ID card or not; and (3)when E.O. 420 further provides strict the ID card system requires the safeguards to protect the collection and recording of personal confidentiality of the data collected, in data beyond what is routinely or contrast to the prior ID systems which usually required for such purpose, are bereft of strict administrative such that the citizens right to privacy safeguards. is infringed. E.O. 420 does not require any special appropriation because Ople v. Torres is not authority to hold the existing ID card systems of that E.O. 420 violates the right to government entities covered by it privacy because in that case the have the proper appropriation or assailed executive issuance, broadly funding. E.O. 420 is not compulsory on drawn and devoid of safeguards, was all branches of government and is not annulled solely on the ground that the compulsory on all citizens. E.O. 420 subject matter required legislation. requires a very narrow and focused The assailed executive issuance in collection and recording of personal that case sought to establish a data while safeguarding the National Computerized Identification confidentiality of such data.

Reference System, a national ID system that did not exist prior to the assailed executive issuance. Obviously, a national ID card system requires legislation because it creates a new national data collection and card issuance system where none existed before.

QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS: EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES: JUDICIAL REVIEW:

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