Lechugas vs.

CA GRN L-39972 & L-40300 August 6, 1986 FACTS: This petition for review invokes the parol evidence rule as it imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate court for admitting and giving credence to the testimony of the vendor regarding the sale of the disputed lot. The testimony is contrary to the contents of the deed of sale executed by the vendor in favor of the petitioner. The petitioner filed a complaint for forcible entry with damages against the private respondents, alleging that the latter by means of force, intimidation, strategy and stealth, unlawfully entered lots A and B, corresponding to the middle and northern portion of the property owned by the petitioner known as Lot No. 5456. She alleged that they appropriated the produce thereof for themselves, and refused to surrender the possession of the same despite demands made by the petitioner. The complaint was dismissed. Petitioner appealed to the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Iloilo where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 5055. While the above appeal was pending, the petitioner instituted another action before the CFI of Iloilo for recovery and possession of the same property against the private respondents. This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 5303. The two cases were tried jointly. After trial, the court rendered judgment. The dispositive portion of the decision states: Wherefore, premises considered, judgment is rendered, to wit: a. dismissing the complaints in two cases; b. declaring defendants except Salvador Anona and Jose Lozada as owners and lawful possessors of the land in question together with all the improvements thereon; c. dismissing the claim for damages of all defendants except that of Jose Lozada; d. ordering plaintiff to pay defendant Jose Lozada the sum of P500.00 as attorney's fees and the amount of P300.00 as litigation expenses; and e. ordering plaintiff to pay the costs of both proceedings. The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter sustained the dismissal of the cases. Hence, this petition with the petitioner making the following assignments of errors: I THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING PAROL EVIDENCE OVER THE OBJECTION OF THE PETITIONER IN ORDER TO VARY THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE DEED OF DEFINITE SALE (EXHIBIT A) ALTHOUGH THE LAND THEREIN IS DESCRIBED AND DELIMITED BY METES AND BOUNDS AND IdENTIFIED AS LOT NO. 5456 OF LAMBUNAO CADASTRE. Petitioner filed an unlawful entry case against private respondent the Lozas. Another case was filed for recovery and possession of the same property and both cases was tried jointly. Petitioner testified that she bought the land from Lasangue in 1950. Private respondent contended that the same land in question was bought by their father from the father of petitioner in 1941. Plaintiffs vendor testified for the defendant stating that she sold the south part of the land which is lot 5522 not lot 5456 which plaintiff claims. IISUE: Whether or not the court of appeals erred in considering, parol evidence over the objection of petitioner.

RULING: The appellate court acted correctly in upholding the trial courts action in admitting the testimony of Leoncia. Petitioner alleges that lot 5522 was sold to her Leoncia, who was never presented as witness in any proceeding in the lower court the parol evidence rule does not apply and may not properly be involved by either party to litigation against the other, where at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to a written instrument in the question and does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation established thereby. The rule is not applicable where the controversy is between one of the parties to the document and third persons. Through the testimony of Leoncia, it was shown that what she really intended to sell is lot 5522 but not being able to read and write and fully relying on the good faith of her cousin, petitioner, she just placed her thumb mark on a piece of paper. The petitioner's reliance on the parol evidence rule is misplaced. The rule is not applicable where the controversy is between one of the parties to the document and third persons. The deed of sale was executed by Leoncia Lasangue in favor of Victoria Lechugas. The dispute over what was actually sold is between petitioner and the private respondents. In the case at bar, through the testimony of Leoncia Lasangue, it was shown that what she really intended to sell and to be the subject of Exhibit A was Lot No. 5522 but not being able to read and write and fully relying on the good faith of her first cousin, the petitioner, she just placed her thumbmark on a piece of paper which petitioner told her was the document evidencing the sale of land. The deed of sale described the disputed lot instead. This fact was clearly shown in Lasangue's testimony: Q. And how did you know that that was the description of the land that you wanted to sell to Victoria Lechugas? R. I know that because that land came from me. S. But how were you able to read the description or do you know the description? A. Because, since I do not know how to read and write and after the document was prepared, she made me sign it. So I just signed because I do not know how to read. xxx xxx xxx Q. What explanation did she make to you? A. She said to me, 'Manang, let us have a document prepared for you to sign on the land you sold to me.' So, after the document was prepared, I signed. Q. Did you tell her where that land you were selling to her was situated? xxx xxx xxx A. On the South. Q. South side of what land, of the land in litigation? A. The land I sold to her is south of the land in litigation. Q. Did you tell her that before preparing the document you signed? A. Yes, I told her so because I had confidence in her because she is my first cousin. (pp. 198-207, rollo)

People vs. Valero (1982)

March 19, 1982

Facts: Michael and Annabel, children of Ceferino Velasco, died of poisoning after eating bread containing endrin, a commercial insecticide. Their sister Imelda would have also died if not for the timely medical assistance given to her. At about the same time, 3 puppies of Velasco under the balcony where the children ate the bread also died of poisoning. Earlier that morning, Velasco was seen throwing poisoned rats in the river near his house. The evidence of the prosecution shows that the poisoned bread was given to the children by Alfonso Valero alias Pipe, deaf-mute brother of accused Lucila Valero, and that it was Lucila who gave Alfonso the bread to be delivered to the children. Lucila denies the allegation. The evidence of the defense tends to show that the children might have eaten one of the sliced poisoned bread used by their father in poisoning the rats. 3/9 witnesses for the prosecution: 1. Rodolfo Quilang testified that he saw Lucila deliver something wrapped in a piece of paper to Alfonso and instructed him by sign language to deliver the same to the Velasco children. He never saw what was inside the piece of paper. His testimony as to WON he saw the parcel delivered to the children was a series of contradictions. He is what the defense counsel calls and eleventh-hour witness 2. Federico Jaime and Ceferino Velasco did not see Lucila deliver to Alfonso the alleged parcel, as well as the alleged instruction. Both claimed that they learned the information from Pipe after interviewing him by means of sign language. Testimony of Jaime was confusing. There is nothing in the testimony of Velasco indicating that Alfonso pointed to Lucila as the source of the poisoned bread. Issue: WON the testimonies of Jaime and Velasco may be admitted

Held: No

Ratio: The evidence is pure hearsay. It violates the principle of res inter alios acta. Alfonso, who was the source of the information, was never presented as a witness either for the defense or the prosecution. Testimony of Velasco cannot be considered as part of res gestae because when the information was allegedly obtained by Velasco from Alfonso, nobody was poisoned yet. With regard to the testimony of Jaime, there is no showing that the revelation was made by Alfonso under the influence of a startling occurrence. The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of incompetent evidence does not give such evidence probative value. The lack of objection may make any incompetent evidence admissible. But admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not has no probative value