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On Human Life Risk-Assessment and Sensitive Ground Fault Protection in MV Distribution Networks
Jos L. Pinto de S, Senior Member, IEEE, and Miguel Louro
AbstractThe minimum phase-to-ground fault current required to be sensed by protection systems in medium-voltage (MV) networks can be as low as 0.7 A in a few countries, leading to a lot of undesired relay trips and poor service quality to costumers. However, these settings raise the protection threshold above the minimum fault current that concerns network operators regarding human safety, although they cannot be practiced when grounding is distributed. The purpose of this paper is to present a risk assessment foundation to determine the required protection sensitivity to ensure human safety in MV distribution networks. The proposed approach is based on a biophysical model included in IEC standards, the consideration of current paths models for typical faults and Monte Carlo methods to deal with nonlinearity, and the many involved random variables. Downed conductors and line-to-concrete pole faults are investigated and sensitivity analysis performed to highlight some important determinants of the results. Index TermsMonte Carlo methods, overcurrent protection, safety.

I. INTRODUCTION

IGH resistance phase-to-ground faults are dangerous events, because they can be very hard to detect. Of these faults, downed conductors have motivated a lot of investigation [1]. Don Russell and his team [2] developed a very detailed research to nd that a number of detection methods were efcient but also that it could be most difcult to discriminate a fault situation from normal electrical events on the distribution feeders. As those authors noted, if an algorithm regularly identies normal system activity as a fault, it is virtually useless in practical relay applications. On the other hand, in overhead line networks, faults with very high resistance can appear due to trees leaning against a conductor, for instance. VTT researchers in Finland have developed a very sensitive algorithm [3] capable of coping with these faults, but eld monitoring has shown that a number of nonfault events could also produce the voltage disturbances upon which the authors methods were based. Some of the aforementioned protection methods have been rened and are now suitable for the processing power of modern microprocessor-based protective relays [4], but they all present

Manuscript received December 18, 2009; revised May 23, 2010; accepted June 14, 2010. Paper no. TPWRD-00944-2009. J. L. Pinto de S is with the Instituto Superior Tcnico, CIEEE, Lisbon 1049001, Portugal (e-mail: pintosa@ist.utl.pt). M. Louro is with EDP Distribuio, Lisbon 1050-044, Portugal (e-mail: miguel.louro@edp.pt). Digital Object Identier 10.1109/TPWRD.2010.2053564

some limitations [5]. Meanwhile, many ordinary zero overcurrent relays, either directional or nondirectional, are in the eld. Utilities make different assessments about the safety risk of high-resistance ground faults, but they all are pressed to provide the best possible service, which brings necessary compromises between protection sensitivity and security [6]. While some utilities are comfortable with settings of 10% of rated current and above for ground fault protection in distribution networks, others have a tradition of more sensitive protection. In Europe, where there is no neutral conductor in MV feeders and sensitive ground relaying is common, a number of Distribution utilities require the detection and elimination of ground faults with as low as 1 A [7] and even less [8]. To cope with nontransposed lines asymmetry and charging current unbalances, which also produce nonfault zero currents, this high sensitivity was traditionally the role of a relay dealing with the current of the substation grounding connection, which is nonselective by nature. Zero overcurrent relays in feeders were set above 57.5 A to avoid tripping with nonfault zero currents [8], and the relay at the substation grounding connection was set to 1 A or less and timed to 2 to 3 min. Usually, this last relay triggers an automatism, which works by sequentially disconnecting the feeders until the relay resets and the faulted feeder is found. For insulated grounding systems, a zero overvoltage relay at the substation bus is used instead. However, excessive use of this practice led to many consumer complaints and with time, new protection approaches have been developed which are more selective [9]. Anyway, many utilities around the world still face a dilemma between guaranteeing sensitive ground faults relaying and avoiding power-quality (PQ) complaints, especially for feeders which are disconnected too often. Although the quest for sensitive and yet secure ground fault protection keeps deserving a lot of research, to these authors knowledge, a quantitative evaluation of how dangerous a high resistance ground fault can really for human life in MV distribution networks was never published. Exceptions exist only in some particular industries where risk conditions are well characterized, as in coal mines [10]. At this point, we should stress that a direct contact between a person and an ungrounded live part of an MV power system will probably lead to the appearance of an arc ash or to tissue electroporation [11]. In either case, it is unlikely that a person will survive without severe injuries. Electroporation occurs in just 540 ms and, therefore, it is impossible for a relaying system to prevent its consequences to the victim [12]. However, it is possible to minimize the amount of energy transmitted to an arc ash by means of fast tripping [13]. Anyway, for arc ash and

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Fig. 2. Conventional time/current zones of effects of ac currents (15 Hz to 100 Hz) on people for a current path corresponding to left hand to feet ([15]). Fig. 1. Occurrence of the vulnerable period of ventricles during the cardiac cycle (from [15]).

electroporation, currents are so large that the issue is protection speed, not sensitivity. The origin of most high-resistance faults, according to the experience of a few utilities, including the one for which one of the authors works for, is the conductor touching the ground, MV/low-voltage (LV) transformer faults, and cable failures between tower anchor clamps [9]. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to offer a human safety risk assessment for the most typical high-resistance ground faults endangering human life in MV distribution networks in order to provide a quantitative basis for the denition of an informed tradeoff between sensitivity and security requirements in ground-fault protection. II. REVIEW OF THE PROBABILISTIC LETHALITY OF THE ELECTRIC CURRENT In high-resistance ground faults, small currents are present, and that is why protection sensitivity is an issue. For these small currents, the most important lethal effect is ventricular brillation and, therefore, some established facts about this phenomenon must be reminded [14]. As Fig. 1 illustrates, ventricular brillation can only occur if an electrical current overlaps the nervous electric heart control in the recovery period of the cardiac cycle, which lasts for only 10% of the entire cycle. This current has also to reach a minimum threshold, but if it persists in time, only 5% of it is required to disturb the cardiac cycle, reducing its duration and lowering the brillation threshold. This is the reason for the S shape of the threshold-time functions illustrated in Fig. 2 (from [15]). Since the number of heart cycles is about 7080 for a healthy person and can reach a hundred under physical effort, the ventricular brillation threshold starts lowering only after 0.1 s, to reach a steady 5% of its initial value in about 2 s. Another important fact is that the brillation threshold varies from one person to another. In Fig. 2, there are three curves: c1, c2, and c3. Under c1, the brillation probability is zero, c2 is reached for 5% of the people, and c3 for 50%. This means, for example, that even though the absolute minimum brillation threshold may be 0.04 A, for a current of 1 A lasting less than 0.1 s, approximately 95% of the people will survive.

For a given contact time, ventricular brillation can be modeled by a lognormal probability function that ts the three curves of Fig. 2, as shown by animal experiences. It must also be reminded that the curves in Fig. 2 are for a current passing through the heart from the left hand to the feet. For other body paths, the values for the current differ and are usually larger, which is accounted for by the IEC 60479 standard relating the brillation current through heart factors in a body path and this reference path (1) Besides ventricular brillation, muscle tetanic contraction may be a severe hazard when stepping on a conductor on the ground, because it can cause knees to ex and the person to fall. C. Dalziel has conducted a lot of research which is not in contradiction with IEC 60479 assumptions and provides further data [16] about the current thresholds for tetanic contraction. Although Dalziels research was focused on hand muscles tetanization, and hence, on let-go current thresholds, recent results point to the validity of extending those results to other body extremities [17]. III. MODELING COMMON GROUND FAULTS INVOLVING HUMAN CONTACTS In what follows, line-to-tree faults will not be addressed because they do not dene an immediate danger for human safety, although it is known that they can ignite res. A. Downed Conductors Undetected downed conductors are a human safety issue because the distances between live parts of the power system and the public are diminished beyond acceptable levels. A downed conductor may have a very low fault current even for low resistivity soils; for example, if the open circuit is from the source side and the line is back fed from MV distribution transformers, or in resonant or insulated networks. Step Voltage Near a Downed Conductor: When somebody touches a downed conductor with a foot, the current will ow from one foot to the other (Fig. 3). The situation presented in Fig. 3 is represented in Fig. 4 to highlight the associated electrical phenomenon.

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PINTO DE S AND LOURO: ON HUMAN LIFE RISK-ASSESSMENT AND SENSITIVE GROUND FAULT PROTECTION 3

Fig. 3. Step voltage in case there is foot contact with a downed conductor.

Fig. 5. Electrical equivalent of step voltage near a downed conductor.

two layers model) and a constant that depends on the top layer depth and the difference between top soil and bottom soil resistivity [18] (5) These expressions follow what is usually derived for substations grounding design and are not new [19], [20]. The calculation of the grounding resistance for a conductor laid on soil can be done through the formula ([19, p. 167])
Fig. 4. Step voltage in case there is foot contact with a downed conductor (prole view).

(6) The ground potential rise (GPR) from the downed conductor is obtained by (2) where length of the downed conductor in contact with the soil; grounding resistance of the downed conductor; short-circuit current to ground. The voltage applied to a person stepping on the downed conductor can be determined by the following equation (refer to Fig. 4): (3) where step voltage (in relative value of GPR); step length. The step voltage can also be obtained from Fig. 5 and expressed by (4) For the case represented in Fig. 5, (8) can be derived by replacing (7) in (3) (8) Of course, in (8), all of the involved variables are random, namely, the length of the laid conductor, the step length, the soil resistivity, the type of shoes and their electrical resistance, the where radius of the conductor; 2L s/2 buried horizontal wire length (a portion of depth of burial. );

In this formula, all of the variables are to be dened. It has been found that for a particular point of a downed conductor, the fault current to soil tends to be random in magnitude because of varying contact effects of grass, roots, bushing, and rocks that cause intermittent ground contact paths of variable impedance. Arcing disturbs the ground path by rapid heating, drying, and expansion of soil, charring of glass and the melting of sand into glass, in a complex and dynamic way. However, at least for conductors lying on soil for a few yards (or meters), it appears that experience conrms the ndings in [21] in which the arcing from the conductor to the ground is seen as equivalent to a at plate. This arcing contact is modeled in (6) by a depth of burial. Substituting (5) in (4), the following equation is obtained: (7)

The resistance of the foot contact to ground resented as a function of the top soil resistivity

can be rep(assuming a

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Fig. 7. Touch voltage across the human body.

Fig. 6. Touch voltage when touching a faulty MV pole.

Besides heart brillation, a current from hand to feet can also cause tetanic muscle contraction in those body extremities, for values much lower than those causing brillation. Anyway, by observing (12), it is apparent that it also depends on many random factors, such as soil resistivity, shoes electrical resistance, body path for the current and its heart factor, applied voltage, and the person brillation threshold. IV. ASSUMPTIONS FOR A RISK ANALYSIS A. Probabilistic Approach A probabilistic approach is how these authors propose dealing with the randomness of the variables involved in the studied events. Risk analysis as related to electric injuries resulting from ground faults is not a new idea [22], but to the authors knowledge, it was never applied to protection practices. Traditional grounding theory uses pessimistic values for all of the random variables present in danger assessment. This implies the assumption that all of the unfavorable situations will occur simultaneously, which rarely occurs. This prudent practice makes sense when designing grounding systems for installations with an expected life of several decades and with operational conditions not entirely foreseeable. However, the goal of this paper is to determine the fault current that is harmful for people stepping on downed conductors and touching poles under fault in real conditions. A deterministic analysis based on the worst conditions would lead to a pessimistic result of almost null probability and requiring too much protection sensitivity. On the other hand, it appears wise to relax the protection sensitivity to determine the associated risk. Thus, in what follows, we start by proposing probability distributions for the involved random variables. B. Probabilistic Assumptions for Common Random Variables Soil Resistivity : According to data from a local utility (EDP), its most common soil resistivity in dry weather is 150 m and the largest identied value was 37 k m. It was considered that the soil resistivity follows a lognormal-type distribution and, tting that data, a median value of 150 m with 95% of the soils having a resistivity below 2000 m was found. Soil resistivity depends a lot on seasonal moisture and regional variations, and in other regions, other statistic parameters can t the data better. : The larger the soil resistivity is, the Nonuniform Soil worse it is. The top soil layer usually has a larger resistivity than the average soil because it is more exposed to water evaporation.

body electrical resistance, and the person brillation threshold, although they exist between some limits. B. Pole Faults Touch Voltage Near a Pole: Another common indirect contact can occur when there is a fault to a metallic or steel-reinforced concrete pole and a person accidentally touches it. This hazard is more probable when a pole-mounted distribution transformer has a fault to its grounded tank, particularly when it is located near houses, but it also occurs with broken insulators. Touch voltage is the most limiting aspect because the probability of the electric current passing through the heart is higher than for step voltage. The case of an indirect contact is illustrated in Fig. 6. It is assumed that the pole in Fig. 6 does not have a ground return wire, as is most usual in MV lines. Should the pole have a ground return wire, the results would probably be less constraining. Considering Fig. 6, the touch voltage to the human body can be calculated through (9) The pole resistance depends on the placing of the ground electrodes and the soil resistivity. The placing of the ground electrodes is uniform, so we have (10) In Fig. 7, the touch voltage is presented as depending on the resistance of the human body, the shoe resistance, the grounding resistance of the feet, and the current passing through the human body. The touch voltage can be obtained by using (11) Equation (12) establishes the relationship between the shortcircuit current to an MV pole and the current passing through a persons heart (12)

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PINTO DE S AND LOURO: ON HUMAN LIFE RISK-ASSESSMENT AND SENSITIVE GROUND FAULT PROTECTION 5

TABLE I SHOE PROPERTIES AND PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE

Fig. 8. Electric potential near a downed conductor.

In reference [23], a 30% resistivity increase in the top soil layer due to evaporation is presented. According to the weather prole of Portugal, it was found that for 150 days of the year, the top layer resistivity is identical to the average resistivity. In the remaining days of the year (dry weather), the top layer resistivity should be 30% above the average resistivity. Human Body Resistance : Statistics for the human body resistance are presented in [16], which follow a lognormal-type distribution [24]. However, its average value depends on the path considered for the current: it is somewhat larger for foot to foot than for hand to feet. IEC 60479 provides means to evaluate the relative impedance for different current paths. : If the heart current surpasses a cerHeart Current tain threshold, ventricular brillation is probable. The data presented in [15] are used for the brillation current. A lognormal probability function is the most adequate for accessing the brillation current [24]. : Grounding design guides usually Shoe Resistance assume barefooting in their models. However, for risk assessment in real life, barefooting is uncommon, at least in industrialized regions. Data on shoe resistances can be found in [25] and are being used for grounding design in Australia and in the U.K. Table I shows those data, with minor adjustments to local conditions. The voltage withstand thresholds of the shoes have to be compared to the actual value calculated in the analysis. If the threshold is violated, any considered algorithm must be adjusted for this circumstance. This, of course, makes the analysis of the statistics very nonlinear. C. Specic Probabilistic Assumption for Downed Conductors : To simulate a Conductor Section and Burial Depth downed conductor, a very low burial depth can be assumed (e.g., 0.002 m). For illustrations purposes, a 25-mm section was also assumed as typical of MV conductors. These parameters have a reduced effect on the conductor-to-ground resistance; thus, they were not taken as random. For example, a 10-times increase in the depth burial (justiable to model arcing into the soil near the conductor contact) only reduces the grounding resistance in 13%.

: This is a most determining Conductor Lengths variable for a conductor-to-ground resistance, which is inversely proportional to the contact length dened in (6). On between MV poles depends one hand, the average span on the voltage level. For the lowest voltage in MV overhead lines, it can be around a hundred yards (or meters), varying up to 1/3 that value. On the other hand, when an overhead line falls on ground, only a portion of that maximum value will be in touch with the soilor close enough for arcing to perform the grounding. Reports from maintenance crews point to two types of reasons for a line to break in regions where it is unusual to have lines running on roadsides and, hence, driving accidents are not a cause for line falling. The most usual reason is simply breaking on the points where tensile efforts are at maximum, which are at the poles suspensions. Trees and human artifacts cause other fractures, which have a higher occurrence at midspan, where the conductors are at their minimum height. Considering all of these aspects would lead to a complex probability distribution, but we consider that a uniform distribution is a reasonable model, taking into account that it probably underestimates . : The step voltage near a Step Voltage downed conductor depends on the step length and the potential near the conductor. Fig. 8 represents the potential near a downed conductor. This data were obtained through a simulation ([26]). Step Length : The standards for grounding design always take the step length at its maximum, 1 m. However, as for barefooting, that model is too pessimistic for modeling reality; hence, a step length with a uniform distribution probability between 0 and 1 m was assumed. Probably a lognormal distribution would t reality the best, but in the end, the convergence of all random variables will always lead to results approximating a lognormal distribution, regardless of the assumed distributions for each variable, thanks to the central limit theorem. D. Specic Probabilistic Assumptions for Faulted Poles Pole Grounding Factor : This factor represents the relationship between the pole grounding resistance and the soil av-

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Fig. 10. Fault current for 0.5% probability of heart brillation when stepping on a downed conductor: with random shoes, barefooted.

Fig. 9. Touch voltage dependence on arm length.

erages resistivity. In this study, some particular grounding practices for MV poles yield [27] (13) Arm Length : The IEEE [19] states that for project purposes, an arm length of 0.8 m must be used, but this is too pessimistic for average real conditions. Therefore and in order to obtain a realistic assessment of the arm length, a uniform distribution probability between zero and 0.8 m is proposed. : The touch voltage (obtained from Touch Voltage [27]), which depends on the arm length, is represented in Fig. 9. : The heart factor depends on the point Heart Factor of entry of the electric current in the human body. If this point is the left hand, then the factor is 1, but if it is the right hand, the heart factor is 0.8 [15]. We have assumed a probability for the point of entry being the right hand and equal to that of the left hand (50%).

Fig. 11. Fault currents versus probability of a fall when stepping a downed conductor. with random shoes, barefooted, X- with only one type of shoes (dry new black rubber).

A. Case for Downed Conductors A rst investigation was done for the brillation risk when stepping on the downed conductor. Fig. 10 shows the achieved results. Perhaps surprisingly, the fault currents causing immediate brillation are quite large, even for barefooted people. It must be reminded that this is not the current through the person, but the fault current from the conductor to ground, for a 0.5% probability of brillation with random variability of all the parameters. For a typical step time of 2/3 of a second, more than 100 A are needed even for barefooted people. One of the reasons for this is that the current that passes through the heart in case of the current entering one foot and leaving the other is only 4% of the total body current [15]. Unfortunately, the current threshold that makes the leg muscles stop to respond to voluntary actions and causes knee exing and loss of balance is much smaller [18]. Once a person falls, there is a large chance that the fall will be on the conductor, and that is why this hazard is what must be considered for stepping downed conductors. Fig. 11 shows how the falling risk grows with the fault current. Since muscle contraction has nothing to do with the cardiac cycle, now the contact time is irrelevant. Even a fault current of 1 A can make 1% of the peopl fall, and 5% of them if barefooted. The risk of falling for people with dry new black rubber shoes is equal to the average shoes up to 10 A, but above this current, there are other shoes, with larger resistances, which increase the amps required to cause a fall. Fig. 12 illustrates the importance of the soil resistivity and the length of the conductor making contact with the ground, for the

V. RISK ANALYSIS THROUGH MONTE CARLO METHODS Monte Carlo methods work by repeated random sampling to compute results. With readily available inexpensive personal computers and powerful software, such as MATLAB, Monte Carlo methods are an easy approach to estimate risk for the situations under study, particularly considering the large amount of random variables and the nonlinear behavior of the shoes. For example, for computing equations (8) and (12), the method was applied as follows. 1) In the Monte Carlo simulation, random numbers that follow the presented random variables probability distribution were generated. 2) Five million random data were calculated for each random variable (using each random variable probabilistic distribution functions) by using MATLAB, followed by the nal equations calculation for that amount of data. Finally, the ve million results for the equations were sorted and the thresholds verifying particular probabilities were determined.

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PINTO DE S AND LOURO: ON HUMAN LIFE RISK-ASSESSMENT AND SENSITIVE GROUND FAULT PROTECTION 7

Fig. 12. Fault currents versus fall probability when stepping a downed conductor. for a short portion of the conductor on the ground (5 m); X- for very resistive soil (5  ); - all random (reference); for low resistivity soil ( =5); 5for a long portion of the conductor on the ground (95 m).

Fig. 14. Time to heart brillation versus fault current for: different probabilities. From left to right0.5%, 2.5%, 5%, and 25%.

Fig. 13. Fault currents versus heart brillation probability for touching a downed conductor. falling on it, with chest making contact, 4with the hand, standing 1.5 m from the point the conductor touches the ground.

risk of a fall. These results conrm how high-resistance soil and a small length of contacting conductor greatly increase the risk for the same fault current, which must be taken into account if the probability for these occurrences is considerable. Once a person falls, there is a chance to fall on the downed conductor. The risk of brillation can be estimated considering as the worst condition the chest touches the conductor and both bare hands touch the ground, at a random distance between 0 and 1 m from the conductor. Fig. 13 shows the probability for this hazard, and the risk of brillation for touching the hanging portion of the conductor with a hand when standing, instead of stepping on it. The heart brillation probability when falling on the conductor is very similar to the probability of muscle tetanization for stepping on it, but the probability of both occurring is approximated by their product; hence, it can be said that for the considered statistics, the risk of dying from stepping on the conductor will be only 0.5% if the fault current is less than around 4 A. However, for this current, the risk of dying from touching the hanging conductor with a hand will be 4 times greater. B. Case for Faulted Poles The application of the same analytic methodology to the case of a faulted pole provides the results of Fig. 14 for a growing risk of heart brillation. The amount of time until heart brillation occurs depends on the touch duration, but unfortunately,

Fig. 15. Time-to-heart brillation versus fault current for different assumptions, all for a 0.5% risk of death.

the related let-go current is much smaller; therefore, once a hand touch is made to a faulted pole, it will likely remain until heart brillation occurs, unless the current is small enough or the fault is eliminated by some protection. For standing faults, the asymptotic current is what matters, for example, 4 A for a death risk of 0.5%. Of course, these results are for random variables in which shoes have a determining importance. Fig. 15 illustrates how barefooting as well as considering only a maximum distance (0.8 m) from the feet to the pole will affect the results (all of the remaining variables are still random). For touches lasting longer than 2 s, barefooting reduces the current required for heart brillation from 4 A to 2.9 A, with the same risk of 0.5%, under the considered statistics. These illustrative results can be compared as shown in Table II. From the obtained results, it can be said that to reach a very high safety level, fault currents to ground above 3 to 5 A shall not be allowed, but below these values, the risk of death is very low.

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TABLE II MINIMUM FAULT-TO-GROUND CURRENTS FOR RISK OF DEATH

VI. EXPORTING THE RESULTS OF THE RISK ANALYSIS TO THE DESIGN OF SENSITIVE ROUND PROTECTION SCHEMES The results reached in the previous section dene fault currents that can endanger human life for a calculated level of probability. The analysis leads to values for currents because electric current is the lethal agent in the human body, once electroporation (which has more to do with voltage) and arc ash are excluded. Of course, if different assumptions are made about the random behavior of the independent variables, particularly the soil resistivity and the features of the shoes, the same risk levels will be yielded by different currents. However, it is unlikely that realistic parameters however different will change these values in orders of magnitude. On the other hand, the evaluation of the total risk depends on the probability of the events themselves (people moving under overhead lines, how the lines are maintained, and how they are clamped to their poles, the materials used to manufacture MV poles, how these poles are grounded, etc.). In addition, of course, it is up to each community to decide on what the risk is that can be afforded. Notwithstanding, if a very low risk of casualties is desired, (e.g., 0.5%), phase-to-ground faults yielding more than a few amps cannot be tolerated. Under this constraint, the suitable protection schemes depend very much on the type of network and particularly on its grounding philosophy. In what follows, some typical scenarios will be addressed. Networks With Resonant Grounding: Networks with resonant grounding (through arc-suppression coils, also named Petersen coils), can limit the current of any phase-to-ground fault to very small values. A perfect resonance would eliminate that current, but real systems cannot do it, rst because the coils are not perfect inductances and always have some resistance, and second because a perfect tuning would create a large voltage unbalance even for very small phase asymmetries. Real systems can reduce the current of a phase-to-ground fault to an extent capable of suppressing most arcs, and that is precisely its best value, but cannot eliminate the fault current from a downed conductor or to a pole from a pole-mounted faulted transformer. However, from the risk analysis presented before, it can be said that if a persistent fault current to ground is less than 3 to 5 A, the risk of human casualties may be really small. Sustained operation with this fault is precisely the usual practice in Austrian and German utilities [28], where grounding through Petersen coils is an old and established tradition and fault currents are most often reduced to a few amps with 3 A being a typical reference. For a phase-to-ground fault to be detected in a feeder in those networks, the current transformers (CTs) have to cope with very

low zero-sequence currents and still provide a measurement accurate enough for the use of sensitive wattmetric relays. This accuracy usually demands a CT with a primary current vector addition or ux summation, in which the conductor cables pass through the center hole of the core balance CT. For overhead lines, the use of this CT is only possible if the line has a cable portion between the substation bus and its rst pole, which is a usual design in many European regions. Nonresonant Networks With Neutral Grounded Only in the Substations: In networks that are ungrounded or grounded only in the substations, without a neutral conductor in the feeders, phase-to-ground faults usually have considerable currents, which are easy to detect by protective relaying, particularly if ux-summation CTs are available to provide good measurements of zero-sequence currents. However, there are two very different situations to consider: Backfed Downed Conductors and Faulted Poles: A downed conductor broken near the suspension point in the source-side pole can have a considerable length on soil with good resistivity and still be characterized by small fault currents. A polemounted transformer with a phase fault to its inner grounded tank creates a similar situation if the fuse of the faulted phase is blown. It can be shown that the phase-to-ground backfed fault current is limited to 1/3 of the prefault load current in the line, unless the fault resistance is really large, and that the residual the zero-sequence current) on the source side of current ( the line is equal to that fault current [26]. Therefore, sensitive zero-sequence overcurrent relays can guarantee human safety against the hazards previously investigated if they can be set to currents as small as 35 A, about the same amps to which resonant grounding usually limits any phase-to-ground fault current. However, if the region served by the network is populated by barefooted people, has poorly maintained equipment, and moderate power-quality (PQ) requirements, a sensitivity as low as 1 or 2 A may be a better option at the substation neutral connection. Nonbackfed Phase-to-Ground Faults: If zero-sequence overcurrent relays are set to 35 A, they will be very sensitive to faults fed by the source, unless a very short length of conductor makes contact with very high-resistance soil. However, setting an overcurrent relay to 35 A can make it sensitive to charging zero currents from the feeder to a fault somewhere else. Means to guarantee selectivity include varimetric directionality in ungrounded networks and an inverse-time behavior for the other grounding options. Networks With Distributed Grounding: In networks with distributed grounding, it may be difcult to distinguish by the amount of amps between currents owing to ground through planned ground connections, or those from a downed conductor. For low-resistance faults, this is not an issue because currents are large and easy to sense by usual relays. However, faults involving short lengths of conductors contacting high-resistance soils can yield low fault currents and be precisely the most dangerous (see Fig. 12). Hence, there is no doubt that high-resistance faults in networks with distributed grounding will be better identied through the signature of their waveforms, not through their

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magnitude. In other words, those are the scenarios where the solutions developed by Don Russell and others and now commercialized by a number of manufacturers are most valuable.

VII. CONCLUSION Beginning with a biophysical model for human physiology, a set of random variables was identied as determining the risk of heart brillation for hazards related to downed conductors and faults to poles. By applying Monte Carlo methods, it was found that to guarantee a very low risk of death, fault currents above a few amps shall not be sustained. Downed conductors and faulted poles yield similar fault current limits. Fullling the requirement to limit ground fault currents to a few amps depends on how a network is grounded. Special relays are most valuable where other methods cannot be applied, as in multigrounded networks or in lines where sensitive zerosequence overcurrent relays cannot be used.

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Miguel Louro was born in 1978. He received the M.Sc. degree in electrical and computer engineering from the Instituto Superior Tcnico, Lisbon, Portugal, in 2008 He was with LABELEC from 2002 to 2007. His main tasks were to provide expertise toward power systems protection for power distribution and generation. He is now in the Network Analysis department of EDP Distribuio, where he focuses on large-scale incident analysis and protection systems.