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FRAMEWORK PAIR
CARD 1: There are rules of agency that restrict the ability to act as a true agent. If I am playing a game of chess, but do not follow the rules of chess or act with the intention of checkmating the king, then I am not a true chess-player. The rules of correctness are defined by the games criteria. Similarly, there are unavoidable rules defined by the game of agency. Ferrero1: Agency is special under two respects. First, agency is the enterprise with the largest jurisdiction.12 All ordinary enterprises fall under it. To engage in any ordinary enterprise is ipso facto to engage in the enterprise of agency. In addition, there are instances of behavior that fall under no other enterprise but agency. First, intentional transitions in and out of particular enterprises might not count as moves within those enterprises, but they are still instances of intentional agency, of bare intentional agency, so to say. Second, agency is the locus where we adjudicate the merits and demerits of participating in any ordinary enterprise. Reasoning whether to participate in a particular enterprise is often conducted outside of that enterprise, even while one is otherwise engaged in it. Practical reflection is a manifestation of full-fledged intentional
agency but it does not necessary belong to any other specific enterprise. Once again, it might be an instance of bare intentional agency. In the limiting case, agency is the only enterprise that would still keep a subject busy if she were to attempt a radical re-evaluation of all of her engagements and at least temporarily suspend her participation in all ordinary enterprises.13 The

second feature that makes agency stand apart from ordinary enterprises is agency s closure. Agency is closed under the operation of reflective rational assessment. As the case of radical re-evaluations shows, ordinary enterprises are never fully closed under reflection. There is always the possibility of reflecting on their justification while standing outside of them. Not so for rational agency. The constitutive features of agency (no matter whether they are conceived as aims, motives, capacities, commitments, etc.) continue to operate even when the agent is assessing whether she is justified in her engagement in agency. One cannot put agency on hold while trying to determine whether agency is justified because this kind of practical reasoning is the exclusive job of intentional agency. This does not mean that agency falls outside of the reach of reflection. But even reflection about agency is a manifestation of agency. CARD 2: The constitute features of agency or human personhood can never serve as sufficient justifications for a particular ethics, because people can always choose not to be an agent. Ethics becomes avoidable. Enoch: Suppose you somehow find yourself playing chess (or, if we are going to be tendentiously picky about what qualifies as actually playing chess, seemingly playing chess), but you do not care about the game and about who wins, nor do you have any reason so to care. It seems rather clear to me that you have no reason whatsoever to attempt to checkmate your opponent. And if a metanormative (or metachess) theorist then comes along, explaining to you that attempting to checkmate your opponent is constitutive of the game of chess, so that unless you engage in such attempts your activity will not be classifiable as chess playing, it seems to me you are perfectly justified in treating this information as normatively irrelevant. After all, what is it to you how your activity is best classified? If you have no reason to be
playing chess, then that some aim is constitutive of playing chess gives you no reason at all, it seems to me, to pursue it, and this whether or not you are in fact playing chess. (Analogously: If you have no reason to be building a house, then that some standard is constitutive of being a house gives you no reason at all to measure up to it, and this whether or not you are in fact building a

If a constitutive-aim or constitutive-motives theory is going to work for agency, then, it is not sufficient to show that some aims or motives or capacities are constitutive of agency. Rather, it is also necessary to show that the game of agency is one we have reason to play,36 that we have reasons to be agents rather than shmagents.
house.)

Constitutivism and the Inescapability of Agency. Luca Ferrero. University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee. Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. IV. Jan 12, 2009.

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FRAMEWORK CARDS
CARD: Ends are ordered hierarchically, with each end ordered toward a higher end within the person. This hierarchy of actions leads the judgments to an ultimate end under which all other ends are contained. This is the form of the agent, and serves as the standard by which their actions are evaluated. Boyle and Lavin 2:
We will consider how these issues bear on the deliberation of a rational agent in the next section. Before turning to that topic, however, we need to say something general about why, if

being a goal-directed agent presupposes being the bearer of a form in the sense described above, such forms should equally constitute
evaluative standards for the acts of the agents who bear them. The answer will be, in a way, disappointingly quick. It is that this is something we have already conceded in all but name in

To represent an individual as the bearer of a form, in the sense we have been specifying, is to represent that individual as a sort of thing that as such pursues certain ends, ends that stand, when things are going well, in a sort of balance or equilibrium, a balance on which the existence of such things depends.
assigning the notion of form the place we have given it in our account. To the extent that such a thing achieves those ends, it succeeds in pursuits that belong to it as such. And by the same token, to the extent that it fails, it fails in pursuits that belong to it as such.

these pursuits belong inalienably to those individuals: they cannot cease to be pursuers of these ends without ceasing to be. And inasmuch as their particular doings are to be understood as acts of powers directed toward certain general ends, these ends will be the measures of those acts, in the way that any act is a success or failure in virtue of its fulfilling or not fulfilling its end. That attributing a form to a thing, in this sense, involves attributing to it something that is a standard or measure of its activity, a standard relative to which it may be acting well or poorly, is thus a truism, not a controversial addition to what has already been said.
Inasmuch as the form in question is essential to individuals that bear it,

CARD: Morality is a system of functional truths that give humans a purpose they must fulfill. Captain MacIntyre: Yet in fact the alleged unrestrictedly general logical principle on which everything is being made to depend is bogus- and the scholastic tag applies only to Aristotelian syllogisms. There are several types of valid arguments in which some element may appear in a conclusion which is not present in the premises. A.N. Priors counter-example to this illustrates its breakdown adequately; [F]rom the premise He is a sea captain; the conclusion may be validly inferred that He ought to do whatever a sea-captain ought to do. This counter-example not only shows that there is no general principle of the type alleged; but it itself shows what is at least a grammatical truthan is premise can on occasion entail an ought conclusion. From such factual premises as This watch is grossly inaccurate and irregular in time-keeping and This watch is too heavy to carry about comfortably, the evaluative conclusion validly follows that This is a bad watch. From such factual premises as He gets a better yield for this crop per acre than any farmer in the district, He has the most effective programme of soil renewal yet known and His dairy herd wins all the first prizes at the agricultural shows, the evaluative conclusion validly follows that He is a good farmer. Both of these arguments are [This argument is] valid because of the special character of the concepts of a watch and of a farmer. Such concepts are functional concepts; that is to say, we define both watch[es] and farmer in terms of purpose of function which a watch or a farmer are [is] characteristically expected to serve. It follows that the concept of a watch cannot be defined independently of the concept of a good watch nor the
concept of a farmer independently of that of a good farmer; and that the criterion of somethings being a watch and the criterion of somethings being a good watch.

CARD: Morality must concern itself with acts of justification. When I claim that my act was moral, I am providing a defense of that action. The nature of morality is in the act of defense of ones actions. This makes morality second personal, or contingent on my authority over other people and their reciprocal authority over me. We all stand in the relation of mutual accountability and have an equal standing to claim justification from one another. Darwall: To justify oneself to someone is to give her a kind of second-personal authority. It is to regard and treat her as having a standing to claim a justification from one (and hence to address claims to others at all). Second-personal authority of this kind is essentially tied to accountability. Justifying oneself to someone is part of holding oneself responsible or accountable to her. So justification to one another is what constitutes mutual accountability. When I justify myself to you, I hold myself answerable to you, and treat you as having the standing to claim this from me. You reciprocate and accord me the same standing when you justify yourself to me. As I understand it, therefore, the root contractualist idea is that this standing is one that you and I share. We have an equal (second-personal) authority to make claims of one another, which we respect in seeing each other as beings to 2 / 11

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whom we should be able to justify ourselves.

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Understanding morality in terms of mutual accountability illuminates why Scanlon can say in Contractualism that agreement (of this sort) is what morality is all about. If moral self-regulation essentially involves making ourselves answerable to one another, then agreement on fundamental principles is not simply a collective epistemic achievement, or a standard of our each doing what is right individually; it is an essential element of the fundamental moral relation (responsibility to one another). This idea is suggested also by the passages from Preference and Process quoted above. Urgency or importance of interests is justificatory weight in warranting claims on others. The question of when practices or institutions are legitimate in light of their power to control or intervene turns on when this is consistent with individuals legitimate claims. Thus, actions towards others are only moral if we have justified moral claims on others. By holding ourselves accountable to moral relation, we see what morality is truly about. CARD: The existence of a particular human precedes the essence, or the nature, of that human that requires them to act morally. The image of man only goes as far as the self. Sartre:
And when we speak of abandonment a favorite word of Heidegger we only mean to say that

God does not exist, and that it is necessary to draw

the consequences of his absence right to the end. The existentialist is strongly opposed to a certain type of secular moralism which seeks to suppress God
at the least possible expense. Towards 1880, when the French professors endeavoured to formulate a secular morality, they said something like this: God is a useless and costly hypothesis, so we will do without it. However, if we are to have morality, a society and a law-abiding world, it is essential that certain values should be taken seriously; they must have an a priori existence ascribed to them. It must be considered obligatory a priori to be honest, not to lie, not to beat ones wife, to bring up children and so forth; so we are going to do a little work on this subject, which will enable us to show that these values exist all the same, inscribed in an intelligible heaven although, of course, there is no God. In other words and this is, I believe, the purport of all that we in France call radicalism nothing will be changed if God does not exist; we shall rediscover the same norms of honesty, progress and humanity, and we shall have disposed of God as

The existentialist, on the contrary, finds it extremely embarrassing that God does not exist, for there disappears with Him all possibility of finding values in an intelligible heaven. There can no longer be any good a priori, since there is no infinite and perfect consciousness to think it. It is nowhere written that the good exists, that one must be honest or must not lie, since we are now upon the plane where there are only men. Dostoevsky once wrote: If God did not exist, everything would be permitted; and that, for existentialism, is the starting point. Everything is indeed
an out-of-date hypothesis which will die away quietly of itself. permitted if God does not exist, and man is in consequence forlorn, for he cannot find anything to depend upon either within or outside himself. He discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse.

one will never be able to explain ones action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism man is free, man is freedom. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimise our behaviour. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any [no] means of justification or excuse. We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free. Condemned, because he did not create himself, yet is nevertheless at liberty, and from the moment that he is thrown into this world he is responsible for everything he does. The existentialist does not believe in the power of passion. He will never regard a grand passion as a
For if indeed existence precedes essence, destructive torrent upon which a man is swept into certain actions as by fate, and which, therefore, is an excuse for them. He thinks that man is responsible for his passion. Neither will an

the man himself interprets the sign as he chooses. He thinks that every man, without any support or help whatever, is condemned at every instant to invent man. As Ponge has written in a very fine article, Man is the future of man. That is exactly true. Only, if one took this to mean that the future is laid up in Heaven, that God knows what it is, it would be false, for then it would no longer even be a future. If, however, it means that, whatever man may now appear to be, there is a future to be fashioned, a virgin future that awaits him then it is a true saying. But in the present one is forsaken.
existentialist think that a man can find help through some sign being vouchsafed upon earth for his orientation: for he thinks that

CARD: reason is the only source for ethical knowledge. Velleman explains: external source[s] of authority [are] turn out to be escapable because the authority behind them can be questioned. We can ask, Why should I act on this desire? or Why should I obey the U.S. Government? or even Why should I obey God? And as we observed in the case of the desire to punch someone in the nose, this question demands a reason for acting. The authority we are questioning would be vindicated, in each case, by the production of a sufficient reason. What this observation suggests is that any purported source of practical authority depends on reasons for obeying itand hence on the authority of reasons. Suppose, then, that we attempted
As we have seen, requirements that depend for their force on some to question the authority of reasons themselves, as we earlier questioned other authorities. Where we previously asked Why should I act on my desire? let us now ask Why should I act for reasons? Shouldnt this question open up a route of escape from all requirements? As soon as we ask why we should act for reasons

, however, we can hear something odd in our

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question. To ask Why should I? is to demand a reason; and so

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to ask Why should I act for reasons? is to demand a reason for acting for reasons. This demand implicitly concedes the very authority that it purports to questionnamely, the authority of reasons. Why would we demand a reason if we didnt envision acting for it? If we really didnt feel required to act for reasons, then a reason for doing so certainly wouldnt help. So there [It] is something self-defeating about [to] asking for a reason to act for reasons. The foregoing argument doesnt show that the requirement to act for reasons is inescapable. All it shows is that this requirement cannot be escaped in a particular way: we cannot escape the requirement to act for reasons by insisting on reasons for obeying it. For all that, we still may not be required to act for reasons. Yet the argument does more
than close off one avenue of escape from the requirement to act for reasons. It shows that we are subject to this requirement to act for reasons. It shows that we are subject to this requirement if

The requirement to act for reasons is the fundamental requirement, from which the authority [from which] of all other requirements is derived, since the authority of other requirements just consists in there being reasons for us to obey them. There may be
we are subject to any requirements at all. nothing that is required of us; but if anything is required of us, then acting for reasons is required.

CARD: Agency provides the rules of a universal law. Choice and action derives from recognizing ends within a concept of universal law. All deliberation is bound by practical reason. Agency requires the will be a manifestation of a universal law. Reath writes2: the will is a capacity to derive actions from a representation of certain laws or principles. (Cf. GMS 4: 412; II, 12.) Herman adds that among the laws that we can and do represent to ourselves is the law that is constitutive of the wills own causal power. In all rational volition an agent is moved by a perceived connection of the action to her representation of herself willing an end, which is to say, according to a representation of the wills constitutive principle the principle constitutive of the wills own activity [is] what we (always and necessarily) represent to ourselves in and as a condition of rational choice. So here is a way to unpack the idea that rational volition is governed by its own self-understanding as aimed at good and sufficient reasons: all rational volition proceeds from a representation of the formal principle of volition and understands itself to specify action through the application of this principle that is by deriving action from principles taken to be universally valid or to provide sufficient rational support. A bit more work will tell us that rational volition, so conceived, is free activity. It is robustly self-determining because it is governed by its self-understanding of its form as expressed in its internal norm, independently of certain kinds of outside influence. Thus the formula of universal law is the formal principle of free agency.
One way to represent this conception of volition philosophically has been suggested by Barbara Herman. Kant tells us that

CARD: Moral claims are based in the justification of my acts to another. This is done through general consensus about what individuals would agree. Habermas explains (Jrgen, Remarks on Discourse Ethics)
Social interactions mediated by the use of language oriented to mutual understanding are constitutive for sociocultural forms of life. This kind of communicative socialization through which persons are simultaneously

the identity of socialized individuals develops only through integration into ever more extensive relations of social dependence. The person develops an inner life and achieves a stable identity only to the extent that he also externalizes himself in communicatively generated interpersonal relations and implicates himself in an ever denser and more differentiated network of reciprocal vulnerabilities thereby rendering himself in need of protection. From this anthropological viewpoint, morality can be conceived as the protective institution that compensates for a constitutional precariousness implicit in the sociocultural form of life itself. Moral institutions tell us how we should behave toward one another to counteract the extreme vulnerability of the individual through protection and considerateness. Nobody can preserve his integrity by himself alone. The integrity of individual persons requires the stabilization of a network of symmetrical relations of recognition in which nonreplaceable individuals can secure their fragile identities in reciprocal fashion only as members of a community.
individuated generates a deep-seated vulnerability, because

CARD: morality dictates that maximization of the good for those to whom we have moral obligations. Eric Rakowski3 writes, On one side, it presses toward the consequentialist view that individuals' status as moral equals requires that the number of
2 3

Formal Approaches to Kants Formula of Humanity. Andrews Reath. No date/ publication title in the pdf I have. Im willing to present the full text.

Taking and Saving Lives Columbia Law Review, Vol. 93, No. 5, (Jun., 1993), pp. 1063-1156 Published by: Columbia Law Review Association, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1122960 4 / 11

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people kept alive be maximized. Only in this way, the thought runs, can we give due weight to the fundamental equality of persons; to allow more deaths when we can ensure fewer is to treat some people as less valuable than others. Further, killing some to save others, or letting some die for that purpose, does not entail that those who are killed or left to their fate are being used merely as means to the well-being of others, as would be true if they were slain or left to drown merely to please people who would live anyway. They do, of course, in some cases serve as means. But they do not act merely as means. Those who die are no less ends than those who live. It is because they are also no more ends than others whose lives are in the balance that an impartial decision-maker must choose to save the more numerous group, even if she must kill to do so.

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PAIR 1
CARD 1: defensive strategies are inherently worse than offensive strategies. There are infinite targets for terrorists, but a finite number of terrorist leaders. The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies explains:
(THE BEGIN-SADAT CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIESBAR-ILAN UNIVERSITY,Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 51)

Israel's policy of targeted killing has hurt the capability of its Arab adversaries to prosecute attacks against Israel. Terrorism is essentially an offensive action, making counter-offensive actions such as targeted killing an especially effective response. It is exceedingly difficult for Israel to defend itself from terror attacks or to deter terror attacks by Palestinians. In terms of defense, there are literally tens of thousands of targets in Israel for Palestinian terrorists. Power stations, government bureaus, bus depots, airports, skyscrapers, open-air markets and sport stadiumsthe list is endless. It is impossible to defend them all, especially against a determined adversary that can choose the time and place of attack. Although, as discussed below, some level of deterrence of terrorism is achievable, dissuading potential terrorists is not easy when they are eager to die for their cause. In such situations, the best response to terrorism is to go on a counter-offensive, that is, to eliminate the terrorist threat before it can be launched. One of the most successful means of eliminating terrorists before they can strike is
There is no question that the policy of targeted killing.

CARD 2: Targeted killing turns moderate civilians into radicals. Kilcullen4:

drone war has create[s] a siege mentality among Pakistani civilians. This is similar to what happened in Somalia in 2005 and 2006, when similar strikes were employed against the forces of the Union of Islamic Courts. While the strikes did kill individual militants who were the targets, public anger over the American show of force solidified the power of extremists. The Islamists popularity rose and the group became more extreme, leading eventually to a messy Ethiopian military intervention, the rise of a new regional insurgency and an increase in offshore piracy. While violent extremists may be unpopular, for a frightened population they seem less ominous than a faceless enemy that wages war from afar and often kills more civilians than militants. Imagine, for example, that burglars move into a neighborhood. If the police were to start blowing up peoples houses from the air, would this convince homeowners to rise up against the burglars? Wouldnt it be more likely to [this would] turn the whole population against the police? And if their neighbors wanted to turn the burglars in, how would they do that, exactly? Yet this is the same basic logic underlying the drone war.
First, the

Killcullen, David, and Exum, Andrew McDonald, Death from Above, Outrage Down Below. May 16, 2009, New York Times.

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PAIR 2
CARD 1: targeted killing lowers the morale of terrorist groups. Daniel Byman, Professor at Georgetown University, 2011. Killing terrorist leaders and key lieutenants not only brings justice to our enemies, but can devastate the group in question. Killing a leader like bin Laden removes a charismatic yet pragmatic leader--one who succeeded in transforming a small group into a household name and proved time and again he could attract recruits and funding. His replacement, be it Ayman al-Zawahiri or another senior alQaeda figure, may prove less charismatic and less able to unify this fissiparous movement. Some existing affiliates and cells may split off, and the core might be eclipsed by rivals. CARD 2: Victims of targeted killing are viewed as courageous martyrs, so targeted killing creates support for terrorists among local populations. David 3: Inasmuch as becoming a victim of an Israeli targeted killing has become a badge of honor among Palestinians, when the Israelis slay an alleged terrorist they unwittingly enhance the popularity of the organization to which he or she belonged. Many of the targets of Israel's attacks have come from Hamas and Islamic Jihad. These organizations then exploit their casualties in a manner designed to curry support among the Palestinian people. With public opinion polls showing skyrocketing approval of these groups, their efforts appear to be succeeding. In an effort to compete with Hamas and Jihad's success, Arafat's [other] organizations dramatically stepped up their own terrorist attacks in 2002. A competition developed as to which group could launch the most costly attacks against Israel. The policy of targeted killing, by affording prestige to those planning and committing these attacks, has encouraged that which it most seeks to deter.

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PAIR 3
CARD 1: terrorists are combatants, so they can be killed just like any other person in war. Blum explains5: The Bush administration has favored the paradigm of war, treating terrorists as combatants and justifying the targeted killing of terrorists as equivalent to the lawful killing of members of an enemy force on any battlefield. Specifically, the administration deemed terrorists [are] to be unlawful combatants, targetable and detainable, but denied the rights accorded to lawful detainees, namely, to be treated as prisoners of war if captured. The Bush administration maintained this position even when the targeted killing took place in Yemen or Pakistan, outside an immediate theater of hostilities such as Afghanistan. Given that the war on terrorism [is] was a global war, the Administration maintained, there could be no geographical boundaries to the theater of war. CARD 2: targets that are not combatants in the traditionally defined sense are outside the scope of international humanitarian law, which means they fall under the category of killing during peacetime, in which their death is clearly illegal. Rona writes:
Johnson poses the rhetorical question: "Should the legal assessment of targeting a single identifiable military objective be any different in 2012 than it was in 1943, when the U.S. Navy targeted and shot down over the Pacific the aircraft flying Admiral Yamamoto, the commander of the Japanese navy during World War Two, with the specific intent of killing him?" It is a trick question that assumes the fact of what it is supposed to determine. The proper question is not whether the law on targeting a known military objective has changed; it is whether the law on determining a

Targeting a suspected member of an amorphous non-state armed group or a suspected member of an "associated force" in a non-international armed conflict is not the same as targeting the commander of a state's enemy forces in an international armed conflict. To suggest otherwise is irresponsible a rather stunning failure to appreciate the most fundamental principles of targeting law designed to protect civilians from the ravages of war. Rather than a successful defense of targeted killing policy, Johnson's speech is an admission that US practice is beyond the scope of international humanitarian law the body of law that governs war, or armed conflict. As such, US practice is also necessarily beyond what international human rights law would permit outside of war, since the international law rules for killing in peacetime require a higher threshold of imminent harm than the rules applicable to war.
military objective is being respected.

Law and Policy of Targeted Killing. Gabriella Blum and Philip Heymann. Volume 1June 27, 2010.

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PAIR 4
CARD 1: A study of 215 domestic violence shelters found that the needs of women were largely met. Lyon:
Eleanor Lyon & Shannon Lane, [University of Connecticut School of Social Work], and Anne Menard National Resource Center on Domestic Violence. MEETING SURVIVORS NEEDS: A MULTISTATE STUDY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SHELTER EXPERIENCES, study prepared for the National Institute of Justice, 2008. RK

Respondents reported that if the shelter did not exist the consequences for them would be dire: homelessness, serious losses including children, continued abuse or death, or actions taken in desperation. Their primary needs at entry were safety, housing, information, emotional support, and help for their children. At exit, after a median length of stay of 22 days (27 for mothers) respondents reported a larger number of needs than they had identified at entry. They also indicated that their needs had largely been met. Although over half reported some kind of difficulty during their stay, such as conflicts with others or problems with rules, most of the problems were resolved. At least two thirds strongly agreed with every rating of staff respect and support, and 95% or more agreed. Neither difficulties nor ratings of
staff respect and support differed significantly among respondents, based on demographic characteristics.

CARD 2: The limited amount of time that people are allowed to remain in shelters makes them harmful. Olsen writes 6
House dynamics, limited capacity, and the requirements of funders may limit a shelter stay to one month. Even when affordable housing is an option (and we all know it is becoming increasingly difficult to attain), it is unrealistic to believe that a survivor of domestic violence can sort through feelings, explore legal opportunities become economically stable, and find a safe, suitable place to live all in one month ( or even three). Because of time limits too many families move from shelter to shelter, which is traumatizing for everyone involved and often results in a return to the abuser. The traditional
model of a limited stay is common in communal shelters.

Linda Olson, Battered Womens Shelters: Reflections The Washington State Coalition Against Domestic Violence March 2077

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PAIR 5
CARD 1: Civil protection wont work because arrests wont be made. Kieviet:
Thomas Kieviet, [Attorney at Law, Pepperdine University School of Law], The Battered Wife Syndrome: A Potential Defense to a Homicide Charge, Pepperdine Law Review Vol. 6, 1978-1979. RK The battered wife that has been able to obtain assistance from the police and district attorney may find some protection in the criminal statutes available for her to use against her husband. Criminal assault 26 and battery 27 are punishable by fines not ex- ceeding five hundred28 and one thousand29 dollars, respectively, and/or up to six months in the county jail. The punishment for assault with a deadly weapon or with force likely to produce great bodily injury is a fine not exceeding the sum of five thousand dol- lars and/or from two to four years in the state prison or up to one year in the county jail.30 However, the effectiveness of the penal- ties for simple assault and battery is significantly reduced by their misdemeanor status. A

prerequisite for an arrest for any misdemeanor is that the act occur in the presence of a police officer or that a complaint be sworn out by the victim in the district attorney's office. Thus, prosecution of these crimes has been hampered by the improbability of police presence at a beating, by the wife's fear of reprisal, or by her lack of knowledge of the avail- ability of these statutory remedies.
CARD 2: going through the law gives a sense of safety to battered women and, even if they arent helped, the courts become a value unto themselves. Weissman 2001 (Deborah, Associate Professor of Law and Director of Clinical Programs at UNC Chapel Hill, "Gender-Based Violence as Judicial Anomaly: Between "The Truly National and the Truly Local" 42 B.C. L. Rev. 1081, L/N)// Pitt- MF

In domestic violence matters, the law has the potential to [*1138] serve as a therapeutic agent in helping to restore emotional well-being and physical safety to battered women. n312 Many battered women are beset by self-blame and shame. They
The indifference with which domestic violence claims typically are treated affects women beyond the potential deficiencies of a court order. n311 have repeatedly been told by their abusers that no one will believe them . The very act of seeking court intervention demonstrates a woman's determination to challenge that

Perfunctory justice denies battered women the benefits of the impartial but authoritative judicial recognition that they have suffered harm. n313
message. Victims of domestic violence who seek orders of protection are not only asking for an acknowledgment of the wrong to which they have been subjected, they are also asking for a

When the process affords victims procedural fairness, including participation, dignity, and a sense of trust, the court process is transformed into a value unto itself. n315 The validation of a battered woman's claim is then an "inescapable by-product" of judicial process and review of the problem. n316 Within the enclave of the public courthouse, a battered woman may experience a redistribution of power in her favor. n317 Marginalization of her claim, however, destroys this opportunity . Judicial
forum where they can be heard and confront their abusers. n314 conduct which undermines her efforts confirms an outcome predicted by the abuser and denies any transformative possibility. n318

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PAIR 6
CARD 1: Battered women are psychologically destroyed.
Charles Patrick Ewing, [Forensic psychologist, attorney and SUNY Distinguished Service Professor at the University of Buffalo Law School] Psychological Self-Defense: A Proposed Justification for Battered Women Who Kill. Law and Human Behavior, Vol. 14, No. 6, 1990. Not all battered women who kill their batterers do so in self-defense, however that term is defined. Those who kill under circumstances that fall within the narrow confines of current deadly force doctrine are, of course, entitled to be acquitted on grounds of self-defense. But what of those, probably the majority of battered women homicide defendants, who kill not to avert an imminent threat of death or serious physical injury but rather to protect themselves from the infliction of extremely serious psychological injury-those who kill in what I have called psychological self-defense? Though these women may not be faced with a choice of killing

or being killed, many are confronted with a dilemma nearly as dreadful. Unable to escape (or unable to recognize any viable means of escape) from the battering relationship, they face the "choice" of killing (either their batterers or themselves) or being reduced to a psychological state in which their continued physical existence will have little if any meaning or value. Whatever one chooses to call this state-"life without feeling alive,"47"partialdeath, "or simply utter hopelessness49-the net result for the battered woman is a life hardly worth living.

CARD 2: And, even within the trials taken, theres no support for the notion that someone under a spell of learned helpessness would rise up and deliberately use deadly force. An Essay on Battered Woman Syndrome, Joe Wheeler Dixon, PhD, JD; psychologyandlaw.com
BWS advocates claim that battered women remain in the battering relationship because of a phenomenon observed in laboratory animals -- learned helplessness. In experimental conditions, laboratory animals have been arbitrarily punished (electric shock) in a no-escape situation until the animals literally give up all attempts to escape the punishment. Ultimately, when presented with an opportunity to escape additional punishment, the poor animals lack the ability to initiate or effectuate their own escape.

Unfortunately for BWS advocates, this condition of learned helplessness induced in animals, completely fails to explain why suddenly the battered woman, supposedly in a state of learned helplessness, suddenly rises up in rage, fear, and anger and initiates the ultimate effect upon her batterer, she murders him in a violent manner. To me, this seems much more consistent with the age-old motive for murder -- revenge, and not some scientifically unfounded syndrome. Additionally, scientists who conducted research in this area of animal behavior did not observe a sudden rousing of rage and aggression at any point in the course of their experiments (all such research is no longer conducted on
animals). Further, and more importantly, there has never been any experiment demonstrating the phenomenon of learned helplessness in human beings. So, the entire argument for learned helplessness in battered women is pure conjecture, without any empirical support, and that is certainly junk science!

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