Democracy, Electoral Systems, and Violence in the Philippines1

Institute for Political and Electoral Reform (IPER)

July 2007

This is the case study commissioned by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and which is the basis for the section on the Philippines of the UNDP paper entitled Understanding Electoral Violence in Asia published in 2011.

Table of Contents
Chapter 1 Problem of Violence Chapter 2 History of Elections in the Philippines Chapter 3 The Philippine Electoral System Legal Framework for Elections The System of Elections Who can vote Who can contest elections Election Body: The Philippine Commission on Elections Chapter 4 Features of Election Violence Election Violence Election Contests and Disputes Focus Group Discussions Chapter 5 Role of Actors in Propagating or Mitigating Violence Candidates and Parties The Commission on Elections State Security Forces Insurgency groups Election Monitors and citizen arms Chapter 6 Case Study: 2004 Philippine Presidential Election Impasse The Issue of Presidential Legitimacy The Protagonists Election Results The Issue of Cheating Continuing Crisis Chapter 7 Issues and Recommendations/Good Practices . 6 . 9 . 12 . 12 . 13 . 15 . 16 . 17 . 20 . 20 . 24 . 20 . 32 . 32 . 33 . 34 . 34 . 35 . 36 . 36 . 38 . 38 . 40 . 44 . 45 . 48 . 51 . 52

Bibliography Research Team Annexes

List of Annexes
Annex 1 Philippine Elections held after 1986 Annex 2 Proportion of Voters to Population Annex 3 Total number of Contestants for the Elected House in the Last 3 Elections Annex 4 Number of Candidates by Party Affiliation (2004 Elections) Annex 5 Number of Elected Candidates by Party Affiliation (2004 Elections) Annex 6 Number of Elected Candidates by Party Affiliation (1998 Elections) Annex 7 Election Contests Annex 8 Procedure in Election Contestation Annex 9 Election Protests for the year 2002 - 2004 Annex 10 Number of Deaths by Government Position (2004, Elections) Annex 11 Comparative Statistics on Election-related Incidents (1995, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007 Elections) Annex 12 Discussion Sessions and Participants Affiliation Annex 13 Philippine Election Laws Annex 14 COMELEC Organizational Structure

List of Tables
Table No. 1 - Philippine elections held after 1986 Table No. 2 Number of seats and candidates in the 2004 and 2007 elections Table No. 3 Powers and Functions of the Commission on Elections Table No. 4 - Number of violent incidents, deaths, and injured (1992-2007) Table 5. Judicial Body where election contests are filed . 14 . 15 . 18 . 23 . 24

List of Acronyms
AFP ARD ARMM BEI BOC BP CA CBCP CER COMELEC COMPACT CPP DepEd DILG EA EAC EDSA EIAC EO ERAP ERVIs FGD FPJ FPTP GARCI GMA HRET ICCPR IFES IPER IPER KBL LAKAS-CMD LAKAS-NUCD LP MILF MNLF MMDA NAMFREL Armed Forces of the Philippines Assistant Regional Director Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao Board of Election Inspectors Board of Canvassers Batasang Pambansa (National Legislature) Commission on Appointments Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines Consortium on Electoral Reforms Commission on Elections COMPACT for Peaceful Elections Communist Party of the Philippines Department of Education Department of Interior and Local Governance Election Assistant Election Areas of Concern Epifanio de los Santos Avenue Election Areas of Immediate Concern Election Officer Joseph Ejercito Estrada Election-related violent incidents Focus Group Discussion Fernando Poe, Jr. First-Past-The-Post Former Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal International Convention on Civil and Political Rights International Foundation for Election Systems Institute for Political and Electoral Reform Indigenous Peoples Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (New Society Movement ) LAKAS-Christian Muslim Democrats LAKAS-National Union of Christian Democrats Liberal Party Moro International Liberation Front Moro National Liberation Front Metropolitan Manila Development Authority National Citizen's Movement for Free and Elections 4

NCR NP NPA OAV OEC PAGs PES PET PNP PPCRV PTC RA RED RPC SC SET SK SONA SWS UDHR ULAP

National Capital Region Nacionalista Party New People's Army Overseas Absentee Voting Omnibus Election Code Partisan Armed Groups Provincial Election Supervisor Presidential Electoral Tribunal Philippine National Police Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting Permit-to-Campaign Republic Act Regional Election Director Revised Penal Code Supreme Court Senate Electoral Tribunal Sangguniang Kabataan (Youth Council) State of the Nation Address Social Weather Station Universal Declaration of Human Rights Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines

Chapter 1 Problem of Violence The post-martial law period in the Philippines call for the need to re-establish democratic processes and institutions. The EDSA People Power I2 escalated from the worsening social, political, and economic order and widespread election manipulations and irregularities of the Marcos government especially in the 1986 snap presidential elections. The uprising led to the eventual ouster of Marcos and the installation of Corazon Aquino as the new democratic president. A new constitution was crafted to restore civil and political rights to the people, and to provide for restricted powers of the president, multi-party system, promotion of the role of nongovernment and sectoral organizations, and proportional representation in the legislature. General elections have been held regularly and the Commission on Electionsthe election management body in the Philippines is given not only quasi-judicial but judicial powers as well. Three major election exercises were immediately held after the drafting of the new Constitution: a national plebiscite for the approval of the 1987 Constitution in February 1987; election for members of the legislature in May 1987, and local elections in January 1988. Since then elections have been a major component of Philippine democratic processes. Unfortunately, Philippine politics is still challenged by instability. Violence and fraud continue to mar democratic elections. The Philippines transition to democracy is not exempt from the transitions (either from or towards authoritarianism) which have a high probability of causing escalating levels of domestic political violence. [Croissant and Kneip, 2006 :12] Several authors point to facets of Philippine politics: undeveloped party system, elite dominance and the ideological sameness of candidates, exclusion of those who fail to muster the considerable resources needed to mount a campaign, the subordination of issues to particularistic concerns, elaborate forms of terrorism and fraud, and the cultural baggage of traditional values of power and dependence. [Mojares(1991), Rocamora(2000)]3 Election is a major feature and mechanism for transfer of power in democracies. Election-related violence can significantly influence the free and fair conduct of elections and exercise of the right to vote. Election violence or election-related violence is included in the term political violence which is defined by Croissant and Kneip (2006) as:
Political violence is a generic term demoting the efforts of individual or collective actors to force public concerns by threatening to use or actually using physical or mental violence against life and limb. This includes forms of action such as attacks on property; rioting; violent confrontation between members of opposing parties; political groups; fighting with one another or with the police/military; violent attacks directed against persons, when one political group attacks another group, or members of the elite or the
2

In February 1986 Filipino people from various sectors of society including the religious and the military rose up in a non-violent revolution against Marcos dictatorship. 3 Gutierrez, Eric. U, et.al. (1992). All in the Family A study of elites and power relation in the Philippines. Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy. 189 pp.

public, causing injuries or death; random violent attacks, when organized violence is directed against persons, regardless of their political or social identities and armed seizures of place and people.

The International Foundation of Election Systems or IFES4 defines electoral conflict and violence as any random or organized act that seeks to determine, delay, or otherwise influence an electoral process through threat, verbal intimidation, hate speech, disinformation, physical assault, forced protection, blackmail, destruction of property or assassination.5 Victims can be people, places, things, or even data. Election violence in the Philippines includes, among others, abductions, killings, physical attacks, intimidation and other acts resulting in death, injuries, and damage to property. Election-related violent incidents are measured in the number of deaths and injuries as recorded and reported by the Philippine National Police (PNP), COMELEC and other election monitors. Meanwhile, the various forms of coercion, harassments, and intimidation are harder to quantify. Violence during and in connection with the electoral process has been a feature of every post-Marcos election in the Philippines. If at all, the picture is getting worse, with hundreds of local areas regularly designated as election violence hot spots during elections. The election irregularities in the form of fraud and violence attending the conduct of Philippine elections continue to cause growing cynicism of the general Filipino electorate. It has led to many losers rejecting the election outcome and filing hundreds of cases of electoral protests. It caused many voters to forego participation in the elections and, more alarming, to peddle their votes for money. The electoral process as the democratic means of transfer of power thus is constantly undermined. Apart from regular electoral processes, transfer of power also happens through mobilizations. This was the natural recourse in 1986 in the people power uprising that brought down the Marcos dictatorship. However, in 2001, a second people power removed the Estrada administration from power amidst a failed impeachment process. In the post-Marcos period peoples mobilizations played a major, if not a decisive role, in policy redirection and leadership changes at various levels of the Philippine political structure. The communist and Moro insurgencies are also a significant factor in the consideration of the countrys political and security situation. During the election period, these affect the local electoral processes as the rebels maneuver to use these for their own causes. Especially in case of the local communist insurgency, elections are an opportunity to raise funds, capture elective positions, and make political statements. Generally, insurgencies position themselves as alternatives to the failures of electoral democracy. To a certain extent, mobilizations flows from the constitutional recognition of various direct democracy mechanisms such as recall of elective officials, referenda, and peoples

4 5

www.ifes.org IFES, (2002), Electoral Conflict and Violence A Strategy for Study and Prevention.

initiative. These forms of direct democracy complement the electoral processes of representative democracy. However, they can also be a measure of the fragility and weak credibility of the formal electoral process. When done in the context of the perceived failure of democratic constitutional processes, they counterpose themselves as alternative processes. It is quite easy from here to jump to extra-constitutional temptations such as military extremism, civil disobedience or even rebellion. The electoral system is rendered useless in this scenario.

Chapter 2 History of Elections in the Philippines During the pre-colonial Philippines, leaders were chosen based on his/her capacity to ensure the survival of his/her tribe and clan. Wisdom, skills, and respect for people were the important qualities for leadership. A system of election was first practiced in the Philippine Republic under the Malolos Constitution6 during the colonial period. However, the process was only limited to male voters who are members of the rich classes, and was more of a ceremonial rather than a genuine democratic mechanism. A leap in the sectoral struggle and political participation was realized in 1937. This was when Act 4112, granting women the right of suffrage, was implemented; and when the peasant movements gained meaningful participation in political parties and in the actual filling of government positions. The first democratic elections in the Philippines after the Second World War was the 1946 elections for President and Vice-President of the Republic, and members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives. From then on, the country operated on a two-party system where two major political parties, the Nacionalista (Nationalist) Party and the Liberal Party, figure in succeeding elections. By 1965, Philippine elections have settled to a predictable pattern of specific governance issues against the incumbent party or leader. Campaign issues in these elections were not a surprise: peace and order problem; rampant graft and corruption; continued rise in prices of consumer goods; and continued smuggling of dutiable goods. The opposition Nacionalista Party led by Ferdinand Marcos won over the Liberals. Marcos ran for re-election in the next election and made history as the first president to be re-elected. The campaign can be characterized as an exchange of accusations and attacks on issues concerning nationalism, land reform, foreign policy, cronyism, and graft and corruption. When Ferdinand Marcos declared Martial Law in 1972, the 1935 Constitution was scrapped, an Interim Batasang Pambansa was created and a new (1973) Constitution was adopted. Election for the Interim Batasang Pambansa was called for in 1978. The Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) (New Society Movement) became the administration party. The election was claimed to be towards restoration of old political order but Marcos purpose was to gain legitimacy for his unpopular administration and to create a rubber stamp legislature. The electoral exercise defied democratic procedures, and was characterized by rampant electoral manipulation done by the Marcos government to ensure victory. Local election in 1980 was characterized by widespread terrorism, violence and wholesale fraud. Intense opposition coming from the peasant and student sector in the countryside supported peasant and labor unrest. In 1981, Marcos submitted himself to the electoral process to regain legitimacy. This is mandated by the constitutional provision of a parliamentary system.

The first Philippine Republic convened its Congress in Malolos, a town in Bulacan province just outside Manila. The Malolos Congress passed the Malolos Constitution, the constitution of the first Republic.

The assassination of Benigno Aquino in 1983 resulted in waves of protest forcing the creation of wider democratic space. Batasang Pambansa elections happened in 1984 to replace the Interim Batasang Pambansa. The exercise was intended to divert the peoples attention away from the Aquino assassination. Still, the period was marked by weakening popularity of Marcos and the peoples growing political will to guarantee that their sentiments are reflected in election results. Snap elections were held in 1986. The widespread election manipulations and irregularities and the worsening social, political and economic order triggered the EDSA uprising in the same year. The mass action known as the People Power Revolution of 1986 called and led to the ouster of Marcos, the collapse of KBL, the installation of Corazon Aquino as the President, and the replacement of the 1973 Constitution. Aquinos program of restoring democracy, promoting stability, and establishing political legitimacy involved three major electoral exercises: national plebiscite for the approval of the constitution on February 1987; election for members of the Senate and House of Representatives on May 1987; and local elections on January 1988. The 1987 Constitution was crafted to restore civil and political rights to the people, and to provide for restricted powers of the president, and proportional representation in the legislature. General elections have been held regularly and the Commission on Elections---the election management body in the Philippines is given not only quasi-judicial but judicial powers as well. During the 1992 synchronized national and local elections, the people voted for president for the first time under the 1987 Constitution. The main campaign issue was doing away with trapo7 or traditional politics. Other campaign issues were economic reform, political stability, clean governance and social justice. An army general who also figured during the EDSA uprising, Fidel V. Ramos of the LAKAS-NUCD Party was declared winner in that presidential race. During that elections too, the first protest contesting the results of a Philippine presidential election for charges of fraud was filed by another candidate Miriam Defensor-Santiago against Fidel V. Ramos, before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). In 1995, congressional and local elections were held. A new form of fraud dubbed as dagdag-bawas (votepadding/shaving) or the subtraction of votes from one candidate to be added to the contending candidate was in practice during these two major elections. In 1998, the first party-list election was held under the virtue of the Republic Act 7941 or the Party-List Law. The constitutional mandate for proportional representation was realized only after almost a decade. During the same elections, Joseph Ejercito Estrada8 was seated as President of the Republic, topping a field of five candidates with 38 percent of the votes. However in January 2001, EDSA 2, a repeat of the 1986 People Power in EDSA removed Estrada from Malacaang on the heels of a failed impeachment process and based on

Trapo is the term used to refer to traditional politics or traditional politicians. In the Filipino language, trapo also means dirt rug. 8 Estrada or popularly known by his screen name Erap is a well-known actor who also had long been a government official as a town mayor, as a senator, and as the vice-president.

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charges of corruption and mismanagement. EDSA 2 also seated Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the new president. The Estrada opposition did not quite accept the legitimacy of Macapagal-Arroyos ascension to power via people power. A series of political protests, capped by another failed people power in May 2001 and a military mutiny in 2003 ensued but failed to unseat her. In 2004, President Macapagal-Arroyo ran and was reelected as president in a controversial electoral contest against Fernando Poe, Jr., Estradas actor-friend. Right after proclamation, the opposition launched protests against her presidency, accusing her of winning through massive electoral cheating. In June 2005, voice tapes surfaced, purportedly recording conversations between the president and an election commissioner. This precipitated a political crisis that has not yet abated, marked by the resignation of almost half her Cabinet, two impeachment attempts, an attempted military withdrawal of support, and intense pressures on various political institutions, including congress, constitutional bodies such as the Commission on Elections, Ombudsman, and Sandiganbayan (ombudsman court), the courts, and the military and police. With the electoral controversy of 2004 Philippine election-rigging allegations against no less than the president and an election officer, the political and election system are in no way lifted to higher ground. President Macapagal-Arroyo's satisfaction rating has been unfavorable for nine consecutive survey rounds, ever since the Third Quarter of 2004.9 The credibility of the election commission is also questioned. The electorate is in a situation where electoral choices mean one member of political elite over another. Appreciation of the value of the vote is very little. Even with the shift to a multi-party system, rivalries among elites10 and alliances are still shaped by clan membership. The trend toward party-switching or political turncoatism a significant feature of party politics during the pre-Martial law era continues to exist in the present is determined by the movement and dynamics of political clans. (Gutierrez, et. al. 1992:6) Various issues in the 2004 elections raised by the opposition, peoples mobilizations, and impeachment complaints posed a great challenge to the legitimacy of the Arroyo administration and to the credibility of the COMELEC and even elections in general. The challenge then is for the government, political parties and the civil society to pursue reforms to counter public cynicism on the credibility of the election process and institution and the legitimacy of the elected officials. Fundamental reforms in the system of can be critical for areas as diverse as conflict management, gender representation and the development of political party systems.11 The value of integrating responsibility of safeguarding the integrity of the

Social Weather Survey for the 3rd quarter of 2006 finds 37% Satisfied and 48% Dissatisfied with the performance of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, for an unfavorable Net Satisfaction Rating of -11. From sws.org.ph 10 Elites are mostly the same clans and families during the Marcos years which are able to re-align themselves and dominate government positions in the post-Marcos politics. 11 Reynolds, Andrew, et.al., eds. (2005).pp.viii.

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election process (and thus lessening the use of violence and fraud) of a strong party system is lacking in the Philippines. Chapter 3 The Philippine Electoral System Legal Framework for Elections Elections in the Philippines are mandated under the 1987 Constitution. Two other international documents, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), govern the right of suffrage in the Philippines. These three instruments similarly provide universality of the right of suffrage; equality in access to public service; and secrecy of the vote.12 Recent addition to international human rights instruments such as the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, and Convention on the Political Rights of Women also provide for the right of suffrage. The current Philippine Constitution provides for a bicameral presidential system of government, multiparty system, partial proportional representation in the legislature, absentee voting for overseas Filipinos, and equal propaganda opportunity. The Omnibus Election Code of 1985 through Batas Pambansa Bilang (or Republic Act No.) 881 is the basic law on elections. The 1987 Constitution and succeeding laws13 served as amendments to the Omnibus Code. Republic Act (RA) 6646 or the 1987 Electoral Reforms Law was passed to govern the first elections under the 1987 Constitution and introduced reforms in canvassing, candidate eligibility and disqualification, and election propaganda. Another law provided for synchronized holding of national and local elections every three years. The Voters Registration law adopts a system of general and continuing voter registration. RA 9006 or The Fair Elections Act of 2001, guarantees candidates and political parties equal opportunity for public service particularly access to media time and space, public information, fora, and campaigns, and protection from harassment or discrimination in relation to the election process. The Overseas Absentee Voting System14 implements the constitutional mandate to ensure the right of suffrage of Filipinos abroad. The electoral modernization law of 1997 provided for the use of automated systems as early as the 1998 elections. However, the full automation was not implemented. Ten years after, another election law was passed mandating amendments to the previous modernization law and the use of an automated election system in the succeeding elections. The most recent 2007 elections did not see to the implementation of this law even in pilot areas due to lack of time for preparation.

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Provisions on the right to vote are in: Article 21 (1-3) of the UDHR; Article 25 (a-c) of ICCPR; and Article 5, Sec.1-2 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. 13 See Annex 13 for a list of Philippine Election Laws. 14 Republic Act 9189 or the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 is lauded for granting method for registration and voting in Philippine national elections foreign land-based and sea-based Filipinos.

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The System of Elections The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance classifies the Philippines as having mixed and parallel voting system which combines elements of both the plurality and the proportional representation electoral systems.15 The presidential, senate, and local elections adopt a first-past-the-post (FPTP), where a candidate or party who wins the most number of votes wins the seat. A mix of plurality-FPTP system and proportional representation through the party-list system is used in election of the members of the lower house or the House of Representatives. The mixed system for congressional elections was intended to broaden representation by hitherto marginalized and underrepresented sectors in the legislature. However, this intent is itself undermined by the compromises in both the constitution and the election laws. The constitutional limit of 20% for party-list seats means a permanent minority status for party-list groups. The law reserves this system to party-list groups and excludes the first 5 major parties. A Supreme Court decision also interpreted the 20% constitutional limit as a target and not mandatory. These effectively prevented the filling up of the reserved seats for party-list. In the 1998 elections, the first year of implementation, only 13 seats out of a possible 51 were filled up. In the 2007 elections, a maximum of 20 seats will be filled up out of the possible 55 that are reserved for the party-list system. On the other hand, the FPTP systemwhich governs all other elections in the country has produced some undesirable effects. Electoral fraud and violence have become institutionalized because of the winner-take-all nature of the system. Coupled with a weak party system, incumbents are often tempted to build political dynasties composed of their families and close allies. Term limits often have no meaning in a dynastic setting where wives, sons and daughters often replace the incumbent in a play to maintain the power, sometimes despite the negative vote of the electorate. In the current manual system, balloting requires voters to write down the names of each candidate for every position. Counting, canvassing of votes, and transmission of election results are also done manually. An automated system of elections was already legislated but has yet to see implementation. Since the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, elections for President and Vice-President are held every six years, while elections for Senators and members of the House of Representatives and local government officials happen every three years. Regional elections particularly in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), local executive and legislative councils, barangay (village) elections and Sangguniang Kabataan (youth council) elections are also held periodically.

15

Reynolds, Andrew, et.al., eds. (2005). Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, pp.171.

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The Constitution provides that a President can only serve 1 term of 6 years. A second term or reelection is prohibited. A Vice-President and a Senator have a term of 6 years and cannot run for a third term after an uninterrupted service of 2 terms, although they may run again after an interval of 1 term after the second term. Members of the House of Representatives and elective local officials cannot run for a fourth term after uninterrupted service of 3 terms, but may run again after a lapse of 1 term after the third term. The bicameral national legislature is made up of the Philippine Senate and the House of representatives. The 250-plus-membership in the House is completed through direct election of single-member district representatives, of which 20% are party-list representatives elected on proportional representation. Representatives have three-year term and are limited to three terms. Twenty four senators are elected on a nationwide basis for a six-year term and are eligible for one re-election. Half of the composition of the Senate is elected every three years. Local Government officials are elected for a three-year term and are allowed re-election up to three consecutive terms. Regional officials---governor and vice-governor are now given three-years in office.
Table No. 1 - Philippine elections held after 1986 (See Annex 1 for detailed list of elections) Year 1987 1988 1989 1992 1992 1994 1995 1996 1996 1997 1998 2001 2002 2004 2005 2007 Type of Elections Congressional Elections (Senate, House of Representatives) Local Elections Barangay (village) Elections Presidential, Congressional, and Local Elections Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Elections Barangay Elections Congressional and Local Elections Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Elections Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Elections Barangay Elections Presidential, Congressional, and Local Elections Congressional and Local Elections Synchronized Barangay and SK Elections Presidential, Congressional, and Local Elections ARMM Elections Congressional and Local Elections

Elections are also highly competitive as shown by the seat-candidate ratio for elective positions. During the most recent national and local elections in 2007, there were a total of 17,880 national and local positions that were vied upon by more than 87,000 candidates. Running in highly competitive elections entails very high electoral campaign costs and other election related expenses. In most instances therefore, election cheating and violence become part of the over-all campaign strategy of candidates and political parties to ensure victory.

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Table No. 2 Number of seats and candidates in the 2004 and 2007 elections 2004 Government Position President Vice-President Senator Party-List representatives Congressman Governor Vice-Governor Board Member Mayor Vice-Mayor Councilor Total Number of Seats 1 1 12 52 212 79 79 758 1,615 1,615 13,292 17,716 Number of Candidates 5 4 48 n/a 650 284 227 2,107 4,264 4,303 38,312 50,204 2007 Number of Number of Seats Candidates 0 0 0 0 12 37 55 n/a 219 -81 -81 -770 -1,628 -1,628 -13,406 -17,880 87,000+

Who can vote Article V of the 1987 Constitution is devoted to Suffrage. Section 1 provides that suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law who are at least 18 years of age and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least 1 year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement is imposed on the exercise of suffrage. Congress is also directed to provide for a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot, as well as a system for absentee-voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. All citizens of the Philippines, eighteen years of age or over, and a resident of the Philippines for one year and in the city or municipality wherein he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election are qualified to vote. The following are disqualified from voting: a. Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment for not less than one year. However, he/ she may reacquire the right to vote upon expiration of five years after service of sentence. b. Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by competent court or tribunal of having committed any crime involving disloyalty to the duly constituted government such as rebellion, sedition, violation of the anti-subversion and firearms laws, or any crime against national security, unless restored to his full civil and political rights in accordance with law: Provided, That he shall regain his right to vote automatically upon expiration of five years after service of sentence. c. Insane or incompetent persons as declared by competent authority In addition, RA 9189 or the Overseas Absentee Voting Law entitles all Filipino citizens overseas, not otherwise disqualified by law, and immigrants and permanent residents with affidavit of intent to resume residence in the Philippines, to vote for elective positions in the national level: President; Vice-President; Senators; and Party-List Representatives. 15

There is a conservative estimate of 3.5 million Filipinos who are qualified to vote under the law. However, only around 500,000 registered in the 2007 elections which is already the second elections where overseas absentee voting was implemented. Of this number, only 14% voted. This dismal voting was traced partly to various restrictive provisions such as the requirement for a pledge to return to the Philippines three years after the elections, personal appearance at both registration and voting in Philippine embassy or consulate offices in many countries, and lack of widespread public education among overseas Filipinos. The overseas absentee voting system still needs to be improved. Relaxing the rules on mail balloting, internet voting, and residency requirements are only some of remedial measures being discussed. However, as a democratic measure, it is already accepted by the electorate. Who can contest elections Several requirements are enshrined in the 1987 constitution for the various elective positions. There are corresponding requisites for citizenship, age, literacy, and residency. All candidates should be registered voters, natural-born citizens, able to read and write. Presidential and vice-presidential candidates should be forty years old or above and should have 10-year residency in the country. Senatorial candidates should be at least 35 years old and 2-year residency. Congressional candidates should be 25 years old or over and have at least resided in his or her district for at least a year. These are minimum requirements provided by the constitution. Other practical requirements for elections are machinery and the resources to run a campaign. Candidates except for party-list representatives can run independently or under a political party or coalition. Party-list representatives can only vie for legislative seats through votes for their parties. All candidates are also required to file candidacy with the Commission on Elections. The 1995 IPER psychographics study on the voting behavior of the Filipino electorate shows that the voters choose their candidate primarily on their popularity. The next determinant of vote is the endorsement of traditional network and organization. The third determinant of vote is the characteristics that can be of benefit to the voter and the last determinant is the Party Program. An update of this study was made in 2003. This time the primary consideration of the voters in choosing a candidate is the characteristics that can be of personal benefit to voters. The second factor is political machinery. The third factor, which is the primary factor in the 1995 study, is popularity. The last factor that the voters consider is the endorsement of traditional network and organizations. These determinants in both studies attest to the relative immaturity of the Filipino electorate in their choices. The 2003 study went further and identified a growing cynicism towards the political process itself. In the 2007 elections, numerous popular media figures lost attesting to the continued weakening of sheer popularity as basis of voter choice.

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In the current government set-up, the Philippine legislature generally constitutes the welloff segment of society. A study on the post-1986 Philippine Congress describes it as composed of richer, older, better educated and better connected or are part of families who have been in public office for two or more generations.16 Political machinery, connections, and money still figure very prominently in elections and consequently the government. With the passage and implementation of the party-list system law, the smaller political and sectoral parties are now able to get seats in the legislature. The provision giving 20% of Congress seats to representatives of national, regional, and sectoral parties17 is meant to introduce proportional representation. This principle when adopted in an appropriate state of party system is supposed to initially extend representation to more sectors and smaller parties and to encourage more program-based campaign and legislative agenda. In effect the democratic space for empowerment and participation of people in governance would have widened. Various election contestations are available to citizens of the Philippines as provided for in the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines. The OEC grants any voter the right to contest the qualification of any person seeking to register, and any voter, election registrar or registered political party the right to petition the annulment of permanent list of voters. Election contests for the position of provincial, municipal, and barangay offices can be filed by any candidate who has filed certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same position. Pre-proclamation controversies can be raised by any candidate, registered political party or coalition of parties. A more detailed presentation of election contestation for local and national candidates is done in Annexes 7 and 8. Election Body: The Philippine Commission on Elections In the Philippines, the Commission on Elections or COMELEC is the constitutional body tasked to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. It also has exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections. (Philippine Omnibus Election Code) The creation of the COMELEC was one of the constitutional mandates for the basic principle that (s)overeignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.18 Created by a 1940 amendment to the 1935 Constitution, the Commission was given more members and more powers by the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Officials and personnel of the Commission exercise not only administrative and quasi-judicial powers, but judicial power as well.

16 17

In Coronel, et.al. (2004), THE RULEMAKERS How the Wealthy and Well-Born Dominate Congress, pp.viii. As provided for in Article 6 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. 18 Article 2, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

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Table No. 3 Powers and Functions of the Commission on Elections National COMELEC (which includes Chair, Commissioners, Department Heads) 1. Ensure fair and impartial implementation of laws and rules 2. Promulgation of rules and regulations/ resolutions 3. Jurisdiction and resolution over all election contests 4. Decision over all questions affecting elections 5. Deputation of teachers, police and military for election duties 6. Registration of candidates political parties, organizations, or coalitions 7. Registration, inclusion or exclusion of voters 8. Prosecution for election offenses/violations 9. Recommend measures to minimize election spending 10. Removal or disciplinary action of deputized officer or employee, recommendation to the President; 11. Monitoring election expenses of parties an/candidates 12. Report to President and Congress on conduct of election (or plebiscite, initiative, referendum or recall) 13. Prescribe forms and appropriate technology for elections 14. Supervise of production and procurement of election materials 15. Distribution of election materials 16. Supervision of training of election officials and regional directors and provincial supervisors 17. Conduct of Information campaign and voter education 18. Tabulation and publication results Local COMELEC (which includes Regional Election Directors, Provincial Election Supervisors, Elections Officers, Election Assistants 1. Ensure fair and impartial implementation of laws and regulations 2. Registration of candidates political parties, organizations, or coalitions 3. Supervision of registration of voters/ correction of voter list 4. Prosecution for election offenses/violations 5. Distribution of election materials 6. Conduct of Information campaign and voter education 7. Tabulation and declaration of results 8. Collection and storage of election materials Board of Election Inspectors (BEIs)

1. Ensure fair and impartial implementation of laws and regulations 2. Receiving election materials 3. Supervision of voting 4. Counting of votes in their respective polling places 5. Return of results and materials 6. Deputies of the Commission in the supervision and control of the election in the polling places/precincts

The Commission is composed of a Chairman and six (6) Commissioners who are appointed by the President and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments (CA)19. Of those first appointed, three (3) members shall serve for seven years, two members for five years and the last members for three years, without re-appointment. These COMELEC officials can be removed from office only by impeachment and are provided with salaries fixed by law which shall not be decreased during their term of office.20

19

The Commission on Appointments is a congressional body composed of the Senate President as Chair, and 24 members, (12 from the Senate and 12 from the House of Representatives) constitutionally mandated to confirm all government appointments by the President. 20 From COMELEC website, www.comelec.gov.ph

18

Appointees for the posts of COMELEC chair and commissioner should not have run for any elective positions in the most recent elections and should have the following qualifications: natural-born citizens of the Philippines; at least thirty-five years of age (at the time of their appointment); holders of college degree; majority of members including the chair should be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years The Commission has a national central office and field offices, further divided into regional and local offices. The Regional Election Office is headed by Regional Election Director and assisted by the assisted by the Assistant Regional Director (ARD) and other officers or employees appointed by the Commission. The Provincial Election Office is headed by the Provincial Election Supervisor (PES) and assisted by officers or employees appointed by the Commission. The City/Municipal Election Office is headed by the City/Municipal Registrar and assisted by an election clerk or other officers or employees appointed by the Commission. During election period, the Commission forms a Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) for every precinct to be composed of a chairman and a poll clerk who must be public school teachers. Those designated to be BEI should neither engage in any partisan political activity nor take part in the election except to discharge his/her duties and to vote. The Commission may delegate its powers and functions or order the implementation or enforcement of its orders, rulings, or decisions through the heads of its field offices. Too, the Commission has the authority to deputize members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) during elections. For the recent 2007 elections, the following are deputized by the COMELEC. The Department of Education (DepEd) through the public school teachers are deputized by the COMELEC to serve as BEI during election period. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is deputized only to provide security in areas with serious armed threats, manning checkpoints, and enforcement of gunban but not in handling, counting, or transporting the ballots nor in providing security to COMELEC officials, personnel, or deputies, or candidates. The Philippine National Police (PNP) is deputized to provide security to polling places, members of BEI, COMELEC personnel and representatives and protect voters from threats, intimidation, coercion, harassments, reprisals. The PNP, National Police Commission, and the National Bureau of Investigation are deputized to enforce prohibitons set in the Omnibus Election Cod and other election laws and COMELEC resolutions. The Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) and the barangay officials and tanods through the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) are deputized for the 2007 elections to tear or remove illegal campaign materials and campaign materials posted outside common poster areas, to make a report on these, and to arrest persons distributing unlawful election materials. Part of the quasi-judicial functions of the Commission also hears and resolves petitions filed by political parties and other groups, and coalitions for accreditation to field candidates in various national and local positions as well as for the party-list elections. The Commission is

19

also tasked to undertake voter education and accreditation of citizen arm, political parties, and party-list groups. The COMELEC has the duty to appoint or accredit citizens arm which will serve to help the Commission in some of its work like voter education, election monitoring, pollwatching, and parallel count. The Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting (PPCRV) and the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) had been the arm for pollwatching and parallel vote count respectively. Chapter 4 Features of Election Violence
Election Violence

Election violence in the Philippines includes abductions, killings, physical attacks, intimidation and other acts resulting in death, injuries and damage to property. While election violence reports are measured in the number of deaths and injuries as recorded and reported by the PNP, COMELEC and other election monitors, the various forms of coercion, harassments, and intimidation are harder to quantify. Incidence of violence related to elections can be grouped across various election phases: pre-election or registration period; campaign period; election day; counting and canvassing period; and proclamation phase. Victims and perpetrators of lection violence are not limited to the candidates and their campaign operators but extend to insurgent factions, military, police and other security forces as well.21 Different election stakeholders also work together to at least monitor and at most counter these incidents. COMELEC, PNP and the AFP, election watchdog and civil society organizations such as National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), Parish Pastoral Council for responsible Voting (PPCRV), Compact for Peaceful Elections (COMPACT) and the Consortium and Electoral Reforms (CER). The Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, albeit having undergone several amendments, outlines the election-related prohibited acts or offenses in Article XXII Section 261. The following are considered violent acts during the election period as they relate to coercion, intimidation and harassments: 1. coercion of subordinates; 2. threats, intimidation, terrorism, use of fraudulent device or other forms of coercion; 3. coercion of election officials and employees; 4. transfer of officers and employees in the civil service; 5. intervention of public officers and employees; 6. the use of undue influence; 7. appointment or use of special policemen, special agents, confidential agents or the like from campaign period to election day; 8. illegal release of prisoners 60 days before and 30 days after election; 9. carrying and use of deadly weapons, firearms and armored land, water, and air craft; 10. wearing of uniforms and bearing arms outside the vicinity of place of work of public and private security and police organizations
21

Patio and Velasco in Croissant (2006), pp.223.

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11. organization or maintenance of reaction forces, strike forces, or other similar forces 12. suspension of elective provincial, city, municipal or barangay officer The Commission on Elections through the PNP (and in some areas, members of armed forces) monitors and keeps record of election-related violence incidents (ERVIs). The Philippine National Police (PNP) lists the following as election-related incidence of violence: Shooting Explosion Ambush Harassment Burning/ Arson Ballot Snatching Gun Ban Violation (refers to bearing, carrying or transporting firearms or other deadly weapons in public places, including any building, street, park, private vehicle or public conveyance, even if licensed to possess or carry the same, unless authorized in writing by the Commission.22 The gun ban is intended to curb political violence during the election period.)

The Commission also declares hotspots or areas with observed or expected high degree of violence. Additional security forces are deployed in these areas. Exemptions on gun ban are also lifted in these areas. In the most recent 2007 elections, the COMELEC declared 10 provinces (12% of the 81 Philippine provinces) as election areas of concern (EAC) and 46 provinces or more than half of the total number of provinces as areas of immediate concern (EAIC). These EAIC cover 201 municipalities and six cities. EAIC are classified as critical hotspot and their administrative activities and deployment of local police and other security units are placed under direct administrative control of COMELEC especially during election day and canvassing periods.23 Meanwhile, provinces declared as EAC were generated based on several parameters broken down into two major categories.24 Category I are areas with: a history of election-related violent incidents in past elections; existence of intense political rivalry between contending parties; and possible employment of partisan armed groups by candidates in the area. Category II are areas where there are serious threats posed by the local communist movement particularly the CPP/NPA southern Philippine secessionist groups such as the MILF and MNLF, and other similar organizations. The degree of affectation and capability threat groups in these areas are the point of consideration. When IPER did a psychographics study in 1995 and 2003 it lists the following activities as common election (mal)practices. These offenses are also those indicated in the Omnibus Election Code.

22 23

Article 22 of the Philippine Omnibus Election Code defines election offenses. Ibid., pp.224 and COMELEC and PNP data. 24 PNP News Release. February 2007 and May 2007.

21

Vote Buying Flying Voter Threatening of Voters Bribing Local COMELEC Ballot Snatching Cheating in Counting Coercion and Terrorism Election-Related Killing

Respondents to the survey were asked of their views of the following practices in Philippine elections and majority of the respondents still view that election-related violent practices should not be tolerated. COMPACT for Peaceful Elections or COMPACT lists four incidence observed to be predominant in the last 2004 elections. Permit to Campaign (PTC) fees and other acts of violence by armed groups Threat or declaration of an intention or determination to injure another by the commission of some wrong Coercion or the physical violence or moral pressure in a determined and constant manner Coup detat or the swift attack accompanied by violence, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth directed against the authorities

Moreover, Compact also lists the following usual violent incidents observed during election period: 1. Political assassinations; 2. Threats or attacks on candidates and their supporters; 3. Attacks on rallies, headquarters or home of candidates and their supporters; 4. Clashes between supporters of opposing camps; 5. Destruction or seizure of campaign paraphernalia; 6. Kidnapping for ransom to raise funds; 7. Ballot box snatching; 8. Destruction of voters list or other election materials; 9. Disruption of transportation of voters perceived to be voting for the rival candidate; 10. Threats on and harassment of voters to vote for a certain candidate or for them not to vote at all; 11. Threats or attacks on election officials; 12. Instigating disorder in the polling precincts; 13. Threats of coup d etat; and 14. Demands for Permit to Campaign fees (PTC) by the New Peoples Army (NPA). The NPAs practice of collecting PTC fees from candidates has been going on for years, largely unnoticed by mass media. It became rampant when the NPA declared it as an official policy, prompting many quarters to denounce it as plain and simple extortion. Since the NPA has a nationwide infrastructure centered on remote rural areas, they can influence mostly the local 22

elections. However, they are able to project beyond the locales through a coordinated campaign where organized approaches are made to provincial, congressional and even senatorial candidates. Permits-to-campaign are sometimes supplemented by permits-to-win in areas where the rebel movement is confident enough that they can influence the outcome of the elections. Influencing often ranges from letting candidates enter their own zones of influence to campaign, actual campaigning for or against certain candidates, committing electoral fraud, and ultimately, the use of electoral violence such as threats, harassments, ambush, assassination, or raids against candidates or their constituencies.
Table No. 4 - Number of violent incidents, deaths, and injured in the last three national elections (1992-2004)25 Year and Type of Election Incidents of election-related Number of Deaths Number of Injured violence 1992 national and local 157 89 138 1995 congressional and local 121 79 111 1998 national and local 267 67 162 2001 congressional and local 269 111 293 2004 national and local 249 148 261 2007 congressional and local 229 121 176

As the table above shows, there were fewer incidents of election violence in the recent 2007 than in the past three elections (1998, 2001, 2004). Unfortunate however is the record of growing number of deaths in the last four elections. Also more hotspots are being placed under COMELEC control. Election observers and monitors and even the police recognize that election-related violence have become more targeted and less random. The more prevailing trend is that election violence occur more in the local levels, thus making it a local phenomenon. 26 The pre-election period saw much more violence than during the day of the election and the post election period. PNP and COMELEC considered election day in 2007 as generally calmer and more peaceful. However, there were allegations that actual voting did not happen in some precincts, but are done by community and other local leaders on behalf of their constituents. The security situation can also prevent voters to cast votes or force them to vote in favor of certain candidates or parties. Meanwhile it is also recognized that election-related intimidation occurs in isolated barangays, where barangay captains exercise control over the population.27 Given this political situation and phenomenon of violence, fraud, irregularity and intimidation during election, disputes are inevitable. The same employment of violence and intimidation figure in election disputes in the Philippines. In election disputes, violence and intimidation become both means and causes.

25

Figures from 1995-204 are based on compiled from PNP and COMELEC Reports, while 1992 data are from Patio &Velasco in Croissant (2006), pp.225. 26 CEPPS report on the May 2004 Philippine Elections. 27 Ibid.

23

The main government bodies tasked to conduct election and process election disputes have continued weak credibility because of allegations of partisanship and politicking. This fact makes for a more problematic handling of election disputes. Election Contests and Disputes28 Pre-proclamation controversy or question pertaining to the proceedings of the board of canvassers (BOCs) or on preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns can be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the Commission. The OEC cites the following as possible issues29 of such controversy: Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers; Incomplete, defective, tampered or falsified copies of canvassed election returns; The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates. The Commission has the exclusive jurisdiction of all pre-proclamation controversies and can motu proprio or upon written petition, and after due notice and hearing, order the partial or total suspension of the proclamation of any candidate-elect or annual partially or totally any proclamation. On the other hand, in cases of post-proclamation election contests, the Commission on Elections has the judicial function of hearing and resolution of election contests on matters of relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of the legislature as well as elective regional, provincial and city officials. The lower courts have the counterpart judicial functions for municipal and barangay level election contests.
Table 5. Judicial Body where election contests are filed
Election Contests for: National legislative positions Elective regional positions Elective provincial positions Elective City positions Elective Municipal positions Elective barangay (village) positions Can be filed with: COMELEC COMELEC COMELEC COMELEC Regional trial Court Municipal Metropolitan court or trial Period of Within 10 results Within 10 results Within 10 results Within 10 results Within 10 results Within 10 results Filing days after proclamation of election days after proclamation of election days after proclamation of election days after proclamation of election days after proclamation of election days after proclamation of election

28 29

Annex 7 details the forms of election contests, and corresponding role and action of the Commission on Elections. Sec 243, Article 20 of the Philippine Omnibus Election Code.

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Focus Group Discussions The research team held two dialogue sessions in the form of focus group discussions (FGDs). One session was conducted in Davao City in Mindanao, while another was held in Quezon City. Participants from the various sectors and organizations were invited. In each of the dialogue sessions, two focus groups were formed based on the number of participants and the sectors represented. In Mindanao, one group was composed of representatives from election implementing body, monitoring groups, political parties, media, other civil society organizations, and youth and women sectors. Another group consisted of local election actors, members of Moro/ Moslem groups, indigenous peoples (IPs) representative, local election campaigners and operators. The session in Quezon City covered participants not only from Metro Manila but from nearby Luzon provinces as well. One group included officers from government agencies involved in elections and dispute resolutions, board members of monitoring bodies, officers of political parties, and academe, media, and youth representatives. Another group was composed of civil society groups working on election and electoral reform advocacy, and actors in local elections of rural areas commonly tagged as election hotspots in the Luzon region. Representatives from Northern, Central, and Southern Luzon participated in the discussion. An invitation was extended to members of the national police body. They were not able to send representative as the schedule of discussion coincided with preparation of the police for the Presidents State of the Nation Address (SONA). A separate interview with a police general was however granted on August 8, 2006. Common to all focus groups are three main issues: 1) perception and experience of the participants on election-related violence; 2) perception on dispute resolution mechanisms; and 3) recommendations for electoral systems reforms, election dispute laws and mechanisms, and measures to address the problem of election violence in their respective areas and in the country in general. In the first issue, each participant shared with the group current and past capacities of involvement in the electoral exercise and then proceeded to give their perception and various experiences of election-related violence. Specific issues discussed vary depending on the presence or applicability of such concerns in their respective areas. Some of the issues discussed were: Permit to campaign fees Communist/NPA Insurgency Moro rebellion/Insurgency Clan dynamics in elections and politics in Mindanao Warlordism Guns, goons, gold

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The portion on dispute resolution mechanisms covered not only perception on available resolution mechanisms but also on the election body, election laws, and the topic covered in the case study---in this case, the election-related controversy involving no less than the President of the Philippines and an election official. Insights of the FGD participants are reported here according to the three main topics discussed: Perception on and experience of election-related violence There was a leveling-off among the group participants on their definition of violence or more specifically election-related violence. For most discussants, violence is very much a part of Philippine election and politics. Election-related violence is deemed to occur not only during the actual election day but spans the whole election period---one year before election up to the post-proclamation period. From the discussions, election violence is defined as a systematic and premeditated act aimed at monopolizing electoral victories through various coercive ways. It consists of infringement of liberty or the freedom to choose (candidates and parties) during elections. The absence of that freedom is equivalent to violence. Violence may be manifested not only by direct physical assault but also in the fear and threat inflicted the individual. One participant equated any deviations from the prescribed processes as irregular and violent. From the Mindanao discussion sessions, it was inevitable to discuss violence alongside with electoral fraud. Much of the discussion is devoted to irregularities and fraudulent activities they are aware and have actually experienced. Some of the usual violence and election irregularities that the participants experienced or are aware of are: Black-out or power failure during counting and canvassing Missing names of voters, unequal tally of votes against the number of registered voters Intimidation of Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) which is composed of three teachers as chairs and members Pressure on the election officer to delay the proclamation of winners Threat on the watchers (verbal, physical, emotional) Seizure of hand-held radio and other forms of communication of candidates There are also areas where incidence of harassment and threats is so high that monitoring bodies cannot deploy watchers, making the system very open for any form of irregularity. Demand for payment of permit-to-campaign fees Non-payment of PTC fees result in: removal of campaign posters and candidates and supporters cannot enter NPA-controlled areas during campaign periods Areas which are considered hotspots are under the control of political clan, landlord, or a revolutionary group Killings which involve mostly local candidates

26

There is a new trend in the strategy of candidates and some political parties in order to ensure election victory. In one province, for instance, as one of the participants recall: To replace buying and selling votes among voters or through community leaders, candidates and political parties buy votes or spend instead during the counting and canvassing phases. Vote-buying now transpires between the candidates (through their operators or campaigners) and the people in charge of the local COMELEC, and members of the board of canvassers. Violence and fraud are used in elections as two different strategies. One is the direct use of violence as a strategy to win the elections. Some political candidates or parties hire goons or mercenaries as stand-by mechanism as observed by an election officer from Mindanao. These mercenaries pose as threats to the rival candidate or party. In this instance, representatives of the candidates are careful not to violate the Revised Penal Code (the Philippines penal laws). However, in extreme cases of political competition, goons are employed to harass or eliminate the political rival to ensure victory in the electoral exercise. In this case, electoral violence parallels and even replaces the election itself as determinant of the outcome. Usually, this happens in a very close fight or as a last resort of the losing candidate, particularly if the candidate is an incumbent. The second is the view of one local campaigner/operator from Luzon who shared his experience where he and his political group employed violence and money to prevent or counter the violence and fraud that their political rivals employed against them. One local campaigner from Mindanao, who managed the campaign for a congressional candidate in 2004, shared that there are two components of a campaignthe good campaign and the bad campaign. The good campaign involves distribution of campaign materials, houseto-house campaigns, participation in community dialogues and candidates debates. The bad campaign makes use of dirty tactics to ensure votes or to guard votes from fraud and manipulation from the opposing candidates. Unfortunately, however the same participant and his husband suffered the strongest form of political violence when they were shot to death two weeks after. Another participant affiliated with a party-list group which caters to multi-sectoral interests, shares that before the elections, they prepare for the non-violent and violent arena. For the violent arena, their response is to go public by holding press conferenceswhich for him is a limited capacity to counter violence. Marginalized sectors in the society such as indigenous peoples find it difficult to compete in electoral exercises especially in the national level, such as in the party-list representation. The primary limitation is machinery and resources to undertake campaign and eventually to win seats. Illiteracy is also a problem among the indigenous peoples, thus making voters from this sector vulnerable to manipulation during elections.

27

COMELEC officials, teachers who serve as board of election inspectors, some party watchers are the persons who are susceptible to the commission of fraud and violence. Some election officers can undertake delaying tactics for a price, or at most times, for the highest price. But the discussion groups proved that there are still a substantial number of local election officers and personnel who continue to be faithful and to make efforts of ensuring clean elections. Given this insight, local election actors in the group see the percentage of faithful election officers and personnel as the opportunity for reform. Continuing education and organizing among these personnel can be a significant force that can pressure the corrupt ones and can work towards repairing the credibility of the Commission. Consolidation of efforts albeit a difficult task, is seen as vital in effecting reforms. The role of the police and the armed forces are also seen as very crucial especially in election hotspots. In the recent 2007 elections, there were efforts to insulate the armed forces of election duties except to vote and in areas identified to have serious armed threat to the electoral process only by: providing security through the deployment of sufficient AFP military personnel to man and patrol the area; manning the checkpoints in locations jointly identified the COMELEC and the AFP; enforcing the ban on carrying of firearms by persons without gun ban exemptions.30 From the experience of participants who have long been actors in local elections, members of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) are the crucial persons in the exercise. On one hand, it is viewed that the school teachers who serve as BEIs are not only burdened with the tedious election procedures but with the impending election-related threats on them as well. On the other hand, there are BEIs who have been really corrupted to perform irregularities. One group raised the impact of modernization or automation of the election system on election fraud and violence. They view that automation can be a deterrent to electoral manipulation and violence. Given the faster means of registration, voting, and counting and canvassing of votes there is little room for politicians and parties or their representatives to coerce election personnel, or manipulate the counting process. The burden of election personnel in the manual counting and canvassing will of course be lessened. The only reservation is the uncertainty of a foolproof automated system. Perception on election dispute and dispute resolution mechanisms Some FGD participants admit that they are not very much aware of all election laws and dispute resolution mechanisms in the country. Much of their knowledge refers to the ones that have practical applications according to their experiences. Local election actors who have filed post-proclamation cases learn about available mechanisms, institutions, processes and rulings which involve post-proclamation election conflicts. Protests on party accreditation will encourage gathering of laws and procedures on accreditation.
30

COMELEC Resolution 7747 promulgated in November 2006.

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Participants representing the civil society and monitoring bodies view that no election protests succeed at the local level. Candidates find it difficult to make their cases proceed or even prosper in the regional trial courts and in local COMELEC. The problem of resources (especially financial) hinders candidates or parties attempt to resolve election dispute. Organizations and sectors such as the indigenous peoples and ethnic groups also stumble on this problem in their attempt to even file cases or protests. Organizing component is important in tackling election disputes. But it is not enough to be organized. The venue where people should fight and the mechanisms should be made available. However the mechanisms and institutions for filing, processing and resolving election disputes are also tainted. People then turn to violence and fraud as a strategy for dispute resolution. In the experience of some local campaigners, engagement in the mainstream political and electoral arena means the use of violence and fraud as defense for the true results of elections. What is frustrating for local leaders is the effort to keep their constituencies believe in the system and the laws when the same system fails to provide the mechanisms for dispute resolution. The institutions which are constitutionally and legally mandated to handle election disputes continue to have tainted image and credibility. Election protest cases filed in courts and the COMELEC seem to stay longer in the dockets. The COMELEC suffers its lowest point in terms of credibility after the Hello GarciGMA controversy. The alleged involvement of COMELEC Commissioner, the president, other national and local candidates and members of the armed forces in election results manipulation has reached the grassroots. Even the unorganized and least politically involved sectors of the society became aware of the credibility question of the Commission. The tendency of the electorate to accept the situation as normal is alarming. There are civil society organizations which continue monitoring and engagement with election management bodies. These organizations discuss venues for complementation of efforts with the implementors. Political parties and party-lists hold an important role in counterbalancing election violence and election disputes. Democratic forces particularly in the local level can serve as the base for dispute resolution because the local politics is where election violence and disputes mostly happen. Most of the participants see the value of studying the phenomenon of election violence in the country which is hoped to form basis for addressing the same phenomenon.

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On civil society mobilizations When asked if civil society mobilizations are still effective in response to election disputes or political crises, the participants have varied responses. Some participants deem it necessary to maintain the active role of civil society of expressing democratic rights in the government. Without the civil society, the ills of the government and the system will be more entrenched. Although some still consider people power as one response for political crises, most of the participants expressed that after the two EDSAs (or mobilizations in EDSA which led to the change in leadership), several failed impeachments, there is decline in the peoples perception on effectiveness of such. People want to see changes as a result of mass actions. The looming cynicism and apathy of the people stem from the lack of substantial change (for the better, that is) in the quality of leaders, quality of election process, and quality of life. People perceive that in the current political crisis, change in leadership will not ensure the needed changes. They expect their present economic and political plights will remain. People now feel the need for an alternative that will address the fundamental problem of poverty and of governance. And that alternative should come with the reforms. There are existing organized groups but some are not organized and do not know where to run or turn to. People again need a figure or an organization or coalition that can unify the efforts at mobilizations. The issue or program-based politics, encouraged in the party-list system of representation, should have a corresponding personality that can compete with the traditional elite leadership. There are inevitable limitations of the civil society in that they can only have substantial intervention in disputes at the municipal levels (or in other lower courts). After the cases are brought to the national courts or the COMELEC, organizations, parties, and individuals are now limited by resources to monitor the proceedings of the election cases. The lengthy process of case proceedings is also a deterrent against resource-poor candidates, particularly in cases where the electoral protest may stretch into the next campaign period. In many cases, the protesting candidate either diverts his attention and resources to the next election rather than continue with the protest. In other cases, the election protest is continued but only within the context of the next election campaign. The protesting candidate hopes thereby that a favorable decision can be handed down before the election and he can use whatever resources of the public office for his or her campaign.

30

Summary of Concerns Two general sentiments came up in both discussion sessions but have a different turnout. In the Mindanao region, the group composed of the local election actors saw very little (or no) hope at all at addressing the problem of election violence and fraud, while the group of representatives from sectors, monitoring bodies, and local implementing body was more enthusiastic in the thought that reforms can still be done in the current system particularly through massive voter education campaigns. During the session in the National Capital Region, the same hope and enthusiasm was felt more by the local election actors from various election hotspot areas. However, this hope and enthusiasm is coupled with the expressed need for a body or a civil society organization that will lead the reforms. Another major insight from all discussions is that money figures very prominently in most election processes. Most of the participants refer to the availability of money or other resources as a big advantage in electoral processes while the lack of these resources makes it difficult for candidates or political parties to succeed in election contests. There is also a view that the incumbent politicians particularly those aligned with the administration are most likely to benefit from the available resources and machinery. Some also view that election violence comes from the elite and powers that be. The weakening view and trust of voters and candidates on the electoral process and institutions result in the employment of election violence and fraud. Violence (as defined during the discussion), as well as fraud are seen to be strategies used not only to win electoral seats but as response or counter-strategy to election disputes and electoral fraud. The incidence of election-related deaths happen more in the local electoral arena. The tendency of the electorate to accept things as part of the situation can be addressed by continuing voter education. The education campaign recommended one that will go beyond the election period. Changes and reforms in the election system should be seen in the light of giving more access and participation to the grassroots.

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Chapter 5 Role of Actors in Propagating or Mitigating Violence As previously mentioned, actors in the election violence phenomenon are not limited to the political candidates and campaign operators and supporters, although of course they figure as the most obvious ones. Patio and Velasco identified six groups of actors in the election violence phenomenon: politician candidates, goons and private armies, partisan armed groups, police and military, communist separatist rebels and election monitoring groups. (Croissant, et.al. eds. 2006) Candidates and parties While national politician candidates and their operators or supporters employ the use of media wars in campaigns and elections, local candidates and operators resort to violence and fraud as a strategy to secure victory. This victory refers not only for their candidacy but for the candidacy of the national candidate/s they are supporting. In areas particularly election hotspots, politicians employ personal bodyguards who may also carry arms or may increase to become the politicians personal or private army. Goons and private armies not only provide protection but can pose as threat or intimidation factors against rival supporters and candidates. There are a recorded 114 private armies in the Philippines (2004 figure), 78 of which are in ARMM. Private armed groups are usually bodyguards of specific politicians and sometimes disguised as private security guards, local police or even military personnel. In a few cases, rebels provide the armed personnel. They existand continued to thrivein a political environment dominated by political dynasties. Apart from the personal army or goons, there are also partisan armed groups (PAGs) which also work for politician candidates as guns for hire or for specific missions or services such as liquidation of politicians rival candidates or known critics. Private armies are regular employees while PAGs are on a professional contractual or output/mission-based relation with the politician. In the 2004 elections there are 115 existing partisan armed groups (PAGs) which from the 2001 PNP figure decreased by 39. The PNP reports 21 to have been neutralized and 74 dismantled during the period of 2004 elections. While the police and military forces are deployed by COMELEC to provide security in election areas, some elements of the state security forces are corrupted by politicians or parties to serve in their favor based from previous experiences and allegations. In this instance, these forces which become partisan are at an advantage because of their access and status in the government. This contributes to decreasing public trust in the institution. It is of course a fact that the existence of partisan armed groups are a violation of existing laws, including electoral laws, and that the Commission on Elections in every election outlaws these groups and deputizes the military and the police to run after them. The COMELEC also imposes a gun ban during the election period.

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However, PAGs are also a reality in every election. They are in effect tolerated by the state and even the COMELEC because of their political connections. It is only when electoral violence by these armed groups reach unacceptable level and there is a popular outcry that these are suppressed. With a weak political party system, the local political dynasties controlling these armed groups are usually allies or provide the political base of the national politicians. Thus the persistence of these partisan armed groups directly depends on the political patronage system that replaced the political parties. Given this reality, the COMELECin itself heavily politicizedcannot provide the political will to go after these personal armed groups. In fact, in the last 2007 elections, it issued more than 23,000 gun ban exemptionseffectively negating the ban. The Commission on Elections As the election administration body mandated by the Constitution, the Commission on Elections has the principal responsibility of maintaining peace and order in relation to elections. To be able to do this, it deputizes the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine National Police and any other government agency it sees fit to mobilize. The only limiting constitutional provision is the requirement for the acquiescence of the President to the deputization. When they are deputized, the COMELEC has almost absolute power to transfer military and police personnel, to deploy them to protect the electoral process, to order the arrest of violators, order a gun ban, institute a liquor ban, to take over local government functions in areas of probable electoral violence, and any other action in support of the peaceful conduct of the electoral process. However, in practice, there are many constraints on the COMELEC, both internally and externally. It is subject to political pressure and may compromise as a result. In areas where warlord political dynasties prevail, the COMELEC usually tiptoes and avoid direct confrontations. The institution is compromised politically in so many ways. The vast majority of its personnel are political appointees, having been endorsed by politicians. Most of their offices are located in local government premises by virtue of the generosity of local incumbents. The presence of partisan armed groups by local warlord-politicians also provides a threat to local election officials. These politicians may also have influence over the local military and police units and exerts pressure over their assignments. The result is the weak or even the absence of political will on the part of the COMELEC to prevent or even prosecute election violence cases. It is usually left to the police to follow-up on cases of election violence.

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However, the COMELEC has the potential to control election violence because of its sweeping constitutional powers. If it so decides to exercise these powers, it has the ample capability to do it. As it is, the level of election violence is inversely proportional to the level of political will of the election administrator. State security forces The Philippine National Police (PNP) has the chief mission of maintaining peace and order in the country. During election period, it is deputized by the COMELEC for election duties. The Armed forces of the Philippines (AFP) is also usually deputized, particularly for areas that have insurgencies or have armed groups that may potentially disrupt the elections. In some elections in the past, the military reservist force, such as the Reserve Officers Training corps (ROTC), are also deputized for election duties. When deputized, these state security forces primarily provide for security of election personnel, equipment, poll centers, and movement of candidates and voters. However, in some cases, the military and police units substitute for the Board of Inspectors (BEIs) when civilians are not available or there is imminent danger for civilians in this role. The problem arises when these units are themselves politicized or become partisan to specific candidates. Then, they become a liability, either by toleration or turning a blind eye to threats or actual electoral violence acts of the politicians and their armed followers or by participating in the acts of electoral violence themselves. The assignment of military and police officers is a major arena among contending candidates, particularly in areas where warlord-politicians prevail. They may well determine the outcome of the elections in these places, by either preventing or tacitly supporting private or partisan armed groups. The COMELEC, with the consent of the President, may reshuffle these officers and thusin theoryprevent the influencing of these officers. However, this is easier said than done when the careers of many of these officerseven those from the Philippine Military Academy (PMA)owe much to their politician-sponsors.31 Many officers are also members of political clans as the latter, learning the lesson from Marcos, include influencing the military and police in their political strategies. Insurgency groups Communist and separatist insurgents also make use of violence and attacks during elections to send message to the government. In the Philippines, the long-standing communist insurgency is waged by the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed component the New Peoples Army (NPA). In the 2004 elections, they went public with their permit-to campaign (PTC) policy sowing more violence and intimidation through the NPAs demand for
31

The Philippine Military Academy as the premier military training institution of the country allows the practice of honorary class membership of politicians. Thus PMA Class 1978 has for adopted member President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo while PMA Class 1974 has the Presidential Spouse Mike Arroyo as its adopted member.

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money, contribution, and material and arms support in exchange for access to rebel areas during campaign and election periods. The separatist rebels in the Southern Philippines are grouped as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The CPP-NPA and the MILF continue to have conflicts with the military, thus threatening the security situation of various areas too. While the police and military forces are deployed by COMELEC to provide security in election areas, some elements of the state security forces are corrupted by politicians or parties to serve in their favor based from previous experiences and allegations. In this instance, these forces which become partisan are at an advantage because of their access and status in the government. This contributes to decreasing public trust in the institution. Election monitors and citizen arms Existence of election monitoring organizations such as NAMFREL and PPCRV works in two ways for a democracy like the Philippines. PPCRV, a nation-wide parish-based group of volunteers accredited as COMELEC citizens arm was established in 1992 and undertakes voter education and pollwatching. NAMFREL conducts election quick count through precinct, municipal, provincial and national volunteers. The CER also works for citizen voter education and election monitoring. On one hand, it promotes the mandate of civic participation in government processes by maintaining watchdogs and as providers of voter education. In the 2007 elections, CER formed the Bantay-Eleksyon 2007 (Election Watch 2007) or the Peoples Coalition to Monitor the 2007 Elections to act as a domestic monitoring mission. It also participated in a Pera at Pulitika (Money and Politics) monitoring of campaign expenditures. One major area of citizen election monitoring is electoral violence. International and domestic monitors continually speak on this in their reports. These have noted, time and again, the prevalence of election violence as a normal part of Philippine election process. The only differences are in the level of violence, number of incidence, and quality of targets. It is only in the 2007 elections that so many of them have come out with a recommendation for the serious campaign by government to eradicate warlordism. They noted, as in the resolution of the influential Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP), that warlordism in certain areas such as the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) has reached a proportion that can affect the outcome of the national vote, including the presidential election this coming 2010. On the other hand, the growing number of local and international organizations which conduct election monitoring and observation also manifest that Philippine politics and elections suffer from democratic flaws not only in the available legal instruments and institutions but most particularly in the actual conduct of democratic processes. All in all, more than 10 national and international election monitoring initiatives were conducted during the 2007 elections. Collectively, they were able to prevent the massive cheating that would have affected even the national election results.

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Of course, the big reason for this explosion of monitoring efforts was the realization that Philippine democracy cannot take another beating with questionable elections such as the one that dogged the 2004 presidential election. The latter precipitated a political crisis that still roils the political landscape up to the present. Unfortunately, the Commission on Elections itself has low credibility because of the alleged involvement of some of its personnel in the 2004 electoral fraud issue. It was not in a position to guarantee the credibility of the 2007 elections.

Chapter 6 Case Study: 2004 Philippine Presidential Election Impasse The Issue of Presidential Legitimacy Philippine president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo came to power in 2001 through a reprise of the people power of 1986. Under siege from a week-long demonstration of more than half a million Filipinos and confronted by the withdrawal of support of the leadership of the armed forces and members of his cabinet, then President Joseph Estrada left the Malacaang Palace in the morning of January 20, 2001. Vice-President Arroyo took over when the latter constructively resigned.32 As president, she continually faced the issue of legitimacy. Cases were filed with the Supreme Court to reverse its decision to recognize the legality of her presidency. 33 In May 2001, hundreds of thousands of Estradas urban poor supporters besieged both the historical EDSA people power shrine and Malacaang palace for several days. In August 2003, several hundred officers and men of elite armed forces units occupied the plush Oakwood hotel in the countrys central business district and attempted to rally for a withdrawal of support. Every sector of the people divided on the issue. The political opposition centered on Estrada never accepted Macapagal-Arroyos accession to presidency. These events in 2001 and subsequent years provided the backdrop to the 2004 presidential election. By this time, the early euphoria of the largely middle class-based support for Macapagal-Arroyo had evaporated and her popularity ratings were down.34 However, these erstwhile supporters were not ready to embrace the political opposition, particularly those identified with Estrada. The 2004 presidential election offered itself as a possible political solution to the issue of presidential legitimacy. Under the 1987 Constitution, the rare instance that a sitting president

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Sabrina M. Querubin, Ana Rhia T. Muhi, and Charisse F. Gonzales-Olalia, Legitimizing the Illegitimate: Disregarding the Rule of Law in Estrada v. Disierto and Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyo, Public Policy (JanuaryJune 2003 Special Issue), pp. 108. The Supreme Court eventually decided that Estradas acts during second People Power can be termed as resignation even if there was no formal act of resignation. 33 The relevant cases are the Estrada v. Disierto (G.R. Nos. 146710-15) and Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyo (G.R. No. 146738). 34 The Social Weather Station tracked President Macapagal-Arroyos net satisfaction rating from a high of +24 in March 2004 (just after she became president) to a lower -3 in November 2003 (before the start of the 2004 election campaign). See Social Weather Station, Third Quarter 2006 Social Weather Survey, Press Release, www.sws.org.ph.

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who only is allowed one six-year termcan succeed oneself if he or she has served for less than four years as a replacement president. The president initially announced in December 2002 that she will not run anymore in the 2004 elections. However, when the time came to make a decision, she decided to run, citing her desire to protect the gains of her initial term. Predictably, the opposition and even some among her supporters criticized her flip-flopping. This action by the president set the stage for a very acrimonious presidential election. The presidents camp questioned the citizenship and educational qualifications of the second-running presidential candidate, popular actor and Estradas friend Fernando Poe, Jr. The latter expectedly brought up the issue of the 2001 Macapagal-Arroyos grab for power and her poverty eradication record. The 2004 presidential election itself became controversial when the opposition candidates, except for former senator Raul Roco, did not accept the results. Poe and his runningmate for vice-president, former senator Loren Legarda, filed their respective election protests before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.35 In December, 2004, barely seven months after the May elections, opposition candidate Poe died. His electoral protest died with him. The rest of the opposition maintained their rejection of Macapagal-Arroyos electoral victory. They initiated street demonstrations, congressional corruption investigations, and even agitated for military intervention. In June 2005, wiretap tapes36 of alleged conversations between President MacapagalArroyo and an election commissioner, Virgilio Garcillano, became public. This fanned the simmering political crisis into a firestorm that has not yet died down. It is still a major, if not the number one issue, in the 2007 midterm national and local elections. The 2004 presidential electoral dispute, as far as the legal process is concerned, is already over when the Presidential Electoral Tribunal ended Poes protest upon his death. 37 It has since then graduated into continuing attempts to force President Macapagal-Arroyo from office, both constitutionally and extra-constitutionally.38

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The Presidential Electoral Tribunal consists of the whole Supreme Court, convening as the former. On June 6, 2005, alleged phone conversations between the president Macapagal-Arroyo and election commissioner Virgilio Garcillano taken by the militarys intelligence services became public, ironically through presidential spokesperson Ignacio Bunye. 37 Under the rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, only the presidential and vice-presidential candidates with the second and third highest votes, respectively, can lodge their respective protests within 30 days after the proclamation of the winner. The spouse, who can do so in relation to lesser elective posts, is prohibited from continuing with the protest. See 2005 Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, p. 11. 38 Several options have already been done by the opposition. A significant number of Cabinet officials resigned in July 2005, calling for the Presidents resignation. Two impeachment complaints were filed in 2005 and 2006. An aborted withdrawal of military support sparked a declaration of national emergency last February 2006.

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The Protagonists The 2004 presidential election involved five major candidates: President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, actor Fernando Poe, Jr., former senator Raul Roco, former police chief and senator Panfilo Lacson, and religious evangelist Eduardo Villanueva. At the start of the election, it was already obvious that the main opponents were President Macapagal-Arroyo and Estradas friend, Fernando Poe, Jr. The contrast between the two main presidential candidates is striking. Macapagal-Arroyo, an economist by profession, campaigned on a platform of economic performance, asserting that her policies led to the stabilizing of the Philippine economy. The 1997 Asian crisis and Estrada mismanagement, by 2001, led to major fiscal deficits and economic downturn. She is the daughter of the late President Diosdado Macapagal. She had consistently won national elections with convincing majorities, first as the topranking senator in the 1992 elections and as vice-president in the 1998 elections. However, this is attributed more to her political acumen and political network than her popularity. In the campaign, she carefully skirted the political issues. Poe, on the other hand, is a newcomer to politics, with no record of any previous government position. However, as the Philippines top actor, he is very populareven more than Estrada. He harped on the political legitimacy issue and her alleged power grab in 2001. He did not do much campaigning, being short on funds and political savvy. Instead, he relied on his movie popularity and clean image to bring him to power. 39 Election Results Under the Philippine constitution, it is only Congress, with both the Senate and the House of Representatives meeting in a joint session, which canvasses the election results and proclaims the winner of the presidential and vice-presidential contest. After one month of canvassing, it proclaimed President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as president and her running-mate, Senator Noli de Castro, as vice-president. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, by official Congressional canvass, got 12,905,808.40 His closest opponent, Fernando Poe, Jr., got 11,782,232. All the quick counts plus an exit poll by the Social Weather Station (SWS) showed the president leading.41 Also, surveys two weeks before the elections predicted a close fight with the president leading.42 The following chart shows both official and unofficial tallies (in percent):43
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Fernando Poe, Jr. is popularly known as Da King for his dominance in box office and movie world. He has a vast following among Filipinos, especially the numerically important electorate from the lower classes. The opposition expected him to win on sheer popularity, as Estrada did in 1998. 40 Figures are from the Congressional Joint Committees Official Canvass Result for President. 41 The Social Weather Station (SWS) was the only one who conducted an exit poll showing: the following: GMA 45%, FPJ 34%, Lacson 10%, Roco 6%, Villanueva 5%. The relatively large margin of the president over Poe became controversial when it was not supported by the official and unofficial counts.

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As can be seen in the all the tallies, the fight between Macapagal-Arroyo and Poe was tight. The presidents three-percent margin in the official tally was not enough to convince the opposition and many among the people of her victory. The opposition, including other presidential candidates Lacson and Villanueva, claimed Poe won, albeit also by a small margin. An election monitoring group, the Coalition of Hope (Honest, Orderly, Peaceful Elections) branded the election a fraud. It even questioned the Catholic church leaders and the Catholicbacked election monitoring groups NAMFREL and PPCRV for certifying that the results of the election show the will of the people.44 An election analysis also concluded that, It was a very close contest, with the most probable results ranging from a GMA win of around 156,000 votes or less, to an FPJ win of around 84,000 votes or less.45 The US-led international election monitoring group, Consortium on Elections and Political Party Strengthening (CEPPS) Philippine mission, was also not able to conclude on the fairness of the election results, although it acknowledged the deeply rooted mistrust that characterizes the relationships between and among virtually all participants in the processes.
42

SWS final pre-election survey for May 1-4, 2004 has the following results: Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo 37%, Fernando Poe Jr. 30%, Panfilo Lacson 11%, Raul Roco 6%, Eddie Villanueva 4%, Eddie Gil 0.3%, and 12% undecided, with an error margin of 3%. 43 Figures as compiled by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), as part of the report on the 2004 elections by the Consortium on Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS) Philippines Election Observation Program. 44 The Daily Tribune, Church Leaders Prefer To Hide Truth By Absolving Cheats Hope, June 2, 2004. 45 Roberto Verzola, The True Results of the 2004 Presidential Elections Based on the NAMFREL Tally: A Final Report, p. 11. (PDF format). This article was also published in Kasarinlan, University of the Philippines Third World Study Center journal.

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There is little evidence of faith in the system or in the honest intent of any of its participants. All parties in the process are assumed guilty of actual or planned malfeasance, and there are no accepted or respected processes or evidentiary standards for demonstrating otherwise. The basic integrity and the legitimacy of virtually every elective office is in question. In the end, the presidential election was not able to decisively resolve President Macapagal-Arroyos claim to a legitimate presidency. Instead, on top of the 2001 legitimacy crisis, a new crisis founded on charges of electoral cheating hounded her after the election. The Issue of Cheating The issue of Macapagal-Arroyos cheating at the 2004 presidential election is essentially a political one. It is being fought in the political arena, within the constitutional border as well as outside in the extra-constitutional arena. The constitutional venue of the legal electoral protest, allowed only for the second- and third-ranked presidential candidate, was effectively closed when Fernando Poe, Jr. died in December 2004. Panfilo Lacson, the third-ranked candidate, did not file any immediate protest and he was barred by the 30-day rule for filing one. It is Loren Legarda, the second-ranked vicepresidential candidate and running-mate of Poe, who still pursues her electoral protest before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal. The problem of an electoral protest in the Philippines, including the presidential electoral protest, is that it is a very expensive proposition and takes a long time to have a final decision. All fees related to the protest are borne by the protesting candidate, including legal fees, attorneys fee, revision fee, and reproduction fees. In a national election protest, this runs into at least tens of millions of pesos or millions of dollars. The painstaking opening of ballot boxes and counting votes, accompanied by legal debate, also prevents any quick protest settlement. An example is Senator and presidential candidate Miriam Defensor-Santiagos case against President Fidel Ramos in 1992. Three years and millions of pesos later, she decided to just run again as senator. It was a practical decisionwith her protest going nowhere and the next presidential election looming in 1998. The impracticality and expenses of the electoral protest in the Philippines lend themselves to electoral manipulation and corruption. In the case of Poe, it mercifully ended with his death. His running-mate Legarda, in the meanwhile, tried to pursue her own protest but also chose to run again in the 2007 senatorial elections, just like Defensor-Santiago in 1995. Given the legal impediments and its historical background, the issue became politically contentious from the start. The opposition, with a substantial presence in the Senate, started various investigations into the use of government funds and illegal gambling contributions for President Macapagal-Arroyos campaign. These include the alleged use the funds from the road users tax to hire 100,000+ contractual streetsweepers for three months coinciding with the election campaign, the distribution of 6-month temporary health cards to the poor from the government health insurance, PhilHealth, the construction of highly-visible infrastructure

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projects during the campaign period,46 the use of government transportation ostensibly for project inspection but ending up in presidential campaign rallies, and the disappearance of hundreds of millions of fertilizer subsidy funds and agrarian reform funds, including those coming from the returned Marcos Swiss assets. These investigations targeted the public opinion. By November 2004, barely six months after her election, President Macapagal-Arroyo had a net satisfaction rating of -5%, a huge drop from her June 2004 rating of +26%.47 As early as August 2004, an SWS survey found 23% saying that Fernando Poe Jr. and Loren Legarda were definitely cheated, and another 32% saying that they were probably cheated, or a total of 55% doubting the official result of the 2004 presidential election.48 Unrest also plagued the military, with rumors of military rebellion appearing in the media intermittently. One reason for this is the politicization of the armed forces and police officer corpsinitiated by Marcos and not quite corrected up to the presentthat led to divisiveness among them. Former senator and coup leader Gregorio Honasan, who maintains strong links with the younger officers, served as Poes chief security during the presidential campaign. The Oakwood mutiny in 2003 is being attributed to him by Malacaang despite his role in ending it.49 The Left, including the underground Communist Party of the Philippines, who had been friendly with President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in her earlier term, now started aligning with the opposition. In June 6, 2005, pre-empting the opposition, Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye announced the existence of the so-called Garcillano tapes, which purportedly record wire-tapped conversations between Commission on Elections (COMELEC) commissioner Virgilio Garcillano and President Macapagal-Arroyo. He attempted to downplay these tapes as fakes and presented ones that were supposedly correct. It was a mistake. People got curious and demands for the public airing of the tapes resounded. The opposition, sensing the public mood, released its own copy. The resulting recording, heard or transcribed, supported the allegation of electoral cheating.50 The President hemmed and hawed. Her spokesperson first denied completely the tapes, branding them as fakes. Later, on June 27, 2005, in a national address, she admitted that her voice was the one on the tape. Later, her people would again deny the admission.

46

There is an election ban on government projects during the election period although an exception is made with regards to projects started before the start of the election period. 47 SWS surveys of June 4-29, 2004 and November 25-December 2, 2004. SWS Press release of July 9, 2004 and SWS Press Release of December 17, 2004. 48 SWS Press Release of August 25, 2004. 49 The Malacaang-created Feliciano Commission issued a report linking Honasan to the Oakwood incident. See http://www.i-site.ph/Record/fffc-findings.html for the whole report. 50 All the versions of the Garcillano tapes can be downloaded from this site: http://www.pcij.org/blog/wpfiles/tapes.php.

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The damage was done. Ten members of her Cabinet resigned on July 8, 2005 and called for her resignation. The Liberal Party under Senate President Franklin Drilon, a member of the ruling coalition, seconded the call. The only other woman president, Corazon Aquino, also called for the resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. However, the majority party Lakas-Christian-Muslim Democrats (Lakas-CMD), rallied to her under the leadership of former president Fidel Ramos and House Speaker Jose de Venecia. The president, thus encouraged, refused the call. Public opinion weighed in, giving the president the worst record in presidential popularity. The Social Weather Survey of May 14-23, 2005 finds 26% of Filipinos satisfied, and 59% dissatisfied, with the performance of Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, giving her a Net Satisfaction Rating of -33%, which is a new record low for Presidents since 1986. By February 2007, while rising again, it still remained negative at -4%. [See chart]

The nationwide 3rd Quarter 2005 SWS survey found 79% wanting President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo impeached, 64% favoring her resignation, and 51% saying she should be removed by People Power if the House of Representatives would reject her impeachment.51 The key factor in the negative sentiment, according to SWS, is the belief of most Filipinos that the president's admitted phone calls to "a COMELEC official" amounted to instructing him to cheat in the 2004 election, and were not merely meant to protect her votes as she claimed in her June 27 apology. The president chose to fight it out. Sensing that the people were not keen on using extraconstitutional means just yet and that both the Catholic church and the middle class called for
51

SWS Press Release of September 10, 2005.

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constitutional means to settle the issue, she rejected the option to resign and maneuvered in the House of Representatives where her allies hold the majority to prevent the initiation of impeachment proceedings against her.52 She also rejected the convening of an independent commission to investigate the charges. Two impeachment charges, in 2005 and in 2006, were filed and defeated in the lower House against President Macapagal-Arroyo. A nascent plot to withdraw military support in February 2006 was also narrowly aborted when she declared a short-lived state of national emergency. The presidents camp took advantage of the weaknesses of the opposition and maneuvered to prevent the critical political mass from developing against her. They also tried to preserve and consolidate their own bases among the congressmen and the local officials, promising them extended terms without the constitutionally-mandated elections in 2007. Their main strategy to achieve a no-election scenario in 2007 was to undertake constitutional change before the elections, thereby shifting to a unicameral parliamentary system, and establishing an interim transition parliament composed of the current legislators. In order to pursue constitutional change, they undertook parallel efforts to convene a constituent assembly and a peoples initiative.53 The pro-Arroyo majority coalition in the lower House of Representatives tried to call for a constituent assembly on its own. Meanwhile, Arroyo allies among the local officials through the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP) and a newly-organized organization, Sigaw ng Bayan (Shout of the People), tried to sponsor a peoples initiative effort. Both efforts failed. The Senate vigorously campaigned against the holding of a unilateral constituent assembly, when the pro-Arroyo majority in the lower house unilaterally passed a resolution convening it, the peopleled by the Catholic Church and other religious groups threatened to hold a people power assembly against it. Both the Commission on Elections and the Supreme Court rejected the peoples initiative. With the defeat of Arroyo constitutional change initiatives, the arena shifted to the 2007 midterm elections. Even if there is no election for presidency, the key issue in these elections still remains the legitimacy of the presidential victory in the 2004 elections. Since one-half of the Senate seats and the whole of the House of Representatives are up for elections, the possibility exists for the opposition to get one-third of the House of Representatives and two-thirds of the Senateand thus mount a successful impeachment in the new 14th Congress in July 2007.

52

Under the 1987 Constitution, only a vote of all members of the House of Representatives can impeach constitutional officers, including the president. The Senate act as the impeachment court. Only one impeachment process can be done against a particular official in a year. 53 A constituent assembly is Congress convened in a joint session to propose a revision or amendments to the constitution while a peoples initiative is a direct democratic method to propose amendments by at least 12% of registered voters nationwide (with at least 3% of registered voters in every legislative district).

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Continuing Crisis President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, so far, successfully fought off all pressures, maneuvering and using all the resources at her disposal. On the other hand, her government is now a government of survival. The political opposition is also fragmented, with sections coming from both pro-Estrada and anti-Estrada camps, various shades of the Left, including the CPP rebels, and some Church and middle class formations. There is no clear-cut leader, much more a unified platform and alternative. They are still far from achieving the cohesiveness, unity and solidity needed to force the hand of the Macapagal-Arroyo administration. The situation is one of a political impasse. One political solution would have been negotiations on a possible political compromise with the opposition. The logical way to resolve the impasse is to hold another presidential election, one that is credible and acceptable to the opposition. However, this has not gone very far because of the intractable nature of the issue and the stubbornness of the presidents camp. Presidential legitimacy rests on the body politic accepting the rule of the person holding the presidency. Precisely, this is the issue. Any presidential election will almost certainly lead to the loss of Macapagal-Arroyos presidency because of the solid majority public opinion against her. As long as this is the case, she will not agree to a new presidential election. The 2007 elections loom as a threat because her low public approval may lead to the defeat of enough loyal congressmen for the opposition to succeed in impeaching her. She may also lose her political base as these congressmen and local officials jockey at the local levels in the elections. In the process of the crisis, almost all post-Marcos political institutions became victim. They were attacked or put under tremendous pressure from both sides of the political divide. The president and her allies maintain their dominance in the executive department, the House of Representatives, the Lakas-CMD party and coalition. They also maintain considerable influence in the military and police, the judiciary, the ombudsman, the commission on elections, and other instrumentalities of government. They also have some influence in the various major religious groups, including the powerful Catholic hierarchy, among big business groups, and mass media. They have a certain level of grassroots support, coming from the base of its loyal local government officials. The opposition holds the Senate and also has considerable influence within and outside the government. Recently, distancing has been observed from the Catholic hierarchy, media and big business. The Supreme Court and even the armed forces are taking a more neutral stance. The Supreme Court decisions against the crisis policies of the president, including the recent decision against the so-called peoples initiative to change the constitution does not augur well for the presidents camp.

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The positioning of the Supreme Court and the neutral stance of the military has guaranteed constitutional stability amidst the crisis. There is therefore the channeling of energies towards the electoral solution. The 2007 elections may well become the indirect referendum on Gloria MacapagalArroyos presidency. However, if this is not credible or is thwarted, the danger rises sharply towards an extra-constitutional channel. The fate of Philippine democracy lies in balance.

Chapter 7 Issues and recommendations/Good Practices Election violence and election dispute resolution in the Philippines take place within the context of a fragile democracy struggling to consolidate itself. In the post-Marcos dictatorship period, this democracy has to contend not only with the usual problems associated with the democratic and electoral process of seeking power but also with institutions, practices, and forces left behind by the Marcos regime. The main issue in relation to election violence is the persistence of political dynasties and its patronage politics. These dynasties or political clans see political power as the end-all and beall politics in the country. To this end, they are willing to do all that is necessaryincluding undemocratic methodsin order to seek and maintain the power. These dynasties and clans have built a power structure stretching from the national to the community or village level that is unmatched by any political party, insurgency group or other political forces. A related issue is the inevitable corruption of democratic institutions in such a situation of dominance of dynastic politics. This includes the election administration agency, the military and police, the courts, and various electoral tribunals. Election disputes are often settled without satisfying the losing side and often spill over to election violence. The third issue is the politicization of the electoral process, including election management and election dispute resolution. The practice of peer judges in the case of senate and congressional election disputes lends itself to political meddling in election disputes. The appointments of COMELEC commissioners and personnel via endorsement or confirmation by political bodies or politicians lead to the political partisanship within the election administration. The existence of political dynasties effectively excludes marginal groups from participating fully in the elections and other political processes. Running for office requires huge amounts of money, connections to government and electoral bodies, and even access to police and military that marginal groups cannot hope to compete on an even playing field with the political clans. Exclusion of marginal groups from political participation provides the main political rationale for local insurgencies and undermines the foundations of Philippine democracy. The

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rise of extra-judicial killings and forced disappearances targeting members of open Left groups, the media, and other critical sectors of society represents a setback to democracy is easily understood if taken within the policy of political exclusion. Of course, insurgencies will persist precisely because of the latter. Gender participation in Philippine elections is also heavily skewed in favor of male dominants who are usually dynastic leaders in a patronage feudal setting. Less than 20% of elective officials are women. Many of the latter are wives or daughters of clan political leaders who are elected within the rationale of maintaining clan political dominance. Only comprehensive political and electoral reforms can effectively broaden participation in Philippine democracy. Curbing election violence and credible electoral dispute resolution can only be done if these reforms are in place and working. Among these are the following urgent ones, as reiterated in the recommendations of election monitors in the 2007 elections:54 1. The Commission on Elections need to be revamped from top to bottom as the vital first step in bringing back the credibility of the institution and reform the electoral system. Among the first steps here is the appointment of four new, competent commissioners with reputation for integrity, have management skills, and capability for undertaking reforms. It is also necessary to weed out political appointees who do not have the necessary impartiality or skill competency for the work of the COMELEC. There is also the need to professionalize the COMELEC organization, raise salaries, promote on merits, and conduct necessary trainings of COMELEC personnel. 2. Election modernization should be implemented. This means the implementation of an automated election system in time for the 2010 elections, modernization of COMELEC infrastructure, and training of COMELEC personnel and public education on the modernized system. 3. The political party reform bill should be passed by congress immediately so as to strengthen the political party system. 4. The party-list law should be amended in the light of lessons learned not only in the 2007 elections but in earlier elections. 5. The overseas absentee voting law needs to be revisited to ensure its full implementation in the next elections. Measures to educate overseas Filipinos should also be devised and carried out. 6. The Omnibus Election code should be amended to reflect the requirements of election modernization as well as to address the weaknesses and loopholes of the present electoral laws.

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This is the set of recommendations by Batay-Eleksyon 2007 (Election Watch), the domestic monitoring mission organized by the consortium on electoral Reforms (CER).

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7. The COMELEC should be given the necessary capability to enforce election laws and prosecute election violators. 8. There should be a major initiative to address the problems of anomalous election practices in ARMM and elsewhere and the phenomenon of massive and organized cheating. 9. The problem of election violence needs to be addressed and effectively stopped in a systematic manner. 10. Citizen participation in the electoral process should be heightened and made on a continuing basis in order to make effective Philippine democracy.

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Bibliography: 1987 Philippine Constitution. Carlos, C.R. and Banlaoi, R.C. (1996). Elections in the Philippines from Pre-Colonial Period to the Present. Commission on Elections. Election Handbook for COMELEC Staff Election Inspectors and Canvassers. 2007. Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening CEPPS. (2004). Report on the May 2004 Philippine Elections Coronel, Sheila S. et.al. (2004). The Rulemakers: How the Wealthy and Well-Born Dominate Congress. Quezon City: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism. 270 pp. Croissant, Aurel, et.al. eds. (2006). The Politics of Death. Political Violence in Southeast Asia. Berlin: Lit Verlag. 385 pp. Gutierrez, Eric. U, et.al. (1992). All in the Family A study of elites and power relation in the Philippines. Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy. 189 pp. Institute for Political and Electoral Reform. (2004). The Voters Choice: Myself A Psychographics Study on Voting Behavior of the Filipino Electorate. Quezon City: IPER and UNDP. 82 pp. Institute for Public Policy. (n.d.). Election Laws of the Philippines. Quezon City: Institute for Public Policy. 140 pp. Maambong, Regalado. (n.d.). Outline and Study Guide on Election Law. National Secretariat for Social Action, Justice and Peace(NASSA-JP). (2001). Modules I-III. National Movement for Free and Honest Elections (NAMFREL). (2001). Curious Practices in Philippine Elections. Retrieved 16 October 2002 from http://www.namfrel.org/Pdf/2001OrganizingManual/2001manual2.pdf Reynolds, Andrew, et.al., eds. (2005). Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook. Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. pp. 223. Gueco, Reynaldo. (2004). Political Violence, Electoral Exercises, and Responses for Building Peace and Democracy. Retrieved from http://www.philsol.nl/A05a/Compact-PolRep-nov04.htm Patino, Patrick and Djorina Velasco. (n.d.). Election Violence in the Philippines. Retrieved from http://www.fes.org.ph/papers_elecviolence.htm on February 20, 2006. Rocamora, Joel. (2000). Formal Democracy and its Alternatives in the Philippines: Parties, Elections and Social Movements. Retrieved from

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http://www.xs4all.nl/~tni/archives/rocamora/formal.htm on April 11, 2006. Paper presented at the conference Democracy and Civil Society In Asia: The Emerging Opportunities and Challenges Queens University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, 19-21 August 2000. Rocamora, Joel. (2002). Political Parties in Constitutional Reform. Retrieved from http://www.xs4all.nl/~tni/archives/rocamora/parties.htm on April 11, 2006. Teodoro, Luis V. (2004). The May 10 elections: Unique but the same. Retrieved from http://qc.indymedia.org/mail.php?id=744 on 11 April 2006. Querubin, Sabrina, et.al. Legitimizing the Illegitimate: Disregarding the Rule of Law in Estrada v. Disierto and Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyo, Public Policy. January-June 2003 Special Issue. Sentro ng Alternatibong Lingap Panligal (SALIGAN). Understanding the Electoral Process Questions and Answers on Elections and Pollwatching. Popular Governance Notes. May 2007.

______________. Power in the Philippines: How Democratic is Asia's "First Democracy"?. Retrieved from http://humanists.net/pdhutcheon/Papers%20and%20Presentations/powerof%20philipines.html on 11 April 2006.Reprinted from Journal of Asian and African Studies, Vol.6, No. 3-4 (July and October 1971), 205-16. Verzola, Roberto. (2006) The True Results of the 2004 Presidential Elections Based on the NAMFREL Tally: A Final Report. Retrieved from http://www.abscbnnews.com/images/news/microsites/namfrel/true.htm on July 7, 2006. COMELEC Website. http://www.COMELEC.gov.ph Social Weather Stations Website. http://www.sws.org.ph/ House of Representatives Website. http://congress.gov.ph/ COMELEC Education and Information Department www.bagongbotante.com/index.html COMELEC Insider COMELEC.wordpress.com/ Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting www.ppcrv.org/ National Movement for Free Elections www.namfrel.org/ Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippine_general_election,_2007 Philippine Daily Inquirer www.inquirer.net/specialfeatures/eleksyon2007/ ABS-CBN Interactive www.abs-cbnnews.com/images/news/microsites/halalan07/prayer.html

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GMA-7 http://www.gmanews.tv/eleksyon2007 Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism www.pcij.org Mindanao Times. http://www.mindanaotimes.com.ph Website of Philippine News Agency - Office of the Press Secretary www.pna.gov.ph Bantay Eleksyon Website. www.iper.org.ph/CER/bantayeleksyon2007 Social Weather Stations Website. http://www.sws.org.ph/ House of Representatives Website. http://congress.gov.ph/ Universal Declaration of Human Rights. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 1987 Philippine Constitution. Republic Act 7941. Party-List System Act. Republic Act 8436. Election Modernization Act of 1997. Republic Act 9600. Fair Election Act. Republic Act 9189. Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. X-COM. (1998). Politico-Everymans Guide to Philippine Elections: Interactive CD-ROM. Quezon City. Business Mirror. The Daily Tribune. The Manila Times. The Philippine Daily Inquirer. The Philippine Star.

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Research Team Ramon C. Casiple Maria Sonia B. Atienza Lian Rosa Bella M. Quindoza Lalaine N. Marfil-Apugan Jay Martin S. Ablola Arturo Guerrero T. Lian

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