Pakistans Experience in Operating CNP-300s and Near Term Deployment Scheme

Presented by: M. Kamran Chughtai Directorate of Nuclear Power Engineering Reactor PAKISTAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

IAEA Work Shop on Technology Assessment of Small and Medium-sized Reactors (SMRs) for Near Term Deployment

Mission

To generate electricity in a demonstrably safe, reliable and cost effective manner over the long

term, for the benefit of our society and stake

holders, as well as to consolidate the basis for

development of the nuclear power program in

Pakistan.

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Pakistans Nuclear Power Programme

At present Pakistan has three operating nuclear power plants; Govt. of Pakistan has planned to enhance Nuclear Power generation capacity till 8800 MWe by the year 2030 In this perspective, Two are under construction PWRs are the preferred choice in future because of design & operational experience

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Status of Nuclear Power Plants in Pakistan

NPP KANUPP CHASNUPP Unit-1 CHASNUPP Unit-2 CHASNUPP Unit-3/4

TYPE PHWR PWR

MWe 137 325

GRID CONNECT 1972 2000

PWR

325

2011

PWR

325

Under construction

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Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP)

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Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP)

Prime contractor and designer: Canadian General Electric Company Ltd.

Civil consultant:

Montreal Engineering Company Reactor type: CANDU Pressurized Heavy Water (PHWR) Gross output: 137 MWe Net station output: 125 MWe Construction date: 01 Aug ,1966 Commercial Operation date: 07 Dec, 1972 Re-licensing date: 31 Dec, 2007 Current Net output: 80 Mwe Fuel Natural Uranium Moderator Heavy Water Coolant Heavy Water Thermal Output 432.8 MWth Plant is still operational after design life extension

Chashma Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1 & 2

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Plant Design / Specifications

Commercial Supplier CNNC

Rated Thermal Power

Gross Electrical Output

998.6 MWth
325 MWe

Net Electrical Output

Operating Pressure Operating Temperature

300 MWe
15.2 MPa 280-302 C
o

Equilibrium Cycle Enrichment

Average Burnup Heat flux hot channel factor Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Net Efficiency Core Damage Frequency (CDF)

3.4 w/o
32000 MWD/MTU 2.70 1.60 ~34 % 1.5210-5 /yr
8

Chashma Nuclear Power Plant Units: C-3/C-4

C-4
C-3

Contract Signing Contract Effective Date Groundbreaking First Concrete Pouring Provisional Acceptance (as per contract)

C-3 20 Nov 2008 31 Mar 2010 5 Aug 2010 4 Mar 2011 End 2016

C-4 20 Nov 2008 31 Mar 2010 1 Apr 2011 Jan 2012 End 2017
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Long Term Planning for NPPs

Long-Term Nuclear Power Plan (9 additional units of 8,325 MW by 2030)

NPP11 1000 MW NPP10 1000 MW NPP9, 1000 MW NPP8, 1000 MW NPP7, 1000 MW NPP6, 1000 MW NPP5, K-3, 1000 MW

NPP4, K-2, 1000 MW

NPP3, C-2, 325 MW

2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 2030

YEARS

Plant Overview

Reactor Coolant System

Steam generator

Pressurizer

Cold leg Reactor coolant pump

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Hot leg

Reactor pressure vessel

12

Reactor Core
Parameter Number of Fuel Assemblies Equivalent Diameter of Core, m Core Average Active Fuel Height, cm Height-to-diameter Ratio H2O/UO2 Volume Ratio, Lattice(Cold) Fuel Weight (as UO2), t Neutron Absorber No. of Rod Cluster Control Assemblies No. of Burnable Poison Rods (First Core) Value 121 2.486 290 1.1665 2.065 40.704 80%Ag,15% In5%Cd 37 576 Borosilicate Glass

Material

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Fuel Assemblies

Parameter Rod Array Rods per Assembly Rod Pitch, mm Overall Transverse Dimensions, mm Number of Grids per Assembly Material of Grids Number of Guide Thimbles per Assembly Material of Guide Thimbles

Value 1515 204 13.3 199.3199.3 8 GH-4169A 20 0Cr18Ni10Ti

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Reactor Pressure Vessel Design Data

Parameter Design/operating pressure, MPa Design temperature, Overall height of vessel and closure head, mm Thickness of insulation, minimum, mm Number of reactor closure head/studs Diameter of reactor closure head/studs, (minimum shank) mm Inside diameter of flange, mm Outside diameter of flange, mm Inside diameter at shell, mm Inlet nozzle inside diameter, mm Outlet nozzle inside diameter, mm Cladding thickness, minimum, mm Lower head thickness, minimum, mm Vessel belt-line thickness, minimum, mm Closure head thickness, minimum, mm
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Value 17.2/15.2 350 10366 77 48 151 3260 3990 3374 700 700 4 115 170 155
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Pressurizer Design Data

Parameter

Value

Design pressure, MPa

Design temperature, oC Surge line nozzle diameter, mm Heatup rate of pressurizer using heaters only, oC/h Internal volume, m3

17.2
370 273 30 35

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Steam Generator Design Data

Parameter Design pressure, primary side, MPa Design pressure, secondary side, MPa Design temperature, primary coolant side, Design temperature, secondary side, Design steam flow rate, t/h Heat transfer surface area, m2 Value 17.16 7.55 350 320 1010 3088.67

Maximum moisture percent, % Overall height, m

carryover,

wt

0.25
17.678 2977 53 22 1.2 4 457
17

Number of U-tubes Number of separators U-tube nominal diameter, mm Tube wall nominal thickness, mm Number of manways Inside diameter of manways, mm
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NPP Structures
All the systems and equipment of a nuclear power plant are housed in about 30 buildings and structures of different sizes. The major plant structures are grouped into the following:

Nuclear Island Reactor Building

Nuclear Auxiliary Building Fuel Storage Building Electrical Building

Diesel Generator Building

Conventional Island

Turbine Generator Building

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De-mineralized Water Building

Switch Yard
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NPP Structures (Cont)

Balance of Plant

Liquid Radwaste Solidification Building

Solid Radwaste Storage Building Low-level Radwaste Storage House Hot Laundry Boiler House Maintenance Building

Intake Structure
Circulating Cooling Water Pump Station Water Treatment Plant Sewage Treatment Plant Drainage Structure Parking Area Fire Pump Station Cafeteria Guard House Hazard Cargo Storage House Administration Building and Emergency Centre

Warehouse
Control Access Ultimate Heat Sink Essential Services Water Pump Station Outdoor Engineering

Environmental Radiation Monitoring Hut

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Nuclear Power plant Systems

There are about 200 systems in CHASNUPP. These are classified, in accordance with their functions, into following categories:
Reactor Core/Fuel I & C / Computer Systems Radiation Monitoring Systems Communication Systems Common Systems Miscellaneous Systems Nuclear Systems Conventional Systems Electrical Systems Lighting Systems HVAC Systems

NI Systems
CI Systems BOP Systems

109
33 52

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Safety Feature

Engineered safety Feature

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

Containment system which provides the last barrier against the post-accident releases consists of containment structures, containment heat removal system, containment isolation system, and containment combustible gas control system. Containment system is designed such that for all break sizes, up to and including the double-ended severance of a reactor coolant pipe or secondary system pipe, the containment peak pressure remains below the design pressure, with adequate margins and Beyond Design Basis Accidents (BDBA), and it can be reduced to half of the design value in 24 hours by the safeguards system

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Engineered safety Feature

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM

The emergency core cooling system is called the safety injection system (SIS). The SIS is designed to cool the reactor core. It provides the capability of cooling following the initiation of the following accident conditions:

The pipe break of reactor coolant pressure boundary (including the double-ended rupture of the largest reactor coolant pipe) or inadvertent relief valve or safety valve opening in the reactor coolant system which would result in a discharge larger than that could be made up by the normal makeup system. Rupture of a control rod drive mechanism causing a rod cluster control assembly ejection accident. The pipe break of secondary system (including the break of the largest pipe in the secondary system) or inadvertent relief valve or safety valve opening in the secondary system. Rupture of a steam generator tube.

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Engineered safety Feature

HABITABILITY SYSTEMS Habitability Systems are designed to ensure that Control Room operators can remain inside the spaces served by the Main Control habitability Ventilation System during all normal and abnormal station conditions. The Habitability Systems cover all the equipment, supplies, and procedures provided to ensure that Control Room operators are protected from postulated releases of radioactive materials, toxic gases, smoke, and steam. The environments in all spaces served by the Main Control Habitability Ventilation System (Control Room envelope) are controlled within specified limits. The Habitability Systems are designed to support a maximum of seven persons during normal and 30 days abnormal station operating conditions.
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Engineered safety System

FISSION PRODUCT REMOVAL AND CONTROL SYSTEMS Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Filter Systems

The following filtration systems that are required to perform the safety-related functions subsequent to Design-Basis Accident (DBA) and BDBA (SCS only) are provided:

Main Control Habitability Ventilation fresh Air cleaning Units

Primary Nuclear Auxiliary Building Exhaust System:

Fuel Storage Building Emergency Exhaust System:

Containment Spray System

The Containment Spray System (SCS) is designed to remove fission products, primarily elemental iodine, from the containment atmosphere for the purpose of minimizing the offsite radiological consequences following the design-basis loss-of-coolant accident and BDBA. At the same time, the spray water serves to nominally reduce containment temperature and pressure during the injection phase

Fission Product Control Systems

The containment is steel-lined post tensioned pre-stressed concrete cylinder with a shallow dome. The containment is designed to withstand post-accident pressure and temperature and to contain the radioactive material that could be released from a loss of 25 12/5/2011integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.

Enhanced Safety Feature

Enhance Safety Features in C-2 Design

More than 160 design changes incorporated on the basis of feedback from C-1 and some from Qinshan-1. Use of PSA to provide insight into safety of different aspects Severe Accidents Consideration. and Beyond Design Basis Accidents

Development of Symptom based Emergency Operating Procedures (SEOPs) for C-1 & C-2 with the help of designer.

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Major Improvements of CHASNUPP-2 over CHASNUPP-1

DESIGN FEATURES The Reactor Cavity Flooding system Hydrogen concentration monitoring system Passive hydrogen recombination facilities The countermeasure for Heterogeneous Boron Dilution The loose parts monitoring system (LPMS) Installation of motor throttled valve on pressurizer
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TARGET Take water from the Refueling Water Storage Tank can be injected to reactor cavity up to the bottom elevation of lower push-pull rod of RPV in case of severe accident. To provide information about containment hydrogen volumetric concentration continuously. To operate during the event of design basis accident and severe accident. To prevent spurious automatic or manual injection of non-borated water by Anti-Dilution Protection (ADP) signal. To detect loose parts in the primary system as early as possible. The sensor location of LPMS is RPV, SG and RCP. To fulfill the function of overpressure protection and rapid depressurization.
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Severe Accident Management

Detection

Instruments with their limiting capability to meet the Severe Accidents environment
Wide range hydrogen concentration monitoring system

High temperature indicator in the reactor cavity

A motor throttle valve to function during abnormal conditions to prevent high pressure events, to avoid possible direct containment heating and containment failure at early stage Anti-dilution mechanism or interlocks to prevent inadvertent boron dilution in the primary system

Prevention

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Severe Accident Management (Cont.)

Addition of a diverse diesel generator in addition to two EDGs to withstand SBO

Increased design pressure of Residual Heat Removal System piping to prevent IS-LOCA

Mitigation

Reactor Cavity flooding, Cooling Water Injection system to increase possibility of in-vessel corium retention or mitigate exvessel molten corium concrete interaction in case of reactor vessel failure Passive Hydrogen Recombination Facilities Strengthening the containment boundary including the penetrations

SAMGs to be jointly developed by the designer and the utility

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Hydrogen Passive Auto-catalytic Recombiners

Hydrogen generation can be described in three phases.

In-vessel core degradation phase, where large surfaces of metallic zirconium are available and temperature excursion is amplified by the exothermic reaction.
Hydrogen may also be generated during the in-vessel relocation phase according to the failure mode of the lower head, consisting of solidified core material and the lower support plate, and the availability of water in the lower head. Hydrogen will be produced by melt core-concrete interaction (MCCI) in case of RPV failure. Hydrogen passive auto-catalytic recombiners (PAR) have been implemented inside the containment both for DBA and severe accidents instead of the active hydrogen recombiner (used in C-1). The PARs will be arranged at different locations inside the containment and will be able to recombine hydrogen when the concentration of hydrogen is above 2~4 % to avoid hydrogen detonation.
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Cavity Flooding

Increase possibility corium retention

of

in-vessel

The accident management strategy to flood the reactor cavity with refueling water storage tank (RWST) water and submerge the reactor vessel is credited with preventing vessel failure Protection of the integrity of the reactor vessel containing the molten corium by cooling its external surface Lower part of the reactor vessel should be submerged with cooling water

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Loose Part Monitoring System

Loose Part Monitoring System (Including Trouble Analysis System)

LPM007

LPM016

The principal functional requirements of the loose parts monitoring system (LPMS) are to detect loose parts in the primary system as early as possible. Early detection of the loose parts can avoid or mitigate safety-related damage or malfunctions of components in the primary system so as to minimize economic losses.

LPM008 LPM009

LPM01

LPM010 LPM001 LPM002 LPM003

LPM012

LPM013

LPM014

LPM004

LPM005

LPM006

LPM015

Sensor Locations

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Operational Performance (C-1) (upto 30 September, 2009)

100 78.2 75 71 66 67.6 55 60.2 51.6 25 17 0 3 6 11 6 5 3 7 3 3 68.9 68.2 66.4 97.8 85.1 82 74.2 67.1 54.7 51.5 96.4 76.1 69.9

%
50

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Availability F actor C apacity F actor Unplanned O utag es

Operational Performance (C-1)

Cumulative (Since 15 Sep 2000) Reactor Operation, EFPDS Generation, GWh Export, GWh Availability Factor , % Capacity Factor , % After RFO-5 (Since 23 Jan 2009)

2125 17399 16093 72.6 68.7

198 1498 GWh 83% 86.8 % 76.7

Outages, #
Longest Continuous Operation

74(10 Planned)

162 Days (Nov. 17, 2005 ~ April 29, 2006)

Reactor Core Analysis results

CYCLE 1 ICFM Design
CAL MEAS.

CYCLE 2
CAL MEAS.

CYCLE 3
CAL MEAS.

CYCLE 4
CAL MEAS.

CYCLE 5
CAL MEAS.

CYCLE 6
CAL MEAS.

CYCLE 7
CAL MEAS.

Cycle length (EFPD)

485

490

325

332

375

381

403

405

400

401

375

377

377

380

CBC HZP 1297 (ppm) T1 Worth (pcm) Overlap banks worth (pcm)

1335

1321

1298 1477

1447

1567

1508

1447

1467

1457

1453

1474

1461

3068

2987

1321

1229 1907

1808

1405

1366

1710

1776

1771

1801

1590

1628

5566

5530

2510

2235 2368

2110

2928

2765

1952

1803

1708

1654

1574

1571

Periodic Safety Review

(Safe and reliable operation - Ten (10) years of PWRs)

PSR Purpose

The PSR is a tool to carry out a systematic and comprehensive review of the safety case at regular intervals during plant life. Demonstrate that the plant is as safe as originally intended

Obtain an overall view of actual plant safety like ageing effects, Modifications, operating experience feedback, development in technology, etc.
Compare current level of safety with latest standards and state of know-how and identify improvements at justifiable cost Obtain a broad integrated view of current safety of nuclear installations.

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PSR Objectives

Confirm that the plant is as safe as originally intended, conforms to current national safety standards and practices and the licensing basis remains valid and identify areas where safety improvements can be made at justifiable cost.
Determine if there are any structures, systems, or components that could limit the safe operation of the plant in the next ten (10) years. To ascertain the adequacy of arrangements that are in place to maintain plant safety.

Fulfill PNRA requirement for renewal of Operating License for next ten (10) years of operation.
Provide a higher level confidence in safety at national and international level. Maintain and upgrade knowledge base for the plant.
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Review Strategy

Compilation of changes in Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800)

Identification of issues from Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) routine inspections Identification of issues from QA Audit findings and surveillance

Identification of issues from external reviews

Review of each safety factor and gap identification (issues) from current regulations, codes, standards, and current SRP Compilation of issues master list and associated corrective actions Short listing and risk assessment of issues where changes cannot be made Ranking of issues for which corrective actions to be implemented

Approval of corrective action program schedule from PNRA

of corrective actions
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Implementation 12/5/2011

Safety Factors
1.
2.

Plant design
Actual condition of Systems, Structures and Components (SSCs)

10.

Organization and administration

Procedures The human factor Emergency planning Radiological impact on the environment

11. 12. 13. 14.

3.
4. 5.

Equipment qualification
Ageing Deterministic safety analysis

6.
7. 8. 9.

Probabilistic safety analysis

Hazard analysis Safety performance

Use of experience from other plants and research findings

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PSR Corrective Action Plan

Plant Design

Operating procedures changes (inclusion of new steps/configurations) may be analyzed by design group. Severe Accident Management Guideline (SAMGs) development. Severe accident analysis may be carried out based on C-2 FSAR.

Deterministic Safety Analysis

Loose Parts Monitoring System (LPMS) Re-analysis may be carried out for the accident of reactor coolant pump shaft seizure due to change of control rod drop time by considering the effects of earthquake and uncertainties and scram reactivity worth.

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PSR Corrective Action Plan

Probabilistic Safety Analysis Low Power analysis may be considered in PSA Level-1 Plus. Shutdown analysis may be considered in PSA Level-1 Plus. Internal flood analysis may be considered in PSA Level-1 Plus. Internal fire analysis may be considered in PSA Level-1 Plus..
Hazard Analysis Fire Hazard Analysis (FSAR Chapter-9) may be updated. Pipe Whip analysis described in FSAR Chapter-3 may be updated. Containment analysis against aircraft crash

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PSR Corrective Action Plan

Human Factors Develop overall plant level procedure for assessing and monitoring the health and fitness of plant employees. A comprehensive lecture on safety culture may be delivered to all plant personnel on annual basis.
Equipment Qualification Environmental monitoring program for qualified equipment may be developed. Procedure to control list of qualified equipment may be developed. Procedure(s) for analysis of the effects of equipment failures on equipment qualification and appropriate corrective actions and/or safety improvements to maintain equipment qualification may be developed.
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PSR Corrective Action Plan

Ageing Ageing Management Program (AMP) may be developed. Potential ageing degradation that may affect the safety functions of SSCs may be documented. AMP training may be imparted to relevant personnel. Requirement for monitoring of physical condition of AMP SSCs, actual safety margins, and any features that would limit service life may be included in AMP. AMP software & tools may be acquired.

Radiological Impact on the Environment Tritium monitoring may be established. Procedure for estimation of liquid/gaseous/solid waste during RFOs may be developed. Quarterly administrative targets for discharge limits may be 45 12/5/2011 established.

Capabilities

Safe and reliable operation - Ten (10) years of PWRs and forty (40) years of CANDU Design, analysis and engineering of systems and components of Nuclear Island, Conventional Island and Balance of Plant of NPPs.

Design and analysis of nuclear reactor core and fuel, fuel management, thermal hydraulics, safety analysis, accident analysis (design basis and beyond design basis accidents), shielding design and licensing.
Site selection and evaluation, design, analysis of buildings and structures, geotechnical Investigations, and environmental impact assessment of NPPs.

Technical support to operating NPPs for safety significant design changes, criticality and startup, fuel management & operational core analysis, periodic safety review etc.
Structural analysis/design of reactor core and internals and Plant ageing management of NPPs.

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THANK YOU