America Discovers Central Asia Author(s): Charles William Maynes Reviewed work(s): Source: Foreign Affairs, Vol.

82, No. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 2003), pp. 120-132 Published by: Council on Foreign Relations Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20033508 . Accessed: 14/11/2012 12:57
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America Central

Discovers Asia

CbarlesWilliam Maynes

LONG TIME, NO SEE

PRIOR SEPTEMBER 2001, theCentral Asian states of the TO 11, former Soviet Union-Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan-might aswell have been on the other side of the moon as far asU.S. policy was concerned. They were and are everything the United States is not: landlocked,

poor, peripheral, fearful,defenseless,Muslim, and undemocrat

ic. Today, however, they are high on the U.S. foreign policy agenda, and America once again finds itself engaged militarily in an area about which its key officials know little. Almost none speak the critical languages of Central Asia; all too few have relevant

experience there.
Curiously, as different and remote as theUnited States and the Central Asian countries are from one another, their fates have in tersected at least twice before. During the U.S. Civil War, the North's tight trade blockade on the South had an unexpected consequence for Russian textile manufacturers: they suddenly found that they could no longer buy American cotton for their rapidly expanding plants. On learning of their plight, expansion minded Russian officials developed a new rationale for pushing the borders of their empire south: conquering Central Asia, where cotton could grow, would assist the industrialization of

modern Russia.
CHARLES WILLIAM MAYNES isPresident of the Eurasia Foundation andwas Editor of Foreign Policy from 1980 to 1997. [120]

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America Discovers CentralAsia The fate of Central Asia next intersectedwith theUnited States a

when, during theColdWar, American policymakers century later,

realized thatMoscow was locating its nuclear testing and missile launch sites in the region, as far away from prying American eyes

The U.S. interestin the region. This promptedrenewed aspossible.

United States sought military facilities in Iran and Pakistan to monitor Soviet activities in Central Asia. Many pressing for U.S.

supportof radicalIslamic forcesduring the Soviet occupationof would spread into Soviet Afghanistan hoped the religious fervor
Central Asia, as indeed it did. After the fall of the Soviet Union, America's main objective in the region seemed to be to help the Central Asian states gain sufficient confidence and stability to prevent

of any resurgence Russian influence.

But then came September ii, which abruptly brought the United States and Central Asia together much more closely and permanently. One of theworld's richest countries, a state so power ful that itsmilitary and economic reach seems limitless, suddenly began to voice greater concern over developments in one of the world's most remote and powerless regions. Of courseWashington's

heightened interest is understandable.If CentralAsian countries

take thewrong path, it is feared, they may willingly or unwittingly provide sanctuary to the kinds of terrorists that struck the Pentagon and theWorld Trade Center. Indeed, given America's new fears and interests,U.S. involvement inCentral Asia is likely to last longer than official statements suggest. Although theBush administration promises a timely end to themilitary

presencethere, many believe theUnited Stateswill remainengaged

through an enhanced political and military presence for years to come; after all, staying until the "job is done," as the administration has

in promised, means rootingout the conditionsthatbreed terrorism

the first place. And that formidable goal suggests a quasi-permanent U.S. interest inCentral Asia. In becoming the de facto protector and guarantor of the region, theUnited States has an opportunity to play a constructive role that will further its own interests as well as those of the Central Asian states themselves. To succeed, however,Washington will need a crash course in the realities of this complex and troubled region.
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CharlesWilliam Maynes
THE LAY OF THE LAND

CENTRAL ASIA is spread over an area roughly a quarter the size of Russia. The largest country, Kazakhstan, is four times as large as Texas; Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are each about the size of California; and the last two, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, are the size

ofWisconsin andSouthDakota, respectively. Geographicallylarge, the region is also becomingmore importantdemographically. In

most of Central Asia, the birthrate ismore than 20 per thousand, whereas in Russia it is amere 9. Central Asia, at roughly 50 million, is thus stabilized or growing in demographic weight as Russia's population of about 15omillion continues to decline. Economically, the postcommunist era of freemarkets and global ization has not been kind to the region. According to World Bank studies, Central Asia is now much worse off than it was under

All communism. of its fivecountries havesuffered shocking declinesin

health and education standards, and all-except oil-rich Kazakhstan

have suffered disastrous a decline ingrossdomesticproduct.InTajik

istan, the GDPtoday isonly 38 percent ofwhat itwas in 1990.Kyrgyzstan, another orphaned republic,now finds itSGDPa third lower than in 1990. Where economic reform has been attempted, moreover, it has caused a high degree of disruption without much tangible payoff, whereas Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have staved off much of the economic disruption suffered by their neighbors by steadfastly refusing to reform.Uzbekistan, for example, hasmanaged through intransigence to hold its GDPat 96 percent of the 1990 level.The likely long-run cost of this decision to protect the Soviet legacy could be ruinous, however. Little has changed inTurkmenistan orUzbekistan since 1990, and al though the resultmay be less economic disruption in the present, itwill also almost certainlymean less growth in the future. Machinery from the Soviet period is steadilywearing out. And old markets lostwith the disappearance of the Soviet Union are not being replaced. Given this unpromising outlook, some see the new American presence as an unexpected ray of hope. The U.S. military has now stationed 3,ooo U.S. personnel inKyrgyzstan and i,ooo inUzbekistan to operate out of local air bases. The United States provided roughly $580million in aid to the region in fiscalyear 2002, more than doubling
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America Discovers CentralAsia its aid level from the preceding year's $250 million. In addition, Washington has dramatically stepped up its diplomatic involvement by assigning top diplomatic personnel there and sponsoring high level visits bymembers of theCabinet and Congress. It is argued that with this new U.S. commitment, local governments will gain a greater degree of confidence and security andwill have the courage to accept the political risks that reform entails. This theory is about to be tested. But what makes change-or at least a restoration of hope for future change-so crucial is the severity of poverty in the region.More than two-thirds of the Tajik people now live on less than $2 a day. In Kyr gyzstan, nearly half suffer at that level.A full third of Uzbekistan's population lives below the official poverty line. Some might point out that Russia's figures are no better, with a third of its own people in poverty. But at least President Vladimir Putin has been able to restore hope in the future of his country, thanks to the economic reforms he has undertaken. Central Asia, on the other hand, has much less cause

foroptimism.
FROM BAD TO WORSE

AGAINST THIS BLEAKBACKDROP,the governments of Central Asia

face five fundamental challenges:identity, development, water, bor

ders, and security.All are problems that theUnited States will also be forced to confront as the now preeminent military power in the region. Central Asia today is in the process of etching out a new identity, the contours of which are still uncertain. Its peoples accepted Soviet domination only after a bitter resistance that lasted decades. Indeed, some of the same religious forces that so frighten local authorities and West today trace their roots to the earlier resistance against Soviet the

power.Furthermore,thewider local population,now freed from compulsoryatheistic secularism,is returningto its religiousroots. Mosques arespringing Although often fundedby outsidebene up. factors,they fillwith local Meanwhile, the countries' worshippers. mainly holdoversfromSoviet times,are terrified rulers, about such which theypoorlyunderstand. developments, has Their response been repression, which thendrivesresurgent politicalIslamunderground,
making its true strength harder to gauge.
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CharlesWilliam Maynes

Western leaders, by similarly frightened theprospectof resurgent Turkish modelwould hoped that the secular radical Islam,originally
replace the Soviet one inCentral Asia. Indeed,Ankara was encouraged to make a bid for preeminence in the region. The Western gambit failed miserably, however. Turkey did not have the resources to play such an outsized role, and countries in the region would not accept it. Indeed, far from being amodel, Turkey seemed, like the Central Asian states, in need of massive financial support from others. The core issue inCentral Asia today is how the political order can accommodate the rise of Islam.At this point, neither the authorities nor outside powers have an answer or know what this new order will look like.They have already had one chance and failed to explore its

Given America's new fears and interests, U.S. involvement inCentral

Asia is likely to outlast

war, established a coalition government with

Tajikistan is the only Islamic possibilities: countryin the world that,afterabrutalcivil Unfortunately, IslamistsinDecember 1997. the the world largely this ignored experiment,
success of which could have had profound

implications for the way that theWestern

official predictions.

world reacts to resurgentpolitical Islam

elsewhere. The United States relocated its ambassador to a neighboring country for security reasons, and there Western countries towork with the coalition was no sustained effort by government. Still, nongovernmental groups working inCentral Asia report that today Tajikistan is one of themore open countries in the region. The Tajik example could well inform political developments in the region and elsewhere-and should help define Western per ceptions of Islam. Further confounding Central Asia's political future is its currently West has preached stalled economic development. For ten years the market to theCentral Asians.Western experts have thevirtues ofthe free told local leaders that if they undertake the necessary reforms, Western investmentwill follow.Of course, ifmore far-reaching reforms had been adopted, the outlook would be better, at least in the longer run. But there is still little prospect of major Western investment in several of the countries. The region is too remote, the market too

With the exceptionsof fragmented,and the future too uncertain.

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America Discovers CentralAsia oil-rich Kazakhstan and gas-rich Turkmenistan, Western investors have shown little interest inCentral Asia. There are few resources in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, andUzbekistan isone of only two countries in theworld that is doubly landlocked. (The other isLiechtenstein.) Any hope that the blessings of the freemarket will replace any time soon the subsidies that Moscow once poured into the area is probably ill founded, at least for the smaller countries such as Kyrgyzstan or

Tajikistan.(Indeed, Kyrgyzstan, whichworked sohard tobe the first

country in the region to join the World Trade Organization, has seen little return from this bold step.)Although Uzbekistan has the largest population among the five states, outside investment is unlikely to increase there either, even with reform, unless the country manages to break out of its unusual geographic isolation.

Meanwhile, the region's closedborders inaccessibility throt and also

tle development. More liberal economic policies will not compensate adequately for the limited commercial opportunities that exist under current conditions. Young people in the region face increasingly bleak futures. a result, they tend to emigrate, either physically or spiritually, As and crime and drugs arebecoming the preferred sourcesof livelihood.

WATER

SHOWS

THE

WAY

THERE IS NO MAGIC WAY out of Central Asias morass, but two possibilities offer some hope. One is for some outside power or inter national institution to attempt to restore the subsidies thatMoscow

once channeledto the region. This prospectseemshighly unlikely,

however. The other, more practical, approach would be to find ways to induce states in the region to open theirborders tomutually beneficial

developmentand commerce.
Such regional cooperation is essential, for example, to dealing with the region'svery serious water shortage.As poor as Sovietwater practices may have been-and they arewidely condemned for the damage that they did towater levels in the Aral Sea-the collapse of the Soviet Union made water management in the region even worse. Suddenly, a single system became five. Soviet planners looked on Central Asia as a single unit and, in a

rational manner, accordedlow priority to agricultureinTajikistan

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CharlesWilliam Maynes and Kyrgyzstan, where land is poor but water is plentiful. Instead,

they encouraged agriculturaldevelopment further downstream,

where the reverse is true-the land is good but thewater scarce. Today, the two upstream states, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, find

of crucialto theirdown themselvesthe guardians water reservoirs

stream neighbors. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are therefore asked to maintain a system thatbenefits othersmore than themselves, and no one should be surprised that they are reluctant to do so.On their end, the downstream states that have always received water at no cost fail to understand why they should now consider schemes to pay for it. As thewater system that the region inherited falls into disrepair, leakage and evaporation have increased; in response, states now use more water to compensate for unexpected losses.A drought in recent

Washington

needs to

Today, yearshas compoundedthe problem. the regionconsumes150percent morewater

than it should, according to a recent report by

work with Moscow and Beijing to exclude

Central Asia from

CrisisGroup. the International

more and more

As burgeoning populations push statesto

bring land under cultivation,

their water needs will only grow. Between

great-power politics.

and brought 1995 2000, thestatesin theregion seven percentmore landunder cultivation

will be another claimant for the region's And soon there using irrigation. limitedwater. Afghanistan has never drawnmuch water from the com mon river system that divides that country from the rest of Central Asia. But with peace, theAfghans will surely press for a larger share. Making understanding and compromise more difficult is the steady deterioration of the Soviet monitoring systems. Countries have begun to question the exact amount of water that their neighbors are using. And with good reason: Turkmenistan, for example, has sharply in creased the amount of water that it drains from theAmu Dar'ya, with the result that some provinces of Uzbekistan have not receivedwater in several years. Indeed, the situation between Uzbekistan and Turk menistan resembles in some respects the relationship between Iraq and Kuwait: a powerful neighbor to the north contending that its weaker neighbor to the south is unfairly depriving it of an essential natural resource. Under the encouragement of the United Nations
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WADWI

AN

, 1~~~~~~~~~~~
o3 b OZ K I 5 T T A N

DevelopmentProgram,the U.S. Agency forInternational Develop

ment, and other aid agencies, the countries of the region have opened talks about thewater issue.But progress has been slow due to regional mistrust and the uncertain security situation. Further contributing to an atmosphere of insecurity are a number of border disputes. Territorial arguments among nations have a tendency to lead to war, and in Central Asia, border problems acquire a complexity seldom seen anywhere else.Central Asia was once a border less region where themap lines drawn by cartographers were largely

meaningless;todaythose linesdividebrotherfrombrother. Pieces of

one country remain lodged in another. Under Soviet nationality policy, aminority language group in one

republic couldassociate itselfwiththe majoritypopulation another. of

Pockets of Tajiks and Uzbeks inside Kyrgyzstan, for example, were thus considered part of Tajikistan andUzbekistan. Their geographic separation from the "motherland"made no difference in Soviet times

becausebordersthen were only symbolic. No longer. With independence, impoverished Kyrgyzstanfound

itself home to seven ethnic enclaves linked to neighboring states: five toUzbekistan and two toTajikistan. The largest of these, theUzbek populated Sokh, measures 320 square kilometers and ishome tomore than 40,000 people. Other enclaves, however, are as small as half a
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CharlesWilliam Maynes town or a handful of acres. Nonetheless, according to the rules of

modern sovereignty, they are formally partof other states,boasting those states' flags, currencies,and legal systems. Indeed, some of thesecommunitiesfollowthe timezone of theirhome countryrather
than that of the country inwhich they are located.

These smallethnic outpostshave exacerbated larger the problem

of developing a common loyalty within the new state entities that emerged out of the shattered Soviet Union. Take Uzbekistan, for ex ample. A large number of Tajiks live in some of the country's major cities. The central government inTashkent is eager to create a sense of loyalty toward the new Uzbekistan among all the people of the country. But ifUzbekistan also holds on toUzbeks living next door inKyrgyzstan, what message does that send to the Tajiks and others who live inUzbekistan proper?Do they also have a right tomaintain a special relationship with their ethnic homeland? As ifunclear borderswere not troubleenough, the new states must also sortout the problem of economic zones located inone republicbut owned by another.Uzbekistan, for example, has energy leases in neighboring countries thatwere signed during the Soviet period. The countries that now hold the properties under lease feel thatTashkent should pay them a higher rent for these leases.Tashkent, not surprisingly,feels otherwise. To the credit of the new authorities inCentral Asia, they have not allowed strains over border disputes to reach the point of open conflict. True, Uzbekistan, which has the only significantmilitary force in the re gion, has occasionally broughtmilitary pressure to bear against itsneigh bors, but no sustained engagement has taken place. Nonetheless, the tinder ison the ground.At the beginning ofJanuary of this year,violence erupted in one ofthe Tajik enclaves inKyrgyzstanwhen Tajiks destroyed aKyrgyz border crossing and theKyrgyz retaliated against aTajik post. must bewary of letting such The United States, as the region'sguarantor, sparks fly.If a border dispute were to increase tensions in the future-as such disputes have done in the past-the United States must restrain Uzbekistan, the strongestpower in the region, and not look the otherway. Security in the region is complicated by still another factor: the unrest flowing out of Afghanistan. Policymakers in Washington might fearedMoscow's return, but leaders inCentral Asia were more have concerned with the arrival of the Taliban. Assuming theWestern
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America Discovers CentralAsia commitment to solving theAfghan problem remains firm and begins to bear fruit-as yet an uncertain assumption-the security of Central Asia could dramatically improve. Such progresswould remove some of the arguments advanced against greater pluralism,more open borders, and easier trade regimes.At that point, however, the regionwill face a new security challenge, this time involving severalmajor powers. If, as seems likely, U.S. forces remain in the region for the foreseeable future, it is almost inevitable that tensions among the larger powers over this presence will begin to grow. A rift is already evident in the Moscow's decision to bless theAmerican presence deep resentment that in Central Asia has generated within the Russian military. But the more serious concern is going to come from China. From Beijing's perspective, the entrenchment of an American military presence in Central Asia could appear a form of encirclement. The United States already has bases in Japan and South Korea andmaintains an implicit security relationship with Taiwan. A growing U.S. military presence inCentral Asia could look to Beijing like a new threat from the east. If tensions over Taiwan were to grow, Chinese suspicions over the real American objectives inCentral Asia would mount. It is therefore important that Washington work with Moscow and

Beijing to exclude this regionfromgreat-power politics.The three

major powers should strike a clear understanding about what kind of military presence the United States will maintain in the region. Washington should make the U.S. presence theremore transparent aswell as look forways towork with theRussian andChinese militaries to address some of the other local security threats.

TAMING THE TIGER

CENTRAL ASIA, an area long on the farthestmargins of U.S. interest, is now at the center of Washington's concerns. The United States has established amilitary presence in Uzbekistan andKyrgyzstan and has sharply increased aid and diplomatic involvement.Yet it could still end up riding a tiger. The governments ofthe region are all authoritarian and

increasingly from theirown populations. estranged Washington thus

runs the risk that itwill be perceived as favoring these governments and an unsatisfactory status quo. As currents below the surface carry these
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CharlesWilliam Maynes

the Islamicidentities, United societies closerandcloserto theirearlier

States may find itself in the position of appearing to oppose thewishes of themajority of the populations. There is no easy way out of this quagmire. The principal Islamist

otherworldly, movementsin theregion advocate policiesthatseemeither when theIslamic Movementof unacceptable, troubling: or otherworldly,
Uzbekistan (IMu) and theHizb ut-Tahrir (HT) call for the unification of the entire Islamic world community under a restored Caliphate; unacceptable, when the IMUseeks the violent overthrow of the current

governmentinTashkent;and troubling, because theHT,although it of advocatesthepeacefulseizure power,holds extremely conservative

views about the roleofwomen in society, isvirulently anti-Israel, and has no realprogram to solve social or other governmental problems.

challenges must boldly and The United States thusfacesenormous

More precisely, theUnited States rethink theway to engage this region.

a visionof regionalism shouldconsidertwostrategies: promoting larger

and exploring possible ways to reconcile democracy and Islam.Here, a look back at history provides some insight.Americans like to think that itwas their generosity under theMarshall Plan alone that enabled the World War II.Yet 8o percent of Europeans to stand on their feet after the capital invested in the decisive postwar years was European, not American. Washington's realcontribution was in insisting that itwould not provide aid unless Europeans agreed towork together. The United States and other donors should follow a similar approach inCentral Asia. Just as Western Europeans had, in the end, largely to fund themselves, sowill Central Asians. ButWestern aid could again be critical at themargin and, if coordinated, could push the states towork with one another in a regional context.Up to this point,Western aid has been parceled out among the various claimants,which denies the donors regional leverage.And among the five states themselves, most of the efforts at regional cooperation have been more talk than reality. For awider regional effort to succeed, the outside world will need to stop viewing Central Asia through a colonialist lens. Because of the Russia and imperialBritain, Central Asia was cut strugglebetween tsarist off for nearly 150years from its cultural neighbors to the south. Today Central Asia should rightly be seen as a region that reaches beyond the five states of the former Soviet Union to include neighboring
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America Discovers CentralAsia Afghanistan, Iran, and perhaps even Pakistan. There will be objections to such a proposal.U.S. policymakers are reluctant to engage Iranwith out further reform there.As long as that hesitation remains, awider regional approach could startwith the five Central Asian states and Afghanistan, with Iran joining onlywhen ready. Turkey obviously has a role to play in such an effort, since severalof the states in the region have strong linguistic ties to it, but Ankara these days ismore interested in joining the European Union than in being seen as part of Central Asia. Pakistan,which offers another outlet to the sea, might have the same kind of association asTurkey-an interested friend and economic partner. If theUnited States begins to view the problems of the area from awider regional perspective and, startingwith the fiveCentral Asian states andAfghanistan, encourages states towork together, theymay all be able tomake more progress in resolving themany pressing bor der and water issues they face. Furthermore, in the broader regional context, themarket is larger, the trade rootsmore historically based, and the pool of outside money to gain leveragemore considerable. With Genghis Khan and Tamerlane at the core of localmythol ogy, Central Asia appears to offer little fertile ground for democracy. The trademarks of the region are intrigue and military mastery, not compromise and concessions, and decades of Soviet rule further entrenched such authoritarian traditions. Yet itwould be wrong to condemn the region to a nondemocratic dungeon, not least because themajority of itspeople want to join themodern world. Moreover, the region already boasts individualswho speak out for greater tolerance, more freedom, and the ruleof law, and they should be encouraged. Unfortunately, the ground is not prepared for any local reformers to reach positions of power in the foreseeable future. Work must be done to reconcile Islam and democracy, and Western countries must make this goal a priority if they hope to co-exist with the political forces likely to dominate the region. Here again the West could take a page from its past. In the postwar period, Western governments attempted to reconcile democracy and communism by enabling communists to enter the system at the local levelwhile barring them, at least for a probationary period, from participation in national gov ernment. The entry of communist candidates into office at the local level introduced them to the complexities of governing amodern
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CharlesWilliam Maynes political system. It also confirmed in theminds of the voters that the communists had no magic answers to the problems of governance. InCentral Asia, the problem is complex: because the IMUadvocates

violenceto achieveitsends, it isdifficultto feelcomfortable endorsing itsparticipationin thepolitical system.In contrast,theHT, despite
some objectionable features of its platform, does propose to reach power peacefully. The West should urge the region's leaders to open local government to electoral challenge and to allow all parties seeking peaceful change to take part. Perhaps itwill turn out thatmore radical

Islamists enjoylittlesupport. Even if theydo garnerelectoral support,

however, Islamic forcesmay gradually develop a stake in the system, so thatwhen they do finally enter national government, itwill constitute an act of inclusion, not revolution.

In all theseefforts, Washingtonmust showpatience. During the

Cold War, theUnited States developed long-run policies that took years to bear fruit.Washington subsidized the study of the Russian and Chinese languages, for example; it encouraged exchanges, supported the development of scholarly centers for the study of communist societies, andwas prepared militarily but kept its powder dry. It was cautious in the use of force and developed programs to reach out to local elites. The time has come to adopt a similar approach toward Islam, particularly inCentral Asia. Needed are special programs to support American students in the study of local languages.Western countries should reach out not only to secular forceswith which they are com fortable but also to leaders who are likely to rise to positions of influence in the religious parties.Meanwhile, U.S. assistance programs need to avoid the deadening hand of the region's unreformed gov ernments and reach directly into local communities. Such an approach might enable the United States to manage its engagement inCentral Asia more happily than it has managed its Muslim world. Itmay well permit presence inmany other parts of the theUnited States to accomplish through cooperation and diplomacy what itwill find difficult to achieve by force. Finally, itmight provide West and Islammore generally, one of the lessons for reconciling the critical issues of the age.Now is the time and Central Asia is the place for the United States to develop a set of policies appropriate to the new challenges of the post-September ii world.0
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