201 SCRA 210, 1991 FACTS Monsod was nominated by President Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC

on April 25, 1991. Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsods nomination, petitioner filed a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void because Monsod did not meet the requirement of having practiced law for the last ten years. ISSUE: Whether or not Monsod satisfies the requirement of the position of Chairman of the COMELEC. HELD: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he: . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. Atty. Monsods past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyerlegislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. IN RE: CUNANAN FACTS OF THE CASE: In the manner of the petitions for Admission to the Bar of unsuccessful candidates of 1946 to 1953; Albino Cunanan et. al petitioners. In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as R.A. 972 popularly known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953. Generally a candidate is deemed passed if he obtains a general ave of 75% in all subjects w/o falling below 50% in any subject, although for the past few exams the passing grades were changed depending on the strictness of the

correcting of the bar examinations (1946- 72%, 1947- 69%, 1948- 70% 1949-74%, 1950-1953 75%). Believing themselves to be fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by the S.C., and feeling that they have been discriminated against, unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentages lower than those admitted to the bar went to congress for, and secured in 1951 Senate Bill no. 12, but was vetoed by the president after he was given advise adverse to it. Not overriding the veto, the senate then approved senate bill no. 372 embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. The bill then became law on June 21, 1953 Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparations. By and large, the law is contrary to public interest since it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had inadequate preparation for the practice of law profession, as evidenced by their failure in the exams. ISSUES OF THE CASE: Due to the far reaching effects that this law would have on the legal profession and the administration of justice, the S.C. would seek to know if it is CONSTITUTIONAL. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of the law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. The Judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring, and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial. The Constitution, has not conferred on Congress and the S.C. equal responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. The primary power and responsibility which the constitution recognizes continue to reside in this court. Its retroactivity is invalid in such a way, that what the law seeks to cure are not the rules set in place by the S.C. but the lack of will or the defect in judgment of the court, and this power is not included in the power granted by the Const. to Congress, it lies exclusively w/in the judiciary. Reasons for UNCONSTITUTIONALITY: 1. There was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court. 2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of the court, and only the S.C. may revise or alter them, in attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the Constitution. 3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and supplement the rules on admission to the bar (since the rules made by congress must elevate the profession, and those rules promulgated are considered the bare minimum.) 4. It is a class legislation 5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of art. 1, the entire law is void.

HELD: Under the authority of the court: 1. That the portion of art. 1 of R.A. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952 and all of art. 2 of the said law are unconstitutional and therefore void and w/o force and effect. 2. The part of ART 1 that refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law (1953- 1955) is valid and shall continue in force. (those petitions by the candidates who failed the bar from 1946 to 1952 are denied, and all the candidates who in the examination of 1953 obtained a GEN Ave. of 71.5% w/o getting a grade of below 50% in any subject are considered as having passed whether they have filed petitions for admissions or not.) 16 07 2010 PCGG v SANDIGANBAYAN *kalokohan na kaso to, 140++ pages (disclaimer) main decision 28 pages lang ** merong history of Rule 6.03 and other historical stuff sa case Facts: 1976: General Bank & Trust Company (Genbank) encountered financial difficulties. Central Bank extended loans to Genbank in the hope of rehabilitating it (P310M). Nonetheless, Genbank failed to recover. 1977: Genbank was declared insolvent. A public bidding of Genbanks assets was held with the Lucio Tan Group winning the bid. Solicitor General Mendoza, representing the government, intervened with the liquidation of Genbank. 1986: after EDSA I, Cory established the PCGG to recover the ill-gotten wealth of Marcos, his family and cronies. 1987: PCGG filed a case against Lucio Tan and certain other people (basta marami sila). In relation to this case, PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the respondents by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with Marcos. Sandiganbayan heard the case. Estelito Mendoza (Solicitor General during the time of Marcos) represented the respondents. 1991: PCGG filed a motion to disqualify Mendoza, because of his participation in the liquidation of Genbank. Genbank (now Allied Bank) is one of the properties that PCGG is seeking to be sequestered from the Lucion Tan group. PCGG invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Sandiganbayan denied PCGGs motion. According to the Sandiganbayan, Mendoza did not take an adverse position to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank. And Mendozas appearance as counsel was beyond the 1 year prohibitory period since he retired in 1986. Issue: W/N Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility apllies to Estelito Mendoza

Held: No, it does not apply to Mendoza. Sandiganbayan decision is affirmed. The matter (see 3rd note), or the act of Mendoza as Solicitor General is advising the Central Bank on how to proceed with the liquidation of Genbank. This is not the matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The matter involved in the liquidation of Genbank is entirely different from the matter involved in the PCGG case against the Lucio Tan group. The intervention contemplated in Rule 6.03 should be substantial and important. The role of Mendoza in the liquidation of Genbank is considered insubstantial. SC is even questioning why PCGG took such a long time to revive the motion to disqualify Mendoza. Apparently, PCGG already lost a lot of cases against Mendoza. Kyles interpretation: PCGG getting desperate Something to think about: SC is somehow of the opinion that Rule 6.03 will make it harder for the government to get good lawyers in the future to work for them because of the prohibition of accepting cases in the future that were related to ones work as a government counsel. Concurring Opinions: Panganiban & Carpio: the congruent interest prong of Rule 6.03 should have a prescriptive period Tinga: Rule 6.03 cannot apply retroactively to Mendoza (when he was Solicitor General, no Rule 6.03 yet) Bottom line, they are all questioning the unfairness of the rule if applied without any prescriptive period and if applied retroactively Notes: Adverse-interest conflicts where the matter in which the former government lawyer represents a client in private practice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while employed with the government and the interests of the current and former are adverse Congruent-interest conflicts the use of the word conflict is a misnomer, it does not involve conflicts at all, as it prohibits lawyers from representing a private person even if the interests of the former government client and the new client are entirely parallel Matter any discrete, isolatable act as well as indentifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular situation and specific party Intervention interference that may affect the interests of others Lawyers in government; when allowed to practise. In the case of FELIPE E. ABELLA vs. ATTY. ASTERIA E. CRUZABRA, A.C. No. 5688, June 4, 2009, the Supreme Court found Atty. Asteria E. Cruzabra guilty of engaging in notarial practice without the written authority from the Secretary of the Department of Justice, and accordingly it REPRIMANDED her. She was warned that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall merit a more severe sanction. The Court further held, thus:

1. Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 provides: Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful: xxx (b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not: xxx (2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; or xxx 2. Memorandum Circular No. 17 of the Executive Department allows government employees to engage directly in the private practice of their profession provided there is a written permission from the Department head. It provides: The authority to grant permission to any official or employee shall be granted by the head of the ministry or agency in accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules, which provides: Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of Department; Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government: Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, the time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the chief of the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the other officer or employee: And provided, finally, That no permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve any real or apparent conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or become an officer or member of the board of directors, Subject to any additional conditions which the head of the office deems necessary in each particular case in the interest of the service, as expressed in the various issuances of the Civil Service Commission. (Boldfacing supplied) 3. It is clear that when respondent filed her petition for commission as a notary public, she did not obtain a written permission from the Secretary of the DOJ. Respondents superior, the Register of Deeds, cannot issue any authorization because he is not the head of the Department. And even assuming that the Register of Deeds authorized her, respondent failed to present any proof of that written permission. Respondent cannot feign ignorance or good faith because respondent filed her petition for commission as a notary public after Memorandum Circular No. 17 was issued in 1986.

4. In Yumol, Jr. v. Ferrer Sr., we suspended a lawyer employed in the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) for failing to obtain a written authority and approval with a duly approved leave of absence from the CHR. We explained: Crystal clear from the foregoing is the fact that private practice of law by CHR lawyers is not a matter of right. Although the Commission allows CHR lawyers to engage in private practice, a written request and approval thereof, with a duly approved leave of absence for that matter are indispensable. In the case at bar, the record is bereft of any such written request or duly approved leave of absence. No written authority nor approval of the practice and approved leave of absence by the CHR was ever presented by respondent. Thus, he cannot engage in private practice. As to respondents act of notarizing documents, records show that he applied for commission as notary public on 14 November 2000, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 42. This was granted by RTC Executive Judge Pedro M. Sunga, Jr., on 01 December 2000. However, the CHR authorized respondent to act as notary public only on 29 October 2001. Considering the acts of notarization are within the ambit of the term practice of law, for which a prior written request and approval by the CHR to engage into it are required, the crucial period to be considered is the approval of the CHR on 29 October 2001 and not the approval of the RTC on 04 December 2000. 5. In Muring, Jr. v. Gatcho, we suspended a lawyer for having filed petitions for commission as a notary public while employed as a court attorney. We held: Atty. Gatcho should have known that as a government lawyer, he was prohibited from engaging in notarial practice, or in any form of private legal practice for that matter. Atty. Gatcho cannot now feign ignorance or good faith, as he did not seek to exculpate himself by providing an explanation for his error. Atty. Gatchos filing of the petition for commission, while not an actual engagement in the practice of law, appears as a furtive attempt to evade the prohibition. 6. Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, engaging in the private practice of profession, when unauthorized, is classified as a light offense punishable by reprimand.

Case Digest on People v. Hon. Bonifacio Maceda January 24, 2000 November 26, 2010

This case stems from denial by the SC of the Peoples motion seeking reconsideration of our August 13, 1990 decision holding that respondent Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of August 8, 1989 giving custody over private respondent Avelino T. Javellana to the Clerk of Court of the Antique RTC, Atty. Deogracias del Rosario, during the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355. At that time, sufficient reason was

shown why Javellana should not be detained at the Antique Provincial Jail. The trial courts order specifically provided for private respondents detention at the residence of Atty. del Rosario. However, private respondent was not to be allowed liberty to roam around but was to be held as detention prisoner in said residence. It was howevere found that the order was not strictly complied with because Javellana was not detained in the residence of Atty. Del Rosario. He went about his normal activities as if he were a free man, including engaging in the practice of law. Held: Private respondent Javellana has been arrested based on the filing of criminal cases against him. By such arrest, he is deemed to be under the custody of the law. The trial court gave Atty. Deogracias del Rosario the custody of private respondent Javellana with the obligation to hold and detain him in Atty. del Rosarios residence in his official capacity as the clerk of court of the regional trial court. Hence, when Atty. del Rosario was appointed judge, he ceased to be the personal custodian of accused Javellana and the succeeding clerk of court must be deemed the custodian under the same undertaking. As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. ATTY. MISAEL M. LADAGA A.M. No. P-99-1287 January 26, 2001 Facts: Atty. Misael Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, appeared as counsel for and in behalf of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, an accused in Criminal Case No. 84-885 for Falsification of Public Documents before the METC of Quezon City. It is also denied that the appearance of said respondent in said case was without the previous permission of the Court. During the occasions that the respondent appeared as such counsel before the METC of Quezon City, he was on official leave of absence. Moreover, his Presiding Judge, Judge Napoleon Inoturan was aware of the case he was handling. Respondent appeared as pro bono counsel for his cousin-client Narcisa Ladaga. Respondent did not receive a single centavo from her. Helpless as she was and respondent being the only lawyer in the family, he agreed to represent her out of his compassion and high regard for her.

This is the first time that respondent ever handled a case for a member of his family who is like a big sister to him. He appeared for free and for the purpose of settling the case amicably. Furthermore, his Presiding Judge was aware of his appearance as counsel for his cousin. On top of this, during all the years that he has been in government service, he has maintained his integrity and independence. He failed to obtain a prior permission from the head of the Department. The presiding judge of the court to which respondent is assigned is not the head of the Department contemplated by law. Issue: WON Atty. Ladaga, upon such several appearances, was engages into private practice? NO Held: Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees which prohibits civil servants from engaging in the private practice of their profession. A similar prohibition is found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which disallows certain attorneys from engaging in the private practice of their profession. THERE WAS NO PRIVATE PRACTICE: In People vs. Villanueva: Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, N.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding ones self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S. E. 522, 98 N. C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the isolated instances when respondent appeared as pro bono counsel of his cousin in Criminal Case No. 84885 does not constitute the private practice of the law profession contemplated by law. DECISION: Reprimanded. Aguirre vs. Rana, 403 SCRA 342 (2003) DOCTRINES: Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession

Having held himself out as counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court. It is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. THE CASE: Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for membership in the legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than possession of legal learning. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar examinations. FACTS: Respondent Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation. The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking. However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyers oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now. Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate and filed with the MBEC a pleading where he represented himself as counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan,and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan. On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body. On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan without

the latter engaging respondents services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate. On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the lawyers oath but disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him. In the same resolution, the Court required respondent to comment on the complaint against him. In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific assistance to represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law. Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an attorney in the pleading. On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that he submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of the Certification of Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the complaint is politically motivated considering that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys. On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents Comment and refuted the claim of respondent that his appearance before the MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao filed a petition for proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel before the MBEC, complainant questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was an employee of the government. Respondent filed a Reply reiterating his claim that the instant administrative case is motivated mainly by political vendetta. On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation. OBCs Report and Recommendation The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyers oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC believes that respondents misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that respondents unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law. The OBC therefore recommends that respondent be denied admission to the Philippine Bar.

On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which respondent allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a government employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and his resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan to represent him before the MBEC. HELD: We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar. Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the lawyers oath. In the pleading entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for George Bunan. In the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated that he was the(U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T . BUNAN. Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him before the MBEC and similar bodies. On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also retained respondent as her counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the said party. Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was entering his appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of law without being a member of the Philippine Bar. In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, the Court elucidated that: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law, incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal

mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied) x x x In Cayetano v. Monsod, the Court held that practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill. Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself counsel knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar. The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license. The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran,Jr. v Abad, a candidate passed the bar examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court. True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a fullfledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-atlaw. Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow respondent to act as counsel for a private client in any court or administrative body since respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan. Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts complained of as constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that he was resigning effective upon your acceptance. Vice-Mayor Relox accepted respondent's resignation effective 11

May 2001. Thus, the evidence does not support the charge that respondent acted as counsel for a client while serving as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan. On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law. WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar. Catu vs. Rellosa [A.C. No. 5738. February 19, 2008] 16 Aug Ponente: CORONA, J. FACTS: Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot and the building erected thereon located in Manila. His mother and brother contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu and Antonio Pastor of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay. Respondent, as punong barangay, summoned the parties to conciliation meetings. When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in the (subsequent ejectment) case. Complainant filed the instant administrative complaint, claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Rellosa violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. HELD: YES. Respondent suspended for six (6) months. RATIO: [R]espondent was found guilty of professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission of the head of the department concerned in accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules.

Respondent was strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza. Spouses OLBES VS. Atty. VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE AC-5365. April 27, 2005 Facts: Atty. Victor V. Deciembre was given five blank checks by Spouses Olbes for security of a loan. After the loan was paid and a receipt issued, Atty. Deciembre filled up four of the five checks for P50, 000 with different maturity date. All checks were dishonored. Thus, Atty. Deciembre fled a case for estafa against the spouses Olbes. This prompted the spouses Olbes to file a disbarment case against Atty. Deciembre with the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court. In the report, Commissioner Dulay recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Issue: Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Deciembre was in accord with his fault. Held: Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with conditions. It is bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law, but also known to possess good moral character. A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which he has sworn to be a fearless crusader. By taking the lawyers oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice. Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the publics faith in the legal profession. It is also glaringly clear that the Code of Professional Responsibility was seriously transgressed by his malevolent act of filling up the blank checks by indicating amounts that had not been agreed upon at all and despite respondents full knowledge that the loan supposed to be secured by the checks had already been paid. His was a brazen act of falsification of a commercial document, resorted to for his material gain. Deception and other fraudulent acts are not merely unacceptable practices that are disgraceful and dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct that merely enables one to escape the penalties of criminal laws. Considering the depravity of the offense committed by respondent, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP of suspension for two years from the practice of law to be too mild. His propensity for employing deceit and misrepresentation is reprehensible. His misuse of the filled-up checks that led to the detention of one petitioner is loathsome. Thus, he is sentenced suspended indefinitely from the practice of law effective immediately. PARTIES ALAWI, sales rep of E.B. Villarosa ALAUYA, incumbent executive clerk of court FACTS Through ALAWIS agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by ALAUYA of a housing unit

A housing loan was also granted to ALAUYA by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) Subsequently, ALAUYA wrote a letter to the President of Villarosa advising termination of his contract on the grounds that his consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by ALAWI and proceeded to expound using acerbic language A copy of the letter, which bore no stamps, was sent to the VP of Villarosa ALAUYA also wrote the NHMFC repudiating as void his contract with Villarosa and asking for cancellation of his loan Finally, ALAUYA wrote 3 other letters to officers of the SC to stop deductions from his salary regarding the loan from NHMFC NHMFC also wrote the SC requesting it to stop said deductions Learning of the letters, ALAWI filed a complaint alleging that ALAUYA o Committed malicious and libelous charges o Usurped the title of attorney

ISSUE W/N ALAUYA VIOLATED THE CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES HELD YES, PARTICULARLY SECTION 4

RATIO Section 4 public officials and employees at all times respect the rights of others, and refrain from doing acts contrary to law, public order, public safety and public interest ALAUYA, being a member of the Sharia Bar and an officer of the Court, may not use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing or otherwise improper His radical deviation from these norms cannot be excused ISSUE W/N ALAUYA BEING A MEMBER OF THE SHARIA BAR CAN USE THE TITLE ATTORNEY HELD NO, RESERVED ONLY FOR THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN ADMITTED AS MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR RATIO Court has already had an occasion to declare that persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar and may practice law only before Sharia courts ALAUYAS wish of not using counsellor because of confusion with councilor is immaterial because disinclination to use said title does not warrant his use of the title attorney People vs. Santocildes, Jr. [G.R. No. 109149. December 21, 1999.] Post under case digests, Legal Ethics at Monday, February 20, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts: On February 17, 1992, appellant was charged with the crime of rape of a girl less than 9 years old. Appellant contends that he was represented during trial by a person named Gualberto C. Ompong, who for all intents and purposes acted as his counsel and even conducted the direct examination and cross-examinations of the witnesses. On appeal, however, appellant secured the services of a new lawyer, Atty. Igmedio S. Prado, Jr., who discovered that Gualberto C. Ompong is actually not a member of the bar. Appellant therefore argues that his deprivation of the right to counsel should necessarily result in his acquittal of the crime charged. The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, maintains that notwithstanding the fact that appellant's counsel during trial was not a member of the bar, appellant was afforded due process since he has been given an opportunity to be heard and the records reveal that said person "presented the evidence for the defense with the ability of a seasoned lawyer and in general handled the case of appellant in a professional and skillful manner." Issue: Whether or not the accused was deprived, though no fault of his own, to be defended by a person authorized to practice law amounting to denial of due process. Held: The right to counsel of an accused is enshrined in Article III, Sections 12 and 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution. Such right is guaranteed to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial system where the accused is pitted against the awesome prosecutory machinery of the State. Such a right proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which basically means that a person must be heard before being condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a person's basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily. Hence, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of conviction and ordered the remand of the case to the trial court for new trial. The Supreme Court also directed the IBP to investigate Ompong's unauthorized practice of law. Rey Vargas, et al. vs. Atty. Michael Ignes, et al., A.C. No. 8096, July 5, 2010. Post under Legal Ethics, villarama doctrines at Thursday, December 01, 2011 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind Attorney; engagement of private counsel by GOCC. In Phividec Industrial Authority v. Capitol Steel Corporation, we listed three (3) indispensable conditions before a GOCC can hire a private lawyer: (1) private counsel can only be hired in exceptional cases; (2) the GOCC must first secure the written conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel, as the case may be; and (3) the written concurrence of the COA must also be secured. Failure to comply with all three conditions would constitute appearance without authority. A lawyer appearing after his authority as counsel had expired is also appearance without authority. Rey Vargas, et al. vs. Atty. Michael Ignes, et al., A.C. No. 8096, July 5, 2010.

LEMOINE v BALON FACTS: Lemoine is a French national who filed an insurance claim with Metropolitan Insurance. His friend Jesus Garcia arranged for the engagement of Balons services as his counsel Balon advised Lemoine that he was charging 25% of the actual amount to being recovered payable upon successful recovery. An advance payment of P50,000 to be deducted from whatever amount would be successfully collected. P1,000 as appearance and conference fee for each and every court hearing and legal expenses and other miscellaneous will be charged to Lemoines account which would be reimbursed upon presentment of account. Lemoine never gave his consent as to the fee. Lemoine signed an undated Special Power of Attorney authorizing Balon to bring any action against Metropolitan Insurance for the satisfaction of Lemoines claim as well as to negotiate, sign, compromise, encash and receive payments Metropolitan Insurance offered to settle Lemoines claim and Balon confirmed his acceptance of the offer December 1998, Metropolitan Insurance issued a China Bank check payable to Lemoine in the amount of P525,000 which was received by Balon When Lemoine asked Balon as to the status of the case, Balon answered that Metropolitan Insurance was offering P350,000 for settlement which Lemoine suggested that Balon accept to avoid litigation December 1999, Lemoine visited the office of Metropolitan Insurance to ask on the status of the case and it answered that the case was long settled via a check given to Balon. Balon acknowledge that he is in possession of the check and that he is keeping the check as attorneys lien pending Lemoines payment of his attorneys fee equivalent to 50% of the entire amount collected. He also threatened Lemoine that he will not hesitate to make proper representation with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, DOLE and BIR if Lemoine will make any trouble to Balon and that he has good network with the mentioned agencies. Balon later claimed that he gave P233,000 to Garcia on the representation of Lemoine. No written memorandum of the turn-over was made because Garcia was a co-Rotarian and co-attorney of Balon Balon was in possession of the said check for 5 years ISSUE: W/N Balon violated the Code of Professional Responsibility HELD: YES! And he was ordered disbarred by the SC The lawyers continuing exercise of his retaining lien presupposes that the client agrees with the amount of attorneys fees to e charged. In case of disagreement, however, the lawyer must not arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to the payment of his fees. He can file the necessary action with the proper court to fix the fees

Before receiving the check, he proposes a 25% attorneys fees, after receiving the check, he was already asking for 50%. under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful acts , must observe fairness in all his dealings with his client and must hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client a lawyer who practices deceit in his dealings with his client not only violates his duty of fidelity loyalty and devotion to the clients cause but also degrades himself and besmirches the name of an honorable profession.