Family Law Project Work

JUDICIAL OPINION REGARDING CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE REMEDY OF RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS

INTRODUCTION
Our marriage laws recognize a concept called the restitution of conjugal rights. Restitution of conjugal rights is a remedy by which a person can obtain a direction from the court against his spouse who is living separately, to the effect that she must live with him and carry out her obligations as his wife. Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 embodies the concept of Restitution of Conjugal Rights under which after solemnization of marriage if one of the spouses abandons the other, the aggrieved party has a legal right to file a petition in the matrimonial court for restitution of conjugal rights. This right can be granted to any of the spouse. This section is identical to Section 22 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954. The provision is in slightly different wordings in the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936, but it has been interpreted in such a manner that it has been given the same meaning as under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and the Special Marriage Act, 1954. However, the provision is different under the section 32 Indian Divorce Act, 1869 but efforts are being made to give it such an interpretation so as to bring it in consonance with the other laws. The provision under Muslim law is almost the same as under the modern Hindu law, though under Muslim law and under the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936 a suit in a civil court has to be filed and not a petition as under other laws The provisions for restitution of conjugal rights are similar in the personal laws. They provide that where a person without reasonable excuse or lawful ground "withdraws from the society" or "deserts or stops cohabiting with" her spouse or "neglects to perform the obligations imposed by

marriage," the court can direct that such obligations be resumed. The personal laws also provide that where the person has a reasonable excuse for not living with her spouse, the court will not issue directions for resumption of the marital relationship.1 While "reasonable excuse" need not be the same grounds on which a divorce would be granted, provisions such as these are founded upon and are enforced upon norms of behaviour and dynamics in a marital relationship and upon what is normally expected of the husband and wife. In most instances, these cases are initiated by the husband against the wife. Many cases under these provisions are filed on the husband's insistence that the wife must live with the husband on terms and conduct determined by him, such as giving up her employment which is in a different city, compliance with lifestyle choices made by him, etc. While restitution of conjugal rights is a remedy, which cannot be physically enforced by the law, there is provision for attachment of the property of the erring spouse or for payment of money to compel enforcement under Order 21 Rule 32 of the Civil Procedure Code. This is a form of judicial coercion intended to safeguard the institution of marriage especially in cases where a marriage is on the verge of collapsing. This remedy, which is recognized in all personal laws and in the Special Marriage Act, 1954, is based on a fallacy that the law can compel and force a relationship. This remedy also raises a basic issue of whether law should force an unwilling partner to live with her spouse. Ought law to force a person to live with his/her spouse, and be subject to a marital relationship when he/she does not want to? A marriage, as we understand, is a relationship of sharing and trust, and a compulsion that the parties live together, against their will, as spouses negates this. This law of physical restitution of a marital relationship enforces bondage, especially for a woman. The legality of this provision was considered by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of T. Sareetha v. T. Venkata Subbaiah in 1983, where the restitution provisions were challenged by a woman as violating her fundamental rights. The High Court agreed and said, "A decree of restitution of conjugal rights constitutes the grossest form of violation of an individual's rights to privacy. A State coercion of this nature can neither prolong nor preserve the voluntary union of husband and wife. Neither the State coercion can clear the misunderstanding between the parties."

www.hindu.com/mp/2007/01/06/stories/2007010600810200.htm

Despite this clear and unequivocal reasoning, the law of restitution of conjugal rights remains on the statute books in India. In England, where this provision originated, the law has been repealed.2 At this juncture this project intends to look at the various judicial opinions on this topic in recent times and to understand the present opinion on the constitutionality of the remedy of restitution of Conjugal Rights.

DIFFERENT JUDICIAL OPINIONS PREVAILING

Like any controversial topic, there are two views regarding the constitutionality of the remedy of restitution of conjugal rights. One school of thought advocates that the remedy of restitution is unconstitutional as it renders the woman a captive in the hands of her husband who is unwilling to part company with her. This school of thought believes that the remedy of restitution of conjugal rights is violative of Articles 14 and 21 and hence violative of Part III of the Constitution. As per Article 13 of the Constitution of India, any law violative of Part III of the Constitution is null and void and hence the remedy of restitution of conjugal rights is null and void. This school may be referred to as the abolitionist view. This view was first propounded by Justice P.A. Choudary3 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the year 1983 while hearing the matter of T. Sareetha v. T. Venkata Subbaiah.4 The abolitionists argue that it is a remedy that was unknown to Hindu law till the British introduced it in the name of social reforms. Even when the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 was being passed in the Parliament, there were voices of scepticism regarding the efficacy of this remedy. Sir J. Hannen in Russell v. Russell also vehemently opposed the remedy. Further, they are of the view any law that forces any person to live with another person is contrary to the value of the society. The remedy openly violates the fundamental right to life, privacy and equality hence is unconstitutional. Further more, there is frequently insincerity in the petitioner's intention. The remedy is blatantly misused to achieve ulterior purposes other than reconciliation, the root cause being S.13 (1-A)(ii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and has created an additional ground of divorce. Yet another major problem
2

www.lawreform.ie/publications/data/volume3/lrc_22.html http://hc.ap.nic.in/aphc/pacj.html AIR 1983 AP 356

with restitution petitions is that it is used as a defence for maintenance suits. This remedy has been repeatedly misused, abused and exploited. Adding more, the procedure prescribed to enforce this decree under Order 21 Rule 32 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 is also criticized on the ground that in India, where most of the population and especially women (wife) do not have actual possession over any property. In such cases, if a restitution decree is not complied with, then the court is required to ascertain the share of the wife in the property of her husband, when it is not divided and arrive at her share in the property, but this involves cumbersome procedures. Difficulty also arises if the husband does not have a property in his name. Further, it is not correct to think that coercing a person that his property would be attached and sold away can change the attitude of the adamant spouse and make him obey the decree.5The abolitionists are criticized for basing their argument majorly on the premise that a man could force himself upon his unwilling wife, who is on the verge of seeking divorce or is unwilling to have sexual intercourse with him. As a result they claim that the remedy of restitution of conjugal rights is an instrument of law which is enabling marital rape to occur. The other view on this subject is shared by those who feel that the remedy of restitution of conjugal rights is a constitutional remedy and is a means to safeguard the institution of marriage in these days when divorces are prevalent all around. Today's wife is not ready to merely live at the mercy of her husband and the members of his family. A sense of confidence and self-respect has come to be instilled in the wife in view of advanced socio-economic conditions. The wives are ready to face challenges in life. They are keen to become self-dependent.6 The spirit of forced tolerance of yesteryears is waning away. They are prepared to live separately rather than to stay united while unhappy. The leading idea of Section 9 is to preserve the marriage. What the court seeks to is to enquire into the causes which have led to the rupture of the marital relations and a refusal to share the matrimonial life. If there is no reasonable excuse for living apart, the court orders the withdrawing party to return to the conjugal fold so that the consortium is not broken. The object of the restitution decree is to bring about cohabitation between the estranged parties so that they can live together in the matrimonial home in amity. From the definitions of cohabitation and consortium it appears that sexual intercourse is one of the elements that goes to
5

http://www.legalserviceindia.com/articles/abol.htm www.ourkarnataka.com/Articles/law/conjugalrights.htm

make up the marriage. But it is not a summum bonum. 7The Supreme Court also agreed with the logic in Saroj Rani v. Surinder Kumar Chadha8 and upheld the validity of Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act and the same is applicable till date.

ABOLITIONIST VIEW
To understand the underlying concepts of abolitionist view, one must go through the T. Sareetha v. T. Venkata Subbaiah9case in which a landmark judgment was rendered by Justice PA Choudary. This was one of the first cases in which the constitutionality of the remedy of restitution of conjugal rights was discussed. Justice Choudary declared Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act as ultravires the constitution. This view is also known as the Feminist View in judicial circles. It is therefore necessary to understand the T. Sareetha case and the same is analyzed hereunder: FACTS OF THE CASE: The Appellant was a famous film actress of South India and was married to the respondent while she was in high school. They were separated almost immediately and have been living apart for over five years. The respondent filed a petition for restitution of conjugal rights under section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act before the sub court of Cuddapah. The appellant filed an objection, on grounds of jurisdiction, to entertaining the above mentioned petition under section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act, before the same court. This objection was duly over ruled and thus the appellant preferred to file a civil revision petition before the Honourable High Court of Andhra Pradesh. The appellant in her revision petition also questioned the constitutional validity of section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act. Thus this matter came before the Honourable High Court of Andhra Pradesh.

Justice AB Rohtagi of the Delhi HC in Harvinder Kaur v. Harmander Singh Choudary, MANU/DE/0234/1983
8

AIR 1984 SC 1562 AIR 1983 AP 356

Proceedings before High Court:

At the outset, the court settled an important question of jurisdiction and found that the sub court of Cuddapah had the required jurisdiction to try the petition. The question of jurisdiction shall not be examined in this paper.In her civil revision petition the appellant questioned the constitutional validity of section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act which was duly decided by this Honourable court.

Appellants Contentions:

The appellant contended that section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act must be struck down as it violates Art. 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India and offends the guarantee to life, personal liberty and human dignity and decency.

The States contentions are however not mentioned in the judgement. Justice P.A. Choudary while delivering the judgement declared S.9 of HMA to be void as it violated the Constitution of India. After analyzing various American and UK cases, Justice Choudary declared S.9 to be unconstitutional as it forced an individual to have sexual intercourse against her will.

RATIONALE: The major reasons underlying the verdict of the Andhra Pradesh High Court are as follows:
1. Justice Choudary felt that one of the most important differentiating aspects between man

and other animals was the Sexual autonomy. He opined that an individuals right to choose his or her partner to a sexual Act, is of primary importance. Sexual expression is so integral to one's personality that it is impossible to conceive of sexuality on any basis

except on the basis of consensual participation of the opposite sexes. No relationship between man and woman is more rested on mutual consent and freewill and is more intimately and personally forged than sexual relationship. According to him, the remedy of restitution of conjugal rights was a coercive act of the state compelling sexual cohabitation between two people whereby one of them was unwilling to do so. Therefore, must be regarded as a great constraint and torture imposed on the mind of the unwilling party. The life of a man or woman which the sovereign can commandeer through the coercive power of the state for performing an unwilling Act of sexual cohabitation cannot but be regarded as that of a human beast drained of all spirituality. He relies on the judgment of Russel v. Russel10 rendered by Lord herschell whereby he stated that the law of restitution of conjugal rights as administered in the courts did sometimes lead to barbaric results. 2. Further it was violative of the Right to Freedom enshrined under Article 19 because it led to forceful sex and unwanted pregnancy. Justice Choudary felt that the woman ought to have a choice when it came to matters so intimately concerning her body as begetting, bearing, delivering and rearing a child and Section 9 completely violated this freedom according to him.
3. Further citing the case of Govind v. State of MP11 and Kharak Singh v. State of UP12,

Section 9 violated the Right to Privacy guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India as any right to privacy must encompass and protect the personal intimacies of the home, the family, marriage motherhood, procreation and child rearing.13Hence any state intervention into the matters of motherhood, procreation and child rearing would be violative of Article 21 and unconstitutional. The right of marital privacy falls within the category of right to privacy, Griswold's case14 is in authority for the proposition that the
10

(1897) AC 395 MANU/SC/0119/1975 MANU/SC/0085/1962 As per Justice Mathew in the Gopal v. State of MP case Griswold v. Connecticut, (1965) 14 L Ed 2d 510

11

12

13

14

reproductive choice to beget and bear a child does not belong to the state and that belongs to an individual. Further in the case of Missouri v. Danforth,15the court held that one did not loose his/her right to privacy belonged to each of the married couple separately and was not lost by virtue of marriage. The Judge opined that the decree of restitution makes the unwilling victim's body a soulless and a joyless vehicle for bringing into existence another human being. In other words, pregnancy would be foisted on her by the state and against her will. There can therefore be little doubt that such a law violates the right to privacy and human dignity guaranteed by and contained in Article 21 of our Constitution.
4. State coercion of this nature can neither prolong nor preserve the voluntary union of

husband and wife in matrimony. State coercion cannot soften the ruffled feelings nor clear the misunderstandings between the parties. Force can only bebet force as action can only produce counter-actions the only usefulness in obtaining a decree for restitution of conjugal rights consists in providing evidence for subsequent action for divorce. But this usefulness of the remedy which can be obtained only at enormous expense to human dignity cannot be counted as outweighing the interests in upholding the right to privacy.
5. Moreover Section 9 fails to comply with the requirements of Article 14 of the

Constitution which guarantees the right to equality to all the citizens. Firstly, section 9 of the Act does not satisfy the traditional classification test. Secondly it fails to pass the test of minimum rationality required of any state Law.
6. It makes no discrimination between a husband and wife. On the other hand, by making

the remedy of restitution of conjugal rights equally available both to wife and husband, it apparently satisfies the equality test. But according to Justice Chaudary, it is important to understand how the remedy works in life terms In our social reality, this matrimonial remedy is found used almost exclusively by the husband and is rarely resorted to by the wife. There are certain inherent differences between a man and a woman. By enforcing a decree for restitution of conjugal rights the life pattern of the wife is likely to be altered irretrievably whereas the husband's can remain almost as it was before this is so because it is the wife who has to beget and bear a child. This practical but the inevitable consequence of the enforcement of this remedy cripples the wife's future plans of life and prevents her from using that self-destructive remedy. Thus the use of remedy of
15

(1976)-49 L ed 2d 788

restitution of conjugal rights in reality becomes partial and one-sided and available only to the husband. The pledge of equal protection of laws is thus inherently incapable of being fulfilled by this matrimonial remedy in our Hindu society. By treating the wife and the husband who are inherently unequal as equals, section 9 of the Act offends the rule of equal protection of laws. Hence Article 14 of the Constitution is violated by Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act.

COUNTER VIEW
Immediately after Mr. Justice Choudary declared Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act as unconstitutional, many other High Courts heard petitions wherein the respondents of the restitution proceeds challenging the validity of the said section. The Delhi High Court was the first to reject the challenge to the constitutionality of the section in the matter of Harvinder Kaur v. Harmander Singh Choudhry16and held the section to be valid. The Supreme Court agreed with the Delhi High Court in the Saroj Rani v. Sudershan Kumar Chadha17 case. Justice Sabyasachi Mukherjee refused to accept the argument that the remedy of restitution of conjugal rights resulted in violation of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Justice Sabyasachi Mukherjee and Justice AB Rohtagi felt that the abolitionist view arose due to misunderstanding of the underlying idea of marital co-habitation enforced by the court under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, which according to them was simple cohabitation and sexual intercourse between partners was not mandatory and would not be enforced by the courts of law. One might feelt that the counter view is anti-feminist at first look, but a thorough reading of the counter view judgements shows that the proponents of this view intend to safeguard the institution of marriage and at the same time try to safeguard the dignity of women by laying down safeguarding measures. An in-depth analysis of the important judgements of Saroj Rani and Harvinder Kaur are given hereunder along with the analysis of Chetan Dass v. Kamala Devi:

1. HARVINDER KAUR v. HARMANDER SINGH CHOUDHRY Facts of the case: The respondent husband filed a petition for restitution of conjugal rights before the additional district judge. Despite an opposition from the wife, the court granted the decree to the
16

MANU/DE/0234/1983 AIR 1984 SC 1562

17

respondent. Thus the appellant has come in appeal before the Honourable High Court of Delhi. On appeal, it may be noted that the appellant challenged the constitutional validity of Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act.

Proceedings before High Court:

Appellants Contention: The counsel for the appellant heavily depended on the case of T. Sareetha v. T. Subbaiah18 and relied upon the judgment given therein, which declared Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act to be constitutionally void as it violated Art.14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Justice A.B. Rohatgi opined that the judgment in Sareethas case was erroneous in law as the view stated therein was based on a misconception of the true nature of Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act. At para 7 Justice Rohatgi dissents from the ratio of Sareethas case.

Honourable Justice Rohatgi, held Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act, to be constitutionally valid. Reasoning: 1. Quoting Tolstoy, the court said that the court cannot enforce sexual intercourse, but only cohabitation, and restitution of conjugal rights can not be ordered where the respondent refuses sexual intercourse but continues to cohabit with the petitioner. It further stated that this remedy is aimed at preserving the marriage and not at disrupting it as in the case of divorce or judicial separation.19

18

Supra note 12

19

Supra note 12 at para 7

2. A husband and a wife are living under the same roof. But the wife does not allow the husband sexual intercourse with her because she thinks that it is a horrid and beastly thing. Will the court pass a restitution decree? The answer is 'No'. Since they are living together as one household, as one unit and not as two, the law cannot go further and compel them to have sexual intercourse. The court has neither the means nor the capacity to enforce its decree in the marriage bed20. Thus the court categorically laid down that the courts cannot order a decree to force sexual intercourse and that sexual intercourse is not an integral part of a restitution decree.

3. The decree of restitution of conjugal rights acts as an index of connubial felicity. It is a sort of litmus paper. It shows a change of heart if the restitution decree is obeyed. If the decree is disobeyed it is indicia that the parties have reached a stage of no return21

4. Regarding the question of constitutional validity the court said at para 34 that ...Introduction of constitutional law in the home is most inappropriate. It is like introducing a bull in a china shop. It will prove to be a ruthless destroyer of the marriage institution and all that it stands for. In the privacy of the home and the married life neither Article 21 nor Article 14 has anyplace

5. Believing in the socially good intention of this provision, and its requirement in Indian society, the court upheld its validity.

6. After upholding the constitutionality of Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act, the court dismissed the
appeal on its merits.

Ratio:
20

Id at para 12 Id at para 17

21

Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act is constitutionally valid and the constitutional mandate cannot be applied to personal laws.

2. SAROJ RANI v. SURINDER KUMAR CHADHA Facts of the case:

Parties married on 24th January 1975. They had two daughters and May 16th 1977 was the last day of cohabitation. The respondent allegedly threw the appellant out of his house and withdrew himself from her society. The second daughter meanwhile unfortunately expired and the wife filed a petition under Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act on 17 th October 1977 before learned Sub Judge First Class.

The wife had alleged maltreatment by the husband as well as his parents towards her. On March 21, 1978, the learned Sub-Judge First class passed an order granting Rs.185 per month as maintenance pendente lite and Rs.300 as the litigation expenses. on the petition of the wife for restitution of conjugal rights, the husband-respondent appeared and filed his written statement admitting therein the factum of marriage between the parties but denied the fact that the respondent had ever made any demand from the petitioner as alleged or had ever disliked her or had withdrawn from her society or turned her out from his house as alleged by the wifepetitioner in her petition for restitution of conjugal rights. The respondent there after made a statement in the court that the application of the petitioner under Section 9 of the said Act be granted and decree thereof be passed. Accordingly the learned Sub-Judge First Class on March 28, 1978 passed the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights between the parties. This decree was not complied with though.

On April 19, 1979, the respondent/husband filed a petition under Section 13 of the said Act against the appellant for divorce on the ground that one year had passed from the date of the

decree for restitution of conjugal rights, but no actual cohabitation had taken place between the parties. Wife contended that she had cohabited with the husband for two days before she was turned out again and she had thereafter filed a petition under section 28A of Hindu Marriage Act to direct the husband to obey the decree and this petition was pending.

Along with the above, the District Judge observed that the decree of restitution was given by mutual consent of both parties and therefore divorce cannot be obtained due to non compliance to such a decree and thereafter dismissed the husbands petition.

Proceedings Before High Court:

On appeal to the High Court of Punjab & Haryana, the court held that it could not be said that the husband was taking advantage of his wrongs. Thereafter the learned Judge expressed the view that the decree for restitution of conjugal rights could not be passed with the consent of the parties and therefore being a collusive one disentitled the husband to a decree for divorce (based on an earlier case). He felt this principle required reconsideration and referred the same to the Chief Justice to be referred to a larger bench. A division bench of the High Court on consideration of different authorities came to the conclusion that a consent decree could not be termed to be a collusive decree so as to disentitle the petitioner to decree for restitution of conjugal rights. Consent decrees per se in matrimonial matters are not collusive. Thus the matter was decreed in favour of the husband.

Proceedings Before Supreme Court:

In the civil appeal before the Supreme Court the appellant had two contentions:

1. The respondent should be stopped from taking advantage of his own wrong doing in not full filling the restitution decree and thereafter claiming divorce. 2. Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act is constitutionally invalid.

The Supreme Court negated the first contention. For the second contention the Court discussed the case of T. Sareetha22 and Harvinder Kaur23. The Court, upheld the ratio in Harvinder Kaurs case and held that S.9 in constitutionally valid and implied that the constitution had no place in personal laws of the country.

Ratio: Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act is constitutionally valid and the constitutional mandate cannot be applied to personal laws.

22

Supra note 5 Supra note 6

23

3. CHETAN DASS v. KAMALA DEVI24

Facts of the case:

The appellant, Chethan Dass, and the respondent, Smt. Kamla Devi, were married on November 30, 1976 at Vijaynagar, District Ganganagar according to the Hindu rites and rituals. The respondent Smt. Kamla Devi stated in her statement that the allegations made against her that she was unwilling to live with the petitioner and his parents at Kirawad was incorrect.

The trial court thus considering all the evidence and the facts and circumstances of the case, came to the conclusion that there existed illegitimate relationship between Chetan Dass and one Sosamma Thomas. In the appeal preferred by the appellant in the High Court, the findings recorded by the trail court have been upheld.

An appeal was filed by the husband challenging the judgment and order passed by the Rajasthan High Court, upholding the judgment passed by the District Judge, Sriganganager, dismissing the petition of the appellant under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 praying for dissolution of marriage by granting a decree of divorce.

Rationale :

24

AIR 2001 SC 1709

1) The Supreme court didnt apply Chanderkala Trivedi (Smt). v. Dr. S.P. Trivedi25,

Romesh Chander v. Savitri (Smt.)26, Smt. Saroj Rani v. Sudarshan Kumar Chadha27, and said that in the present case, the allegations of misconduct of adulterous behaviour have definitely been made by the wife which have been found to be correct. 2) The averments made in the petition for obtaining a decree for divorce, namely, desertion on the part of the wife without any reasonable cause have not been found to be correct.
3) Brijesh Kumar, JJ. also stressed on the fact that Matrimonial matters are matters of

delicate human and emotional relationship. It demands mutual trust, regard, respect, love and affection with sufficient play for reasonable adjustment with the spouse. 4) He further said that the relationship has to conform to the social norms as well. 5) The matrimonial conduct has now come to be governed by Statue framed, keeping in view such norms and changed social order. It is sought to be controlled in the interest of the individuals as well as in broader perspective, for regulating matrimonial norms for making of a well knit, healthy and not a disturbed and porous society. 6) Institution of marriage occupies an important place and role to play in the society, in general. Therefore, it would not be appropriate to apply any submission of "irretrievably broken marriage" as a straight jacket formula for grant of relief of divorce. This aspect has to be considered in the background of the other facts and circumstances of the case.

Ratio:

The court laid that when there is a misconduct on part of a husband he cannot claim the advantage of his own wrong and be granted a decree of divorce on the ground of desertion on the part of his wife who is still prepared to live with him provided he snaps his relationship with the other woman.

25

(1993) 4 SCC 232 (1995) 2 SCC 7 (1984) 4 SCC 90

26

27

CONCLUSION
As part of this project, I have analyzed the landmark judgments of the Supreme Court with regard to the constitutionality of the remedy of Restitution of Conjugal Rights and studied the abolitionist view and the counter view. After a thorough understanding of the concepts, it is safe to conclude that S. 9 HMA is unconstitutional. I wish to emphasis, that constitutional law must ratify personal law.

Today, judges are skeptical about applying Constitutional guidelines to personal laws as they are well aware about the political ramifications that it will carry. Art. 44 of the Constitution which pertains to a Uniform Civil Code, sadly remains a dead letter. Enforcement of Art.44 would indirectly mean enforcement of Art.14 and Art. 21 and due to various political interests, the governments of this nation are not pursuing it.

What this nation needs today is a champion of the Constitution, a judiciary which will break the stronghold over religious politics and establish a truly secular India. We pride ourselves in being a diverse yet unified country however the unity we speak of is hollow. Politics, dirty politics, will always crop its face up. Enforcing the Uniform Civil Code, is a way to enforce the Constitution, a way to break the dirty religious politics in the country, a way to make India truly secular.

We must attempt to pursue equality in its true sense, in all fields, in all aspects. We must move into the light in the words of Martin Luther Kind Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere