Haggard and Kaufman (1997) - The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions

Discusses Rutow's contribution by bringing in elites and bargaining to transitions. (And then those that followed him) O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) Przeworski (1991) - game theoretic model between hardliners and softliners Di Palma (1990) But there have been "costs" associated with these elite bargaining models They require a clear specification of the preferences and capabilities of the players and delineation of the agenda over which they are negotiating o Authors say many models take the actors preferences as given not addressing where they came from or how they might change over time

Some analyses use relative power of the actors as an organizing device in describing how the negotiation/transition process unfolds o Authors say that the relative power is more important (because there is always going to be some negotiation) They pay little attention to economic variables and interests

There approach: draws on strategic analysis (like above) but focuses on the effects of economic conditions on the preferences, resources, and strategies of key political actors in the transition "game". They recognize that there are lots of factors contributing to the third wave democracies (international factors, contagion effect, structural changes due to long-term economic growth) They do not offer an economic theory of democratization o They focus on how economic conditions influence the timing and terms of democratic transitions and post-transition political alignments

They differentiate between transitions that occur in conjunction with economic crises and those that occur when economic performance is strong o Economic crises undermine the "authoritarian bargains" forged between rulers and key sociopolitical constituents and expose rulers to defection (protest from below) o Resulting isolation of incumbent authoritarian leaders tends to fragment the ruling elite and reduce its capacity to negotiate favorable terms of exit o Post-transition democratic politics in these settings is characterized by low political barriers to entry and tendencies to political fragmentation (pg 267) Where authoritarian governments avoid (or overcome) crisis, rulers are likely to maintain backing from powerful segments of society even as they exit office. o This allows them to impose an institutional framework that maintains their prerogatives and restricts their opponents' freedom of maneuver

They look at 6 crisis transitions: Argentina (1983), Bolivia (1980), Uruguay (1985), the Philippines (1986), Brazil (1985), Peru (1980) 4 non-crisis transitions: Chile (1990), Korea (1986), Thailand (1983), Turkey (1983) Non-crisis transitions result in the outgoing rulers being in a better position to impose control on the new regime Military remains unreformed Outgoing rulers have two central objectives: 1. To preserve the military's organizational autonomy 2. Impose limits on the opposition

Elite bargaining is an important element in all transitions The authors wanted to put these strategic interactions into a larger socioeconomic context