Immunitarian Democracy

1. Does "community" refer to democracy? If not, could it or is it too deeply embedded in the conceptual lexicon of the Romantic, authoritarian and racist Right? This is the question, one already asked by American neo-communitarianism, that is emerging again in Europe at the precise moment when, some, especially in France and in Italy, are risking thinking community anew. At issue is not only a legitimate question, but in some ways even an inevitable one, in which democractic culture deeply examines its own theoretical precepts and future. This doesn't change the fact though that it's the wrong question or that it's badly put. Wrong or badly put because it takes as its term of comparison -- in order to be related to the category of community - a concept, that of democracy that is utterly incapable of "understanding" it, not only because its modern meaning at least, arrives much later, but also because it is flatter and increasingly overwhelmed in a dimension that is entirely political and institutional. With respect to this lack of depth and substance of the politicological notion of democracy, community has a very different semantic width, both on the vertical level of history and on the synchronic one of meaning. This isn't the place to attempt a complete reconstruction, though my recent research beginning with the etymological origins of the term communitas and even more before that of munus in Latin does confirm the historical and semantic richness of the concept (R. Esposito, 1998). What we can infer from the above discussion, however, is that the correct question isn't whether the community can become a part of the democratic lexicon, but whether even democracy can be a part or at a minimum acquire some of its meaning in the lexicon of community. Without wanting to show my hand too quickly, a first step is required, which focuses more on the second term. Here we aren't helped at all by the conceptual dichotomies with which 20th century philosophy has tried to define community, one that lost along the way the original meaning of community. I'm not talking only of the one constructed by the so-called American communitarians with respect to their presumed adversaries, the liberals, who constitute rather their exact interface in the specific sense that they unconsciously share the same subjectivist as well as exclusively partisan lexicon, applied not to the community but to the individual (where communities like individuals are distinguished between them, one from the other). But also in the more entrenched juxtaposition between "community" and "society," a juxtaposition that reaches its greatest point of typological elaboration in Fedinand Tnnies's Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. And this because here too, despite being better elaborated than the first, community remains completely inscribed within one of the two terms -- that of society -- such that it emerges as completely produced by it. This idea of community not only is born with modern society, but doesn't acquire meaning except in contrast to it. It is the Gesellschaft that "constructs" its own proper and ideal-typical reversal so as to be able to found itself -- in apologetic or slanderous terms depending on the point of the one who observing and judging. The fact is that the organic Gemeinschaft of which Tnnies and his many (and some less judicious) 20th century imitators speak has never existed as such is seen both as the sign and the confirmation of the mythological character of the dichotomy that founds it: it is nothing

other than a figure of the self-interpretation of society in the phase of its maximum development, which coincides with it and its incipient crises. Does this mean that one can't really say anything about community, that it doesn't have a logical or historical opposite that is capable of defining it categorically? As I have tried to show elsewhere, the situation is somewhat different, only that what is at issue refers to a meaning which has the same diachronic profundity and the same semantic power of the concept to that which it refers by way of contrast. Rather than being opposed to it from the outside as happens with the modern ideas of "individual," "society," and "freedom, it corresponds to it in a sort of originary co-belonging. This is why it shares, even if by way of contrast, the same etymological and conceptual foundation. Such a meaning I believe I've linked to the idea of "immunization," derived by way of extension from the Latin term immunitas, which is precisely tied to that of communitas from the relation, in the former negative and in the latter positive, with the lemma munus. If the members of the communitas are joined together by the same law, by the duties or gift [dono] that they have to give -- which is what precisely munus means-- immunis is instead he who is exempt or exonerated from them: he who does not have obligations with respect to the other and who can therefore conserve entirely his own proper essence [sostanza] as subject who is owner of himself (cfr. R. Esposito, 2002). What are the advantages of such an etymological-paradigmatic choice? Above all, there is the fact that the perfect co-implication of the two concepts means that one can line them up in a historical succession, in which one would follow the other, substituting it according to the optimistic (or pessimistic) modalities of any philosophy of history. Any individual, society, or kind of freedom that is based on the "progressive" or "regressive" attitude of the interpreter -- would prevail or would leave behind the ancient community. Furthermore it also opens up a larger horizon with which to see the same dynamic of democracy, understood not only in a politological key, but also and above all in a socio-anthropological one. This is because if there is something in the endless contemporary debate on democracy it is precisely this long gaze on the constitution of the homo democraticus that Tocqueville had launched with incomparable forcefulness (cfr. for one of the few exceptions, M. Cacciari, 1997). Yet the category of "immunization" is able to restore to the analysis of democracy the same breadth and the same interdisciplinary transversality with which the great social philosophy of the 1930s and 1950s surveyed the anthropology of the homo totalitarius -- I'm thinking here, in addition to the Frankfurt School, of the work associated with the Collge de sociologie in Paris and in particular of the monumental essay of Bataille's on fascism (G. Bataille, 1981). With one perspective there clearly comes into view the profound relation that joins in a single aporetic knot community and democracy: modern democracy speaks a language that is opposed to that of community to the degree to which it has introjected ever more into it a demand for immunization. 2. That the category of immunization, in direct opposition with that of community, was the most fruitful interpretive key for reading modern political systems was already apparent to the

important negative anthropology of the last century (cfr. B. Accarino, 1991): from Plessner to Gehlen to Luhmann, through the systemic reconversion of the "Hobbesian paradigm of order" undertaken by Parsons (cfr. M. Bortolini, 2005). In an essay titled precisely The Limits of Community, Plessner will juxtapose the immunitary logic of the "democratic game" to community (H. Plessner, 2001): in a world in which individuals who are naturally put at risk face off against each other in a competition whose stakes are power and prestige, the only way to avoid catastrophe is that of instituting between them enough distance to immunize everyone from everyone else. Against every communitarian temptation, the public sphere is that site in which men enter into relation with each other in the form of their dissociation. Here arises the need for strategy and control apparatuses that allow them to "live nearby" without coming into contact, and therefore to increase the sphere of individual self-sufficiency through the use of "masks" or "armor" that protect them from undesirable and insidious contact with the other. As Canetti reminds us, nothing frightens the individual quite like a being touched by what threatens to penetrate his own proper individual borders (E. Canetti, 1981, pp. 17-19). In this anthropological framework, one dominated by the principle of fear and the persistence of insecurity -- the very same politics winds up being identified with an art of diplomacy that conceals the relation of natural enmity in the civil forms of ceremony, tact, and conduct. What in Plessner still maintains a constitution that oscillates between art and technique in Gehlen takes on a decisively institutional character. He too starts with the Hobbesian (and Nietzschean) consideration of the natural lack of man with respect to other animal species and of the need to transform this biological lack into the possibility for preserving life (A. Gehlen, 1986). But with respect to his predecessor he is keen on stabilizing this immunitarian option in a true and proper theory of institutions (U. Fadini, 1995). In a situation of environmental impact and pressure, institutions have the task of freeing man from the weight that the contingency of events places on him. This requires in the meantime a sort of "plasticity," which is to say a capacity to adapt to a given situation that doesn't expose the individual to unbearable conflict, but also a mastery of his or her own proper instincts that inhibit the drive to fragment and which channels them in a self-reproducing sense, in the same way in which the satisfaction of needs is contained and put off in a framework of rigidly controlled compatibility. Only through this double renunciation can man be immunized securely against the respective dangers determined by his own structure of lack: to occupy that initial void that distances it from itself, to reappropriate that which isn't naturally his own [proprio]. But to occupy the void and to make proper what is improper, is the equivalent of reducing to extinction the "common." And in fact the exemption from environmental contingency which institutions ensure coincides for the democratic individual with a distancing from the world in which it is rooted and for that very reason, with a lifting up from that common munus that compels it with respect to others. In this way the individual is led to close his originary opening and to be circumscribed within his own proper interior. What else is immunization if not a form of escalating interiorization of exteriority? If the community is our "outside," the outside-of-us, immunization is that which leads us again within ourselves breaking every form of contact with the outside.

Niklas Luhmann was surely the person who carried this logic to its extreme. Hi theory, situated at the intersection between the functionalism of Parsons and the regulative paradigm of cybernetic models, his theory constitutes the most refined explication of the immunitary logic as a specific form of modernization. In addition he argued not only that "a series of historical tendencies indicate a growing concern from the beginnings of the modern epoch and especially from the 18th century on, with the actualization of a social immunology (N. Luhmann, 1990, p.588), but also that the immunitary system which coincides originally with law [diritto], was extended to all areas of social life, from economics to politics. Such a tendency was already manifested in the initial Luhmannian definition of the relation between system and environment, where the problem of system control of dangerous disorder caused by the environment is resolved not by a simple reduction of environmental complexity, but rather through its transformation from external complexity into internal complexity within the system itself. But a second strategy with even graver consequences for environmental difference is added to the first of interiorization activated by the immunitary process. And that is its complete inclusion within the system, which is to say, its objective elimination. Such a development in Luhmann's perspective, which is determined by the adoption of the biological concept of autopoiesis consists in shifting the lens away from the defensive level of systemic governance of the environment to that of a self-regulation within the system, which is completely independent and autonomous with respect to environmental pressures: the system is reproduced in a form that is always more complex, itself constituting the elements that make it up. It's clear that this perfectly circular logic has the effect not only of breaking apart any form of relation with the outside but also calling into question the very idea of "outside." If the contradictions that ensnare democratic systems have in the final analysis the function of alarming their immunitary apparatus so as to set in motion a defensive reaction against every threat of destruction, this means that these contradictions no longer pit outside against inside. They are nothing other than the outside of the inside, one of its simple folds. But this means at the same time that the immunitary system has "immunized" the very same communication, including it in its referential mechanism. It also means that the entire communicative flow is nothing other than a selfreproducing projection of the process of immunization: "The immunitary system," Luhmann concludes, "deploys 'no', in the event of the refusal to communicate. Such a system operates without communication with the environment" (ivi, p.613). If we compare the passages within Luhmann's immunitary theory with the history of that ever more important branch of bio-medicine, namely a true and proper immunology, their similarities are striking. We know that the object of immunology is the capacity of vertebrates to react to the introduction of substances extraneous to the organism is to produce anti-bodies that are able to defend their bio-chemical identity, in system terms of adequately responding to the challenges of the environment represented by outside antigens. But this general overview -with the move from chemical immunology to molecular immunology -- undergoes profound modifications that move in the same direction of meaning as those of experienced in the theory of systems, namely from the defense from the outside to self-regulation within. The underlying question pivots on the role of the antigen, which is to say the virus received from outside for the

production of the antibody. In what way is the reaction of the antibody connected to the antigenic action? The response which from the middle of the last century begins to make headway beginning with Ehrlich and then until Erne is that the immunitary antibody isn't determined by the introduction of the antigen but pre-exists it. Without being able to trace (and not even partially at that) the most salient aspects of a long and controversial debate (on this score, see A.I. Tauber, 1999), what matters for our reconstruction is that in molecular immunology, as exactly in Luhmann's theory, the central problem isn't the organism's capacity for distinguishing its own components from those outside it, but rather that of the selfregulation within the immunitary system itself. If anti-corporeal cells communicate even in the absence of the antigen, which is to say, if external stimuli are lacking, this means that the immunitary system takes on the characteristics of a network of internal recognitions [riconoscimenti] that are absolutely self-autonomous. It is the final result of an immunitary war that modernity fights from its very beginning against the risk of communitarian "infection." There is no longer an outside that it must defend itself from; that the other doesn't exist except as a projection of the self. This is the same as recognizing that the immunitary system doesn't have limits of time or space. It always exists and it is to be found everywhere. It coincides with our identity. We are identified to ourselves as us -- definitively drawn away from our being altered by community. 3. And so? If this is the condition that characterizes the present moment, where ought we to look for relief? Is it still possible to activate a thought of community in our democracies? Can we join community and democracy again but this time differently somehow? Can we imagine a democracy that doesn't immunize, one that isn't already immunized or has the process of a generalized immunization destroyed both community itself as well as the possibilitiy for thinking it? I don't think so. I don't think that the first order of the day is closing down thinking community, but on the contrary it's my view that never more than today is a reactivation of community called for. What else are we told, what else do we talk about, if not the question of community, of its absence, but also of its demands: bodies, faces, the gazes of millions of starving, of deportees, of refugees whose images, terrible in their starkness, flash across our television screens from every corner of the globe? And yet isn't it still the community -- by which I mean the relation, our cum, "we" as cum -- that is recalled in every birth, every encounter even of the most anonymous and daily kind, the most seemingly banal? Nevertheless, as always happens, it is precisely that which we most need to reflect on that becomes the least obvious. In point of fact never more than today does the thought of community remain exposed to the double risk of forgetfulness and being unrecognizably altered [deformazione]; to repression and betrayal. Forgetfulness, above all, because the end, the collapse of communism -- of communism completely and of all communisms -- produced a void of ideas, like a vortex in which the question of community seems to have been filtered out, thrown into the abyss, discredited and embarrassed by regimes that exploded or imploded under the weight of their errors and their horrors. But in addition to the danger of forgetfulness and erasure another danger draws alongside and is superimposed,

not less but perhaps even more serious: that of the perversion of the idea of community into its opposite, in that which raises walls rather than breaks them down. This happens far from us on the world's periphery, but also close to us, and is found at the heart of our world, because community has been reduced and brought low to the defense of new and exclusive attachments to groups [particolarismi], of small nations enclosed and walled in against what lies outside, hostile and opposed to everything which doesn't belong to them; that might weaken the obsessive linking with identity and with what is considered to be properly their own. In this case, therefore, the image of the fortress is superimposed over that of the desert, which decidedly reverses the communitarian horizon in a new and even more powerful immunitarian oscillation or drift of meaning [deriva]. What are the new ethnic, religious, and linguistic communities that are arising on the other side of the Adriatic, in Asia and in Africa, but also in the center of Los Angeles, if not the most aggravated form of auto-immunity with respect to a common existence? If not the most dramatic unleashing of self-appropriation of that which appears as insidious in the other? If not the attempt to abolish every exteriority with regard to a interiority folded again within its own endogenous reproduction? The idea of communitas -- and even before that of munus from which it derives -- moves us in a sense that is radically opposed to such a seemingly unstoppable drive towards interiorization (though we could also say "internment" of the immunitarian sort). It refers, on the contrary, to an exteriorization of existence; or better an interpretation of the same existence as exteriority, experience, ecstasy, in the radical sense of these expressions: as the escape of the subject from itself or as its originary opening to otherness that constitutes it from the beginning in the form of a "being with" or of a "with-being." tre-avec and Mitsein. These are precisely the two perspectives put forward in the last century by the two greatest philosophers of community: Martin Heidegger and Georges Bataille. Now I think that we ought to resist the temptation to see them both just and only as philosophers, too removed from us, too abstract with respect to the problems we face today. If we read them without getting lost (given the particular density of their lexicons), we can't help but see that they speak precisely about it; of community as the exteriority of that which appears enclosed within, of the irreducible nucleus -- and for which reason empty of the other -- of that immunitarian system that seems ever more to limit our horizon of meaning. But if the question that they offer us is one we share -- that of what is "outside" the subject and of the subject -- there are different ways of responding, as well as what we can infer with regard to the underlying analysis with which we began. How to think -- but also live -- the "common" in the time of immunization? Where can we find the outside of that which is presented only from within? Bataille's mode is of the fractured [effrattivo] sort. It moves through the breaking of the immunitary cord and the singling out of possible points of contagion between subjects that outstrip it; of wounds through which social circulation can move again via the communication of reciprocal lacks (G. Bataille, 1997). In this case the reference to munus is part of an idea of the loss of what is one's own [proprio], of the ex-propriation or weakening of what is one's own [depropriazione] that contests the immunitary logic in its very presupposition, which is to say

the preservation and the defense of the "self" from what threatens from outside. From here it is a short distance to contesting the limited economy [economia ristretta], as Bataille defines the utilitarianist paradigm of our democracies, in favor of an economy enlarged or generally dominated no longer by the imperative of accumulation, but by the principle of unproductive expenses and also therefore of the gift. What Bataille sketches is, in fact, a conception of the energetic abundance radically juxtaposed to the theory of organic lack of the animal-man which precisely belongs to the neo-Hobbesian anthropology of Plessner and Gehlen. While they, as we saw, put into action a series of protective measures directed towards freeing the individual from his communitarian bonds, Bataille distinguishes in the stitches of the instinct of selfpreservation, an opposite though no less stronger tendency, for the disintegration of the individual identity in a common donative act of weakening what is one's own [depropriazione]. Where Bataille examines the anthropological dimension of such a tendency, Heidegger shifts his attention onto the ontological root. His question doesn't concern so much the inter of esse, as much as the esse of inter: not the sociality of being, but the being of the cum (with) and as cum (with). What does this mean for us when we turn to the question of democracy? What does it mean that being itself has the form of cum? How can we translate into our language a similar ontologia of community? First in the simple proposition that community is, or better, is given irrespective of our will or capacity to achieve it. It is also given -- perhaps above all -- in the moments in which it seems to disappear from our horizon, in which as was noted earlier, it seemed to have been transformed into a desert or to be distorted into a kind of fortress. Here too the negation of community is something that belongs to our common being; it is a mode, albeit defective or negative, of community, just as solitude, conflict, and anomie are. Indeed Heidegger says something more in this regard -- but only then to contradict himself in other parts of his work and his life. In opposition to every temptation to conceive the community in terms of "authentic" or "one's own" [proprio] -- which is to say as the self-appropriation on the part of man or a population of one's own essence -- community always has to do with an inauthentic modality, one in opposition to what is one's own [improprio]. What else is the "common" if not what isn't one's own; if not that which is not, is properly no one's, but exactly general, anonymous, indeterminate; that isn't determined by race or by sex; that is pure existence exposed to the absence of sense, of foundation and of destiny? Yet a final key still remains with which to re-read Heidegger's mit (with), this time as being in relation to his ambivalent assessment of technology [tecnica] as an extreme danger, but also as a potential resource. Here I have in mind the phenomenon of globalization of which technology constitutes the final and most striking configuration. Globalization isn't limited to representing it, but is in fact technology absolutely spread out in a planetary power that meets no resistance or difference [difformit], which it doesn't make a part of itself, making it conform to its own model. In this sense globalization also expresses the decisive closure of the immunitary system on itself. Indeed it is the immunization driven to a sole principle of the regulation of individual and collective life in a world made identical with itself; precisely made global [mondalizzato]. And yet this "mondalization" carries with it another result that moves beyond the same horizon

of Bataille and Heidegger. It doesn't only coincide with the destruction of meaning but also its withdrawal from every general principle, as well as from every given, waited for, prescribed meaning. Globalization is also the return of the world to its pure state of phenomenality [fenomenicit], to its being nothing other than world (J.-L. Nancy, 1997). In other words, that this is the only world -- the entire world -- also means that it is only world; without presuppositions, origins, or ends that transcend its simple existence. From this point of view, therefore, one which sees the progressive erosion of the Nation-State and modernity that produced it as part of a unique turning point, can perhaps a democracy on just such a planetary scale be thought, with all the necessary caution and attentiveness to the difficulties of the case at hand; or better, the problem of democracy can be extended to the only level that is capable of ripping it free from the immunitarian drift that it appears destined to follow: that of a world community, which is to say of the only world that we have in common. We know that immunization functions through the controlled incorporation of the communitarian "germ" that it wants to neutralize. But what if we were to reverse the operation? What if we tried to rethink community precisely by completing the process of immunization? At bottom a world without an outside, a world completely immunized -- by definition doesn't have an inside. The culmination of a successful immunization can also be extended further as well so as to immunize it from itself: to reopen the breach, or the time, of community.

Democracy Expansion
In a democracy, the government is the spokesperson for the people and the needs they would like to be met. The government is a group of people in the state who have the ultimate authority to act on behalf of that state. A democracy is a state in which citizens vote to choose the best candidate. Democracy derived from liberalism, which is the ideology that individuals develop their capacities to the fullest. A democracy reflects the liberal value that individuals are responsible for their own choices. Citizens can be free to run their lives as they want. Democracy requires an attitude of mind, a belief that every citizen has the right to a hearing, a sense that no doors are closed to talent and energy. Democracy in Africa is slowly coming together, but not fast enough. 1993 was the first presidential in 10 years. Abiola won, but soon went to jail for treason and the military remains in power. The wave of democratization called second liberation began at the end of the cold war. Political institutions have to be built in order for Africa to become a full fledge democracy. "Most of Africa lacks the crucial educated middle class and professional classes and the mediating private and public institutions that compose a civil society(William Pfaff). Political conflicts have brought a collapse of government of authority. The low levels of income at about $300 per year continent wide and huge trade deficits is not a good standing in moving toward a democracy. The only six countries that have seen economic growth are Ghana, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Gambia, and Burkina Faso. The United States, other western countries, and the UN have assisted in the democratization process. The United States aid has totaled 1.2 billion as of 1995, which is less than 10% of the 13.7 billion foreign aid budget. The British Monarchy coexists with a democratic government and is based on history and tradition. A monarchy has three main parties. The Conservative Party is the government party that enforces the laws passed. The liberal party is a separate group that makes decisions to make the government act for the people. The labor party makes the decisions on which they want in the government party. Political, social, and cultural democratization of the 19th and 20th centuries has made public opinion an important political force and the monarchy a more familiar outlook. Monarchy is seen as an aid in appealing to working class voters and countering socialism. Monarchy has ruled over England since the 9th century the only reason it has survived is by adapting to changing conditions and by accepting to limits on its power with the rise of new political forces. Retain formal powers to dissolve the national legislature designate a new head of government and sign legislation into law but differ to political leaders in playing those roles. Britain will risk their survival if they become too involved in politics(Richard Rose). A country gets caught up in politics and tries to influence events and takes sides and eventually you will end up on the loosing side. A British newspaper stated that, Reinforces the impression that British society is like a pyramid and that its apex, birth counts for more than merit. Monarchy connects us to our history. Monarchy remains at the heart of the constitution. The United States is the most advanced of the democracy wave and sets the trend for the rest of the world to move toward a democracy. The U.S. has three branches of main government, the President, Congress, and the Supreme Court. The President is head of his party, legislative leader, and the chief executive. He is in charge of armed forces. Has the ability to

ratify treaties with two- thirds of the senate. The president has to prepare an executive budget and an economic report that congress approves of each year. Congress has the power to declare war, raise and maintain the armed forces, establish tariffs, and regulate commerce with the foreign nations. Congress passes a bill by a majority vote. The Supreme Court is established by the constitution. The president with advice and consent of the senate nominates the Supreme Court. The decisions made by the Supreme Court involve statuary construction of law. This democracy consists of two major political parties. The democrats rule favored national action to solve social problems, emphasized government regulation of the economy and favored strong action to aid minorities. Republicans help balance the budget to lower inflation and tax cuts to promote industrial development. Japan is another leading democratic nation that coincides with the United States. Power in the decisions in Japan is made by a cabinet, which is headed by a Prime Minister. Prime minister is head of the party in power. Prime minister also chooses the cabinet from members of the national legislature. The country is divided into 47 sections in which an elected governor and assembly administer each. The government leader is in control of the public education and may levy taxes. The major political party is the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). This party has control over agricultural groups, trade protection and cooperate as the bureaucracy and the business interests set up most public policies. This party maybe undergoing changes or may be strengthened because no clear party leadership has emerged to take the place of the LDP hegemony. One reason that Japan has one dominant party is because Japans society consists have oriented to social groups. The power of agricultural groups is one of the main reasons for Japanese- American tensions over trade. Ones family or factory or association demands intense loyalty and support. The Japanese are about politics and groups formed around political issues. Taiwan is a country that used Japan as a mato in the government system. Taiwan has transformed over the past decade from a single party dictatorship to a fledging democracy due to the generation changes, economic influence, and native-born Taiwanese. Taiwan has a president that is head of the state and represents Taiwan in its foreign relations and at state functions. The National Assembly elects the president to six-year terms. National Assembly can declare change to the Republic of Chinas border.

The Price of Democracy

Democracy, while it can be beneficial, may also be complicating and difficult to balance when associated with the economy. This paper will discuss the relationship between the health of a democracy and the economic prosperity. Also covered in this paper will be the distribution of the wealth in a democracy and the justice of it. And finally, how to appropriately balance the wealth in a democracy. In the world nowadays, the health of a democracy seems to be directly related to the economic prosperity. The reason behind this is the more wealth there is in the economy, the more likely it is that the people of that particular nation will be more satisfied with there government, thus the healthy democracy. The better off the democracy is obviously the people will most likely be better off as well just adding further to the wealth of the economy. And equally the prosperity of the economy affects the way that the people feel about their government again bettering the relationship between the two. If wealth is an essential requirement of democracy, an unequal distribution of wealth imperils the democratic process. The way that this works is when there is too much wealth, the poor feel unsatisfied with their government because they are so impoverished while others are extremely wealthy, therefore they feel that they do not have a say in their government which is supposedly "led by the people" including the poor. When this happens the wealthy end up basically having more power because of their social class and therefore has more control in the government, which then ends up being unfair. Finally, uncontrolled wealth has in the past and still today promotes injustice, while controlled wealth has limited freedom. A proper balance perhaps might be to establish a limit in the maximum amount of money an individual may have. Although this may put a little bit of a limit on that individuals freedom, the government obviously couldn't make the amount so low that it would take away drastically from there wealth. With the limit on an individual's wealth, injustice among less fortunate individuals would be less then before. The lower poor class would then feel that at least an effort is being made to help take away from the injustice, causing them to be at least a little bit more satisfied. In conclusion, the health of a democracy is directly related to the prosperity of the economy by the relation of the satisfaction of the people with both. Also unequal distribution of wealth will also cause major problems in the democratic process. And finally there are ways to control the wealth of an individual while still leaving plenty of their individual freedom. Although the relations with a democracy and the economy may be confusing, they are quite imperative!

The Unhappy Democracy

Plato/Socrates defined democracy as "the government of the people." He modeled his democratic society after Athens at the time, a small city-state where every adult male had a vote. The transition to democracy occurred after a revolution in which the rich oligarchic rulers were overthrown and disposed of and the poor gained control. Then, they provided everyone with equal rights. Democracy was characterized as a bazaar of constitutions" where every citizen chose his own path in life. There was no obligatory military service, no privileged classes, and those that claim to love society were able to acquire the most power. Individuals may have desired honor in the morning and wealth in the evening. There was no consistent goal that individuals pursued and their desires changed constantly. However, democracy, unlike other imperfect societies, did not forbid the practice of philosophy; it had been indifferent to it. Eventually, "Things everywhere are just bursting with the spirit of liberty." Soon children disobey parents, students disobey teachers, and a disregard towards authority develops. Citizens become divided into three classes: the ruling class of spendthrift politicians, the middle businessman/merchant class, and the large mass of poor people who own little property and mostly stay out of politics. The politicians begin to pass laws that tax the capitalists in order to meet their spending promises. Next, a reactionary political party was formed by the wealthy in order to resist the taxes. After a while, the poor became frustrated with all of the disorder and selected a champion of the people who eventually acquired absolute power and corrupted by it to become a tyrant who would disregard all aspects of freedom in order to fulfill his individual desires. Plato/Socrates made a valid point as to why democracy is clearly not the best form of state, but only fourth out five, behind only despotism. Defenders of democracy may feel that this was an unfair criticism since democracy is the form of government that allows for the most individualistic freedom, which makes it the best form of government. This school of thoughts assumes that freedom brings the most happiness to people, which is the goal every state ought to strive for. However, Plato/Socrates was correct in his assessment of democracy not only because it was the second worst form of government, but also because in the end, happiness for individuals was not achieved. Democratic states do not produce happiness since individuals freedoms interfere with one another, stability is absent in this society, and that the pursuit of freedom is misguided. First of all, individuals in a democracy trample on each others freedoms. For instance, a merchant may achieve a monopoly in a certain area and use his freedom to charge citizens excessive prices for a good or a builder may build houses on territory needed for grazing livestock. Their lives are guided by their desires instead of will and reason. Those that desire power end up as politicians, those that desire wealth become wealthy capitalists, while those that desire any other virtue such as justice, temperance, wisdom, or moderation usually end up being in the lower classes. This society rewards those with ambitions and ignores virtuous

people. The politicians come to power on the basis of making empty promises to the masses and their sponsors. While in office, unless heavily pressured otherwise, politicians will act in their own interests, which often violate freedoms of their subjects. They may free criminals, place excessive taxes, ban certain types of business activities, or start a war for personal reasons. Most of the actions performed by individuals will disregard interests of others since they are not governed by justice or reason but by their own ambitions. After all, Socrates himself was convicted to death by a democratic society. Those whose interests are violated will not feel happy. Of equal significance, a democratic society has no stability and is doomed from its inception. Even a constitutional democracy is unstable because even a constitution can be amended to serve a desired purpose. The citizens of this society have no overriding virtues such as honor or justice to maintain the fabric of society. This lack of purpose and control eventually leads to such utter chaos that the only solution to maintain order is despotism. While democracy may serve individual interests temporarily, it is only a matter of time before the freedoms shall come to a screeching halt. Historical examples in which a democracy transitioned to despotism because of excessive practice of freedom include Athens, France, Italy, and Germany. The resulting despotism would not serve individual freedoms except for those of the despot, nor would it provide happiness for its population due to suppression of freedom. Last but not least, the pursuit of freedom is fundamentally flawed since it is simply a means to an end pursuit such as the pursuit of wealth or honor, which intends to provide its possessor with happiness. Unfortunately, happiness is only achieved when the soul is harmonious, which is something that the chaos of democracy could never provide The reason being that individuals constantly focus on fulfilling desires rather than applying reason to guide their will. Consequently, their soul is always in a state of flux rather than being in harmony. Therefore, only the ideal state, not democracy, is capable of creating the conditions necessary for its citizens to attain happiness because it is founded on justice instead of liberty, which produces the harmony of the soul. In conclusion, democratic citizens shall never find true happiness in their political system because liberty is practiced at the expense of the liberties of others, the inherent lack of stability will eventually lead to situation in which individual liberty is rigorously suppressed, and because the pursuit of liberty is futile because it does not lead to true happiness. Democracy truly is the worst kind of government, after despotism.

Threats to Democracy
What threats to "Democracy" presented themselves during the first few decades of independence? How did leaders of the U.S. solve these problems? During the first decades of our premature nations' existence, it is hard to imagine that the United States would evolve to become such a great democracy. A democracy others would prefer to believe with hypocrite reasoning. When the U.S. first won its independence it was a united group of people left to fend for themselves. This group was to become a nation and creating it involved more than winning independence from Great Britain. In 1783, the U.S. was a country forming in its premature stages. By 1787, this baby begins to develop, to become a nation. By 1787, people perceived that their constitution represented what the people desired the U.S. to be; well at least the Federalists presumed this. The AntiFederalists watched for signs that threatened their "republican principals" for which they so recently had fought the American Revolution. After winning the war the unity and optimism among Americans did not translate easily or smoothly into the creation of a strong central government. The Federalists and Anti-Feds were very opposed to eachother's views. By the late 1700's and early 1800's, a deep political division had occurred amongst the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists. Anti-Federalists were mostly from the South, and were labeled "Jeffersonians". Their label came from the fact that they defended slavery and third President, Thomas Jefferson, was known for owning herds of black slaves. Southerners held agreed with many of Jefferson's views. The AntiFeds, Republicans, believed in strict interpretation of the constitution, peaceful foreign relations, and a reduction of the role of the federal government in the lives of average citizens. They were opposed to a strong central government and felt states should hold the power to govern. The Federalists believed that the constitution should be loosely interpreted and that America should follow the spirit of it to make laws and judgements. Federalists wanted to organize the states so a strong federal power could govern over them in order to keep enough power for the economy, war and ruling. Many were opposed to this form of government because it so closely mimicked that of Great Britain. Between these two diverse groups, their followers split the nation. The United States was geographically split North from South. The North was home of manufacturers and industry. Farming was not the North's economic base as was manufacturing. Crops would not grow year around due to freezing weather; therefore slaves were of no need during off-seasons in farming. Here, it was not economically safe or resourceful to own slaves, because of the fact that they were expensive to acquire and maintain. Since slaves were mostly used in manual labor, their use in the North was almost nonexistent. Blacks were not used in factories for fear of them gaining knowledge and accessing power.

In the South, large plantations and small farm owners used slaves for their manual labor of the fields and common household work. Not every household in the South owned a slave, as many people may believe. Only the wealthy could afford slaves. These slaves abducted from Africa were characterized and treated equivalent to animals by their owners. Since slaves were owned, they were property, and they were treated however their holders felt fit. This was a great threat to democracy because it went against what democracy supposedly stood for. Slavery, at the time, was disregarded in the constitution and therefore it can be concluded that the government ignored it. There were greater threats to democracy during the first decades of U.S. independence that are far more important to the significance of the period. Americans held an optimistic view of the nation's "manifest destiny". Manifest destiny meant that the United States would eventually reach from sea to sea no matter what speed bumps it ran into. The Louisiana Purchase in 1803 enabled President Jefferson to partake in this view. The purchase consisted of a vast 885,000 square miles of land for $15 million acquired from France. The purchase was done behind closed doors without the knowledge of the federal government; Jefferson wanted the transaction to be speedy and quiet. James Monroe arrived in France with power from President Jefferson to buy New Orleans and the Floridas for not more than 10 million dollars; he was offered the whole of the French territory for approximately 15 million dollars. Although the American agents had no authority to spend such a large sum, they signed the treaty of purchase on April 30, 1803. It was specifically purchased from Napolean Bonaparte who used the money to build France's grand army with which he planned to conquer many nations. This was a great threat to democracy because the president went behind the people's backs and negotiated with France. This agreement, which was very beneficial to France, had other nations such as Great Britain in an uproar. Although it was a quick decision for Jefferson, it was a good one for the U.S.; the size of the nation doubled with the stroke of a pen. Another great threat to democracy was the Burr Conspiracy of 1804. Burr became involved in a bizarre plot to separate the West from the rest of the nation after a series of events. He lost the presidency in the election of 1800 to Jefferson and became vice-president. As vice-president, Burr created difficulties for the president. Burr's strange behavior during the election of 1800 raised suspicions that he had conspired to deprive Jefferson of the presidency. Whatever the truth may have been the vice-president entered the administration under a dark cloud. Burr was an ambitious man and it was frustrating for him to deal with the minor roles that the vicepresident was in charge of. In the spring of 1804, Burr decided to run for governor for the state of New York. During this edgy time high Federalists were planning the succession of New England and New York from the Union. Alexander Hamilton, secretary of treasury, made comments about Burr that he insisted made him lose the election. Burr then challenged Hamilton to a duel, which Hamilton accepted reluctantly. Unfortunately Hamilton, a magnificent man for our nation, was shot and killed by the vice president in New Jersey on Nov. 11, 1804. Due to the murder of Hamilton, Burr fled to the west in seek of gaining followers there. Jefferson was slow but successful in meeting this first real threat to the new American union.

Aaron Burr was accused of making a treasonable effort to set up an independent government in the Southwest and his career laid in shambles. The War of 1812, a strange war, helped the U.S. finally feel free from Great Britain. In 1811, there was a strong anti-British mood in Congress. A group of militant representatives, some of them elected to Congress for the first time in the election of 1810, announced they would no longer tolerate national humiliations. They called for action, for resistance to Great Britain, for any course that promised to achieve respect for the U.S. and security for it's republican institutions. These aggressive nationalists, many of them from the South and West, have been labeled "War Hawks." The group included Henry Clay, a Kentucky congressman who served as Speaker of the House, and John C. Calhoun, a brilliant South Carolinian. The people felt that Britain's lingering dominance was threatening to their democracy. Britain was on the verge of forming peaceful relations at the time that the U.S. planned to wage war, for their own reasons. James Madison, President at the time, had reason to ask Congress to wage war. The War Hawks were putting pressure on him and at the same time his major aim was to force the British to respect American maritime rights, especially in Caribbean waters where Britain had possessions. Even though the U.S. was not ready to go into war, and Republicans in Congress were reluctant to help the military gain needed resources, the votes in Congress to wage war outnumbered those against. The war persisted until 1815. After the war ended, there was the Battle of New Orleans, which was not even supposed to have transpired. Poor communications disabled the military from learning drafts for a peace treaty had already been written up. The British, led by General Edward Pakenham, landed an assault on the Americans, led by General Andrew Jackson, whose army was very well defending their positions. In a short time the British force was destroyed and the Americans had only suffered light casualties. The victory was significant in military terms but it was more important in creating a base for a much-needed source of pride for Americans. After this war, the U.S. felt free from foreign threats to their independence and way of life. The greatest threat to our democracy has been a man, President Andrew Jackson. This "Military Hero", served his term during 1828-1836. He was a public figure who came to symbolize the triumph of democracy. The election of 1828 saw the birth of a new era of mass democracy. After losing the election of 1824, he came back to win in 1828 by devising penetrating ways to win peoples' votes. The mighty effort on behalf of Jackson featured the widespread use of such electioneering techniques as huge public rallies, torchlight parades, and lavish barbecues or picnics paid by his supporters. His campaigning techniques proved successful and as president he came to be known as "a man of the people". Jackson found the modern political party (today's Democratic Party) and set down most the foundation of our politics today. As the seventh president of the United States, he was simultaneously the best-loved and the most-hated president the young nation had known. Jackson believed the president was directly responsible for the nation's good, and so he set a new example for future presidents by being a more active and responsible leader. When he did not agree with Congress, he freely used the right of veto. His six predecessors, between them, had vetoed only nine bills. Jackson

vetoed 12, besides frequently using the pocket veto. Jackson was the first to make the presidency a powerful office. Through his aggressive leadership and patronage, Jackson had welded together a vigorous new party--the Democratic Party. He might have been a great threat to democracy but there have been many threats to this grand nation since the days of its birth that has benefited it. This great democratic nation is constantly expanding its horizons to accommodate new technology and satisfy generation after generation of Americans. No empire in history ever been built that can compete with the grand United States; if its democracy is mighty enough, it shall out last any threat to its existence.

American Democracy
The paper in which I chose to write about is American Democracy. When the thirteen British colonies in North America declared their independence in 1776, they laid down that governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. This meant that they wanted a government for the people, run by the people. This is one of the basic ideals upon which our nation was founded. The colonies needed to have a written constitution to define and therefore more specifically limit government powers. After the Articles of Confederation failed to work in the 13 colonies, the U.S. Constitution was created in 1787. One ideal found in the Preamble of the Constitution is the ideal that majority rules. In our government, the Congress uses majority rules to pass bills, through Congress and the President. As there are so many checks and balances, sometimes they dont even make it as bill. This is one of the ideals found in the Constitution. This separation of powers, within the three co-ordinate branches, the legislative, executive, and judiciary branch has no supremacy over the others. This was designed to prevent any branch, from infringing individual liberties safeguarded by the Constitution. Our constitutional rights are very important. Without these rights, the United States would not be any different from other places of the world that do not have as many rights. Our rights secure our liberties and ensure justice for all. I believe the Constitution was such a great document necessary for achieving American Democracy. This document was very concise in its expressed powers. In the words of James Madison, If men were angels, no government would be necessary. This was from Federalist #51 and states the only way government wouldnt be needed is if we all were perfect angels and we wouldnt need rules. The Declaration of Independence means to me that all men and women join freely together to make an equal government for the U.S. This is basically said in the preamble by a famous quote: "All men are created equal." The ideal of our government have remained true over 225 years. The U.S. grants its citizens with the rights such as freedom of speech and freedom of religion, etc,

which separates us from other countries. I think that all countries should be able to decide what government they want to have until they harm the United States of America in any way. Then we should try all peaceful ways to negotiate and if none of that works we should use armed forces. In conclusion the American political system has about as many strengths and as many weaknesses, but it evens out in the long run. If our democracy consisted of all strengths it would not be fair and equal to all citizens. We are all different and have different beliefs and values so a utopian democracy is not possible. We live in a democracy that has succeeded mainly because it has changed with society. We the people have the right to run the government and if we are not satisfied with the government, we have the power to change it, because we are a democracy.