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Asian Journal of Political Science

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Conceptualizing BRICS: OPEC as a Mirror

Theodor Tudoroiu
a a

Centre for International Peace and Security Studies, Montreal, Quebec, Canada Available online: 30 May 2012

To cite this article: Theodor Tudoroiu (2012): Conceptualizing BRICS: OPEC as a Mirror, Asian Journal of Political Science, 20:1, 23-45 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2012.673857

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Asian Journal of Political Science Vol. 20, No. 1, April 2012, pp. 2345

Conceptualizing BRICS: OPEC as a Mirror

Theodor Tudoroiu

BrazilRussiaIndiaChinaSouth Africa (BRICS) is a popular yet poorly conceptualized group. This article builds a parallel between BRICS and OPEC in order to assess the former using a weak cognitivist version of the regime theory. The five countries created an international regime whose members cooperate in view of acquiring, collectively and individually, increased influence in international financial and economic institutions. As they do not concern this domain, the diverging interests of the five members do not hamper the rather limited socialization process at work and the implicit development of the regime. However, they will most likely prevent BRICS from reaching generalized political cooperation. Consequently, the group can be expected to increase its influence significantly in comparison to the present level but not to become one of the worlds leading actors. Keywords: BRICS; OPEC; International Regimes; Brazil; Russia; India; China; South Africa Introduction The BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) acronym was Goldman Sachs 2001 bestselling item. It was bought indiscriminately by governments, mass media, academia and the people in the street. First, the term has incontestable mnemonic and symbolic virtues. Then, small is beautiful: the menacing emerging world was reduced to four challengers. They are major, well-known countries easy to locate on a mental map. Therefore, simplicity is BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) best feature.1 Yet, efforts to conceptualize this apparently simple term have been scarce. There is an impressive literature on BRICS in terms of markets and economic growth. Jim ONeill and his very active Goldman Sachs team (see Goldman Sachs, 2012) have inspired a large number of investment-oriented followers. In fact, they frequently
Theodor Tudoroiu, PhD, is an Associate Researcher at the Centre for International Peace and Security Studies, Montreal, Quebec, Canada. Correspondence to: Theodor Tudoroiu, 307-3125, Boulevard des Trinitaires, Montreal, Quebec H4E 2S2. Canada. E-mail: tudoroiu@hotmail.com
ISSN 0218-5377 (print)/ISSN 1750-7812 (online) # 2012 Editors and Editorial Board, Asian Journal of Political Science http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2012.673857

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analyse the five countries together with other emerging economic powers. In political terms, on the contrary, there is a trend to isolate the groups members and to study their respective foreign policy separately. The main actors are China and Russia, with India as a less present partner. Brazil and South Africa are frequently placed in categories of their own. The few Political Science authors that explore the concept of BRICS use frameworks for conceptualizing the workings of the global economy (Armijo, 2007: 910; see for example Muller, 2011; Davydov, 2010; Estrin and Prevezer, 2011; Vlad et al., 2011; Kurecic and Bandov, 2011). Ngai-Ling Sum (2010: 543) even analysed the Cultural Political Economy of BRIC, examining the rise of discourses about the BRIC economies and about their implications for power shifts in the world system. International Political Economy (IPE) is undoubtedly useful in explaining the origins and development of BRICS as it was in the cases of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) or the European Union (EU). Yet, the latter two examples show that such organizations acquire rapidly an influence on world affairs that goes far beyond the narrow IPE domain. Like OPEC and the EU, BRICS should be conceptualized in a broader International Relations perspective. This has been seldom done. One of the obvious reasons is the groups still timid joint actions. BRICS has a long way to go in order to become a fullyfledged world actor. But there are also the atypical characteristics of a group that does not fit the classical definition of an international organization. Its situation is reminiscent of that of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). As M. S. Rajan wrote in 1990, the nomenclature of the policy is settled by general practice. But the meaning of the concept of non-alignment still remains undefined and/or confusing to both writers and statesmen (Rajan, 1990: 2). This also applies to BRICS. The NAM BRICS comparison is interesting because both are groups of emerging states challenging the global pre-eminence of the West. In terms of theoretical analysis, however, BRICS is similar to the NAM only up to a point. The Non-Aligned Movement was a very large and extremely heterogeneous group in many ways similar to the present emerging world of which BRICS is but a vanguard. What is needed, then, is to identify an already well-studied vanguard of the NAM and use it in order to assess BRICS. This article is based on the idea that the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries represents such a useful comparison term. The next section briefly presents this organization and shows that it reasonably mirrors BRICS features while its functioning can be well explained by the theory of international regimes. The ensuing section builds the theoretical framework*represented by a weak cognitivist version of the regime theory*needed in order to support the OPEC-BRICS comparison and to analyse BRICS in more detail. Then, the five BRICS members are presented. This is followed by the description of the groups progressive institutionalization. Finally, BRICS is analysed as an OPEC-type international regime that develops due to a process of international socialization. The latters consequences will increase the groups unity and, implicitly, its effectiveness and international influence. However, BRICS probably will not evolve towards an international community.

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The OPEC Mirror In the mid-1970s, OPEC was one of the best known organizations in the world. Still, in a way reminiscent of BRICS, many prefer to see only its economic dimension: OPEC is in many ways a cartel*a group of producers that attempts to restrict output in order to raise prices above the competitive level (Zycher, 2011). This is technically true but also misleading. OPEC was established in 1960 as a joint political initiative representing a nationalist response to an economic colonialism . . . . OPEC was, therefore, primarily a political creation (Skeet, 1988: 222). All its actions were highly political and had enormous consequences on the geopolitical map of the planet. The OPEC members differed widely in most of their characteristics. They had in common only the fact of not belonging to the developed world; the reliance on petroleum export revenues as a mainstay of their economies; and the primacy of the state in the ownership, acquisition and disposition of oil revenues (Amuzegar, 1999: 12). It is frequently claimed that the tendency of individual producers to cheat on a cartel agreement is a long-standing feature of OPEC behaviour (Zycher, 2011; see also Griffin and Xiong, 1997). The success of the organization, however, is due to the strong solidarity among its members despite differences in ideology and politicoeconomic philosophy (Amuzegar, 1999: 31). In 1960, the West still had an overpowering political, military and commercial influence in the developing world. In this context, the creation of OPEC was a considerable and unexpected achievement (Skeet, 1988: 25). As the Financial Times put it in February 1961, it is, indeed, the psychological effect of OPECs very existence which may have the most important consequences (Ibid.)*a statement that describes perfectly the present perception of BRICS. But developments in the late 1960s allowed OPEC to go beyond the psychological level and take the upper hand in designing a new international oil order (Amuzegar, 1999: 30). In purely political terms, the weight of this new actor became very visible in 1973. The organization took advantage of the reaction of its Arab members to the ArabIsraeli war and imposed its complete control of the world oil prices (Skeet, 1988: 106). Soon, OPECs political agenda went far beyond the ArabIsraeli conflict. This was illustrated by the Solemn Declaration adopted by the First Summit of the Sovereigns and Heads of State of the OPEC Member Countries held in March 1975 at Algiers. Its content showed how far OPEC had come, how its relatively parochial interests of the 1960s had burgeoned into an international role for the 1970s (Ibid.: 125). OPEC (2009: 3) went as far as contemplating a defence dimension. Perhaps more importantly, the organization called*exactly as BRICS does today*for the establishment of a new international economic order based on justice, mutual understanding and a genuine concern for the well-being of all peoples (OPEC Secretariat, 2009: 8). This was more than simple rhetoric. OPEC (2009: 2) considered that it served the larger and ultimate interest and progress of the world community because it acted in the direction hoped for by all developing countries, producers of raw materials, in defence of the legitimate rights of their peoples. The Solemn Declaration thus reflected

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the optimism and expectation of the Less Developed Countries for whom OPEC had become a champion; not necessarily the one they would have chosen or trusted, but one that held a hand of cards that for the first time might stand up to the trumps permanently held by the OECD. (Skeet, 1988: 127128).

The immediate expression of this solidarity was the January 1976 establishment of the OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID), a multilateral development institution seeking to promote cooperation between the member states and other developing countries. OPEC played also a leading role in the setting up and financing of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (OPEC Secretariat, 2009: 25, 12). The second oil boom of 19801981 marked the zenith of OPECs glory, power and wealth (Amuzegar, 1999: 34). However, a downward trend soon followed. The oil supplies from non-OPEC sources overtook OPECs output by 1 million barrels per day in 1982 (Ibid.). Today, OPEC is responsible for only one-third of the worlds petroleum output. Its political influence has declined accordingly. Yet, the structural crisis has not hampered the development of the organizations agenda. Sustainable development and the protection of the environment were addressed by the Solemn Declarations of the second and third OPEC Summits held in 2000 and 2007, respectively (OPEC, 2009: 15, 2022). Incidentally, in 2009 almost identical elements were included in the Joint Statement of the first BRIC Summit (BRIC, 2009). OPEC has been characterized by a low level of institutionalization. Its supreme authority is the Conference consisting of Heads of Delegation who are the Ministers of Petroleum, Oil, Energy or equivalent portfolio of the member states. The Conference meets at least twice a year and operates on the principle of unanimity. It is responsible for the formulation of the general policy of the organization and the determination of the appropriate ways and means of its implementation (OPEC Secretariat, 2009: 2). None of the other main bodies*the Board of Governors, the Economic Commission and the Secretariat*plays a major role. To sum up, the creation of OPEC was due to Third World nationalism directed against Western economic neo-colonialism. By taking full control of their own petroleum resources and of the associated world market, the member states challenged the NorthSouth power relations and implicitly the very structure of international relations. This was done on the basis of an emancipation ideology that was common to all developing countries during a period strongly marked by anti-colonialism and antiimperialism. In other words, OPEC functioned as a vanguard of a much larger movement. Its main actions were of course limited to a narrow domain. Furthermore, the effects of the oil price shocks affected indiscriminately developed and developing countries. It can be even said that the latters fragile economies had more difficulties in adjusting to the new situation than Western ones. Aware of the danger of being perceived as selfish profiteers, the OPEC countries intensified their pro-Third World discourse and adopted effective financial measures proving their solidarity with the developing world. These legitimating efforts were not the only possible choice. At the same time, the newly industrialized states of Eastern Asia did not present themselves systematically as anti-Western champions of the Third World. If OPEC did, this

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indicates that the organization found clear political advantages in placing itself in the larger context of the NorthSouth confrontation. These advantages were twofold. On the one hand, such an orientation helped its members to seek individually and collectively a leading political role at regional and global level. This approach*best illustrated by the 1973 crisis*was far beyond the realist aspirations of countries like South Korea or even Japan. On the other hand, the governments of the OPEC countries (most of which were undemocratic) could take advantage of the tiersmondiste ideology to legitimate themselves domestically. 1979 Iran is of course the best example of what could happen when a pro-Western OPEC leader failed to do so. Overall, the extremely heterogeneous member states of an organization with a low level of institutionalization were able to enforce an ambitious political programme and to respect a group discipline that ensured otherwise unimaginable individual and collective benefits. The main explanation lies with the members awareness of their common interests. This led them create a set of principles, norms, rules and decisionmaking procedures that have been in most cases respected despite the absence of a strong institutional structure designed to enforce them. This situation is best described by the regime theory. As shown in the next section, OPEC has been an international regime that guided the behaviour of its members with a view to optimizing collective outcomes. The similarity between OPEC and BRICS is striking. Both are very heterogeneous. Both have weak institutional structures. Both have used their economic potential in order to increase their international influence and contest non-violently the Western hegemony. Both have presented themselves as champions of the developing world in its fight for a more balanced and just international order. Finally, OPEC succeeded in imposing itself as a major international actor while BRICS is advancing on the same way. This is why BRICS can be analysed with the same instruments as OPEC. More specifically, its creation and functioning can be explained with the help of the regime theory. International Regimes Theory The theory of international regimes originated in Charles P. Kindlebergers (1973) hegemonic stability theory. The label itself (international regime) was first used by John Ruggie in 1975. The classical definition of the regimes was coined in 1982 by Stephen Krasner (1983: 2) : Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors expectations converge in a given area of international relations. In the second half of the 1970s and during the following decade the concept of regime became increasingly fashionable. Robert Keohane turned it into the backbone of the neoliberal institutionalism. He interpreted the liberal international arrangements for trade and international finance as responses to the need for policy coordination created by the fact of interdependence (Keohane, 1984: 8). In this perspective, international regimes seek to realize specific policy ends through the

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establishment of mechanisms of coordination and cooperation and the elaboration of internationally agreed normative prescriptions, which can guide the behaviour of relevant actors with a view to optimizing collective outcomes (Nilsson et al., 2009: 341). This rationalist approach emphasizes a functional perception of shared needs and interdependent interests by states, as autonomous, rational utility-maximizers that brings about more or less permanent cooperative arrangements based on common norms and institutions (Ibid.). More recent approaches have been influenced visibly by the sociological turn of the International Relations. They tend to define international regimes as social institutions created to respond to the demand for governance relating to specific issues arising in a social setting that is anarchical (Young and Zurn, 2006: 121; italics added). Consequently, in their 1997 book and 2000 Review of International Studies article, Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger identified three schools of thought within the study of international regimes: realists, who focus on power relationships; neoliberals, who emphasize constellations of interests; and cognitivists, who base their analyses on knowledge dynamics, communication, and identities (Hasenclever et al., 1997: 12). It is clear that the realist approach is hardly appropriate when dealing with the internal dynamics of OPEC or BRICS. Due to the volume of its petroleum production, Saudi Arabia was perhaps the most important OPEC member and as such influenced in a number of cases the final outcome of the decision process within the organization. But nobody has ever claimed that this can be equated with hegemony. The decisions of the other members were certainly not imposed by the Saudis in the framework of a power relationship. This is also true for China and BRICS. The second, liberal approach seems more appropriate, despite the fact that in most cases it also emphasizes the role of the hegemon. The neoliberals believe that institutionalized cooperation of states for managing conflicts and interdependence problems is more advantageous than relying on self-help strategies. This is true even if, in the short term, self-help action may seem to produce greater individual benefits or less individual costs (Rittberger, 1995: 9). This approach, well illustrated by the prisoners dilemma, could be used to explain OPEC group discipline and most of the elements related to the OPEC cartel. But it is less useful in going beyond the petroleum market and analysing OPEC as a vanguard of the non-aligned states. There, pure rational choice was involved but it is likely that other, more complex elements related to the member states perceptions and beliefs were also important. This is why I prefer the third, cognitivist approach in order to analyse both OPEC and BRICS. Its most ambitious branch, strong cognitivism, claims that knowledge constitutes states and enables them to engage in both power games and cooperative ventures (Hasenclever et al., 1997: 138). In fact, this view goes as far as rejecting the conception of states as utility maximizing, rational actors. Instead, a different behavioural model is preferred: the state making a foreign policy decision asks what is appropriate for it to do in a given situation, rather than how it can maximize its individually defined goals (Ibid.: 1112). International institutions are prerequisites for, rather than consequences of, rational choices. The robustness of international

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regimes is therefore perceived as considerably greater than neoliberals suggest (Ibid.: 138). Yet, it is difficult to admit that the reasons of OPEC and BRICS behaviour have not been mainly rational. Knowledge was undoubtedly important, but in addition to, and not instead of, rational choice. This situation is better accounted for by the weak cognitivist approach which is complementary*and not an alternative*to the rationalist theories. In this view, the demand for regimes in international relations depends on actors perception of international problems that is, in part, produced by their causal and normative beliefs. In turn, these beliefs are considered partially independent of actors material environment. In other words, the weak cognitivists do accept states as rational utility-maximizers. But they believe that the perception of utility depends on knowledge. This knowledge is irreducible to material structures and thus possesses the status of an autonomous variable (Ibid.: 137). This means implicitly that interests are not given; the preferences of the states are to be seen and to be treated analytically as depending on the actors understanding of the natural and social world (Ibid.: 140). Moreover, weak congnitivism stresses the importance of intersubjectively shared meanings for both regime formation and regime performance. The choice of a substantive body of rules depends on the existence of a minimum of collective understanding of the issues at stake (Ibid.: 141). Another key concept is learning. Joseph Nyes simple and complex learning as well as Ernst Haas adaptation and learning illustrate the two types of responses of the states to structural changes in their environment. The first is but a search of more adequate means to meet the new demands. The second, on the contrary, means that the members of an organization are induced to question earlier beliefs about the appropriateness of their goals and to think about the selection of new ones (Ibid.: 146147). More recently, many of these aspects have been developed by the students of international socialization. The latter can be defined as a process in which states are induced to adopt the constitutive rules of an international community (Schimmelfennig et al., 2006: 2). In his introduction to the 2005 special issue of International Organization on International Institutions and Socialization in Europe, Jeffrey Checkel (2005: 804) identifies two types of international socialization. In the framework of Type I internalization or socialization,
agents may behave appropriately by learning a role*acquiring the knowledge that enables them to act in accordance with expectations*irrespective of whether they like the role or agree with it. . . . conscious instrumental calculation has been replaced by conscious role playing.

This rather limited type of socialization is generally preferred by rationalist and weak cognitivist approaches. Strong cognitivists favour the more advanced Type II internalization/socialization that goes beyond simple role playing. It implies that agents accept community or organizational norms as the right thing to do. They adopt the interests, or even possibly the identity, of the community of which they are a part. Conscious instrumental calculation has now been replaced by taken-forgrantedness (Ibid.). This is a process that may have affected the members of the European Union, but certainly not those of OPEC or BRICS. Their behaviour is

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much better described by the Type I internalization/socialization process. Checkel also outlines three mechanisms involved in the process of socialization: strategic calculation, role playing and normative suasion. They are associated to three modes of rationality that may contribute to socialization outcomes: instrumental, bounded, and communicative (Ibid.: 805). Given the rather limited reach of the first two (incentive-based) mechanisms, normative suasion is normally needed in order to complete the switch from a logic of consequences to one of appropriateness and ensure Type II socialization. But OPEC and BRICS did not and will probably never go that far. In their case, strategic calculation and role playing are the only mechanisms at work, corresponding to instrumental and bounded rationality, respectively. Indeed, OPEC has always functioned on an incentive basis. The member states created a cartel, which is to say that their approach was based on strategic calculation. Furthermore, rational choice was in part responsible for choosing the role of antiWestern, Third World vanguard: political benefits were much more important than the limited financial costs implied by the creation of the OPEC Fund for International Development. This instrumental rationality has remained an important OPEC feature up to date. Yet, beliefs were also significant. They influenced both the creation of the organization (anti-imperialist nationalism) and the relation with the developing nations (advocacy of Third World emancipation). They made the functioning of OPEC clearly different from that of a simple alliance.2 Basically, there was a learning process that led to Type I socialization. Role playing became an important element of OPEC members behaviour. Despite occasional cheating, their respect of the commonly agreed production quotas showed that OPEC countries understood and assumed fully their role of members of an international regime. This role was also visible during the negotiation of the quotas. A non-hegemonic alliance could have not survived half a century of external crises and internal contradictions. OPEC did because its members conformed to what was expected from them and, even under the most unfavourable circumstances, made efforts to come to a reasonable compromise instead of breaking away. Role playing was also extended progressively to the OPEC developing countries relationship. Both as a group and individually, the member states adopted the behaviour that best suited their self-assumed role of Third World vanguard. In the early 1960s, this was at best a political project. The 1975 summit confirmed its transformation into a political reality. Ever since, the actions of the OPEC members have respected this line despite their decreasing ability to influence world affairs. The process of international socialization did not, however, lead to Type II socialization. The identity of the OPEC states did not change fundamentally. The organization did not evolve towards a community. The process that led Western Europe from a common market to the European Union is simply absent. OPEC has been and will remain an international regime. This is much more than an alliance but considerable less than a community. The evolution of BRICS has respected and will most likely continue to respect the same pattern. Therefore, it can be best assessed using the same weak cognitivist version of the regime theory.

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BRICS: Unity in Diversity Undemocratic capitalist China (Zweig, 1999) is today the global centre of manufacturing and the major export platform of the cross-national production network (Liang, 2007: 130). In gross domestic product (GDP) terms, it represents half of BRICS (see Table 1). The post-totalitarian, authoritarian neo-communist regime in Beijing draws its legitimacy mainly from two very different sources: economic growth and nationalism. These two elements are in fact representative for two not necessarily overlapping Chinas. The first is a de-territorialized, post-modern great power using globalization to invade the world with its goods and emigrants. The second is a classical, purely territorial empire that is obsessed with issues like Tibet and Taiwan. The resulting foreign policy agenda can hardly be coherent. Yet despite displeasure with certain aspects of the international order, China has mostly accepted that order and decided to fix its problems by reforming it from the inside (Glosny, 2010: 116). Consequently, Beijing does not antagonize systematically the United States but tries to accelerate the evolution towards a multipolar international system. BRICS is one of the instruments. In this perspective, the claim that China needs the BRICs much less than the other three countries do (Ibid.: 109) is a matter of opinion. India is demographically comparable with China but more than three times poorer. Its economy is still quite inward-oriented (Sinha and Dorschner, 2010: 80) and consequently the export performance has hardly been encouraging (Desai, 2007: 803). Furthermore, economic growth has not eliminated large scale poverty. Numerous domestic problems ensue. Worldwide, Indias foreign policy was traditionally symbolized by a porcupine*vegetarian, slow-footed and prickly. The famous defensiveness of the porcupine became the (countrys) hallmark (Narlikar, 2007: 984). Things started to change in the early 1990s. Today, New Delhis influence in international forums such as G20 or World Trade Organization (WTO) is unprecedented, but does not go beyond the level of a de facto veto-player status (Ibid.: 985). As India still has not articulated a coherent strategic vision of what it hopes to achieve with its emergent power status and aspirations (Sinha and Dorschner, 2010: 77), much remains to be done in order to complete the countrys transformation into an Asian tiger. However, two things are clear. Indian policymakers are reluctant to abandon the current nonaligned status. And they are genuinely interested in working with the United States instead of challenging the American dominance (Ibid.: 88). Despite the involvement in BRICS, caution permeates Indian attitudes towards some of their partners. More specifically, there remains considerable suspicion of China and guarded and lukewarm fondness for Russia (Ibid.: 97). The latter has been the most vocal advocate of BRICS. This is due mainly to the fact that, like the Soviet Union before it, Russia is militarily strong, economically weak, and determined to command a major role on the world stage (Hancock, 2007: 96). Demographically shrinking, it exports little more than natural gas and oil as well

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Table 1. BRIC and Selected Developed States Indicators

China 2010 GDP (in trillion current US$) 2010 GDP per capita (in current US$) 20012010 Average GDP growth (in%) 2010 Population (in million inhabitants)
Source: World Bank, 2012.

India 1.73 1,474 7.7 1,171

Russia 1.48 10,439 4.9 142

Brazil 2.09 10,710 3.6 195

South Africa 0.36 7,275 3.5 50

United States 14.6 47,198 1.6 309

Japan 5.46 42,831 0.7 127

Germany 3.28 40,152 1 82

5.93 4,428 10.5 1,338

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as military and nuclear energy equipment (Ibid.: 72). For years, rising oil prices gave the illusion of strong economic growth. This changed due to the world crisis. Politically, Russia is a rather weak actor outside the Commonwealth of Independent States. Consequently, it has been seeking external allies that could enhance its international position. Since the mid-1990s, its most important long-term strategic ally has been China (Ibid.). The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is the instrument intended to defuse the two countries rivalry over Central Asia. The next logical step was the creation of an alliance with Beijing as well as New Delhi, Moscows second most important emerging power partner. This is how Russia became the leading proponent of transforming the BRICs from an investment strategy into a recognized coalition of emerging powers bearing significant implications for international relations (Roberts, 2010b: 38). Moscows BRICS diplomacy has been one of its most successful international initiatives and possibly its most important contribution to the general progress towards a multipolar world. For its part, Brazil represents half of South America and has the capabilities to be a regional leader (Armijo and Burges, 2010: 21). But outside Latin America, Brazilian bi- or unilateral actions are infrequent and lack significant effects. Events such as Luiz Inacio Lula da Silvas failed Iranian adventure (The Economist, 2010a, 2010b) are exceptional. On the contrary, Brazil has become an effective political entrepreneur at the global level, initiating and participating in multilateral fora (Armijo and Burges, 2010: 14). As a peaceful and democratic soft power (see Sotero and Armijo, 2007: 5164), it shows a clear preference for multilateralism. It demands reform to international institutions that could accommodate Brazils great power aspirations (Haslam and Barreto, 2009: 10). It also contests certain normative elements of the world order which hold developing countries back from autonomous development (Ibid.). Indeed, on issues of style, inclusion, and distributive justice Brazil is a developing country (Armijo and Burges, 2010: 14). Consequently, a number of its policy preferences for the international political economy remain closer to those of the modal poor country, as illustrated by Brazils positions in many international fora (Sotero and Armijo, 2007: 6465). But unlike China or Russia, Brazil is closely tied to the West by culture, history and geography (Ibid.: 64). Its core public policy instincts embrace familiar Northern preferences: liberal, and mixed-capitalist, democracy (Armijo and Burges, 2010: 14). Therefore, Braslia will most likely preserve good relations with the United States and Western Europe (Sotero and Armijo, 2007: 44). These links make a Russian-style, anti-American foreign policy improbable. However, they do not prevent Brazil from trying to enhance its international position through alliances with other developing countries. In fact, Brazils leaders have participated enthusiastically in the BRICs process (Armijo and Burges, 2010: 34). The most recent member, South Africa, is rather special. Demographically, it represents only a third of Russia and a quarter of Brazil. In GDP terms, the ratios are a quarter and a sixth, respectively (see Table 1). Moreover, economic growth is anaemic. There is growing scepticism about South African economic management (Draper, 2011; 212). Certain authors speak of structural weakness, stemming from

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serious domestic problems of a social, political and economic nature (Andreasson, 2011: 1165; for details, see 11751178). South Africa is nevertheless the largest African economy. This economic weight and the legacy of soft power derived from the peaceful transition from apartheid to democracy turned it into a major regional player (Draper, 2011: 207). This status was enhanced by a unique reputation*that of having unilaterally disarmed its nuclear arsenal; by South Africas predilection for multilateralism and its willingness to exert moral influence in multilateral fora; and by its multilateral championing of the global Souths cause (Kemp Spies, 2010: 75; 78). Equally important for the overall influence of the BRICS, South Africa is the only African member of G20. Consequently, the unprecedented diplomatic efforts of President Jacob Zuma to secure BRIC membership for his country were successful. South Africa was invited to join the group in December 2010. It became a full member in February 2011 (Andreasson, 2011: 1173). A comparison of these portraits can lead to the conclusion that the five BRICS countries are quite dissimilar, do not share common political interests, and are not a natural trading bloc (Sinha and Dorschner, 2010: 88); they lack coherence (The Economist, 2010c). Consequently, the notion of the BRICs countries as a set appears forced (Armijo, 2007: 9); the category of the BRICs is thus, strictly speaking, a mirage (Ibid.: 40). Yet, the same comparison cannot ignore the existence of a significant number of common features. First, these are populous countries that dominate demographically at least their respective regions. Second, they are the largest economies outside the OECD (except for South Africa). Third, they have impressive growth rates. Fourth, they are and regard themselves as developing countries with substantial numbers of poor people. Fifth, they do not belong to NATO-type political and military alliances and do not have special, JapanUS style relations with other major powers. Sixth, they are or try to be recognized as regional powers. Seventh, they have a long history of contesting or at least questioning Western supremacy as communist, non-aligned, or almost non-aligned countries. Eighth, they have an explicit or implicit interest in pushing towards a multipolar international system that would enhance their role in world affairs. Ninth, they retain a large measure of respect for American power and resiliency (Roberts, 2010a: 8) and do not reject openly the present structure of the international system. Rather, they prefer soft actions whose cumulative effect will become visible in the long term. And tenth, they share the conviction that the first step of their joint strategy should be the demand for more influence and decision power in international economic and financial institutions. It is this rather solid common basis that made possible the construction of BRICS. Institutionalizing BRICS Between 2001 and 2005, BRIC was only an investment strategy. The political chronology of the group (Ministerio das Relacoes Exteriores, 2010) started in September 2006 with a meeting, repeated one year later, of the four Foreign Affairs

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Ministers on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly session. In 2008 there were five common events, including the same ministers first stand-alone reunion. At Yekaterinburg, Russia, they institutionalized BRIC, agreeing to hold regular meetings of the foreign ministers (Chaudhury, 2009: 51) and the finance ministers (Roberts, 2010a: 2). In 2009 there were seven common events, including the first BRIC Summit. By then, the four countries ambassadors were meeting monthly in Washington to coordinate a common BRIC policy strategy (Margolis, 2009). In the first four months of 2010 the number of BRIC events increased to 10. They included the second summit, a meeting of the agriculture ministers, four reunions of high ranking officials as well as gatherings of BRIC commercial banks, BRIC development banks and even BRIC think-tanks (The Economist, 2010c). The Braslia Summit was followed by a flood of new events, which continued to multiply in 2011 and 2012. There have been meetings of health ministers, high representatives on security, science and technology senior officials, competition authorities, national statistical authorities and mayors of BRICS cities. A Business Forum and an Academic Forum were also created (Ministry of External Affairs, 2012). This impressive development shows that the five countries are committed to transforming the group into an effective, fully institutionalized structure. Its profile was clearly outlined at the three summits. The first was held in June 2009 at Yekaterinburg, described for the occasion by President Dmitry Medvedev as the epicenter of world politics (Gorst, 2009). That same day, the Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva published an article entitled Em Ecaterimburgo, os Bric atingem sua maioridade. It was perhaps too early for such an ambitious claim, but the group was indeed able to show how it envisaged to bring new answers to old problems. As Lula put it, we live between surpassed paradigms and discredited multilateral institutions. BRIC would provide responsible leadership with the objective of reconstructing the global governance and sustainable growth for all (Lula da Silva, 2009). The summits Joint Statement asked clearly for a more democratic and just multi-polar world order while emphasizing the BRIC strong commitment to multilateral diplomacy with the United Nations playing the central role. The groups role was not only to serve common interests of emerging market economies and developing countries, but also to build a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity (BRIC, 2009). In the context of the financial crisis, the Joint Statement asked for greater voice and representation in international financial institutions for the emerging and developing economies (i.e. for BRIC itself). In a section reminiscent of pro-Third World OPEC statements, the document addressed the situation of the poorest countries, sustainable development and global food security. Climate change was also mentioned, but it was on intra-BRIC cooperation that the Joint Statement insisted. The four states agreed upon steps to promote dialogue and cooperation . . . in an incremental, proactive, pragmatic, open and transparent way (Ibid.). This already clear political programme was expanded and detailed by the Joint Statement of the second BRIC Summit, held at Braslia in April 2010. In fact, the eight-page document contains paragraphs on multipolar world order, multilateral diplomacy,

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the groups role and intra-BRIC cooperation that were almost copied-and-pasted from the Joint Statement of the previous summit. But some other points were expanded to full titles. One of them dealt with International Economic and Financial Issues. More bluntly than one year earlier, it called for an ambitious conclusion to the ongoing and long overdue reforms of the Bretton Woods institutions bringing a substantial shift in voting power in favour of emerging market economies and developing countries (BRIC, 2010). The section on the developing countries included separate titles on development, agriculture and fight against poverty. Similarly, energy and climate change were each addressed in a title. Intra-BRIC cooperation mentioned no less than 10 sectoral initiatives (mostly meetings and conferences of ministers, high-level officials, banks, cooperatives and businessmen) as well as other important manifestations of our desire to deepen our relationship. The latter even included a feasibility study for developing a joint BRIC encyclopedia (Ibid.). The third summit was held in April 2011 at Sanya, Hainan, China. The main points of the resulting Sanya Declaration were very similar to those of the previous Joint Statements. The inclusive and non-confrontational character of the groups approach was also reiterated (BRICS, 2011). There were, however, two major new elements. The first was the confirmation of South Africas joining, which turned BRIC into BRICS. The enlargement was presented as a bridge linking BRICS with Africa for further cooperation. BRICS would become a SouthSouth cooperation mechanism covering Asia, Europe, America and Africa (Wenping, 2011). The second novel element was the inclusion in the declaration of a point stating BRICSs deep concern with the turbulence in the Middle East, the North African and West African regions; in approaching such crises, the use of force should be avoided. Cooperation in the UN Security Council on Libya was also mentioned (BRICS, 2011). This latter point had no immediate consequence. It is, however, significant that, as stated by a senior Brazilian diplomat, BRICS is turning into a political structure that tries to forge common positions on a host of global issues: We are no longer a creation of Jim ONeill (Blanchard, 2011). The BRICS picture is now clear. It is a rapidly institutionalizing political framework that has not yet reached the status of a fully-fledged international organization. Even minimal permanent structures, such as an international secretariat, are still missing. It is nevertheless obvious that the stage of a simple political alliance has been surpassed. The groups objectives are well formulated, coherent and realistic. Like OPEC at its time, BRICS knows what it wants and is constructing the appropriate institutional instruments. Moreover, South Africas joining suggests that the group is not hostile to further enlargement. This first step is probably a test. If BRICS benefits from the South African contribution, new accessions might be envisaged.

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BRICS as an International Regime BRICS sceptics use two main arguments to predict the groups failure: the many differences between its members and their diverging or contradictory interests. Consequently, they dismiss the BRICS summits as a paper exercise similar to the Non-Aligned Movement that will prove heavy on rhetorical flourish but unlikely to significantly change the unipolar status quo (Sinha and Dorschner, 2010: 88). A more refined analysis acknowledges BRICS contradictions and lack of homogeneity, but asks a different question: whether the BRICs countries form a set because they have a similar type of influence in, or equivalent implications for, the international political or economic system (Armijo, 2007: 9). The major differences between OPEC members such as Venezuela, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia, for example, did not prevent them from cooperating effectively within the organization, which allowed the latter to project its influence on the world arena. Moreover, the same is true even for opposing interests. Iran and Iraq were involved for eight years in a brutal war. As they tried to destroy each other, the two Gulf states had very few common interests. Still, both remained members of OPEC and took part in the OPEC decision-making process. The war required huge financial resources that would have been unavailable without the OPEC control of the petroleum market. Tehran and Bagdad were therefore forced to cooperate within OPEC in order to increase their capability of fighting each other. The same reasoning can be applied to BRICS. Russia and China may be rivals in Central Asia, but this is not a reason to stop common efforts directed at improving their respective positions at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The above mentioned sceptics refuse to see things in this light due mainly to a conceptual confusion. Involuntarily, they perceive BRICS as the embryo of a future community. It is clear that a political and economic community such as the European Union or a security community such as NATO cannot reunite countries with significantly diverging interests. But this is not the case of an international regime such as OPEC. The regimes typically concern only one domain, a given area of international relations to quote Krasners definition. Therefore, diverging interests*and, in extreme cases such as that of Iran and Iraq, even open hostility*can exist in fields that are not covered by the regime. For sure, they limit the overall socialization process and thus prevent the transformation of the international regime into a community (a trajectory that OPEC did not follow). Yet, they do not necessarily affect the functioning of the regime*be it on a purely rational choice basis*in its specific domain. The conclusion is that the BRICS countries may have certain diverging interests, but these are unimportant for the development of the group as long as none of them concerns the fields covered by the BRICS regime. Moreover, as none of these contradictions is comparable with those of the IranIraq war, the BRICS cooperation can go beyond strategic calculation and include Type I socialization. The latter can only increase the groups homogeneity and coherence and, consequently, the effectiveness of its actions as well as its international influence.

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At this point, the constitutive elements of the BRICS regime have to be analysed. First, its domain of action has to be identified. Strictly speaking, for the time being the regime concerns mainly the cooperation of its members in international financial and economic fora in view of strengthening their individual and collective influence as well as contributing to the progressive transition towards a multipolar world. This is rather logical, as the five countries are emerging economic great powers. At a later stage, their cooperation might spill over to other related domains. But predicting future developments would be pure speculation. The claim that the joint actions of the five countries already concern a broader, political domain cannot be supported with solid arguments. Presently there are no signs of such generalized cooperation. Furthermore, the already mentioned diverging interests will most likely prevent it in the future. Second, the regimes set of implicit or explicit principles and norms was created formally by the Joint Statements and the Declaration of the three BRICS Summits. Their role is in fact comparable with that of the Solemn Declaration adopted by the OPEC 1975 First Summit at Algiers. The BRICS documents established the fundamental principle of acting, mainly through multilateral diplomacy, in order to create a more democratic and just multipolar world order. This would serve the common interests of emerging market economies and developing countries, but would also help building a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity. A more specific, short-term goal was also established: to help the emerging and developing economies acquire greater voice and representation in international financial institutions (BRIC, 2009). Like OPEC some decades earlier, BRICS did not want to give the impression of a selfish group trying to get rich and influent. Much more ambitious*and altruistic*objectives were therefore chosen. Such an alliance is not just an economic one, but an initiative to create a just world order (Chaudhury, 2009: 51). An interesting point was emphasized by Jerry Harris (2005: 7): Theirs is not a surrender to imperialism, but an attempt to build a bulwark against it, from which they can implement their own national strategies for development. This is not to say that Russia will suddenly give up its great power policy and behave kindly towards Georgia or Moldova. The five BRICS states adopted this democratic and just stand only within the regime, i.e. with regard to each other and their joint actions undertaken in the BRICS framework. Most likely, the Kremlin will continue to bully Tbilisi. But at the same time it will act within G20 to increase the weight of emerging and developing countries, Georgia included. This might seem cynical, but it is a realistic, effective strategy that is qualitatively different from that followed by the non-aligned movement after Bandung (Ibid.). The sections of the two Joint Statements and of the Sanya Declaration on development, agriculture and fight against poverty are intended also to show BRICS commitment to helping the developing countries. Overall, BRICS is closely mirroring the OPEC approach of presenting itself as the champion of the Third Worlds struggle for political and economic emancipation.

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Third, the more practical level of the regimes rules and decision-making procedures is still in the making. The 2009 Joint Statement mentions steps to promote dialogue and cooperation between the members in an incremental, proactive, pragmatic, open and transparent way (BRIC, 2009). The 2010 one presents no less than 10 sectoral initiatives meant to increase intra-BRICS cooperation (BRIC, 2010). The 2011 Sanya Declaration includes a fully-fledged Action Plan with specific sections on enhancing existing cooperation programmes, new areas of cooperation and new proposals to explore (BRICS, 2011). It is obvious that BRICS institutional structure has not yet reached maturity. And even when it does, it is likely that most decisions will continue to be taken by the heads of state or government on an ad-hoc basis. Unlike OPEC, BRICS has to deal with matters much more complex than the price of an export commodity. The various problems facing the group require specific negotiations and a high level of adaptability both within BRICS and in the larger framework of its political and economic environment. Some of these negotiations need to be conducted at the highest level. It is therefore probable that BRICS will never reach OPECs institutional rigor and simplicity. Fourth, the explanation of the groups creation and development has two components. One is incentive-based. It is clear that the five countries cannot obtain individually or using temporary alliances the same results as a stable group that approaches international negotiations on the basis of coherent, well prepared and well implemented strategies. The OPEC-style decision of presenting BRICS as a vanguard of the emerging and developing states is also, in part, due to a costbenefit analysis. The economic and political weight of the five countries can only be enhanced by the favourable attitude and the effective support of the Third World. Strategic calculation is therefore essential in explaining BRICS. But it is not the only explanation. Beliefs play also an important role. Each one of the five countries has the option of forging a special relation with the West*and, more precisely, with the United States*that could be more advantageous than the BRICS formula. In fact, Russia under Boris Yeltsin made such an experiment. Its failure highlights the difficulty of accommodating the beliefs of the Russian elite and society with the Kremlins rational choice decision of adopting a pro-West stand. This is only in part related to the respect of Western-style democratic values and human rights. The Russian*as well as Chinese, Indian, Brazilian and South African*perception of international problems, both at regional and global levels, stems from a number of factors that include history, culture, nationalism and great power status and ambitions. The five states are rational utility-maximizers, but only on the basis of national interests that reflect their understanding of the international environment. Such beliefs create affinities and natural solidarity between the rather similar BRICS states as well as between them and other emerging countries, while hampering their cooperation with the West. This predisposition was, in addition to strategic calculation, the cause of the BRICS formation. A process of learning ensued. The interactions within the group as well as between the group and its international environment (negotiating within G20, for example) made the five states learn

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progressively their BRICS role. As shown by the increasingly similar statements of their leaders (Lula da Silva, 2009; Medvedev, 2010), the BRICS states started to act in accordance with their mutual expectations: conscious instrumental calculation has been replaced by conscious role playing (Checkel, 2005: 804). Through this Type I socialization, the BRICS international regime started to take shape. The process has only begun and it will probably continue for a long time before reaching the stage of a mature, fully institutionalized regime. But, no matter how mature it becomes, this is a rather superficial form of socialization that does not have profound consequences on the identity of the regime members. This is most visible at the societal level. The citizens of Belgium consider themselves citizens of the European Union (itself the result of Type II socialization) and may act as such. The citizens of Venezuela will never consider themselves citizens of OPEC. Similarly, Chinese citizens should not be expected to think they are BRICS citizens. This does not prevent their government from respecting strictly the group discipline imposed by BRICS role playing. Yet, even for that government the process is reversible. In 2008, Indonesia became a net importer of oil. It withdrew from OPEC and the next day its role-playing simply disappeared. The BRICS regime is a complex, rational- and belief-based political construct. But its effects on the member states are rather limited and cannot be compared with those of a Type II socialization process leading to the creation of an international community. The positive side is that the more superficial Type I socialization is simpler and faster. The six-year old BRICS regime is already functioning while decades are needed to create a fully-fledged international community. Fifth, the degree of success of the BRICS regime is best assessed on the basis of the results of joint actions undertaken by its members. Unfortunately, it is too early to have enough such results. It is true that the available information is positive. Already in 2005 analysts claimed that the BRICS collective might within the G-20 is already forcing concessions on trade, agriculture and subsidies from the US and EU (Harris, 2005: 7). This was before the formal creation of the group. When it took place, the BRICS countries elaborated coherent strategies meant to enhance their negotiation potential. The 2009 Joint Statement mentioned the close cooperation among members to ensure greater voice and representation in international financial institutions for the emerging and developing economies at the next G20 Summit (BRIC, 2009). The action was a success and President Medvedev could triumphantly state thanks to a common approach, we were able to successfully redistribute 5 percent of voting shares in the IMF and 3 percent in the World Bank in favor of emerging and developing economies at the G-20 Summit at Pittsburgh (Medvedev, 2010). Indeed, the Pittsburgh Summit Leaders Statement expresses the agreement to reform the global financial architecture to meet the needs of the twenty-first century. It acknowledges the fact that critical players need to be at the table and fully vested in our institutions (Pittsburgh Summit, 2009). It goes without saying that BRICS states are prominent among these critical players. Moreover, the increasing role of G20 itself represents a victory for BRICS as it provides a framework for direct and balanced

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negotiations between BRICS and the developed countries. However, these positive results are too few to justify assessing the regime as clearly successful. Equally important, little is known about the conducting of intra-BRICS negotiations or the five states possible divergences. Results that have the appearance of a success for the group might in fact prove frustrating for some of its members. In the long term, this can make the dissatisfied countries leave the regime. Symmetrically, the failure of common actions undertaken by an international regime does not necessarily mean that individual member states perceive their participation in the regime as useless and will consequently choose to leave. They can identify other, individual benefits that justify their continuing involvement. This means that the success of BRICS can be assessed on the basis of a different element than its record of international triumphs. Indeed, Michael Glosny aptly analysed how China has benefitted both collectively and individually from its participation in BRICS. Most of the elements he identified can be applied to the other four countries. As BRICS members, they stabilize the international environment and prevent encirclement; exchange ideas and experiences; coordinate BRICS positions and improve bargaining position with Western countries; hide in a group to avoid negative attention while advancing their agenda; help other developing countries; strengthen their identity as developing countries; restrain American hegemonism and revisionism; and minimize dependence on the United States by exploring options other than the United States (Glosny, 2010: 100; 111 115). This shows that BRICS countries have good reasons to continue their cooperation even if some of their joint actions fail. The overall benefits go far beyond the simple securing of more IMF votes. To conclude, BRICS*the tag [that] seems to have permeated the public domain and become synonymous with change, emerging markets and growth (The Economist, 2010c)*closely mirrors the objectives, structure and development of OPEC (see Table 2). It is an international regime created on both rational choice and beliefs-related bases. It uses the economic potential of its members to challenge the present, Western-dominated world order. Furthermore, it presents itself as a vanguard of the emerging and developing countries in order to secure their solidarity and support. Still in its early stages of development, the regime is constructing an institutional structure that will most likely remain very simple. A process of learning and Type I socialization is also taking place. The five member states are increasingly assuming the BRICS role playing, acting in accordance with their mutual expectations. This will progressively improve their coordination and increase the effectiveness of BRICS international actions, thus enhancing the groups global influence. At present, the regimes main domain of action is the cooperation in view of acquiring increased influence in financial and economic international fora. In the long term this already successful process, as well as a possibly enlarged political agenda, are supposed to contribute to the progressive evolution towards a multipolar world. It is important to note that the BRICS consensus on non-violent, smooth contestation of the present world order will restrain the behaviour of its most radical

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Table 2. OPEC and BRICS Main Features

Main Features Current number of members Year of creation First publicized event Type of structure Degree of institutionalization Type of socialization Socialization mechanisms Key documents Main objective Long-term objective OPEC 12 1960 First oil shock (1973) International regime Low Type I Strategic calculation and role playing 1975, 2000 and 2007 Summits Solemn Declarations Control of the world oil market Establishment of a new international economic order based on justice, mutual understanding and a genuine concern for the well-being of all peoples Economic and social development, eradication of poverty, energy, protection of the environment Developing countries BRICS 5 2006 First Summit (2009) International regime Very low; still developing Type I Strategic calculation and role playing 2009, 2010 and 2011 Summits Joint Statements and Declaration Increased influence in international financial and economic institutions Creation of a more democratic and just multipolar world order based on the rule of international law, equality, mutual respect, cooperation, coordinated action and collective decision-making of all states Sustainable development, global food security, fight against poverty, energy, climate change Emerging and developing countries

Other fields of interest

Presents itself as champion of which countries

members. This can only reduce the probability of future Russian or Chinese American crises. What remains unknown is in what measure the regime will be able to expand its domain of action. Nobody denies the existence of diverging interests between the BRICS countries in certain political, security and economic fields currently not covered by the regime. This does not hamper the present cooperation, but the regime cannot be expanded to include those fields. Such an important limitation will most likely prevent BRICS from reaching generalized political cooperation. If this is the case, the BRICS regime can be expected to increase significantly its influence in comparison to the present level but not to become one of the worlds leading actors. Notes
[1] S was added to BRIC after South Africa formally joined the group in February 2011. Consequently, this article uses BRIC and BRICS for the periods before and after this date, respectively. An alliance can be dened as a close association of nations formed to advance common interests or causes (American Heritage Dictionary, 2012). Historically, certain alliances were institutionalized and, in the unique case of NATO, even evolved towards an international

[2]

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community. But these are exceptional cases. Normally, an alliance implies only a certain degree of coordination of strategies, policies and actions. Its creation and functioning are rational choice-motivated and are not accompanied by a process of socialization. Institutionalization is inexistent or, at best, rudimentary. This implies the dissolution of the alliance as soon as the causes that led to its creation cease to exist.

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