Vince A.M.

Klsters

 Human beings are members of a whole, In creation of one essence and soul. If one member is afflicted with pain, Other members uneasy will remain. If you have no sympathy for human pain, The name of human you cannot retain.

Saadi, Persian Poet (c. 11841283)

Cover image contains combined images from Wikimedia Commons

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Faculty of Arts, Radboud University Nijmegen

American-Iranian Relations and the Nuclear Turn Addressing the Perilous Enmity between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran

Vince A.M. Klsters

A thesis written for the partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in North American Studies at Radboud University, Nijmegen

Supervisor: prof. dr. J.H.J. (Jac) Geurts

e-mail: v.a.m.klosters@student.ru.nl student number: 0823465 Nijmegen, January 2013

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List of Illustrations
1. Conceptual model for this thesis 1.1 Waltz's model of international politics 1.2 Van Evera's offence-defence theory 1.3 Wendt's model for the codetermination of institutions and processes 1.4 Wendt's diagram of political cultures 2.1 Spheres of influence in Persia ca. 1907 2.2 Power structures within Iran 2.3 The states surrounding the Persian Gulf 2.4 The territory gained and lost during the Iran-Iraq War 3.1 Iran's nuclear facilities 3.2 The range of Iran's ballistic missiles 3.3 "Bibi's bomb" 4.1 Israeli attack routes 4.2 Different bombs' capabilities to destroy Iranian underground facilities 4.3 Iran's oil infrastructure and exports in 2011 4.4 Nixon's handshake with Zhou En-lai 5 14 18 21 23 30 33 36 41 50 55 58 73 76 84 92

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Preface
In early May 2012, I was attending a lecture on the Iranian nuclear programme and its effects on the regional balance of power, given by dr. Vali Nasr. After an enlightening exchange between him and Meir Javendanfar, an Israeli-Iranian expert on Iran, the audience was invited for questions and comments. An official of the Iranian embassy in the Netherlands stood up and affirmed the peaceful intentions of Iran, and further elaborated upon Iran's official policy. A seemingly enraged man -- at the least he was impassioned -- stood up and protested against this official being given a platform for the Iranian government's voice. He passionately talked about his family having been imprisoned and murdered, indirectly because of the said official. It was briefly after this moment that I realised that any treatise on policies surrounding Iran would do injustice to the grievances, conflicts, and experiences of individuals. After this meeting, seemingly undisturbed by this man's plea, some guests entered a casual conversation with the official and exchanged business cards. Regardless of the veracity and severity of this man's claims, this seemed not to be the time and place for resolving or discussing his grievances. Politics, in Hans J. Morgenthau's words, seems to remain an "autonomous sphere of action," sometimes even in reality. I realise that this thesis often overlooks personal experiences and the reality for the people 'on the ground'. Nevertheless, I hope to present to the reader ways of looking to a more peaceful future. A required, but insufficient, condition for improvements for the Iranian people is stability and peace in the Middle East. The purpose of this thesis is to show that it is in every state's interest to pursue this state of affairs and to provide a theoretically informed policy rationale for pursuing it. Unfortunately, it will also touch upon the discord between reality and rationalism.

Table of Contents Cover Page Title Page List of Illustrations Preface Table of Contents Introduction
1 - The Iranian Quagmire 2 - Research Objectives 3 - Theoretical Framework 4 - Methodology 5 - Thesis Structure

i iii iv v vi 1
1 2 4 5 6

1.

National Interests in the International System: Constructed Realities

1.1 - Introduction 1.2 - Hans J. Morgenthau: Politics as an 'Autonomous Sphere of Action' 1.3 - Kenneth N. Waltz: The 'Structure of International Politics' 1.4 - Alexander Wendt: The 'Socially Constructed Structure' 1.5 - Conclusion: Channelling Reality's Complexity

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8 9 13 19 25

2.

The Persian-Iranian Legacy: Between Pragmatism and Fanaticism

2.1 - Introduction 2.2 - The Persian Heritage: 'The Centre of the Universe' 2.3 - The Islamic Revolution: 'Neither East, nor West' 2.4 - The Iran-Iraq War: A 'War until Victory'? 2.4 - Conclusion: Pride, Phobiae, and Pragmatism

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27 28 32 38 43

3.

Iran In International Relations Today: The Nuclear Turn

3.1 - Introduction 3.2 - The Nuclear Turn: Explaining the Nuclear Issue's Centrality 3.3 - The Nuclear Turn: Explaining Western and Regional Policy Responses 3.4 - Iran's Take: A Peaceful Assertion of Iran's Prowess 3.5 - Conclusion

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45 46 52 60 66

4.

The Road to Rationality: Proposed Policies and their Merits

4.1 Introduction 4.2 The Offensive Option 4.3 The Pressure Option 4.4 The Rapprochement Option 4.5 Conclusion

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69 70 78 86 96

Conclusion: From a Vicious to a Virtuous Cycle A1 List of Abbreviations and Acronyms A2 Bibliography
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99 103 104

Introduction
"In the modern world, America is the symbol of arrogance, in the negative and detestable sense of the word. Otherwise, it is not just a matter of opposing a particular race or nation. The important matter is that each nation has a sense of honor and an identity, and is unwilling to allow foreign powers to make its honor an object of ridicule through bullying and deception. Each nation has a source of wealth and does not want its wealth to be plundered." Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Khamenei (2009) For several years, and in 2012 in particular, the Iranian nuclear crisis has often dominated the debate in American foreign policy circles. It has been a slowly moving crisis indeed, with threats of war waxing and waning. In a sense, one can no longer speak of a crisis in the truest sense of the word. The Iranian nuclear programme is but one of the many elements exacerbating the three decades old enmity between the United States and Iran. As we know, many other states possess (possible) military nuclear capabilities far greater than Iran's potential without dominating the national security agenda; indeed, Iran's nuclear advancements are only problematic because of the way American-Iranian relations developed in the wake of Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution and Israel's role within the American and Iranian political psyches. As the opening quote shows, there is a historically entrenched opposition between the United States and Iran. The two countries went decades without effective communication, a situation characterised by mistrust and oscillating tensions. Thus, without any substantive process in the year 2012 -- a year rife with threats from either side to undermine or attack the other -progress in alleviating the potential threat posed by Iran's nuclear programme has been limited, at best. As a result, the nuclear turn in American relations with Iran has so far only been perceived as a national security concern. This nuclear turn is the increasing centrality of the nuclear programme in AmericanIranian relations. As this thesis will show, this turn takes on special significance in the greater context of international politics, historical experience, and perceived threats on both sides. Often predictable failures in negotiation are the result of a failure in adequately taking into account this greater context. 2013 will prove a yet another crucial year.

1.

The Iranian Quagmire

Clearly, the current situation surrounding the Iranian nuclear programme is not a durable one. Moreover, all those states involved agree that the current situation in the Middle East is an undesirable one: whether it is the hawkish logic of some American policymakers stating that Iran is the single most important threat to worldwide peace, the Israeli perception that Iran is increasingly developing into an existential threat, or the Iranian view that the Middle East is unstable because of the intervention of certain 'arrogant powers'. It would be a nave goal indeed to try and reconcile these radically divergent points of view. It is clear, however, that the West and Iran are once again at odds. The problem with most contemporary accounts of these tensions is that they often implicitly assume this state of affairs to be self-evident. Policy prescriptions are often biased towards the historical experience of one side without taking into account the sensitivities and fears of the other side. This thesis will grapple with two main problems which emerge from these observations. On the one hand, it will reframe the common accounts of the situation surrounding the Iranian nuclear programme to include historical experiences and lessons from more than one side. On the other hand, it will seek to combine a 'dispassionate' methodology of international relations theories with this historical awareness to tackle the problem of selection bias. This methodology will then be applied to solve the first problem: that many accounts of policies towards Iran fail to interrogate the objective rationale for many of the policies followed by both Iran and the West. 2. Research Objectives

Much has been written about Iran's history and Iran's position in the greater Middle East and the world at large. Much has also been written about the role of the Iranian nuclear programme in its foreign policy and the policy dilemmas it creates for Western countries, and the United States in particular. And, finally, many theories of international relations have been used to analyse and describe current policies, predict the future behaviour of states, and to prescribe future policies for states. This thesis seeks to combine the best of these three worlds in order to accomplish three main goals. Firstly, it aims to provide a picture of the influences on the perceptions and concurrent policies regarding the nuclear programme of Iran, and Iran's position in the international system in general. It strives to do so through providing an overview of the most important historical threads influencing states' behaviour regarding this issue, and by utilising theories of international

relations (IR) within a conceptual model to explain both historical experiences and the contemporary situation of international politics. Secondly, it aims to judge both existing and possible future policies on the basis of the lessons provided by these historical experiences and the IR theory surrounding it. Suggestions for future policies will be judged on the basis of how they would build upon the lessons learned from the historical experience and the insights provided by IR theory. In turn, a secondary 'side-effect' is that this research may contribute to the practical application of theory and possibly modify its predictive and descriptive value by showing the limits of the existing paradigm. Different theories carry different degrees of explanatory value for different cases. Thirdly, it seeks to fill the lacunae in combining academic insights with real-world implications surrounding the Iranian quagmire. By virtue of its interdisciplinary approach, it seeks to provide nuance and in-depth consideration of the quagmire surrounding Iran. Oversimplifications, generalisations, and categorisations are the result of natural human tendencies and requisites to understand the world. Of course, this thesis necessarily uses such devices, but seeks to unravel the most commonly held (mis-)conceptions. To accomplish these goals, this thesis will seek to answer the following question: "Keeping in mind the nuclear turn in American-Iranian relations and the shared historical experience, which policy or set of policies would best serve the American -vis Iran?" A three-stage foundation will be laid by answering three sub-questions: (1) Which theories can be used to describe, prescribe, and judge foreign policy-making? (Ch. 1) (2) What are the historical threads influencing Iran's foreign policy-making and 'national character' and how do they affect the significance of the nuclear turn? (Ch. 2) (3) What is the role of the nuclear turn in Iran's foreign policy-making and other states' visions on and policies towards Iran? (Ch. 3) While the main research question seems most relevant to the situation surrounding Iran today, the separate sub-questions also carry significant value on their own as a work of reference for future research to build upon or for policymakers and academics to base their suggestions on. In a sense, this thesis also provides an extended 'checklist' of matters which need to be taken into account when formulating policies towards Iran. national interest vis-

3. Theoretical Framework In order to answer the research question and achieve the set objectives, this thesis will combine various disciplines which are not often presented in combination with one another. Often, researchers seek to provide a solely historical or international relations perspective on the issue at hand. This thesis, instead, will use an interdisciplinary approach and combine insights from international relations (Chapter 1) and history (Chapter 2) in order to provide a well-informed judgement on current visions and policies (Chapter 3), and what future policies should look like (Chapter 4). It will use two political realist approaches, together with a social constructivist approach, to give meaning to the historical experiences, as well as current and future policies. Political realism assumes that international politics revolves around the use of power and that states seek to maximise their security. Social constructivist theory modifies this statement and says that power has different meanings in different situations, and adds the crucial insight that relations between states are not a given but are socially constructed; states(-men) have an image of another state(-man) and act upon that image, an image constructed as a result of shared histories, relations of power, and (mis-)understandings. This collection of meanings forms the 'political culture'. One might then ask: why include the realist paradigm of international relations? And, indeed, this thesis generally assumes that states shape the reality around them by giving meaning to relations of power, thus giving it a social constructivist character. Like persons, states are affected in their behaviour by their memories and perceptions. Not relations of power, but perceptions of these relations shape behaviour. But, for states as for persons, realities of power also constrain the potential range of actions and policies. Realism's insistence on the key role of power in international politics still carries important lessons for post-Cold War policymaking (Wohlforth, 2011). Moreover, the first type of realism discussed, classical realism, is more open to the role of ideas in international relations, and provides the foundation on which both its realist successor and its constructivist descendant are built. Whether states perceive others as a threat or not, they always think in some form of a 'balance of power', and they always see some other states' increase in power as a threat to themselves. The second realist theory, structural realism, provides a stepping stone towards social constructivism: states are pushed and shoved to act in certain ways by the international system, and their capabilities relative to other states in the end determine what foreign policy options they have.

Social constructivism is, in a way, the icing on the cake. It builds upon earlier realist insights (e.g. 'balance of threat') and argues that power indeed matters, but that states' perceptions of other states and the relations between them greatly shape the meaning of and reactions to this power. The realist emphasis on power still matters, but since states make policy based on perceptions of reality, and not a given reality itself, the socially constructed nature of interstate relations carries the day in how policies are made. Unlike a singular focus on theory and the contemporary constellation of international relations, the approach to this thesis is predicated on the assumption that states are also greatly influenced by their history. Citizens of a state uphold and pass on their 'collective memory' in processes of socialisation, memorisation, and ritual enactments in the broadest sense (Wendt, 1999: 163). For this reason, my approach to historiography consciously includes the assumption that the imagined histories of people(-s) influence both the way they give meaning to the world around them and with what preconceptions and predispositions they approach this world. 4. Methodology

Figure 1 - The conceptual model for this project

Following the theoretical framework, the basic setup of this thesis and a rough role division of the chapters are depicted in Figure 1. What this thesis seeks to explain is the foreign policy of states, which is the dependent variable Y. The roles for the different contributions to this explanation are shown in the independent variables X and the intervening variable Y. This model assumes that the structure of international politics (i.e. the relations of power) and the political culture (i.e. the character of relations) between states influences the domestic
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policymaking on the area of foreign affairs. More specifically, states' perceptions of the nature of international politics influence how they formulate their foreign policies. Thus, (perceptions of) X1 and X2 influence Z in its attempts to formulate Y. While Z is influenced by Y, it is also inspired by the historical experience of the domestic polity, which is assumed to be endogenous, though not primordial, to the polity. While this implies a state-centric approach, the thesis will also touch upon the crucial influences of intra-state politics in making or breaking of foreign policy (Y). Actions on the level of the international system can reverberate and have effects within a country, which in turn affects policies on the international level. The theoretical chapter has been built around three primary authors. While the degree of theory development within this chapter has been kept to a minimum, some comments on how the theory was developed were deemed too important to be abridged. Thus, the build-up of the theoretical chapter does not add content; instead, it seeks to convince the reader of the integrity of these theories and how they help explain both historical and contemporary praxis surrounding Iran. In discussing Iran's history, this thesis has attempted to use a broad-ranging variety of sources to ensure a validity of the findings. Historiographies have been complemented by primary documents, such as speeches and (declassified) policy documents from various perspectives. Scholarly articles often complement these sources to provide additional insights. The same goes for the considerations on contemporary policies, where recent works by academics have been supplemented by a wide range of news sources and primary documents. As stated above, both theoretical and historical threads are of great importance in explaining the contemporary and future policies. Because historical insights are a means to an end, this thesis will mainly focus on the longue dure of Iran's history, focusing on the macro level implications. As such, it does not do justice to the individual Iranian's mind, except for some of the most important leaders. 5. Thesis Structure This thesis consists of four distinct parts. Each of the four chapters starts off with a brief introduction. Each subsequent chapter builds upon the cumulative insights of the previous parts. Chapter one covers international relations theory. Such theory precedes considerations of the reality surrounding Iran. The first section lays down the foundation for international relations theory by looking at Hans J. Morgenthau's classical realism. The second section deals with Kenneth N. Waltz's parsimonious version of structural realism, as well as two of his

contemporaries who have expanded it. A final section builds upon both Morgenthau's ideas on the multifaceted nature of power and Waltz's structural insights to emphasise the socially constructed nature of international politics. The second chapter lays down the most important historical tenets which are useful for explaining Iranian behaviour and policies towards Iran. The first section covers Iran's more distant history, laying down the central threads relevant to Iran's 'historical consciousness' today. It is followed by a consideration on the implications of the 1979 Islamic Revolution for Iran's consciousness. A third section covers a case study on the Iran-Iraq War. Each section within this chapter is concluded by a brief elaboration on what theory has to add to these historical lessons. An austere form of 'discourse analysis' is conducted to evaluate the power of both Western and Iranian discourse in shaping politics. The third chapter combines both solely theoretical and the historical-theoretical insights of the previous two chapters to explain the 'nuclear turn' in Western politics concerning Iran. Firstly, it delves deeper into the progression of the Iranian nuclear programme and its role in politics with the West. It is followed by a section on both neighbouring countries' and Western visions on the Iranian nuclear programme, as well as a section on how Iran views its nuclear programme and what its potential interests are regarding future developments. The fourth chapter builds upon all previous considerations and gives the most direct answer to the main research question. Three sections will cover three general policy recommendations, building upon earlier insights of history, theory, and contemporary debates. This section is most directly relevant to the American policy arena, but also runs the largest risk of being rendered obsolete in its general form. Still, as is the case with the first three chapters, it will present lessons relevant to all dealings with Iran. This section is aimed at both academics and policy-makers.

Chapter 1 National Interests in the International System: Constructed Realities

1.1 Introduction

From ancient Grecian and Chinese thinkers onwards, debates have raged on how national interests of a state are formed and followed. Stemming from such authors as John Locke, JeanJacques Rousseau, and more recently, John Rawls, political philosophers have debated the purpose of the state and in what ways a (hypothetical) society could best protect and serve its citizens. Their debates touched mostly on issues of social justice, a state's range of authority, and rights and duties of citizens. It is their intellectual predecessor, Thomas Hobbes, who defined life without a 'Leviathan', the state, as "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short." As such, governments are often seen as a necessary evil to rein in the human tendency towards unbridled "competition, diffidence, and glory" (Hobbes, 2006: 70). Hobbes' observations can, in turn, be complemented by his intellectual predecessor's. In a situation of anarchy, "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must" (Thucydides, 2009: 302). These proto-realist observations, later formed into assumptions in theories, of self-interest and anarchy are what underlie the 'realist' school in international relations. There is no world government, and both man and the state act in their own interests in the international scene. States would do well to engage in practices of 'self-help', as they can only rely on themselves. Most realist theories also assume that states act rationally to pursue these ends, they are not power-maximisers, but power-optimisers: states will seek an optimum amount of power to pursue their national interests. Thus, the core of realism is quite compact. States, as actors in the international arena, seek to ensure their security by seeking an 'optimal' place in the international arena. Which place is deemed optimal depends on which theory is used. In order to facilitate a structured and methodologically consistent analysis of the tensions between Iran and the world around it, a theoretical framework is necessary. It will merely draw from the elements which have utility for describing and prescribing policies surrounding Iran in the international system today. The first three sections will continue the thread touched upon above, first discussing Hans J. Morgenthau's contributions to the field. He builds upon the worldviews of such (proto)political scientists as Thucydides, Thomas Hobbes, Niccol Machiavelli, and Max Weber. His intellectual descendant, Kenneth N. Waltz, builds upon Morgenthau's political realist theory by elevating it to the level of the 'structure of international politics.' Alexander Wendt steps outside
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the bounds of realism and adds a social constructivist layer to Waltz's structural theory, partially returning to Morgenthau more inclusive theory. A final section, briefly inquiring into the limits of this approach and combining its most important tenets, will conclude this chapter. 1.2 Hans J. Morgenthau: Politics As an 'Autonomous Sphere of Action' "[R]ealists view conflict as a natural state of affairs rather than a consequence that can be attributed to evil leaders, flawed sociopolitical systems, or inadequate international understanding and education" (Holsti, 1995). Holsti's observation summarises most early realists' reasoning, but some early realists had a more nuanced view of how conflict develops and who has the primary agency of deciding where and for what reasons to initiate conflict. Hans J. Morgenthau (1904-79) is one of these realists, his theory often bearing the name of 'classical realism'. Morgenthau is one of the founding fathers of 'political realism', and provides a valuable theoretical contribution for describing and prescribing policy (Lebow, 2003: 28-39). He builds upon and nuances earlier proto-realist assumptions and models that politics is a zero-sum game played by self-interested actors: "he who is the cause of another man's greatness, is himself undone" (Machiavelli, 1992: 8). Morality and ethics are often mere window-dressing to the reality of a struggle for survival and security by acquiring power. In both theoretical and 'applied' realism, a state's primary national interest consists of protecting its citizens and advancing their welfare, as well as ensuring its own survival (Kennan, 1954: 11). The usage of power shapes international relations, and disagreements in international politics revolve around conflicts of interest. According to realists, this "politics among nations" takes place in a world of anarchy, where no single world government holds a monopoly on the exercise of violence. States can only rely on themselves, and there is an inherent uncertainty in trusting other states for support. Realists commonly predict a world rife with conflicts due to this uncertainty and distrust, though almost all realists propose means of mitigating escalations into violence. Morgenthau is no different in this regard. Expanding Political Realism Morgenthau builds upon the Aristotelian idea that "the law has no power to command obedience except that of habit"(Politics: 1269a24). Negotiations in international politics, and international

politics itself, is a manifestation of human nature (Morgenthau, 1948b: 154). The reason why man abides by laws, norms, and institutions is merely because it is in his interest. Thus, looking at a state's intentions is counterproductive, as there is room for dishonesty and radical change, and we should merely look at a state's capabilities and actions. In promoting their interests, power is the main 'currency' which states use to compete with others. However, the content of power is not fixed (Morgenthau, 2006: 10-1). One type of power (e.g. military) might not be as effective in certain domains (e.g. the battle for the 'minds of men') as another (e.g. invasions). It is not necessary to fix a definition of power for this project, but there have been many policy-relevant debates on this issue (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; Dahl, 1957; Lukes, 1974; Nye Jr., 2004; 2011). On the one hand, all politics is a struggle for power "inseperable from life itself" (Morgenthau, 1948a: 17-8), but on the other, politics is "an autonomous sphere of action" (2006: 5). In this "sphere," interests collide to shape a balance of power and "[t]he statesman must think in terms of the national interest, conceived as power among other powers. The popular mind, unaware of the fine distinctions of the statesmans thinking, reasons more often than not in the simple moralistic and legalistic terms of absolute good and absolute evil" (2006: 165) Building upon his elaboration on the nature of politics, both he and George F. Kennan deride the primacy of morality 'divorced from reality' in leading American foreign policy conduct (Morgenthau 1950: 836, 853-4; Kennan, 1954: 49). Kennan admitted that "Americans seemed to lose their feeling for reality generally about foreign policy," alluding to the hopelessly utopian Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, which 'outlawed' offensive war (1954: 15-22). For realists, idealism and moral righteousness in international politics is often tantamount to bad policymaking. Morgenthau and his contemporary realists thus petition to look beyond mere intentions, as a statesman's motives may well be honourable, but the end result might not serve the national interest. Moreover, these intentions inevitably change, leading to uncertainty in relations among nations. Defining a nation's foreign policy according to an often simplistic and Manichean ideological worldview is, in any case, not in the nation's best interest (2006: 159). Successful foreign policies are inherently locked up in a tension with the moral imperative of the statesman, and the trick is to prioritise the national interest and act prudently in the international arena (2006: 159-61).

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Every state operates within the international context of a "balance of power." The balance of power is active at the level of direct human interaction, but also on the level of international politics. Its most important implication is that power can only be balanced by other power. Morgenthau would prescribe a policy of seeking a balance against the strongest power. Building upon geopolitical theory (Mackinder, 1904), it was crucial in Morgenthau's time that no single power (bloc) controlled the entire military-industrial power of the Eurasian landmass (Gaddis, 1982: 25-88; Kennan, 1954: 65). Morgenthau (1955: 440; 2006: 10) knew that his political realist insights often did not describe reality accurately. One of his contemporaries already observed that nations are held together more by "force and emotion, than by mind" (Niebuhr, 1963: 88). Morgenthau paints an image of an ideal of rational foreign policies in the political world, which is simultaneously a rough sketch of reality and an ideal image to strive for. As such, political realism is at least as much prescriptive as it is descriptive. Not surprisingly, Morgenthau would look with apprehension at the US' situation today. A state with little to no opposition in the international scene has a lot of room to conduct a self-destructive foreign policy. Morgenthau's States Morgenthau also developed a typology of various states in the international arena. He created three categories of (1) status quo states, (2) revisionist states, and (3) prestige-seeking states. They have different objectives, respectively "to keep power, to increase power, or to demonstrate power" (2006: 50). The first two have entered the broader political lexicon, as status quo powers seek to maintain a current balance of power, which often favours them, and revisionist powers seek to "[reverse] the power relations between two or more nations" (2006: 57). A revisionist (or imperial) state can seek dominance on a global, continental, or local scale. It can pursue various means of "imperialism" to accomplish its goal, including military, economic, or cultural means (2006: 67-74). After elaborating upon this typology, Morgenthau gives advice on how to tackle imperialist policies, building upon the intrinsic dangers of the 'security dilemma' (2006: 77). First elaborated upon by John H. Herz (1950: 157), the security dilemma is "[a] structural notion in which the self-help attempts of states to look after their security needs tend, regardless of intention, to lead

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to rising insecurity for others as each interprets its own measures as defensive and measures of others as potentially threatening." Morgenthau advises against this situation spiralling out of control by positing that compromise is a viable option after a nation's imperialistic tendencies have whittled away. These tendencies must either be contained or accepted, after which a policy of compromise and dialogue can be followed. Such a suggestion was quite unique following the ostensible failure of appeasement at the advent of the Second World War. The final type of state, a prestige-seeking state, follows a policy of acquiring prestige for the sake of itself, or to bolster either the status quo or its revisionist goals. Prestige is an equally important driving force for Morgenthau, as prestige as a sub-currency in the battle for the "minds of men" seems closely linked to forms of cultural imperialism (2006: 90-2). Prestige is based on a nation's power and others' perceptions of it, a nation's history, and its use of its power resources. True prestige, for Morgenthau, is an exponent of wise and rational statesmanship. Implications Morgenthau's theory, in general, prescribes how states should deal with rival powers, depending on their character. States seeking to maintain a status quo, to expand their power, or to demonstrate their power would be wise to follow rational and prudent policies. And at the dawn of the nuclear age, bearing acute relevance for the situation surrounding Iran, both Morgenthau (2006: 365) and Kennan (1954: 33, 84) warn that the Clausewitzian observation that "war is a continuation of politics by other means" no longer automatically holds as (nuclear) technological advances rush forward. In addition to prescribing prudence, Morgenthau claims that morality is subordinated to the competition between self-interested states, but that it can play a role in justifying and legitimising policies in the autonomous sphere that is politics. His final theoretical contributions for this thesis lie in his conception of power as being multidimensional in nature and its efficacy being dependent upon the context in which it is exercised. And while he describes the international system as consisting of an organic "balance of power" he attributes a significant degree of agency to states in pursuing foreign policy. Of course, reality is often different and this model is used merely to approximate it: statesmen are never fully informed about their counterparts' true intentions, the balance of power only barely scratches the surface of the dynamics of international power politicking, and the full theory itself is a mere sketch of reality. In order to narrow the scope sufficiently, this thesis will

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proceed from Morgenthau's model that politics is an autonomous sphere of action. This will provide a framework for seeking out the facts most relevant to the issue of Iran's position in the Middle East and its troubled relations. As Morgenthau leaves a lot of room for cultural, historical, and ideological baggage in his definition of states' interests and their surroundings, these crucial issues will also be included as an essential foundation for gauging what states' interests are surrounding Iran and its position in the Middle East. 1.3 Kenneth N. Waltz: The Structural Turn " We must come to think of the development of international life as an organic and not a mechanical process. (...) We must learn to take these forces for what they are and to induce them to work with us and for us by influencing the environmental stimuli to which they are subjected, (...) not tearing the plants up by the roots when they fail to behave as we wish them to " (Kennan, 1954: 93). Both Kennan, Niebuhr and Morgenthau were pioneers in the field of modern political realism. As the Cold War developed and remained relatively (!) peaceful in its later years, many concluded -- often in hindsight -- that bipolarity was a stable configuration for the international system to be in. Kenneth N. Waltz (1924-), a 'structural' realist, would utilise Kennan's idea of seeing international politics as tending a garden, being steered by and profiting from the "forces" of international life. In his earlier work, Man, the State, and War (1959), Waltz differentiated between three 'images' of international politics. He does this in an attempt to seek a framework for answering questions of war and ordering these answers. In Waltz's view, there is the image of man itself (the individual), the structure of separate states, and the state system (Waltz, 1959: 12). As Sagunami concludes, "his main thesis is that 'man' and the 'state' are important because we cannot explain particular wars without reference to what they do, but that 'the international system' is important because it explains the possibility and recurrence of war" (Sagunami, 2009: 375). All three images can help explain the causes of conflict, but sometimes, explanations from one image are more important than others. His later work, Theory of International Politics (1979), focuses on the third image of international politics and the structural conditions states are surrounded by. He grapples with the question why state behaviour is similar across the centuries,

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even while the decision-making bodies continually change (Waltz, 1979: 68-9). His answer is that the structure of international politics shapes the conditions in which states must operate. The Structure of International Politics As did Morgenthau, Waltz (1979: 115-6) accepts the main premises of realism that states are the main actors on the international scene, that international politics is anarchic in nature, and that international institutions are mainly the result of states' behaviour and not the cause of it. Waltz (1986: 331) adds to this, however, that states are unitary and rational actors and that they are sensitive to pressures from the international system (the 'structure') to behave in certain ways. Waltz (2010: 93-6) defines the international system according to its most powerful actors, for "[w]hen the crunch comes, states remake the rules by which other actors operate." He typifies the international system as being of some 'polarity', depending on the number of great powers. This includes, for example, a multipolar system at the advent of the Second World War, a bipolar system during the Cold War, and a unipolar system after the Cold War. Indeed, Waltz mostly focuses on how states relate to one another in terms of capabilities, not on how they interact with one another (2010: 80). In his model used in Theory of International Politics below (Figure 1.1), the states X1, X2, X3, etc. interact with one another, their policies N1, N2, N3, etc. influence the structure (the circle) and the structure influences both the states and their mutual interactions, as well as the specific effects of their policies. Thus, "[s]tructures shape and shove; they do not determine the actions of states" (Waltz, 2000: 24). This model is part of the inspiration for the conceptual model used for this thesis (Figure 1).

Figure 1.1 - Waltz's model of international politics (1979: 100)

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This is also where Waltz most visibly departs from Morgenthau. Morgenthau asserts that states' behaviour flows forth from human nature, whilst Waltz maintains that the structure 'shapes' and 'shoves' states into a certain direction.. The difference in capabilities may give rise to different roles for different states, however, and it may also create a degree of hierarchy as more powerful states gain renown in certain domains: "Although states are like units [i.e. differ only in terms of power] functionally, they differ vastly in their capabilities. Out of such differences something of a division of labor develops. (...) The division of labor across nations, however, is slight in comparison with the highly articulated division of labor within them" (1979/2010: 105). The Unitary State's Capabilities and Interests Waltz (1986: 133) also finds it difficult to pin down an accurate measure of power but his model posits that the "political clout of nations correlates closely with their economic power and their military might" (Waltz, 1979: 153). Thus, the unitary states power is determined by the usage and quality of its material capabilities, as they are the ultimate basis for security and independence (Grieco, 1988: 498). As with Morgenthau, it is in a states interest to balance against a preponderance of power. This follows from Waltzs proposition that a states gain in capabilities (which is a unitlevel attribute) only gains meaning when placed in the context of the distribution of capabilities as a whole (which is a system-level attribute), so that relative gains matter more than absolute gains (2010: 98). States are incentivised by structural conditions to act in this way, and could be penalised for not following a strategy of balancing. If they 'bandwagon' with the most powerful states, they could become a vassal or risk losing freedom of action in the foreign policy arena. Thus, states (should) fear potential relative gains in rank by their competitors because these gains could be used against them. This security dilemma-light is posited by Waltz (1979/2010: 105) when he builds upon Morgenthaus discussion of the dilemma: When faced with the possibility of cooperating for mutual gain, states that feel insecure must ask how the gain will be divided. They will be compelled to ask not "Will both of us gain?" but

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"Who will gain more?" (...) Notice that the impediments to collaboration may not lie in the character and the immediate intention of either party. Instead, the condition of insecurity -- at the least, the uncertainty of each other about the other's future intentions and actions -- works against their cooperation" When states attempt to cooperate, they are faced with systemic obstacles in the way of mistrust, uncertainty, and the concurrent rising costs and risks of establishing cooperative ventures. Waltzs theory thus gives states many reasons to engage in competitive relations. Instead of the oft-mentioned Social Darwinism, his theory embeds a form of political Darwinism. Successful states base their success not only on material capabilities, but also by following structural incentives (i.e. to balance against stronger powers). The policies they follow are then emulated by other states. Through a process of competition ("which policies are most successful?") and socialisation ("which policies are best appreciated?"), this emulation leads to further homogenisation of states, adding to his argument that states become like units (Waltz, 2010: 76-7). These best practices survive whilst less successful policies may lead to a less favourable position among other states. In contrast to offensive realism (Mearsheimer, 2005: 17-21), Waltzs defensive form of realism advises against maximising power. In his balance of power-theory, this would inevitably lead to other states balancing against ones rise. One should expect to see balancing acts against the United States today, or against Chinas rise in the future, and debates have raged on whether this is actually happening and whether defensive realisms precepts are correct (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2005; Lieber and Alexander, 2005; Pape, 2005; Paul, 2005). Later realists, to be discussed below, have added more depth to this debate. In Waltzs view, states should in any case seek to follow structural incentives to balance against concentrations of power and to acquire power only appropriately (i.e. optimise) in order to maximise their own security. States are power-optimisers, security-maximisers, and survival-ensurers. Waltz' Descendants Many of Waltz's contemporaries have expanded his theory. Their contributions provide important notions that add depth to Waltz's parsimony. Several of these authors contribute significant concepts useful for my later analysis on the situation surrounding Iran. Two authors' contributions will be briefly discussed.

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Stephen M. Walt Walt's most relevant contribution lies in his development of "balance-of-threat" theory. He adds an extra layer to structural realism, accepting the premise that balancing is the most common behaviour. The determinants of this behaviour change, however. According to Walt, "[r]ather than allying in response to power alone, it is more accurate to say that states will ally with or against the most threatening power" (1985: 8-9, italics his). In sharp contrast to Morgenthau and Waltz, he asserts that states' offensive intentions matter, as well as their offensive capability, aggregate power, and geographical proximity. In contrast to Morgenthau's conception of the security dilemma, Walt distinguishes between offensive potential and defensive efforts. Indeed, "[p]erceptions of intent play an especially crucial role in alliance choices" (Walt, 1985: 12). Therefore, states are not "like units," and they may misperceive one another's threatening intentions. The effect is that they see the other as a threat and seek to balance against it. Waltz purposely avoided focusing on these issues, as it is difficult to accurately measure intent and perceptions thereof. Still, Walt's four factors in determining the level of threat are of significant explanatory and descriptive value when talking about Iran. This is less so for Waltz's theory. Uncharacteristically for realists, Walt even adds a role for "ideological solidarity." This role may lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy in the form of a modified Thomas theorem: "If statesmen believe that ideology determines international alignments, they will view similar states as potential friends and dissimilar ones as potential enemies" (Walt, 1985: 26). Ideological predispositions influence perceptions of which powers are most threatening. Stephen Van Evera Van Evera (1998; 1999) hypothesises that war is far more likely when conquest is easy. His "offence-defence theory" is summarised below in Figure 1.2. Note that his main hypothesis is based on states' calculations on increasing their power through conquest, and not on issues of ideology, emotion, or politicians' preferences.

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Figure 1.2 - The hypotheses of Stephen Van Evera's Offence-defence theory (1998: 12)

Again, perceptions matter. Even if conquest is not easy, it is still possible that statesmen believe that it is. This was, arguably, an important enabling factor for the Iraq War of 2003. A regime's popularity also significantly affects prospects for offensive dominance (Van Evera, 1998: 20). As George W. Bush had significant clout in the aftermath of 9/11, he had a bigger window of opportunity. Luckily, aggressors are often balanced against before they get into a positive feedback loop of increasing returns on their offensive actions (Van Evera, 1998: 15). Van Evera (1998: 24) argues that today's situation is one of defence dominance. The nuclear revolution has significantly added to this state of affairs. The US' bellicosity varies due to shifting feelings of insecurity and perceptions of whether offensive actions against real or imagined threats will be successful (1998: 33-9). I would add to this that perceptions on the potential success of offensive actions will differ when the purported goals of these actions change. It is easier for the US (or any other state) to destroy another state than to build it up again. Implications Many have accused Waltzian-inspired structural realist thought to be ahistorical or even apolitical (Cox, 1986; Ruggie, 1986) and incapable of describing reality accurately. As often touched upon above, Waltz was aware of this and admitted to the parsimonious nature of his structural theory. Deflecting criticism that structural realism no longer held after the end of the Cold War, Waltz
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(2000) predicts that the condition of unipolarity a decade ago would lead to more room for less pragmatic foreign policy. My earlier work (Klsters, 2011) has shown that the 'Bush Doctrine' is a direct fulfilment of this prediction. While structural realism seems to be good at describing only parts of the international system's mechanics, it has great prescriptive value. Waltz's embedding of a form of 'Political Darwinism' into his theory can tell us much about the motives for states rationally adapting their behaviour to respond to the incentives provided by the structure of international politics, i.e. by balancing against concentrations of power in order to seek survival and security. As with Morgenthau, states carry an intrinsic distrust of others and the best way of advancing one's objectives is through self-help. Walt and Van Evera add important notions to Waltz's parsimonious theory. For Walt, power, in itself, is not an immediate threat. It forms the basis for potential threats, and this threat level is determined by a competitor's geographical proximity, (perceived) offensive intentions, and (perceived) offensive capabilities. Also, ideology can play a key role in alliance formation and maintenance, but comes second after pragmatic concerns. And while my brief coverage of Van Evera's theory does not do justice to the complexities he embeds, his 'Offence-defence Theory' provides valuable insights. Shifting perceptions of threats and insecurity make for a fluctuation in states' willingness to engage in offensive actions. Most importantly, when conquest is perceived as being easy, states are more likely to call their citizens to arms. 1.4 Alexander Wendt: "Anarchy is what states make of it" "Realist [theories] of international politics, then, will guard against two popular fallacies: the concern with motives and the concern with ideological preferences" (Morgenthau, 2006: 5). Realist theorists consciously omit certain elements of international politics from their approaches. Reality, however, is socially constructed by those who participate in it. In turn, reality shapes them. Historical experiences and contemporary perceptions all influence how we perceive the reality around us and act upon these perceptions. The same goes for international politics. To make sense of this proposition, Alexander Wendt (1958-) developed a social constructivist theory of international politics in various consecutive works.

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Wendt accepts many neorealist assumptions. The international system is indeed anarchic, states are unitary actors, and they strive for survival. As with Walt, however, threats are constructed according to certain factors. In contrast to Walt, Wendt focuses mostly on the relationships themselves and how they shape international politics. Wendt most visibly departs from realist political theory by focusing on the political culture that shapes and moulds a state's identity and interests. "Motives" and "ideological preferences" do matter in how they shape a relationship and this political culture encompasses the shared understandings and misunderstandings about ideas, interests, and material capabilities (Wendt, 1999: 141). The Mutual Constitution of International Politics For most realists, a state's interests are a given. They flow forth from a state of affairs wherein self-help is the most dominant and rational way of achieving survival and security. At most, processes of interaction and institutionalisation affect rewards and penalties for behaviour and regulate it in realist theories, but do not change an actor's identity and concurrent interests (Wendt, 1992: 392). In other words, the structure of international politics affects state's policies and their outcomes, but not the roles states have and the meaning given to them. More so, an actor's identity is irrelevant in structural realism. For Wendt, this dominance of "self-help" predicted by political realism is a far-fetched assumption (1992: 401). A state's identity is determined by both domestic factors and its relations with others. States define their identities as a result of behaviour towards one another, and these interactions are encapsulated in a political culture. In turn, a state defines its interests differently according to different forms (or "logics") of anarchy. For Wendt, this process of interaction determines how states define their interests. In Wendt's theory (1999: 12, 251-9), states' roles and identities are not unit-level properties, but are determined by the structure (remember that Waltz had only differentiation in terms of capabilities, not roles). A state's participation in and acceptance of institutions -- as a broader concept of norms, concepts, and social roles -- changes not only these institutions, but also how this state defines itself vis--vis others. To Waltz's idea of (what I rephrase as) political Darwinism, Wendt adds these processes of identity and interest formation (1992: 392, 399). Even more so than in Waltz's theory, the structure flows forth from states' interactions. The structure of international politics consists of materials, interests and ideas (Wendt, 1999: 139). Instead of acting on others' relative capabilities, states act on their surroundings on the basis of what meanings they attribute to them (1992: 396-7). Thus, state A's position in the international system is not only determined by its capabilities, but also how state B perceives

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these capabilities, what courses of action they prefer in this political culture, and what actions state B eventually undertakes and how state A perceives this. Wendt's model for this structure of interaction is shown in Figure 1.3.

Figure 1.3 - Alexander Wendt's Model for the Codetermination of Institutions and Processes (1992: 406)

Waltz may be quite effective in explaining the why in clearly polarised international systems, but his theory has little value in explaining how states perceive the world around them and act upon these perceptions. In Wendt's vision. "[i]t is collective meanings that constitute the structures which organize our actions" (1992: 397). Self-help as a dominant and often acceptable "way of life" is therefore a socially constructed institution, and the interests states derive from this institution are not necessarily fixed. Other institutions, such as 'sovereignty', have commonly been conveniently put aside for the sake of 'intervening' (instead of invading) in conflicts abroad. A community of states determines the meaning of such 'intervention', but, of course, such a meaning is often contested outside a certain community of allies.

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The "Logic" of Anarchies and How They Take Shape Thus, for Wendt, and in contrast to Waltz, conflict also flows forth from shared (mis-)understandings and is not necessarily the result of a natural state of affairs (1999: 252-3). Shared understandings and shared meanings do not necessarily imply cooperation. The US and USSR understood all too well that both their (rational) interests and their identities conflicted. Wendt provides an interesting thought experiment in how it is possible that we are stuck in a "self-help" world today. From an "original position" of no interactions, states build up their material resources. These capabilities can change over time, of course, but in principle they are preliminary to interactions. States inherently strive to maintain their material capabilities, but they only attain a "Self" to uphold when in contact with Others (1992: 402). Through their "First Encounter," states acquire a history of interaction with others which shapes their mutual understandings and expectations (1999: 267-8). While this situation has never literally arisen in reality, its value lies in showing that states only abide by certain institutions because of a history of interactions, or "reciprocal typifications" leading to certain expectations and concomitant institutions and interests (1992: 402-5). An important question to ask here is why states have ended up in a primarily "self-help" world. Another form of the security dilemma provides an enlightening illustration. Imagine a community of peaceful and well-intentioned states, with only one or a few predatory states. These peaceful states will find it difficult to form allegiances to counter aggression, and are quickly forced to "fight fire with fire" (1992: 408). Aggression becomes normalised as the predatory states contribute to shared norms and expectations (the political culture), and pacific states are faced with the dilemma of adapting to more aggressive norms or run the risk of being overrun. The peaceful states have to overcome collective action problems in a security-scarce world, with few precedents and much uncertainty of one another's intentions ("if my aggressive neighbour acts in this way, why wouldn't my peaceful neighbour decide to do so as well?"). It is not surprising that we live in a world wherein self-help, often with some window-dressing, is a dominant institution. Hobbes, Locke, and Kant Wendt has established that self-help as an institution is not self-evident, but that it is a likely outcome of international politics. Still, it is possible for nations to transcend egoism and to define their interests in accordance with other states' interests. This is not simply turning a realist zerosum game into a non-zero-sum game ("we can both gain!"), it means changing the inherent

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identity and interests of a state to a new level ("my friends' gains are my gains"). Wendt developed typologies of these various political cultures and their degrees of internalisation in his 1999 work Social Theory of International Politics. Simply put, there are three types of political culture. Such a culture can be Hobbesian, Lockean, or Kantian. These cultures correspond with relationships of enmity, rivalry, or friendship. Thus, relations of power do not necessarily change the structure of international politics, but "[s]tructural change occurs when actors redefine who they are and what they want" (Wendt, 1999: 336-7). In a Hobbesian culture, the Self does not recognise the Other's right to exist and there is no restraint on violence except, possibly, those arising out of external conditions or inadequate capabilities (Ibid.: 260-1). In a Lockean culture, states recognise one another's right to exist (e.g. "sovereignty"), and states tend to practice more restraint and the inherent uncertainty present in international relations diminishes somewhat. States build up a more positive and less conflictual "history of interaction" (1999: 279-82). According to Wendt, this is the world we have (mostly) lived in the last three centuries (1999: 297). The Kantian culture, to be seen within NATO and the EU, eliminates violence as a legitimate means of politics. Friends share security concerns and do not threaten one another with violence. Wendt purposely does not exclude non-violent conflicts, as they may still surface within a culture of friendship (1999: 299). He also does not exclude that states may regress into a more conflictual culture as their relations deteriorate. Adding to Wendt's argument, other states readily frown upon violations of the logics of dominant cultures, as they often have a vested interest in maintaining it and derive part of their identity from it. If a state were to act aggressively towards another state today with the intention of conquering or destroying it, most of the world -- being Lockean in nature -would condemn it out of self-interest (fear of precedents) or identity (violence is not legitimate).

Figure 1.4 Wendts (1999: 254) political cultures and their degree of internalisation, what he calls the multiple realization of international culture.

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Already in his earlier work (1992), Wendt implied that there was a certain kind of (nonteleological) progress towards a less competitive form of anarchy in international politics (409). As states start to cooperate out of mere self-interest, they will improve the odds of future cooperation (1992: 417). There are two factors at work agitating against a general change in political culture, however: (1) once a self-help system is dominant, it is difficult to break out of this cycle towards more altruistic and cooperative ventures, and (2) states, and especially statesmen, might have an intrinsic interest in maintaining a certain political culture (1992: 411). As a result, the rigidity and sustainability of the political culture is dependent upon the degree of internalisation. There are, conveniently, also three degrees of internalisation in Wendt's theory (1999: 269-306). States move from the aforementioned "First Encounter" into a first degree internalisation, wherein the actor is forced to abide by the political culture by others. The second degree of internalisation means that actors follow norms out of simple self-interest and this acceptance of norms is a means to an end. Wendt admits that the line between being forced and acting out of self-interest is vague (1999: 270). We cannot always 'measure' whether someone is being forced into something or what this actor's interests are. The third degree of internalisation encompasses states following norms because they think they are legitimate. This inevitably means that states have a vested interest in maintaining this norm for ideological and possibly pragmatic reasons. Think of Russia and China vigorously protecting their sovereignty in the international arena, which is a Lockean version. Most ideal is a third degree Kantian culture, and a third degree Hobbesian culture ("it is legitimate that I want to erase that nation from the map") seems the most damning. Implications The latter note seems most clearly connected to the dangers in the quagmire surrounding Iran's geopolitical position and its nuclear programme. Wendt's theory tackles issues in how relations are not a fixed result of mere capabilities. Like in structural realism, capabilities only gain meaning in relation to others' capabilities. However, the state possessing these capabilities changes its interests and its identity as its and others' usage of these capabilities varies. States find themselves in a political culture that is either one of enmity, rivalry, or friendship. They have internalised these cultures in varying degrees. These degrees of internalisation move from being forced to abide by the dominant norms, to following them out of self-interest, to actually believing in them. When one combines a degree of internalisation with a certain culture, obviously, nine possibilities arise, shown above in Figure 1.4.

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Wendt explains how the world today is primarily a self-help world, even though his earlier work does not yet zoom in on his perception that the world today is a Lockean one. The national self-interest dominates, but it is restricted and also constructed by the changing elements of a political culture stressing nations' right to exist and to govern their own territories as they see fit. As a case in point, we see the institution of sovereignty being challenged by various nations as the degree of internalisation shifts. An example is the 2004 "Responsibility to Protect" initiative (R2P) which postulates that states should protect their population from atrocities and that others should aid them, with military intervention as a very last resort. The primary question is, of course, whether these nations challenging rigid conceptions of sovereignty do not selectively appropriate R2P's tenets to serve their own interest. It is clear that this consideration is quite sceptical of nations actually achieving and maintaining a third degree internalisation, but it is not impossible. The most damning example, as mentioned above, is a situation wherein states believe in a Hobbesian anarchy where they deny the Other's right to exist. This is a vicious cycle of ideologically fuelled anarchy, also warned against by many realists, wherein enmity becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Luckily, Wendt's theory provides an analytical framework with which to plot a course out of (according to realism) irrational opposition, towards a closer and less conflictual political culture. 1.5 Conclusion: Channelling Reality's Complexity

This chapter has moved from the founders of political realism to one of its indirect offshoots, social constructivism. It serves to enlighten the reader on the theoretical notions used throughout this thesis. It also provides a basis to both describe and prescribe policies for the United States and the West towards Iran, with limited applicability in prediction. Hans J. Morgenthau, as a true founding father of realism, provides us with the basics in terms of political science's, and especially realism's, jargon when discussing the balance of power, security dilemma, and national interests. Here, politics is conceptualised as an "autonomous sphere of action" as well, though other elements obviously play a role. In this sphere, he prescribes prudence most of all, and his typology of types of states proves useful in highlighting which goals states may successfully seek by following prudence (or fail to achieve by not following it). When I use terms such as 'rationality', I imply that states should act prudently and seek to maximise security. Morgenthau, as a classical realist, is arguably closer to Wendt than to Waltz, when he asserts that the effectiveness of power depends on the context in which it is exercised, and that this context depends on states' differing "national characters."

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The parsimonious nature of Waltzian neo- or structural realism is a tool to prescribe equally simple policies. Adding depth to structural realism, Walt's "balance of threat"-theory lends itself well as a bridge between Waltz's material structure and Wendt's socially constructed one, while Van Evera's theory of the "offence-defence balance" adds the (in this thesis) somewhat commonsensical notion that war is more likely when conquest is easy. Though these realist insights might sometimes be far removed from reality, they offer a dispassionate and rational way of prescribing policies. Because of structural realism's parsimony, it is less prone to selection bias -- in selecting or prescribing policies -- when used as a tool. Wendt's social constructivism adds the necessary depth to describe the current situation, however. This thesis will try to avoid the dangers of selection bias, but it is an ever-present danger when discussing present-day situations without the benefit of hindsight (or omnipotence, for that matter). While Waltz posits that states should follow incentives provided by the international system, Wendt adds that this system is comprised of a socially constructed reality. There is no self-evidence in enmity, nor is there any in rivalry or amity. These relationships are constructed by and in turn affect the states which are part of it. While Waltz provides us with a simple objective to follow, Wendt's theory will prove to be a valuable tool in theoretically justifying and explaining (thus: prescribing!) future policies towards Iran. Though these (mostly) structural theories form the basis for my framework, it is inevitable that intrastate issues be discussed as well. I consciously include these aspects in my thesis, sometimes stepping outside these theoretical bounds, though the emphasis in policy recommendations lies at the structural level. Still, some issues are so pertinent that it would be irresponsible to mention them only briefly or simply dismiss them out of hand. These unit-level aspects, like national politics and individuals' interests, play a significant role in determining the political culture and relations between states, and they will be included accordingly. The following chapter will inquire into Iran's experience in international relations until 2002-3, when the nuclear turn in Western policies towards Iran manifested itself.

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Chapter 2 The Persian-Iranian Legacy: Between Pragmatism and Fanaticism

2.1 Introduction Theories of international relations will help to give meaning to contemporary debates surrounding the position of Iran and its nuclear programme. Since, in reality, the concepts these theories employ only carry meaning within the context of a policymakers' and nations' backgrounds, historical insights are invaluable in understanding how Iran views the world, how it formulates its foreign policy, and how to effectively respond to them. As Wendt (1999: 187) maintains, only agents (e.g. policymakers) can change the structure (i.e. social fabric) of international politics, and history basically constitutes the process of change initiated by those agents. The brief history of Iran as described here serves the purpose of providing the threads most useful for explaining Iran's behaviour today, and is necessarily the result of a process of omission. For example, Iran's relations with its eastern neighbours have largely been omitted because these are less relevant to the nuclear issue. There are many issues in Iran's history on which opinions are clearly divided, and scholars commonly debate the weight these historical experiences carry in current-day policy making. Also, inquiries into a nation's history run the risk of falling into the trap of cultural determinism or primordialism, especially considering the fact that most sources are Western in origin. Still, it would be irresponsible to opine or write about Iran's policies today without being informed of its past experiences and perceptions. Thus, just like the theoretical frameworks outlined earlier, these descriptions are meant to supplement the conceptual framework (Figure 1) and will try to do justice to the diversity of Iranian history within the confines of this project. It is not an attempt to construct an inventory of Iran's "national negotiation style" (cf. Binnendijk, 1987), but these (pre-)conceptions and experiences hold explanatory value for Iran's behaviour today. Being aware of another nation's history and culture is not only a sign of respect, but this chapter serves to better inform policymakers in and of itself. This chapter draws both on Iran's Persian heritage and the Islamic elements imbued onto its character after the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The first section will look at the threads that have carried over from Iran's diverse and rich history before the Islamic Revolution, followed by a consideration on the more recent turn in Iran's 'national character' as initiated by the Islamic Revolution. A third section will briefly cover change and continuity in Iran's policy by way of a
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case study. Concluding remarks will consider which propositions can be drawn from theory and history. 2.2 The Persian Heritage The Islamic Republic of Iran is the offspring of a series of revolutions against the descendant of the ancient Persian Empire. As such, Iran is one of the few nations with a continuous history running back for millennia, in contrast to many modern nations whose histories were consolidated or imagined only in the last few centuries. This rich and long history cannot be disregarded even by the Supreme Leader of the present-day Islamic Republic. Persian Dreams The Persian Achaemenid Empire (c. 550-330 BCE) was the first global power, occupying seaboards at both the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean, Its territory encompassed three different continents. Its Persian successors, ruled by the Sassanid (224-651 AD) and Safavid Dynasties (1501-1736 AD), covered similarly extensive domains (Fuller, 1991: 16; Takeyh, 2008: 2). While the various consecutive Persian Empires were extensive, they were often conquered or subordinated to the whims of external powers. These powers, ranging from ancient Greece (i.e. Macedon) under Alexander the Great to the Ummayyad Caliphate, not only influenced Persian culture, but were also influenced by their experiences in Persia. Still, even under the pressure of later Arab and Mongol conquests, Persia retained its unique identity and was never 'Arabised' (Fuller, 1991: 18; Hunter, 1990: 98; Takeyh, 2008: 2). Moreover, Persia never lost its role either as a dominant power in the region or as a power to be taken into account when making inroads into the region as an outsider. The unique nature of the Persian experience has imbued Iran's consciousness with a sense of pride and arrogance towards its neighbours. To Persia's west lie its Arab neighbours, who were often seen as inferior (Saad, 1996: 7-14). As many great cultures are wont to do, the Persians titled their civilisation, and more specifically, their Shah, as being at the "centre of the universe." Partially because of this history of pre-eminence, Iran sees itself as a natural regional hegemon, or at the very least as an arbitrator in a turbulent and troubled region (Takeyh, 2008: 2, 14). It is a great historical accomplishment in itself for a people's identity not to be wiped even while religions, great powers, and Mongol hordes are picking at their identity. These various

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incursions have brought with them a sense of insecurity and weakness, however. This leads to the paradoxical nature of the Persian consciousness, which is simultaneously bent on claiming a leadership role in the region while being ever-suspicious and fearful of foreign incursions and dominance. Persian Nightmares Like China, that other proud and millennia-old nation, Iran has only recently cut itself loose from the grips of the great powers. It was a playing ball in the Great Game between the British and Russian Empires. The contemporary discourse in the Islamic Republic even sees the period under the Shah (1941-1979) as an extension of previous patronage to imperialist powers, of which the Western-backed coup in 1953 to overthrow president Mosaddegh was a prime example (Cooper, 2011: 24). Historically as well as contemporaneously, Iran is surrounded by non-Persians, and its Sunni Muslim and often Arab neighbours have kept it at arm's length (Takeyh, 2008: 3-4). While debates on whether alliances and friendship take shape due to shared ideology or shared interests will continue indefinitely, it can be safely said that the direct environment of Iran is not ideologically nor religiously aligned with the Shi'a Muslim and Persian state of Iran. Persia's historical experience and background have given it no 'natural' allies on the basis of ethnicity or religion. The many foreign incursions into Persia and Iran have given the nation a great fear of being carved up by great powers, even today. Before the overthrow of Mossadegh in 1953, many in Iran saw the US as a benevolent anti-imperialist power due to its history of resistance (Hunter, 1990: 48; Foroughi, 1978). It was not until after Mossadegh's overthrow that many began to question the United States' role. Under the Nixon Doctrine, Iran was to be a regional bulwark against communism and the Shah was pleased to acquiesce to Iran's position as the United States' "island of stability" in the Middle East, effectively making Iran no more than an instrument in American Cold War strategy (Fuller, 1991: 12; Hunter, 1990: 52). The Islamic Revolution in 1979 would extend fears of foreign great power deals to divide Iran into spheres of influence along the lines of the Great Game (Figure 2.1), even while the United States continued to see Iran's role in the Middle East mostly in Cold War terms.

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Figure 2.1 - Spheres of influence in Persia ca. 1907. The blue zone indicates Russian influence, red indicates British influence, and the yellow zone is a neutral sphere. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

Iran is burdened by a fear of great power machinations and conspiracies to undermine its power and that of Muslims more generally. The Supreme Leader Khomeini would later state that the destruction and partitioning of the Ottoman Empire was aimed at weakening Muslims and plundering its riches (Hunter, 1990: 39). Of course, this fear was also used instrumentally as Persian rulers often positioned themselves as victims of great power aggression (Fuller, 1991: 202). The fear of great powers' involvement in Persian affairs was coupled with an adeptness at playing these powers out against one another. Persia often simultaneously aspired to become the region's great power arbiter while despising other great powers' interventions. It was ever fearful of the dissolution of its power base in the region and afraid of being threatened by neighbours not at all receptive to Iranian dominance. A feeling of pride, built upon a history rife with glory, is therefore marred by insecurity.

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Theoretical Insights and Implications While this brief consideration does not convey the complexity and diversity of Persian history, it has sought to identify key components stemming from Iran's more distant history relevant to its position and policies in international politics today. These historical insights can be combined with elements from the theoretical framework provided earlier. These propositions will be further refined and built upon in the following section, where the effects of the Islamic Revolution will be analysed. Firstly, for Iran, the security dilemma is exacerbated due to its historical experiences. In Morgenthau's theory, any build-up of power by one state will likely be perceived as a potential threat by another state. This is not to say that Iran's degree of insecurity is unique in the world or that history alone determines the degree of insecurity. But it is obvious that a country such as Denmark does not fear either American or German military power today. Because Iran has few (recent) historical precedents mitigating its perception of outside threats and is generally fearful and suspicious of great power involvement, it is more likely that a(-n increase in) great power's presence or involvement will be perceived as a threat. Thus, the perceived acuteness of the security dilemma is increased. Secondly, a lack of 'natural (ideological) allies' in the region will likely contribute to Iran's sense of isolation. How statesmen perceive others' behaviour and intent plays a large role in any nation. Iran does not have a historical experience of "ideological solidarity" with its neighbours, which is complemented by a history of conflict and rivalry with both other regional powers and outside superpowers (cf. Walt, 1985). Walt also states that, in the end, security interests take precedence over ideological concerns. These can be mutually reinforcing, however; if Iran sees its neighbours as a threat due to a lack of ideological affinity and it does not trust them, it is likely to get stuck in a vicious cycle of ideologically-inspired distrust and a rising threat perception. Finally, it is likely to be difficult to transcend this historical consciousness in order to strive for less distrust and change how Iran sees itself vis--vis great powers. The Persian tendency to see conspiracy and deception has carried over into present-day Iran, making confidence-building measures even more difficult (Fuller, 1991: 24-5). For Wendt, a state's identity is also changed by the international system and its participation in international institutions. As such, it is to be expected that relationships change slowly and that only continued cooperation between (e.g.) Iran and the United States can dilute Iran's historical fear of great power intervention.

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2.3 The Islamic Revolution: Iran as Revolutionary Vanguard Before the fall of the Shah in 1979, Iran was an "island of stability" for the United States with many policymakers petitioning for full support for a strong Iranian military presence, even considering a joint invasion of Saudi Arabia in order to capture its oil wealth (Cooper, 2011: 11, 41). Its lack of democracy was no obstacle for the administration's adherence to the Nixon Doctrine (Cooper, 2011: 30). It seems even stranger to imagine today that Israel and Iran were allies in many areas, especially with regards to Arab nationalism and their ties with the US (Fuller, 1991: 72). For the Iranian people, however, the Shah always carried a patina of illegitimacy due to the way he came to power (Cooper, 2011: 22). The Islamic Revolution's 'Great Satan' The Revolution of 1979 was not initially Islamic in nature. The Iranian ancien rgime's fate rested in the hands of American backing and the petrodollars involved, through which it neglected to tend to matters of social justice at home (Abrahamian, 1982: 534-7; Mackey, 1998: 236, 260; Harney, 1998: 37, 167). Such neglect went hand in hand with the Shah's efforts to Westernise and secularise the country (Del Giudice, 2008; Goldschmidt, 1996: 332), which gave the Islamist movement the political credibility to offer an alternative: a republic led by often conservative Islamic values of social justice. Like the present-day Arab Spring, and many other revolutions, it seems plausible to conclude that the structural conditions for revolution were present, but that a certain historical 'trigger event' (e.g. the 1978 Black Friday shootings of civilians or the shutdown of the oil industry) was necessary to precipitate an all-out revolution (Moin, 2000: 189). The Islamist movement was first past the post and gradually gained control of the government, beating both Marxist and Islamic socialist groups. With Islamic revolutionary fervour fully legitimised, the West was associated with oppression and decadence. While a relatively moderate prime minister was approved by Ayatollah Khomeini, a perception of the US as an imperialist and interventionist power pervaded the Revolutionary leadership; it was Islam's 'Great Satan'. The takeover of the American embassy and the resulting hostage crisis (1979-81) were used by Khomeini to consolidate his domestic position and anti-imperalist doctrine (Crist, 2012: 28-9). Thus, the power of the Supreme Leader was cemented within the newfound Iranian republic (Figure 2.2). While relations between countries usually shift over time, the sudden and vitriolic nature of the Islamic revolution ruptured American-Iranian relations. From then on,

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despite sporadic cooperation and friendly overtures, the United States and Iran would be engaged in a quasi-war (Crist, 2012).

Figure 2.2 - Power structures within the Islamic Republic of Iran (R. Parsi, 2012: 13)

The Supreme Leader Khomeini's world vision was built upon Iran's constructed history as a victim and puppet of imperialist powers. His goal was to break the relations of "master" and "servant" (T. Parsi, 2012a: 10). The US was tainted with an 'original sin' for its orchestration of Mossadegh's overthrow and ostensible patronage of the Shah (Hunter, 1990: 48-9). Both Khomeini and his successor saw the world in terms of an all-embracing struggle between the 'spiritual' and the 'materialist', between the 'revolutionary' and the 'arrogant' powers. The great powers, like the United States, were "paper tigers" to be swept away in "the current of history" (Fuller, 1991: 23). This discourse was no mere Third World narrative of 'oppressor vs. oppressed', though it carries the same tropes. Iran was to be the standard-bearer and moral centre of this worldembracing Islamic revolution (Fuller, 1991: 29; Hunter, 1990: 38-9; Menashri, 2001: 225). Khomeini saw it as Iran's task to ensure a just world order, which could only be achieved through struggle and the Shia virtue of martyrdom (Fuller, 1991: 14-5; Menashri, 2001: 266). Perhaps one of Khomeini's most famous statements is that Iran sees itself as "neither East, nor West." This statement echoes Persian ideas of being at the "centre of the world." This attitude does not entail mere non-alignment (in Cold War terms), but implies the formation of an entirely new and self-evident bloc of Islam which would not seek offensive expansion but retain
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the right to self-defence (Hosseini, 2009: 44-5; Ramazani, 1986: 21-25). Soon after the revolution in 1983 and like the Shah before him, Khomeini sought to expand Iranian power and reinstall the historical custodianship over the Persian Gulf, thereby establishing an Iranian hegemony in the region (Marschall, 2003: 15; Ramazani, 1986: 30). Again, this desire to play a leading role in the world was often countered by an isolationist and introspective tendency. While it might be too blunt to state that "[t]hey are manipulative, fatalistic, suspicious, and xenophobic," like a 1979 State Department report noted, it was certainly true that the 'new' Iran was less likely to acquiesce to Western institutions and pressure. Even while looking to overthrow a corrupt world order, Khomeini's doctrine seeks self-reliance and independence from the 'arrogant' powers (Hunter, 1990: 38). Moreover, in the Persian tradition of fear of foreign conspiracies, the first Iranian president, Bani Sadr, stated that "if we do not go out of Iran to help the revolution, others will come to our country to plot against us" (Hunter, 1990: 40). Like that other universalist revolutionary in China before him, Khomeini simultaneously sought to distance himself from the corruption of the past while being unable to cut historical ties entirely. The eye for conspiracies was once focused on great power machinations between Britain and Russia or the United States and the Soviet Union, but Khomeini turned it towards Zionist dominance of the contemporary world order (Fuller, 1991: 20-2). According to Khomeini, Israel was an unnatural creation within the Middle East and it should be removed, a proclamation which sparks controversy until today. The Islamic Revolution and the 'Little Satan' Khomeini sought to establish an all-encompassing Islamic state to unite the Islamic world (Ummah Whidah) by evicting imperialist powers. Thus, while the United States carried an 'original sin' of its involvement in the overthrow of Mossadegh, Israel carried a sin in the form of its very presence as a state. Until today, Revolutionary doctrine sees Israel as a tool for imperialist powers with the purported goal of dividing the Muslim world (Menashri, 2001: 271). Israel was simultaneously the 'Little Satan' subordinated to the 'Great Satan' and the manipulative vanguard of Zionist conspiracy to undermine Islam, also present in the American government. The Iranian leadership sympathised with the Palestinians' plight, and helped mobilise armed movements such as Hezbollah and Hamas to combat the Israeli occupation (Hunter, 1990: 126). Relations between the two countries obviously soured as a result, a definitive break with the recent past.

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Jews were often conflated with Zionists in officials' rhetoric, which is not surprising considering the fact that Israeli leaders often portrayed themselves as leaders of the Jewish people, instead of a mostly Jewish state (Menashri, 2000: 276). Khomeini never advocated an eradication of the Jewish people, but vowed to remove Israel as a state: "Jews are different from Zionists; if the Muslims overcome the Zionists, they will leave the Jews alone. They [the Jews] are a nation like other nations; their life continues on and cannot be rejected by Muslims" (qtd. in Sanasarian, 2000: 111). A considerable Jewish population remains in Iran, enjoying constitutionally protected rights (Theodoulou, 1998), despite the many incentives to leave (Tait, 2007). Still, early Revolutionary zeal not only forbade Jews to associate themselves with Israel, but added an extra risk of execution as punishment for violation (Soroudi, 1981: 113-4). Early policies towards Iranian Jews were reminiscent of American McCarthyism during the 50s, accusing Jews of conspiring against the state and God, essentially based on nothing more than ideological or religious incompatibility (Sanasarian, 2000: 112-3). And while such zeal extended to all Zionists, Israel did not see Iran as its greatest threat until nearby Iraq's power diminished (Kaye et al., 2011: 1). While Iranian Jews often left, there was no overarching ideological invective directed towards Jews themselves. The newfound Islamic Republic has consistently denied Israel's very existence and its right to exist. Later shifts in the Iranian raison d'tat forced it to periodically change its behaviour, however. Historical tensions with its Arab neighbours also resurfaced, with a newfound acuteness for both sides. Relations Change with Arab States Many Arab states surrounding the Persian Gulf increasingly saw the US as an offshore balancer to counteract Iranian assertiveness (cf. Mearsheimer, 2003; Takeyh, 2008: 8). Khomeini's policy of seeking to extend Iranian control over the Gulf was an exponent of the earlier Iranian fascination with the Gulf, thereby also threatening the various other Gulf states (Fuller, 1991: 613). The newfound rivalry between Arab states and Iran was only newfound in its added ideological dimension. The Shah already sought to undermine Saudi Arabia's regional power (Cooper, 2011: 26), even while the Saudis sought a compromise between dependence upon American support and Islamic leadership (Fuller, 1991: 107-8). Because of its allegiance to the 'Great Satan' and the concurrent corruption of Islam, Saudi Arabia caught the brunt of Khomeini's antagonism towards the Arab monarchies (Menashri, 2001: 240).

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The House of Saud and other Arab monarchs feared that Iran might seek to subvert their rule by exporting the revolution. The Saudis were especially afraid of a 'Shiite Crescent' taking shape, threatening the Sunni dominance within Arab states (Takeyh, 2008: 13). And indeed, Khomeini stated that "[m]onarchy is one of the most shameful and disgraceful reactionary manifestations" (Ramazani, 1986: 29), though he also stated that export of the revolution by way of the sword is not export at all (ibid.: 25). Iran sought to align itself with the Shia cause, but both the Arab-Persian divide and Iran's earliest tactics of inciting terrorism and violence alienated Shia at the other side of the Gulf (Takeyh, 2008: 6). Even before the Islamic Revolution, many Arab Shia faced discrimination and were looked upon with suspicion (ICG, 2005). While some Shia responded to the Iranian revolution by way of demonstrations, as the monarchs feared, they did so mainly out of their own political and economic disenfranchisement (Ramazani, 1986: 53). Still, any upheavals coming from Shia minorities in Arab states were often framed by the monarchs as being part of Iranian involvement in their internal affairs (Ulrichsen, 2009: 12). The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was formed partly as a response to the perceived threat of the Iranian revolution (Ramazani, 1986: 117-27), with Saudi Arabia seeing a chance to take the lead as a result of the ensuing tensions between Iran and Iraq in 1981 (Safran, 1985: 372-4). Figure 2.3 shows the states surrounding the Persian Gulf, with the GCC states marked dark brown.

Figure 2.3 - The states surrounding the Persian Gulf. Dark brown states are members of the GCC.

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Despite the rigidification of enmity between the Gulf's Arab states and Iran, they did not engage in a direct war. Relations with Iraq, however, had been deteriorating since 1958, when a Soviet backed Arab-nationalist overthrew the Hashemite monarchy (Fuller, 1991: 73; Hunt, 2005: 72). Open hostility between Iraq and Iran quickly ensued after the latter's revolution. Saddam Hussein feared the ostensible spread of the revolution amongst his sizable Shiite minority (Hunter, 1991: 104-5), while Iran also faced Iraqi subversion by the People's Mujahedin (MEK). The precipitating events of the crisis were to be found in an alleged assassination attempt on Iraq's foreign minister, though both the Islamic revolution and geopolitical considerations (control over oil fields) also played a role. The conflict fit within historical trends of rivalry between the two powers, but it also played into Khomeini's ideology. As the US generally supported Iraq and acquiesced in its use of chemical weapons, Khomeini was bolstered in his rhetoric denouncing the US as the imperial power seeking the destruction and division of the Muslim world. Theoretical Insights and Implications The 1979 Revolution added a deep Islamic dimension to Iran's take on foreign policy and the world in general. It was a break with only the most recent past, as the United States was cast out and it was denounced along with Israel; it was a form of continuity from Iran's distant past, ever wary of foreign intervention and suspicious of the intentions of great powers in a world order maintained by their power and for their own interests. The propositions from the previous sections can be refined and supplemented accordingly. The first two propositions regarding the increased acuteness of the security dilemma for Iran and the lack of 'natural (ideological) allies' are only reinforced by the consequences of the Revolutionary discourse. Khomeini's doctrine, followed to this day, only strengthens Iran's perception of its neighbourhood as being potentially hostile (especially as a result of the Iran-Iraq war), while it has few Shia-dominated brethren in its region. In the case of Iran's support for Hezbollah and de facto alliance with Syria, ideological and security considerations reinforced one another as all parties had an interest in curbing both Israeli and Iraqi influence. The last proposition, positing that relationships are hard to change, is not applicable in the case of the Islamic Revolution. The shock of the revolution caused a turbulent and nearimmediate change (in historical terms) in Iran's relations with Iraq and Israel, leading to various conflicts in the process. In Wendt's social constructivist theory applied to our contemporary world, relations between states are usually those of Lockean rivalry (i.e. "we recognise one another, but act out of self-interest"), but not of fully internalised enmity. Iran's stance towards

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Israel changed so radically, however, that its leadership changed political culture between the two nations to fully internalised Hobbesian enmity (i.e. "I do not recognise the Other's right to exist out of true belief"). In his theory, this also means that the nations in a Hobbesian enmity will shun no measures to eliminate one another. Luckily, this is only a theoretical proposition, and it does not match reality. Wendt's theory has more to add, however. It predicts that it is difficult to break out of entrenched political cultures, and that step-by-step trust-building is necessary so that states see that there is a way out of enmity. His theory also predicts that statesmen might have an intrinsic interest in maintaining a particular political culture. This leads to the proposition that it is in the Iranian clerical leadership's interest to maintain a culture of animosity towards Israel and the United States, or even the Arab states. Their rule is largely based upon the credibility of the ideology they proffer. 2.4 The Iran-Iraq War: A 'War until Victory'? While the Revolutionary rhetoric may seem threatening and foreign to Western observers, it has hardly been directly converted to practice. And, most importantly, such perceptions of threat work both ways; Iran's Supreme Leader often caricatures Western ideologies like many Western policymakers draw a caricature of Iranian Revolutionary dogma. The previous section served to provide a degree of nuance regarding the latter. Of course, in order to be able to export the revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran had to survive and grow. The sudden turn in relationships was a radical change in itself, which endangered the survival of the fledgling Republic on many occasions, with US interventions looming on the horizon. Thus, Iran's most recent history is a history of tensions between the pragmatic needs of a state in the international system and the promises of a nation proclaiming to be at the advent of a world-embracing Islamic revolution. This section will perform a case study in order to provide concrete examples of Iran's historical consciousness in action. The Iran-Iraq War and Signs of Pragmatism The most prominent feature of Iran in international relations in the decade following the Revolution was the war between Iran and Iraq. It rallied the people behind the revolutionary cause and increased the Revolutionary rhetoric's credibility (Precht, 1988: 110). Hostility between the two nations was present before the Revolution, but the Islamic dynamic added an acuteness to the perceived threat for Saddam Hussein (Fuller, 1991: 47-51; Woods et al., 2009: 28). This

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dynamic was exacerbated by the fact that many in Iraq's army were of Shia Muslim conviction, even though most acquiesced to fighting their Iranian brothers of faith (Fuller, 1991: 40). American support for Iraq flowed forth both out of geostrategic concerns about a hostile Iran's military prowess and from the legacy of the hostage crisis, which started in 1979. Iraq was fully to blame in starting the war in September 1980, mostly out of the aforementioned fear of a spreading revolution and its perception of a window of opportunity for offense (cf. Russell, 2002; Van Evera, 1998). Ranks increasingly closed as a previously troubled relationship between the Arab States (especially Egypt) and Iraq was mended to ensure that Iran did not emerge victorious. Saddam Hussein saw himself as a new Saladin, destined to unite the Arab people where Egypt had betrayed them by signing the 1978 Camp David Accords with Israel (Frtig, 1991). While Iran was right in blaming the United States for supporting Iraq in the later phases of the war, it had no hand in the war's onset (Crist, 2012: 87-9). Surely, Iran was also at least partially to blame for continuing the war and escalating it to Persian Gulf shipping (the "Tanker War"), evidenced by many officials' chants of "War until victory!" (Crist, 2012: 102). As a senior analyst at the CIA has argued, "[t]he Iraqi aggression ensured the clerical regime's survival by reviving the public's nationalism and diverting attention from the country's slide into tyranny" (Ward, 2009: 242). Not surprisingly, Khomeini saw the war in the bigger picture of a struggle of justice versus corruption. An Iranian victory was not even necessary for the war to buttress Khomeini's rule, but it would ensure Iran's predominance in the region, and the Persian Gulf in particular. This was something the US was bound to prevent. It would indirectly support Iraq as to avert an Iraqi defeat (Crist, 2012: 96, 100). Yet American policymakers, fixed in a Cold War paradigm, feared that supporting Iraq fully would push Iran into Soviet hands. Conveniently enough, Iran replaced Iraq on the list of state sponsors of terrorism. The two-pronged fear of Iranian dominance and Iran falling into the hands of the Soviets dominated American policymaking. The US also established CENTCOM, a command focused solely on the Greater Middle East. The clerical government in Iran rightly feared American intervention, as the US fomented unrest, sought to install pro-American moderates in key positions, and contemplated regime change at least as early as 1982 (Crist, 2012: 51, 62, 71-79). In the ancient Persian tradition, Iranians feared being carved up between the two superpowers and stepped up their support for the 'oppressed abroad'.

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After Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon, many Shia Lebanese welcomed Iranian support (though the Persian-Arab divide remained), and Iran sought an unlikely alliance with the secular Alawi regime of Hafaz al-Assad (Crist, 2012: 123; Geraghty, 2009: 9). Khomeini authorised the 1983 bombings of US Marine barracks in Beirut (Crist, 2012: 133), but Richard Armitage agitated against those wanting to attack Iran directly during the Iran-Iraq War. This would only further legitimise the Manichean vision of the Iranian leadership and rally the people around the flag (Crist, 2012: 287). While the Reagan administration was criticised for its indecisiveness in responding (McFarlane, 2008), its prudence might have averted a broader escalation of and issue linkage between conflicts in the Middle East. As the Iran-Iraq War continued, revolutionary fervour was spent and the frontlines shifted only slowly (Figure 2.4), signs of pragmatism and prudence arose in Iranian foreign policy. Already during the war, Iran collaborated with Israel on defence issues (T. Parsi, 2007: 101-9). While the Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) supported various kidnappings and acts of terrorism, it did not want to be directly tied to them (Baer, 2003: 74; Precht, 1988). When Iranian pilots harassed and attacked oil tankers in the Persian Gulf, they were to avoid those flagged as American, and when hijackers flew an Air France jet to Tehran, it was turned back by Khomeini's orders (Precht, 1988: 112). And, finally, while Iran acquired Chinese Silkworm anti-ship missiles with a range of over 150 kilometres in 1987, they were not used directly against the US. In the aftermath of the revolution, Iran was forced to exercise restraint in foreign policy, for unbridled hostility would mean an open war between Iran and nearly all of its neighbours to the west, possibly involving the United States. To the north, Iran acquiesced to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan because it needed Soviet arms, and Iran promised not to enflame Islamist sentiment in Russia's borderlands (Menashri, 2001: 234-5; Takeyh, 2008: 18-9). As Shireen Hunter (1990: 43) put it just after the Iran-Iraq War, "the requirements of survival, plus demands imposed by pressing economic and political needs have forced most Iranian leaders to become political practitioners and statesmen rather than pure ideologues or idealists."

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Figure 2.4 - The territory gained and lost during the Iran-Iraq War. Like the Great War decades before it, this war was a war of attrition without significant territorial gains and losses. Source: Maximilian Drrbecker, Wikimedia Commons.

Like any other state and as his predecessor had learned, the Supreme Leader Khamenei would also put the survival of the Islamic Republic first, for without its survival, Iran would not have the chance of leading the Revolution or becoming a regional hegemon. The Speaker of Parliament Rafsanjani said in 1988 that Iran should stop its "crude diplomacy to avoid making enemies" as a result of the economic destituteness Iran found itself in after the war (Marschall, 2003: 18). Like any revolutionary regime, Iran realised that survival was a prerequisite for acting on revolutionary promises, though the process of guaranteeing survival might not always fit within a revolutionary worldview. It is beyond the scope of this section to inquire into the developments following the IranIraq War, but a general trend towards more pragmatism in Iranian foreign policy conduct ensued. While not part of Waltz's theory, a process of political Darwinism can explain why Iran has been
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"pushed and shoved" by the structure of international politics to abide by the most successful forms of behaviour. Rampantly pursuing ideological goals will negatively influence a state's position in the international system. Even though the United States and Iran would be on the brink of war during and after a US naval exercise in 1994, relations between the two countries improved and there seemed to be hope for a true rapprochement with the election of the moderate President Khatami in 1997. Until the 'nuclear turn' in 2002-3, these hopes remained high. Theoretical Insights and Implications Again, recent developments in Iranian foreign policy are both a continuation of past practices and a shift away from them. The revolutionary zeal found its target and fears of foreign involvement and great power domination were confirmed during the Iran-Iraq war, but all parties to the conflict exercised restraint at crucial points. Iran's socially constructed identity has changed slowly over time, as it might have carried over revolutionary rhetoric into the present, but has increasingly practiced policies of moderation. Hobbesian enmity ("I do not recognise the Other's right to exist") still persists between the 'revisionist state' of Iran and Israel, but in order to survive, Iran has been forced to act more and more like other states in the international system. Organisms in nature survive when following practices most conducive to survival, and states imitate successful behaviour as to ensure their own survival. Uncontrolled revolutionary zeal is not one of these successful mechanisms, at least not in the longer term. History shows that Iran has consistently behaved as a 'revisionist state' (cf. Morgenthau, 2006: 57). It has sought to reverse the relations of power between itself and the 'arrogant powers' of the West and its Arab allies by acting as the Morgenthauan 'prestige-seeking state', thereby attempting to win the "battle for the minds of men" (cf. Morgenthau, 2006: 90-2). As established in the previous section, Iran's historical experiences and discordant ideological outlook make it extremely fearful of foreign intervention and interference in its ambitions. Arguably, pragmatism and prudence from its neighbours and the United States during the Iran-Iraq War and the nineties have led to the possibility for Iran to increasingly 'normalise' its foreign policy while maintaining the official discourse of seeking to overturn the Western-dominated world order. In my adaptation of Waltzian theory, Iran has increasingly moved to be like other states in the international system (becoming a 'like unit') through a process of 'Political Darwinism'. The Iranian state with its unique Islamic character would simply not have survived if it had attempted to carry through its Revolutionary promises and rhetoric to the fullest. As Waltz posited, a state (i.e. Iran) would seek to balance against an increasing preponderance of power (i.e. Iraq's invasion

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of Kuwait). Thus, Iran's neutrality during the 1990-91 Gulf War is a case in point: it had an interest in seeking to remove Saddam Hussein but did not actively support a 1991 Shia uprising, and by acquiescing to a Western intervention, it avoided increased animosity. Pragmatism won over revolutionary zeal and historical fears of regional interference by great powers. These two theoretical insights lead to the final proposition flowing forth from this section. Iran will most likely act pragmatically and with restraint where necessary, and pursue its revisionist and ideological goals whenever these do not threaten the security of the Iranian state in its current form. 2.5 Conclusion: Pride, Phobiae, and Pragmatism This chapter has served to provide a firm grasp of the historical threads that influence Iranian foreign policymaking. The exercise of revolutionary zeal has waxed and waned in the previous two decades (Marschall, 2003; Takeyh, 2008), with a distinctive tendency (within the idea of political Darwinism) towards a more national interest-oriented foreign policy. It is commonly accepted that the landslide victory of president Khatami in 1997 ushered in an era of increased cooperation between Iran and the outside world (Marschall, 2003: 142-4). Both the 'Persian heritage' and the Islamic Revolution carry valuable lessons for policymakers today. Iran is a nation burdened with historical phobiae and buttressed by historical pride. Like the United States, it draws on a sense of exceptionalism and is heavily influenced by its experiences in fighting oppression, though from a distinctly different view on cosmopolitan justice. Negotiations with Iran are bound to be rife with fears of betrayal and conspiracy. The perceived acuteness of the security dilemma is higher for Iran than for a 'normal' state due to its historical experiences. Recent history has not significantly altered Iran's perceptions of the outside world, despite the Islamic dimension. It is still surrounded by non-Persian states and great powers are still involved in the region. Though the seeds for regional rivalry were already sown, the Revolution shifted Lockean rivalry between Iran and its neighbours to Hobbesian enmity, with Iran seeking to overturn a corrupt world order. A possible(!) future secular revolution could, like the 1979 revolution, reverse these relations. As long as the clerical leadership remains, however, relationships are bound to change only slowly as states build up and dismantle cooperative efforts. The clerical leadership is bound to see the fledgling nuclear programme is as part and parcel of Iran's greatness and a continuation of Iran's progress towards a revolutionary role in the world.

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Therefore, the most important observation in the last three decades is that Iranian foreign policymaking has become increasingly pragmatic, even while ideology continued to provide the Iranian leaders with a core narrative and a crucial patina of legitimacy. While this means that irrational behaviour has not dominated foreign policymaking, it is unlikely that Iran will lose the ideological dimension to its foreign policy. Historical experiences change as history progresses, revolutionary fervour can be spent, but the Islamic leadership of Iran is dependent upon offering a credible world-embracing ideology even while it cooperates with those it despises (Sadjadpour, 2009: 14). It is important to take the role of ideology into account when conducting diplomacy, regardless of whether revolutionary rhetoric drives Iran's actions or is used merely instrumentally. Enmity between Iran and the United States has become self-sustaining and even selfreinforcing. Indeed, were it not for the vitriol present in the Islamic Revolution, the United States might not have felt the need to align so closely with Iran's rivals. Going back even further, were it not for the Western-backed coup against Prime Minister Mossadegh in 1958, there might not have been a feeding ground for such vitriol. Further elaboration on this 'blame game' is beyond the point that hostility is rooted in both historical experience and strategic rivalry. Still, strategic rivalry need not be a cause for continued hostility. Historical precedents and threat perceptions must be overcome in order to steer a course towards a more peaceful and stable relationship.

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Chapter 3 Iran in International Relations Today: The Nuclear Turn

3.1 Introduction The 'nuclear turn' is only one of the key processes surrounding Iran in the 2000s and 2010s. This 'turn' implies that Western policies towards and diplomacy with Iran have increasingly focused on the issue of the nuclear programme, setting aside the broader debate on Iran's (future) position within the greater region. As the historical experience shows, this debate is of immense concern to Iran. With a historical development from revolutionary fervour towards more cooperative relations in mind, the early 2000s seemed to herald a new era between Iran and the US. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, this prospect radically changed as major developments changed (Western perceptions of) Iran's place in international politics. The 2000s have witnessed upheavals in the Middle East caused by two Western interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Iraq's 'reset' has brought the Shia Muslim community back to power, thereby improving its relations with Iran (Oktav, 2011: 137-38). In Afghanistan, the US and Iran first sought to cooperate against the mainly Sunni Taliban, but Iran has lately improved its ties with the increasingly assertive Taliban as US forces have withdrawn and a shared antiAmerican interest has developed (Farmer, 2012; Ghosh, 2012). The 2010s so far have witnessed upheavals in the form of the 'Arab Spring' (or any other nomenclature). In the tradition of Iran's perception of itself as the flag-bearer of the Revolution, the Supreme Leader has sought to identify Iran as the leader of this 'Islamic Awakening' with limited success, as these protests once again stem from secular grievances (Dalacoura, 2012). Accordingly, Iran's relations with both Iraq and Egypt have so far only improved, while Syria's fate is still uncertain. Most importantly, the security environment has grown more insecure as violent conflicts continue, governments seek a place within the new Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, and the US is slowly pivoting towards Asia. President Ahmadinejad, though not the ultimate decision-maker, has appropriated the nuclear issue as his main point of assertiveness. Iran's continued progress in the nuclear field and the accompanying uncertainty surrounding it thus takes place in a volatile and unpredictable context. Policymakers inspired by political realist theory have learned to abhor volatility and uncertainty, and these regional developments have inspired caution in great powers' policies towards the region, accordingly. Of course, despite Ahmadinejad's rhetoric and Khamenei's

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unrelenting support for civilian nuclear advancements, Iran has also walked a fine line to avoid a direct confrontation with the West and Israel. This chapter will seek to answer what the role of the nuclear programme is within Iran's foreign policy calculus and how it affects other states' visions on and policies towards Iran. The first section will elaborate upon the recent history of the Iranian nuclear programme and how past policies have been formulated towards it. The second section will look into how major players view Iran and its nuclear assertiveness by looking at American, Israeli, Saudi, and Turkish perspectives. The third section will look at how Iran views its nuclear rights, programme, and how it could find a motivation to acquire nuclear weapons. A concluding section takes the most important lessons that need to be applied in the fourth chapter, where policies will be proposed and evaluated. 3.2 The Nuclear Turn: Explaining the Nuclear Issue's Centrality Most apparent tensions between Iran and the West today revolve around uncertainty surrounding its nuclear programme. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations Security Council claim that Iran does not provide the necessary assurances that its programme is for peaceful purposes only. Meanwhile, Iran maintains that its nuclear programme is for technological, medical, and civilian purposes and is steadily increasing its capacity to enrich uranium and master the entire "fuel cycle" on sufficient scale to supply its (future) nuclear power plants. In light of the broader strategic view maintained in this thesis, the Iranian nuclear programme is seen as 'only' a single important piece of the larger puzzle. This section will discuss the various roles the nuclear programme plays and serves to identify the core problems it raises and/or exacerbates. Firstly, the programme's history will be briefly outlined to show changing perceptions and key decision points surrounding it. Secondly, the following part will inquire into the role of the programme for Iranians and their government, as placed within Iran's historical experience. Thirdly and finally, the contemporary programme's geopolitical implications will be discussed as placed within the realist and social constructivist theories. This final part serves as a bridge towards the next sections, where the focus will lie on the various policy responses and their effectiveness. While this thesis does not extensively use nuclear energy jargon, some clarifications are in order. The process of enrichment (increasing the percentage of 'usable' uranium) which Iran is currently pursuing is limited to enriching uranium to 3.5 percent, which is suitable for energy

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generation purposes, and 20 percent, which is mostly useful for medicinal and research purposes. These percentages still fall within the category of low-enriched uranium (LEU), whilst anything above 20 percent is highly-enriched uranium (HEU). The most important implication is that, counterintuitively, the step from this LEU to weapons-grade HEU (over 90 percent) requires considerably less effort than the first few steps (Fitzpatrick, 2010: 78; 2011b). The crux of the problem thus lies in the fact that Iran has completed the most intensive part of uranium enrichment, and that it fails to provide the transparency which the IAEA desires. The Nuclear Ambitions of a Nation Iran's nuclear programme has a long history, running back to the earliest initiative from the United States under the 'Atoms for Peace' initiative under the Eisenhower administration in 1957 (Bruno, 2010). This initiative started Iran's endeavours into the area of civilian nuclear research. The Shah was given quite some freedom in expanding his nuclear programme in cooperation with the European consortium Eurodif, through which Iran would acquire rights to buy 10 percent of a Eurodif uranium enrichment plant's production. Cooperation with the US expanded under the Ford administration, which would eventually give Iran control over the entire nuclear fuel cycle, effectively giving it the option to fully enrich uranium suitable for nuclear weapons. Accordingly, a 1974 CIA Special National Intelligence Estimate predicted that Iran under the Shah would be likely to acquire nuclear weapons, should other regional powers proceed in developing nuclear weapons development. Like Iran's position in the world at large, international attitudes towards Iran's nuclear programme changed quickly after the Islamic Revolution in 1979. As discussed in the previous chapter, threat perceptions of and concurrent relations with the Islamic Republic greatly changed because of the radically altered national ideology of Iran. In turn, these responses strengthened Iran's self-perception and resolve. International policy changed following the 'logics' provided by both political realism ('nuclear development and possible weaponisation means more power') and social constructivism ('nuclear development has different meanings in different hands'). As the regime's character and international orientation changed, so did the meaning and implication of its nascent nuclear programme. In 1979, the Eurodif consortium ceased deliveries of enriched uranium, work on the Bushehr nuclear project by a German company was halted, and the United States stopped supplying fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). For the Iranian leadership, history repeated itself, and reliance on foreign sources was once again seen as Iran's Achilles' heel (NRSB, 2009: 38); to this day, Iranian officials reiterate the point that it was the victim of

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"double-standard and discriminatory policy" (Embassy Communiqu, 2011). Further pressure from the United States prevented cooperation from Western countries, China, and the IAEA on advancements in Iran's enrichment technology (Hibbs, 2003: 12). The Iran-Iraq War saw the unfinished Bushehr reactors damaged, setting back developments for years (IAEA, 1984). This was coupled with the Supreme Leader Khomeini's reluctance to engage in nuclear development as it was an 'un-Islamic' endeavour, even though development slowly continued (Fitzpatrick, 2011b: 10). Only after the war did Iran continue its programme to full effect with the help of Russian nuclear experts, Chinese equipment and Argentinean low-enriched uranium. When Khamenei took Khomeini's place as the Supreme Leader, an 'obstacle' towards further nuclear development was removed. Iran continued its inquiries to acquire nuclear technology, some of it of a so-called 'dual-use' nature (i.e. with both military and civilian purposes, see Fitzpatrick, 2011b: 52). The United States managed to pressure China, India, and Argentina into cancelling nuclear cooperation with Iran, but the programme still steadily expanded (Fitzpatrick, 2011b: 8). This included beginning construction of a heavy-water reactor at Arak in 1996 and a uranium enrichment plant at Natanz in 2000, which were not declared to the IAEA and thus not revealed to the outside world. Indeed, the West was right in claiming that Iran was secretly developing its nuclear programme, but Iran was not initially in violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty it signed, nor the IAEA's charter. When it declared the Esfahan uranium conversion facility in 2000, however, it lied about the purpose of this facility, thereby concealing the existence of the Natanz plant (Fitzpatrick, 2011b: 16). Figure 3.1 shows the extent and spread of Iranian facilities relevant to the nuclear programme. The 'nuclear turn' in Western politics towards Iran was set in motion because of Iran's continued assertiveness and the possible implications it could have for Western interests. In essence, this turn indicates that the 'nuclear issue' slowly came to dominate policymaking towards Iran during the 2000s. In 2002, an Iranian opposition group revealed the existence of the Arak and Natanz facilities, which were not made public by Iran (they had no legal obligation to do so). Of course, Western intelligence services already suspected that Iran was making progress in mastering the nuclear fuel cycle. The cause of the dispute on the Iranian nuclear programme lies not in the supposed negligence or lies by Iran on its nuclear programme, though these have made for a lack of trust, but in the broader situation of international politics as constructed by states' interests and perceptions vis--vis Iran.

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Figure 3.1 Facilities relevant to Irans nuclear programme (Fitzpatrick, 2011: 50). International Institute for Security Studies, 2011. All rights reserved. Reproduced with permission.

The Nuclear Turn and Its Global Implications The revelation of the Arak and Natanz facilities in 2002 followed closely after American policy shifted from a relatively isolationist policy towards pursuing a world-embracing struggle against terrorism in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Both President Khatami and the Supreme Leader expressed sympathy and condemned the attacks. Regardless, officials within the Bush Administration had agitated for war with and regime change within Iran (Crist, 2012: 423-8, 445); publicly, George W. Bush declared Iran as part of an 'axis of evil'. Earlier Iranian overtures to seek better relations and cooperation in Afghanistan had been rebuffed (Sadat and Hughes, 2010) and president Khatami wanted to light a candle at Ground Zero, but was denied from doing so because such an action might undermine the credibility of the 'war on terror' (Crist, 2012: 432-3). Just as Iran had historically feared great power machinations, the United States now feared an Iranian-sponsored cabal of terrorism seeking to undermine American power. Iran withdrew its extended hand. The Bush Administration had entrapped itself in its own rhetoric.
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This time, Iran's traditionally revolutionary rhetoric was matched by vitriolic worldview from the United States, equally conducive to Hobbesian enmity, further reinforcing both American and Iranian perceptions of the Other's existence as inherently undesirable. And, of course, the alleged prospect of the Other developing nuclear weapons (Iran) or the Other occupying two neighbouring countries and attempting regime change on the Self (US) only served to strengthen mutually shared perceptions of enmity after the invasion of Iraq and the nuclear turn. Regardless of the fact that many other states were given a chance to redeem themselves after relatively minor transgressions, by June 2003 the United States pushed the IAEA member states to refer Iran to the United Nations Security Council (Fitzpatrick, 2011b: 18). Iran's nuclear advancements only catalysed an already present enmity. While suspicions mounted that Iran was conducting activities relevant to the development of a nuclear weapon, president Khatami sought to maintain good relations with the international community (Bowen and Brewer, 2011: 933). Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's election as president and his subsequent full restart of uranium enrichment in 2005 signalled a turn in Iran's attitude. The character of the nuclear programme did not intrinsically change, but Iran's assertiveness and resistance to foreign pressure increased. Thus, the range of meanings attached to the programme shifted further towards it being a potential danger to the West and Israel. In September 2005, Iran was found to be in non-compliance with the IAEA's Safeguards Agreement regarding the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the US saw its wish fulfilled as Iran's case was referred to the Security Council. Unilateral American sanctions in June 2005 were followed by Security Council sanctions under resolution 1737 in early 2006. Iran continued its efforts to master the fuel cycle, however. Later resolutions in 2007, 2008, and 2010 also incorporated the American demand for suspension of uranium enrichment. When Barack Obama became president in 2009, relations between Iran and the US were cold, at best. While the Bush Administration had maintained the goal of allowing no enrichment on Iranian soil (a clear political, not a legal, goal), the Obama Administration kept closer to international law and demanded the suspension of enrichment to build trust and transparency (T. Parsi, 2012a: 59). Still, many officials within the Obama administration never gave diplomacy a chance to work and kept their historically entrenched distrust of Iran at the forefront of policymaking (T. Parsi, 2012a: 61-2). Khamenei appreciated Obama's initiative in his Nowruz message, addressing Iran by its full name and expressing his desire that "the Islamic Republic of Iran take its rightful place in the community of nations." Obama publicly recognised the Other as a

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rival and sought improved relations instead of regime change, but Khamenei desired more concrete actions. During the contested Iranian elections in 2009, Obama once more sent an appeal for rapprochement, but did not receive a final answer due to the turmoil surrounding the elections (Blechman and Brumberg, 2010: 43; Parsi, 2012: 100). Moreover, he was stuck between defining American policy in support of the Green Movement protesting in the streets of Iran and seeking a diplomatic rapport with the incumbent Iranian government (T. Parsi, 2012a: 100-1). Indeed, opposing further escalation of sanctions towards Iran might have been good policy, but it was bad politics in terms of pleasing both his constituency and placating American allies in the Middle East. In turn, the Iranian political landscape also prevented steps towards de-escalation in 2010. Opposition in the Iranian Parliament prevented Ahmadinejad from pursuing a deal in which Iranian uranium would be swapped for fuel rods for nuclear power plants. This was the same opposition which often criticised Ahmadinejad for his uncompromising stance (Fitzpatrick, 2011a; Katzman, March 2012: 35; T. Parsi, 2012a: 141, 147-8). Obama's policy has shifted from attempts at engagement, which were not given much leeway in his Administration and lacked credibility in the eyes of the Iranian government, to a renewed focus on pressure (Katzman, March 2012: 59-60; T. Parsi, 2012a). Until the time of writing, uncertainty regarding the Iranian nuclear programme has only increased, sabre-rattling has continued, and there seem to be only sporadic indications of change in the Hobbesian enmity that has typified American-Iranian relations in the last thirty years. Conclusions The nuclear turn in Western politics towards Iran is mostly the result of a geopolitical rivalry buttressed by an ever-present yet often latent enmity. The revelation that Iran had continued its mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle was primarily troubling because of these factors and this observation is placed within the context of the Bush Administration's insistency on a Manichean worldview conducive to further mutual hostility. These contextual factors help explain why the Western reaction to these relatively minor violations was tilted towards pressure and isolation from the start. While historically entrenched and rigidified enmity has prevented steps towards rapprochement, both Iran and the US also lacked the domestic windows of opportunity to pursue more cooperative policies. Concretely, this can be seen in the way American policymakers and US allies lacked faith in diplomacy and made its failure a self-fulfilling prophecy, with one Democratic Congressman even going so far as stating that the purpose of sanctions is to hurt the

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Iranian people (instead of changing Iranian political behaviour, see T. Parsi, 2012aa: 106). And while the Iranian government had already signed it, the Iranian Parliament refused to ratify the IAEA's Additional Protocol allowing more intrusive inspections because of the West's insistence on pressure. This socially constructed enmity is further compounded by a broader strategic rivalry. American allies in the region do not necessarily have an interest in American rapprochement with Iran, as their alliance with the US might suffer and their relative power might decrease. Iran's assertiveness on the nuclear issue has given these allies and American policymakers alike fuel to propel US policy towards further escalation. 3.3 Western and Israeli Visions and Responses In general, the nuclear turn in Western policy towards Iran meant that the security dilemma for Western powers and Israel became more acute. Iran has always played a significant regional role, whether it was as a friendly state or as a regional power to be dealt with. This time, relations were dominated by the perceived danger of a nuclear weapon in a regime judged to be irrational and vitriolic, even while it has consistently shown signs of pragmatism. Both Walt and Wendt's theories help explain why Iran's assertiveness and its resistance in the face of stiff sanctions are more than a mere thorn in the West's side, and even more so for Israel. Following the November 2011 IAEA report and its four 2012 follow-ups, all stressing uncertainty regarding "possible military dimensions" of the Iranian nuclear programme, sanctions by both the E.U. and US were expanded and talk of a possible military intervention waxed and waned. While the merits and faults of possible future policies will be discussed in the next chapter, it is sufficient to note that, regardless of attempts at diplomacy, escalations of sanctions and pressure have dominated the practice of policy. This section will analyse the dominant Western and regional perceptions and interests regarding the nuclear programme and its potential role in Iran's foreign policy. American Responses Many Western observers in non-partisan, policy and academic circles (Bowen and Brewer, 2011; Clapper, 2012: 5; Fitzpatrick, 2011b: 119; Katzman, March 2012: 28-9) share the perception that Iran is working towards the capability to produce nuclear weapons. Expert inquiries (Albright et al., 2012a; 2012b; Fitzpatrick, 2011b) into the nature of the Iranian nuclear programme conclude that some elements in the Iranian nuclear programme are more suitable for military applications

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than for the current spectrum of civilian activities, at least in their current form. Moreover, an Iranian parliament member posited that Iran might convert some of its 20 percent enriched uranium to 60% for use as fuel for future nuclear submarines (Albright et al., 2012c). Such a step would bring Iran yet closer to producing weapons-grade uranium (i.e. enriched to more than 90 percent). Such observations are balanced by the significant engineering challenges Iran would face in manufacturing a nuclear weapon (Witt et al., 2012), and by Iran's recent diversion of enriched uranium towards medical stockpiles. The Iranian leadership has not pursued the suggestion to further enrich uranium above the 20 percent level, and any such developments would be immediately detected by the IAEA. Again, ambiguity surrounding nuclear issues is less disconcerting for the West when talking about Japan or even Israel. But because of the stake the US has in the Middle East, even the slightest chance of an Iranian nuclear weapon capability would deteriorate its leverage and strategic position. Increasingly fixated on worst-case scenarios, Western policymaking circles as a whole fear that Iran is developing a 'threshold capability' under a strategy of 'nuclear hedging' (Bowen and Brewer, 2011: 924). In this scenario, Iran acquires all the elements needed for a nuclear weapon without actually assembling it. The dual-use nature of many of Iran's facilities and uranium enrichment and conversion in general make such a policy relatively feasible for the Iranian government, should it decide to pursue it. Covert assassinations of nuclear scientists have gone hand in hand with digital sabotage efforts to curb Iran's potential progress towards this scenario. Its increased ballistic missile capabilities, with a similar dual-use nature as space-launch vehicles, also contribute to these fears, though these also act as a strategic deterrent for Iran without nuclear warheads (Fitzpatrick, 2008: 17-8; OxAn, 2012: 6-8). Figure 3.3 shows the range of Iran's ballistic missiles. Acquiring a 'threshold capability' with a mature ballistic missile programme would place Iran in a position to follow through on a second option. This is an option whereby Iran would actually acquire a nuclear weapon; Iran would follow in North Korea's footsteps, 'breaking out' of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) acquiring a nuclear weapon soon afterwards. According to Fitzpatrick (2011b: 70), it would be possible for a country to produce the required stockpile of low-enriched uranium before breaking out of the NPT in order to pursue weapons-grade uranium. Legally, this is perfectly possible. Politically, this would cross the red lines set by both Israel and the United States, most likely leading to an armed intervention. Logically, as Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium of the 20

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percent grade increases, so does its 'break-out capability'. The 20 percent grade would still need to be enriched further, however. Such efforts would clearly signal possibly hostile intent.

Figure 3.2 - The range of Iran's ballistic missiles (Robb and Wald, 2012a: 55). Bipartisan Policy Center 2012. All rights reserved. Reproduced with permission.

While Western countries often fear a path towards weaponisation of Iran's nuclear programme, and while some activities conducted by Iran may have military purposes, there are no signs of a structured programme towards weaponisation, as confirmed by the CIA's National Intelligence Estimates of both 2007 and 2012. Moreover, the West has consistently discovered secret elements in the Iranian nuclear programme (Fitzpatrick, 2011b: 74; Kroenig, 2012: 79). Most importantly, however, the Supreme Leader, who has the ultimate control over the nuclear programme, has condemned and outlawed weapons of mass destruction. Even while many US allies in the region are extremely undemocratic, the perception of Iran as a theocratic dictatorship also shapes opinions on, policy towards, and relations with Iran. Walt's balance of threat works against seeking better relations, as the "perception of intent" is tilted against the Iranian leadership, regardless of the Supreme Leader's assurances. Aside from mutually hostile rhetoric and policies of pressure on the one hand and resistance on the other, the history of interaction between the two nations is a huge hurdle to overcome. Nearly all precedents in diplomacy are tainted with distrust and failure, as discussed in the previous chapter.
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Trita Parsi (2012: 5), a prominent scholar on US-Iranian relations, put it most effectively, "[t]he thirty-year old US-Iran enmity is no longer a phenomenon; it is an institution." The American policy response towards Iran generally fits within what social constructivism would predict in a culture of enmity. This history and political culture incentivises American policymakers to base their policy on worst-case scenarios wherein Iran seeks to manoeuvre itself into a position to threaten US allies and interests in the region. An Iranian nuclear weapon or an Israeli-style 'nuclear ambiguity' (not declaring yourself to be a nuclear weapons state) will effectively limit American policy options towards Iran, narrowing its historically important 'freedom of action' in the international scene due to Iran's deterrent. It is also just a few steps away from the most hard-line response of an armed intervention, something which many American policymakers would support. The nuclear programme and its ambiguity have acted as a catalyst for hawks in the American beltway to pursue an escalation of pressure. While the influence of the 'Israel Lobby' and its links towards the Israeli government remain controversial topics (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007), their goals often overlap; without devolving into the realm of conspiracy theory, it is safe to say that both internally and externally, the US has often been pressured by Israel and its other allies towards more escalation. The Israeli Assessment Israel is the only state to have been in a direct conflict with Iran (Devenny, 2006). The two states have not engaged in a 'shooting war', but Iran has helped Hezbollah and Hamas by supplying them with expertise, manpower, and rockets. The acuteness of the security dilemma and fear of a nuclear weapon further reinforced by the anti-Israeli rhetoric coming from Iran and by the Jewish historical fear of genocide. Yet, even Israel realises the often pragmatic nature of Iranian policy, and Israel -- more realistically -- fears that Iran will gain freedom of action and power at the cost of Israeli security. For Israel even more so than for the West, a fear of the unknown permeates all debates surrounding a possible Iranian nuclear weapon: there is simply no precedent of Iran possessing nuclear weapons. The uncertain future of the Syrian-Iranian-Lebanese nexus further increases tensions between Israel and Iran, as both are supporting opposing sides in the Syrian civil war (Robb and Wald, 2012a: 33-5). First and foremost, this is the primary geostrategic rivalry underlying the enmity between the two states. As Prime Minister in 1996, Benjamin Netanyahu addressed the US Congress on the fact that "[t]ime is running out" on the nuclearisation of "terrorist states" (Greenberg, 2012). Nearly

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seventeen years later, Netanyahu uses similar tropes in speeches to AIPAC, the UN, and his own people. According to him, the nuclearisation of Iran would mean an existential threat to Israel. Iran's official ideology dictates that the state of Israel should be removed by way of a "popular referendum" (Sadjadpour, 2009: 19-20). Since Netanyahu sees the fate of the Jewish people as intricately tied up with the fate of Israel, the 'removal' of Israel would have the same implications as the Holocaust: "the year is 1938 and Iran is Germany" (Kaye et al., 2011: 33). Nevertheless, Iran has never showed the intent to use nuclear weapons, nor sought the destruction of the Jewish people (as discussed in the previous chapter). Where Netanyahu is right is that Iran's increased resolve as a result of a nuclear capability or some other source of regional power will decrease Israel's ability to counter Iran's conventional hostile actions and decrease Israel's relative power (Kaye et al., 2011: 3; T. Parsi, 2012a: 26). Thus, ideological and religious layers of enmity contribute to geostrategic rivalry (Kaye et al., 2011: 25). As Walt's balance of threat-theory would predict, Israel seeks to balance against what it perceives to be the most threatening power. Iran is only perceived to be an existential threat because of these enmities and rivalries, yet any nuclear weapon is a potential existential threat to Israel, even its own. Considering the acuteness of the security dilemma for Israel, it is not surprising that it is pushing its American ally to pre-empt any form of Iranian nuclear capability. In order to garner support in the West, Netanyahu is playing upon entrenched Western perceptions of Iran as an irrational and unreliable actor, and even called the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) comments on the Iranian regime as a "rational actor" as serving Iran's interests (Ravid, 2012). Regardless of whether this is true, the CJCS, General Dempsey, first and foremost serves the American national interest. In political reality as well as theory, it is not impossible for a state's interests to coincide with the interests of one of its rivals. Israel's interest in pre-empting an Iranian nuclear weapon is mostly shared by the US, but the two countries' governments draw different conclusions on the severity of the threat based on different historical experiences and different perceptions of Iran's nuclear status (T. Parsi, 2012aa: 50; see Figure 3.6). The Netanyahu administration's actions flow forth from the Jewish historical experience and the short-term Israeli national interest, but are not conducive to finding a way out of the hostility that permeates Israel's relations with Iran. Not unsurprisingly, the American people do not seek more "foreign entanglements" (Kull and Telhami, 2012) and Israelis generally do not believe that a military strike will be effective in stopping Iranian ambitions (Pillar, 2012).

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Figure 3.3 - Israeli PM Netanyahu showing his perception of Iran's nuclear progressions at his 27 September 2012 speech at the United Nations General Assembly.

Aside from Israel's push for firmer US policies, it has been making extensive preparations for an independent strike. Talk of war between Iran and Israel, possibly backed up by the US, has waxed and waned in the last year. Israel has been expanding its capabilities through a lease of Azerbaijani airbases (Perry, 2012). Also, some see its campaign in the Gaza as a means of disabling Hamas' capability to act as Iran's proxy in case of an Iran-Israel war (Stern, 2012). Still, it is uncertain whether Israel possesses the capabilities to inflict the damage it desires on (underground) Iranian nuclear facilities (Johnson and Chorley, 2012). Because of this, some argue that the Israeli government has used threats of an attack on Iran to pressure the US into pressuring Iran more extensively (Dreyfuss, 2012). While most Western policymakers would readily summarise Iran's policy as 'nuclear hedging', Israel's policy can be seen as 'strategic hedging', slowly preparing to decrease the risks involved in striking Iran. Due to both strategic rivalry and entrenched Hobbesian enmity, a nuclear Iran would be extremely detrimental to Israel's capacity to ensure its security in the Middle East. Following these logics, it is not necessarily problematic for Israel if Iran's power were to increase relative to its own, but the nature of the relationship and concurrent perception of threat would need to change dramatically. The Regional Players: Saudi Arabia and Turkey With the 'reset' of Iraq and the improved relations between Iran and Iraq comes an improved strategic position for Iran (Litwak, 2009: 240). Iran's other traditional geopolitical and
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ideological rival, Saudi Arabia, watches these developments with suspicion. Even more so than in the past, fears abound concerning the rise of Shia and Persian influence (Bowen and Brewer, 2011: 939). US support for revolutionary movements in the Arab Spring has increased the House of Saud's focus on regime survival (Aarts and Van Duijne, 2009: 64; T. Parsi, 2012a: 18). While both Saudi Arabia and Iran try to discredit each other's ideological credentials, the Saudi-Iranian rivalry is mostly rooted in the struggle for regional dominance (Aarts and Van Duijne, 2009: 71). In general, however, Iran's regional influence seems to have increased, partially at Saudi Arabia's expense (Cause, 2011: 16). While Morgenthau predicts a security dilemma to occur between foes, it also occurs between allies (Snyder, 1984: 466-7). Any improvement of relations between Iran and the US, be it on the nuclear programme or within a framework of regional security, will invoke further Saudi fears of US abandonment. At the least, the Saudis fear that such a deal will further decrease their influence in the region (Cause, 2011: 28). It is not surprising that behind the curtains, the Saudis have joined Israel in the drumbeat to pre-empt any Iranian nuclear capability (Oren, 2012; T. Parsi, 2012aa: 18). While it is not clear where Saudi Arabia draws the 'red line' for an Iranian nuclear capability, there will be a tipping point somewhere along the line of prospective Iranian developments. Saudi Arabia will then seek to acquire their own nuclear deterrent in order to stem a further loss of power relative to Iran (Black and Tisdall, 2010; Al Faisal, 2011). While realist logic would prescribe such actions for Saudi Arabia, an expanded American security commitment could also soothe Saudi fears of a further loss of relative power in the region. A more constructive role towards regional peace has been reserved for Turkey. Its ties with Iran have flourished since Erdoan's AKP came to power and introduced the 'zero problems' principle in its foreign policy. Trade across the four centuries old border has boomed in the last decade, despite the Western push for sanctions (ICG, 2012: 15). After the 'nuclear turn', it has consistently supported Iran's right to a peaceful nuclear programme and has expressed its scepticism regarding the effectiveness of sanctions (zcan and zdamar, 2010: 112). Turkey has also clearly indicated that it does not seek a nuclear capability of its own and will seek to deter Iran conventionally. Political realist theory would readily prescribe states to acquire a nuclear deterrent to ensure their security in troubled regions, but Turkey has relied upon its formidable conventional arsenal and NATO support and abides by international non-

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proliferation norms (lgen, 2012: 4). Turkey has sought and will continue to seek a diplomatic solution in its role as facilitator and mediator (Grzel and Ersoy, 2012). In 2010, for example, Turkey and Brazil's successful attempt at brokering a deal with Tehran to export its enriched uranium in return for reactor fuel was blocked by the West because they were already pursuing punitive measures towards Iran (ICG, 2012: 19-21). While Turkey and Brazil received signals that the Obama Administration still favoured the specifics of this deal, Obama later asserted that the deal was off because Iran still retained the required amount of enriched uranium to fabricate a nuclear device (Zakaria, 2012a). There are still sources of rivalry, however. Both Iran and Turkey place the Palestinian cause high on their agendas, and Iranian fears of Turkey 'hijacking' this cause have hampered Turkey's efforts to increase trade (ICG, 2012: 16). Iran and Turkey have adopted conflicting approaches to the Syria conflict and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein has left a vacuum for Iran to exploit (ICG, 2012: 23). Moreover, Turkey's membership of NATO creates an inherent tension between its regional and global postures. Turkey's participation in missile defence programmes and the American nuclear weapons stationed on its soil provide fuel for conflict in the scenario of a diplomatic falling-out between Tehran and Ankara. Thus, Turkey finds itself in a conflict between its aspirations to become a player on the world stage and its regional interests in maintaining 'zero problems' in its near abroad. Conclusions The struggle for regional dominance that characterises the Middle East is a persistent feature of international politics. The Arab Spring and developments in Iraq have made the future balance of power in the Middle East more uncertain. Cross-cutting allegiances between Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey and the US further complicate the geopolitical landscape. As states seek to increase their security and ensure their survival, they will engage in practices of 'internal balancing' (i.e. acquiring a nuclear deterrent or strengthening military posture) or 'external balancing' (i.e. seeking alliances vis--vis an ascendant Iran). The policies they pursue depends firstly on the degree and nature of Iran's assertiveness, and secondly on the credibility of American security commitments. For both Saudi Arabia and Israel, a 'security dilemma' exists in their alliance with the US: there is an ever-present fear of abandonment. For both the West and Israel, in different degrees, an Iranian nuclear weapon is unacceptable for three reasons. Firstly, it is perceived to be an existential threat to Israel. Secondly, it would increase Tehran's position of power and prestige in the region, to the detriment of the West and its allies. Thirdly, there is always a latent possibility of nuclear weapons

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proliferation, evidenced by Saudi statements that it would also pursue a nuclear capability in the case of continued Iranian pursuits. The underlying historical enmity and mistrust legitimise the first reason, exacerbate the implications of the second reason, and increase the likelihood of the third reason crystallising. An important lesson to be drawn from the contemporary responses to Iran's assertiveness is that Iran's relations with many of its neighbours and the West are characterised by a hardcore realism as the mutual perception of a 'zero-sum world' dominates: "the Other's gain in power is automatically a threat to Our security". As social constructivism emphasises, this is not a fixed characteristic of reality itself. Yes, realities of power inevitably influence politics among nations. Like humans envy their more powerful counterparts, states are vulnerable to intrinsic (realist) tendencies to seek to undermine the most powerful states' position. But there is nothing self-evident about a Manichean enmity dominating relations with Iran. 3.4 Iran's Take: A Peaceful Assertion of Iran's Prowess Throughout the last three decades, Iran has continuously asserted its rights to a peaceful nuclear programme. The Iranian discourse carries a distinct undertone of alleged victimisation by the international community. This section will look into Iran's take on the rights it has regarding its nuclear programme, the programme's place within Iran's greater political consciousness, and a hypothetical account of what Iran could gain or lose by acquiring nuclear weapons. The majority of the following observations have been drawn from two official communiqus released by the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Netherlands in late 2011 and 2012, as well as speeches and proclamations by the Supreme Leader Khamenei. They are placed in the context of the fear that some aspects of Iran's nuclear programme might be relevant for military purposes. Iran's Nuclear Rights As implied above, Iran feels as if it is treated differently by the IAEA and the UN. It is party to the NPT, which gives countries a right to pursue their own civilian nuclear programme under Article 4. Iran sees the demand by the UNSC to suspend its uranium enrichment and the resulting sanctions as a violation of this sovereign right. Yet, there is a certain conditionality to countries' rights to pursue a nuclear programme. They may do so only when observing the IAEA's Safeguards Agreement. The IAEA has repeatedly concluded that Iran has not complied with this obligation (IAEA Board of Governors, 2011; 2012a-d).

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As the West often fears that Iran is still working on activities relevant to a military nuclear programme, it would seem that Iran would have no reason not to deliver full transparency on its civilian nuclear programme. Yet there is a certain rationale behind Iran's continued defiance. Were Iran to come clean on its (highly likely) military activities in the past, this would only confirm Western fears (Fitzpatrick, 2008: 20-1). Moreover, less than half of the IAEA members has signed the 'Additional Protocol', which Iran would need to sign in order to allow for more intrusive inspections. Such compromise might not seem troubling to outside observers, but can be seen as a sign of weakness within the Iranian domestic political arena. In refusing to 'simply' comply to the IAEA's demands, Iran's behaviour and perception today bear an uncanny resemblance to its historical experiences. In its January 2012 communiqu, Iran indicated its concern with supposed IAEA diversion from its "fundamental legal and functional duties under the ill-intentioned political influences of certain powers who are wellknown for the manipulation of the facts and rules and [are] misusing the international institutions to serve their own agendas." These are heavy accusations bearing close resemblance to the historical fear of great power machinations and conspiracies. According to Iran, "certain powers" are supplying the IAEA with false information on its nuclear programme, as to enable them to apply increasing pressure (i.e. sanctions) to keep Iran from increasing its regional power. Recent controversy surrounding a fake graph depicting Iranian nuclear weapon simulations add to these fears (Butt, 2012). This distrust matches what Waltzian realism would prescribe. International institutions reflect the power relations in the structure of international politics. They are subject to the whims of the great powers and Iran would be right in questioning the IAEA's impartiality. Wendt would emphasise that they also have the capacity to influence the dominant acceptable behaviour of states, and, indeed, outright violations of established non-proliferation norms (i.e. in North Korea's case) are often decisively acted upon. For Wendt, it would not be surprising to observe that Iran has repeatedly asserted that it is a "responsible and full-fledged cooperative member of the IAEA." Nevertheless, Iran also engages in its own Waltzian realism when promoting its own agenda as a leader of the 'Third World' in international organisations such as the Non-Aligned Movement. Iran has an unalienable right to a civilian nuclear programme. But this right is not unconditional. Like every other state, Iran has to abide by the IAEA's decisions to resolve the outstanding disputes before regaining the right to further pursue uranium enrichment for peaceful purposes. There is nothing to say for the idea that Iran is being treated differently than other states within the IAEA's framework; there is a lot to say for the idea that Iran is being

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punished disproportionately for its failures to comply with the IAEA's demands for clarification on the nature of its programme. Iran's quarrel with the IAEA, the UNSC, and the West stems from the fact that the sanctions imposed on Iran are a disproportionate punitive measure for its violations. The reason for this disproportionately high punishment lies in the factors explained in the previous section: the slightest possibility of an Iranian nuclear weapon and the prospect of further Iranian assertiveness is a bleak one for both the West and Israel. Whether these blocs also manipulate the IAEA's judgements on Iran, as Iran has implied, is a matter for further investigation. It is clear, however, that political realists would encourage states to use institutions such as the IAEA or UN to further their own security. The Programme's Place within Iran's Consciousness The Iranian government's official communiqus cite various reasons for its insistence to pursue nuclear energy. Like many Western economies, it seeks to establish an "energy mix" that is durable well into the future (Fitzpatrick, 2011b: 17). Advancement in the nuclear field is seen as instrumental to sustainable development and energy diversification. The government has acknowledged that foreign resources are possibly necessary to provide enough fuel for electricity generation, defusing earlier doubts how Iran was to go about pursuing nuclear energy with the prospect of a limited domestic supply of uranium (Fitzpatrick, 2008: 18; 2011b: 52). Of course, the nuclear programme also plays a significant role within Iran's domestic political arena. It is widely supported by the Iranian public as constituting a 'national project' of pride, though support has fluctuated (with no distinctive direction) across the years (Fair and Shellman, 2008; IPI, 2010; Loschky and Pugliese, 2012). Even Mir-Hossein Mousavi, the opposition leader supported by many American policymakers eager to overthrow the clerical regime, accused Ahmadinejad of being too conciliatory on the nuclear issue (though this could also be for domestic purposes; Zakaria, 2012b). The nuclear project also plays a role within the broader Revolutionary ideology. Khamenei has repeatedly asserted that there is a causal link between technological advancements and the political independence which he greatly desires (Sadjadpour, 2009: 11, 22-3). Again, the nuclear project is an instrument within the persistent Iranian desire to cut itself loose from unreliable dependence on other nations. From this independence, Iran would seek regional leadership, within which technological prowess plays a significant role (Fitzpatrick, 2008: 14). While it may not deliver the de facto independence of foreign resources, as acknowledged by the

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Iranian Embassy's communiqu, it is a symbol for Iran's self-reliance and re-assertion of its role as a significant and distinctive player. The Supreme Leader does not acknowledge Western fears on proliferation of nuclear weaponry in Iran's hands. Indeed, both Khamenei and Khomeini have issued nearly immutable religious edicts (fatws) declaring nuclear weapons as being sinful and un-Islamic (harm) (Barzegar, 2010: 82; IAEA, 2005: 121). As such, there is no place for nuclear weapons, or any other kind of weapon of mass destruction, within Iran's ostensibly defensive arsenal. These heavy-weighing statements are coupled with a denunciation of the ambition for territorial conquest (Sadjadpour, 2009: 26). It need be said, though, that a fatw in Shia Islam may be overruled in the case of urgent political needs of the state, comparable to American House and Senate bills granting the President certain authorities for the sake of the 'national interest'. Both Khamenei and the broader governmental apparatus seek to explain Western hostility as being the manifestation of fear. They state that the US fears Iranian self-sufficiency and its concurrent leadership role within the Islamic world. Resistance to Western pressure in the form of continued nuclear and technological advancement is placed within both Iran's Shia consciousness of martyrdom, the Persian drive for regional leadership, and the broader Revolutionary desire to overthrow a corrupt world order (Parsi, 2012: 52). Even though the practical foreign policies of the US and Iran are not aimed at either side's total destruction, fears and rhetoric mirror this typically Hobbesian political culture. The clerical leadership fears that the US seeks regime change; it also proclaims its desire to overthrow an ostensibly US-led world order while spilling often multi-interpretable messages on the fate of Israel. Pursuing nuclear technology and resisting Western pressure goes hand in hand with what Khamenei sees as a policy expedient to Iran's status as the avant-garde of an Islamic revolution. In Morgenthau's more general model, Iran would seek to revise its position in the world order in order to seek an increase in prestige. It seems that Khamenei is stuck with an entrenched enmity against the US based on Khomeini's more influential writings, which he needs to abide by to legitimise his rule and rally the Iranian people around a Revolutionary flag. In fact, some (Sadjadpour, 2009: 2, 25) have argued that US interventions in countries neighbouring Iran have lent more credibility to this worldview. Khamenei has often supported president Ahmadinejad's vitriolic statements and strident efforts regarding nuclear advancements, but debates have also raged within Iran's political apparatus on what prices can be paid to support an absolute ideology of resistance and self-reliance (Bowen and Brewer, 2011: 937-8; Chubin, 2010: 165-7)

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Thus, the clerical leadership under Khamenei is faced with a dilemma: outright hostility towards the West by way of nuclear assertiveness threatens Iran's security, but too much (perceived) compromise under pressure also threatens its legitimacy by eroding the anti-American foundations on which it is built. As the Bush administration became entrapped in its 'Axis of Evil'-rhetoric, both Khamenei and Ahmadinejad are stuck with their anti-American philosophy. A Nuclear Weapon for Iran? The following account of a possible nuclear weapon in Iranian hands is an entirely theoretical, and thus hypothetical case. Wendt's social constructivism has already shown that the current nuclear programme carries a distinctively different meaning for the West and Israel because it is in the hands of a power which is placed within a firmly Hobbesian enmity. When dealing with the scenario of an actual nuclear power, it seems fitting that a 'hard' theory of power politics is used to analyse the reasons behind a nation's potential quest for it and the reasons behind this pursuit. This inquiry will focus on possible Iranian considerations as prescribed by political realist theory. Note that the policy suggestions in the next chapter do not deal with the possible scenario of a nuclear-armed Iran. Because the 'nuclear turn' (which is the centrality of the nuclear programme with possible military dimensions) is the central concept within this thesis, discussing policy options with regards to a nuclear-armed Iran would move beyond the nuclear turn, putting it beyond the scope of this thesis. It is clear, however, that such an option is not wholly unrealistic and some have argued that a nuclear Iran might even improve the region's security (Waltz, 2012), whilst others warn against possible proliferation of nuclear weapons (Donnelly et al., 2011; Edelman et al., 2011; Kroenig, 2012 In structural realist theory, there is no difference between one state and another state's motivations in the quest for security. Iran would have the same reasons as the United States, China, or Pakistan for acquiring nuclear weapons. Simply put, nuclear weapons are an effective deterrent against foreign incursions. Historically, once a country has acquired nuclear weapons, other states have acquiesced to it (Waltz, 2012: 3). Even after the Cold War, as the US increasingly focused on 'rogue states', Pakistan (1998) and North Korea (2006) arose as new nuclear powers, the former of which faces a rather bleak proliferation scenario should its government ever collapse (Kerr and Nikitin, 2012). While Waltz (1981) himself touches upon factors of prestige and offensive purposes in acquiring nuclear weapons, his primary arguments for states seeking nuclear weapons generally

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follow his own theory's logic: if adversaries possess nuclear weapons and a state has no nuclear allies, it is likely to have a (latent) desire to acquire them to ensure a credible deterrent. Even a small nuclear force would suffice. Both Israel and the US would ask themselves, 'what if even one of Iran's nuclear weapons hits Tel Aviv or Haifa?' and conclude that a (limited) military strike is not worth the risk. As Pakistan sought to acquire nuclear weapons to balance against India's capabilities, Iran would seek to balance against its primary regional rival. Van Evera's offencedefence balance would tilt in favour of restraint and defence; a primary reason why some (Waltz, 1981) argue that nuclear weapons in fact make the world a less war-prone place because the costs of war are higher. In the case of Iran, it is obvious that a realist motivation might mostly be found in the fact that Israel possesses nuclear weapons, but also because the US has stationed nuclear weapons in Turkey and that three of its other neighbours possess nuclear weaponry. The paradoxical implication might in fact be that the more credible Western or Israeli threats of intervention or invasion become, the more strategic sense it would make for Iran to rapidly acquire nuclear weapons in order to deter such aggression. Nuclear weapons often provide a relatively cheap means of acquiring a robust deterrent, though in Iran's case the costs of sanctions are obviously also mounting. Sanctions are increasingly isolating Iran from the West and pushing it towards the East. This might actually be conducive to Iran following a structural realist logic, which raises a damning prospect. As Waltzian theory prescribes self-help and self-reliance (precepts similar to Iran's official ideology), these sanctions are evidence that a state can only rely on its own strength. Both real pressure and the spectre of an armed intervention give Iran ample reason to pursue a credible deterrent. This grim prospect seems to confirm the general impression that realist theory is tilted towards prescribing war and violence. Still, Waltz's nuances provide an important sidetrack. States would seek to acquire an appropriate degree of power to ensure their security. While it could be argued that Iran is 'overbalanced' (i.e. there is no stable balance of power in the Middle East), Iran will need to take into account the political reality of the path towards nuclear weaponry. Acquiring too much power will inevitably upset Walt's balance of threat and invite increased balancing behaviour as predicted by Waltz's structural realism. It is impossible to accurately pinpoint which degree of power is appropriate, but so far the consensus in Tehran has been that an overt path towards nuclear weapons is too costly and will invite further balancing behaviour. At times, the US and some of its allies have shown that there is a low threshold for being labelled a target for invasion; the 2003 invasion of Iraq is a case in point, as there was little

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evidence for development of WMDs. A touch of Morgenthau would therefore be welcome in prescribing Iran's possible path towards a nuclear weapon: prudence is required in the face of any state's irrationality. An outright dash towards nuclear weapons would readily be detected (as history has shown). Moreover, there is always a risk of further proliferation of nuclear weapons amongst its Arab neighbours, thereby negating Iran's advantage in acquiring such an arsenal (T. Parsi, 2007: 269). Iran's hypothetical quest for a nuclear weapon would be the result of circular causality (Fitzpatrick, 2008: 14). Iran is faced with a most pressing Catch-22. By seeking to ensure its safety and prestige by way of a nuclear weapons programme, it might invite a military intervention. Yet the US and Israel would only attack Iran in the case of a pending nuclear threat. But due to American and Israeli historical belligerence against Middle Eastern countries, whether this is perceived or real, Iran can never be sure of Israel's or the US' intentions, especially considering the continuous presence of American Carrier Battle Groups near the Persian Gulf. Needless to say, these misperceptions and limits of communication work the other way around as well, as the West cannot take the Supreme Leader's word of peace for granted. The lesson to be drawn from this scenario is that the Iranian leadership might at one time decide on acquiring nuclear weapons because they perceive it outweighs the risks involved in its current situation; thus, the conclusion that further military pressure and sanctions will cause Iran to rethink its assertiveness is premature and not founded on pragmatic realist logic. Today, Iran enjoys none of the deterrence benefits of nuclear weapons but does face crippling sanctions and the threat of an imminent attack as if it were already structurally pursuing nuclear weapons. The road towards weaponisation is paved with dangers, however, and this strategic reality adds to Iran's pragmatically balanced approach to this day. 3.4 Conclusion: The Nuclear Programme as a Catalyst for Enmity Recent history shows broad lines of consistency in US-Iranian relations. On either side, diplomacy has often been given a modicum of room to succeed, but has never carried through due to distrust and domestic constraints. While stopping a structured military nuclear programme in the early 2000s and despite increasing pressure and periodical setbacks, Iran has continued its developments in the nuclear field with possible relevance to military applications. And in the last decade, uncertainty, miscommunication, and a lack of transparency have precluded accurate judgements on the possible applications of this programme.

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The West's lack of faith in Iran's peaceful intentions is further strengthened by the often vitriolic rhetoric coming out of Tehran. On the other hand, Iran feels as if it is once again the victim of great power "bullying" and the accompanying hypocrisy. It asserts its right to peaceful nuclear developments but fails to provide the reassurances which the UN Security Council and the West desire. And even the slightest chance of an Iranian nuclear weapon, or 'threshold capability' is unacceptable to Israel as it sees such a weapon as an existential threat. Thus, the nuclear turn has aggravated an already present Hobbesian enmity and has increased the risk of further escalation due to a singular focus on the nuclear programme. These realities need to be taken into account when formulating policies. The nuclear turn is problematic because of the already present tensions, as the meaning Western and Israeli policymakers give to the nuclear programme serves to further strengthen distrust and enmity. In order to steer Western-Iranian relations towards a less hostile political culture, and in order to alleviate the acute security dilemma between Israel and Iran, the broader strategic reality can be combined with theory and history to provide the following insights relevant to the next chapter: In Iran's case, the West will need to take seriously the historical fear of betrayal, an everpresent longing for a significant regional role, and the insistence on its nuclear rights. A degree of clemency must be offered for Iran's past violations to stimulate Iran from being transparent about its asserted lack of violations today. Moreover, if a state wishes to deal with any incumbent regime of another state, the reality of survival needs to be taken seriously: no regime dependent upon an ideology for its survival will undermine it by blindly compromising over a core issue such as a 'nuclear project'. In the diplomatic arena, either side will need to make a distinction between confidencebuilding measures for a final deal and the endgame. The 2010 Turkey/Brazil deal was a step in the right direction, but the Obama administration argued that Iran still possessed enough enriched uranium for a nuclear device. Before negotiated steps crystallise, a framework of shared meanings and misunderstandings will need to be agreed upon. Recognising the Other's point of view and historical experience will make policymaking better informed and less prone to miscommunication. Indeed, according to structural realist logic, the more Iran is isolated and pressured, the more likely it is that it sees the possession of nuclear weapons (though the process less so) as a desirable status to ensure deterrence. Thus, it is in everyone's interest to ensure that the perception that hostility is the only way out (a fully internalised Hobbesian enmity) does not come to dominate policy-makers' discourses and the resulting realities.
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On the other hand, Iran will need to acknowledge Israel's right to exist, or at least cease the extreme vitriol in its rhetoric. The Israeli leadership must then opt for a two-state solution (which is still the official policy of the Obama administration). In the past, Iran has offered to withdraw support for Hezbollah and Hamas, so this need not necessarily be an insurmountable barrier. The Palestinian issue is beyond the scope of this thesis, however, so further details will have to be worked out in this regard.

The United States need not 'abandon' its Arab allies to seek better relations with Iran. Security guarantees for them can go hand in hand with alleviating the balance of threat in the Middle East. The zero-sum game that characterises the Middle Eastern powers' perceptions today can be transcended by seeking to improve relations with Iran so that its need to show its power (the 'prestige-seeking state') diminishes. And if Saudi Arabia's need to challenge Iran at every other turn (and vice versa) decreases, both powers will feel less insecure.

Hard facts of power politics will always remain. One state's increase in power always potentially threatens another state's security. But why are there cases where one state does not see the other as a decisive threat to its own security? Israel does not see French nuclear weapons as a threat. While it is too optimistic and naive to strive for a removal of the acute security dilemma that characterises many states' relations with Iran, its acuteness can be greatly decreased. Moving from this form of Hobbesian enmity to a form of Lockean rivalry would be a rational first step. To serve these ends, however, pragmatic policies have to be followed. Short-term power-political gains to curb the other's rise in power do not always serve the long-term national interest. The following chapter will evaluate the merits of both current and proposed policies in soothing the acuteness of the security dilemma by drawing upon the previous three chapters' insights on theoretical description and prescription, historical contextualisation, and the role of the nuclear turn in policies towards Iran.

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Chapter 4 The Road to Rationality: Proposed Policies and Their Merits

4.1 Introduction Since this thesis focuses on answering the question which set of policies would best serve the American national interest, it is also blunt in admitting that this interest need not completely align with that of its allies, such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, or the EU. Yet, regional states as well as the EU will find that there is a shared interest with the United States in avoiding another extended American war and ensuring economic and political stability in an already turbulent region. American allies might differ in their assessments of the nature of the Iranian threat. For Israel, the threat might be existential and an increase in Iranian power will limit Israel's freedom of action. The security dilemma has been shown to be more acute for Israel. In the case of Saudi Arabia, and less so in the case of Turkey, there is a competition on the ideological and economic levels for the dominant role in the Middle East. How to manage these alliances is certainly an avenue for further research, as this chapter will only touch upon these aspects so as to retain the singular focus on the American national interest. Of course, some argue that a limited form of conflict is necessary to avoid the need to contain or confront a nuclear Iran later on. An attack will pre-empt any Iranian capability to use nuclear technology for military purposes. As talk of war has often dominated fears from Iran's friends and foes alike, the first section will inquire into the possible merits of this option. In not opting for an attack as of yet, the United States has limited its means of pressuring Iran to diplomatic isolation and sanctions. Since diplomatic isolation is a core characteristic of the Wendtian culture of Hobbesian enmity, the second section will look at the historical effects and effectiveness of sanctions in general so as to enable the reader to make an assessment of their future utility, after which the Iranian case will be discussed. The mutual diplomatic nonrecognition as described in the second chapter forms the basic framework for these discussions. Finally, negotiations seem to be the best way out. Yet, they have not been given a lot of room in the past, as the previous chapter has shown. Both sides had to be able to sell their results to the public, their allies, or their political opposition. So far, they have not been able to do so. Therefore, the final section will lay down the challenges which need to be overcome, after which lessons will be drawn from the Nixon administration's rapprochement with the People's Republic of China. These two then lead to the final independent and substantive part of this thesis, which

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includes recommendations regarding the process and content of negotiations as means to alleviate the perilous enmity that characterises contemporary American-Iranian relations. 4.2 The Offensive Option "Enfin, chacun voit assez que les princes conqurants font pour le moins autant la guerre leurs sujets qu leurs ennemis, et que la condition des vainqueurs nest pas meilleure que celle des vaincus." Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Swiss political philosopher The preceding chapters have shown that both in recent history and contemporaneously, IranianAmerican relations have remained in a state of flux with tensions on one end of the spectrum, and a quasi-war on the other. Mutual cyber-attacks, covert infiltrations, and (attempts at) assassinations characterise the last few years, showing that the tides of enmity were, or are, once again waxing. The political arena has featured many proto-crises in the previous year, including the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists, Iran's threats to close the Strait of Hormuz, and Israel's invasion of the Gaza, all of which could have easily escalated. The notion of attacking Iran to pre-empt a nuclear capability is a recurring theme but has not crystallised fully. While the re-election of Barack Obama has made an American attack on Iran's nuclear facilities less likely, the option, as ever, remains "on the table". And while some consider the threats by Israel to independently strike Iran's facilities as a bluff to get the US to put more pressure on Iran (Ahren, 2012), there may come a time when Israel's political leadership will feel compelled to act.. Most importantly, many policymakers and commentators within the US and Israel remain convinced of the merits of a "surgical strike" on Iran's nuclear facilities. This assessment is not likely to change. Both structural realist theories and social constructivist theory lay the emphasis on a state's (perceived) threat environment, and such an environment does not intrinsically change if a nation's leader is replaced. Since the option of an attack will remain on the table in all situations -- regardless of whether the American president says so -- and since this option is at the most aggressive spectrum of policies towards Iran, this first section will discuss the merits of the offensive option in different forms. It will first discuss the arguments presented for an independent Israeli strike on Iran's nuclear facilities, which Israel consciously presents as ever-likely. Many arguments applicable to other scenarios will also be presented here. The second section will inquire into the

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caveats associated with a mainly Israeli strike, while the final section will add a discussion of American support to the equation. Israeli Freedom of Action: Ensuring "Never Again" at All Costs As has been shown in the previous chapter, Israel's actions are intricately tied to US policy. In the context of mutual distrust and a history of a quasi-war, Iran will likely assume American complicity in an Israeli attack even if the US decides not to (directly) aid Israel. Most worrisome for the US is the aforementioned divide between it and Israel regarding the acuteness of the perceived security dilemma. The perceived existential threat posed by nearby Iran is not specific to the Netanyahu administration, and Jewish historical fears and promises of "never again" inspire Israeli militancy against Iran's nuclear assertiveness (Johnson and Chorley, 2012: 24). Considering the broadly shared solidarity for Israel within the American Beltway and the status of Israel as a de facto American ally, any actions taken by or against Israel will inevitably draw in the US, indirectly if not directly. At various moments in the past year, academics and experts have stated that the right time to strike Iran's nuclear facilities is "now" (Fisher, 2012; Ronen, 2012; Tyra, 2012). Some put it more subtly than others, but the spectre of war never fully retreated. Israel's nuclear deterrent is not enough for it not to see an Iranian nuclear capability as a potential precursor to a second Holocaust (Economist, 2012: 20). The time to strike is "now" because Iran seems to be on the verge of gaining a degree of invulnerability to airstrikes, as it is placing its nuclear facilities deeper underground (Kroenig, 2012). According to Prime Minister Netanyahu and his (former) defence minister Barak, Iran will soon enter a "zone of immunity", clearly indicating the either/or nature of the issue for Israel (Landler and Sanger, 2012; Zanotti, 2012: 20). And, some argue, if Iran is fortifying its facilities, there is ample reason to believe that it is planning on developing nuclear weapons. Moreover, Israel is capable of reaching Iranian soil with relative ease through Syrian, Jordanian, and/or Iraqi airspace (see Figure 4.1). A strike is therefore warranted. There is no doubt in anyone's mind that an Israeli strike will set back the Iranian nuclear programme considerably, possibly in the range of one to two years. And while no-one navely believes that an attack is the end of Iran's nuclear ambitions, bearing the economic cost of repeated strikes is preferable to a nuclear Iran capable of wiping (Israeli) cities off the map (Kroenig, 2012: 84). Moreover, Iran's ability to strike back seems limited. Estimates of Israeli casualties remain in the low hundreds, according to (former) Israeli defence minister Ehud Barak (Eiran, 2012). Other assessments also add the notion that Iran will indeed feel compelled to respond in kind (Kroenig, 2012: 82), but that it will limit its response so as not to provoke a full-

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fledged American reaction (Shanker et al., 2012). In any case, not attacking "now" might give Iran the signal that its endeavours with ostensibly aggressive intent are tolerated. Historically, states have often weaponised their nuclear programme, or attempted to do so, when there was no resistance (Waltz, 1981). Aside from the socially constructed Jewish historical experience and damning balance of threat between Iran and Israel, when viewed from a political realist and dispassionate perspective, there is much to be said for striking Iran. From this perspective, the cost/benefit analysis could at some point shift towards favouring a strike. And, as Van Evera's offence-defence theory would predict, when perceptions of an easy offensive option dominate the debate, it is more likely that states will resort to this option, even though the option is difficult in practice.

Figure 4.1 - Potential Israeli attack routes and refuelling points for an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities. IHS 2012. All rights reserved. Reproduced with permission.

Political realism itself also includes an important caveat, however. In this case, political realism does not help and cannot be an independent tool without factual input and complete transparency in international politics. When public politics are informed more by speculation regarding potential threats, historical fears, and entrenched enmity, there is much to be said for

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prudence in the face of uncertainty and lack of information. There is no objective measurement of the progress Iran has made towards weaponising its nuclear programme, if any. As such, much will depend on classified information unavailable to the public, and their judgements on Iranian intent and factual progress. Until those indicators seem to point towards hostile intent changing the balance of threat, many more arguments can be found against striking Iran. The Caveats to an Israeli Strike Proponents of an attack often argue that Israel successfully stopped Iraq's (1981) and Syria's (2007) nuclear ambitions by way of airstrikes. Moreover, Israel's initially undetected October 2012 airstrike on an arms factory in Khartoum (which lies at a similar distance as Tehran) shows Israel's continued ability to root out growing threats. A lot can still be said for comparing the 1981 strike on Iraq's Osirak reactor complex with today's situation. Israel views Iran now as it did Iraq then, as then-Prime Minister Begin referred to the threat of another holocaust in the face of an Iraqi nuclear capability. As it did then, Israel quickly turned to framing events and confirming its role as a victim forced to respond aggressively by way of sabotage and assassinations (Ramberg, 2012). Like Iran's reactors now, Iraq's Osirak reactor was under IAEA supervision, so any diversion of nuclear fuel was bound to be detected before it could become a threat. As political realism would predict, threat assessments were prone to intelligence failures. In the end, the strike destroyed the complex but backfired immensely in the long run. It drove Saddam Hussein to pursue a covert uranium enrichment programme in earnest and strive for an "Arab nuclear weapon" (Ramberg, 2012). In contrast to Iraq, Iran has consistently denounced atomic weapons and its facilities are farther away, more strongly fortified, and more dispersed. As Figure 4.1 shows, Israeli aircraft will inevitably have to violate other countries' airspace. While many of these neighbours cannot effectively react against Israel's air force (Iraq and Syria) or potentially consider Iran to be a rival (Turkey and Saudi Arabia), there is no guarantee that the latter countries will acquiesce to Israeli overflights, considering their tense relations with Israel. Israel's Arab neighbours and possibly Turkey will feel obliged to put more pressure on the Jewish state, increasing regional instability and risks of extended conflict even without Iranian retaliation. In light of the American national interest, tensions will inevitably arise between the two de facto allies, as the US will most likely be seen as being complicit in any Israeli action. In the likely scenario that an Israeli strike is only partially successful, Arab states will be reluctant to let

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the US carry out a "finishing blow" (Cordesman and Wilner, 2012: 105). Successful suppression of Iranian attempts to further its nuclear programme will require a continuation of offensive pressure (Cordesman and Wilner, 2012: 161), with inherent tendencies towards escalation. Feeling cornered, Iranians themselves might ask for a forceful response, a response which would in turn lead Americans to call for a more forceful reaction (Kahl, 2012: 168). Instead of a globally unified front against Iran weaponising its programme, the US and/or Israel will be left on their own due to their unilateral aggression (Abramowitz et al., 2012: 37-8). Whether the US and/or Israel see their strike as a just cause does not matter; other influential states will have their own readings of the strike and its causes. The Necessity for American Support The previous considerations generally assume that an Israeli strike is largely successful. But the Israeli Air Force (IAF) will have great difficulty in significantly damaging the underground facilities of the Iranian nuclear programme in order to delay its progress significantly (Cordesman and Toukan, 2012; Katz and Hendel, 2012: 167-93). The 1981 Osirak, 2007 Syria, and the 2012 Khartoum strikes were carried out against single, unshielded, "soft" targets. Most sites in Iran are hardened and are defended by short- to very long range anti-air missiles, the sites are spread out requiring the fullest commitment by the IAF, and the Iranian Air Force (IRIAF) maintains a sizable fleet of fighter craft requiring the deployment of an airborne escort. Most importantly, the IAF possesses bombs only barely capable of penetrating underground facilities and will need to attack at close range, exposing their aircraft to Iran's ground-based air defence (Johnson and Chorley, 2012: 24-5). Only the United States possesses the capability to strike at the heart of Iran's underground facilities (see Figure 4.2). The operation itself will have a greater chance of success in significantly delaying Iran's progress if the United States is to provide Israel with its newest type of "bunker buster" bombs ('MOPs'). Credible future suppression might be provided by repeated American and/or Israeli strikes, though this is also dependent on whether US allies acquiesce to such actions in their near abroad (Cordesman and Wilner, 2012: 104). Also, decisive American commitment will make it possible for the US to limit spillover, because Iran will feel pressured not to overreact as to evoke further attacks (Kroenig, 2012). In this case, a strong offensive posture will be required to deter Iran from responding by closing off the Strait of Hormuz.

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Figure 4.2 - Different bombs' capabilities to destroy Iranian underground facilities. Courtesy of the U.S. Congressional Research Service, 2012.

A long-term suppression of Iran's nuclear ambitions does not automatically follow even from full operational success. A strike by Israel, especially if backed by the US, will legitimise the Iranian leadership's official doctrine: a worldview of neo-imperialist powers attempting to curb Iran's "rise in power" will be buttressed by reality (Abramowitz et al., 2012: 38; Eiran, 2012; Kahl, 2012: 170). More saliently, while the United States possesses the weapons required to successfully destroy most known (!) facilities, a more powerful strike might incite a more powerful reaction. Indeed, a large-scale strike might even spur Iran to pursue the bomb: "[t]he idea that a bomb is the only defence against an implacable American enemy might become stronger than ever" (Economist, 2012: 10; cf. Blechman and Brumberg, 2010: 54). The Islamic revolutionary fervour
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that was shown at the start of the Iran-Iraq War might be rekindled and Iran's behaviour under siege might not be so restrained as it has increasingly been in the past. As said above, operational goals might be achieved, but the nuclear know-how will not be eradicated. There will not be a global coalition to contain the effects of an Iranian counterstrike, and Iran's knowledge base of nuclear weaponry might very well be covertly filled by the West's competitors. While these arguments are based on speculation, they are no less likely to hold than assuming that Iran and other great powers will restrain themselves in their opposition to the attackers. Expanding the operation to also include eliminating civilian personnel will increase chances of a less controlled Iranian response; the harder you beat Iran, the more compulsion the leadership will have to show resolve. It will alienate both the Iranian people and the international community, the latter of which has stood united against Iranian weaponisation throughout. Indeed, instead of convincing Iran to back down, American resolve might spur Iran to an all-out retaliation (Kahl, 2012: 168). If Iran decides to strike back in force, Israeli casualties and casualties around the world as a result of "terror" attacks might very well be low, as proponents maintain. But Iran has several levers to pull. It could close the Strait of Hormuz, something with which Israel will not have to deal directly and a situation which the US will then need to contain (Kroenig, 2012). The economic costs of this could send oil prices skyrocketing, expanding the costs of strikes beyond mere military deployments (Abramowitz et al., 2012: 53, fn. 32; Berman, 2012; Blechman and Brumberg, 2010: 53). Iran's strategy of laying mines in the Persian Gulf to counter its enemies' shipping has hardly changed since the eighties, but neither have the US' (insufficient) capacities to counter it (Crist, 2012: 236, 281). In case of an attack, political realism is a necessary brake upon a socially constructed enmity. There are simply too many variables which could turn out 'the wrong way': international solidarity for Israel will further collapse, non-Western states will be legitimised in their attempts at curbing American-led unipolarity and/or hegemony, Iranians are likely to rally around the flag, and the Iranian nuclear programme is hardly delayed. A pinch of Morgenthauan restraint is needed to sweeten the bitter reality of mutually reinforced Hobbesian enmity. Conclusion: War as a Blunt Instrument "Major war can be at best the lesser of two evils, a terrible and heavy price paid in order to avoid the necessity of paying one still more terrible and still more heavy; but then it must be a defensive war, forced upon us, accepted reluctantly and with a heavy heart."

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These words by George F. Kennan (1954: 81) echo the general impression which this section has sought to convey. Whether the American government states that there is a military option on the table or not does not matter. Such an option is never removed from the palette of policy options. And whether one appreciates the fact that Israel might take matters into its own hands or not is also irrelevant, as the Israeli psyche simply plays a large role which has to be taken into account. Thus, proponents and opponents of various forms of military options depart from different assumptions. The former likely believe that force will deter Iran from reacting with too much aggression and convince Iran of the fruitless nature of its nuclear assertiveness. The latter believe that Iran is likely to rally its people around the flag and respond in kind, thereby giving it all the more reason to seek a credible (nuclear) deterrent. And while covert actions are bound to continue, these should not give any indication of seeking to change the regime in Tehran, as such signals might spur sentiments for seeking a similar deterrent to guarantee regime survival. In sum, the worst case is an ideologically legitimised clerical regime with many more renewed incentives to pursue a nuclear weapon and much more sympathy from the international community. The nuclear programme is only briefly delayed (by as little as six months) and is no longer under IAEA oversight. The populace is wont to support weaponisation of the nuclear programme even more than it does currently (Abramowitz et al., 2012: 38-9; Elson and Nader, 2011: 11-16). Barring an invasion, regime change, or continuous strikes, Iran will have more reason, room, and support in seeking to assert itself in the nuclear field. This worst case is no less likely than the best scenario of a regime changed to favour the West or the Iranian leadership turning its opinion and ideology around 180 degrees. It is impossible to predict exactly how events will unfold after an attack on Iran's nuclear installations. However, the scenarios that have been drawn up are bleak at best. In cases such as this, political realism would prescribe prudence in the face of uncertainty. There are many variables at work which could culminate and lead to an unwanted escalation or what Leon Panetta (2011) termed, "unintended consequences." With even the Bank of Israel Governor warning against a possible economic crisis (Schmulovich, 2012) and Israeli officials, highly ranked military staff, and former politicians wary of the possible consequences (Harel, 2012; Sachs, 2012; Sherwood, 2012), an attack seems ever imprudent. At best, an attack is a moment of respite in the short term. At worst, it could plunge an already turbulent region into war, drawing the US into another protracted conflict it has no desire in waging. As Waltz (2000: 24) rightly warns, "in the absence of counterweights, a country's

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internal impulses prevail, whether fueled by liberal or other urges." It is no surprise that Colin Powell, serving as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff once stated that the US was running out of demons and enemies, thereby implying that it needs an "Other" to confront. In the end, it must not succumb to the urge to place Iran in the rigidified pedestal of the Other and strike hard at it. Such endeavours will further turn "the rest" against "the West" and are detrimental to the longer-term American national interest as laid down in the National Security Strategy documents of preserving its self-purported material and ideological leadership position in the world. 4.3 The Pressure Option "If a sanction doesn't achieve its purpose within two or three years, it should be recognised as a failure. Sanctions twisted our economy. All that money, the billions and billions which went into our nuclear armament program, into our uranium enrichment program, into our rubber program, into buying oil at a premium -all that could have been used for further development" F.W. de Klerk (2012), former South African President In the historically dominant political culture of enmity between the United States and Iran, pressure has been a commonly used tool of attempting to coerce the other party to change their political behaviour. Pressure can come from various domains, ranging from a tough military posture to diplomatic and rhetorical denunciations, often coupled with attempts at economic isolation. Of course, both the US and Israel have included a tough military posture -- including threats of war -- in their policies aimed at deterring Iran from weaponising its nuclear programme. Since the military dimension belongs to the previous section and the diplomatic and rhetorical denunciations are part and parcel of both sides' identity vis--vis one another, as the chapter on Iran's history has shown, this section will mostly deal with sanctions and embargoes as tools of American foreign policy. This chapter assumes that sanctions are primarily economic policy instruments to change the target's cost/benefit analysis of a certain course of action (Taylor, 2009: 12). Multilateral sanctions are aimed at Iran suspending its nuclear programme, while American and European sanctions often go further. This section builds upon the assumption by Taylor (2009: 15-6) that sanctions are part of a grand strategy of both symbolic and instrumental nature by great powers to serve both
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domestic political ends ('show muscle'), to reassure allies of its determination, and to change the target's political behaviour, the latter of which is often the only publicly stated goal. Thus, if sanctions fail at a certain goal (e.g. changing behaviour) they might still succeed in other areas (e.g. by reassuring allies or the public of the sanctioning state's determination). In the history of American-Iranian relations, the U.S. has continuously expanded the scope and range of its sanctions. As has been shown in the second (historical) chapter, the status of enmity between the U.S. institutionalised a wide range of mutual hostilities and nonrecognition. From Reagan to Bush Jr., the noose was increasingly tightened around investments in Iran's energy and banking sectors, exports from and to Iran, and provisions of foreign aid. Still, the American president has been given the authority to waiver these sanctions if it is considered to be in the national interest (PAAIA, 2012: 2). Unilateral Western sanctions blanketing swaths of the Iranian economy have been buttressed by a more limited UN Security Council-supported set of sanctions targeting sectors relevant to military and nuclear procurement. This section will first inquire into the existing literature surrounding sanctions, investigating their historical effectiveness and providing an overview of lessons learned from the past. As F.W. De Klerk's quote implies, they are often blunt instruments which would rationally need a reassessment every few years. Secondly, this section will look at the case of Iran and the effectiveness of sanctions there. In both parts, a division will be made between sanctions' effectiveness in placating the public and the sanctioning state's allies on the one hand, and actually changing the sanctionee's political behaviour. The Historical Effectiveness of Sanctions "When military action is impossible for one reason or another, and when doing nothing is seen as tantamount to complicity, then something has to be done to express morality, something that at least serves as a clear signal to everyone that what the receiving nation has done is disapproved of" Galtung's (1967: 411) astute observation regarding the symbolic purposes of sanctions still holds today. Such an application of sanctions is most obviously relevant in the case of human rights abuses. Especially if a great power desires to uphold the image of being a 'responsible stakeholder' or 'benevolent hegemon' in the international system, resorting to sanctions as a means of pressure is a favoured choice. For example, in five years time (1993-8), the US

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threatened to impose or actually imposed sanctions on over seventy countries (Lee, 1998). As such, sanctions are an easy and often knee-jerk reaction to other states' violations of international law, most often applied when deemed politically expedient. What is often seen as a 'secondary' and symbolic purpose of sanctions can become the primary motivator for such measures (Weiss et al., 1997). Sanctions are seen as a cost-effective way of placating the public and assuring them of strong and decisive statesmanship, even though statesmen often know that sanctions may be ineffective (Whang, 2011). The problem in these cases is, however, that allies might be reassured and the public might be satisfied, but that the results 'on the ground' are less than satisfying or even destructive to the civilian population in the target state (Mueller and Mueller, 1999; Weiss et al. 1997). More significantly in the sense of desirable policy outcomes, it is also reported that civil liberties and empowerment of civilians in the target state may decrease, contrary to common belief (Peksen and Drury, 2010). In the political realist paradigm, gains may be made in assuaging the fear of abandonment by allies, but by extending pressure, a state is further cornered and isolated.. Both allies and the public are reassured at the cost of preserving the status quo of animosity. As with an attack, however, extensive periods of non-communication, mutual sabre-rattling, and unrelenting pressure are prone to further escalation. In contrast to the previous consideration on the public and allies, another study (Drury, 2001) has found that the American president mostly takes into consideration the relations with the target. Unfriendly or hostile relations are a logical precondition for the imposition of sanctions. As with an attack, proponents of sanctions often argue that it can work disintegratively on the target's base of support for the target's course of action which is (purportedly) the cause of sanctions. One of the earliest studies by Galtung (1967) found that, in fact, sanctions often alienate the target's population and thus work integratively on the target's base of support. A 'rally around the flag'-effect is the result. More positively, studies have also found that American presidents often back down when sanctions are ineffective in changing the target's behaviour (Eland, 1995; Drury, 2000). Still, carrying particular relevance for the case of Iran, the president also often calls the target's bluff if he suspects that it is overstating its capacity and willingness to resist US pressure (Morgan and Miers, 1999). Often, presidents may carry on sanctions as they are part and parcel of the relationship with the target. Focusing on domestic political gains, presidents will fear the prospect of looking weak both in the eyes of the target (which will frame it as a feat of successful resistance) and the eyes of the public (as his opponents will scorn him for being soft).

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Galtung also found that there are often ample opportunities to evade sanctions due to de facto, if not de jure, unwillingness of some states to uphold them. States may legally support sanctions but consciously fail to uphold them in practice. Moreover, states often seek to diversify their economy as a result of being sanctioned, and pressure will lead to a renewed assertiveness. In the case of South Africa, for example, being sanctioned actually led to the decision by its leadership to pursue a uranium enrichment programme (SNIE, 1974). Some argue that, in the past, sanctions have simply been applied in the wrong manner (Hufbauer and Elliott, 1999; Hufbauer et al., 1993/2008). While it is beyond the scope of this section to explore cases in detail, and since others have done so extensively, it suffices to say that their efficacy in changing the target's political behaviour is disputed. At best, and including "decisive military action", sanctions are effective 34 percent of the time (Hufbauer et al., 1993/2008). At worst, as Robert Pape (1997: 98-106; 1998) found, sanctions are effective only 4-5 percent of the time. Applying them might seem like the 'right' thing to do or be politically expedient in terms of showing determination to both friends and foes, but they are hardly ever effective in changing the sanctionee's course of action. As Hufbauer et al.'s (1993/2008) study shows, sanctions are often followed by decisive military action. In their definition and measurement, sanctions are deemed effective even if the target's political behaviour was changed by way of military means. This says nothing of the desirability (with regards to the national interest) of armed conflict. Recent studies (Letktzian and Sprecher, 2007; Peterson and Drury, 2011) seem to suggest that intensive sanctioning by major democratic powers leads to a higher chance of "militarized interstate disputes", likely due to democracies tying their hands and making escalation of the level of conflict a self-fulfilling prophecy. Rhetorical entrapment, allies' fears of abandonment, and the target's highly likely reaction of resistance ripen the soil for conflict to grow and flourish. As a result of evolving scholarship, targeted or 'smart' sanctions have become the dominant paradigm within the sanctions option, for, at worst, blanket sanctions hurt the target's civilian population while failing to achieve the desired political gains. These seek to limit the focus to sanctioning materials or activities relevant to the course of action which is the reason for sanctions being applied. In theory, these also limit the potentially extensive damage to civilians. The International Community: United Against a Nuclear Iran? In the case of Iran, the international community, under the auspices of the UNSC, has applied the aforementioned targeted sanctions under the UNSC Resolution 1803 in 2009. Western states

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have unilaterally expanded sanctions from targeting regime officials and relevant technologies to an all-out embargo and more all-encompassing "blanket sanctions" (PAAIA, 2012: 11). As is to be expected as a result of the above consideration, these sanctions are quite effective at blanketing and choking the Iranian economy and its citizens. Thus, other states are reluctant to support an expansion of sanctions (Kozhanov, 2011: 158). Russia does not consider an increase in pressure to be an effective strategy, and China has traditionally seen sanctions as a violation of countries' sovereign rights (Taylor, 2009: 84). Of course, energy-related considerations also play a role for Russia and China. The Chinese generally seek to ensure rapid economic growth by continued access to rich energy markets. The Russians see Iran both as an investment opportunity and a potential competitor for the European energy market. A combination of self-interest, meaning expectations of leverage over the US (realism's future payoffs), and expectations of "good" behaviour by other states (social constructivism) has motivated China and Russia to acquiesce to sanctions in the first place (Taylor, 2009: 87-9). Indeed, some would place Russia and China's relatively warm relations with Iran in a greater (albeit simplified) strategic picture of the "rise of the rest" vis--vis the West. Of course, as the second chapter has shown, even while Iran sees itself as an independent 'node' of power -"neither East nor West" -- it is forced Eastwards due to pragmatic economic concerns as it is already exporting the majority of its oil towards the East (see Figure 4.3). It is not surprising that Western pressure on Iran will push it further Eastwards, diverting American attention away from the greater changes in the balance of power which currently (!) seem to benefit China's relative position of power. The American political psyche and the heritage of thirty decades of enmity ensures that sanctioning Iran has become an automatic response within the institution of Hobbesian enmity. It is the standard option open to punishing Iran for (ostensibly) violating international law or human rights and support for terrorism since the 1979 Revolution (Taylor, 2009: 67). In the case of the nuclear programme, American(-backed) sanctions were aimed at preventing Iranian companies and foreign banks from supporting either trade in materials relevant to the nuclear programme. Historically, sanctioning Iran has not helped in changing Tehran's political behaviour (Takeyh and Maloney, 2011: 1309), much as the literature on sanctions in general would suggest. Iran's case seems like a typical case within the plethora of cases regarding the effectiveness of sanctions.

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Figure 4.3 - Iran's oil infrastructure and exports (Sedghi, 2012). More recent figures are often disputed, but Iran has suffered significantly in its exports to the EU, and only somewhat in its exports to Asian countries, as exemptions to sanctions were recently extended by the US (Adelman, 2012)

Changing Tehran's Political Calculus Continuing the threads from the second chapter on Iran's historical experience, it is easily observed that Iran has prepared well to seek self-reliance and independence from the whims of the world political system, ideologically if not economically. Though their predisposition will inevitably influence their judgements (which is equally true for Western observers), both Iranian academia (Biniaz, 2008: 138; Ghanbarlu, 2008: 89; Haji-Yousefi, 2010: 10; Sadeghi, 2008: 25; Zahrani, 2008) and the leadership (Khamenei 2012a/b) see and/or frame sanctions only as a tool by a corrupt American or Zionist-led order to oppress and stunt Iranian development. They see the typical Iranian self-image of the leader of a new spiritual world order reinforced by blunt policies of sanctioning. As Galtung would predict, Iran has ample opportunity to evade embargoes on its oil sector (cf. PAAIA, 2012: 14, 18; Takeyh and Maloney, 2011: 1309; Taylor, 2009: 91), even though its economy has been terribly hurt by the EU's oil embargo (PAAIA, 2012: 18). This economic effect also includes ordinary Iranians' suffering, who find it increasingly hard to get basic medical
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care as the availability of food and shelter is also under pressure (Farshneshani, 2012; PAAIA, 2012: 21). Evidence so far indicates that the nuclear programme might have been slowed due to sanctions, even though there is no directly observable causal relationship between sanctions and a slowdown in nuclear advancements (Albright and Walrond, 2012; Jones, 2012: 7-8). Instead of increasing transparency, Iran has engaged in bouts of cooperation in the nuclear field with North Korea (Taylor, 2009: 94). At the cost of increasing civilian suffering, there is a slight chance that the programme, which is not decisively threatening as of yet, has been delayed. Iran's decision-making regarding the nuclear programme has so far not yielded observable evidence of changing course as a result of intensifying sanctions (Katzman, December 2012). The cost/benefit analysis might very well be a point of discussion within Tehran, but, as the earlier general consideration suggests, Tehran might resist in the face of pressure for fear of losing face. Such speculation is no less likely to be true than that Iran is likely to change course anytime soon. The argument that Iran has been forced to negotiate as a result of increasing pressure is also unfounded (cf. PAAIA, 2012: 4), as there is no causal link between their desire to negotiate and an increase in pressure. Moreover, it is a moot point, because the negotiations have been ineffective so far. Indeed, the reasoning that tough sanctions impede the credibility of negotiations is, again, no less likely to hold, even though there are plenty of other reasons for the failure of negotiations. Thus, policymakers will need to be aware of the distinction between sanctions having effects and sanctions being effective: the oil embargo may very well be damaging to Iran's economy -- hurting the civilian populace in the process -- but it is not effective in its purported goal of changing Tehran's behaviour regarding the nuclear programme. Aside from economic damage, what are the observed effects of the ever-intensifying sanctions regime? According to Barack Obama, the goal of sanctions is to isolate Iran (Taylor, 2009: 60). One of his fellow Democratic party members, Rep. Brad Sherman (D-CA) (2010), even went so far as to admit that it was the purpose of the blanket sanctions to hurt the Iranian people in order to force a democratic election. The viability of such a mechanism is disputed. Still, Obama's goal of isolating Iran has been achieved, at least in isolating it from the West and compounding its relations with the East. Iran's historical experience with its Arab neighbours also gives it few natural allies in the region willing and able to help it. But, as has been shown in the case of South Africa's pursuit of nuclear weapons (SNIE, 1974), an isolated foe will increasingly lose faith in diplomacy and seek to assert its independence.

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Similarly, Iran could become more convinced of the need to show its ability to endure (Parsi, 2012b) and the Iranian government might even strengthen certain damaging effects of the sanctions so as to disempower civil society and empower the IRGC (cf. Oechslin, 2011). There is some evidence that this is already happening and that democratisation is being blunted by sanctions (Bahrami and Parsi, 2012; Ganji, 2011; Taylor, 2009: 91; Zakaria, 2011). To exacerbate the implications if this argument actually works out, some argue that allowing Iran to function normally in the economic sphere (i.e. applying only targeted sanctions) will empower Iranians to the point that the regime's ideological credibility (vis--vis an oppressive capitalist system) is destroyed (Majd, 2012). Such a logic follows a reasoning similar to the one that the openness of Western culture and economy helped usher in the fall of the Communist bloc. Such hopes must not be overdrawn, however, as there are also voices arguing that there is a generation of "young reactionaries" in Iran who grew up in the Iran-Iraq War, ready to have their revolutionary fervour legitimised in the face of Western oppression (Takeyh and Maloney, 2011: 1306). In the end, it is impossible to measure whether Iran's political behaviour has changed. Even with the benefit of hindsight, scholars will dispute how states change their behaviour under the influence of internal and external pressure. What can safely be said, however, is that the blanket sanctions by the West are hurting Iran's economy and the ordinary people comprising it. Moreover, the nuclear programme has possibly been slowed even while there is evidence that the IRGC is gaining strength and that civil society is being given less room to flourish. Conclusion: Sanctions as the Default Option Even while sanctions have significant effects, they are often framed as being effective as well. Those who do not agree with this assessment argue that more pressure is needed or that an attack might be the best solution in the end. As the academic literature would predict, Iran is not changing its course of action regarding the nuclear programme, many ordinary Iranians are negatively affected, and the clerical government's power and ideological credibility are increased. Why, then, are sanctions the dominant tool for pressuring Iran? Russia may very well be right in stating that sanctions have become an end in and of themselves (T. Parsi, 2012a: 232). It is no surprise that Trita Parsi also coined the term "A Paradigm of Enmity" as typical of Iranian-American relations. Combining a legacy of distrust, a negative view of the Other, and the exacerbated balance of threat with the power of habit makes sanctioning Iran the default response. As the existing literature shows, sanctions are also an easy response in the face of a lack of other options. "Something must be done" to show resolve to both allies and the public. And, unfortunately, even though this consideration shows that

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sanctions are ineffective, lifting them unconditionally is also undesirable once they have been put into action. The Iranian leadership would surely frame such actions as a victory and find itself spurred on. Once again, a Catch-22 has materialised. Blaming actions in the past is no use, but learning from them is important. Sanctions, like an attack, only extend and reinforce the enmity between the US and Iran which is the cause of the Iranian nuclear programme's perceived threat. They are ineffective and come at great cost to ordinary Iranians and the West's leverage over other powers. Yet backing off is a sign of weakness as long as enmity is the dominant political culture between the US and Iran. Small steps will have to be taken to make a suspension of sanctions viable to the American government and make it sellable to the public and American allies. Such steps will need to be taken within a framework wherein there is a common understanding of existing problems. 4.4 The Rapprochement Option "Engagement will yield information even if it's completely sterile in terms of achieving accommodation. And more information leads to better policy, and better policy leads to better results." Former American Ambassador James F. Dobbins, Jr. (et al., 2012) Further pressure is unlikely to positively influence Iran's political behaviour regarding the American national interest. An attack carries with it too many variables which could turn out negatively. Containing a nuclear-armed Iran might be possible, but seems unrealistic for the nearby future. And even if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, many of the lessons learned regarding its political psychology and history with the West still apply. The only path serving the long-term American national interest is a credible process of rapprochement. While many have already argued for such policy and while many negotiations have been attempted, there has been no substantive success so far. So, it might seem that this section will merely repeat previous arguments for a hopelessly idealistic endeavour. To the contrary, however, this section seeks to inventorise the obstacles that lie ahead on the basis of the lessons learned in the previous chapters. Successful negotiations are improbable in the context of American-Iranian relations, but they are the only way to shift Hobbesian enmity to Lockean rivalry, thereby also changing the underlying cause for Iran being a national security challenge in the first place.

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This section will first lay down a brief list of the most important challenges to be surmounted. These are general in character, and the previous chapters provide a more substantive backdrop to the observations noted here. Lessons will then be drawn from Richard Nixon's steps of rapprochement with China, after which a final section will combine the most important insights and considerations. This final section contains the most important matters to incorporate into any approach to negotiating with Iran with the goal of seeking to transcend past grievances. The Challenges to Surmount As this project has served to show, there are plenty of factors agitating against effective negotiations as means towards rapprochement. It would be a significant step if the US and Iran would simply enter a routine of negotiations, thereby acknowledging the mutual grievances and possible paths of future cooperation. Charting a diplomatic path out of Hobbesian enmity, and out of the threatening nature of the nuclear turn, will require statesmanship of the highest order. The American negotiators and their Iranian counterparts will need to acknowledge what they themselves and their counterparts want, and what they share in interests (Luers and Pickering, 2012). Chapters two and three have shown that past negotiations are tainted with distrust. There is little credit either side will give the other in case of small successes. Indeed, both sides characterise the other as being indebted because of past transgressions. Within social constructivism, this raises extremely high barriers to increasing cooperation as both sides' calculus is based on worst-case scenarios of the other's intentions. Stretching from ancient Persian history until now is a sense of pride marred by insecurity and an eye for conspiracy. This paradoxical nature of Persia's legacy still plays a significant role, as the Supreme Leader is wont to frame any losses on his side as a continuation of historical oppression by great powers. The patina of legitimacy imbued by the Islamic revolution only exacerbates Iran's perception of the security dilemma. Any infringement upon what it sees as its rights regarding the nuclear programme will be framed within a discourse of oppression and concomitant resistance. Indeed, Iran is the archetypal revisionist state. Such a discourse also works the other way around, as any gains made or decrease in great power involvement (i.e. the US in Iraq and Afghanistan) is framed as a victory for Islamic resistance and legitimises Iran's place as the standard-bearer of a world-embracing Islamic revolution. Like any form of rhetoric, however, these words need not be taken at face value. They may be a sign of intent, but history has shown that Iran has acted pragmatically through a process
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of political Darwinism. It is possible to accurately frame this judgement regarding the Iran-Iraq War with the benefit of hindsight, and debates are undoubtedly raging on whether the nuclear programme is worth the cost in Iranian policymaking circles today. Because of this, it is highly likely that the discourse maintained by the clerical leadership is used for domestic purposes and regime survival (Sadjadpour, 2009: 20). And even though many in the West would like to see the regime in Tehran changed, such a goal is both beyond the scope of the American national interest and this thesis. The case study of the Iran-Iraq War and its aftermath has already shown, however, that Iran acts pragmatically and with restraint when deemed necessary. The Obama administration's approach has not been successful so far, possibly because of the fact that policymakers never gave diplomacy the room to succeed. Simultaneously increasing pressure discredits any fledgling attempts at substantive diplomacy. A legacy of the Bush administration's Manichean worldview also haunts negotiations, with the Supreme Leader Khamenei insisting on more concrete efforts at compromise from the American side. The first challenge for both sides will be to provide promises concrete enough to break through the distrust and suspicion that has permeated the few interactions that have taken place to date. The second set of challenges is centred around possible domestic opposition. The leadership in the US and Iran are alike in the sense that their survival depends on their legitimacy, which is essentially based on economic achievements and ideological credibility. Though some emphasise one aspect over another, both inevitably play a role. Future deals might potentially bounce because of internal opposition to compromise. The fuel swap deal in 2009/2010 was promptly rejected by the Iranian parliament because it would ostensibly have sold out Iran's national interests. There is widespread support for an independent and civilian nuclear programme in Iran. It must be possible for the incumbent to immunise any deal from criticism of seeming weak in the face of Western pressure. Even though some (Dobbins, 2011) argue that chances of rapprochement are extremely unlikely as long as the current clerical regime remains in power, this is the reality negotiators will have to acknowledge and deal with. Similarly, this holds for the American Congress and Beltway as much as for the Iranian parliament. Political opponents of the American president's party will inevitably seek ways to undermine his credentials in terms of negotiating with Iran. Presidential conviction will need to be combined with nuance in order to maintain Congressional support for future steps towards

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rapprochement, as it is inevitable that multiple bills will need to be approved or rescinded by Congress before relations are normalised in the de jure sense. The third set of challenges surrounds the potential fears American allies in the region will have. The Middle East is a turbulent region, and many of its states work from worst-case scenarios and perceive their relations with other major powers in a zero-sum way. One state's gain in power is often perceived to damage the other's relative power and security. This is especially true in the case of American allies' relations with Iran. The key challenge is to credibly assure allies that they will not be abandoned as relations with Iran improve. The most important facet to this challenge is to have these allies acquiesce to a possible relative decline in power as Iran gains strength when sanctions are slowly lifted. Such measures are only feasible if these countries, especially Israel, can be convinced of the idea that decreasing the acute security dilemma by seeking better relations with Iran might decrease their relative power but increase their security. Such suggestions are supported by both structural realism, which recommends states to seek an appropriate amount of power, and by social constructivism, as a change in the nature of relations simply means that the nature of potential threats also changes. Even if relations with key American allies deteriorate or slip somewhat as a result of successful negotiations, the threat environment for the US itself will have become less prone to escalation. Allies in the region are a means to an end, the end being the American national interest. This national interest in maintaining a responsible leadership role in the world need not necessarily align with the interests of American allies. This is not a normative statement on the appropriateness of the American national interests, but it is a recommendation that American policymakers scrutinise their allies' statements regarding perceptions of so-called shared interests (i.e. in striking Iran). Concrete Steps: Rapprochement with China "Any American policy toward Asia must come urgently to grips with the reality of China.(...) Taking the long view, we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbors." Richard Nixon (1967: 121) as a private citizen
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With Iran potentially ascendant as a regional power, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger's steps towards rapprochement with the People's Republic of China are ever-relevant. Like Iran today, China saw itself as a rising power. Nixon feared that the US would suffer a decrease in power in Asia and the world at large (Macmillan, 2008: 119). As pragmatists in power, Nixon and Kissinger sought to remedy this by seeking engagement with a country which sought to overturn a capitalist-led world order (Jian and Wilson, 1998: 116-7; Sutter, 1978: 20-1; Tao, 1968: 416), claimed it could easily survive a nuclear war (Peterson, 2012), and which was not recognised by the United States as being a country in the first place. War had already taken place between the two countries in Korea and both the US and China supported opposing sides in Vietnam. In short, conditions of enmity were even further entrenched than in the case of Iran. "Fat chance" was Kissinger's apt remark regarding the odds of Sino-American rapprochement in the form of a presidential visit, just after Nixon was elected (Macmillan, 2008: 105). A similar sentiment is dominant regarding American-Iranian relations today. Yet, history shows that pragmatism is a powerful force when given enough room. Nixon found it hard to favour his pragmatism and ideal of a "stable world structure" over his earlier "knee-jerk anticommunism" (Caldwell, 2009: 643; Dallek, 2007: 147). A firm US policy of containment survived well into the late 60s and the few interactions that took place between the two countries often led to a widening of the communicative divide (Caldwell, 2009: 634). As one prominent American diplomat stated, "relations with China, whatever they were, did not leave room for anybody to be thinking about conciliation or advancing heretical views about American policy" (Tucker, 2001: 92). In the case of China, the relationship itself became part of the identity of Mao Zedong's government in seeking to lead the "countryside" in overthrowing capitalism (Solomon, 1967). Enmity had become an institution and attained a degree of self-evidence. Nixon recognised that leaving 800 million Chinese out of the loop would only help uncontrollably escalate conflicts (Nixon, 1969: 7). Signs of pragmatism already arose during the Vietnam War, however, as neither side sought to escalate the conflict beyond into a direct confrontation (Rogers, 1976: 296; Ou, 1979: 80-1). Both sides were stuck in a vicious cycle of ideological framing and misinterpretations of each other's actions on the world stage, further strengthening animosity. For pragmatism to work, however, chances of miscommunication had to be minimised. In his speeches, however, Nixon slowly started to recognise the People's Republic of China, even though Zhou En-Lai was reluctant to compromise on the Taiwan issue in his

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communications with Kissinger. American support for Taiwan was unacceptable to the communist Chinese because they refused to recognise Taiwan, just as American support for Israel is a rather large thorn in Iran's side. Still, through tacit understanding of a mutually shared interest in avoiding conflict, Nixon and Zhou En-Lai slowly recognised one another's equality (Kissinger, 2012: 246-7; see Figure 4.4). Even as its ideological credibility depended upon it, Zhou En-Lai and Mao Zedong were willing to negotiate without American recognition of the People's Republic as being the single legitimate China. These probing steps towards rapprochement ultimately culminated in Nixon's trip to China and concurrent handshake with Zhou En-Lai as he arrived in Beijing (Kissinger, 1971). This case also shows that rapprochement is no panacea, however. There is no absolute cure to past grievances, present tensions, and uncertainties about the future. But normalising relations is an important prerequisite for avoiding unwanted escalations of conflict and enabling a dialogue on issues important to both sides.

Figure 4.4 - Nixon's historical handshake with Zhou En-Lai. This act carried great symbolic importance, as John F. Dulles (as secretary of state) refused to shake hands with him at the 1954 Geneva Conference. Courtesy of the White House (Byron Schumaker, 1972).

The ideological invective wielded by China shows an uncanny resemblance to Iran's antiAmerican rhetoric. Iran has an uncompromising stance regarding the status of Israel, just as China had (and still has) an uncompromising stance concerning Taiwan. Iran insists on its inalienable rights to a civilian nuclear programme, while China wanted to be recognised as the single legitimate Chinese state. While the latter still has not completely happened, most nations
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have recognised the People's Republic. Of course, China already had nuclear weaponry and rapprochement had direct strategic relevance vis--vis the USSR. Still, several lessons can be drawn from this case. First, Nixon and Kissinger's rapprochement with China took time. As is the case in Iran, relations change only slowly and a history of enmity is not erased overnight. It took several years (1969-72) and 'merely' resulted in a tentative message from both countries regarding their shared understandings and disagreements (the Shanghai Communiqu). Second, ideology is flexible. Statesmen often manipulate ideology instrumentally so as to fit the needs of the national interest. In this regard, a decision by an absolutist leader such as Mao Zedong or Khamenei carries more credibility, because he does not need to take into account his constituency as much as a democratic leader would. Negotiating with approval by the highest authority is advisable. Third, a lack of communication exacerbates the risk of escalation. This is the part of the reason why Nixon and Kissinger sought rapprochement, and why the Moscow-Washington hotline was installed after the 1963 Cuban Missile Crisis. While statesmen will never be completely honest to their foes or even their friends, at least having the possibility to communicate is important to avoid critical misunderstandings during crises. Fourth, small steps are just that. Small steps are needed because giant leaps, especially towards more cooperation, are hardly credible or feasible. But small steps need to be placed within a larger framework. A list of disagreements, such as the Shanghai Communiqu, needs to be agreed upon. These need not all be resolved, but an endgame might be agreed upon; a final goal to be achieved in the areas in which agreement is readily found and in which agreements are needed. Fifth, a process of rapprochement need not be announced to the public. While this may not fit within the liberal democratic ideal, much more room is available on either side when domestic political opponents do not have the chance to pressure statesmen. This is equally relevant for Obama's political opponents as much as for Ahmadinejad's parliamentary opposition. Without public pressure, ideological framing and vitriolic rhetoric need not sabotage or undermine the credibility of the process. Sixth, and finally, negotiation and rapprochement are two different things. Nixon and Kissinger engaged in negotiations to seek rapprochement. Negotiations are not an end in themselves, though they serve the goal of normalising communication and creating mutual understanding. Negotiations, as means, have been taking place with Iran over the larger part of a decade, but these have been limited to resolving issues regarding the nuclear programme. While it

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would be foolish to expand the agenda so as to drown the relevance of the nuclear programme, it would only be wise to also discuss the broader relationship and take seriously each side's grievances, at least behind the scenes. Concrete Steps: The Iran Case The earlier consideration on the meaning of Iran's nuclear programme for different actors already lead to the observation that there is no self-evident reality of realism; one state's gain in power need not necessarily threaten another state's security. Yet, on one end of the spectrum we might find The Netherlands' relations with Denmark, while Iran and Israel's relations are on the other side. This observation leads to the prescription that a change in the nature of the relationship might also mean a change in the balance of threat. Of course, this is a case of circular causality, as Iran's continued assertiveness helps maintain this culture of enmity. And since huge leaps are highly unlikely, smaller steps need to be taken within the context of a greater framework of understanding. This final and most concrete part will utilise a two-pronged approach to posit future policies in seeking rapprochement with Iran. Firstly, it will elaborate upon applying lessons to the process of negotiations, after which it will provide suggestions regarding the content of this process. The cumulative insights gained in the previous chapters lead to several recommendations regarding the process of negotiations. First of all, negotiations take time and should be undertaken one step at a time. Still, these need to take place within a commonly agreed framework. The US and Iran will need to compile a list of grievances from either side, without attaching any concrete guarantees to it. This mere recognition of the legitimacy of the others concerns will also help identify avenues where cooperative ventures are more likely to succeed. Both sides will need to acknowledge the others concerns and agree that the eventual goal is to reach a higher degree of mutual understanding and seek rapprochement. Compromise is not a dirty word. Secondly, there is no room for take it or leave it-diplomacy. Of course, both sides have limits to their flexibility within negotiations, but attempting to unilaterally dictate terms to one another without an eye for the others wishes will prove to be less than fruitful. Related to these issues is avoiding unnecessary denouncements of one another during negotiations. Public denouncements only serve to further undermine the credibility of ones resolve. Thirdly, in order to facilitate more negotiating room for diplomats, negotiations should take place behind closed doors and through a back-channel, but with direct supervision by both
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the American President and the Iranian Supreme Leader. The Nixon and Kissinger success with China exemplifies the utility of covert negotiations. Following back-channel successes, the public can be made aware of them in terms both parties agree upon. High profile annual diplomatic confrontations are simply exposed to too much scrutiny, too much press attention, too much media attention, too much political attention for either side to move very much or very significantly, according to James Dobbins (et al., 2012). Fourthly, and lastly, both sides should be open to actually discussing the aforementioned avenues of further cooperation. Iran will need to acknowledge that the nuclear issue simply plays a large role for the US foreign policy apparatus and neither side should have any preconditions for starting to negotiate. History shows that preconditions will only impede a free discussion on topics relevant to the issue at hand. As mentioned above, part of the negotiations should also concern agreeing upon a list of agreements and disagreements. These issues could include the US acknowledging Irans problem with the American presence in the Middle East and its support for Israel, the contested status of Palestine and a recognition of Irans potential peaceful leadership role in the region, as well as a future lifting of sanctions. Iran would in turn need to acknowledge that the US has a problem with potential nuclear weapons being proliferated, Irans support for groups the US designates as terrorist actors (though this needs to be framed more subtly), and the American strategic interest in the region. Not all of these issues need to collide intensely, but they are bound to be incompatible in some areas. Discussing and acknowledging them will be a first step in turning Hobbesian enmity into Lockean rivalry, thereby acknowledging the Others interests. Both sides also share an interest in avoiding an all-out war, ending drug trafficking, ensuring the political and economic stability of the Greater Middle East, and coordinating issues concerning Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. Such agreements should take place within the back-channel process advocated above. Of course, before Iran is willing to acknowledge the US grievances and provide transparency regarding its nuclear programme, it should be given amnesty for all past transgressions by the IAEA. Iran proclaims that its current programme is only aimed at civilian or research. If this is true, it is not unlikely that its parliament would be willing to ratify the IAEAs Additional Protocol allowing for more extensive inspections when the international community is willing to forgive it for past violations. As indicated in the third chapter, many other nations have been given clemency. If Iran is not given amnesty, the chicken and egg conundrum will continue as Iran needs a clean slate from the IAEA to resolve the crisis but the

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IAEA is willing to give Iran such a clean slate only when the crisis is resolved. The US and Iran have the power to break through this quagmire. Of course, for every action an equal or similar reaction is needed. The Iranian parliament would arguably be willing to sign the IAEAs Additional Protocol if continued compliance leads to an automatic lifting of the most damaging blanket sanctions. Just as the economy dominates US election seasons in times of hardship, economic realities will catch up with ideological preferences, and a lifting of the oil embargo will significantly benefit the average Iranian. To address American concerns in the short term, Iran should swap its 20 percent enriched uranium for the fuel it needs. Such swaps can take place in steps and with cooperation of countries friendly to Iran to ensure a smooth transition. The American Beltway must then be convinced that these measures are there to build confidence, and that repeated swaps of enriched uranium for reactor fuel will lead Irans stockpile to decrease below the threshold required for fabricating a nuclear weapon. The US Congress, in bills H.RES 568 and S.Res 380 -- has insisted that Iran sustains its suspension of enrichment, but does not specify a period. There is room for manoeuvring here. Other requirements, such as stopping the development of ballistic missiles, are beside the point of a peaceful nuclear programme and the US will need to compromise in this regard. The often hard-line president Ahmadinejad has already indicated that he is willing to temporarily suspend 20 percent enrichment of uranium (Dobbins et al., 2012). When sanctions are lifted and a recognition of Irans right to enrich uranium under full IAEA supervision follows this fuel swap measure, the Iranian president can use these gains as a face-saving exercise towards the Iranian parliament and public. The regime can then place the results of these negotiations within its revolutionary ideology, ensuring that a deal with the US does not cause a decline in its legitimacy. US allies, including Israel and Saudi Arabia, are likely to put pressure on any public negotiations, but will also feel their relationship under pressure if they are not informed of bilateral talks. Still, ensuring the covert nature of negotiations will give Iranian diplomats more room to seek compromise, and American allies can be informed of the results prior to any public announcements to alleviate any fears. In the end, only negotiations have the potential to change the meaning of Iran's power, which is the true cause of Iran being perceived as a threat. The previous considerations are not an exhaustive overview of issues relevant to the discussions between Iran and the US. They are, however, the most salient issues; these are fields wherein

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compromise is either readily possible or simply necessary. Together with the previous sections, policymakers and academics alike will find a guide for seeking to prescribe and carry out policy. 4.5 Conclusion "The only way over the long term we can assure Iran doesn't get a nuclear weapon is by getting them to understand that it's not in their interest" Barack Obama in an interview on 6 February 2012 (Kellerhals, 2012) In a sense, this chapter has been about a divide between those emphasising the ideological calculus vis--vis the materialist calculus of Iran's decision-making apparatus. Some argue that the material calculus dominates in pursuing nuclear advancements, and that the cost/benefit analysis can be changed by way of increasing pressure or striking important Iranian sites. This chapter has shown that these incentives of ever-larger magnitudes of pressure are not likely to work, because Iran has ample opportunity to evade sanctions, reconstruct its nuclear programme after a strike, and the Iranian civil society is likely to suffer from either. The international consensus against Iran's ambitions is likely to crumble at some point along the spectrum of increasing pressure, if it has not already, thereby giving Iran even more opportunities to assert itself in the nuclear field. And even if punitive measures succeed in changing Iran's material calculus, there is a consensus about further pressure negatively affecting (for the West) the ideological calculus. There is no question about sanctions further harming the Iranian economy and crippling any civil society movement towards democratisation. There is also ample evidence that Iran's opposition is more likely to rally around an Islamic revolutionary flag in the face of such pressure. Unilaterally increasing punitive measures legitimises the clerical leadership in Tehran even while only barely slowing down its nuclear advancements. Indeed, as all previous chapters indicate, Tehran gains more reasons to assert itself in the nuclear and military fields when there are little prospects of improving relations with its opponents in the West. Thus, rapprochement should be the end for which negotiations are the appropriate means. A concurrent relaxation of punitive measures (i.e. pressure) are also a form of means to be included in this approach. But even if rapprochement is not successful, increasing the frequency of interactions will decrease the chance of miscalculations. As was the case with China, a lack of communication leads to an increase in insecurity and uncertainty, potentially leading to
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unwanted escalations. As James Dobbins put it, "the fact that we don't actually know what the Iranians want is a reflection of the fact that we're not talking to them" (Dobbins et al., 2012). But, in the end, this "talking" remains a means to achieve a change in the nature of the perilous Hobbesian relationship that characterises US-Iranian relations today. Like China and the US did with the Shanghai Communiqu, a declaration of mutual grievances and agreements can be released at the culmination of (potential) successful back-channel meetings. Some of these things are unrealistic and the two states can agree to disagree, such as a removal from US presence in the Middle East. Most of the challenges are surmountable, in the long run if not in the short run. There is ample room to expand cooperation, for example regarding the case of Afghanistan and Iraq, securing a stable flow of oil, integrating Iran in the international community, and avoiding an all-out war. Such a process will not be easy to start up, but it is simultaneously necessary and unlikely. Getting out of a state of Hobbesian enmity is often a slow-moving process, as the risks are perceived to be high (thereby actually making them higher). Yet, as Wendt argues, structural change can occur when there is enough agency propelling it forward. Within a larger framework of set goals, back-channel meetings increase the frequency of communication and thereby increase mutual understanding and chances of success. As was the case with China, negotiations need time and room to succeed. Pursuing rapprochement behind the scenes is more effective because counterproductive pressure, either by concerned allies or opportunistic political rivals, is minimised. Moreover, guarantees can be made that otherwise would have been unrealistic. Without the intense pressure placed upon high-profile negotiations, negotiators have more room to manoeuvre and setbacks need not have the same fallout that public setbacks have in decreasing faith in successful negotiations. More concretely, promises of lifting sanctions can be made and deals regarding the exchange of fuel for enriched uranium can more easily be closed. The only way to increase the chance of successful rapprochement is to provide credible guarantees regarding the relaxation of mutual measures of animosity, both from the Iranian and American sides. If negotiations succeed, the history of interaction between the two nations will acquire a more positive nature and the security dilemma will become less acute for both sides. Both Iran and the US will be able to sell the result to their publics as a victory in seeking to defuse a situation positive to neither side's national interest. American allies can be reassured because Iran has shown less belligerence, and Iran can continue its regional rise in actions (i.e. an improving

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economy without the burden of sanctions) rather than only words (i.e. defying the arrogant powers at all costs).

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Chapter 5 Conclusion: From a Vicious to a Virtuous Cycle

Though this thesis has primarily covered a period of conflict, as many IR-inspired works do, it seeks to stimulate peace. Many sceptics will read the recommendations towards 'rationality' and consider them hopelessly idealistic. Some will argue that they are merely a set of hopes and dreams tied together with imaginary aspirations. Maybe they are right. But there is no reason not to provide policy-makers and academia with an extensive and intensive overview of the issues which will be relevant when attempting to seek more peaceful relations. Striving to ameliorate tensions without an understanding of the factors underlying these tensions is a hopeless endeavour. Striving to ameliorate tensions with a potential roadmap of issues and an overview of influences from the past and present may make this endeavour a little less hopeless.

International Relations Theory Refined When concerning the link between academia and policymakers, theories of international politics provide important initial lessons ever-relevant to policymaking in general. Morgenthau would prescribe prudence when determining whether to further pressure an already cornered enemy. Waltz's structural realism warns of powerful states losing focus in their foreign policies in pursuing "fancies abroad" and explains why Iran has acted pragmatically in order to ensure survival in its current form. Wendt's social constructivism adds a degree of empathy for the Other: regardless of whether we like Iran's view of the world, we will need to take its perceived interests into account if we are to pursue the national interest. Such a sensitivity is no form of cultural relativism, it is merely an awareness of the fact that unilaterally dictating terms is not the most cost-efficient way of achieving one's goals. Most importantly, social constructivism adds the potential caveat that some states may have an intrinsic interest in maintaining a certain political culture. In Iran's case, it is clear that the clerical leadership predicates its legitimacy on continued resistance to American-led oppression and dominance. On the other hand, the American tendency to present the US as the paragon of liberal democracy and international law also carries with it certain (moral) obligations vis--vis perceived foes, historically resulting in either (armed) interventions abroad or extensive sanctioning of states falling within a political culture of enmity (i.e. Iran). As the obstacles in a path towards rapprochement have shown, these factors are hard to overcome. But the aforementioned mechanism of 'Political Darwinism' provides hope. Iran has adapted its foreign policy to stay within certain bounds of the most favourable behaviour in international relations. It has refrained from starting all-out wars in the previous and current
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centuries. Despite threats by stronger powers, Iran has survived, much as organisms would, by pursuing behaviour conducive to survival. Despite its often vitriolic rhetoric and provocative actions, in which many states engage, it has often shown prudence. Future research, with the benefit of hindsight, might inquire into how the debate regarding the nuclear programme's costs and benefits raged within Iran. Such research might contribute to the development of theory regarding the salience of either materialist or ideological calculi. The Nuclear Turn within a History of Enmity Many other scholars have provided policy advice or an analysis of the present and past enmity between the US and Iran. This thesis has sought to combine the best of all worlds into a work that is acutely relevant today with regards to informing policy, and will stay relevant well into the future when considering the longer-term implications of Iran's historical experience and the lessons learned by placing the quasi-war in the context of socially constructed relations. It might also serve as a work of reference for those seeking to understand why relations with Iran were soured in the first place and how diplomacy is compounded by these difficult relations. The nuclear turn is made relevant and salient by the history of animosity between the US and Iran. In turn, the lack of mutual understanding and progress towards a negotiated resolution only exacerbate the implications of this history. Persian dreams of regional prowess and nightmares of great power oppression inspire Iran to assert itself in the nuclear field. Its eye for conspiracies gives it a distrust towards international institutions such as the IAEA, which could easily be manipulated by their Zionist foe. Iran's paradoxical history of pursuing great power ambitions whilst simultaneously fearing other great powers' ambitions vis--vis Iran complicate negotiations. Still, it might not be hopelessly idealistic to strive for an American-Iranian relationship which is less prone to miscalculation and concurrent escalation. These steps will take time, as Wendtian social constructivism would predict, but the current state of enmity is by no means self-evident. The US deals with other undemocratic powers on equal terms, even while they also potentially threaten American security interests, as Walt's balance-of-threat would predict. Deconstructing this enmity in negotiations will yield a shared understanding of either side's grievances, which is a crucial first step in seeking to defuse tensions surrounding the potential implications of Iran's fledgling nuclear programme.

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The Road to Rationality Since many have already provided policy suggestions in the areas of engagement, pressure, and attack, the consideration on these policies has been relatively brief. Though it is clear that rapprochement is the favoured option, as was the case with China under the Nixon administration, there are many obstacles. Since these obstacles are bound to shift, the last chapter is most vulnerable to the changing whims of international politics inducing a degree of obsolescence. Still, it is clear that a back-channel negotiation with a set goal of rapprochement and a list of agreed-upon disagreements best serves the American national interest. Such an interest is defined in terms of maximising the US' security, as political realism would prescribe. But as social constructivist theory posits, the perception of security is dependent upon the nature of the relationship in question. Changing the nature of the relationship takes time, but is the most durable solution to situations wherein threats are most prominently present. The clearest example is the historical taming of Franco-German tensions by way of European integration. Though not entirely comparable, it is clear that increasing cooperation and limiting competition to the political and economic arena can lead to violence and sanctions being seen as illegitimate means to an end. This is the situation that needs to be achieved with Iran. Obstacles will have to be recognised first. Then, the most important ones will need to be surmounted. These processes will take years. After the first back-channel results come in, the American Congress will have to be convinced of the virtues of changing a relationship. Statesmanship of the highest order will be required, as allies will fear abandonment by their American ally. And the Iranian domestic arena is little different from the American one in that the incumbent's political opponents might see opportunities to portray him as 'selling out' the national interest to the Other. As many sceptics would note, it is not at all realistic to expect returns in the short-term. Yet even frequent negotiations and bilateral talks without concrete results will increase the information available to either side and decrease chances of unwanted miscalculations and escalations. A vicious cycle of non-recognition, oscillating tensions, and threats of war will slowly be eclipsed by a potentially virtuous cycle of communication, understanding, and accommodation. Even the slightest chance of such progress eclipses the risks involved in continuing public sabre-rattling and escalations of mutual pressure. Such policies are both easiest as they follow the path of least resistance (i.e. enmity) and the most politically expedient with regards to the domestic arena, but they do not serve the long-term national interest of ensuring national security.

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Steps towards rapprochement may not be likely, but this makes them no less desirable. Some might consider them undesirable, because of their ideological or personal stake, but this does not make them less conducive to American national security. The best way to beat your enemy is to make them a friend. Seeking to defuse tensions, decreasing the perceived threat, and incorporating Iran into the global economy might even stimulate a much-wanted democratisation process. Giant leaps may indeed be unlikely, but a similar distance can be crossed more cautiously by taking small steps. In American-Iranian relations, as in Sino-American relations in the past, at the very least these small steps will avoid relations from taking giant leaps in the wrong direction.

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Appendix 1: List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

AIPAC - American Israel Public Affairs Committee AKP - The Turkish 'Justice and Development Party' (Turkish: Adalet ve Kalknma Partisi) D-CA - Democratic Representative of California in the House of Representatives CENTCOM - United States Central Command CJCS - Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff GCC - Gulf Cooperation Council H.RES - US House of Representatives Bill HEU - Highly Enriched Uranium (over 20 percent) IAEA - International Atomic Energy Agency IAF - Israeli Air Force IR - International Relations IRGC - Islamic Republic Revolutionary Guard IRIAF - Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force LEU - Low-Enriched Uranium (below 20 percent) MEK - People's Mujahedin of Iran MENA - Middle East and North Africa (region) MOP - Massive Ordnance Penetrator, a 'bunker-buster' bomb NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization (S)NIE - (Special) National Intelligence Estimate NPT - Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons NRSB - Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board PAAIA - Public Affairs Alliance of Iranian Americans R2P - The UN's Responsibility to Protect Initiative S.Res - US Senate Bill TRR - Tehran Research Reactor UAE - United Arab Emirates UNSC - United Nations Security Council WMD - Weapon of Mass Destruction

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Appendix 2: Bibliography
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