Heartland 1/2000 A New Silk Road?

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HEARTLAND is a world partner of LIMES, the Italian Geopolitical Review, published by

Gruppo Editoriale L’Espresso
It is registered in Hong Kong and in Rome, and published by Cassan Press-HK and by
Gruppo Editoriale L’Espresso
For any information, please contact Limes, viale Castro Pretorio 116, 00185 Rome (Italy).
Tel. 0039 06 4940432; fax 0039 06 4940403; e-mail: bema@limes.net
HEARTLAND’s website address: http://www.heartland.limesonline.com
Editors: Lucio Caracciolo and Michel Korinman
Managing Editors: Francesco Sisci and Zhang Xiaodong
Editing and Secretariat: Rosa Balfour, Huang Jianliang, Yu Shicun, Xiang Daiyun
HEARTLAND IS PUBLISHED WITH THE SUPPORT OF
BIRINDELLI E ASSOCIATI
studio legale
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contents no. 1/2000

5 Why Heartland
7 Romano PRODI - Building Bridges between Asia and Europe
11 ZHU RONGJI - Don’t Be Pessimistic about the Euro
PART I WHAT CHINA STANDS FOR
17 WANG XIAODONG - The West in the Eyes of a Chinese Nationalist

31 ZHANG XIAODONG - Geopolitical Changes in the Western Regions
47 Francesco SISCI - The Pope in China: Still a Long Way to Go
57 Fabio MINI - From the Rim to the Heart
71 ZHANG JIE - The Foundationers Associated with Mr W.’s Funds
PART II FROM ASIA TO ASIA
93 Tommy KOH - ASEM is a Sunrise Organisation

97 Alison BROINOWSKI - All in the Same Boat?
Australia’s Relations with Asia
107 Michel KORINMAN and Lucio CARACCIOLO - There is No Australasia
113 Marie-Sybille de VIENNE - What if Dr Mahathir Was Right?
121 Paolo COTTA-RAMUSINO and Maurizio MARTELLINI - The European Policy
towards Korea
PART III WHAT IS ASIA?
135 V.K. NAMBIAR - The Indian Bridge

141 YUMIKO YAMADA - Asia Viewed from Japan
149 Vitalij TRET’JAKOV - To Stay in Europe, Russia Must Become
an Asian Power
153 Frédéric DURAND - A New World
MORE HEARTLAND
159 Luca M. BIRINDELLI - China: One Country, Two Systems,

Several Markets (“Go West”)
163 Leonardo DINI, Stefano CELLETTI, Franco CUTRUPIA - Doing Italian Business
in China
165 Camillo DONATI - “We Behave Like the Church”
166
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A NEW SILK ROAD?
Why Heartland
W HAT IS GEOPOLITICS? GEOPOLITICS IS THE OPPOSITE OF THE “CLASH OF
civilizations” that the political scientist Sam Huntington made famous.
It is more; it is the opposite of racism. It postulates the uniqueness of the
human species. Every nation has a right to its historical representations
and constructs. Every nation has a right to its arguments. Every nation
has a right to its geopolitical projects.
Geopolitics is also the opposite of exoticism, which in fact is a way
of expelling from a literary point of view entire peoples from our
mindset. Exoticism is a mild form of colonialism. Instead, for us
distance is not significant: the geopolitical dialogue is in any case
equal, even if the interlocutor is thousands of kilometres away. Before
“globalisation”, Europeans could believe that the exotic approach
served to marginalise Asia; and Asians could think that it served to
restrain European influences in Asia. But now, to close up – and to
impose closure on others – means to be lost. We have moved from
exoticism to “endoticism”: we are all actors of one world. Each with his
own way of thinking.
Why Eurasia? Why are Europeans rediscovering Asia and Asians

are increasingly interested in Europe? For Europeans, to project
themselves in Asia is also a way of making Europe. Just look at how
easily the Europeans who live in Asia group together. Also, single
European states do not have the appropriate dimensions to establish an
equal dialogue with their Asian partners. And it is evident that Asians
are not interested in having the US as their only Western interlocutor. 5
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WHY HEARTLAND
We know that today Eurasia does not exist. But it is necessary that
the dialogue between Europe and Asia makes a qualitative leap. Econo-
mic and trade relations are important, but are not all. Via economics,
relations must move onto geopolitics. The Silk Road grows through a
geopolitical dialogue.
Heartland, what for? This journal is a tool for the dialogue

between Europe and Asia. It is not just a matter of exchanging ideas on
the pages of Heartland, but of building a network for debate between
Europeans and Asians. Nothing formal or diplomatic, but an open and
promising path. As we all know, the Silk Roads are infinite.
6
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A NEW SILK ROAD?
BUILDING BRIDGES
BETWEEN ASIA
AND EUROPE by Romano PRODI
A T THE START OF THE NEW CENTURY,

the two major themes that have dominated the European political and economic
scene in the past fifty years – the positive thrust of European integration, on the
one hand, and the resolution of the limitations caused by the division of the
continent into two opposing blocs, on the other – have changed the face of
Europe completely.
At the same time, the sustained growth of Asia’s economy has radically
transformed the outlook for trade relations: the main axis of international trade
may now be shifting not from the Atlantic to the Pacific – as some authors had
predicted – but rather to the Asia-Europe route, from the South China Sea to the
Mediterranean Sea, via the Indian Ocean and the Suez Canal.
Political developments like the peace process in the Middle East, the
enlargement of the European Union and the independence of natural-resource-
rich Central Asian countries are contributing to the growth of trade between
Europe and Asia, as is the accelerating process of establishing a regional identity in
a peaceful Asia.
Against this background, relations between Europe and Asia are developing a
growing momentum. When the challenging task of enlargement concludes, the
Union will be able to project its influence far beyond its continental borders, and
engage in a genuine partnership of mutual respect and mutual benefit with its
friends in Asia.
Economic growth in Asia (and in Europe) and economic integration in Europe
(and in Asia), and the dense network of relations between “open” economies have
created a genuinely global market, in which Europe and Asia are no longer
isolated partners, but part of a wider system.
These economic processes are increasingly driven more by direct investments
from foreign sources than by traditional trading relations. Consequently, each
country’s interest in the economies of the others has increased. Modern companies
do not perceive distant countries solely as potential markets for their goods, but
also as opportunities for investment, creating employment at the same time. And
since companies with assets in multiple countries would oppose any attempts at
protectionism, increasing liberalisation is almost irreversible. 7
BUILDING BRIDGES BETWEEN ASIA AND EUROPE
A healthy two-way flow of investments contributes to a country’s wealth; this

gives the economy of each individual country a much greater stake in seeing other
economies perform well. The increasingly substantial trade and flows of capital
between Europe and Asia are as important for today’s economy as the Silk Road
was in the 13th and 14th centuries.
Europe has realised that it can no longer ignore a substantial section of the
globe, one that includes great nations and will soon be the world’s largest
economic region. Until it manages to be a player on the Asian stage, Europe will
be unable to formulate a truly global policy.
Trade between Europe and Asia has increased by over 100% more than trade
between the United States and Asia. This is no accident, and was reflected in the
regional policy framework developed at the ASEM summit (Asia-Europe Meeting).
The problems that emerged with the Autumn 1997 crisis in the Far East are
not, in my opinion, structural. Asian economies will continue to grow, as they
have all the physical and human resources they need to do so. They will also
continue to be attentive to the need for economic and financial reform, just as we
in Europe must always be vigilant in maintaining a healthy economy.
The major obstacles to progress in Asia are more political and social in nature:
tensions between neighbours, concerns over security and the possibility of
disastrous military conflicts – together with the need to meet the challenges of
social and political change that come with rapid industrialisation. The
development of economic relations can provide a strong incentive to avoid
political and social conflicts, but the solutions to these problems must be political
and social in nature. Matters such as human rights and transparent and
accountable government are vital to meeting these challenges, and indeed are
universal elements which all of us, in Europe and Asia alike, must address.
China’s growth into a great power will have a substantial international impact.
The international community should accept this development, rather than seeking
to construct a network of local and global alliances around Beijing. China will play
an ever-increasing role in regional and world diplomacy, and will make a
constructive contribution to international politics and the global economy, thus
developing interests favourable to the maintenance of stability.
To defuse and isolate potential sources of regional instability, all the regional
powers should join forces to establish a common definition of acceptable behaviour.
The potential economic and security benefits of stability could reward the effort
needed to moderate policies that are not acceptable to neighbouring countries.
Europe’s ability to increase its diplomatic role in Asia depends not only on
closer economic ties, but also on the experience it has acquired in building its
institutions. Existing institutions, such as the United Nations and the World Trade
Organisation, could be used to launch productive forms of cooperation.
At the same time, Europe must not just focus on Asia’s economic importance.
We must also work together in the political field, and we must also work to
8 increase our mutual understanding and awareness.
A NEW SILK ROAD?
THE SILK ROADS

R U S S I A N F E D E R AT I O N
Istanbul
Bursa
K A Z A K H S TA N Ulaanbaatar
TURKEY 1
2
3 MONGOLIA
SYRIA Beijing
5
4
IRAQ 7
6
IRAN
AFGHANISTAN CHINA
SAUDI
ARABIA
PA K I S TA N 1- GEORGIA Fuzhou
2- ARMENIA
3- AZERBAIJAN
INDIA 4- T U R K M E N I S TA N
5- U Z B E K I S TA N
OMAN 6- TA J I K I S TA N
YEMEN
7- K Y R G Y Z S TA N
When Europe’s first overseas expansion began in the 16th century, Asia was
by far the richest region in the world, and its civilisation was probably the most
advanced. The spectacular growth of the last few decades, in spite of the recent
crisis, has resulted in a situation in which it would not be unrealistic to expect a
return to that happy state of affairs.
I do not believe that there will be a “clash of civilizations”. There are
opportunities to work together, as long as Asians and Europeans are ready to
show each other commitment and goodwill. In the aftermath of the Cold War and
its rigid divisions, the old fault lines have failed to give way to new ones. There has
simply been a reaffirmation of the importance of diplomacy as a way of finding
solutions to shared problems that sooner or later would hinder our progress
towards a better future.
In the same spirit of keeping channels of thought and debate open, I would
like to wish Heartland every success in its endeavour. In our global economy,
time and distance count for less and less. Geographical borders are increasingly
meaningless. Isolation is the way of the past, not the way of the future. In a world
of such rapid change, continued discussion of the issues that shape the destinies of
so many people everywhere is absolutely essential, for the sake of stability, and for
the sake of progress.
9
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A NEW SILK ROAD?
Don’t Be Pessimistic about the Euro

Premier ZHU RONGJI’s Answers to Our Reporter’s Questions
HEARTLAND Why is the euro in such a bad situation? What could the EU do to chan-
ge it?
ZHU RONGJI I’m an engineer instead of an economist. However, I have been
engaged in economic work for 50 years, and hence having some experience. I
think EU is very promising and has actual strength as an economic entity. Of
course, in comparison with the economic entity of USA, EU has not been as
prosperous for such a long time and its economy has not developed so fast as
USA. However, USA is only a country, while EU includes more than ten countries.
There exist some differences between the economic developments of so many
countries, and it is certainly not easy to coordinate the actions of these countries.
As an economic entity and an economic community with great differences in
economic development, I think it is quite an achievement for it to reach the
current level of development. It indicates that the European politicians are quite
skilled in organisation and management. Therefore, from a long-term point of
view, EU’s economic development is quite promising and very hopeful. Of course,
the euro has depreciated from 1.17 at the beginning to about 0.9 currently. I think
this is a very specialised issue that needs to be analysed. There are a lot of causes
for such a situation. I mean it is only a specialised issue but not a full reflection of
economic strength. It is also very difficult to maintain a common currency
involving more than ten countries and to maintain its stability. As per analysis of
various conditions, it is entirely unnecessary to be pessimistic about the euro. I
think that with the coordinated development of all EU countries, it is unavoidable
for the euro to appreciate gradually. At the same time, China will never undersell
its foreign exchange reserve, your euros. Never.
HEARTLAND Can you tell me the amount of China’s existing euro reserve?
ZHU RONGJI It does not mean I don’t want to tell you. I myself do not know the
amount. 11
DON’T BE PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE EURO
HEARTLAND What’s the influence of IT development on China’s politics?

ZHU RONGJI This question covers many other questions. I can not give you an
immediate and clear explanation. Do you mean the development of China’s e-
commerce or the development of network economy or any other things? China’s
networks have developed very quickly, and the number of Chinese Internet users
is almost doubled every half year. China currently has over 10 million Internet
users. With the development of networks, we have encountered many new things.
Regulation and legislation are required in many aspects. We are wanting in
experience in this aspect, and it’s a very serious issue on how to manage networks
in a standardised way.
HEARTLAND Do you think is it beneficial for the EU to strengthen its internal
coordination?
ZHU RONGJI That’s sure. But it is not the focus of what I mean. I mean the
coordinated development of the economies of all EU members, since there is a
great difference between the development degrees of them. EU includes some
very developed countries and some moderately developed countries, and there
are some very poor regions in some countries. Therefore, the economic policies of
these countries are also quite different. These facts lead to their differences in
other aspects and different requirements.
HEARTLAND What do you think about the Taiwan issue?
ZHU RONGJI Concerning our policies toward Taiwan, we remain unchanged. Our
consistent policy is peaceful reunification and one country two systems, which
were clearly explained in President Jiang Zemin’s “declaration of eight points”. It’s a
pity that many countries fail to completely understand what President Jiang said.
For example, what we mean by “reunification” and “one country two systems” is
very liberal for Taiwan. We will neither change its current political and economic
systems, nor interfere with any of their matters. Such a policy is more liberal that
those for Hong Kong and Macao. In other words, Chinese government will not
send army to Taiwan, and the leader of Taiwan may also hold an important post in
the central government of China. Thereby, none of their vested interests will be
damaged. However, we must admit that there is only one China and Taiwan is only
a part of China. This is a clear-cut point. It’s a pity that the current Taiwan leader
does not admit there is only one China, and he even dares not to admit that he is a
Chinese. How can the reunification be realised in such a situation? Our requirement
is very simple. We can negotiate about anything so far as you admit there is one
China. However, after contacting many leaders of European countries, I find quite a
number of them fail to have a full understanding of the one-China policy, and they
do not know the true nature of Taiwan leader’s clamour for independence.
HEARTLAND Some people say Taiwan’s direct election is very democratic. What do
you think about it?
ZHU RONGJI Is the so-called election in Taiwan really democratic? Why is it so highly
estimated? In Taiwan, he (means Chen Shuibian) only got 40% of the votes. He
12 has no experience of holding power at all. They themselves also admit that what
A NEW SILK ROAD?
they are playing at is “black gold politics”. Therefore, such a kind of direct election
is entirely meaningless. In addition, we are very clear that without Li Denghui’s
playing of his personal roles, Taiwan would take a totally different standing point
now. So we may say the so-called direct election can not lead to democracy. What
is direct election? Even the election systems of those big Western powers are not
completely same. I think French Presidents are directly elected, while USA
Presidents are not. Are the Italian Presidents directly selected? Also no. Then, what
kind of direct election you are peddling to me? The so-called direct election takes
different forms in different countries. Both USA Presidents and Italian Presidents
are not produced through direct election. While French President and Premier
have different functions, respectively in charge of internal affairs and diplomatic
affairs. For the difference of political, cultural and historical backgrounds between
different countries, their political systems are also not completely same. There
even exist some countries still carrying on the system of constitutional monarchy
with kings and queens. According to our own conditions, China currently adopts
the system of people’s Congress, according to which, the people’s deputies are
selected first and the government is selected by the people’s deputies then. I don’t
think such a system of people’s Congress is the most democratic one, and we will
not ask the other countries to follow us. However, such a system is suitable for the
conditions of China. We will neither evaluate, nor criticise any foreign country’s
election system. But Taiwan is not a foreign country, and we know so much about
it. While you say Taiwan Presidents are produced through democratic election, we
think it’s quite a joke.
HEARTLAND Does China have any new measures to propel its private economy?
ZHU RONGJI Our formulation about private economy has been dramatically
changed. In the past, we said private economy is a supplementation to the socialist
economy, while at present, we say it is one of the integral parts of the socialist
economy. We admit and encourage the development of non-public-owned and
private economic sector. This sector has really seen great development in China in
these years. The development would be greater when foreign-funded economy is
included. Foreign-funded economy certainly belongs to private economy, and our
relevant policies have been greatly liberalised. For example, in the aspect of credit
policies, haven’t these private economic sectors developed under the support of
credits? They could not gain any development without loans granted by the
national banks. So far as they are beneficial for the development of the whole
national economy, our attitude towards private economy and individual economy
is to encourage and support their development. The development of this kind of
economy also has a backward and illegal side. For instance, recently a Chinese TV
station reported that some private enterprises in Zhejiang Province had employed
a large number of child labourers. Such a phenomenon is absolutely illegal and
must be resolutely eliminated. Certainly, this is only some particular phenomenon,
and it will not influence our encouraging and supportive attitude towards the legal
and healthy development of private economy. 13
DON’T BE PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE EURO
HEARTLAND Would you please tell me the causes of the decline of trade volume
between China and Italy?
ZHU RONGJI I think it is not declining now. On the contrary, it dramatically
increased in the period from January to May of this year. In the past two or three
years, the foreign trade growth of whole China was null or even negative for the
influence of the Asian Financial Crisis. However, China’s foreign trade saw great
growth in the following five months, and our trade with Italy also increased to a
high degree. We attach a great importance to the cooperative relations with Italy in
economy and trade. Personally speaking, I have paid great attentions to
cooperation with Italy. Because Italy boasts very good experience in technical
promotion and technical reform of middle and small-sized enterprises, I
cooperated with Italian parties in many projects in the ‘80s. Italian industries have
their own features, which are very important for China. I believe the cooperation
between China and Italy is very promising. Our purpose is to further improve the
China-Italy cooperative relations in economy and trade, especially in the aspects of
technical cooperation between middle and small-sized enterprises.
HEARTLAND Concerning the issue of Vatican, when will you invite the Pope to visit
China?
ZHU RONGJI We have contacted the Vatican party for many times, and we have
made it clear that our relations could only be established on the basis of only one
China. It means that Vatican must admit that the People’s Republic of China is the
only legal representative of China, and Taiwan is only a part of China. This is our
principle and standing point. Of course, we also insist that the internal affairs of
China should not be interfered in the name of religious freedom. Religious
freedom has been included into our law, and hence we maintain and protect
religious freedom. However, such a matter should not be used to interfere our
internal affairs. I think we are just negotiating about this principled stand. The
Pope will be invited to China after this issue is settled. “Is the negotiation
underway”. I think probably yes.
(by Barbara Alighiero and Francesco Sisci)
14
A NEW SILK ROAD?
Part I
WHAT CHINA
STANDS for
017-030/LiMes/Wang 6-10-2000 15:18 Pagina 17
A NEW SILK ROAD?
THE WEST
IN THE EYES
OF A CHINESE NATIONALIST by WANG XIAODONG
T O PROMOTE COMMUNICATION, DEEPEN

understanding and remove misapprehension between Chinese and Westerners
would be to the happiness of all human beings. I feel quite abashed that I have
taken so long to complete this article. One of the important reasons is that I
really cannot find enough time, or build up enough writing passion to compose
an article in terms of Western “academic norms”. Frankly, I think that Western
“academic norms” often set up a barrier in the expression and communication
of ideas. The so-called “rigid demands” do nothing but raise the “entry barrier”.
Removing the “entry barrier” would require a large amount of spare time and
money. In the Third World, at least in China, it would be very difficult for a
researcher or thinker to have enough resources to meet the Western “academic
norms” without the mighty patronage of Western academic institutions. One of
the consequences is that what Westerners hear about Chinese ideas, or at least
about those of the Chinese intelligentsia, is in fact born under Western auspices,
and therefore to the Westerners’ liking; otherwise, the researcher might not
benefit from those auspices another time. These “Chinese ideas” are far from
genuine Chinese thoughts, and from these Westerners will never get to know
the real ones. Even from a general point of view, leaving aside China, the so-
called “academic norms” usually clash with freedom of thought and creativity,
barring many intelligent minds from a charmed circle of mediocrities. In the
long run, neither the works by Confucius nor the Bible fit in with “Western
norms”.
I do hope that the above digression about Western “academic norms” will not
be edited, for this is an ideological exchange, which might not be without
importance.
First, I would like to introduce some of my ideas, but the introduction might
not be comprehensive and profound enough due to the limited space. In fact, to
help foreigners know Chinese nationalists comprehensively and profoundly, it is
necessary to compile an anthology including the main thoughts of Chinese
nationalists. Westerners have published a few, which, however, mainly include
critiques of Chinese nationalists by Westerners and some pro-Western Chinese 17
THE WEST IN THE EYES OF A CHINESE NATIONALIST
intellectuals.1 Given that few texts have been written by Chinese nationalists
themselves, could those criticisms be serious, earnest and responsible to
knowledge (here we can also see that the so-called “academic norms” of
Westerners cannot guarantee the quality of research)? Of course, one of the
important reasons for the absence of texts by Chinese nationalists is that they
would not be published (by contrast with the claim by Western researchers that
the Chinese government has been instigating and making use of nationalists).
Fortunately, Internet provides Chinese nationalists with an unprecedented space
to express their ideas. The texts of Chinese nationalists on Internet are a splendid
sight.
The Oppression of China’s National Interests by the USA

If people say that China was aggressive in Mao’s time, then, in the years after
Mao’s death, China adopted a completely defensive posture, and even a tendency
to follow the USA. China no longer has the inclination to challenge the US’s
national interests. Therefore, the clash of national interests is caused mainly by the
oppression of China by the USA.
The oppression of China’s national interests by the USA is represented in a
few aspects known to all. First, the issue of Taiwan. The USA has played a critical
role in severing the state on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Had the USA not
intervened, there would be no severed state. However, American efforts to attempt
to break up China go well beyond the issue of Taiwan. Often Westerners use the
excuse that the state has been severed for over 50 years and that the USA’s role is
to maintain the status quo, without exerting further oppression of China’s national
interests. Then American support of the separatists of inland Tibet and Xinjiang is,
no doubt, aggressive and invasive. Some might say that the US government has
not openly indicated its support for the separatists of Tibet and Xinjiang; at most, it
has interviewed the Dalai Lama, or shown concern towards human rights in Tibet
and Xinjiang. To this claim I answer that not only do the US authorities interfere,
the USA does.
I want to make a special mention of the Tibet issue. It is known to all that in
recent years a movement in the USA to support the independence of Tibet is
surging, in which Hollywood and the American media are involved. I remember
an article in an American magazine (Time or Newsweek, I cannot remember
clearly) saying that it has become fashionable in the American entertainment circle
to support the independence of Tibet. Their excuses appear justifiable, saying that
China suppresses human rights and the freedom of religious belief, and so on.
Most of these are lies. I admit that there are serious human rights problems in
China. I also know that, having been in contact with Western culture, the Dalai
Lama has well familiarised himself with Western human rights ideologies, and
18 1. See for instance J. UNGER, Chinese Nationalism, New York 1996.

A NEW SILK ROAD?
knows very well what he should say to fawn upon the Westerners. Viewed from
Western standards, however, before the People’s Republic of China controlled
Tibet, the state of human rights in Tibet under the theocratic reign of the Dalai
Lama was much worse than in the areas dominated by Chinese people of Han
nationality. In those days serfdom was practised in Tibet, which is not far from
slavery. Well, the Westerners might argue that it is part of the unique Tibetan
culture and religious belief. So why do Westerners claim that human rights are a
universal value? Why has the Chinese substantial and obvious improvement of
human rights in Tibet been distorted as a trampling of human rights?
I also want to comment a view expressed in a letter by an American in the
1990s to Ma Lihua, a Han writer living in Tibet, which goes as follows: “The
difference between assistance and intervention rests on whether the other side is
seeking it. When Tibetans are seeking help to make progress, and only at this
time, if one will and can offer help, will that assistance be understood as a kind of
social progress and be readily received? Then one can become a helper, a knight
with shiny armour and be considered the saviour. And if the other side has no
receptive capability, all the assistance one hopes to give and all the well-meant
motives will be dissipated in a hostile environment. Therefore, assistance must
sought and hoped for”.2 The American’s view sounds very reasonable, but when
talking about some Tibetans seeking assistance, which people of the area does the
US refer to? Some Tibetans have sought assistance: I hear that in the heart of many
late serfs, Mao Zedong is still a Buddha. But when the USA intervened in Kosovo,
was it because the Serbs had asked for it?!
Approaching this issue from the human rights perspective, I think Westerners
do not have enough grounds to accuse China and give support to the Tibetan
separatists. It appears that Westerners are full of a sense of justice, but they are
completely under the influence of an ill-natured propaganda by the hegemonic
media. When talking about national interests, the misleading propaganda by the
West, the USA in particular, is obviously a threat to China’s national interests. To a
great majority of Chinese, further improvement of human rights in Tibet is
acceptable (and in the whole of China), but the attempt to separate Tibet from
China is unacceptable and those who are conspiring to do this are no doubt an
enemy of China. Viewed from the experience of other areas in the world,
separatism has brought nothing but revenge and harm to human rights, though it
might play to geopolitical interests of the USA or the West.
American support of the separatist movement in Tibet and Xinjiang is closely
connected to its geopolitical strategy. In the USA, some people’s hostility to China
does not arise from human rights issues, but from geopolitical interests or racism
– human rights are at most a pretext. In 1996, I had a talk with Mr. Ross H. Munro,
author of The Coming Conflict with China. In his opinion, the USA’s concern
towards human rights in China is uncalled for, and the key problem is that the
2. MA LIHUA, Fleeting Soul, Writer’s Press, 1994, p. 212. 19

USA is an established super-power, while China is a growing super-power

(although, few Chinese see their country as a growing super-power). From a
historical perspective, the only solution to the clash between the two nations’
interests is to go to war. In addition, Mr. Samuel P. Huntington, the author of The
Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, listed the Chinese
civilisation as an enemy of Western civilisation. I think that Mr. Samuel P.
Huntington is a racist, whose “clash of Civilizations” is nothing but a euphemism
used instead of the politically incorrect “clash of races”. Some Westerners insist
that these ideas are not mainstream and that the US is not set to antagonise China.
This is acceptable, as much as it is for China to be alert in case that tendency
develops. What is more, the armament of the USA, such as National Missile
Defence and Theatre Missile Defence, the latter in particular, including early
warning radars, will be set up at the gate of China to cover Taiwan. Is this not a
real threat to China from the USA?
Recently, Westerners like to discuss the “threat from China”. But in our eyes,
China makes no threat against Western countries, because it has neither the
capability, nor the intention to threaten others, while the threat to China from the
USA is obvious to all. On this issue, I think that the USA and other Western
countries have no right to preach “morality and justice” to China. China is not
powerful enough to compete with Western countries either in military strength or
in control over the media, so we can only sit still while the Westerners demonise
us. As Chinese nationalists, the lesson we have learned is not to listen to the
morality and justice from the mouth of Westerners. In their system, it is strength
that counts; consequently, China must aspire to gain more strength.
The Clash of Ideologies

The clash of ideologies between China and America has two aspects: between
the Chinese government and America, and non-governmental groups and America.
The two aspects are strikingly different and must be dealt with separately.
The clash of ideologies between the Chinese government and America
focuses mainly on human rights and the system of democracy. In this clash, the
Chinese government has a completely defensive position of which I can give a
persuasive example.
On October 19, 1996, the Strategy and Administration office sponsored an
informal discussion with Chinese experts in international affairs, and Robert
Hawke, former Australian Prime Minister, attended. In the discussion, Mr. Liu Ji,
Vice President of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, said, “In modern
history, no diplomacy directed by ideologies has succeeded”.3 Immediately Mr.
Hawke retorted, “I cannot agree less to Professor Liu’s analysis. Historical facts
show precisely the contrary: Western diplomatic policy has been dominated by
20 3. See Strategy and Administration, 1996, VI, p. 19.

A NEW SILK ROAD?
ideologies, and this policy has achieved a general victory”.4 Mr. Hawke also said a
lot and eloquently. At that time, the interpreter, Wang Yong, an Associate Professor
from the Institute of International Affairs of Beijing University, did not dare
translate the words to Mr. Liu Ji, so I decided to interrupt the discussion and
translated the words to him. I noticed that Mr. Liu Ji was in great embarrassment.
As a senior official of China, Mr. Liu Ji’s attitude was representative: the
Chinese government does its best to avoid an ideological dispute with the West,
and expects Westerners not to challenge their ruling with regard to human rights
and democracy.
The clash of ideologies between non-governmental groups and America is
totally different. In the areas of human rights and democratic politics, the general
public has no clash with Westerners. The serious human rights and democracy
problems of China cause great suffering in the first place to the Chinese. Some
Westerners think that Chinese nationalists disregard the human rights and
democratic politics advocated by Westerners. With an air of racial superiority, they
claim that since the Chinese do not want Westerners to strive for human rights and
democratic politics for them, and are instead willing to be enslaved, then, why
should Westerners bother? This is totally wrong. Chinese nationalism means
nothing without human rights and democratic politics. Human rights, democratic
politics and the protection of Chinese national interests can and should run parallel.
It should be said that, with regard to human rights and democratic politics, the
Chinese, or the Chinese nationalists, are not that different from Westerners or
Americans. But together with the image of Western, and especially American,
advocates of human rights and democratic politics, another image is in the heart of
Chinese: they are the oppressors and exploiters of the poor, of the weakest groups
and of states, and they are unjust. From this perspective, Chinese non-
governmental groups are not entirely defensive in the clash of ideologies with
America. This has been fully proved by Che Guevara, a play recently staged in
Beijing. First, Che Guevara, the enemy of America, was killed by government
troops trained and directed by the CIA. He was chosen as the hero of the play to
show that America is the oppressor. Secondly, the script is full of derision of the
American capitalist values embraced by the upper class of China. The play, a big hit
in Beijing, was produced 36 times in a row with full houses for every performance.
By the way, although the upper class in China might be dissatisfied with talks
about human rights and democratic politics by Americans, they are quite pro-
American. Those who revolt against America are usually the lower classes. The
reason might be that the Chinese upper class has accumulated a great amount of
wealth in economic dealings with America. Talks about human rights and
democratic politics have no visible effect in threatening their interests and their
control over Chinese society. On the other hand, the lower and middle classes of
4. Hawke’s words that I accounted here are not exactly the same as that in Strategy and Administra-
tion, 1996, VI. What I recorded is more accurate, for the equivocal words in Strategy and Administra-
tion might be due to political considerations. 21
China have not found much benefit in communication with America and the West.
Recently things are getting worse with increasing numbers of people made
redundant and unemployed – and it could be well founded to ascribe this to the
capitalism advocated by the US.
The ideological challenge to America made by Chinese non-governmental
groups is still very weak, but its significance is probably far-reaching. China is a
relatively strong nation outside the Western club. None of the nations within the
club will challenge the well-established international system dominated by the
USA, for they are the beneficiaries of the system. While weak nations outside the
club have no capability to challenge it, China is a comparatively powerful nation
outside the club that has a large population and a long-standing civilisation.
Therefore, once the ideological challenge by Chinese non-governmental groups
grows powerful, it could be of worldwide significance. This will be good to
human beings. Without any challenge, all the injustice and unfairness of human
society would never be improved, and the progress of society would never occur.
Chinese Nationalism as a Response to Domestic Problems

These trends in ideas, even if apparently with an anti-foreign taint, are firstly a
response to domestic affairs. Chinese nationalism is in the first place a response to
some domestic problems of the 1980s and 1990s. At the beginning, the name
“nationalism” was not adopted; it is a label put on by Western academics and mass
media, a point I made clear in the article “Nationalism in China and the Future of
China”.5 Please forgive my repeating the main ideas of the article.
The reason that the so-called “nationalism of China” is so eye-catching in the
1990s is that it contrasts strikingly with the “reverse-racism” of the 1980s (the
original meaning of reverse-racism in English is the objective harm done by anti-
discrimination to white people. Here, however, the author gives it a new meaning
in the Chinese setting). Chinese “reverse-racism” is a spectacular phenomenon: it
is a trend of ideas produced by mainstream Chinese intelligentsia, which deem
that the Chinese culture and nation are inferior. The virtuous think that the Chinese
nation is disqualified to live on earth until thoroughly changed, while those who
are heavily influenced by racism think that this nation is so inexorably despicable
that it is not worthy of being on this planet.
In the 1980s this kind of “reverse racism” invaded the whole ideological,
academic, literary and media fields, the educated broader public, and received
even official encouragement. Few Westerners noticed or mentioned that the
Chinese authorities encouraged “reverse racism” in the 1980s, yet they are rather
sensitive to and make a big fuss over the so-called nationalism used by the
Chinese authorities to “bridge the ideological gap” in the 1990s. This is not strange.
5. See China Road Under the Shadow of Globalization, November 1999, Chinese Social Sciences
Press, pp. 81-106. Parts of the article were originally published in the September issue of Mingpao
22 Monthly, with the title “From Reverse-Racism to Chinese Nationalism”.
A NEW SILK ROAD?
CHINA
R U S S I A N F E D E R A T I O N
KAZAKHSTAN HEILONGJIANG
Harbin
Ulaanbaatar
Changchun
Ürümqi M O N G O L I A JILIN
NEI MONGOL
Shenyang
NORTH
LIAONING KOREA
Hohhot P’yongyang
XINJIANG Beijing
BEIJING
GANSU Tianjin Tianjin
Yinchuan Shijiazhuang Seoul
Claimed by India Taiyuan HEBEI SHANDONG SOUTH
NINGXIA
SHAANXI
Jinan KOREA
Xining SHANXI
Under Chinese
administration QINGHAI Lanzhou
Zhengzhou JIANGSU
Xi’an
Hefei Nanjing
HENAN
XIZANG Shanghai
SICHUAN Wuhan ANHUI SHANGHAI
HUBEI Hangzhou
New Lhasa Chengda Nanchang ZHEJIANG
NEPAL
Delhi Changsha
Kathmandu BHUTAN JIANGXI Fuzhou
Thimphu Guiyang HUNAN
FUJIAN Taipei
INDIA Kunming GUIZHOU Xiamen TAIWAN
Dhaka GUANGXI DONG
YUNNAN NG Guangzhou
BANGLADESH Nanning
GUA
Hong Kong
Hanoi
MYANMAR
LAOS
Vientiane
Yangon VI
ET PHILIPPINES
N
THAILAND
A
M
0 500 km
Firstly, the Chinese authorities’ encouragement of “reverse racism” was a peculiar

and unusual phenomenon, and well beyond the Westerners’ imagination.
Secondly, to give publicity to “reverse racism” in China would mean glorifying
Westerners – and it is hardly credible that the Chinese government, which had
antagonised the West for years, might encourage this. Thus, Westerners believe
“reverse racism” was a trend of the intelligentsia, especially of dissidents. In fact,
the Chinese authorities greatly supported “reverse racism” publications, sponsored
and even organised seminars on the so-called “cultural strategy”, and broke the
rules to promote some intellectuals to important positions in control of public
opinion. The case of He Shang 6 explains it all. Although in showing this TV film
6. He Shang, the name of a TV series; “He” refers to the Yellow River, the symbol of Chinese civiliza-
tion; “shang”, means “death before growing up”, so the literal meaning of the title is “death of the Yel-
low River” (translator’s note). 23
the producers of He Shang talked about a political risk, it really was a publicity
strategy (the Chinese knew that, at that time, there was no better advertisement
than claiming a political risk). Indeed, the film would not have been made
successfully without the authorities’ support; secondly, after it was shown, CCTV
as well as other major official media headed by the People’s Daily dedicated
attention and debates to it. The supporters of He Shang said: “The press in China
has never paid so much attention to a television series like He Shang, publishing
the commentary, writing reports, comments and discussions”. 7 Of course, given
the anti-government position that some authors of He Shang held, the Chinese
government accordingly changed its attitude. Even so, the “reverse racism”
expressed in He Shang still found many supporters in the ideological officials in
control of China’s media.
How did this “reverse racism”, encouraged by the authorities and raved about
by the intelligentsia (who called it “cultural hit”), come about? There are several
reasons. The nihilism of national culture denies that its tradition and culture is part
of a tradition of the Chinese intelligentsia. The May 4 Movement sometimes
contradicted the patriotic calling of the Chinese Communist Party, though on the
other hand, from the perspective of historical philosophy, responded to the anti-
feudal ideology of the Communist Party. It should not be forgotten that the
“Cultural Revolution” began by “breaking the ‘four olds’, establishing the ‘four
news’”, 8 and destroying the remains of Chinese traditional culture. After the
“Revolution”, all the policies of that period were denounced, but the outlook of
historical philosophy was completely inherited. I have pointed out once and again
that the modes of thinking of many Chinese intellectuals who abhor the
“Revolution” point to that as the main characteristic of the “Revolution”. As a
consequence, once the “Revolution” that aimed at the destruction of Chinese
traditional culture was over, all the blame, including that of the “Revolution”, was
cast upon Chinese traditional culture, the wave of denouncing Chinese traditional
culture was surging again, and no one ever thought about its absurdity. Apparently
this time they went much farther than “May 4” and the “Revolution”. “May 4” ideas
were tinted with a “nihilism of national culture”, but lacked such strong “national
nihilism” or “reverse racism”, and the mainstream was nationalism. Yet from
“nihilism of national culture” to “national nihilism” or “reverse racism”, the
development was quite logical.
“Reverse racism” was also encouraged because China in the 1980s needed to
open its gates rapidly to the West for investments, technology, ideas or forms of
entertainment. Viewed as a whole, “reverse racism” met the general policy
requirements.
7. TIAN BENXIANG, “On He Shang”, Comments on He Shang, edited by Cui Wenhua, Culture and Art
Press, 1988, p. 218.
8. This slogan was quite popular during the “Cultural Revolution”. The “four olds” was used to refer to
“old ideas, old culture, old customs and old habits”; the “four news” were new ideas, new culture,
24 new customs and new habits (translator’s note).
A NEW SILK ROAD?
However, regardless of whether “reverse racism” was needed at the time or

how its “historical effects” can be evaluated, it could not remain in Chinese
consciousness. It would be very difficult for any nation to support ideas that
maintain its own inferiority, more so for China, a great nation with a quite
glorious and not so far away past, a population of 1.2 billion, and, though
frustrated, showing no trace of decline. This does not need to be “proved”
theoretically. Every life has a self-affirmative mechanism; otherwise its survival
would be impossible. From the late 1980s onwards, the Chinese intelligentsia
began revising “reverse racism”, which developed into a strong trend of
“nationalism” in the 1990s. Nonetheless, “reverse racism” is still dominant in the
Chinese intelligentsia, especially among those in control of the academic and
educational fields.
It must also be emphatically pointed out that the self-abusive “reverse racism”
mania of the 1980s existed mainly among intellectuals and college students, while
today it has lost much of its market and is confined to the dignitaries and the
“liberal” intellectuals. The average public is influenced by this trend, but generally
without the self-abusive mania. In fact, “the silent majority”, i.e. the average public,
have been rebelling against it, as the “liberal” intellectuals clearly see. For this
reason, they criticise “nationalism” and “populism” together. I have made similar
points earlier in this article: in China, “nationalism” stems from the lower and
middle classes, while “reverse racism”, pro-American and pro-Western attitudes
are common in the upper class of dignitaries, many of whom are corrupt officials
hated by the people.
Leaving aside theories and ideas and moving on to facts, these corrupt
officials often collude with foreign businessmen to sell off national interests and
the interests of the general public. One example is provided by the tragedies of
those sweatshops created with foreign investment, in which many women
workers (sometimes a dozen, and sometimes over a hundred) were burnt to
death. Women workers are locked in shops or dormitories like slaves with no
escape in case of fire. In disagreements with foreign businessmen, or commercial
disputes between foreign and Chinese businessmen, Chinese corrupt officials
stand side by side with the foreigners for their own benefits. No wonder that the
general public often thinks that Westerners are on the side of the corrupt officials,
that their talk of human rights and democratic politics is hypocritical, and that the
social politics and economic theories that Westerners thrust upon China only serve
the corrupt upstarts in China. In this context it is no wonder that nationalism finds
loud echoes among the lower and middle classes.
From a certain point of view, nationalism in China is a response to the
“reverse racism” embraced by those who believe in “meritocracy” and who
scorn, revile and discriminate ordinary Chinese. It also is a response to the
corruption of those who collude with foreigners and sell out the interests of
ordinary Chinese. 25
Freedom, Democracy and Hegemony 9

How can freedom be guaranteed? In 1944, Friedrich August Hayek, a well-
known liberal thinker, argued in The Road to Serfdom that in a competitive society,
the freedom we choose is based on such freedom: if one refuses to satisfy our
hopes, we may turn to another. But with a monopoly, we can do nothing but be at
its beck and call. What Hayek referred to is an authority that monopolises the
economic artery. Once such a monopoly arises, we have no freedom.
Understandably, he could not discuss the super hegemony that came about 50
years later in international relations. If Hayek’s above judgement is a universal
liberal principle (I think it is, and agree with it completely), obviously it will be
applicable to the present international order. Such a monopoly has appeared or at
least is appearing in the present international order with the hegemony of the
USA. For the moment, none of other forces in the world may challenge this
hegemony; we can turn to no other force that can counteract the US. In front of
such hegemony, what freedom do you say we have?
To a great extent, the fall of the Soviet Union foretold the coming of the day in
which we would lose our freedom. Some say the Soviet Union was an evil empire
that also had the wild ambition to be the lord of the world. And some even say
that the threat from the Soviet Union to China was more hazardous than that from
the USA. These ideas might be right, but unfortunately they miss the point. The
key does not lie in whether the Soviet Union was better or worse than the USA,
but whether we have more or less freedom in a unipolar world, compared with a
bipolar or multipolar one. The liberal principle tells us that an authority that
monopolises the artery of our subsistence entails our loss of freedom. Therefore,
under the hegemony of the USA, the world has evidently lost its freedom: in the
years since the fall of Soviet Union, the USA has started roughing up the world
without scruple, promising a dark future.
Some might claim that the several rough-ups of the USA, such as Gulf War and
Kosovo, had been caused by brutal atrocities, which had to be stopped by the
money, the arms and the people of the USA – a selfless act for the people in other
areas of the world. Had the USA not rushed there to stop the atrocities, those who
suffered would have been totally hopeless. The USA itself often puts on an air that
“I don’t want to be the world guard, but whom else can you turn to when the
world needs one?” Here I do not want to plunge into the dispute such as “whether
Milošević carried out ethnic cleansing or not”. In The Constitution of Liberty,
Hayek says that coercion cannot be avoided completely, because the only way to
prevent it is to threaten the use of coercion. A free society empowers the country
to enforce the monopoly of coercion in order to restrict the use of the power on
part of individuals.
9. In “Liberalism and Hegemony”, I discussed the relationships between freedom, democracy and he-
gemony. See China Road Under the Shadow of Globalization, Chinese Social Sciences Press, Novem-
26 ber 1999, pp. 58-72.
A NEW SILK ROAD?
From the point of view of traditional international law, the USA’s assault on
Yugoslavia was an outright invasion. Then, why do some “liberals” support it in
the name of justice? In my opinion, consciously or unconsciously, they are willing
to endure the US’s monopoly of power. In international relationships, how can the
actions of the USA, a peremptory monopoly, be delimited? It must be kept in mind
that democratic politics do not play any role here. We have no right to vote for the
President of the USA or the members of Congress. If we cannot limit the actions of
the USA – instead of relying on its self-restriction – the international order is
exactly the same as a totalitarian system, not yet bad as that thanks to Russia,
China and India.
The emergence of a unipolar international order will never increase the
freedom of the majority in the world except for the monopolising country. I have
no intention of debasing the American civilisation and ideal, but the liberal
principle tells us that the guarantee of freedom cannot come from the noble
morality of the ruler, but from the restriction of the system. No matter how noble
and free the American nation-founding ideal is, it cannot create a unipolar
hegemony in the world, which would bring a horrible totalitarianism in the
international order (intensive bombing on Yugoslavia by US-led NATO clearly
shows how horrible such an international order is). It may even carry out, as
Hayek puts it, “authoritative government acts according to liberal principles”. 10
But a liberal knows that the ruler is not reliable. In this case we would have “no
one to turn to”. Freedom cannot rely on the ruler, but on another one we can turn
to. Therefore, a liberal has to consider how to limit the hegemony of the USA in
the world, and support those countries that are counterbalancing the hegemony of
the USA.
Liberalism does not only mean abstract principles. If these abstract principles
were not put into practice according to concrete conditions, liberalism and the
liberals would be worthless. Unfortunately, few “liberals” stand up to oppose the
hegemony of the USA. Have I misunderstood liberalism and the USA, or have they
betrayed the liberal principles and turned away from the decency that is essential
to a liberal? I think it is the latter case. Of course, there are some reasons for which
Western liberals do not protest (though some have done): they are in the club of
world conquerors, or have no way to taste what it is like for those who are outside
the club, or have selfish motives. But the attitudes of Chinese liberals are strange:
when American hegemony is overshadowing the whole globe, they oppose
Chinese “nationalism” instead of standing up to the US. I wonder whether they
know the meaning of liberalism. If they are true liberals, they should oppose
American nationalism instead of Chinese “nationalism”. But they don’t, they
impudently support American nationalism and oppose Chinese “nationalism”.
If an atrocity such as genocide really were to take place somewhere in the
world, all the people in the world should try to find ways to stop it instead of
10. HAYEK, The Constitution of Liberty, 1960. 27

looking over with folded arms. The “liberals”, however, should not forget their
lectures to us in the past: under totalitarianism we might be less molested by
criminals. But we’d rather discard such kind of “safety”, for the cost is too high.
The actual example is the bombing on Yugoslavia by the USA. Though Milošević
was not totally clean-handed, I think American bombing did far more harm to Serb
and Albanian civilians. If the international relations of the future are dealt with in
this way, the cost that the world will have to pay will be far greater. If ethnic
cleansing really were to take place in the present world, do we have other
substitutes? In dealing with this kind of issue, a few better ways than intervention
in the internal affairs of a state can be found. It is also unacceptable for civilised
people to stand by and look onto genocide with folded arms. Human beings in
the future should have better solutions, something like a world with Great-
Harmony or the like. Why not use the UN? The excuse of the USA is the non-
cooperation of Russia and China, which would exercise their right to veto in the
Security Council. But why wouldn’t Russia and China cooperate? Does the USA
have adequate reasons to intervene in Yugoslavia by force? If it does, why not try it
in the Security Council so that all people of the world, including Chinese, can see
the “hideous acts” of “abusing power” and how “irresponsible” Russia and China
are? In fact, China has been very responsible in voting at the UN, especially careful
when using its veto power and Russia did not intend to shield Yugoslavia
completely (it lacks the capability as well). Obviously, the USA’s purpose in
putting aside the UN and invading Yugoslavia in the name of NATO was to
establish a new international order with US-led NATO to dominate the world by
force. For the rest of the world except the USA or NATO countries, this kind of
new order is totally incongruous with freedom.
Over half a century ago, Hayek wrote his famous book, The Road to Serfdom.
Now the kind of country he referred to no longer exists, and the kind of thought
he referred to is in low tide. Since his time, this world has been through great
changes. Have the liberals today noticed the changes, the threats from new
freedoms, and the different sources of threats to freedom in international relations
and internal politics? If the answer is no, the liberals today are unworthy of the
glorious word “liberty”. If none of us can realise this, then, a new totalitarian
international order will descend on this planet, which is a sure new road to
serfdom.
Conclusion: The Prospect of a New International Order

An essential world problem is the distribution of natural resources. In order to
scramble for natural resources and living spaces, many bloody wars have broken
out in history: World War II, for example, which is still fresh in our memory. After
the War, the new argument was that in the postwar free trade system, natural
resources and living spaces are not so important: anyone who wins the
28 commercial competition may have a happy life. Those who have discarded
A NEW SILK ROAD?
hypocrisy and are thinking seriously about the problems on this planet will never
agree with such a fallacy.
If one goes to and has a look at the Chinese inland where natural conditions
are extremely inclement but the population extremely dense, he will see that
people in those areas are virtually living in despair: the extremely inadequate
natural resources doom them to failure in any commercial competition. The
inclement living conditions also deteriorate their social relations: when everyone is
scrambling for natural resources, tolerance, freedom and democracy find no
foothold, and environmental protection is out of the question. Their only hope is
to escape to a place where natural resources are plentiful.
Recently in Britain a human smuggling incident scored the highest death toll
of stowaways. On the early morning of June 19, when British landing waiters were
checking a Dutch-registered lorry at the port of Dover in the South of Britain, 58
(54 male, 4 female) corpses of illegal immigrants from East Asia were found in a
container, and two survivors were rushed to hospital for emergency treatment.
They probably were from China.11 I have read too much news of this kind, and
every time I feel a gnawing in my heart. Some Westerners as well as some Chinese
who are used to derogating China to fawn Westerners might say that these
stowaways were “fleeing a dictatorial regime”. However, every objective and fair-
minded person knows they were fleeing insufficient natural resources and
congested living spaces. Others might say that these stowaways were not very
poor, otherwise they couldn’t have afforded the expenses. It has become part of
Chinese group subconscious to flee from deficient natural resources and congested
spaces. Every year countless Chinese go through innumerable trials and hardships
to try to enter areas where natural resources are not so limited and space is not so
crowded, and the best places are North America, Europe, and Australia. If not,
Russia, Eastern Europe, Latin America will also do, and even some parts of Africa.
The examples of the argument that natural resources and living spaces are not
important and any winner in a commercial competition may enjoy a good life can
only be applied to a few small and very special countries and regions, such as
South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Japan seems to be one of the
examples, but Japan gained its original capital by defeating China in wars and
plundering its natural resources.
Natural resources and living spaces are never unimportant. But how are the
distribution of natural resources and living spaces determined? No doubt, they
have been distributed by wars. The rich nations today, mainly the white and
Japan, have lived happily by defeating or even exterminating other races (such as
in South and North America) and robbing abundant natural resources and living
spaces. This issue can never be evaded. Without mentioning this, it is hypocritical
to talk about “human rights”, “freedom”, “environmental protection” and
“peace”…. while those sanctimonious intellectuals and politicians avoid this issue.
11. Telecommunication from Reuters on June 19, 2000. 29

Even if the issue is evaded, it still lingers in people’s heart, especially of the
Chinese, Indians, and peoples of other races in the world.
Another essential problem is that the fate of such a large a population is held
in the hands of a few who do not know or care about them. From the perspective
of internal politics, this is an issue of despotism; from the perspective of
international order, it is an issue of hegemony of the club of the USA and other
Western powers. I appreciate the democratic system of the USA and other Western
countries to the utmost. However, from the perspective of international
relationships, it is quite similar to that of ancient Rome. In my view, another group
cannot control the destiny of the Chinese, even if the people in that group made
the decision through a democratic procedure, for in this procedure, the Chinese
were not involved. This is where the difference lies between those pro-Western
Chinese intellectuals and myself.
Without solving these problems, it would be very difficult for “human rights”,
“freedom”, “environmental protection” and “peace” to exist. What really exists is
what human beings have done in the long river of history: a group of people with
strong fists wipes out another group with weak fists to seek their own benefits. In
this case, what is the use of those fair-sounding words?
If Westerners really care about these things such as “human rights”, “freedom”,
“environmental protection” and “peace”, why not think more about how to
distribute the natural resources and living spaces fairly and how to establish a
democratic system with all human beings involved notwithstanding race,
countries, religious beliefs and sexes.
(translated by Yao Ximing)
30
031-046/LiMes/Xiaodong 6-10-2000 15:20 Pagina 31
A NEW SILK ROAD?
GEOPOLITICAL CHANGES
IN THE WESTERN REGIONS by ZHANG XIAODONG
T HE FIRST TIME I GOT TO KNOW “THE

Western Regions”* was at the end of the 1970s, when I took the first College
Entrance Examinations after the “Cultural Revolution” and had to stuff my head
with a jumble of things I had never heard of. At that time, “the Western Regions”
was a geographical name in history that I had to remember. Later, when I studied
in the History Department of a university, more and more information about the
Western Regions began to accumulate in my mind: Qin’s Moon and Han’s Pass,
the exotic pipe and flute, the shining spears and armoured horses, the single
column of smoke and the setting sun…1 and also messengers in Han and monks
of the Tang Dynasty who were trekking in the flying sand as well as the
indefatigable camel train and trade caravan. Although the Western Regions were
still remote and obscure, the great spatio-temporal vicissitude had sealed it inside
the vast accumulation of historical data.
However, since the 1990s the image of the Western Regions gradually began
to become clearer and more concrete in the depth of my mind. First, since the
disintegration of the Soviet Union, a large number of ethnic nations have
mushroomed in the Asian hinterland, a place that is customarily called Central Asia
or Transcaucasia. Soon a region that is closely related in geopolitics, security,
religion, ethnicity, culture and economy looms into our view. For such a large area
that includes Western Asia, Central Asia, the Caucasus and parts of South Asia, only
the name “Western Regions” can embrace it all. Second, bordering Chinese
Xingjiang and Tibet, this region not only affects our national security and stability
of the Great Northwest, but also relates to the development of the West of China,
* According to Word Ocean (1979, condensed version, Shanghai Lexicographical Press), after the Han
Dynasty, the region west of Yumen Pass (Northwest of Dunhuang, Gansu Province now) was gene-
rally called the Western Regions. The word has two meanings: in a narrow sense, it refers to the area
East of Congling; in a broad sense, it refers to the regions that can be reached through the area East of
Congling, and includes the Middle and West of Asia, the Indian Peninsula, the East of Europe and the
Northern parts of Africa. In this article, the Western Regions refer to the Middle East, Central Asia, the
Indian Subcontinent and the Caucasian region, which is a little different from the broad meaning. But
while a better word is yet to be found to include the above four regions, “the Western Regions” is not
a bad choice (author’s note).
1. These are the widely known descriptions of the Western Regions by ancient poets (translator’s note). 31
GEOPOLITICAL CHANGES IN THE WESTERN REGIONS
as well as the economic development of China as a whole in the 21st century. Here
only the word “Western Regions” can evoke our grand sense of honour and our
sense of crisis.
The region must be recognised de novo and the influences of the changes in
this region on our country must be understood. All of these constitute the main
motives of my retrospection on the Western Regions (please forgive my using a
word that had been forgotten for over 100 years) at the turn of the millennium.
The Changes in Geopolitics of the Western Regions since

the End of the Cold War
In the vast expanse of the Western Regions, the end of the Cold War was
mainly symbolised by a series of great historical events, such as the Soviet troops’
withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Gulf War, progress in the peace talks in the
Middle East and the successive independence of the countries in Central Asia and
Transcaucasia, which have not only changed the balance of power and broken the
Cold War set-up formed since the World War II, but also ignited momentous
rearrangements in geopolitics in this region in over 100 years.
First, due to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russian influence in
Central and Western Asia has shrunk on all fronts. From the planned large-scale
expansion (1700) of Peter the Great to the annexation of Crimea, Caucasus,
Central Asia and so on into the domain of Tsarist Russia (Russians entered Pamir in
1891),2 it took the Russians about 190 years. After the October Revolution, the
Soviet Union not only inherited the territory of the Tsarist Russia but also gradually
picked up its external policy in Asia. In order to compete for supremacy with the
USA, as well as break the encompassing of the USA in the South wing, the Soviet
Union took as its main objective the access to the Indian Ocean, snatching
strategic points and achieving an advantage in geopolitical competition. In its
heyday, the Soviet Union set up military bases in the African Horn and South
Yemen, and maintained close ties with some radical Arab countries such as Syria
and Libya. From the mid 1980s, under the leadership of Gorbachev, the country
undertook a general political and economic reform, which, more like a disaster
than a reform to the whole nation and the people, solved none of the substantial
problems that the country faced at home and abroad, and instead caused the worst
chaos in economic order and the ultimate disintegration of the Union. However,
this was good news for the USA, the Western camp and those countries that had
been under the Russian threat over the past 100-odd years. Through the Gulf War
in 1990-1991, the USA established its dominance in the whole Middle East. In other
words, it became impossible to solve any problems in Middle East without the
active involvement of the USA, while the Soviet Union (and its heir Russia) turned
2. ZHAO CHANGQING, A Survey of Five Central Asian Countries, Economic Daily Press, Beijing, April
32 1999, p. 30.
A NEW SILK ROAD?
into an on-looker of Middle Eastern affairs and an endorser of the American

scheme. In the North of the Middle East, countries such as Turkey, Iran,
Afghanistan and Pakistan, which had been under tight Russian pressure, may
slightly relieve the taut nerve at last. The Soviet troops’ withdrawal from
Afghanistan and the successive independence of three nations in Transcaucasia
and five nations in Central Asia not only drove the threat further North for several
hundred and even over one thousand kilometres, but also provided these
countries with more space to exert greater influence in regional politics.
Second, an immense political vacuum appeared in the hinterland of Asia. No
matter how the conquest of Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union in Central Asia and
Transcaucasia is evaluated, a fundamental fact is that the successive independence
of the three nations in Transcaucasia and the five nations in Central Asia essentially
presupposes a total renunciation of the Soviet politics, economics, social system,
culture and ideology. In view of this, the so-called political vacuum is represented
in the thorough “non-Sovietisation” and “non-Russianisation” in the nations of
Central Asia and Transcaucasia. In the next place, due to the disintegration of the
Soviet Union, in an instant, Central Asia and Transcaucasia turned from being a
Russian exclusive domain into a “derelict enclave” in international politics. No
effective influence from any international and regional political power fell upon
this region, and these nations themselves are standing in bewilderment, unable to
ascertain their identity and future. Just like those nations that have experienced
ethnic migration or suffered foreign invasion, the ethnic nations have to make a
settlement about the past and a choice about the future. Put another way, the
future politics, economy and society of these countries are characterised by great
uncertainty and plasticity. Whatever choices are ultimately made, the
consequential influence (upon the peripheral countries in particular) will be
immense.
As a result, nearly at the same time of these countries’ independence, a
geopolitical competition with the aim to affect the orientation of the countries in
Central Asia and Transcaucasia began to unfold. Turkey, which is close to Central
Asia and Transcaucasia in language as well in ethnicity, aspires to establish a
Turkish community stretching from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China.3
The interests that Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and others are pursuing contradict
each other to a great extent, but all of them aspire to restore Islamic features in this
region. While the USA and other Western countries take it as a matter of course
that after casting off the shackles of the Russians who had tied them for over 100
years, the countries in Central Asia will “throw themselves into the arms of the
Western-coloured freedom and democracy without hesitation”,4 and therefore
their main goals are to “promote democracy”, “establish a liberal economy” and
3. WU CHUANGUN, “On the Developmental Prospect of Pan-Turkism”, Russia Studies, IV, 1993.
4. DONG FANGXIAO, Islam and Post-Cold War World, Social Scientific Literature Press, Beijing, June
1999, p. 190. 33
“help this region merge with international society” 5 and so on. To a great extent,
the important strategic position of this region, the abundant petroleum and gas
resources in the Caspian Sea area further stimulate the desire and enthusiasm of all
kinds of powers to fill up the political vacuum. To achieve its strategic aim, the
USA not only is planning to compromise with Iran, but also does not have
reservations in making use of the “Taliban”, an Islamic extremist organisation, to
open up the passage to Central Asia through Afghanistan.6 The Japanese lay
special emphasis on “seizing the opportunity to peek the Chinese and Russians
from their back” and attempt to avoid “a gap in politics and economy” in Central
Asia.7
Third, power integration that crosses regional boundaries. In the 2000 years
prior to the mid 18th century, the political, economic and cultural communication
among the people in the expansive region that we call Central Asia, Western Asia
and South Asia was probably far more complex and frequent than we know.
Comparatively the artificial obstruction of the Russian conquest on the regions of
Central Asia and Transcaucasia lasted for only 100 years, which might not cause
much damage on the longstanding historical connections. However, the past 100
years is a period that characterised not only the rapid growth in economy and
technologies in human history, but also extreme clashes in ideologies and national
interests. These, on one hand, have made an immense difference in material well
being, but on the other have widened the gap in spiritual and political life. It
should be specially noted that, as a result of the formation of the two great camps
(East and West) and the breakout of the Cold War after World War II, all the
differences and gaps widened.
The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union removed
the artificial communication barrier between the various regions, and provided the
possibility for other international and regional powers to exercise their influence.
At the same time, the general emphasis of every country on accelerating economic
development and improving people’s living standards has produced sustained
stimulation for the integration of cross-regional powers.
The first kind of power integration in the Western Regions is the whole-scale
expansion of Islamic influence. As part of the traditional Islamic world, the region
of Central Asia is covered with fertile soil for an Islamic revival. Furthermore, a
large number of Muslim countries (Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran and others) add
fuel to the fire for the revival of Islam in Central Asia through investments,
religious donations, sponsorships for pilgrimages and cultural exchanges. With
the very help from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab countries, Central Asian
countries successively joined in the Organisation of the Islamic Conference
5. GU GUANFU, “The US Intervention in Central Asia and the Security of China”, Institute of China Stra-
tegy and Administration, Analytic Report of International Affairs, 1997-1989, p. 52.
6. As above, p. 54.
7. DAIKAKU NAOYA, “Diplomacy along the Silk Road – A Back View of the Strategies of China and Rus-
sia”, Japan: Yomiuri Shimbun, February 5, 2000. Quote from: Xinhua Agency, Tōkyō, February 5,
34 2000, Japanese telecommunication.
A NEW SILK ROAD?
(OIC), 8 thus accomplishing the return to Islam on the official level. Meanwhile,
under all kinds of influences from within and without, the religious enthusiasm of
the general public in this region is continuously surging, and also Islam is
gradually becoming an effective weapon of quite a few political opposition
groups.9 The second kind of power integration in the Western Regions is the Pan-
Turkism mainly promoted by Turkey, which actively pushes ahead the relations
with Central Asian countries in all fields, and established and held a “Turkish
Summit Conference”. Turkey can make use of ethnic and language relations as
well as the eagerness of the Central Asian countries, in search for a new course of
development and to accomplish a “non-Russianisation” at the beginning of their
independence. It is not easy to establish a “Turkish Community”, “Great
Turkestan” or any other Pan-Turkish entity, but the geopolitical shift engendered
in the whole Western Regions by such activities and its influence upon Xinjiang in
Chine can never be neglected.
The third kind of power integration is probably the most significant and
problematic: the economic cooperation of the whole region. In 1992, the
“Economic Cooperation Organisation” (ECO, formed in 1985) founded by Turkey,
Iran and Pakistan was expanded to include the five Central Asian countries,
Azerbaijan and Afghanistan, formally starting the regional economic operation
stretching over Central Asia, Transcaucasia and the Northern part of the Middle
East. In spite of the summit conferences held in the few ensuing years and quite a
number of agreements reached in the fields of banking and infrastructure
improvement, few of them have been put into practice. The activities of ECO have
virtually stopped, especially when Turkey and Iran placed more attention
respectively on the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Association (BSEC) and
Caspian Sea Users, two organisations focused respectively on each of the
countries.
Fourth, the Eurasian continent crossroads. Prior to Russia’s complete control
over Central Asia and the Caucasus, this region, the core of the Eurasian continent,
had played a unique role in the whole ancient world. For one thing, the “Silk
Road” leading to the West from China went through this region, the cities on the
way were not only the distributing centres of all kinds of goods, but also posts that
maintained the security and smoothness of transportation; secondly, this region
was also the only passage for the nomadic ethnic nations in the North of Asia to go
down to Mesopotamia, Iran and India. Of course, not all of those who were
trudging along the “Silk Road” were travelling merchants, not all of those who
were galloping on the Central Asian prairie and in the harsh desert were the
cavalry of the barbarian ethnic groups. The region of Central Asia and the
Caucasus had in fact grown into a crossroads where the politics, economics and
cultures of a few cultural areas on the ancient Eurasian continent converged and
8. DONG FANGXIAO, Islam and Post-Cold War World, Social Scientific Literature Press, Beijing, June
1999, p. 177.
9. MIR ZOHAIR HUSAIN, Global Islamic Politics, Harper Collins Publishers, 1995, pp. 255-256. 35
interacted. As René Grousset, a French scholar, described in his monumental work

The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia, “along this road, trade was
going on and religions were spreading; along this road, came the Greek arts of the
Alexandrine successors and the people who preached Buddhism from
Afghanistan. From this road, Greek-Roman merchants went to and tried to take
control of Saraga (a name used by Ptolemaeus to refer to Luoyang, which he also
called Thinae, author’s note), a place Ptolemaeus had mentioned to be plentiful
with silk, and the generals in Eastern Han Dynasty of China had ventured to
establish communications with Iranian world and the Eastern part of the Roman
Empire”. 10
In the 1990s, having been out of view of the world politics and international
communications for over one hundred years, the region of Central Asia and the
Caucasus once again resumed its geographic advantage of linking the continents
of Europe and Asia. If increasing globalisation were taken into consideration, its
geopolitical advantage would probably be far more prominent than in the past.
Obviously the leaders of the Central Asian countries have realised the close tie
between the geopolitical advantage and the future development of their countries.
“As a result, all countries have eagerly declared their desires one after another to
become the new ‘tie’ and bridge”. 11 Of course their performing capability has
been seriously hindered by underdeveloped economies, fragile infrastructures,
complicated religious and ethnic conflicts, but their potential advantages in
geography, strategy and even economics cannot be indiscreetly brushed aside.
This might be the important reason for which Russia is re-establishing its presence
in the region and for which the USA, European Union and NATO are getting
involved.
The Western Regions and the National Security of China

On the Eurasian hinterland and bordering the Pacific Ocean in the East, China
was troubled by the invasion of the nomadic ethnic nations in the North and
Northwest in the past feudal dynasties. Hun during the Qin Dynasty, Turk during
the period of Sui-Tang, the Northern chaos caused by war during the Five
Dynasties, the confrontation between Northern Song and Nuzhen, and later, the
successive entrance in the Central Plains of Mongolians and Manchurians, all
accounted for a simple fact: the invasions of the nomadic ethnic nations were the
major threat to the external security of past dynasties. The rock-firm Great Wall
that has been standing for hundreds and thousands of years vividly interprets
China’s focus and main orientation in security. With the establishment of the
Western maritime hegemony and the rise of capitalism, the main threat against the
10. R. GROUSSET, The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia, translated by LAN QI, Commer-
cial Press, Beijing 1999, pp. 10-11.
11. SUN ZHUANGZHI, Foreign Relations of Five Central Asian Countries, Contemporary World Press,
36 Beijing, April 1999, p. 35.
A NEW SILK ROAD?
security of China shifted from land to sea. During the 110 years from the Opium
War in 1840 to the foundation of the People’s Republic of China, there were
numerous invasive wars against China launched from the sea, and China’s capital
was captured and ransacked three times: in 1860, the Allied Armies of Britain and
France burnt Yuanming Garden; in 1900, the Eight-Power Allied Forces occupied
Beijing; and in 1938, Japanese Devils caused a blood bath in Nanjing. It should be
noted that even in this period, threats from the North and Northwest had by no
means subsided. The territory and borders in the depth of the continent had
undergone tremendous changes, from which the threat had not been felt until the
1960s-1970s: from the utmost Eastern part of the Wusuli River to the Pamirs in the
Far West, China was half enveloped by the Soviet Union from North to West; the
three provinces in the Northeast, the base of China’s heavy industry, were
between the hammer and the anvil, and even Beijing, the capital, was within the
range of a lightning war.
By 1991 the threats from the West and the North had generally undergone two
stages. The first stage started around 221 BC and ended in mid 19th century, when
the main threat against China came from regular invasions of the Northern
nomadic ethnic nations. When the central dynasties were comparatively strong,
the invasion caused no more than wars on the Northwestern frontiers; when the
central dynasties were vulnerable, the whole Northern regions would fall in the
chaos of war including the Central Plains under foreign occupation. Fortunately,
although the well-developed civilisation in the Central Plains “had been
conquered, yet in the end, it conquered the barbaric and uncivilised victors by
inebriating and doping them, and ultimately wiped them out”. 12 From the mid 19th
century, the threat from the Northwest underwent substantial changes. First, Russia
replaced the nomadic nations and became the main invader from the North, for
the expansion of territory cast a spell over Tsarist Russia; second, both the Tsarist
and Communist reigning groups were frequently under strong fanatical impulses
to launch large-scale invasions and military strikes against China; and third, unlike
the regular invasions of the nomadic nations, Russian pressure on the security of
China was overwhelming and longlasting.
The disintegration of the Soviet Union in December of 1991 and the following
independence of the Central Asian countries marked the dawn of a new era in
which the security environment in the West and North of China would undergo
great changes. Optimistically, the disintegration of the Soviet Union relieved China
of the most intense military pressure along the continental border, and in the
foreseeable future, there will be no threat of large-scale military invasion in the
North and West of China. Even the possibility of border clashes also dropped to
the lowest point in history, for China has not only solved the majority of border
issues with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and other countries, but also achieved
a common view through dialogue and negotiation au pair on border disarmament
12. R. GROUSSET, The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia, translated by LAN QI, Commer-
cial Press, Beijing 1999, p. 18. 37
and reliance establishment. “The Shanghai Five” in particular, has become a

cooperative paradigm in the security field of international society.
Nevertheless, it should not be neglected that security in the West and North of
China still faces serious uncertainties. The first is related to Islamic extremism and
ethnic separatism. Viewed from the whole, the international and regional
environments since the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 are propitious to
the promulgation of Islamic extremist and ethnic separatist thoughts. From the
international perspective, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the frustration
suffered under Socialism have not only provided space for the overflowing of all
kinds of political and religious trends, but also helped their natural justification: as
long as they are trying to shake off Russian control and influence and oppose the
Soviet political and economic pattern, they will earn wide support and
acclamation in international society. What is more, with the Kosovo war as the
turning point, the new interventionism of the USA and NATO has come into
shape, represented especially in their support to the “Kosovo Liberation Army”, an
extremist faction, and their position on the later Chechen issue. This will stimulate
all kinds of separatism. From the regional perspective, both Pan-Islamism and Pan-
Turkism have a ready market in Central Asian regions. One reason for this is that
some countries studiously preach and hawk these thoughts in pursuit of their own
interests; the other reason is that, to a great extent, these thoughts filled the
ideological vacuum during the post Soviet era, and provided a certain ethnic and
cultural identity and authenticity. In such great a setting, all kinds of religious
extremisms with an Islamic colour and ethnic separatism became active as never
before, from the Balkans to the Caucasus, from Central Asia to Afghanistan and
Kashmir, that is, along the boundary between the Islamic world and the Eastern
camp.
To sum up, the Islamic extremism and ethnic separatism active in this region
have some common characteristics. First, without exception they lump religious,
ethnic and political issues together to evoke widest international sympathy and
support; second, while constantly advocating noble religious and political goals,
they take up kidnapping, assassination, explosion and other terrorist practices
without hesitation as means to achieve their goals; third, in order to acquire
reliable resources, the area they control has become a workshop of drugs. It is
reported that opium produced in Afghanistan is three times the total amount
produced in other areas in the world. In 1999 only, the opium produced in
Afghanistan was 4600 metric tons, double the 1998 output. 13
In China there are 10 ethnic groups that believe in Islam, with a population of
about 18-20 million, who mostly live in the Northwestern regions. If it was true
that during the Cold War, China could cut off the tie between Xinjiang and Central
Asia through tight border controls and other security measures, at present it is
impossible: in ethnicity, language and religion Xinjiang has a far-reaching
13. AHMED RASHID, “The Taliban: Exporting Extremism”, Foreign Affairs, November/December 1999,
38 p. 33.
A NEW SILK ROAD?
connection with the Western Regions. The bi-directional flow of people,

information and materials into and out of the Western Regions is not only the
outcome of Xinjiang’s opening to the outside world, it is also the prerequisite of
further development. It has been proved that Xinjiang has become the coveting
object of extremist religious factions, terrorists and drug dealers, as well as the
main infiltration target of “Pan-Islamism” and “Pan-Turkism”. The security and
stability of Xinjiang has aroused the unusual attention of the Chinese academic
community and governmental departments.
The second uncertain element in security that the West of China faces is
related to the clash between India and Pakistan. Centred on the dispute of
Kashmir, the clash between India and Pakistan has lasted for 50-odd years. Unlike
the situations in the past, it is possible that Kashmir will trigger a general war
between India and Pakistan. Owing to the disappearance of the Soviet Union,
Pakistan has lost its weight in the global strategy of the USA. In the eyes of many
Americans, the former strategic ally and hero, which resisted the southward
expansion of the Soviet Union, has degenerated into a sheer ruffian: corrupt
politicians, the servicemen are unbridled in their truculence and extremist
Islamism overspreads; in international politics, the country recklessly develops
large-scale weapons, brazenly acts in collusion with Islamic extremist forces, and
gravely jeopardises regional stability and peace. On the contrary, India, in the past
a “spoiler” in the eyes of the Americans, becomes the exemplary citizen: India is
the largest “democratic country” in the world, so it can become the motor of
democracy; India puts forth no territorial claims on its neighbours, so it is the
protector of the regional order in Southern Asia; even when India risked
everyone’s condemnation to conduct nuclear tests, its action was considered a
reasonable security demand, and Americans believe that, unlike North Korea and
other countries which attempt to possess large-scale antipersonnel weapons, India
is one of the most responsible.14
In Southern Asia, India is an absolute leading power. The balance with
Pakistan was maintained for over half a century because that the big powers
conditioned each other. The collapse of the Soviet Union and especially the
adjustment of the USA in its policy concerning Southern Asia have seriously
broken the fragile balance in this region. It should be especially noted that, when
talking about the so-called “China threat”, the USA and India found a common
topic. This might cause India to have an illusion that it has acquired enough
freedom and strength to act in Southern Asia, and can solve once and for all the
dispute with Pakistan. Unlike before, the dispute probably will lead to serious
nuclear confrontation: in the dry tree, Pakistan may fight desperately, while India,
holding all the trumps, may well catch the ball before the bound and perform a
surgery on Pakistan. It seems that Kashmir has become the “one of the most
perilous places in the world” as Clinton, the American President, puts it.15
14. MOHAMMAD AYOOB, “India Matters”, The Washington Quarterly, 23:1, Winter 2000, pp. 27-39.
15. XINHUA AGENCY, UN, April 16, 2000, English telecommunication. 39
To China, an India-Pakistan clash would definitely bring tension and disorder

in the Western frontier of China, and even a disastrous influence on the economic
development in the area. However, the real danger lies in that it is possible that
China will be beguiled into an unexpected clash in which it did not intend to be
involved in at all.
The Western Regions and the Security of China’s Energetic Source

Over the past 20 years, China has been one of the countries with fastest
economic growth. When we are proud of the economic achievements and enjoy
the convenience brought along by them, we must give enough attention to one of
the important elements that support economic growth – the production and
supply of petroleum, and the consequent security issue of the energetic source. In
1993 China became an importing country of crude oil, but strains in its production
and demand had appeared before this. As early as in 1978, China’s oil output
exceeded 100 million tons (reached 104.05 million tons), while by 1990, output
had only increased to 138,3 million tons, which meant that the output only
increased 34.25 million tons in 12 years, with an annual increase rate of no more
than 2.7%. Compared with the annual increase rate of 11% 16 before 1978 (from
1952 to 1978), there really was a world of difference. There are various indications
that the room for oil increase in China is very small. It is virtually impossible for
China’s oil output to get onto a new stage unless there are big breakthroughs in oil
prospecting. In the meanwhile, the tempo of the opening and reform of China is
continually accelerating, and due to the rapid economic development, the demand
for oil increasingly swells up. In 1980, oil consumption was 87,574 million tons, in
1985, 91,688 million tons, and in 1987, exceeded 100 million tons and reached
103,122 million tons.17 Throughout the 1990s, the conflict between supply and
demand was not relieved, on the contrary, it became worse than ever. In the light
of statistics, Chinese output of crude oil in 1995 was 149,064 million tons, in 1996
and 1997 they were respectively 157,292 and 160,441 million tons. From 1998,
however, output has been decreasing: in 1998, 160,256 million tons; in 1999,
158,786 million tons; 18 and it seems that even at its best, the oil output in 2000 is
hardly more than a return to a little over 160 million tons. In striking contrast with
the fluctuation of oil output, its demand repeatedly broke the record. According to
the statistics and forecast of IEA, the demand for petroleum in China in 1996 was
3.70 million barrel/day; in 1997, 4.10 million barrel/day; in 1998, 4.20 million
barrel/day; and in 1999 and 2000 it will reach 4.40 million barrel/day and 4.60
million barrel/day respectively.19 Put another way, the insufficiency between oil
production and demand in China will be as high as 70 million tons.
16. MA XIUQING, Petroleum-Development-Challenge of the Economy of the Middle East — Ahead for
the 21st Century, Petroleum Industrial Press, Beijing, February 1995, pp. 200-201.
17. China Statistical Yearbook, 1988; 1994.
18. International Petroleum Economics, vol. 8, no. 2, March 20, 2000, p. 55.
40 19. IEA, Monthly Oil Market Report, February 11, 2000.
A NEW SILK ROAD?
With the improvement of people’s living standards and the expansion of the
Chinese economic scale, and the acceleration of the structure readjustment in
energy resource due to the increasing pressure of environmental protection, oil
demand in China will further increase. According to the forecast of a report
entitled “Studies of the Tendency and Countermeasures of China’s Petroleum
Importation” issued by the Economic Research Centre of the China State
Commission of Economy and Trade, in 2005, the consumption of crude oil in
China will reach 243 million tons, and in 2010 and 2015, 296 million tons and 360
millions respectively.20 If no large oil fields are discovered and the oil output
remains at 160 or 170 million tons, the insufficiency of supply will be as large as
200 million tons. The estimation of IEA is more alarming: by 2020, China will daily
import more than 8 million barrels of crude oil, or 400 million tons in a whole year.
No matter how huge the discrepancy in the estimates on Chinese oil demand
in the forthcoming 20 years, a simple fact is that the enormous gap between
supply and demand has to be made up by imported oil, while in the present
world, the main source of the imported oil is in the Middle East, the Gulf in
particular. It is unnecessary to provide the already well known figures on reserves,
output and export volume of oil in the Middle East. A glance at the figures in the
following table 1 will make one understand more than enough the role played by
petroleum from the Middle East in meeting China’s oil demand.
At present, the influence of Middle Eastern oil on the energy security of
China is limited because, though since 1996 China has become a pure importing
country of crude oil, the proportion of the imported petroleum in the total
demand is not very high. At the same time, China annually exports some crude oil
to the USA, Japan and some Eastern Asian countries. Thus, on balance the
proportion of imported petroleum will be much lower. In 1998 for instance,
China imported 27,322.90 thousand tons of crude oil, 13% of the total demand
(210 million tons, 4.20 million barrels/day). In the same year, China exported
15,600.70 thousand tons to Japan, the USA, South Korea, Singapore and others.
On balance, imported crude oil is 11,722.20 thousand tons, taking 5.58% of the
total demand. Suppose that it was impossible to import crude oil (16,668.30
thousand tons) from the Middle East for some reason, if the worst comes to the
worst, China would stop exporting crude oil to Japan, the USA and others, thus
the actual insufficiency would be only 1,060 thousand tons. Obviously this would
be far from enough to endanger China’s energy supply and economic security.
Nevertheless, the alarm bell is ringing, and oil from the Middle East will ultimately
become the critical element in affecting China’s energy security. In 1999, when
the amount of imported crude oil increased considerably, the export amount
decreased by a large margin (only 7,166.60 thousand tons). With the domestic oil
price gradually coming in line with that in international market, this tendency will
be strengthened. If the forecasts are accurate, in the 20 years ahead 50% of the
20. http://cn.yahoo.com/headlines/000803/busi/huasheng/20000803jjgjtxt2.html 41
Table 1.
(Unit: thousand tons)
Year Total importing From Middle East Percentage of
amount Middle East %
1996 22,616.90 11,962.00 52.89
1997 35,469.70 16,781.60 47.31
1998 27,322.60 16,668.30 61.00
1999 36,613.70 16,903.90 46.16
Source: International Petroleum Economics, vol. 8, no. 2, March 20, 2000, p. 7.
demand in China will have to be provided by imported petroleum, of which at

least half will be from the Middle East.
Chinese policy-making institutions and academic circles have fully recognised
the significance of Middle Eastern oil in meeting China’s demand, and also realised
the hazards of excessive reliance on it. Therefore, while strengthening domestic
prospecting and production, China takes the diversification of importing sources
as its main strategy in risk-spreading. Statistically, Africa and some Southeast Asian
countries are two additional importing regions besides the Middle East. However,
given the frequent chaos of wars, booming local demand, or the limits in
production increase and importing volume, it will be difficult for the two regions
to exercise a decisive influence on China’s reliance on the Middle East. By this
token, petroleum from Central Asia, and Caspian region in particular, should be
given an important position in China’s diversifying strategy. In other words, to
strengthen petroleum cooperation with Central Asia, the Caucasus and Russia
might be of potential significance. First, the high petroleum reserves and low
exploration are advantageous to cooperation between China and related
countries. In the light of statistics, the proved oil reserves in the Caspian Basin are
as much as 15-29 billion barrels, which, though not a match with the Gulf region,
is on a par with the USA (22 billion barrels) and the oil fields in North Sea (17
billion barrels). During the Soviet period, the oil capacity in the Caspian region
had not been fully developed, while nearly all the reserves in Azerbaijan, 30-40%
in Kazakhstan and Tadzhikistan are under the sea.21 Second, the countries in
Central Asia and the Caucasus are particularly interested in international
cooperation in the petroleum field. After their independence, these countries have
austere situations in economic development. To introduce foreign capital and
strengthen international cooperation in the field of energy is one of the few
choices to cast off economic crises. What is more, these countries also face
problems in national economic security: to get rid of dependence on Russia in
21. IDE SPOT SURVEY, The Caspian Basin Oil and Its Impact on Eurasian Power Games, MANABU SHIMZU
42 (ed.), Institute of Developing Economies, Tōkyō, June 1998, p. 5.
A NEW SILK ROAD?
technology, production and transport, a variety of partnerships in energy have

become a common policy trend. Lastly, China and Central Asian countries are
geographically connected, which greatly facilitates Sino-Central Asian cooperation
in the field of energy. Of course, at present there are more hindrances than
conveniences in cooperation, such as incessant religious and ethnic clashes,
unstable politics, underdeveloped infrastructure and so on in Central Asia. But
from a long-term point of view, cooperation in energy with Central Asia ought to
and surely will exercise considerable influence on the security strategy of China’s
energy source.
On China’s Policy Concerning the Western Regions

The end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the resulting
series of large-scale geopolitical shifts all help China’s establishment of a continental
passage to Central and Western Asia, Southern Asia and even to Europe through the
traditional “Silk Road” and the Eurasian heartland. The Western Regions, a word
that sparked the imagination of the ancient literati and was buried in oblivion for
over 100 years, sailed into the view of the Chinese policy-makers with an entirely
new connotation. With the accelerating development of China’s economy, and
especially with the gradual unfolding of the development strategy in Western
China, the ties with the countries in the Western Regions will be much closer, and
China’s interests in this region will be represented on numerous levels. Therefore,
the academic community and the government departments should well notice such
a diplomatic strategy by evaluating accurately and taking hold of the relationships
between China and the Western Regions and the developing trends. At the present,
however, the issues of national security, triggered by religious extremism and
ethnic separatism, and of energy security due to oil supplies, are two key areas in
Chinese diplomatic policy in the Western Regions for the next years.
With regard to national security, Chinese diplomacy should unfold on three
levels. First, it should have good relations with the big countries, such as Turkey,
India, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Kazakhstan. These countries hold the balance in
regional relations, including in the security and stability of the West of our country.
Turkey is the main base of Xinjiang ethnic separatist exiles, India is the
headquarters for the Dalai Lama to instigate Tibetan independence, Saudi Arabia
and Iran have wide influence in the Islamic world, while Kazakhstan shares the
longest border with China and is the largest Central Asian country with both
Islamic and Turkish characteristics. Developing relations with these countries
should be the main focus of our diplomacy in the Western Regions. If these
countries stick to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and fully understand
the regional harm of religious extremism and ethnic separatism, this would
exercise a positive influence upon the improvement and development of bilateral
relations and on regional security and stability. To the regular communication of
the cross-border ethnic groups, China bears no objection and it would welcome 43
heartily a constructive dialogue on the basis of the principle of mutual equality and
respect. But under all circumstances, China strongly opposes intervention into
other country’s internal affairs under the pretext of ethnic and religious issues.
Second, China should strengthen cooperation with Russia and other Western
Region countries. It should be acknowledged that the difference in political
systems and ideologies, the complexity of religious and ethnic composition, the
imbalance of economic and social development and the national interest conflicts
in various fields severely impair mutual trust between China, Russia and other
countries in the Western Regions. It should also be acknowledged that China,
Russia and most countries in the Western Regions are the victims of religious
extremism, ethnic separatism, terrorism and cross-border crime, which, as a result,
undermine the cooperation potential of these countries in the field of security.
China and Russia ought to be the active participants in the security cooperation.
Without a full understanding and cooperation between China and Russia, the
rampant growth of religious extremism, ethnic separatism and international
terrorism cannot be effectively checked. In the meanwhile, China and Russia
should also encourage more Western Regional countries to join this form of
cooperation. Only through a larger scale of information exchange, personnel
training and concerted efforts can the reticular connections of these international
criminal organisations be cut off, especially their come-and-go in funds, personnel
and trans-national traffic in ammunitions and drugs. At the recent Summit
conference of “the Shanghai Five”, great progress was made between China,
Russia, Kazakhstan, Tadzhikistan and Kyrgyzstan, united against religious
extremism, ethnic separatism and international terrorism. Just as Putin, the Russian
President, put it, “the Summit between China, Russia and the Central Asian
countries that aimed to solve border problems became a Summit for the
prevention of international terrorism and to promote cooperative relations”. 22 The
historical change of “the Shanghai Five” indicates that an increasing number of
countries have realised the importance of cooperation in security.
Third, China should watch out for the strategic intentions of the Western
countries in this region. While China, Russia and other countries have discarded
the Cold War mentality and are exploring new paths in international and regional
security structures, the US-led Western countries still cling to bygone dreams and
are infatuated with patching up and just modifying the decade-old Cold War
machine: the NATO and Japan-US alliance attempts to contain China and Russian
strategically. In the West, NATO’s tentacles have extended to the Caucasus and
Central Asia; in the East, to consolidate the alliance with Japan, the USA has
attached great strategic importance to the improvement and development of
relations with Vietnam, and India in particular. Through the war in Kosovo and the
50th NATO anniversary, the US-led Western countries made an attempt to establish
a new form of interventionism. We are more than willing to take their motivations
44 22. XINHUA AGENCY, Tōkyō, July 6, 2000, Japanese telecommunication.

A NEW SILK ROAD?
and goals as kind and noble, but the outcome of the war in Kosovo and the
double standards in human rights have shattered our imagination and a severe
reality lies in front of us. We would rather believe that this judgement is far from
true: when the influence of the USA and NATO infiltrates Central and Southern
Asia and begins to harangue human rights, large-scale of chaos in Xinjiang and
Tibet will not be very far.
The second diplomatic key question for China in the Western Regions is to
ensure the stability and security of oil supplies. It must be made clear that the
interests of China, the USA, Europe, Japan and other countries are exactly the
same in obtaining petroleum supply from the Middle East, and the Gulf in
particular. Consequently, China should not only give active support to but also try
its best to be involved in any suggestions and efforts aimed at the promotion of
regional security and stability in the Middle East and the Gulf. It has to be pointed
out, however, that there are divergent opinions on how to bring peace and
stability in the Middle East and the Gulf, and ensure the continuous flow of oil
from the Middle East to the international market at an acceptable price.
Therefore, China’s policy on the Middle East should first focus on multilateral
cooperation and opposition to irresponsible unilateral action. Second, multilevel
cooperation with oil-producing countries in the Middle East should be
substantially strengthened to realise the best combination of economic interests of
oil supply and production. Chinese policy-makers should bear in mind that a
single tie of petroleum supply and demand, or a high complementarity in trade,
would be insufficient to ensure that oil-producing countries sell petroleum to
China under any circumstance. Only full-scale cooperation in oil prospecting,
production, transportation, refining and related petrochemical fields can ensure
the security of oil supplies from the Middle East. Third, the Middle East and the
Gulf are unstable regions, as much as the sea route from the Gulf to the Far East
through the Indian Ocean, Malacca Strait and South China Sea is unsafe. Thus, the
maintenance of security in transport should also be addressed.
The prospect (or rather reality) of importing most oil from the Middle East is
an even greater challenge to the security of China’s energetic source. Were there
another major potential supplier in the Caspian region, it would be pressing to
develop a wider ranging policy. Presently, China is not a powerful competitor in
the development of Caspian oil: we have neither the favourable geographical
position of Russia, nor the abundant financial resources of Americans and
Europeans. Therefore, it is not easy to pick the first fruits. Nevertheless, China has
potential advantages that other countries lack: among those that can reach the
Caspian Sea without passing a third country, China is the one with the fastest
growth in the economy and in oil demand. For the countries in the Caspian and in
Central Asia that want to achieve economic and social development through
developing resources, China is more appealing than the pure petroleum
developers. Furthermore, Pacific Asia is a region with great potential in the coming
decades. In China, the Central Asian countries can find not only a most reliable 45
buyer of oil and other resources, but also the most convenient track for their
economies to integrate into Pacific Asia. If the Central Asian countries considered
the potential capability of the second Eurasian continental bridge and the immense
influence of China’s Western development, surely they would think over the role
China could play in the development of the energy source in the Caspian Sea and
in Central Asia. In view of this, China should not worry about present difficulties,
or abandon its fundamental positions in order to pick the first fruits. For the
Chinese government and enterprises, the two fundamental principles in energy
cooperation in the Caspian Sea and in the Central Asian region are a far-reaching
strategy and commercial feasibility.
46
047-056/LiMes/Sisci 6-10-2000 15:20 Pagina 47
A NEW SILK ROAD?
THE POPE IN CHINA:

STILL A LONG WAY TO GO by Francesco SISCI
T HE HISTORY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN

China and the Vatican is fraught with misunderstandings. It is fascinating,
especially from the Catholic side, but ridden with mistakes with far reaching
consequences for both sides. Just recall the controversy of rites that pulled the
Jesuits out of China in the 18th century, or the war of attrition between the Pope,
committed to an anti Communist crusade in the 1950s, and Mao’s comrades, which
ended with the expulsion of foreign missionaries from China. Over the past two
years, two men with very different personal backgrounds and ambitions put a
completely different spin on bilateral ties, starting a new and crucial phase in this
sensitive relationship and drawing in the rest of the world. The two men are Li
Hongzhi, head of the Falungong cult, and Chen Shuibian, president of Taiwan.
The Falungong Threat

On 25 April 1999 over 10,000 Falungong followers held an unprecedented
demonstration around Zhongnanhai, the residence of Chinese top leaders in
Beijing. The Chinese Communist Party was challenged for the first time not by
spontaneous protests, but by a large, well organised, semi-clandestine organisation
with clear political ambitions, a strong religious ideology and whose leader was
residing outside China. Moreover, Chinese leaders realised they had not heeded
the many alarm signs against the sects and cults that were mushrooming all over
the country. They had underestimated the political dangers posed by the sects,
had not received accurate intelligence on them, and genuinely theorised a policy
of greater tolerance towards religions. Many senior officials were followers of the
new sects and did all they could to cover up their actions.
The end result was that the many warnings from all quarters passed
unnoticed. In the spring of 1999, Chinese leaders discovered that the previous year
a senior Buddhist priest, Chen Xingqiao, had written a book to refute the
Falungong (Foujiao qigong yu falungong, The Buddhist Qi gong and the
Falungong). Not only. Discreetly but clearly all “traditional religions” – those
recognised by the state and including the official Catholics – had warned against 47
THE POPE IN CHINA: STILL A LONG WAY TO GO
the spread of new cults. But until the demonstration, the leadership would rather
trust the new sects than the “old enemies”, the traditional religions that had been
fought by the old Chinese Communist Party. The CCP had been reading the signs
wrongly, thinking that the hostility of traditional religions towards the Falungong
and their likes stemmed from normal animosity in the face of the competition. The
new challenge of the cults did not drastically change the CCP’s suspicion towards
traditional religions, but put it into a different perspective.
The CCP began to realise it had lost its old appeal on people’s mind. The
Communist Party in the past 20 years had become secularised and no longer
claimed to provide a total answer to people’s problems. Its appeal to Maoist
Communists had been watered down by Deng’s new dogma “no matter if the cat
is black or white as long as it catches rats”, i.e. be pragmatic and cast aside high-
flying theories. Its hold on power had been kept by running the country well.
Deng’s approach reversed the priorities of Maoist times: he would manage the
country well, improve people’s life and gradually loosen old ideological bonds.
This policy received praise from everywhere but left a spiritual vacuum, as
Communist leaders realised already in the early 1980s when they launched the
first of their campaign against “spiritual pollution” against the dangers of Western
ideas pouring in, unhindered, through the open door policy. They did not pay
any attention to the new Qi Gong wave that spread in China. On the contrary,
masters of the old breathing technique, were given ample coverage on TV and
radio. Official papers gave credit to the miracles they could perform and even
elderly leaders sought their advice and cure for ailments. Youngsters taught
themselves Qi Gong by reading old and once forbidden books or by looking for
old monks. Incredible stories were circulating of masters capable of flying,
passing through walls, and materialising miles away within seconds. As early as
1988 there were unheard calls for prudence. Young students experienced
physical and psychological problems while practising Qi Gong without the
supervision of trained masters. Taoist and Buddhist monks, who had been
preserving the technique for centuries, warned that Qi Gong could turn out to be
dangerous.
Officials did try to pay attention to these calls but they did so in a way that
ultimately made matters even worse. The government kept an eye on the
phenomenon by having Qi Gong associations registered under the Sport
Commission, implicitly leading many people to believe Qi Gong was a harmless
sport rather than a new religion. In the early 1990s dozens of masters appeared
from nowhere and organised their styles, and also brought in new beliefs filling
the vacuum left by traditional Communism, accompanied by new organisations
that collected money for the master and spread the technique. The diffusion of
those ideas was so powerful that hardly no one can claim to have never practised
any Qi Gong. It also contributed to bringing back a tradition worth preserving, and
appeased millions of Chinese with an important part of their cultural legacy. Last
48 but not least, the new Qi Gong wave provided spiritual support for people who
A NEW SILK ROAD?
had lost faith in everything and felt deeply disoriented in a fast moving society
where old values were dying out.
The people and government preferred trusting new Qi Gong masters rather
than old Buddhist and Taoist monks or Protestant and Catholic priests. Traditional
Taoists or Buddhists were also associated with the Guomindang tradition of the
Nationalist party, the sworn enemy of the Communists for almost a century.
Buddhism was dangerously close to the religion practised by the Dalai Lama,
spiritual head of the Tibetan ethnic group with many grievances against Beijing.
Compared to Buddhism, newly founded Qi Gong sects appeared quite tame and
manageable. The objective of the Beijing government, in line with the imperial
tradition, was to hinder the growth of organised religions that aspired to share
power with the State. China has never known wars of religion and has seldom had
conflicts of interests and power in any way comparable to those between the Pope
and the European sovereigns. Given China’s tradition of religious tolerance, the
policy up to 25 April was to keep traditional religions, considered more
dangerous, under firm control and let other sects develop.
This policy was first reviewed in 1998 when the Falungong held many
demonstrations against the media, radio stations and newspapers, guilty of
criticising the cult. In all instances the media retracted their allegations, and the
writers and scientists who had discreetly attacked the sect were warned by the
Propaganda department. The pattern was clear: the government did not want any
conflict with the Falungong or any other sect and saw those criticising the sect as
stirring up trouble by upsetting the social balance the sects had somehow
contributed to maintain.
However, the growing number of people complaining with the authorities
about their relatives being swayed and harmed by the sects, and the increasing
number and dimension of Falungong demonstrations drew the attention of the
official departments. At the end of 1998 the government estimated that those
practising Falungong were tens of millions, though not all as blind followers. The
Falungong had reached the army and the security department, which had
introduced Qi Gong practice as part of their martial arts training. Its organisation
was tightly knit, with a clandestine pyramidal structure, emulating the Communist
Party’s, with a kind of politburo and central committee and many local branches.
Now the party suspects that as early as 1998 the Falungong was actually preparing
for a struggle with the party. Although far from illegally, Li Hongzhi had left the
country to the US that year, and had organised, according to official reports 1 three
levels of clandestine leaders, so that anybody arrested could be easily replaced.
Officials said that until the 25 April demonstration the government had no
intention of cracking down on the Falungong. On the other hand, I have been told
by followers that a repression was in the offing since early 1998 and that they were
simply trying to resist it, citing Li Hongzhi’s flight to the US as proof of his personal
1. See People’s Daily Commentary, October 28, 1999. 49

50
AMERICA ASIA
047-056/LiMes/Sisci
Population: 765,547,000 3,456,280,000

Catholics: 484,366,000 101,210,000
Percentage: 63.27% 2.92%
6-10-2000
NORTH AMERICA
Population: 292,762,000 EUROPE
Catholics: 69,614,000 Population: 711,497,000 ASIA (SOUTH - FAR EAST)
15:20
Percentage: 23.77% Catholics: 288,953,000 Population: 3,257,850,000

Percentage: 40.61% Catholics: 98,058,000
Percentage: 3.00%
ASIA (MIDDLE EAST)

ANTILLES Population: 198,430,000
Pagina 50
Population: 35,890,000 Catholics: 3,152,000

CENTRAL AMERICA Catholics: 22,941,000 Percentage: 1.58%
Population: 123,541,000 Percentage: 63.92%
Catholics: 115,721,000 AFRICA
Percentage: 93.67% Population: 725,850,000
Catholics: 107,077,000
Percentage: 14.84%
SOUTH AMERICA
Population: 313,354,000 OCEANIA
Catholics: 276,090,000 Population: 28,200,000
Percentage: 88.10% Catholics: 7,760,000
Percentage: 27.51%
WORLD
Population: 5,687,374,000
Catholics: 989,366,000
Percentage: 17.39%
CATHOLICS IN THE WORLD (1997)
A NEW SILK ROAD?
danger. But in this case the official version seems more credible. The 25 April
demonstration appears to be a pre-emptive defensive attack in by the cult. The
party was unprepared for confrontation with the Falungong, as demonstrated by
the two feverish months the party took to ban the sect. Furthermore, most of the
arrests and identifications of followers occurred during the demonstrations: were
the party planning a crackdown, it would have long prepared lists of names to
keep under surveillance. The subsequent repression on the Falungong and all
other “creepy” Qi Gong sects creates a different environment for traditional
religions, in particular for Catholicism.
The Catholic Opportunity

Chinese leaders became genuinely frightened of the Falungong, which has
repeatedly shown signs of intolerance, by protesting against foreign journalists
even mildly critical of the sect. The Party feared it because of its organisation, its
structured ideology/faith, its experience of confrontation with the Party, and its
leader safely outside the country – all the elements that had made the success of
the CCP over half a century before. The Falungong could reap the benefits of
social discontent due to economic reforms and it could, if unchecked, constitute a
threat to the country’s stability.
The government’s analysis is sound from the socio-political point of view, but
a repression of the Qi Gong sects would leave yet again a spiritual vacuum. In
spring 1999 the party launched, without much success, a science and Marxism
campaign to cater for the spiritual needs of society. Chinese scholars were soon
sceptical of its possible results. The people craved for a spiritual bond with the
world, with the after life and the cosmos, and science so far has been unable to
satisfy this craving. The most fanatical form of Marxism, which claimed to provide
an exhaustive answer to human needs, is now out of question in China. As the
country is set to join the club of the developed nations, and conduct its affairs
according to the international standards of the World Trade Organisation, a return
to Maoism is impossible.
This leaves no choice but reconsider the policies towards traditional religions,
which, because of their history and their now proven integration in the Party
apparatus, could become reliable partners in what the state considers its duty to
manage the people’s spirituality. Catholicism could stand out as the most interesting
among the traditional religions. Thanks to their strong organisation, Catholics could
be tough adversaries, but also reliable allies. It would be best to join hands with the
most organised religious group that is most likely to follow Party directions once an
agreement with its leaders has been reached. The path is not easy but things are
changing rapidly. The Catholics of the Patriotic Church, loyal to the Party, have
been slowly moving towards reconciliation with Rome. Catholic officials admitted
that the Patriotic Church is conducting a dialogue with many bishops of the
underground church, who could join the official Church once ties with the Vatican 51
are normalised. Catholics, along with other traditional religions could then expect
to enjoy more freedom to do missionary work in the country.
Of course this will not come without a price for the Vatican, which perhaps is
higher than expected. Vatican officials claim to be informed that tougher
regulations will be applied on the Catholics’ activities in China after the
normalisation of ties. They are privately worried that these new regulations are
aimed at stopping religious activities while cashing the international points Rome
could offer to Beijing, which will be discussed in the next paragraph. In a way the
Vatican seems to miss the logic of the reconciliation for Beijing.
The new relationship can work on purely utilitarian grounds because there is
a possible win-win solution. The Party has an interest in Chinese people becoming
Catholic rather than Falungong, once and if the Catholics guarantee that they will
not use the strength gained through the new converts to destabilise the country,
but to stabilise it. But how can the party be sure of the honesty of the Vatican’s
intentions? The answer is by imposing a close monitoring of the Catholic activities.
The Falungong grew because it went unchecked by Beijing, but government
tolerance created a direct challenge to its legitimacy, and greater intolerance
towards intellectuals, who had grown far more fearful of the Falungong than of the
party censorship. The Falungong went unchecked until it decided – unprovoked –
to move against the party leadership, grossly overestimating its strength. This is a
mistake party leaders cannot afford again, lest loose the country. As a matter of fact,
from a structural point of view the Catholics are just the same as the Falungong:
well organised, a structured ideology/faith, an experience of confrontation with the
Party, and their leader is safe outside the country. The Party can and has an interest
to do business with the Vatican, but cannot underwrite a blank check to the Pope.
Certainly the Pope can claim none of Li Hongzhi’s weird ideas, and can
positively affirm to head an organisation known for its reliability. While these are
good enough reasons to start talks, guarantees, i.e. strong checks, are necessary in
a new venture, especially for the CCP. On the other hand Beijing appears definitely
interested in opening a dialogue with Rome, which represents the only religion
that can offer an internal solution as well as an external advantage.
Taiwan
The election of Chen Shuibian as president of Taiwan last March has further
complicated Beijing’s sentiments about the island.
Since the mid 1990s Beijing has been very worried about Taiwan’s drift
toward a formal declaration of independence. Several steps taken in Taiwan were
perceived as moving to this end. President Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the US in 1995
was followed by the vocal presidential election of 1996, when Lee was elected and
the American intervened in the Taiwan Strait with two aircraft carriers groups. In
1999 the controversial announcement of the “special two state theory” was
52 considered by Beijing as a further move to independence and, finally, the
A NEW SILK ROAD?
candidate of the pro independence Progressive Democratic Party Chen, was

elected in March 2000 despite the Mainland’s stern warnings against him.
Since 1996 economic relations between the two sides of the Strait have
improved but political distance has increased. Bilateral trade increased from $18.9
billion dollars in 1996, to $19.8 billion in 1997 and to $20.4 billion in 1998. But
during the same period Chinese scholars perceived a growing cultural distance
between the two sides, denouncing a “taiwanisation” of culture. The authorities of
the island tended to emphasise the local cultural identity in contrast with the
Mainland. Minanyu, the language of the majority of the island’s population and in
the Mainland’s province of Fujian, is gaining more prestige at the expense of
Mandarin, seen as the language of unification. Museums feature a new history of
Taiwan, illustrating the island’s individual culture, first inhabited by people of
Malay stock, rather than the Han origin of the present population. Beijing has little
hope of influencing “taiwanisation”, and does not appear to have started thinking
about a counter cultural strategy. In the mid 1990s the dominant idea was that
better economic ties would reverse the drift toward independence. But the
experience of recent years proves that other means must be found. Taiwan’s bid
for greater independence could be contrasted by reducing its diplomatic room for
manoeuvre and proving to public opinion that “taiwanisation” will lead nowhere.
At the moment the Vatican is the most important of the 28 governments holding
diplomatic ties with the island.
Taiwan is the big prize at stake in the normalisation of relations between
China and the Vatican. New ties could convince some Latin American
governments to switch sides in the diplomatic tug of war between Beijing and
Taipei. They could also improve China’s image in the US where the Catholic
Church is very influential and, within a couple of decades, with the growth of the
Hispanic population, could command the loyalty of the majority of voters. The ties
would have huge positive impact in Europe and in the rest of the world, and
would further isolate the Dalai Lama’s position. It would be more difficult for his
people to understand why the Dalai cannot reach an agreement with Beijing if the
Pope could. It would have a positive impact on China’s human rights record. In
other words better relations with the Vatican could trigger the start of a badly
needed tidal change in China’s image abroad.
In China there were past fears of very close links between the Pope and the
US. Suspicions of an American-Vatican alliance to bring down the East European
block have grown weaker for many reasons. In the past 10 years the agenda of the
Vatican and that of the US have increasingly diverged. Moreover, neither wants to
bring about the collapse of the Communist party, which could cause an even
greater implosion of the country than the one experienced in the former USSR.
The US administration has proved its best intentions by signing a ground breaking
WTO agreement in November 1999 and by campaigning with Congress to extend
the Permanent Normal Trade Relations treaty to China. The NPTR is a major step in
building better relations on the two sides of the Pacific. 53
The intentions of the Vatican are less apparent and certainly need to be
clarified to the Party. Despite the risks, the benefits for Beijing could be huge. The
risks should not be underestimated because China’s leadership tends to be very
cautious on issues touching yishixingdai, ideology in a very broad sense.
If Beijing is interested in this big prize it must act swiftly. In the Vatican there is
no consensus on the benefits of normalising relations with Beijing. Allegedly Pope
John Paul II is personally in favour of the re-establishment of relations, but not
everybody agrees with him. With a new Pope and agenda, China might have to
start all over again. A strong constituency in Rome thinks the Holy See cannot trust
the Chinese Communists, and certainly the CCP has no particular interest in or
sensitivity to Catholic issues. Dealing with the Communists would be a new ball
game for cardinals and bishops, used to relate to political leaders who show
sensitivity if not outright respect or worship for their religion. The pros and cons
would have to be measured in purely geopolitical terms, without the plus of
religious influence, which can be played worldwide in most occasions. It would
certainly be a challenge new to many princes of the Church, and arguably
something John Paul II, because of his personal experience in Communist Poland,
is more ready to deal with. However, not even in Poland or former USSR was there
the deep rooted, almost callous, insensitivity to Catholic issues one can experience
now in China.
Catholicism per se is not a problem: four million Catholics are well organised
in a established Patriotic Church, the other four million of the underground Church
are less important compared to the Falungong and represent a small fraction of the
1.3 billion population of China. The Catholic issue becomes important for Beijing
only in geopolitical terms. But the Vatican might think it is not worth the effort.
Rome has waited 50 years for China, it could just as well wait another 50 and
respect the sacrifices of the millions Chinese who upheld their faith in dire straits
and never gave up their loyalty to the Pope. Cutting a deal with Beijing could seem
a betrayal towards those people, who are the backbone of Catholicism in China. If
the time is ripe for the Vatican, because of the present Pope, things may change
rapidly in China. In a couple of years both the Taiwan and Falungong issues might
be under control by different means and without the Vatican. In which case a deal
with Rome may appear less interesting for Beijing.
Historically, the Catholics had an important chance at the beginning of the
Qing dynasty in the 17th century that Rome did not understand and missed. There
now is a broad consensus in the Church that in the 17th century Rome made a
mistake with China, so the logical outcome would be avoid another mistake and
strike a deal now. In a few years, without formal ties with the Vatican, the
underground Church could stop being Catholic altogether. It is currently
experiencing serious problems. In the 1980s, because of the anti Christian
persecution that made it impossible for Rome to monitor events in China closely,
the Pope granted the right to appoint their bishops without his approval to the
54 Chinese underground Church, but the situation is allegedly getting out of hand,
A NEW SILK ROAD?
and in ten or twenty years what now is the backbone of the Church could become
very unreliable for Rome.
Both the Party and Rome are fully aware that bilateral relations are a new
policy of opening up. Through what might appear just a small opening, new water
will flood into China. No matter how small the opening is initially, the water
pressure will naturally expand it. The trend will continue even if, as it is likely, the
Chinese authorities intervene to reduce the opening, which might grow to become
an internal cleavage. In other words, the agreement for the Vatican could be on
how to create an opening and how to keep it of a reasonable size. With the
ecumenical aspirations of the Church, can the Holy See afford to miss a second
chance in China? It is important to focus on the entire picture rather than on the
many tricky details. For both parties it is worth thinking of Deng Xiaoping. It is
important to open the window, though remembering that once the window is
open flies will come in along with the fresh air.
In mid September bilateral relations took an unexpected twist. Cardinal Roger
Etchegaray was invited – after a seven years’ absence – to China to discuss
religion, but was then received with courteous yet firm protest about the Vatican’s
decision to “sanctify” 120 Chinese martyrs on the following 1 October, China’s
national day. China saw the ceremony as a provocation, and objected to the
choice of martyrs. Many of the martyrs were killed during the boxers’ uprising,
which China considers a first anti colonialist movement. The Vatican delegation in
Beijing appeared genuinely surprised by this fierce reaction. This proves that the
Vatican did not mean it as a provocation, but also shows the great distance in
understanding between Beijing and the Vatican.
On 6 January 2000 Beijing ordered six new bishops: it was a clear provocation
by Beijing that chose the traditional Catholic day for their appointment. Was then
the October celebration a tit-for-tat? It will still take weeks to clarify what
happened, but it is certainly clear that bilateral relations, although in theory helpful
to either side, are hampered by reciprocal misunderstandings. Beijing is not clear
about the Vatican, and somehow the Vatican has many misconceptions of
Communist China. The first bridge to establish relations is therefore
understanding, which for the Chinese means first that Catholic missionaries have
to become more Chinese, and not vice versa. Today this means that the Catholics
have to understand fully the trappings of the Chinese Communist system (very
Chinese and little Communist), which is ingrained in society, and is not just a
veneer. It is a matter of nationalist sovereignty for Beijing.
This takes us back to Matteo Ricci and the controversy on the rites.
Understanding the Chinese Communist system could be seen as a betrayal of the
true faith and as an easy concession. How to strike a balance? Or is it necessary to
strike a balance at all?
The other road for the Vatican is to wait for the fall of Communism in China.
But who knows when this will happen and if the next government will be less
nationalist than the present one. 55
057-070/LiMes/Mini 6-10-2000 15:21 Pagina 57
A NEW SILK ROAD?
FROM THE RIM

TO THE HEART by Fabio MINI
A LMOST ALL THE GREAT GEOPOLI-

tical forecasts have fallen short of the mark. Models of the remote past linked to
geographic considerations have not been of any great benefit in making
predictions, even though they did rationalise possible scenarios. The inability to
foresee the collapse of the Soviet bloc was the greatest demonstration that,
notwithstanding an enormous intelligence apparatus and teams of dedicated
analysts, reality is always uncertain. Today, no one hazards any grand projections
and many experts limit themselves to detailed examinations of the present or the
recent past, at times making it seem as if the present were the past and vice versa.
With respect to Asia, a good exception is the study by Cass and Schwarz (C&S) 1
who in 1993 analysed three hypothetical main scenarios for the next decade.
These scenarios are worth outlining, as they are still plausible. In fact, one of them,
the least favourable, prognosticated the Asian economic crisis along with some of
its related political and social consequences. The two experts identified some of
the driving forces of Asian development in the following factors:
• resources and influence of the overseas Chinese network;
• the constraints of a rapid economic growth;
• the uncertainty of regional security;
• the increasing importance of intra-regional commerce and flow of capital;
• the emergence of sub-regional development;
• the affirmation of Asian capitalism (defined as “monolithic capitalism”) as
the dominant socio-political-economic model.
An analysis of each of the above factors had lead to some interesting
deductions that in many ways are still valid today, seven years from their initial
formulation. Specifically, Cass and Schwartz identified some of the limitations to
Asian economic growth in the education and qualification of the work force. With
the growth rate that existed during that period, it should have been clear that the
national educational systems would not be able to assure a qualitative replacement
1. S. CASS and P. SCHWARTZ, From Silk Road to Silicon Road-Managing the Challenges of Success in the
Asia Pacific During the 1990s. This work is the result of a project conducted by Global Business
Network in 1992 to study future scenarios for the Asia-Pacific region. 57
FROM THE RIM TO THE HEART
and renewal of the productive force. Indeed, given that the field of mass
production into which Asia plunged rapidly exhausts markets and, at the same
time, makes them more sophisticated in their requirements, it should have been
obvious that without an adequate educational system, competitiveness would fall
short and growth would either slow down or stop altogether. This phenomenon is
still in full development and is truly a limiting factor, especially for China.
Another factor of deceleration would have been the excessive urbanisation of
development. The examples of the megalopolis of Bangkok, Djakarta, Beijing,
Seoul and Tokyo anticipated a certain type of structural collapse. In material terms
this collapse has yet to take place, but we have witnessed the collapse of real estate
prices and a consequent reduction of returns on investments. Furthermore, the
implosion of the megalopolis is pre-announced by the overcrowding of suburban
areas. Today, in China, a huge mass of people lives on the outskirts of large cities,
yet officially resides in the country and is computed as rural work force.
Another trend that should have had a positive influence on development was
the Asian model of capitalism. Cass and Schwarz defined it as a monolithic model
– although not much is monolithic in Asia – and viewed it as substantially different
from Western models since it was not based on the relative “laissez faire” of the
American system and was far removed from the European welfare system. The
principal characteristics of this capitalism were viewed as:
• high level of government/business integration both in the definition of
economic objectives and in policy implementation;
• relatively weak multi-party systems, with a tendency toward favouring the
soft authoritarianism of a predominant party or a charismatic leader, whether this
be the Chinese Communist Party or Suharto;
• a relative lack of concern for social welfare or for “safety-net” mechanisms
compared to European or North American models.
These characteristics are still largely valid, as much as Cass and Schwarz’s
observation on the fact that while the United States are incapable of integrating
national and foreign policy with economic and military policy to reach common
objectives, their Asian counterparts have no difficulty in achieving this. In addition,
Asian capitalism is little influenced by ideology or politics or by what in the West
are called civil liberties or individual rights.
According to the prevalence of one or more of the aforementioned driving
forces, the two experts of the Global Business Network foresaw three interesting
scenarios: regional integration, in which there is a strong connection between
Asian economic and political forces; sub-regional integration, in which this
phenomenon is limited to lower level economic areas; of dis-integration, in which
nationalist forces and protectionism prevail over designs of coordinated power and
the Asian economy does not succeed in assuming a guiding role on a global level.
Regional integration. In this scenario the dominant forces are the network of
58 the Chinese diaspora and the growth of intra-regional market of capital and trade.
A NEW SILK ROAD?
Together with an open world market, the Asian region maintains a high growth
rate and becomes highly integrated. On a global level, commercial blocs such as
NAFTA and the European Community resist protectionist pressures and become
supporting elements of an even more integrated global economy. The Chinese
diaspora practices a type of capitalism never before seen in the West: authoritarian
and Confucian, accepting economic freedom but neglecting democracy, despite
the increasing role of a growing middle class.
Sub-regional integration. If the dominant driving forces are sub-regional

development and a weak regional security structure, Asia, according to Cass and
Schwarz, can reject integration in favour of a more localised approach to
development and cooperation. In this case Asia develops into 4 sub-regions, from
North to South:
(1) The Sea of Japan (or Greater Korea) based on the $30 billion project of the
Tumen River (TRADPT – Tumen River Development Program) which incorporates
the areas of the two Koreas, Northeast China, Siberia and Japan.
(2) Greater China, which includes the Southern provinces of China
(Guangdong, Fujian, Guanxi, Hainan, Hong Kong) and Taiwan. With a population
of 120 million inhabitants and a GNP of $320 billion (1991), this Greater China
already has a pro capita GNP of 2700 dollars, compared to the $200 of the interior
provinces. 75% of direct foreign investments come from Hong Kong and Taiwan.
Other provinces that could become part of this zone are Zhejiang, Shanghai,
Jiangsu, followed by Hunan, Jiangxi and Anhui.
(3) Greater Indochina, centred on Thailand and inclusive of Vietnam, Laos
and Cambodia, Burma, the Chinese province of Yunnan and Singapore.
(4) An insular Southeastern Asia based on the development triangle of
Singapore, the Malaysian state of Johore and the island of Batam in Indonesia. This
area includes Brunei and the rest of Indonesia as well as Papua New Guinea.
This sub-division appears to be the natural evolution of a process of synergy
between sources of capital, labour, raw material and productive capacities to
maintain rapid growth and reduce the effects of infrastructure bottlenecks in
transport, communication, energy and labour. In this scenario, there is no clear
political regional leader and the US presence continues to be crucial for the area.
But China’s security policy toward the exterior and its doctrine of external defence
becomes increasingly superimposed onto the need to ensure resources and
commercial routes. China’s movements towards the South China Sea appear even
more threatening. Only American presence and naval cooperation with Vietnam
would make China more reasonable. This initial fear of China leads ASEAN to
become a significant political and economic force. Military cooperation
accelerates, as does the sale of weapons. ASEAN becomes a military alliance with
an anti Chinese and anti Japanese function. This scenario also contemplates a
potent player in a subsequent phase: a unified Korea, causing Japan and China to
reconsider their relations. 59
The reunification of Korea would be the first result of sub-regionalisation. But

given the German experience, South Korea is in no hurry to ally itself with the
poor economy of the North. As part of its strategy to achieve development prior to
unification, South Korea invests in the North and in the Tumen project. Sub-
regional development becomes diversified and triggers a new investment market
in the region.
Dis-integration. This is the final scenario. The driving forces indicate that
there is another possible future, one in which Asia does not succeed in managing
the challenges of success. In a world of growing protectionism, if obstacles to
development are not confronted appropriately, growth in the Asia-Pacific area
slows down. The limited development of qualified labour, excessive centralisation
and urbanisation, restrictions imposed by energy requirements and environmental
deterioration become real impediments to the economy. The social result is the
growth of nationalism and militarism.
In this context economic problems begin to generate political friction. The
new “ideological” conflict and nationalism emerge from the global competition of
different models of capitalism. Protectionism develops as soon as the breaking
point with Asian economies that refuse to “play according to the rules” is reached.
Europeans raise protectionist barriers to halt immigration and preserve the politics
of welfare that are so dear to them. The Asians are confused and distressed by
European and US insistence on “opening” and other issues like the environment,
the rights of workers, copyrights and a number of other intangible factors that lead
only to greater problems for Asian affairs.
Triggered by the deceleration of regional economy, Chinese political relations
also suffer. A repressive foreign and security policy and the lack of security in Asia
nourish each other in a downward spiral of intra-regional political tensions. China
moves to fill the gap created by American and European isolationism in Southeast
Asia and sets its sights on the Indian Ocean. Japan increases its military role in
Indochina to secure resources and markets. Soon China is perceived by other
Asian nations as an arrogant power in search of regional hegemony. South Korea,
Japan and Singapore lead the effort to contrast Chinese expansion but are
hampered by their own economic and social problems. While China expands into
the South China Sea, towards the Senkakus Islands and up to the Indian Ocean for
resources, environmental confrontation escalates due to the increase in CO2 and
the problem of water supplies.
Because of its identification of the Asian structural problem and its vision of
the consequences of a global economic break down, this final scenario has
something prophetic. Today we are witnessing many of the signs and factors of
this scenario, though its catastrophic effects are not yet visible. For example:
Indonesia is falling apart, China expands, India itself is looking for a way to the
South China Sea, the “fear of Asia” is driving Australia towards a “sheriff’s role” that
60 is not recognised by anyone and is far from stabilising the situation.
A NEW SILK ROAD?
With respect to China, this latter scenario is as likely as the others. China
possesses the potential to guide the region or a sub-region or even to find its own
way in the general chaos. But since 1993, the year of the Cass and Schwarz study,
the Asian geostrategic picture has changed significantly and China’s position
merits new consideration.
A New Geostrategic Framework for China

Even though the Cass and Schwarz scenarios are excellent examples of
strategic analysis, they limit China to the Asian context, and, most important, view
the latter in a marginal framework with respect to the rest of the world. Attention is
still centred upon the United States and the Western world. But something is
changing and perhaps this viewpoint is no longer appropriate to interpret global
geostrategic phenomena. There are a great many areas of tension in the world
today and it is absolutely and unquestionably true that the United States are at the
very centre of all of them: their global interests and the divine mission they have
taken upon themselves to keep the world from sin place them at the centre of the
world. It is nevertheless a centre that is strictly political; a centre that is involved
out of interest, not survival: no one is threatening the territory of the United States,
no neighbouring country is having tantrums or seeking to remove itself from their
control. This attribute has led the United States over the past few years to develop
a mania for extraterritoriality. Since US territory is not threatened it must defend US
interests wherever these may be, without regard to the sovereignty or the will of
others. It is a role that historically is so anomalous that it cannot last for long and is
destined to set off new balances or imbalances of power. In this sense, China’s
position is totally different, and, if we will, historically more comprehensible: at the
moment it is the only country that is in the direct centre, and in contact with,
development, trade opportunities, tensions and conflicts of any nature and of a
global scope. What has happened and what could happen?
From the “rim” to the “heart”. Communist China has for decades been placed
at the periphery of the developed world. This was something downright offensive,
not so much due to China’s marginal economic role but by reason of its political
significance, since it was and is a member of the United Nations Security Council.
Even in periods of greatest external influence, when it exported revolution to
Third World countries and fomented extremist movements in Western countries,
China did not succeed in assuming a global dimension. The vision of a tripolar
world as contemplated in the 1970s was a pure academic exercise. The power
factors upon which China based its presumed race toward hegemony, or at the
very least the consideration of the powerful, were completely anachronistic or
scarcely credible. Anachronistic was the demographic factor. To base the extent of
one’s power upon the number of mouths to feed was a concept the West had
abandoned at least a century before. Anachronistic was the economic factor based 61
62
057-070/LiMes/Mini
HUNTINGTON’S CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS

6-10-2000

15:21
Pagina 62
Sinic
Western Hindu
Latin American Orthodox
African Buddhist
Islamic Japanese
Source: S. P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, pp. 26-27 - New York 1996
A NEW SILK ROAD?
on agriculture when the world had already gone on to industrialisation.

Anachronistic and superfluous was mass industrialisation when the world had
already graduated to advanced technology and the development of service
industries. Scarcely credible were factors of military power based on a people’s
army and a militia that was ill equipped and incapable of carrying out any
concerted operation outside of its own territory. In fact, until the 1980s the great
Chinese military exercises consisted of biblical movements of men on trucks or on
foot for the classic 10,000 li (5,000 kilometres). Scarcely credible, as a threat against
the exterior, was the strategic concept of a people’s war or guerrilla warfare or of
the “you fight your way I’ll fight my way and I’ll always beat you” method.
Following years of support for Vietnam in a strictly anti-American and anti-Russian
function, when the Chinese army decided to teach a “historical lesson” to that
country, winner but martyred nevertheless, it revealed its total strategic and tactical
inability to conduct conventional operations of the pre-modern type. And this was
1979. Scarcely credible also was the strategic nuclear threat. A strategy of
deterrence based on a confrontation of thousands of warheads and highly
sophisticated systems to provide either party with the ability to react or survive a
surprise attack – exactly four intercontinental missiles, perfectly identified by
satellites and of a technology that could be easily downed in flight – did not
represent a serious threat to anyone. Unless the “first use” was to apply. But China
always rejected this possibility increasing suspects and decreasing its already weak
credibility.
Overcome on the continent by the Soviet Union, thwarted at sea by American
power, forced to autocracy not by political choice but by social and economic
conditions, uninfluential in the economic marketplace and limited along its
internal border by the impossibility of acting upon its external one, until the 1980s
China was the suburb of the world – exotic, idealised, but non-existent as a power.
It was in this China that the United States could allow itself the luxury of installing
intelligence gathering posts, the USSR could acquire territories and Taiwan and
other Asian tigers freely draw upon low cost labour and young virgins for their
brothels.
With the end of Maosim and the advent of the reforms of Deng Xiao Ping the
picture begins to change. Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia and
Indonesia shift economic attention to the Pacific Rim, the “border” of the Pacific
Ocean, of which however, the United States remains the principal manager. China
is gradually, but at an increasingly accelerated pace, integrated into this economic
picture and up to 1989 becomes one of the countries of the Rim, one of the
players, if for no other reason that the market absorption it can offer other
countries. The crisis of Tiananmen was at once a consequence of this new
international Chinese dimension (the students did not wish to bring down the
government or the Party but wanted a little democracy and commercial freedom
as in the other Asian nations) and reason for the freezing of the process of
internationalisation. Tiananmen however turned out also to be the good fortune of 63
the Chinese system in a political sense. The isolation to which China was subjected
by the international community, and which China imposed upon itself, allowed it
to come to grips, without any restrictions and external interference, with the global
changes taking place at that very moment: the breakdown of blocs and the end of
the Cold War. During the years of probation and supervised sovereignty brought
about by Tiananmen, China had the time to reflect on the failure of the Communist
system and the collapse of the Soviet empire, on the effects of the Perestrojka and
the wild development that China itself had set off. Thus it was able to re-organise
its leadership, make plans, tighten up, encapsulate its centrifugal forces and
develop a new nationalistic conscience by re-launching the great themes of
reunification.
This is the period of the establishment of a leadership that allied the
murderers of Tiananmen with the moderates and cast aside those who, like Zhao
Ziyang and Yang Shangkun, had supported democratic appeals in order to subvert
a tottering power system. However, the system itself became stronger and even
from a military perspective China grasped the occasion to tear down old schemes
no longer suitable either to managing internal power or facing up to external
challenges. During the Tiananmen crisis the weakness of the military had become
apparent as military regions and army corps commanders refused or hesitated in
following Beijing’s orders. The armed police forces had demonstrated their
ineffectiveness; there were no rapid reaction forces within the army or in the
police. Tiananmen brought about significant changes both on the political and the
military sides, while on the front of conventional warfare, the Gulf War
demonstrated clearly and without the shadow of a doubt what type of military
instrument any power had to have to participate in the global political-diplomatic
game. And it was an instrument the Chinese did not have and which they realised
they would not have soon. But the upgrading of the entire apparatus does begin
during those years. The cadres of the Yang clan, asserting local power on the basis
of personal acquaintances, were purged; the regularisation of the armed forces
began, as did the reduction of conventional forces, the strengthening of strategic
forces, and the development of collateral activities connected to the acquisition of
technology and funds required for modernisation and the establishment of rapid
reaction forces. Command and control is concentrated in the central military
commission not only in political terms but in operational ones as well. The military
begin to make national, economic and foreign policy. It is a veritable social,
economic and military revolution that goes almost unnoticed because Europe and
the United States are apparently satisfied with the Madrid sanctions, fully intending
to ignore them if it is a question of making money. From the ashes of Tiananmen
emerged a new China, fully conscious that it must and can take on a new regional
and global role, even though it is not yet sure which, and aware that it needs the
economic, political and military instruments to exercise this role.
The primary political instrument, in this sense, is the affirmation of a search
64 for stability along its borders as well as domestically. Stability becomes a slogan
A NEW SILK ROAD?
that tends to reassure the exterior and prevent any dangerous deviations from the
interior. The China of today, while the Madrid or Washington sanctions are still
active, but Tiananmen almost completely forgotten, is no longer simply one of the
countries along the Pacific Rim but is the centre of a vast area of global
geostrategic significance. Notwithstanding the claims of a search for stability,
China is at once the centre and the container of tensions, conflicts, positive
ferment and instability. And all these things are not limited in causes and effects to
local and regional factors but involve the entire world. In this sense, China has
once again become the Kingdom of the Middle (Zhong Guo) of the imperial
period of 2000 years ago.
Centre of continental power. The new central Chinese dimension is not

connected to the old imperial power, which was essentially one of protecting the
interior from the exterior while expanding its influence, but the exact opposite: the
new imperial power of attraction of the exterior. In this sense China is expanding its
influence. At the same time it is like the bordering areas into which investments and
exploitation of the West may be poured, greedy and on the constant look-out to
safeguard its own standard of living by exploiting those who have no such
standard. China itself is the centre of this vast continental area that possesses
enormous resources yet is not capable of exploiting them properly. It is surrounded
by a Russia undergoing a profound crisis, but which is also another unnatural black
hole into which the resources and investments of the immense surplus of the
Western world may be poured. It borders with Central Asia, which is just waiting for
investments to return twice what was put in. To the Northeast, the great project of
the economic zone of Tumen stagnates even though large investments had already
begun. The Siberia of Vladivostok is flooded with approximately 300,000 Chinese
operators while the province of Heilongjiang becomes the conquered land of
Russian operators. Mongolia depends almost entirely on its commerce with China
and is not at all happy with this state of things. To the West, the area of Central Asia
is the site of an economic boom without precedent. Immense resources and the
ability of new governments to avoid social and international tensions place this area
among those with the highest potential for growth. China has more than one
interest in the area and has developed both agreements and infrastructure networks
that allow for osmosis with neighbouring countries. It is nevertheless an area of
turbulence because the greatest Chinese player in this new frontier of economic
development is the province of Xinjiang, with a majority of Uygur separatists and
breakaway groups, and a new generation of native sons (heirs of the Chinese
transplanted by force) that is centrifugal or at the very least federalist.
To the South is the great Indian sub-continent with its human resources,
culture, intelligence, productivity and immense consumption potentials. And
Southeast Asia itself, connected to the continent, one peninsula behind the other,
like branches in an ocean that itself becomes a continent, with its myriad islands
and enormous reserves of energy. China is the centre of this great pole of 65
attraction and it is also the only country that can, at this time, ensure the security of
the sole great continental route that connects the world of the satiated with that of
the hungry.
Centre of ferment and economic instability. China is at the centre of a vast

economic area of great turbulence as well. The Asian crisis that has struck Japan,
South Korea, the “Tigers”, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and others, has been too
superficially defined as a financial crisis and too simplistically treated with financial
and currency measures. In an all too banal manner, this crisis is considered to have
no influence on China itself simply because China does not participate in the
mechanisms of global financial markets. Superficial also is laying the blame on
Asia for the so-called domino effect that the Asian crisis supposedly would have
set off in world financial markets. A chain reaction is the most natural effect of
speculative investments, on callous private and public, international, multinational
and supranational interventions that view government and geospolitical systems in
transition only as an opportunity for a quick profit. It is these investments that
draw the attention of these same states away from real problems and tempt leaders
with the chimeras of easy wealth and participation in global politics. Crises, on the
contrary, are symptoms of the great difficulties in which Communist or former
Communist systems, or those with centralised economies (such as Russia and
almost all the other Republics of the dissolved USSR) and systems without
planning and control (like Latin America) find themselves in their transition to a
market economy. This transition is the condition imposed by the Western world
and by international monetary bodies to grant funds and guarantee investments. It
is the condition for achieving what the Clinton administration maintains is the
highest expression of democracy: market democracy. All these countries in
transition, or en route to constructing a stable economic model, had clearly
perceived only the immediate advantages of that passage: those resulting from
financial speculation, and they are now feeling the mid-term effects they had
neglected in their race to easy money. Thus the Asian crisis is the first issue to
come to light, followed by the Russian one and Latin America.
In reality it is a profound structural crisis that involves systems of power
management (politics), development management (economy and social policy),
and security systems (defence and geostrategic balance) and that provokes social
imbalances that become more dangerous as they become more evident. This
structural crisis has struck and will make itself felt increasingly in China unless
appropriate measures are taken. Because this is the crisis of governmental systems
of production freed of the economic reality of the market (the most serious
problem in China). It is the crisis of priorities in development with excessive
emphasis on services infrastructure (which in China is somewhat macroscopic,
given the growing number of 5-star hotels and obsolete factories). It is the crisis of
production unfettered by research (something which in China is shameful as
66 research is understood to be simply the acquisition of the technology of others). It
A NEW SILK ROAD?
is, furthermore, the crisis of a social system that bears no burden because it
excludes welfare (in China social costs are not borne by the government but by
productive units and new high technology companies still bear no costs as they
have hired only young people, have almost militarised production and foresee no
union movement). It is the crisis of a generation renewal in the leadership of
political and economic systems (something that has occurred only marginally in
China). In fact, there has been no political change in most of the countries touched
by the crisis: power is in the hands of the same people and, above all, is managed
using the same logic. It is the crisis of employment because this has never been
considered a social factor and can now no longer be ignored. It is the crisis of the
banking and credit system used to great risks in favour of the powerful (as is
dangerously becoming obvious by the bankruptcy of the Guangdong International
Trust and Investment Corporation and the suspicions of insolvency that now
weigh upon other financial institutions and on the “red chips”) and no risk to assist
the small (translated into enormous suffering for the state and no incentives for
new businesses). Finally it is the crisis of a fiscal system unable to collect in
accordance with contribution capacity.
Today much praise is being heaped upon China for its resistance to the
devaluation of the yuan or restraints placed on the liberalisation of money. The
United States, Japan, Korea and dozens of other countries thank them. 2 China
assumes the role of saviour of the world to increase its international influence,
acquire global recognition and the power to influence the decisions of others.
These are the true Chinese objectives and to attain them, China, as always, is ready
to sacrifice its resources and even the life of its people. If these objectives may be
reached by also allowing the Chinese abroad who support the economic policy of
the PRC, and the mainland Chinese, who have invested widely in Wall Street rather
than Shanghai, to make a few deals, so much the better. The fact that the financial
crisis in Asia emerged in the countries supported by the capital of the overseas
Chinese, precisely when Communist China re-launched infrastructure investments
throughout its territory and wished to contain Japanese and Korean commercial
pre-eminence, is symptomatic rather than accidental. It is also singular that the
social upheavals taking place in Cambodia, Thailand and Indonesia this time have
only marginally involved Chinese expatriates. In 1969 a similar situation in
Indonesia lead to the massacre of more than 200,000 Chinese, considered the “Jews
of the East”. The fact that the greatest effects of the Asian crisis (or the Russian one)
are visible in the financial markets is due to the extremely dynamic nature of this
market which, thanks to global computer technology reacts quickly to any pressure
and is, in fact, able to precede pressures to the point of actually provoking them.
Indeed this factor also is cause for further reflection on Chinese involvement:
it is no accident that the crisis occurred at the exact moment in which the greatest
2. “We also appreciate what China and Hong Kong have done and the price that has been paid to
stabilise the situation”, Statement by Bill Clinton in Honk Kong, South China Morning Post, July 3,
1998. 67
technological and commercial battle in the world concerned the acquisition of the
Chinese telecommunications market first, the Asian one second and finally the
global one. Nor is it an accident that over the past few years the Chinese have
dedicated themselves body and soul to developing a communications network
and to exploiting space launches for telecommunications. The 55 million Chinese
of the diaspora who control 75% of the capital market in Asia and who are
massively present on Wall Street began only a few years ago to entrust their own
transactions to cellular and computers rather than couriers and to evaluate the
potential of other regional markets.
Centre of geostrategic instability. This Chinese centrality of a financial and

economic nature corresponds, in an even greater measure, to a geostrategic
centrality on political and military issues. China has become the “centre of gravity”
for tensions that have an explosive potential. Regions that China perceives as
internal are in fact buffer zones, in contact with others that are already highly
unstable. The explosion of conflicts in these areas may extend outwards, just as
external conflicts may extend to the interior of China or threaten its system by
provoking reactions that would be extremely dangerous to global security. In
addition to Xinjiang, which has connections with Afghanistan, Kashmir, Pakistan
and India, there is inner Mongolia in which a Mongolian minority demands
autonomy and towards whom Mongolia, and even Russia, are not indifferent.
Then there is Tibet which, following the resurgence of hostility between India and
Pakistan and the dangerous nuclear show, has once again become crucial to
Chinese control of the Indian sub continent. The Dalai Lama sees it as the nerve
centre from which peace in Asia may be achieved. This is true and not only for
religious considerations. To the South there is the question of the Spratley Islands,
considered Chinese territory by the Chinese but also claimed by Taiwan, the
Philippines, Vietnam and others. The province of Yunnan has become the
throughway for organised crime from the golden triangle and a theatre of local
instability due to the drastic measures that the Chinese periodically, but
alternatively, adopt with respect to a population consisting of more than 26 non-
Chinese ethnic groups. The Southern and Eastern China Seas have become a
theatre of piracy that for the moment is commercial, but which neighbouring
nations accuse of being nurtured by units of the Chinese navy. To the South, the
question of Taiwan, stubbornly considered by the Chinese as one of its rebel
provinces, is explosive in the truest sense of the term: the echoes of the missile
launches of 1995 and 1996 can still be heard and the development of political
relations based only on common interests presupposes that there are advantages
to be attained rather than crises to share. To the East, China’s support of the North
Korean regime is perhaps lukewarm but not over. Among other things, Chinese
influence on North Korea is the only way the rest of the world has to dialogue with
a disagreeable interlocutor. To the Northeast, border problems with Russia for the
68 territories of the Amur-Ussuri appear subdued, but the district of Vladivostok and
A NEW SILK ROAD?
the Cossacks of the Transbaikal do not forgive the Duma in Moscow nor do they
forgive Gorbachev for ceding the territory of “Great Mother Russia”. In addition,
the entire area of Manchuria (provinces of Heilongjiangm Jilin and Liaoning) is one
of the most unstable from a social and economic perspective. It is the traditional
area of the great Chinese government industry; which is now presented as failing
and deficient, which is induced to bankruptcy, to reconversion and to dismissing
hundreds of thousands of workers. This area feels victimised by Beijing and is
increasingly turning to Russia and to Japan.
Centre of international relations. This new central dimension is strongly

perceived by the Chinese who, to tell the truth, had never stopped considering it
even when the world was going in the opposite direction. It is obvious, from
political and diplomatic relations and from the position China holds with the rest
of the world, that it considers only a few countries as privileged interlocutors and
not all of them for reasons of objective power.
With Europe its relations are unfocused, one of the reasons being that Europe,
for the Chinese, is not even a geographic expression. The European Union is an
interesting entity only for its commercial aspects, but bilateral relations with each
member country are favoured. Germany and Italy receive priority consideration,
the first for its quality products, the second for its culture and design. France
enjoys excellent cooperation, which, however, it pays dearly with a policy of
acquiescence. Great Britain has been, and will for a long time to come, be
identified with the coloniser, the arrogant one of the opium wars, the power that
has oft times humiliated China and whose original sins shall not be forgiven, not
even by returning Hong Kong which, nevertheless represented the first of many
signs of a national reawakening. Eastern Europe still has close ties with China, and
the former Yugoslavia still manages somehow to maintain its current regime
thanks also to Chinese support. In this instance the Chinese position is not so
much in defence of the Serb regime as it is in defence of non-interference and
resistance to NATO, viewed as the armed wing of American and Western political
and economic power.
In North Africa, relations with Algeria, Libya and Egypt are good but not
significant. More important are its relations with Israel with which it has a true
technical and political military association by virtue of which China acquires
technology and is, in return, viewed as placatory with Syria and Iraq for Israeli
interests. With Iran and Iraq cooperation is important and respect is mutual. In Asia,
relations with India continue to be tense and those with Pakistan of total support.
Traditional cooperation in the area of armaments was only tempered by recent
Pakistani acquisitions in Eastern Europe, in particular of T80 tanks from the
Ukraine. But this has not prevented China from openly defending its old ally during
the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests. The prospect that Pakistan may become
radical and align itself with Afghan Taliban and Iranian fundamentalists is another
factor that prevents China from changing policies with this ally or with India. Good 69
relations with Pakistan, Iran and other central Asian republics are for China the sole
guarantee that the enormous region of Xinjiang will not escape them.
In Latin America, China has long had great commercial interests with oil and
mineral producers in Argentina. With Australia, its relations are good even though
the Australian defence white book cites China as a potential threat from the North.
With Japan, cooperation continues and although the scenario of a regional triad
between China, the US and Japan has not yet come true, this is only due to
Japanese economic and political difficulties. The leadership of the two countries is
slowly being assumed by leaders who have little or no memory of the past and of
the wounds China suffered at the hands of Japan. This will aid cooperation and a
pragmatic industrial and commercial synergy, apart from any atavistic diffidence,
cannot be excluded. With South Korea and other countries touched by the Asian
crisis, the attitude is one of superiority. The same, but with more caution and
refinement, holds true with respect to Russia which is adequately considered for
opportunities of industrial cooperation, especially in the field of armaments and as
a counter-balance to the United States, but is no longer feared. The dissolution of
the USSR was a great lesson for Beijing. But the evolution of power in Russia is
now followed with great interest and concern and no longer with the arrogance of
1990, when the Chinese viewed the failure of real Communism and the
strengthening of their own characteristics with such satisfaction.
As can be seen from this rapid and incomplete chronicle, today’s China
believes it has only one interlocutor at its own level: the United States. And even
the US is perceived as a “virtual” centre of political and military power; an
important dimension, but not as important, to Chinese eyes, as the geostrategic
and geospolitical continental centrality represented by the world of Sino-centric
instability. This instability is at the moment an instrument of political power, but
shortly it could evolve into a controlled ferment of development. At any rate, if the
technological brains and the purse strings are in the West, the heart of the world,
today as hundreds of years ago, throbs in Asia, and China is perhaps the centre of
gravity of this new continental dimension. It has nothing else to teach, nor
ideologies or technologies to export. It has, however, an immense attraction
potential that can succeed in obfuscating and seducing the brain as it can loosen
the purse strings, especially for those who require the circulation of money (any
kind, anywhere and for any purpose) to permit the survival of their own ideology
and way of life.
China, for the moment is also the only nation that is succeeding in managing
this potential of attraction by itself. And not always under peaceful conditions, on
the contrary, often by fighting on several fronts. If its culture is not further
exportable, if its political system is at the very least non-reproducible and largely
not proposable, its example of independence and stubbornness may become the
conduit for reawakening the entire continent and make it again the Heartland.
(translated by Jo Di Martino)
70
071-092/occhLiMes/ZhangJie 6-10-2000 15:24 Pagina 71
A NEW SILK ROAD?
The Foundationers Associated

with Mr W.’s Funds
by ZHANG JIE
Not all artists are the same. History and the strategic conditions of their countries
heavily weigh on their behaviour, as well as on their work, causing clashes
of personalities almost as loud as those of civilisations.
A geopolitical comedy by one of China’s greatest writers on the backdrop
of a Western arts foundation naively convinced that all artists are equal.
A LTHOUGH THE DOCTOR HAD NOT

told him anything, Mr W. sensed the imminence of his end. He was not ill, he was
just about to leave this world. Folks tend to name such doom “a natural death”.
Except for a few sketches which were still affixed to the walls of his old
house, he had already donated to national museums his entire collection –
including paintings, sculptures, manuscripts left behind by some 18th or 19th
century authors, and relics (such as spectacles, tufts of hair, pieces of music,
batons) belonging to some deceased composers.
The only thing he was not at peace with regarded the way to dispose of his
immense fortune.
He had a sadly transient married life that left him issueless, apart from some,
not lasting amorous experiences. And it was not incumbent on him, he calculated,
to bequeath anything to his nephews or nieces.
Remembrances of his bygone days did occur to his mind, though!
Life for him was literally all plain sailing. However, in the privacy of his
thoughts he was haunted by only one gnawing suggestion that all his exertions
towards making himself an art expert remained forever unrequited.
He was in love with art as a man would be with his beloved woman. But, to
his bewilderment, art seemed to have never requited him with the same passion.
In his youth he learned to play the piano, practised painting, and tried to
mould a writer out of himself. 71
THE FOUNDATIONERS ASSOCIATED WITH MR W.’S FUNDS
For all his immeasurably great fortune, he took to living the way of a penniless
artist, finding shabby accommodation, without curtains on the window. He threw
away an old air conditioner, as large as a printing machine, with the body filled of
many years of dust; he fed himself on a low-priced diet, and sometimes he went as
far as collecting lunch or dinner from one of those places dispensing free meals to
the poor. Especially in emotional moments like at Thanksgiving or at Christmas he
would go and collect those kinds of meals. Many of these institutions bore the
name of his family and its merciful deeds, so that well brought up parents could
not say or think anything strange about it. He drove a second, or even a fourth-
hand car, the engine of which would stop even when it was not too cold. Then Mr
W. would start the car with the winch, which he carried on his shoulders. He wore
second-hand duds bought at three kg per buck.
He was happily at one with pauperism, so long as he was obsessed with the
craving for fashioning himself into an artist. That was just the line of conduct in
vogue with some of his contemporary young people who, being fervently dedicated
to art, would care for nothing in life but art. To tell the truth, these people, so
unceremoniously addicted to art to impose themselves almost as an eyesore upon
the local community, could exist only in Mr W.’s days. Although usually arrayed in
second-hand duds got at the price of three kg per dollar, Mr W., a billionaire, was
after all not likely to be reckoned as socially on a par with those artists dressed in
duds worth 0.33 cents per kg because that was all they could afford.
Museums were his everyday haunt. “If you can’t find me in the cafe”, I must
be just on my way there.” This is a popular saying about cafe addicts and is most
fit for characterising Mr W., if the wording is aptly modified: “If you can’t find me
in the museum, I must be just on my way there.”
Each time some allegedly unique exhibition or show was scheduled to take
place in a museum, he was bound to be there exactly out of the reason of
broadening his professional horizon. Sometimes he would keep waiting in
unwearied patience at a place, yearning to be met by and have some professional
exchange with an art celebrity. (It goes without saying that his endeavour to meet
a star in the realm of art had nothing in common with stardom-cult-motivated
antics of some fans.) Moreover he was constantly on the lookout for a chance that
would enable him to patronise a prospective art star, having little scruple about
whether the patronised would be interested in accepting his favour. In a word his
ardour in promoting art and real effort to improve his artistry were most probably
more intense than that of some dedicated artists. But he remained, after all, an
outsider to art circles for all his lifelong devotion to art.
Then a miracle happened. There were people saying: “Oh, Mr W. I’m very
embarrassed to say this... But you really look like that famous writer Hemingway.”
To This Mr W. politely smiled.
There are all kinds of people on the theatre of life, but few are the ones who
act on purpose. Mr W. was one of those few who had taken an acting part in full
72 conscience. Mr W. knew this imagination was stronger than any literary
A NEW SILK ROAD?
comparison, and if it did not come from the soothing intentions of a friend it came
from the worship inspired by his money.
Mr W. was very generous. In the world there are plenty of people who don’t
get anything – isn’t it just fair if you let them have something? So he didn’t bother if
he really looked like Hemingway, and carried on his life as usual.
In the course of time his family fortune accrued unfailingly, and it stung his
ears to learn that his position in the national GDP had moved up and his wealth
had grown like a pestilence. Yet Mr W. wanted to be a normal person with his
whole soul, and in those long days he would just shake his head.
At the beginning he would stop longer and longer in front of the mirror, but
then his eyes were quite objective, he hadn’t become like Snowhite’s stepmother.
He could draw a good comparison in front of the mirror; no matter how he moved
his long face, he had little to share with Hemingway’s square profile. Afterwards,
almost carelessly, he let his beard grow on his chin, had a half an inch stub, and
cut his long hair. In this way he felt that he looked like Hemingway. Although the
mirror was the same one, the image he saw in it was somewhat different. Then
when people told him he looked like Hemingway he silently accepted it.
However, even if other people or Mr W. himself felt there was something in
common between him and Hemingway, Mr W. could not become an artist; no
matter how hard he tried he didn’t know where the problem was.
In the end, he gave up his art pursuit and fell back on looking after his
enormous fortune and making business. In the business world the ebbs and flows
of various “curious” trades were simply unmanageable. To cope with them he was
virtually compelled to do the impossible since he fared even worse than he did in
following art. In the realm of art, however ungifted he was, he could be rated as
appreciably professional in his approach to artistic creation. His art collection
could cogently attest to this.
He never treated his fortune with the scrupulous care he would lavish on art.
But, however carelessly he handled his property and however mindlessly he made
his investments, his fortune accrued unfailingly; and he prospered irrevocably.
Very apathetically, he perceived his fortune multiply; and money cascaded
into his wallet without him knowing it. To put it another way, he could so totally
effortlessly have all the returns from his investments that in the twilight of his
career he felt even a sense of revulsion at making money.
Supported by such a frame of mind, Mr W. was completely free of impact of
any earthly pathos, lingering in his eventual composure and expecting the
impending and final relief that soon he was going to have nothing to do with lucre
and was going to wash his hands of any forms of profit.
Unaccountably it occurred to him one day that he could use his money to set
up an arts foundation through which all the impoverished artists in the world
would be adequately supported so that they could be able to concentrate on
artistic creation. Thus he immediately sent for his secretary, lawyer, and steward
and informed them about details of his plan to create an art foundation, the aim of 73
such a foundation and the requirements each of the beneficiaries would be asked
to meet. At the end of the fireside meeting in his old house he ordered that his will
be drawn up.
Not unlike most of the billionaires in the world, he had organised for himself
an unusually qualified domestic affairs staff. Soon the staff succeeded in setting up
first an administrative body that would be responsible for the establishment and
the control of the foundation after its birth. Then the staff proceeded to recruit
executives to man the hierarchy of the foundation. Mr W.’s very imposing
mansion, which had been an irresistible attraction to make every passer-by slow
down his pace to have a glimpse of the building, was in the shortest possible spell
converted into a condominium containing separate apartments which were most
suitable for a contingent of artists who would live there concentrating on artistic
creation. Each apartment was unique in its architecture as well as decorations with
the purpose of meeting different habits, tastes and practical needs of artists from
different continents.
Every apartment had a toilet, a sitting room, a bedroom, and a studio. In every
sitting room there was invariably a folding couch that could serve to accommodate
a visitor of the prospective occupant of the apartment. There was also a
kitchenette, where it would be possible to cook some dishes prepared according
to the cuisine of the occupant’s own country.
Sitting in a wheelchair pushed around by his steward, Mr W. inspected every
apartment in the remodelled mansion; then he ordered that a white marble statue
should be erected in the midst of the rose beds in the garden of the mansion. Then,
he began to complacently brood over the prospect of a multitude of talented artists
emerging in the limelight after having stayed for a period of time in this mansion.
Finally, he examined the name’s list, which was submitted by the
administrative body of the foundation, of the first batch of applicants for allowances
from the foundation. These applicants were all luminaries from different fields of
art. One of them had won an award from the United Kingdom. Although the award
was practically negligible, it carried clout of honour. However, Mr W. didn’t think
such an applicant would be substantially eligible for getting help from his
foundation, because his concept of a qualified candidate was based on the life
experience of a vagabond artist shuttling between museums with his palette and
framed canvas. The type of artists Mr W. was particularly fond of should have been
– like him – not only aspiring but also still unknown to the world!
What was extremely regrettable was that Mr W. died before the arrival of the
first group of artists. His demise was not at all preceded by anything suggesting the
throes of death; there he lay in the perfect likeness of a celebrated artist, rather
than of a charitable billionaire.
The first artist admitted to the condominium was from the country of E. He
came wearing a pair of jeans and other articles of clothing reminding of a cowboy
in the early days of the American West. Nothing unusual about him indeed!
74 Nowadays youngish sorts tend to keep in their wardrobes a pair of jeans and to be
A NEW SILK ROAD?
dressed like a cowboy in the early days of the American West. But what was
appallingly unusual was the pair of cowboy boots with colossal and solid soles he
wore. When the boots were set in motion, they bore down upon their destination
like two tanks roaring out of a marsh. Thus after they had crossed the Persian
carpet an indelible line of footprints was left behind.
The instant the footprints greeted the eyes of Miss M., the receptionist, she
promptly averted her gaze to look out the window. It goes without saying that she
was not responsible for cleaning the carpet. Her only concern was receiving
guests.
She was not sure whether she really liked to work as a receptionist there.
However, she had to quit her previous job because she could no longer stand
her boss’s sexual harassment. While leaving it, she had the chance to read the
ad, placed by the foundation, of a receptionist job. She applied and got it
without ado after undergoing an interview. She guessed that being multilingual
had helped her secure it.
The new comer casually slung his travelling bag on top of the piano that was
standing in the reception hall. The metal fittings hammered on the piano making
the keys moan helplessly in response. With his hands tucked deep into his hip
pockets, the newcomer whistled and then hissed, “Remarkably nice, here!” But
this elicited no reaction whatever from the receptionist. She was completely
engrossed in jotting down all the needs and requests of any newcomer and looked
so dutiful and so ready to comply with them.
The next artist was a dramatist from the country of B., looking so cultured and
amiable. He was in a long cream-coloured windbreak, sporting a European taste
in the matter of colour. His hair was combed backward from his brow. Having
been offered by the receptionist the allowance for the very month he arrived at the
condominium, he counted the money with meticulous care; then he asked the
receptionist,
“Where’s the phone? I want to call.”
“Pay phones are available in every apartment,” she answered.
“Can you give me,” asked the dramatist, patting his pocket where he had just
slipped his allowance in, “some change for a pay phone call?”
Now the receptionist set about ransacking her handbag for some change and
happened to ferret out some.
“This change is not enough;” protested the dramatist. “I want to make a lot of
phone calls and have a talk over the phone with a publisher about some details in
the contract I am going to sign with him.”
“In this case,” said the receptionist stolidly; “you’d better go to the bank for the
change you need.”
Having already installed himself in a sofa, the artist from E. hailed a “Hi” in the
direction of the dramatist. However, without bothering to stop and call a greeting
to the artist, the dramatist just speeded promptly away, casually slinging over his
shoulder “Very glad to meet you”. 75
“Hey, hey, don’t turn your back on me. Aren’t we old acquaintances?
Remember, we were alumni of the same foundation before we took this one; and
you borrowed money from me and sneaked away without paying the debt.”
Neither to succumb to the exhortation nor to refute it, the dramatist headed in
the direction of the garden. There he was stunned by its beauty and was
irretrievably befuddled by the motivations underlying Mr W.’s generosity in
creating such a foundation. If he were Mr W., he would bequeath his large fortune
even to his remotest kin rather than to this medley of so-called artists who had
virtually no connection whatsoever with him.
The barest truth remained that if he were as wealthy as Mr W., he would of
course be spared the ordeal of a vagrant.
Every commodity has to be bought at a given price, and nobody – not even
a national leading luminary – an get it at even a cent less than that price. If the
price of a loaf of bread is five, you aren’t likely to leave the store with it by
paying only four ninety-nine. This explains why the dramatist chose to sneak
away rather than paying what he owed the artist before they parted company.
The world is too small to let the dramatist forever shun his creditor! “And
how nastily the artist talked to me!” the dramatist was now fuming. But what
could he do as a resourceless debtor to salvage his self-respect? And now, the
awareness that he had to pretend to be fairly well off was even more
unbearable!
Was the artist superior to the dramatist in some respects? Not really. The
former was no less a scavenger than the latter in cadging a living from all
manner of foundations across the world.
To tell the truth the dramatist and Mr W. were not gentlemen of the same
type. The latter died, being disappointed with his failure to become an artist,
whereas the former had been a famous playwright leading practically an
aristocratic life before the disintegration of the state apparatus in his own
country. In those pre-disintegration days, the dramatist had not only belonged to
the top his own country’s intellectual elite but he had also been nominated – on
the strength of his overwhelming popularity – as a candidate for the presidency
of his country. These were, for him, memories indeed excruciating!
In his heyday he could boast legions of mistresses and might be rated as
“Champion sower of wild oats”. He was, in those days, intoxicated with his manly
stunt of spicing his literary career with acts of chivalry as buying a necklace for one
of his girls from time to time or escorting another to a posh restaurant.
To tell the truth, it was the women who were ultra-sensitive to the tragic
power structure disintegration. But what was his womanhood in essence? A
cluster of leeches! Can a successful man exempt himself from being victimised
by such leeches? On the other hand, such leeches can serve as tokens – just as a
luxurious car, a château, a champion racehorse, etc. – to publicise a man’s
success in life. Conversely, it is precisely such “leeches” that are always the first
76 to give their host the initial experience of crucifixion resulting from his fiasco.
A NEW SILK ROAD?
No Romeo’s or Juliet’s counterpart can be found in our world nowadays!

Womanhood of our epoch is unique for its ability to detect or discern. Nothing can
escape a woman’s detection or discernment. A leech of a woman can readily – and
almost accurately – figure out the balance of her host’s account, the working of his
political or financial budget, etc. Once she is aware that a deficit is unavoidable in
the settlement of his host’s political or financial account, he forfeits forever even
the right to have access to her phone number, not to say access to herself in bed.
Such are traits of our womanhood, which “career manhood” of our epoch is
believed to have been fully acquainted with.
Just as the saying goes: “politics is as fickle as a flirt”. Owing to the
disintegration of the power structure in his country, the dramatist had been
deprived of his aristocratic way of life as well as of his opportunity to become a
presidential candidate; moreover he was later pilloried by the new power structure
in his country. Thus he had to flee his country and eke out a living abroad by
begging alms from various foundations, however distasteful and disgusting such
alms might be!
It was reported that things had been rather auspicious for him in the end. His
country was actually the worst off among those countries that had experienced a
political structural disintegration. A piece of news awakened some expectations
in him. According to the news, capitalism was being revived, or restored, in his
motherland. Hence his plan: after having wound up his current business with Mr
W.’s foundation, he would travel back to his motherland to find out the real
conditions there. Once in his own country, if he had found that things there not
so rosy as he now expected, he would come back to Mr W.’s foundation for a
renewal of its grant. Anyway he would carefully proceed by taking the lesser of
two evils.
The fate befriended him once, while he was having an interview with a
female compatriot who was believed to be a leader of a recently founded sect. She
was able to make him “hook up” with a very popular and generous cultural
foundation in a very affluent country on condition that he would pay her a sum as
fees. Through her good offices, being reluctant to go back home, he could stay
long in that affluent country, avoid any degrading menial work such as washing
dishes in a restaurant, and earn a respectable and comfortable livelihood by
having himself associated, as an artist, with a cultural foundation.
Then the artist from E. appeared in the garden, casually drawing on his
cigarette. The dramatist went up to him, intending to talk the artist out of the
resentment for the debt not paid back.
“This condominium is hell!” said the dramatist quite endearingly to the artist.
“Neither a woman nor a bar can be found within the walls! You have no idea of
how a playwright like me lived in my country. In those days I lived in the capital
of my country.”
“I know you lived in a house that looked like a junkyard,” said the artist not
interested in increasing the intimacy between them. 77
That evening a banquet in honour of the newly arrived artists was given by
the foundation in compliance with the concept of liberality advocated by its
founder. The banquet took place in a notable restaurant that had a very long
history behind it.
Completely oblivious of his surroundings, the dramatist gorged himself
indulgently at the banquet table, because he had been forced to survive on
sandwiches – the cheapest sandwiches, to be exact – and mineral water for ages.
In chewing his food, the movements – definitely rhythmic and continuous – of
his upper and lower jaw were as fast as those of a rabbit. Every time, after
having lifted morsels of food into his mouth four or five times with a fork or
spoon, he set his jaws to work. In the course of time his mouth was gradually
crammed with only partially chewed food. Still he kept sending food into his
mouth. As his oral cavity could no longer take any extra load, the uninterrupted
supply of viands made his facial integument work strangely; consequently his
eyelids began to turn inside out, and his chin began to assume an angular shape.
As he had the habit of using only his incisors to chew his food, juice from the
food he was chewing and saliva were inevitably extruded through his
imperfectly closed lips.
Others at his table involuntarily lowered their heads because of a sense of
shame. In the face of such an epitomised representation of grim starvation, all
those who had never experienced the ordeal of hunger ought to feel the prick of
guilty conscience. Only the artist from E. dared to offer to the dramatist a little
comment, “I presume the roast beefsteak you’ve helped yourself to must be more
than one kg.”
The day after his arrival the dramatist asked the receptionist to pass on to the
foundation administration his request that he should be given a couple of months’
pay in advance, because he needed to travel far and wide to make extensive
cultural contacts and could not stay put in this isolated condominium. The
receptionist faithfully took down every word he said.
From then on, he went to town every day and showed no intention to carve
an art career for himself or concentrate on artistic creation within the framework of
the foundation as Mr W. had expected.
Time flew. One day the dramatist drove back to the condominium in a
second-hand car. Before then, nobody had been curious to know how he went on
with his cultural contacts in town, because nobody there was like people in his
home country who took great pleasure in intruding upon other people’s privacy.
Moreover just like slices of bread provided free of charge in a small container
placed on the table in a pub that usually attracted no attention, a second-hand car
was nothing to merit attention from the inhabitants of the condominium.
The second-hand car had already a decade of usage behind it. However the
dramatist believed it could be sold easily in the market of his own country in case
he could have it shipped there and that he could reap handsomely from selling it
78 in his home market because of the exigent dearth of car supply there.
A NEW SILK ROAD?
Recently the dramatist had been behaving exactly like such a petty landlord as
described in Turgenev’s or Tolstoj’s novels: By the peep of day he was seen
already at the door of his apartment. Soon he would begin to cough complacently
and fervidly. Then holding his hands behind the back and in the typical gait of a
Russian petty landlord, he would stroll toward his second-hand car before he
hovered about it, showing off his fairly sexy legs and stout torso.
Soon the condominium’s sanitation worker would appear in time to do his
everyday cleaning duties. The dramatist would take advantage of his tools to clean
his car so that it could shine dazzlingly and look like a SAAB or BMW.
The artist from the country of E. was infuriated at last. “Why do you choose to
clean your car outside my window while I am working. The noise simply prevents
me from concentrating on my work. I am going to call the police if you keep on
harassing me”, the artist warned.
From then on the dramatist would kindly offer the other condominium’s
inhabitants – except the artist from E. – a lift when any of them needed to go to
town for shopping. But the dramatist’s Soviet-style Cold War tactic failed to make
any inroad into the fortress of hauteur put up by the artist from E.
Unexpectedly, before long the engine of the second-hand car was out of
order. Thus the dramatist consulted a great number of car experts about remedial
expedients. However the consensus of those experts was this: the reparation
would invariably cost one quarter of the price the dramatist had paid for the car.
The dramatist had been experiencing annihilating pangs since his car broke
down. He seemed to have thus contracted a heart disorder. One morning he went
out to the circular corridor. There he met a writer from I.
“There must be something the matter with my heart,” he said to the writer
from I., “would you please feel my pulse?”
After feeling his pulse for a while, the writer from I. said, “Your pulse’s ok, Sir.”
“But would you please feel my bosom? My heart’s about to leap into my
mouth.”
“No,” said the writer from I. “Since your pulse is normal, your heart must be
ok. They work in unison.”
One day the dramatist told the receptionist that he had contracted a chronic
psychosis.
“My request that I should be given of a couple of months’ allowance in
advance has not been granted so far,” he reminded the receptionist; “though you
have entered my request in your notebook.” He stared sharply into the
receptionist’s eyes, insinuating that a mental patient could have the acumen of a
sorcerer to see through all sorts of stratagems.
Afterwards the dramatist would either stay all day long in the garden, staring
blankly and motionlessly into the sky or roam the garden throughout the night,
sending out in the dead of nocturnal quietude a thrilling growl like the howl of a
wolf. His growl woke all other inhabitants of the condominium. Eventually they
seemed to begin to suffer a breakdown like the engine of the dramatist’s car. 79
And now other inhabitants of the condominium were convinced that the
dramatist was really in the grip of a chronic psychosis.
The receptionist was worried to the utmost as it dawned upon her that in case
the dramatist lapsed again into a nervous breakdown and thus incurred some
calamity, the foundation administration would certainly inculpate her because of
her undutifulness in attending upon him, though she had filled an entire notebook
with all the requests he had dictated to her. However she needed not to wait long
before finding out that her worry in connection with the dramatist was totally
misplaced.
It was not until after the dramatist invented a way to circumvent the car
engine crisis that other condominium inhabitants could regain their right of
nocturnal relaxation. As a matter of fact, he hadn’t stayed in the garden and stared
blankly into the sky in vain. His long meditation there led him in the end to pin all
his hope on Mrs Lu, who lived just next door to the office of the condominium.
In almost all other parts of the world culture and art had already been
relegated to virtual pariahdom. Consequently, the instant a gentleman engaging in
a field of artistic creation had no alternative but to admit he had taken it as his
occupation, he would be at the same time seized with a sudden shame as if he
were confessing that he was leading the idle life of a sponger like a beggar – and,
for that matter, a completely shameless, yet tricky, beggar! But here the dramatist
now stayed in a country deeply imbued with its traditional culture. Here, in this
country, people were still unable to get rid themselves of the enthralment bred of
its traditional culture. Besides, rather than in a city buoyant upon the avant-garde
torrent branching off some ultra-contemporary stream of culture, the office of the
foundation was located in a small town always developing at a half the speed of a
city, so much so that residents in this town could never bring themselves to
completely give up their addiction to arts and culture which were altogether not
lucrative. It was precisely in such a milieu that Mr W.’s moved to establish his
cultural foundation and the first batch of international artists were met with
unreserved local adoration.
It happened that at the gallery inauguration sponsored by the foundation, Mrs
Lu was so lucky as to take back home a painting by the artist from the country of
E, in addition to a small statue done by a South An sculptor. So it is imaginable that
if the foundation could survive for aeons, her house would certainly be turned into
an art museum bursting with all manner of artistic products. It is against such a
background that Mrs Lu willingly ordered her son to repair – for nothing, of course
– the dramatist’s car engine by using the components supplied free by her son, in
addition to her son’s tools.
The crisis of the car engine being over, the dramatist’s mental disorder was
brought to an end even without any treatment.
Having emerged intact from his psychosis, he started to frequent again the
corridor. Every morning the circular corridor, through which all the apartments in
80 the condominium were made mutually accessible, would become a milieu of an
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international coffee-drink exposition, because every morning would see all the
international inhabitants in the condominium take their cups of coffee prepared
according to various recipes of their own country to the corridor and drink it there.
The circular corridor served also as a dining hall where not only these
international inhabitants’ breakfast but also their lunch and supper were served. In
a sense the corridor functioned as a reviewing stand; and the dramatist was
particularly keen in taking advantage of this.
One evening while preparing his supper, the writer from I. suddenly found he
had ran short of his cooking oil. The dramatist adroitly took advantage of this
opportunity to demonstrate to all other inhabitants that he could be in a way
useful to their community. Thus he held high a bottle of cooking oil – as if he were
holding his national flag – and paraded back and forth in the corridor, instead of
marching straight into the Italian’s kitchenette.
In the face of such a pretence the artist from E. turned to address the South An
sculptor, “Doesn’t his antic remind us of one of the British blatant acts of
colonisation?”
“I can never convince myself,” said the South An, “that a man of his calibre
could have the chance of being nominated for the presidency. Aren’t you aware
he used to rake in anything, cigarettes, cakes, and small change we casually left on
dining tables?
“In his home country everything that would be inconceivable in other parts of
the world can happen indeed;” said the artist. “No politicians would behave
otherwise, I assure you.”
“But do you think Churchill, Roosevelt, or de Gaulle did behave likewise?”
“It is true that politicians are contradictory in terms of personal behaviour, as
well as artists.”
Having tasted all sorts of coffee at the international coffee-drink exposition,
the dramatist declared that he preferred Italian coffee to any other sort of coffee.
On the strength of such a declaration he would often take up a seat at the table
where the writer from I. sat to eat his breakfast. Everybody knows that not only
Italian coffee but also Italian food is among the best in the world. The writer from I.
was not only hospitable but also very fond of preparing delicious dishes. In the
gathering gloom the condominium would be bathed in pleasant flavour of garlic
enriched by the sweet fragrance of Italian spices. Such an atmosphere served to
sharpen all the faculties of not only other artists in the condominium but also of
their neighbour, Mrs Lu. Thus motivated by the olfactory stimuli they would move
of their own accord in the direction of the corridor now functioning as a dining
hall. Naturally the dramatist would present himself on time at the writer from I.’s
dining table. As soon as the dramatist was seated, he would most impatiently move
the principal dish from the centre of the table to the side of his plate. Then he
would recklessly and unabashedly ferret out all the most delicious titbits through
the agency of his fork and knife and very agilely popped them into his mouth in a
prolonged volley. Therefore before others sat at the dining table, the demolished 81
dish which the writer from I., an inveterate devotee of fine arts, had taken pains to
mould into a most charming objet of art, had been already degraded into a tiny
heap of unnameable litter fit only for the trash bin. In case the main dish was
chicken, it would be metamorphosed in a short interval into a jumble of chicken
skin and bones under the auspices of the dramatist’s gourmand frenzy!
“Excuse me, but I can’t help leaving the chicken skin and fat untouched;” the
dramatist explained. “My family reports a medical history of hereditary
hypertension.”
While he was chewing his food energetically with his eyes being almost shut,
he was actually highly watchful of every move made by any other member at his
table. Whenever someone held out his fork or spoon to get some food from the
table, he would promptly follow suit and add some new morsels to his plate,
though more often than not a new addition to the food already heaped in his plate
tended to induce a “landslide” that would usually spill a fringe of food down the
brim of his plate.
Mrs Lu offered him her advice, “Please do try to eat less and at a lower speed.
Otherwise your stomach would begin to ache.” Her advice was not at all pointless.
Days before she harvested pailfuls of Spanish plums from a plum tree in her yard.
Thus almost all containers in her house were filled with fruit. Accidentally the
dramatist came over to pay her a visit, asking for her advice on how to approach a
local theatre to accept a play newly written by him. She offered him a bowl full of
Spanish plums. He took them home but did not feel an urge to taste them, because
there were great amounts of various fruit trees – such as cherry, apple, pear,
apricot – in the condominium. Although the dramatist was not familiar with all
parts of the condominium, yet with little difficulty he found a ladder in a
storeroom. He took the ladder to the yard and placed it against a cherry tree. He
turned to talk to the Italian writer contentedly, “Do we need to get some fruit from
the supermarket?” Enlightened by his interlocutor’s sagacity, the Italian queried,
“Incidentally would you please tell me where the storeroom is? I hope I can find a
pair of pliers there.”
The dramatist did not think the Spanish plums palatable until he tasted a
couple of them. Thus he let himself have the plums to his heart’s content. The next
morning, at two o’ clock, Mrs Lu was woken up by thunderous poundings at her
door. She opened her door to find the dramatist there in the throes of unbearable
bellyache. He thought he contracted appendicitis and believed he could not drive
himself to a hospital. Thus Mrs Lu was obliged to take him immediately to a
hospital. There he was admitted instantly to the emergency room. The diagnosis
said it was intemperate eating and drinking – rather than appendicitis – which
caused his stomach to suffer because it was overworked. The doctor prescribed
some medicines that could aid his digestion and told him to let his stomach take a
brief respite.
In addition to his hereditary chronic psychosis, he developed gastritis during
82 his stay with the foundation; and it turned acute each time he shared a supper with
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the writer from I. For all the illnesses he had put on much weight since he came to
live here, his face looking more than ever before like that of a petty Russian
landlord. His cheeks were so puffed up as to eclipse his ears – as if he had
contracted acute mumps – and reminded his mates of the configuration formed of
the swept-back wings of a jumbo-jet.
He no longer bore the likeness of what he had looked like when crossing the
threshold of the condominium for the first time in his life. At least his amplified
cheeks were something eloquently suggestive of jolly plumpness.
Except for the writer from I., nobody else in the condominium was on good
terms with the dramatist whose isolation here was not terminated until the arrival
of a Russian composer. Consequently – so it seemed – the dramatist found an ally
in this newcomer and then contracted the new habit of often strolling in the yard
hand in hand with the newcomer; and together they reminded all the onlookers
they walked past of Stalin’s time!
Close together they hobnobbed over vodka and crooned Slavic arias. The
murk of the deepening evening gloom lent a particularly desperate ethos to their
crooning emitted from their souls forlorn and damned. Lethargised by the
heartbroken tunes everybody else in the condominium would become touched by
the pathos they managed to evoke and demurely whisper to anybody within
earshot, “The nation that has created such mournful tunes is simply tragic!”
“Slavs are mournful in disposition;” commented the artist from the country of
E. “Immediately after they get out of their beds in early morning they begin singing
and sing persistently while they are eating their breakfasts. This is the habit of all
of them, men and women. They learn to chorus together with their mums while
they were in an embryonic form of existence in the wombs of their mothers. How
can Slavs be otherwise than sorrowful?”
Since the arrival of the Russian composer the receptionist had been much
busier, jotting down requests dictated to her by the condominium mates. But
none of the requests recorded in her notebooks had ever been fulfilled.
Although temperamentally resigned, the South An sculptor could not help
commenting eventually, “I will reveal to the TV correspondent scheduled to
interview me next week how the foundation is operating and the problematic
side of its operation.”
To tell the truth, the Russian composer should be rated as much more astute
than the dramatist. Only a couple days after he took up his residence in the
condominium, he had the gall to ask Mrs Lu to lend him her car. But he refrained
from approaching the dramatist for borrowing the latter’s car, though both of them
were so buddy-buddy as could not leave the other alone in crooning Slavic arias.
The composer was affable though candid. He frankly told Mrs Lu that he was
about to travel to two neighbouring cities to perform at concerts there and that
since he could not afford to stay in hotels while sojourning there, he would be
heavily indebted to her if she would allow him to use her car so that he could be
spared not only the greyhound fares to and back from the two cities but also the 83
hotel expenditures, as he could sleep in her car during the nights he was to spend
in the two cities. Never allowing himself to behave as parsimoniously as the
dramatist who had never lifted a finger to return the favours she had done him, the
composer took to her house tapes recording the songs and tunes composed by
him and offered them to her as a gift. On the top of the wrapping enclosing these
tapes he put down his autograph.
Such a move on the part of the composer cornered her. But she managed to
say at last, “But I regret to say I can’t afford to dispense with my car any day.”
“Well, in that case would you please oblige me with some warm clothes that
you have planned to discard?” asked the composer humbly.
“That’s something in my power to do;” said she unexpectedly filled with
generosity. “My son bought a warm eiderdown jacket. He needed it for his journey
to Hong Kong on an errand. I don’t think he is to travel there any more. So he can
spare that jacket for you.”
The receptionist thought the composer very polite and gentle. Every time he
asked her to come to his room for a talk, he was bound to offer her four cookies
piled on a small plate in addition to a cup of tea. Soon after his first arrival at the
condominium she was presented a gift comprising tapes of his works enclosed in
an autographed wrapping.
To her great surprise, she was summoned one day to the police station where
she was instructed to take the composer back to the condominium, because he
had held a solo concert in the plaza in a nearby city without the permission of
authorities concerned. Thus the police there took him into custody. After he was
detained the police discovered that his visa had already expired.
She was stupefied, because, as a rule, the validity of his visa ought to have
been synchronous with the inauguration of the foundation. How come his visa had
expired? Was it because, she pondered, the composer had arrived in this country
much earlier than the foundation was established? But how could a foreigner have
managed to travel into this country before the foundation was created? Indeed a
foreigner was in most cases much more capable than a citizen of this country!
Under such circumstances the foundation had no alternative but to ask the
composer to go back to his homeland to undergo the process of applying for a
new visa. But he refused to do so. He not only refused to be repatriated but also
requested to have all his family members migrate to this country. The arguments
he offered to support his request were not only convincing but pitiable: his
hometown was Chernobyl, the place of the nuclear leakage that had stunned the
world. His children were victims of lethal radioactivity. Therefore it was imperative
for him to try his best to move his family out of that dangerous place.
“In order to provide my family with accommodations in this country,” he
continued; “and in order to save the government of this country the trouble of
supporting my family after they come here, I went to give a solo concert in the
plaza in that city. Besides I want to earn and save up money so that I can buy a
84 house for my family after they come here. Furthermore my family members have
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to apply to the Russian government for passports; that would certainly cost us a
fortune. I would be boundlessly grateful to the foundation, in case it would kindly
help me out with overcoming all the difficulties besetting their migration.”
The dramatist willingly canvassed everywhere on the composer’s behalf.
Sympathy made the rest of the condominium inhabitants forget both their
resentment against the composer and the dramatist and all the indecencies
committed by the two of them. While the rest of the condominium was making
peace with both the dramatist and the composer, the hatchet was unexpectedly
taken up by either against the other; and the dramatist’s car was the last straw.
After Mrs Lu’s refusal to lend her car to the composer, the latter was left no
alternative but to have recourse to the dramatist’s car. At first the dramatist
reluctantly complied with the composer’s requests for using his car because he
had been very frequently cadging meals from the composer. Each time after the
composer drove away in the car borrowed from the dramatist, the latter promptly
got the jitters, giving vent to his rancour by slamming his door nervously. Then it
suddenly dawned upon him that he could resort to the stratagem of talking the
composer into buying a second-hand car. Consequently the composer was
repeatedly driven to town; and the dramatist showed him around in a number of
second-hand car markets in order to coax him into buying a second-hand car. But
instead of taking second-hand car purchase seriously, the composer went about
dealing with a lot of his personal affairs in town by taking advantage of the
opportunities when the dramatist drove him there expressly to cajole him into
purchasing a second-hand car. Finally the dramatist saw through what the
composer was really up to. The dramatist thought aloud, “Having taken advantage
of all the opportunities I drove him to town he has been shrewdly and slyly
dealing with all the affairs he needed to take care of in town. That accounts for
why he has never for once asked me to lend him car recently.”
The dramatist had already reached an agreement with a second-hand car
dealer that if he could persuade the composer to buy a second-hand car from him,
fifteen percent of the price paid by the composer for the car went to the dramatist.
Now that the composer refused to buy a second-hand car, the dramatist was denied
the windfall of fifteen percent of the car price. Feeling embittered because he
thought the composer had been intentionally fooling him, he told the composer
pointblank, “From now on you have to pay me for half of the gas needed to cover
the distance to be travelled whenever you want to have a lift with me.”
“Don’t tell me you’re calling the shots here, man. Know your place;” spewed
out the composer in contempt.
“Don’t tell me you’re calling the shots here, Mr Superpower,” retorted the
dramatist in deadly defiance; “remember you’re no longer in a position to
dominate and abuse me as you country did with its satellite states without
incurring an impending disaster of self-destruction.”
As a matter of fact what the dramatist said to the Russian was nothing but a
stark truth, rather than some indecent remarks. With the two of them the only 85
crucial problem was that in the wake of the power structure disintegration in
their respective country their lives and careers had been calamitously deorbited.
This constituted their current source of torment and disgrace and left them
behaviourally upset and intellectually unanchored. The history of Russia or that
of any of her former satellites is not void of records of foreign conquest or
national humiliation. The lapse of almost a score of centuries has already
benumbed the pang derived from such foreign conquests or national
humiliations. But the pang given rise to by torment and disgrace arising from the
contemporary cataclysm in a country is, generally speaking, too acute to bear
indeed. Therefore the pang fashioned the behavioural anomalies displayed by
the two of them. Such a phenomenon deserves commiseration indeed.
Ironically such behavioural anomalies tended to furnish both the dramatist
and the composer with elation and vivacity. As either party was deeply familiar
with the past of the other party, every charge from one party was invariably fatally
devastating for the other party. Consequently such an infernal duel could lead
nowhere but to the most pristine violence.
In the end the bottles of tomato juice, wine, anything that were the properties
of the South An sculptor or some other condominium mates now became guided
missiles ejected by either warring party at his foe. A hand-grenade of tomato jam
hit Mr W.’s portrait on the wall before long. Instantly his face was rouged
charmingly. Nevertheless he smirked with good humour at the two raving knights.
Feeling quite outraged when he looked up at the sullied portrait of the
founder of the foundation, the South An sculptor shouted, “Stop it, you, good-for-
nothing Slavs! Dirty pigs!”
Abruptly the two warriors stopped their rivalry simultaneously and turned in
perfect unison in the direction of the South An sculptor, both being ready to make
an onslaught on the South An.
“Dare you insult us in Hitlerian jargon?” boomed the two combatants in
chorus.
“Whatever jargon I used is not important. I simply can’t tolerate such a
shameless mêlée. What a bestial scene you’re making here? More degraded than
dirty pigs!”
Thus began a scuffle involving the three hostile parties. However the martial
art proficiency of the South An was deadlier than that the two Slavs could exhibit.
On the verge of being mortally wounded the dramatist swiftly manoeuvred himself
out of the arena, because he knew he had his second-hand car to take care of. It
would be outrageously stupid for him to die before his car was shipped back to
and sold at a most profitable price in his home country, he believed.
Then the two Slavs went to report to the receptionist what a dirty and
Hitlerian language the South An sculptor had used to insult them. She reacted by
expressing her deep regret for how the South An had conducted himself, saying,
86 “That’s truly deplorable!”
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“But,” pursued the two Slavs, “do you mean to say we should take all this
lying down?”
“What else can I do, Sirs?” answered she. “One is entitled to unrestrainedly air
what is on one’s mind, even if that might offend somebody else.”
The dramatist could not bring himself to accept this. In the meantime he
learned from some local newspapers that a local movement to fight the revival of
Fascism was unfolding. He reacted unhesitatingly and called the editors of those
newspapers, telling them that evident traces of revival of Fascism could be found
among the foundation beneficiaries. Some reporters could not wait to rush to the
foundation for a timely coverage. But other reporters objected, declaring that since
all South Ans were suffering because of the recent bombardments carried out by
America in South An, it would be an utterly inhumane move to censure a South An,
instead of showing him sympathy. Thus the matter was dropped in a precarious
equilibrium between the pros and cons voiced in local journalistic circles.
Consequently, none of the rest – except for the Italian writer – of the
condominium mates would associate themselves with the two Slavs.
“How dare you,” shouted the dramatist angrily at the rest of the condominium
population, “deride or look down upon the two of us? Aren’t you, like the two of
us, cadging a livelihood with this departed benefactor? All cadgers are on an equal
footing. Don’t you see that?”
The foundation would have remained so far a commonplace undertaking
blessed with plain sailing but for the conflagration that terminated its existence.
The conflagration devoured part of the condominium and was alleged to have
originated with a burning cigarette butt carelessly left to kindle the bedclothes
in the couch of the artist from the country of E., after he went to sleep in
exhaustion. The ignited bedding spread the fire to everything around it. Of all
the condominium inhabitants, the artist suffered the heaviest loss because his
painting collection and his own paintings were lost in the holocaust. Thanks to
the foresight of the foundation administration, the artist received an enormous
compensation from an insurance company, since the foundation had had the
properties of all the condominium inhabitants insured. The artist professed
quite unperturbedly, “An artist is entitled to claim any compensation for his loss
from an insurance company since artistic works are all priceless articles, you
know.”
“It’s a fiendishly predatory dog that never barks before it snatches;”
commented the dramatist from the country of B.
“And you must be a dog that never snatches before it barks!” offered the artist.
The compensation secured by the artist gnawed jealously at the dramatist’s
heart, because none of his properties, his second-hand car included, was damaged
by the fire. However he managed to wrench from the insurance company some
indemnity for the loss that made his health suffer because the shock he received
from the conflagration had aggravated the symptom of his chronic psychosis.
After the fire the first round of activities of the foundation came to an end. 87
Every condominium inhabitant was about to part company with the

foundation. Being fully aware that he was no longer able to be copiously catered
to by the wealthy foundation, the dramatist was overwhelmed with sadness and
turned for the worse. Notwithstanding, he was sensible enough to know that he
couldn’t help it.
All of a sudden it occurred to him that his backache might help him invent an
expedient to tide over the crisis. While his chronic psychosis was an illness more
imaginary than real, his backache was a sterling illness more real than imaginary.
His backache tortured him day and night; in extreme cases he suffered from
devilish insomnia because of it. He had studied extremely carefully the prospectus
and documentation of the foundation before he decided to apply for an
allowance; later he drew up a plan listing in detail what he intended to acquire
from the foundation. One item in the plan was acquisition from the foundation a
health insurance. Now, in view of the fact that once he was repatriated after the
conclusion of the foundation activities, the cost he would have to pay for a
treatment of nuclear magnetic resonance in his homeland could be exorbitant, he
asked the receptionist to arrange for him to take such a treatment before he left the
foundation. She did. But the findings from the treatment indicated that there was
nothing wrong with his back. This delighted not only her but him as well. For
though his “backache” was eliminated as a pretext to enable him to prolong his
stay at the foundation, he could rest assured that he would be spared all the
worries connected with his back after his repatriation.
Since backache was demolished as the last pretext he could use for a
prolonged stay at the foundation, the dramatist no longer pretended to have
contracted any illness. Now his only request he asked the receptionist to take care
of was that she take him to a hospital every day and arrange for him to have a
back massage there. So long as he was now proclaimed sound in body, he took to
reclining comfortably on his sofa, smoking, drinking whisky, watching TV. He was
waiting for the day when he was to leave the condominium.
The foundation’s first round of activities concluded triumphantly. All the
condominium inhabitants were ready to leave. The foundation helped the Russian
composer obtain permission from authorities concerned to continue to stay and
secure a job in this country. The artist from the country of E., who had an
undisguised contempt for the dramatist from the country of B., now turned to
another foundation for a chance to carve out a new career. The writer from I.
returned to his own country. With the help of a humanitarian organisation the
South An sculptor went to work for the anti-racial discrimination movement in the
United States. Inspired by the prospects of securing profuse returns by selling his
second-hand care in his own country, the dramatist drove it to traverse the
Continent of Europe.
Before making his adieus to the condominium, he was looking everywhere in
the building for the receptionist because she kept a handsome sum of money,
88 which were rewards paid by parties concerned for the lectures he had given them.
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She ought to have passed on those rewards to him as soon as they had been
handed over to her. Now she explained to the dramatist that she had forgetfully
left them in her home but assured him that she would take the money to the
condominium the next day without fail. But from the next day onward she never
turned up at the condominium again. Later the dramatist called the office of the
foundation and was told that she got leave of absence from the office and was no
longer in the city. Besides he was informed that nobody had any idea of when she
would be back at the foundation.
Miss M., the receptionist, had a grave and dignified bearing. The dramatist had
thought very highly of her, thinking that she must have very noble character and
might not stoop to anything as low as he himself had been accustomed to. Those
who looked noble or dignified in bearing, so he concluded, were not necessarily
more noble-minded than he. This was what he learned from his years of vagrancy
across a number of countries. Certainly he oughtn’t have been sneered at when he
had repeatedly expressed his worries about the safety of his rewards kept in the
hands of the receptionist.
A few miles after his second-hand car crossed the border into his home
country, the dramatist met with disaster in a car crash. Having been informed of
the tragic news, the foundation people said, “If he were still here, he was bound to
invent some expedient to force the insurance company to pay him compensation
for the crashed second-hand car.”
But nobody was sure what had really happened to him or his car.
Some said he was driving when drunk.
Others reported his car was destroyed in a spontaneous combustion in its
engine.
Still others asserted that his car crashed into a big van. But a better informed
source had it that his car crash just camouflaged an attempted murder.
Some later revelations indicated that the dramatist emerged unscathed from
the car crash but he had from then on gone by a new name and manoeuvred
through a general election in the country of B. to become president.
A source intimated that the dramatist had created a foundation of his own and
that it was different from Mr W.’s foundation in that it was a profitable
organisation, by dint of which the dramatist was no longer obliged to cadge a
living with any other foundation across the world. Moreover, through his own
foundation he succeeded in setting a good example for all the foundations across
the world to follow in how to turn a non-profit institution – such as a foundation –
into a profitable one.
Still another source hinted that he had associated with a new foundation. And
it was further inferred that there he might again encounter the artist from the
country of E.
* * *
Miss M., the receptionist, never showed up again. She was so grave and
dignified in bearing that accusing her of having evaded paying back the lecture 89
rewards to the dramatist by hiding herself seemed to be incriminating her unjustly.

Still the hideous fact remained that the dramatist had forfeited forever the
considerable lecture rewards. But her notebooks that were excessively replete
with “details” in her handwriting of the numerous requests which all the
condominium inhabitants had dictated to her and which they had asked Mr W.’s
foundation to comply with were very convincing and, therefore, very useful – as
far as the foundation was concerned – real documents to attest not only to her
functioning efficiency as a receptionist but also to the generosity harboured by the
foundation towards all its beneficiaries. The “details” were quoted copiously in the
foundation’s periodical statements on its regular work; and these statements were
as a rule carried by numerous bulletins and gazettes. All these developments
contributed to Miss M.’s advancement in the ruling hierarchy of the foundation.
All of a sudden the entire staff of the foundation disappeared altogether; and
the condominium was evacuated. Those who knew nothing about the total
disappearance of the foundation staff thought that all the staff members had been
fired by the foundation hierarchy or were on strike or a long furlough. But as a
matter of fact all of them were still paid generously by the foundation.
The condominium, still looking magnificent from a distance, was able to
wrench admiration from passers-by who would in most cases linger there a little
while to appreciate it. But inside it suffered terribly because of long absence from
it of the care of sanitation workers. Even if all the officials of the foundation had
left the condominium on a long furlough, its hardworking sanitation workers
should have been still on duty. Anybody who chanced to enter the condominium
now would be mystified on discovering swarms of maggots were creeping in
every room in the condominium. The sights of kitchenettes and bathrooms were
particularly nauseating.
On all the walls of a kitchenette was a layer of dirty grease looking like a queer
coating. There was nothing in a room in the condominium but was greasy to the
touch. In fact since no inhabitant in the condominium had ever cooked in his
apartment except for the Italian writer, the greasy coating on the walls of every
room in condominium remained a mystery. Piles of unwashed kitchen utensils
were not heaped where they should be deposited but in sofas, on floor, or in sinks.
Not a single piece of dinner services remained undamaged. They were cracked or
jagged, or had a missing handle, spout or lid. Everything in the condominium
seemed to be just a relic of an earthquake or war. All bedding items, including
pillowcases, in any bedroom stayed no longer where they belonged. Instead they
were spread all over the floor of the bathroom in an apartment. In every bathroom
the floor seemed to have been flooded by seeped water coming out of nowhere.
On the narrow walks criss-crossing the yards in the condominium and the
girders in all the bathrooms were grown densely with large and puffy grey
mushrooms.
Yes, it was a nice season, proper to the growth of mushrooms.
90
A NEW SILK ROAD?
Part II
from ASIA
to ASIA
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A NEW SILK ROAD?
ASEM
IS A SUNRISE
ORGANISATION by Tommy KOH
T HE ASIA-EUROPE MEETING, OR ASEM,

brings together the fifteen European Union countries and ten countries of East
Asia. This inter-regional group is unique. The group’s history is brief, having been
established only four years ago in 1996. The leaders of the twenty-five member
countries and the President of the European Commission have met once every two
years, in Bangkok in 1996 and in London in 1998. They will hold their third
summit in Seoul in October this year.
ASEM Fatigue in Europe?

Some commentators have recently expressed the view that although ASEM is
only four years old, some of our European friends seem to be suffering from
premature ASEM fatigue. Is this true? Other commentators have wondered about
the continued relevance of ASEM to the EU. They have pointed out that the EU has
bilateral summits with the three largest Asian members of ASEM, namely, China,
Japan and Indonesia. What additional value does ASEM bring to EU?
Negative Perceptions of ASEAN

Compared to 1996, when ASEM was established, today, ASEAN is not viewed
in a favourable light by public opinion in the EU, for several reasons. The
admission of Myanmar in 1997 created a chasm between ASEAN and the EU.
Market analysts do not seem impressed with Thailand’s reform and restructuring.
As a result, investor confidence in Thailand has not returned to the pre-crisis level.
The protracted negotiation between the government of the Philippines and the
Muslim rebels in Jolo, over the kidnapped foreign hostages, has created a negative
impression of the Philippines and, by extension, of ASEAN. The prosecution and
convictions of Malaysia’s former Deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim, has
attracted the EU President’s criticism. Finally, ASEAN is seen to be backtracking on
its ASEAN Free Trade Area commitments. This has raised questions about ASEAN’s
credibility and competitiveness vis-à-vis other countries and regions of the world.
Can ASEAN compete, for example, with Northeast Asia, and especially with China? 93
093-096/LiMes/Koh 6-10-2000 15:24 Pagina 94
ASEM IS A SUNRISE ORGANISATION
Sunrise or Sunset?
In view of the doubts and questions which have been raised it is pertinent to
ask whether is ASEM a sunrise or a sunset organisation. I would argue that ASEM is
a sunrise organisation, basing my argument on three main reasons.
Economic Prospects of East Asia

Firstly, most of the economies of East Asia have bounced back from the
financial and economic crisis of 1997 and 1998. East Asia, minus Japan, is growing
strongly again. According to a recent essay in The Economist by the eminent
American economist, Dr Fred Bergsten, the world is becoming a three-block
formed by the US, the EU and East Asia. According to Dr Bergsten’s computation,
based on 1997 data, East Asia’s combined GDP was $6,382 billion, compared to
the EU’s $8,093 billion and the USA’s $7,834 billion. Using PPP (Purchasing Power
Parities), the GDP figures were $9,431 billion for East Asia, $7,559 billion for the
EU and $7,665 billion for the US. East Asia’s trade with the world, at $1,380 billion,
was close to the EU’s $1,640 billion and to the $1,586 billion of the US. When it
comes to foreign exchange reserves, East Asia tops the table with $668 billion,
compared to the EU’s $380 billion and only $71 billion of the US.
The conclusion is obvious. The economic rationale for ASEM remains as valid
today as it did in 1996. East Asia is already an important economic partner of the
EU and will become more so in the coming years and decades.
Towards a Multipolar World

Secondly, one of the reasons that brought the Asians and Europeans together
in 1996 was their common aspiration towards a transition from a unipolar to a
multipolar world. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the
Cold War, the world has been dominated by one superpower, the United States. It
is a safer world than during the Cold War, when the danger of a nuclear war was
ever present. However, Asians and Europeans would prefer to live in a multipolar
world in which the EU and a more united East Asia could constitute two other
poles. Such a world would be more balanced, more comfortable and more stable.
This rationale for ASEM is as valid today as it was in 1996. Indeed, I would
argue that it is more relevant now because East Asia is more cohesive and more
united today than it was four years ago. Only a cohesive and united East Asia can
constitute a pole in a multipolar world.
What has happened since ASEM I? The first East Asia Summit, modestly called
ASEAN + 3, was held in Malaysia in 1997, the second in Vietnam in 1998, and the
third in the Philippines in 1999. The fourth summit will be held in Singapore in
November this year. The process is being institutionalised and has already brought
94 together East Asia’s foreign ministers, finance ministers, central bank governors
093-096/LiMes/Koh 6-10-2000 15:24 Pagina 95
A NEW SILK ROAD?
and senior officials. It is not just empty talk either. Already, the group has agreed to
adopt a region-wide currency exchange arrangement that would help them deal
with any future Asian financial crisis. It is also significant that Japan has started FTA
negotiations with Korea and Singapore.
My conclusion is that developments in East Asia over the past four years show
a positive trend. The countries of the region are getting together, developing a
habit of consultation, increasing their comfort level and engaging in concrete
cooperative projects. If this trend continues, East Asia will be in a better position to
constitute a pole in a multipolar world.
Thirdly, one of the biggest challenges of the post Cold War world is the
cultural dominance of the world by one country. The US possesses both hard and
soft power. The soft power is represented by its food, beverages, fashion, music,
movies, television, universities, research and development, and Silicon Valley.
Asians and Europeans would like to counter this trend and to build a world of
cultural diversity. This is one of the common aspirations that unites Asians and
Europeans in ASEM.
In the past four years, ASEM and especially the Asia-Europe Foundation
(ASEF) have tried to build many cultural bridges between East Asia and the
European Union. We have brought together cultural leaders, cultural industries,
arts managers and administrators, education, cultural and television networks,
universities and think-tanks, editors and journalists, students and professors,
artists, musicians, dancers and many others. East Asia and Western Europe are
blessed with rich and vibrant cultures. They should therefore not be mere
consumers of American culture. Asians and Europeans have much to contribute to
world culture.
Conclusion
I would like to reiterate my thesis that ASEM is a sunrise not a sunset
organisation. The three reasons which brought the twenty-six Asian and European
leaders together in 1996, in Bangkok, Thailand, are just as valid today as they were
four years ago. ASEM makes good economic, political and cultural sense. Let us
therefore prepare for the third summit in Seoul with a confident heart and a clear
mind. ASEM is beneficial to Asia, to Europe and to the world.
95
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097/106LiMes/Broinowski 6-10-2000 15:25 Pagina 97
A NEW SILK ROAD?
ALL IN THE SAME BOAT?

AUSTRALIA’S RELATIONS
WITH ASIA by Alison BROINOWSKI
1. A LL AUSTRALIANS, AS THE INHABITANTS

of the world’s only island-continent are fond of reminding themselves, are boat
people. The Iraqis, Afghanis, and Chinese who in 2000 arrived illegally on
Australia’s northern shores in boats were hardly the first to do so. Aboriginal
Australians had arrived in the same way some 40,000 to 60,000 years earlier. In the
18th and 19th centuries, when convicts from England and Ireland and free settlers
from Europe, gold-seekers from China and North America, pearl-fishers from
Japan, cameleers and itinerant traders from India sailed to Australia, they simply
came ashore, and the indigenous people were pushed aside.
Australia is moving towards Asia at six centimetres a year, a pace that seems
too fast for some, too slow for others. Historical sea-links and island bridges to
Asia, and centuries of commercial and personal traffic between Australians and
people in Asian countries have not prevented peaks of mutual enthusiasm being
followed by troughs. Lasting freeways of identity between Australia and the region
have yet to be built. Australia is the only “Western” country – apart from its small
neighbour New Zealand – that is located in the Asia-Pacific hemisphere, and it is
the only one whose relationship with Asia is such a contested issue.
But, to ask a more complex question, are Asian countries any more closely
identified by anything other than “race”? Have Pakistan and Singapore, Japan and
Bangladesh – all Asian countries – more in common than each has with Australia?
Australia is not a member of any Asian organisations that do not include other
“Westerners”, and it is not a member of the Asian bloc at the United Nations.
Australians persist in speaking of themselves as “Western”, habitually comparing
themselves with other OECD countries, and identifying with the Western alliance.
In 1999 they failed to agree to become a republic with an Australian head of state
in place of the British monarch. Unlike the Canadians, Australians have not agreed
to replace the national flag, a quarter of which is taken up by the Union Jack.
Although Asian Australian faces are visible in every Australian city, in most
schools, and increasingly on television, and although 50% of Australia’s trade is
with the region, official emphasis on engagement with Asia has recently
diminished. With the post Cold War empowerment of Asian identity politics, 97
ALL IN THE SAME BOAT? AUSTRALIA’S RELATIONS WITH ASIA
Australia is being excluded from Asia by both Australian and Asian definition. And
with new regional economic structures being formed after the East Asian financial
crisis that explicitly distance the West from the rest, Australians are considering
whether they will be disadvantaged by having no say in them.
To understand why Australia is stuck on the razor blade of identity, it is
necessary to consider, first, the origins of Australian thinking about its place in
Asia, and then how, throughout the same century, Asian ideas of Asia have
developed in a way that of necessity excludes Australia.
2. Australian leaders’ pronouncements about associations with Asia

consistently display the four things they most fear: isolation, facing attack or
invasion, economic disadvantage, and being held up to ridicule. To seek
“mateship”, a reassuring strategy of identity with a protector or a group against a
bully is the instinctive Australian response, learnt in the schoolyard, to such fears.
But Australians have always been mistrustful of their protectors too, and the less
attracted Australians are to identification with Britain or the United States the more
they have from time to time considered identity with Asia as an alternative.
The earliest Australian colonists included idealists like James Matra, E.G.
Wakefield, and the Rev. James Jefferis, who recommended a break with the Old
World and an invigorating union with the new. Australia could become the Athens
of an Australasiatic Mediterranean, as Marcus Clarke speculated in 1877.
Pragmatists of the same period, like Sir George Young and members of the Sydney
Chamber of Commerce, saw Asian labour as the best means of developing the
country, to replace the feckless convicts. Prime Minister Alfred Deakin, an admirer
of India and of theosophy but a supporter of White Australia, united idealism and
pragmatism, predicting mastery of the Pacific as Australia’s future. Others in the
1910s and 1920s, Piesse, Sadler, and Murdoch among them, advocated the study
and appreciation of Asian, particularly Japanese, societies both for intellectual
enrichment and as the best form of security.1 But for many, Australia’s proximity to
Asia constituted a continuing threat. Defence Minister Sir George Pearce,
representing Australia at a Washington conference in 1922, declared: “The Far East
is our far-North... Whilst racially we are Europeans, geographically we are Asiatic.
Our own special immediate Australian interests are more nearly concerned with
what is happening in China and Japan than with what is happening in Belgium
and Holland”. John Latham returned from an official tour of Japan in 1934 to
announce: “What the ‘Far East’ is to Europe... the ‘Near East’ is to Australia”. Liberal
leader Robert Menzies in 1939 picked up his inversion of geographic convention,
and used it to suggest the danger looming over Australia: “The ‘Far East’ is
Australia’s ‘Near North’”. Latham, as Australian Minister in Tokyo in 1941, took up
the identity issue with Japanese who saw Australia as within their sphere of
1. A. BROINOWSKI, The Yellow Lady – Australian Impressions of Asia, Oxford University Press, 1992,
98 Melbourne 1996, pp. 3-4, 24.
A NEW SILK ROAD?
influence: “I may with respect suggest that you get your geography books right, so
that in your schools at least they will know that Australia is not part of Asia”.
Many Australians spoke with pride of their connection to England through
monarchy, government, education, language, law, religion, trade, defence, culture,
and sport; even the Suez Canal and the telegraph were called Australia’s “lifelines”.
In the Federation process that culminated in 1901 (and has recently been
commemorated in London), Australian leaders were united by their concern to
preserve White Australia and the protection of the Royal navy. British trade
preferences enabled Australian governments to mount a tariff wall against Asian
goods, and the Immigration Restriction Act enabled them to exclude Asian
persons. For decades Australian leaders on both sides of politics – W.M. Hughes,
S.M. Bruce, R.G. Casey, R.G. Menzies, A.A. Calwell – made no excuse for these
policies, publicly identifying themselves and their country as white or British or
both. Even two eminent Australians in China, G.E. Morrison and W.H. Donald,
were in no doubt about their Britishness. Australia underlined this by loyally
joining in wars against several Asian enemies, always as the ally either of Britain or
of the United States, and by using postwar Repatriation Acts to expel Asians who
had taken refuge in Australia, but not Americans, British, Dutch, or even Germans
and Italians, who were instead encouraged to settle.
But among intellectuals in the 1930s and again in the late 1940s, the idea of an
“Austral-Asiatic” future was attractive. As Foreign Minister, Dr H.V. Evatt boldly
pursued Asian regionalism, an idea that Prime Minister E.G. Whitlam would later
try to promote as an Asian Forum. But Evatt could not rid himself of White
Australia, and even after Liberal leaders began that process and Whitlam, as
Labour Prime Minister, completed it in 1973, none of them considered undoing the
alliance with the United States. These remained the two key factors that set
Australia apart from newly independent countries in Asia: immigration was no
longer racially based, but security appeared to be. Conservatives on coming to
power repeatedly retreated from their predecessors’ claims of identification with
Asia to warn about the threats that it presented and to offer development aid de
haut en bas. Asian societies were seen as “Friends and Neighbours”, not as family.
So Foreign Minister Barwick asserted in 1963 that “for the purposes of security,
and for the resolution of many problems, we are part and parcel of the Asian
region”. As an anti-racist Prime Minister, but one concerned about Third World
Communism, Malcolm Fraser compromised: Australia was “Western with a
difference”. But, he told the Indian Parliament, Australia was Australia, “not an
appendage of Europe” (1979).
Labour politicians increasingly advocated “engagement” with Asia in the
1980s and 1990s. They hoped to gain economic stimulus for Australia through
proximity to the high-growth East Asian economies, defence security for Australia
through closer association with Asian leaders, population expansion of Australia
through migration of literate, hard-working Asian migrants, and political influence
for Australia through Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the ASEAN 99
Regional Forum (ARF). At the same time, growing prosperity in East Asia gave
Australia opportunities to export more raw materials, food, manufactures, and
health, education, and tourism services. As ALP Opposition leader Bill Hayden,
shortly after an ABC radio series predicting Australia’s Asian Future, had
ventured to suggest that Australia was “becoming a Euro-Asian country” (1980).
Bob Hawke, Prime Minister from 1983, spoke more boldly of “enmeshment with
Asia” and of “finding our true place in Asia”, and his Education Minister embarked
on a program of “Asia-literacy” (1983-91). As East Asian growth rates escalated,
Hawke’s successor Paul Keating sought a personal initiative that would save the
Australian economy, cost nothing, and conform to the ALP platform. He picked
up the Republic, Australia’s “historic shift to Asia”, the “Asianisation” of Australia,
and cultivated ASEAN’s grand old man, President Soeharto. (1992-1996) His
Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, redrew the map to show Australia as: “a country
in the East Asian hemisphere”, “an East Asian hemisphere nation” (1995, 1996).
State Premiers and Ministers were particularly prone to declare identity with Asia
when it suited them, and when there was money to be made (Peter Beattie in
1998, Shane Stone in 1997, Mark Birrell in 1997, and Peter Dowding in 1989, for
example).
Labour leaders outdid each other in their enthusiasm for Asia in the early
1990s, but their pronouncements about a shared identity became more cautious in
1996, when East Asian economies were foundering. What FitzGerald, a former
Ambassador to China, said of ALP spokespeople applied to most Australian
politicians: that they “danced in turn towards and away from a definition of being
‘part of’ Asia”.2 Keating and his conservative successor, John Howard, both picked
up Fraser’s tautological truism and used it repeatedly: “Australia is Australia”, that
is, neither Eastern nor Western. Howard detected no conflict between Australia’s
geography and its history: Australians, he said, “do not claim to be Asian”, and no
country “can be asked to deny its history, principles or culture”. Australia, he told
Asian leaders many times, was “not part of Asia” (1996). Foreign Minister Downer
repeated similar sentiments in Beijing in 2000, when he distinguished Australia’s
“practical” relations with Asia from the “cultural” ones that Asians had with each
other. Resonating in the minds of these leaders, and their advisers, were the anti-
Asian statements of One Nation leader Pauline Hanson, a disenfranchised Liberal
elected to Parliament in 1996, and the support they attracted from voters who
opposed multiculturalism and Asianisation: “I don’t want to be Asianised”, she
declared.
The revised version of Australia’s identity in 1999, according to the
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, was that Australia was no longer
pursuing membership of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) either on the Asian or
the European side “as a policy objective”, since Australia already saw itself as “fully
integrated into the region”, and “we don’t need ASEM to prove we are part of the
2. S. FITZGERALD, Is Australia an Asian Country? Can Australia Survive an Asian Future?, Allen &
100 Unwin, St. Leonards, NSW, 1997, p. 38.
A NEW SILK ROAD?
A.U.S.T.R.A.L.I.A.
NO LONGER DOWN UNDER

region”. Perhaps Huntington was right: Australia was a “torn” country, confused
about what it was and to what it belonged.3
3. In the years when Australia was seeking to define its identity, Asian
countries began to re-establish theirs. The process occurred in four waves, and
their cumulative effect was to reject Western views of Asia and Westerners’
statements about identification with it. The Asianisation of Asia, as Funabashi
Yoichi called it in 1993, sought on the one hand to subsume differences between
Asian societies and to emphasise their similarities, and on the other to stress the
difference between Asia and the “West”, ignoring differences between the United
States and other Western societies, just as Westerners had been guilty of doing
about Asians.
The first wave of Asianisation of Asia rose in Japan, China, and India late in
the 19th century, and found prominent intellectual leaders in Okakura Kakuzo,
3. S.P. HUNTINGTON, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Simon & Schuster,
New York 1996. 101
Mohammed Iqbal, Jose Rizal, Sun Yat-sen, Rabindranath Tagore, and their
influential nationalist successors. Although none rejected Western technology or
modernity, all hailed the advent of an “Asian Renaissance” that would unite Asian
countries in gaining independence and would usher in an era of Pan-Asian
cooperation and prosperity. Paradoxically, they were all Western-educated, and
were encouraged by American and European Asianists to appreciate what was
unique about their own cultures and histories. Fortified with that reassurance, they
based their Pan-Asian vision on the antiquity and richness of their shared Asian
traditions and religions, and on the superiority of Asian spirituality over Western
materialism.
Japan’s victory over the Russian fleet at Shimonoseki in 1905 was an
inspirational event for many, including Sun, Tagore, Mahatma Gandhi, and J.N.
Nehru. It demonstrated what an Asian power could do by combining Western
technology with national self-belief, and it set off a second wave of Asianisation.
Japan’s territorial expansion was accompanied by promises to free Asian countries
from colonial oppression, under the slogan “Asia for the Asians”. Japanese Pan-
Asianists sought to establish Japan as a role model for other Asians, and to spread
their sphere as widely as possible, urging Australia, too, to throw off its Western
yoke and acknowledge that it was part of Asia. In the 1930s and 1940s, young men
were impressed: Aung San in Burma, Lee in Singapore, Sukarno and Hatta in
Indonesia, Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam, Marcos and Laurel in the Philippines, and
Mahathir in Malaysia. In spite of their resentment at Japan’s high-handedness,
Asian nationalists were not eager to welcome the Western colonialists back.
The leaders of the postwar, third wave of renewing or “Asianising” Asia, were
Nehru and Sukarno; their doctrine was independence by peaceful means; their
code was Pancasila; and their support base was as many African and Asian
countries, independent or approaching independence, as they could attract. They
held three early meetings: two in New Delhi in 1947 and 1949 and one in Bandung
in 1959, and the outcome was the Non-Aligned Movement. Australia was invited to
send observers to the first meeting, and a minister to the second, but Australia did
not officially attend the third. Nehru, nevertheless, went so far as to describe
Australia as “a component part of Asia”. Sukarno, however, identified Australia
with the OLDEFOS (old established forces): only non-aligned, non-white states
could claim status as NEFOS (newly emerging forces). In the future, Asian leaders
declared, Asian nations would cooperate with the West only as equals, and would
form “some sort of an Eastern Commonwealth of their own”.4
The fourth resurgence of the “Asian renaissance” was propelled not by Japan
or India, nor by foreign admirers of Asian achievements, but by the leaders of
ASEAN countries. Picking up speed in the 1980s from the rapid growth of Taiwan,
Hong Kong, Korea, and Singapore, as well as from the stimulus of Japanese
investment and China’s trade liberalisation, Southeast Asian leaders selectively
102 4. K. NAG, Discovery of Asia, The Institute of Asian African Relations, Calcutta 1957, p. 781.
A NEW SILK ROAD?
used neo-Confucian ideas, “look East” emulation of Japan, long range planning
(“Vision 20/20”) and “Asian Values”, to inculcate economic progress while keeping
political change under firm control. As their incomes grew rapidly, Asian leaders
gave exceptionalism the credit and urged Western societies to learn from the
“Asian way”. Nevertheless Anwar Ibrahim, in The Asian Renaissance (1996), took
a moderate line, harking back to the first two “Asian renaissance” waves by
accepting Western influences that could be put to good use, but stressing the
centrality of religion and culture in Asian societies. Lee Kuan Yew did the same,
but with rather more emphasis on education, discipline, and hard work. His fellow
Singaporean, Kishore Mahbubani, writing in 1995, claimed the fusing of Western
and East Asian cultures in the Asia-Pacific region was an “unprecedented historical
phenomenon” (just as Okakura had done in 1903). East Asians, he wrote, were
realising that “they can do anything as well as, if not better than, other cultures”.5
China had already contributed to the fourth wave of Asianisation by declaring
an interpretation of human rights that privileged economic development and the
collectivity over the rights of the individual. Right-wing Japanese also opposed the
United States by taking up Ishihara Shintaro’s advice (1989) to “say no” to the
West, and similar slogans appeared in Chinese and Malaysian publications. Asian
countries were asserting for themselves what it meant to be Asian, though not
unanimously. Dissent came, for example, from Kim Dae Jung, who objected to
claims that democracy was not an “Asian value”,6 and from Aung San Suu Kyi and
Xanana Gusmao, who had good reasons to argue for universal rather than
“guided” democracy. Filipinos were annoyed when Lee Kuan Yew told them their
attachment to democracy was excessive.
But the ASEAN countries (6 of them by 1986, 10 by 1999) were determined to
be in control of membership of their club, and not to have its status diminished by
the larger APEC edifice. Mahathir proposed an East Asia Economic Caucus that
would include Northeast and Southeast Asian states and no others: an “Asia
without the Caucasians”. Prominent intellectuals had met in Kuala Lumpur in 1992
as the “Commission for a New Asia” to discuss beliefs, principles, and ethics they
held in common. They distinguished these not so much from Western ideas but
from Western practice, which they considered was often arbitrary, hypocritical,
and based on double standards.7 But the Commission was an exception, in that
attendance was based on a wider definition of regionalism that included South
Asia and Australia.
Other important meetings to which Australia was not invited included the
1993 Asian Human Rights conference, and the 1996 and 1998 Summits of the
Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). Australia was defined as Western by exclusion from
5. K. MAHBUBHANI, Can Asians Think?, Times Books International, Singapore 1998, pp. 115-137.
6. KIM DAE JUNG, “Is Culture Destiny? The Myth of Asia’s Anti-democratic Values”, Foreign Affairs, 73, 6,
November/December 1994, pp. 189-194.
Unwin, St. Leonards, NSW, 1997, p. 133. 103
ASEM, in what FitzGerald argued was a “defining moment” on the way to the
formation of a future East Asian community.8 Australia was not included, either, in
the new, post-crisis structures by means of which East Asians sought to reinvent
themselves: the Asian Free Trade Agreement (AFTA), ASEAN+3, and ARFA (Asian
Regional Financial Arrangement) through Japan proposed to fund non-IMF-style
currency repurchases. When Australia in 1999-2000 led InterFET, a 19-nation
force sent to secure peace in East Timor in preparation for UN-fostered
independence, Indonesian and Malaysian leaders complained on racial grounds
that it included “not enough brown faces”, and in the same breath accused
Australians of white supremacism. The UN Secretary General had said Australia
should be accepted as an Asian country for the purposes of InterFET. But the
editor of the Bangkok Nation, even though Thailand had contributed troops and
a deputy commander to InterFET, took issue on racial grounds with Kofi Annan’s
proposal that Australia was Asian: “Unfortunately it is not an accepted fact in this
part of the world”.9
As Western societies became more responsive to the injustices of colonialism,
to civil and human rights, and to the Orientalism of the past, intellectuals grew
more careful to distinguish Asian societies from each other and to avoid racist,
essentialising accounts of them. But their scruples were not often reciprocated by
leaders in Asian countries.
4. Certainly, when Asian prosperity faltered, Asian enthusiasm for talk of a

“New Asia” or an “Asian Renaissance” also diminished. One of its proponents was
in jail in Malaysia. One more, at least, should have been, in Indonesia. Had the
Asian Renaissance come and gone? some asked. Was the 20th, and not the 21st, the
“Asian Century”? Were Asian values still superior?
Scenes of communal violence in Indonesia, with the government’s guns and
batons being turned on the people yet again, seemed to contradict claims that
harmony and community cohesion were “Asian values”. India and Pakistan tested
nuclear weapons and glared at each other again across Kashmir. Evidence of
leaders enriching themselves and their families in Indonesia and Malaysia, and
bribing supporters in Japan, South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines, seemed to
undermine assertions that Westerners were materialistic, while Asians were thrifty
and spiritual. Some corrupt former leaders were jailed in China, South Korea, and
Japan, but many more remained unpunished there and in Southeast Asian
countries, suggesting that their claims to filial respect from their people were
misplaced. The imperialists’ security acts were kept in place in Singapore and
Malaysia and used against the governments’ political opponents. The plight of
millions of unemployed, whose leaders had scorned the West’s welfare societies,
threatened that worse was to come. Whatever the outcome of Mahathir’s case
8. As above, p. 53.
9. K. CHONGKITTAVORN, “Regional Perspective: Australia is an Asian Partner, but…”, Nation, September
104 27, 1999.
A NEW SILK ROAD?
against Anwar in 1998-99, or his argument against Western/IMF free market

orthodoxy, “Asian values” were no longer required reading, even among Western
conservatives who had endorsed them in the past. Clearly, Asian leaders more than
ever needed the solidarity and empowerment that exclusion of the West provided.
So they increased their efforts to reinvent Asian regionalism, and Australia provided
a harmless exemplar of how they could rhetorically marginalise the West.
Asianisation, however, had variants with which neither most Australians nor
Asians would wish to be identified, but which they seemed in the 1990s and in
2000 to share. In Australia, with the Howard government’s retreat from
multiculturalism, “Asianisation” in the late 1990s took on a negative character, the
opposite of what Australians had come to understand by it under Keating, when
its connotations ranged from positive to euphoric. Both governments, and some of
their predecessors, behaved like some Asian leaders: they sought to impose
ideologies, often through the media. As well, they broke promises, adopted
selective industry assistance, retreated from environmental targets, sought to
reduce minimum wages and work conditions, cooperated with employers to
reduce the power of unions, cut expenditure on social services, health, and
education, confined the independence and scope of public broadcasting, kept
expenditure for defence at a high level, and were unable to reduce unemployment
and borrowing. Like some Asian leaders, they failed to achieve decent living
conditions for indigenous people. The Keating government, like many in Asia,
sought to censor television and to jail journalists who breached “national security”.
The Howard government took the country further in some of these directions,
virtually silencing Radio Australia, bragging about Australia being the “strong man
of Asia” and having what journalists called a Deputy Sheriff role to the United
States in the region. As a result, Australia began to look like some Asian countries
in ways the pro-Asianisation rhetoric did not envisage.
This sort of like-mindedness was not, according to Malaysian-born Australian
Professor Wang Gungwu, what Asian countries expected of Australia, nor what
would admit them to the Asian club.10 Yet Australia, Stephen FitzGerald argued,
could belong to the region without being what East Asians were.11 But coming on
top of a history of oppression of Aborigines for which Howard refused to say the
nation was sorry, several other factors contributed to reducing Australia’s capacity
to influence Asian governments and to reconfirming long-held views about
Australia: Howard’s evident lack of empathy with Asian societies, his position on
human rights and Aboriginal claims, his ambivalence about distancing himself and
his party from anti-Asian racism, and his declared insouciance about how Australia
was regarded in the region. Howard repeated that Australia was not part of Asia;
yet his government asserted Australia is “fully integrated into the region”. It was
10. WANG, “The Australia Asians Might Not See”, in D. GRANT and G. SEAL, Australia in the World:
Perceptions and Possibilities, Black Swan Press, Curtin University of Technology, Perth 1992.
Unwin, St. Leonards, NSW, 1997, p. 9. 105
just as well that regional identity was now a matter for Asians – it seemed to be
beyond most Australians, including many Asian Australians, to decide.
5. Further waves of the Asianisation of Asia will break in the twenty-first

century, and will wash up on Australian shores, if for no other reason than that
Asian leaders will continue to use Australia to enhance their collective power
against the West. But at a personal level, this is an age of diaspora, of mobile
workers, merged families, and rapid travel, when, as Salman Rushdie has said of
Indians, every family has someone living abroad. Many children are growing up as
“third culture kids” – living with languages and societies that are not those of their
parents, who, in turn, have left those of their parents. Perhaps what is wrong with
claims of an Asian Renaissance is their exclusivity and exceptionalism: perhaps in
the 21st century a more appropriate goal would be an Asian Enlightenment, when
Asians become citizens of the world, including of Australia, and when it is
acknowledged that Asia’s and Australia’s boundaries are porous. Perhaps then,
being Australian in Asia will also be more inclusive, and less debated.
106
107/112/LiMes/Caracc-Korinmann 6-10-2000 15:26 Pagina 107
A NEW SILK ROAD?
THERE IS NO
AUSTRALASIA by Michel KORINMAN and Lucio CARACCIOLO
1. I
HE AUSTRALASIA OF COLONIAL ORIGINS
lumped together in the same concept Australia, New Zealand and the nearby
islands. It was the imperial province of the Far South, distinct from Asia. As John
Foster Fraser wrote in 1910, “Australia, which is so vast that you could drop the
British Isles upon it and not find again for years”. 1 The geographer Elisée Reclus, a
great lover of toponymy, claimed enthusiastically: “If the lands from New Guinea
to New Zealand were united to the main body, the surface that would emerge in
the Pacific Ocean would be only slightly smaller than Europe”. 2 This idea of
Australasia has resisted the test of time, as current British and American
dictionaries confirm. 3
But in the 1980s and 1990s it has become fashionable in Australia to give the
word a new meaning to describe the relationship between Australia and Asia. The
Labour governments of Bob Hawke and Paul Keating (1983-1996) reached over to
Asia attracted by its economic growth: now 60% of Australian exports are for Asian
countries. Japan, South Korea, China/Hong Kong and Taiwan are Australia’s main
trading partners together with the US. Back in 1975, having recognised Mao’s
China, the Labour government of Edward Gough Whitlam approved Indonesia’s
annexation of East Timor. Until 1999 this was Canberra’s dominant Asian policy; in
turn Indonesia supports Australia’s integration in the regional organisations of
Southeast Asia.
1. J.F. FRASER, Australia: The Making of a Nation, London, New York, Toronto and Melbourne 1910,
Cassell and Company, p. 3.
2. E. RECLUS, Nouvelle Géographie Universelle, vol. XIV, “Océans et terres océaniques”, Hachette, Paris
1889, p. 711.
3. See, for example, the definitions of Australasia in the Longman Modern English Dictionary,
Longman, London 1976, p. 72: “Australia, Tasmania, New Zealand and their insular territories”;
Webster’s II / New Riverside Dictionary, Riverside, Boston 1984, p. 1437: “Australia, New Zealand,
New Guinea and associated islands”; The Encyclopedia Americana – International Edition, Danbury
(Connecticut) 1984, vol. 2, p. 704: “Australia, New Zealand and nearby islands”; The Oxford Reference
Dictionary, Clarendon, Oxford 1986, p. 54: “Australia, New Zealand and the nearby South Pacific
islands”; same definition in the Wordsworth Encyclopedia, Wordsworth, Ware (Hertfordshire) 1995,
vol. I, p. 161; The Times Atlas of the World, Times Books, London 1998, map at p. XIV: “New Guinea,
Australia, Tasmania, New Zealand and nearby islands” (8,923,000 km sq.). 107
THERE IS NO AUSTRALASIA
Some geographers have mapped this cultural shift. According to them,

Australasia includes “the Australian continent and the large island of New Guinea”,
the “Philippine and Indonesian islands”, and perhaps even Malaysia, whose
“Eastern part, Sarawak, is, overseas, the Northern coast of Borneo”, while “the
Malaysian peninsular is so long and thin that could be nearly be an island”.
Indonesians and Malaysians belong to the same civilisation and to the world of
Islam and are united by the “same mistrust towards the important Chinese
minority”. 4 The background to all this are amusing “epistemological” digressions.
This “geopolitical set” of 9 thousand km from North to South and from East to West
(more or less the size of Africa), paradoxically should be able to spot “the
emergence of potential conflict” from within: rich against poor, extreme
demographic imbalance – an “empty” Australia of just 19 million inhabitants against
an overpopulated Indonesia of 210 million people, with New Guinea as a “cushion
zone” and “outlet” for Indonesia’s population excess. And lastly, there are threats to
Australia from the “North”, which in fact is getting ready to counter them.5 We’ll
leave it to the specialists to discuss the details of such arguments and just limit
ourselves to registering the birth of this rather oxymorous “set”, as the (baroque)
poet would say. A “set” constructed to demonstrate its non-existence.
After all, there is nothing new in this. At the start of the nineteenth century, the
Germanic tradition produced “Geochoren” to overcome natural obstacles to
territorial expansion; later on the French “corèmes” of modern and “scientific”
geography were invented to satisfy the commissioning institutions. And let us not
forget to place the choregraphy of the late 1980s between the two, a peculiar
“theory of sets” that demonstrated that such “sets” do not exist – for example in the
case of Australia’s Nordpolitik. Enough of “epistemological” contortions! This
debate does not make sense. As the Australian Ambassador in Rome Rory Steele
explained to Limes: “There now is a national consensus on the uselessness of
defining ourselves as Asian. It is better to think of us a part of the Pacific Asian
region together with our allies the US and Canada”.
2. And now let’s move onto the basics. On August 11, Manila’s Business World
and London’s The Times published some extracts of Joint Vision 2025, a Pentagon
report. The study was conducted during the summer of 1999 at Newport’s US
Naval War College, Rhode Island, with the participation of the CIA, of experts such
as Graham Fuller of the Rand Corporation, Aaron Friedberg of Princeton
University, Nicholas Eberstadt of the American Enterprise Institute. The report’s
“geopolitical” invariable is: the next enemy is China. Beijing’s government will
mobilise nationalism to prop up its rickety legitimacy and will develop its nuclear
potential. So various scenarios appear. For example: Chinese forces occupy a large
part of the Philippines and attack Indonesia, “damaged by violence”, but are
4. Y. LACOSTE, “Australasie”, Hérodote, janvier-mars 1989, pp. 3, 10.

108 5. As above.
A NEW SILK ROAD?
stopped by the US Navy. Next, a military coup at Beijing. China intervenes in

Siberia, in the Russian Far East, or in Kazakhstan to control its energetic resources.
We are at the doorstep of a nuclear war.
There is another more likely scenario – less pleasing to the Pentagon: China
manages to isolate and de facto subjugate Japan, to neutralise the Indian “soft
belly” and a by now unified Korea to assert its pre-colonial hegemony on Asia.
Beijing would avoid a military confrontation with Washington that it would no
doubt lose.
For the Pentagon analysts, the worst-case scenario would be an Indian-
Chinese power co-habitation over Asia, given that the US does not have enough
military bases in Southeast Asia. A war between India and Pakistan would be a
much better alternative, involving an American intervention against Islamabad and
the explosion of both Pakistan and Taliban’s Afghanistan. In this case China would
be the great loser, cut off while a new Indian confederation arises as the dominant
power in the region, allied with a democratic Iran and the Gulf states – all together
in an American-Asian axis.
The Pentagon thus keeps its distance from the business lobbies and the
government circles favourable to engagement with China, a strategy that aims to
promote trade with China to force it to open up. The critics of this strategy believe
that it would strengthen the enemy. Joint Vision 2025 supports a policy of
containment, the isolation of China to avoid any alternative to American
hegemony in Asia. Of course it is a report among many, blown up for the media,
the publication of which was meant to “send a message” to Beijing. But President
Clinton was not particularly surprised, if we believe The Times. The two sides that
are confronting each other over American policy towards Asia do share one view:
they think of the world in terms of macro-regions, of Grossräume, to use a
definition of the German geopoliticians of the 1920s. Hence “Asia-Pacific” is
fashionable, in America and elsewhere.
3. Australia is not even mentioned in what was made public of the Pentagon
report. Fact is that the American analysts do not “choregraph” any kind of
Australasia. In America the island-continent has nothing to do with Asia. And
Washington knows all too well that Australia has always sided with the West –
otherwise how could it feel secure? It was the then Australian Foreign Minister
Percy Spender to develop a first taste of the “domino theory” in 1950. And then,
from the mouths of the various Conservative Prime Ministers, flourished
declarations of loyalty to the United States: Harold Holt in July 1966: “All the way
with LBJ!” (in Vietnam, with Lyndon Baines Johnson, editor’s note); John Gorton
in May 1968, for Richard Nixon: “We’ll a-waltzing Matilda with you” (the
Australians will happily defend American interests in Vietnam to the notes of the
unofficial national anthem); William McMahon in October 1972: “Where you go,
we go”, still thinking about the war supposed to stop the expansion of
communism in Asia. 109
THERE IS NO AUSTRALASIA
The Americans keep this in mind. But they do not trust the Labour
governments very much (1972-75 and 1983-96), whose socialdemocratic
geopolitics they often find irritating. Americans consider it a little bit to sly, because
it uses the crucial alliance with Washington, tied somewhat loosely in the ANZUS
(the Australia-New Zealand-United States pact), to allow itself very profitable
economic openings towards Asia. But the US is worried about destabilisation in
Asia, now that since 1991 there is no Soviet Union to counterbalance China. So
there is no more room for the Australasian fiction.
The “Howard doctrine” – from the title of an article of September 28, 1999 by
the journalist Fred Brenchley in the Sydney Bulletin that referred to an interview
with the Australian Prime Minister of September 17 – fits in the picture. Brenchley
claims that John Howard himself appreciates the expression “Howard Doctrine”,
which he then tries to minimise. On September 21, the Liberal leader remembers
Palmerston’s statement to the Chamber of Representatives: in the long term,
nations do not have friends but interests. The 1997 Asian crisis and the temporary
interruption of the “miracle” have destabilised the region. More specifically, there
are no security guarantees on the sea communication routes between Australia
and the Far East. Canberra needs more than ever the American guardian, the world
policeman of which Australia considers itself the deputy in Asia. The Australians
will intervene in East Timor at the head of the InterFET mission, with the UN
mandate to bring the area back to peace, and with the full backing of the US,
which cannot afford another military expedition after Kosovo. The operation
directed by General Peter Cosgrove is successful.
This is a strategic turning point for Australia. Canberra can no longer limit
itself to “continental defence”. Australians could enjoy a decisional and operative
autonomy with regard to the vicinity of the island-continent, as prescribed by the
1980s doctrine. But there still is a question mark around the financing of the new
strategy. To strengthen its armed forces, which now employ only 50 thousand full
time men, Australia would have to increase its defence budget from 0.8 to 2.5% of
GDP. But the Howard government itself cut 4 thousand jobs in the forces between
1996 and 1999. This is a big problem for the Americans: if Canberra sticks to a
martial rhetoric without providing the necessary means to act as the Deputy
Sheriff, the rest of the region could understand this attitude as a green light to the
Asianisation of the military balance, a decline of American presence without its
junior partner filling in the gap.
The Asian “partners” – Thailand, Malaysia (traditionally hostile to “white”
Australia’s integration in the Southeast Asian structures) and Indonesia – have no
intention of granting the role of regional sub-protector to Australia. East Timor is a
dangerous precedent. The Asians see Australia’s strong presence in the InterFET
mission as a strategic rather than humanitarian objective. Does the West intend to
start other military missions every time an Asian country shows signs of
110 destabilisation?
A NEW SILK ROAD?
Indonesia is especially angry. It sees itself betrayed by Australia, the only

Western nation that in 1989 had recognised its annexation of East Timor and had
drawn a curtain of silence on Djakarta’s genocidal policy. Hence the incendiary
bombs thrown in the Indonesian capital against the Australian embassy and the
threats of economic retaliation that Indonesia will find other wheat and cotton
suppliers.
If the countries in the region ever believed in Australia’s Asian vocation, now
they accuse Canberra of returning to a colonial past and denounce the “racist”
attitudes of Australian officials. It is unlikely that there is unanimous consensus in
Canberra on the strategic change. Some might fear the long-term consequences for
a country in which the Asian population increases: around 5% today, estimated at
7.5% in 2031, and 40% of new arrivals in 1997-98, without mentioning the more
general demographic weakness of the island-continent. Howard, worried about
Asian reactions, will deny that he is trying to reduce his country to a sub-supplier
of the United States, but it is too late… Asia locuta causa finita.
111
113-120/LiMes/deVienne 6-10-2000 15:26 Pagina 113
A NEW SILK ROAD?
WHAT IF
DR MAHATHIR
WAS RIGHT? by Marie-Sybille de VIENNE
M ALAYSIA’S LONG-SERVING PRIME

Minister, Dr Mahathir Mohamad,1 was born on 20 December 1925 in Alor Setar,
capital of the state of Kedah (looking over the Indian Ocean, on the borders
between Thailand and Malaysia), where his father taught at the Malaysian primary
school.2 He went to school in his hometown, firstly at the Malaysian school, then at
the boarding school founded by the reigning sultan, Abdul Ahmid. His father being
rather strict, he spent his time reading. Indeed, he ran the college library and
acquired a solid general culture,3 which served as a prelude to a brilliant university
career. Like many cultivated young Malaysians, he joined the United Malay
National Organisation (UMNO) from its creation (1946). This party aimed at
defending Bramiputra’s (indigenous children) interests against the other ethnic
groups, particularly the Asians and the British, whose views about Malaysian
independence threatened the traditional referents of Malay political identity,
sultanates, by putting forward a multiethnic state. Mahathirs’s “modernist populist”
conscience emerged together with his political involvement in his community: in
1947 he won a place to study medicine and qualified in 1952. At first an assistant
physician, he obtained a post in his town (1954). Later he married a colleague, Dr
Hasmah,4 daughter of a Muslim dignitary, and eventually set up a private practice
(1957).
Finally freed from material concerns, Mahathir could develop his political
choices within the UMNO. Becoming gradually known by the members of the
1. The distinction between Malaya and Malaysia will be kept. The first corresponds to the federation of
the States in the Malay Peninsula, which lasted from 1957 to 1962; the second was adopted when
Singapore and two others states in Northern Borneo, Sarawak and Sabah joined the peninsula in 1963.
2. At the end of the Second World War the situation in the peninsula was critical: it hosted three main
ethnic groups, indigenous Malay (45% of the population), Chinese (35%) and Indian (15%). The
Chinese community was mainly urban, and controlled the modern sectors of the economy; the
majority of Malays were peasants; Indians were represented in the plantations and liberal professions.
Moreover, while Chinese people organised a Communist guerrilla to resist Japan during the war,
Malaysians partly collaborated.
3. “Dr. Mahathir’s world analysis”, Mainichi Daily News, April 6, 1999,
www.mainichi.co.jp/english/mahathir/03.html
4. Hasmah’s father, Mohamed Ali, was Head of the Department for Religious Affairs in the State of
Selangor: Mahathir and Hasmah had three sons, Mirzan, Mokhzani and Mukhriz, and two daughters,
Marina and Melinda; they also adopted two other children. 113
WAT IF DR MAHATHIR WAS RIGHT?
upper class frequenting his practice, he began to manifest a growing interest for
international affairs at a moment when the place and future of Malaya in the
region took the centre stage in the political debate. When a deep regional crisis
exploded because of the annexation by the Malay federation of Singapore and the
two British territories Sarawak and Sabah, he appeared as the perfect man to
represent Malaysia at the UN (1963).
His political ascent thus started. From the beginning he presented himself as
the champion of Malaysian national identity. In 1964 he was elected Member of
Parliament (for UMNO) in Kota Setar,5 then in 1965 he became part of the ruling
circles of the UMNO. In this position he directly participated in the decision to
expel Singapore and to erode the socio-economical rights of the Chinese
minority,6 who did not forget it. They indeed made life increasingly difficult for the
coalition government UMNO-MCA7 (Malayan Chinese Association) and radicalised
both electorates: the Chinese electorate turned its back on the MCA, and part of
the Malays,8 considering the government too soft with the Chinese, did so with the
UMNO. At the 1969 elections Mahathir lost his seat and went back to anonymity.
He exited the political scene powerless, with no legal means to resume his
political career and, what is more, at a moment when the government, faced with
the gravity of the anti-Chinese clashes, suspended Parliament.
Mahathir risked everything with a media coup: in the name of “malayty” he
published Dilema melayu (The Malay Dilemma),9 so iconoclastic a description of
the Malaysian cultural profile that the book was immediately censored but enjoyed
a great diffusion under the counter. Reinvigorated by this success, Mahathir stuck
to Malaysian radicalism, attacking the Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman in an
open letter for neglecting Bramiputra people. The coup succeeded: he became
famous even though he was expelled from the party and had lost his means of
political expression. But Tunku Abdul Ahmal resigned; this eviction of one of the
highest dignitaries on the political arena10 opened the way for the Deputy Prime
Minister, Tun Abdul Razak,11 a committed Malaysian. On assuming high office in
1970, the latter launched a campaign based on training and investments to
5. One of the districts of the capital of Kedah; see ASEAN Who’s who,Kasuya Publishing, Kuala
Lumpur 1992, vol. 3.
6. Malay became then the only national language and the Bramiputra businesses started receiving
almost all available state funding.
7. Founded in 1949.
8. Including Sarawak and Sabah.
9. The Malay Dilemma, D. Moore for Asia Pacific Press, Singapore 1970.
10. Tunku Abdul Rahman (1903-1990) was the son of the Sultan of Kedah and of his sixth wife, a Thai
princess; see TAN SRI DATUK MUBIN SHEPPARD, Tunku, His Life and Times: The Authorized Biography of
Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra al-Haj, Pelanduk Publications, Petaling Jaya 1995; by TUNKU himself,
(with J.S. SOLOMON) Challenging Times, Pelanduk Publications, Petaling Jaya 1985; Lest We Forget:
Further Candid Reminiscences, Eastern Universities Press, Petaling Jaya 1983. During the Japanese
occupation (during which the Japanese gave Kedah to Thailand), Tunku Abdul Rahman was
appointed Supervisor of education, thus becoming the superior of Mahathir’s father.
11. Tun Abdul Razak (1922-1976), son of a Malaysian dignitary of Pahang (a sultanate on the Eastern
coast of Malaysia), was a jurist who trained in London at the end of the ’40s, where he created the
114 Malaysian Forum.
A NEW SILK ROAD?
promote the Malay ethnic group.12 His government needed new as well as
experienced political personalities: the successful and popular Dr Mahathir
seemed the right choice. Mahathir was hence invited back into the party, and
appointed head of the Council for Education. Faced with the possibilities opened
by this position, he took the risk of leaving his practice and launched into a
successful career. He was appointed Senator (1973), President of the FMA (a
Bramiputra organisation for the development of the agro-industrial sector),13
Member of Parliament (1974), this time for the constituency of Kubang Pasu
(located in Kedah as well, and offered to him on a golden plate as he was the only
candidate), Minister of Education (1974), Deputy Prime Minister (1976), Minister of
Commerce and Industry, and Vice-President of the UMNO; finally, Prime Minister
(1981), an office he stills holds today.
An Increasingly Critical Stance towards the West

Mahatir eventually fulfilled the role of a modern Malay, having managed both
to remove the prerogatives of the traditional elites from Malay political life (by
cutting back on sultans’ attributions, in 1993) and to weaken the Chinese position
in the economy. This modernity finds a further expression in his skills in using
modern communication technologies (he has a web-site14 and is responsible since
February 1999 of a monthly review of one of the most important Japanese
newspapers, the Mainichi Daily News).
However, he also took the risk of opposing both the Malay elite and the
Chinese communities. And he cannot expect any support from the Muslim
extremists, either. They are, in fact, his direct political rivals, for they also aim at
the Malay electorate. Hence, everything seems to lead him towards a Western
model and vision.15 Yet, far from being an emulator of Western values, Mahathir
has imposed himself as one of its main detractors with aggressive as well as
coherent diagnostics. During his political activity at the head of the country, he
has developed his thesis in some ten books: Challenge (1986);16 Regionalism,
Globalism and Spheres of Influence (1989);17 The Voice of Asia; Two Leaders
Discuss the Coming Century,18 with Ishihara Shintaro (1995);19 Europe and the
12. The Malaysians’ revenue was at that time less than 40% that of the Chinese, and their influence in
the modernisation process derisory (less than 2% against 36%, the rest remaining in the hand of
Westerners).
13. Kumpalan Fiam bhd, a governmental agency with the task of developing the sector: it started in
1972 with pineapple plantations and was later privatised thanks to Bramiputra’s capitals.
14. www.smpke.jpm.my
15. He ordered the construction of a Versailles replica by a French architect, in Putra Yava.
16. The Challenge, Pelanduk Publications, Petaling Jaya 1986 (translated from the Malay Cabaran!).
17. Regionalism, Globalism, and Spheres of Influence: ASEAN and the Challenge of Change into the
21st century, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore 1989.
18. MAHATHIR MOHAMAD & SHINTARO ISHIHARA, The Voice of Asia: Two Leaders Discuss the Coming
Century, translated by F. BALDWIN, Kodansha International, Tokyo & New York 1995.
19. ISHIHARA, a strong nationalist, wrote with AKIO MORITA (founder of Sony) A Japan That Can Say
No, Why Japan Will Be First among Equals, Simon & Schuster, New York 1991; he was elected
governor of Tōkyō in 1999. 115
Islamic World: Correcting Perceptions, the Way to Better Understanding (1998);20

The Way Forward (1998);21 The Challenges of Turmoil (1998);22 A New Deal for
Asia (1999).23
The first book’s topics are mainly economic and technical. Every time
Malaysia has undergone an economic crisis, since 1985, the presumed adept of
Anglo-Saxon methods pointed his finger at Western hegemony. World history is,
according to him, “a series of conquests and subjugations by the strong over the
weak,”24 the world economy being nothing but a power relation among diverging
interests. 25 Liberalisation of capital 26 and goods 27 (which has nourished a
“generalised monetary speculation”)28 has done nothing but reinforce Western
supremacy, never as strong as today. Over the years, he has denounced a
sociological manipulation: international institutions are structurally organised to
maintain Western hegemony. The winners of the Second World War have
attributed to themselves a right of veto, which fundamentally contradicts the
democratic functioning of the UN. 29 Under the aegis of the UN, the West
manipulates weapons, maintaining “a fear of a war, a clash between China and
Japan”,30 which nourishes the arms race in Asia. The danger, however, does not
come from there, as all the area’s military budgets put together cannot compete
with the $265 billion of one Western country”.31
According to Dr Mahathir, however, the worst manipulation is an ideological
one. The West wants to impose, in fact, its own cultural paradigm on the rest of the
world.32 Yet the universality of its values is contradicted by the mere existence of
Asian societies,33 and if put in their historical context, they would be rightly
20. Europe and the Islamic World: Correcting Perceptions, the Way to Better Relations, Institute of
Islamic Understanding Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur 1998.
21. The Way Forward, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London 1998 (deals with socio-economic relations
among the different ethnic groups in Malaysia and with the “New Economic Policy”, operative since
1970).
22. The Challenges of Turmoil, Pelanduk Publications, Subang Jaya 1998.
23. A New Deal for Asia, Pelanduk Publications, Subang Jaya 1999.
24. Ucapan Perdana Menteri (speech of the Prime Minister), opening session of International
association of historians of Asia, July 27, 2000, Magellan Sutra Hotel, Kota Kinabalu.
25. Ucapan Perdana Menteri, Tōkyō, speech for the 6th international conference on “The future of
Asia” organised by the Nikkei Shimbun, September 6, 2000.
26. Ucapan Perdana Menteri, speech given in Maputo, Mozambique (one of the poorest countries in
the world) for the conference “Global 2000 international smart partnership”, August 21, 2000. In this
occasion, Mahathir referred to financial markets traders as “cash cows”.
27. Daily transactions rose from $15 billion in 1973 to more than $900 billion in 1992. In 2000 these
will amount to more than $1000 billion a day; Ucapan Perdana Menteri, “Global 2000 international
smart partnership”, August 21, 2000.
28. Hong-Kong, Annual meeting of the World Bank, September 20, 1997.
29. Ucapan Perdana Menteri, International association of historians of Asia, July 27, 2000.
30. Ucapan Perdana Menteri, “The Future of Asia”; Mahathirs’ position might be supported by the
Penthagon report Joint vision 2025 (see Korinman and Caracciolo’s article).
31. Ucapan Perdana Menteri, “Towards Asian Renaissance”, New Asia Forum, Kuala Lumpur,
November 1, 1996.
32. “You must accept democracy and human rights, otherwise you will see how we, the democratic,
will forcefully eliminate your rights and your freedom of self-determination”, International association
of historians of Asia, July 27, 2000.
116 33. “Towards Asian Renaissance”.
A NEW SILK ROAD?
THE ASEAN STATES Wenzhou

ASEAN countries
Fuzhou Taipei
COUNTRY
Population
1997 estimates
C H I N A TA I WA N
INDIA
Capital city
Guangzhou
Hong Kong
MYANMAR
Other town
46,600,000
Hanoi 0 400 km
MYANMAR LAOS
PHILIPPINES
Hainan Philippine
5,000,000
South Manila Sea
Vientiane VIETNAM China
Yangon LAOS 77,000,000
THAILAND Sea PHILIPPINES
TNAM
Bangkok CAMBODIA 73,000,000

Pacific
11,300,000 Ocean
IE
Phnom V
Pehn Ho Chi Minh City
Kota
THAILAND Kinabalu Celebes
61,000,000 Sabah Sea
BRUNEI
L A Y S I A Halmahera
A
M ak
MALAYSIA aw
Kuala Lumpur 21,000,000 Sar
Irian
SINGAPORE Kalimantan Jaya
Su 3,000,000 Sulawesi Buru Seram
m
at Banjarmasin
ra Banda
Palembang
I N D O N E S I A Sea
Indian INDONESIA
200,000,000 Arafura Sea
Ocean Jacarta Java Timor
AUSTRALIA
considered a historical accident. Western infallibility is all but against the facts:
“We, the Malay people, would have remained a British colony had it not been for
the Japanese conquest, which revealed that those who seemed invincible were not
such”.34 At the end of the day, “the Western model will vanish just as those who
preceded it”. “All systems – be they feudal, republican, capitalist, socialist, or
communist – have been regarded as faith”, and consequently any questioning of
them was considered heresy. The reality is, however, that they have been
questioned. The same destiny will “when the time is right, come for democracy” as
for all human ideas: “All systems with which Mankind thought to improve society
were imperfect and became more so when clever people sanctified it”.35 To
conclude, according to Mahathir, the West continues to put its hands on its
presumed universality precisely because it is the only ideological instrument that is
left to the only survivor of the Cold War: the West itself.36
34. As above.
35. “The Future of Asia”.
36. International association of historians of Asia, July 27, 2000. 117
Who really is Dr Mahathir?

The apparent contradiction between the image of a modernist Malay
politician, a pro-Westerner, and an increasingly anti-Western agenda remains to
be explained. A first level of explanation could consist in the fact that the person
Mahathir cannot be explained solely on the basis of his “malayty”, his true
character being much more complex. Certainly, his mother was Malay, from
Kedah, a region belonging at different times to the Siam area. But his father was
Indian, which relates him to foreign minorities. This melting pot is reproduced in
the following generation, as two out of five of his children married foreigners.37
To this, one must add a hybrid education in the name of modernity: Mahathir
studied at the University of Malaya in Singapore, an English speaking but
culturally Chinese territory, and attended a Harvard course in international affairs
(1967). Moreover, he published in Malay as well as in English. His Muslim
dimension too – which is more than evident when he calls himself Malay as all
Malays are Muslim – should be understood as a sign of modernism. At an Islamic
conference he dared say that the reason for the lack of success of Islam’s
universalistic project lied in Muslim people themselves, adding that to prepare
oneself for the other world while refusing education and science in this one, is a
way to ignore Allah’s will.38 His diatribe with George Soros39 (during the FMI
summit) is better explained by a desire to highlight the financial menace,40 rather
than by anti-Semitism.41 The latter is a general characteristic of every politician at
the head of a Muslim country who, as such, must be officially anti-Semitic ever
since the creation of Israel.
Hence, behind a first impression of Dr Mahathir as a modern Malay, there is a
more complex man of networks, which far from being hazardous constitutes a
37. His eldest son married a Chinese, related to Liem Sioe Liong (alias Sudono Salim) owner of the
first Indonesian industrial conglomerate (Salim Group) and a Suharto partner; admittedly Mahathir
was not enthusiastic about this marriage. His eldest daughter married in the ‘80s a French man
working for the Club Méditerranée.
38. According to Mahathir, the process of industrialisation failed because of divisions within the
Islamic world, whereas a disproportionate focus on doctrinal questions put an halt to the cognitive
process: see Ucapan Perdana Menteri, inaugurating speech for the 7th Islamic Conference of Foreign
Ministers, Kuala Lumpur, June 27, 2000; see also his Perspectives on Islam and the Future of Muslims,
Institute of Islamic Understanding Malaysia (IKIM), Kuala Lumpur 1993.
39. Soros Quantum Investment Fund gained $1 billion in profits speculating with the pound in 1992:
see BBC News, December 6, 1998, news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/business: “Mr Soros has aspirations to
be more than a speculator…”; later the market turned his back on him as Mr Soros lost a large amount
of money in 1998, forcing him to close a fund and restructure another one. Yet his book, The Crisis of
Global Capitalism, Public Affairs, New York 1998, does not entirely contradict Dr Mahathir’s views on
financial matters (BBC News, December 4, 1998). However, this does not stop the two to hate one
another: Mr Soros publicly ask for Dr Mahathirs’ resignation.
40. The crisis had as a consequence the eviction of the potential heir and Ministry of Finances Anwar
Ibrahim: father of 6, former responsible of the association of Muslim students, he was accused of
corruption and sodomy, and sentenced to 6 years in 1999.
41. A strong feeling of anti-Semitism gives to Mahathir a politically correct image: with regard to this,
he prohibited S. Spielberg’s Schindler’s List in 1993. See J. SIKES end P. ENGARDIO, “Malaysia’s Mahathir:
118 Leading a Crusade against the West”, Business Week, April 25, 1994.
A NEW SILK ROAD?
sociological type, as old as the peninsula itself. In fact, by virtue of its geopolitical
situation, Malaysia needs to operate a synthesis of the different influences it came
in contact with in order to exist.
This situation mirrors the more general one of Southeast Asia. Mahathir thus
plays the role of spokesperson of the area, with the mission of contrasting the
strong threat represented by the US. To do this, he deliberately chooses
provocation as his communication style, which for a small but rich country (big oil
exporter, with a stock market capital corresponding to half that of Germany, and
above world average) is the surest, and safest, way to be heard. Japan, (the second
world power and the first world creditor at the end of the last century) is in his
eyes the perfect example for contradicting the universality of Western values and,
as such, the perfect example of a modern Asian model. As Western outspoken
critic is has all credentials: his father supported the India ultra nationalist Hose,
who fought the Japanese during the Second World War.42
Mahathir hence perfectly represents Southeast Asia, a structurally fragile
region surrounded by three Empires, Indian, Chinese and Javanese.43 As a result,
local identities underwent a twofold process. On one hand, they became
politically isolated being attached to their cultural specificity. On the other, the
integration of the area was possible thanks to Chinese, Indian, and Arab diasporas
who controlled goods and capital circulation
To conclude, Mahathir appears neither a buffoon nor a nationalist. He rather
illustrates the situation of an area 44 which, energing from a fifty-year period of
decolonisation and more than a century of colonisation, wants “to decide things
for itself”.45 Taking as his the debate about Asian values, launched by Leen Kuan
Yew at the beginning of the ‘90s, he has won over other Asian countries. They
indeed declared in Bangkok in 1994 that “if unspecific human rights are universal,
then one must consider them in a dynamic process of putting in place
international norms, considering the regional and national particularism”.46
Moreover one must acknowledge that the attitude of Western propagandists
42. See the ambassador R.D. PALMER, “Globalism vs. Economic Nationalism: The Southeast Asia Case”,
American Diplomacy, www.unc.edu.depts/diplomat/amdipl 12/palmer global1.htm. Subah Chandra
Bose (1897-1945), was elected president of All India Trade Union Congress in 1938, with the explicit
mission of contrasting the British. The following year, however, he broke off with Gandhi, whom he
found too conciliating. Bose founded the Forward Block and launched an anti-British campaign. He
fled to Germany in January 1941, where he founded the Free India Centre, then left to South East
India. He became an ally of Japan, which in turn helped him organise a liberation army (Azad Hind
Fauz) and instaure a provisory government in Singapore. This army managed to take over a part of
British India (today Manipur, near Burma), thanks to the support of many Southeast Indians.
43. See the Majapahit Empire (14-15th centuries), around Java. It stretched over a great portion of
today Indonesia.
44. See G. SHERIDAN, Asian Values Western Dreams: Understanding the New Asia, Allen & Unwin,
London 2000.
45. Executive Intelligence Review, February 19, 1999, interview of Datuk Seri Dr. Mahathir bin
Mohamad.
46. Preparation meeting for the World Conference on Human Rights. 119
nourishes Dr Mahathir irredentism, the former showing no complex whatsoever

about their past as oppressors, and talking with great arrogance. Warren
Christopher’s words, uttered in the mid ‘90s, perfectly illustrate the case: “There is
only one way of acting which is acceptable on a world level, and the US will apply
it in every country (…) we cannot make of cultural relativism the last refuge of
repression”.
120
121-134/occhLiMes/Martellini 6-10-2000 15:28 Pagina 121
A NEW SILK ROAD?
THE EUROPEAN POLICY

TOWARDS
KOREA by Paolo COTTA-RAMUSINO and Maurizio MARTELLINI
K OREA PRESENTS SOME UNIQUE

aspects in the present-day international situation. Firstly, it is the last country still
divided between a Communist and a non-Communist state, both of which are
internationally recognised. Korea has been resisting unification for more than a
decade following the collapse of the Soviet Union and still now it is totally unclear
when its unification will happen. Secondly, North Korea experienced in the recent
past an incredibly severe economic hardship, something that is generally
unexpected in an industrialised and (formerly) developed country during
peacetime. Finally North Korea has been on the forefront among the countries that
are “of concern” regarding nuclear and missile proliferation. These three problems
are correlated and ways out should be sought that would address the complexity
of the Korean situation.
Let us first start with a quick review of some economic indicators of the
Democratic People Republic of Korea (DPRK). The 1990s have been characterised
as the “lost decade” for North Korea. Practically all the economic and social
indicators are written in red ink. For instance:
(1) The variations of North Korea’s GNP have been consistently negative from
1990 to 1998. Estimates of the decrease of GNP are highly dependent on the
assumptions made. According to one estimate of the Bank of Korea, 1 the
variations of North Korea’s GNP are as follows: 1990: -3.7%; 1991: -5.1%; 1992:
-7.7%; 1993: -4.2%; 1994: -1.8%; 1995: -4.6%; 1996: -3.7%; 1997: -6.8%; 1998: -1.1%.
The corresponding per capita GNP decreased from $1064 in 1990 to $573 in 1998.
Only in 1999 can we see a modest GNP increase and a modest improvement of the
economic situation. This dramatic drop of North Korea’s economic conditions can
be related to specific environmental problems (such as climatic events affecting
the agricultural production), but more fundamentally to the demise of the Socialist
political and economic community.
1. Reported in J.A.B. WINDER “The Economic Dynamics of the Korean Peninsula Peace Process” (May
26, 2000), available at the website of the Korea Economic Institute of America (www.keia.org). See
also P.M. B ECK , “Beyond balancing: Economic Cooperation on the Korean Peninsula”, paper
presented at the US Korean Security Studies 14th Annual Conference, October 27-30, 1999. 121
THE EUROPEAN POLICY TOWARD KOREA
(2) North Korea’s external trade declined probably by a factor 3 in the period
1990-1998.2 To explain the decline in trade one should take into account the fact
that, since the beginning of the 1990s, the traditional trade partners of the DPRK,
namely the Socialist countries and particularly Russia, stopped subsidising the
DPRK and required commercial transactions in convertible currencies. China
continues to supply the DPRK with some food and combustibles but to a degree
that has been insufficient to sustain the basic needs of the DPRK.
(3) Energy production and consumption, and food production dramatically
declined during the 1990s. The grain production fell from 8 million tons in 1990 to
2.5 million tons in 1996. In the same period the consumption of fertilisers fell by a
factor 6, while energy, oil and coal supplies all decreased by more than a factor 2.3
By comparison the Chinese contribution of grain is now of the order of magnitude
of 1-2 million tons per year.
(4) The problem of DPRK’s energy production (and distribution) is aggravated
by the status of the electric infrastructure that relies entirely on old, worn out
Soviet equipment. A modernisation of this infrastructure would require access to
modern technology and to foreign investments that are at present unavailable. The
consequence of this has been an increased reliance on the rationing of both
energy and food with priorities given to the military and political apparatus.
(5) The agricultural production during the 1990s has been also affected by
adverse climatic conditions, but the drop of external trade (implying the decrease
of agricultural supplies from abroad) or, in other words, the increasing reliance on
autarchy (the so called “ju-che” policy) probably is more relevant to explain the
agricultural failure.4 The net result is that, despite Chinese and other international
help, the food situation in North Korea caused an unknown number of famine-
related fatalities (maybe over a million) and an incredible hardship for the citizens
of the DPRK. In this the rural areas have been much more affected than the urban
ones that are accorded a more privileged status by the present regime.
The political situation of North Korea is also peculiar among the (former)
Socialist countries. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold
War, the cooperation between the DPRK and the countries of the former Soviet
block was sharply reduced (including military assistance). An alternative option (in
theory) would have been for the DPRK to shift to more extensive cooperation with
countries with market economies. Examples of similar shifts were not missing
including China itself, or Vietnam. But this opening would have probably
jeopardised the very existence of the DPRK. After all there was already a capitalist
Korea, and the example of the end of East Germany, and of the destiny of the
2. As above.
3. J. H. WILLIAMS, D. VON HIPPEL, P. HAYES “Fuel and Famine: Rural Energy Crisis in the DPRK”, Policy
Papers 46 of the Institute on Global Conflicts and Cooperation (IGCC), University of California San
Diego (2000) available at http://www-igcc.ucsd.edu/publications/.
4. H. SMITH, Y. HUANG “Achieving Food Security in North Korea”, contributed paper to the Forum on
Promoting International Scientific Cooperation in the Korean Peninsula, (Landau Network - Centro
122 Volta and Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Rome, June 1-2, 2000.
A NEW SILK ROAD?
leaders of most of the other socialists states, was not projecting a bright future for
the DPRK and its leadership. Another obstacle to such cooperation had to do with
the past behaviour of the DPRK, characterised by unpaid debts, the default being
almost immediate and “recidivous upon repeated rescheduling”.5 The total amount
of the defaulted debt relevant to the period 1970-75 is $1.2 billion in hard currency.6
Finally, the goal of Korean unification was traditionally seen by the leadership
of the DPRK as the prevalence of a strong North over a weak and unstable South.
As a symbol of strength, the DPRK always made an outstanding (political and
economic) effort to keep a strong armed force (1.25 million men in 1987.7 In the
1990s the situation may have looked rather different and more worrisome to the
leaders of North Korea. By 1992 all the countries of the former Socialist block
(including China) had recognised South Korea. Differently from the case of the
DPRK, the economic development of South Korea has been outstanding (despite
the 1997 crisis) The GNP of South Korea is now more than 40 times bigger than
the one of the North and the per capita GNP is over 20 times bigger.
Compared with South Korea the North appears politically isolated and a dwarf
from the economic point of view. It was the military strength, the missile
production and the nuclear program that had the effect of keeping the DPRK at
the front stage of international politics.
North Korea and Nuclear Weapons

The motivations that influenced Kim Il Sung to begin the nuclear military
programme somehow between 1989 and 1990 may include:
(1) The desire to maintain and enhance North Korea’s security in a very
difficult time. The DPRK had problems with her major military allies: the Soviet
Union was in disarray and China was dialoguing and expanding trade with South
Korea and the West. In the meantime the DPRK had to continue facing an
opponent armed with nuclear weapons, namely the US.
(2) The assumption that nuclear weapons may be cheaper than large
conventional forces.
(3) The desire to acquire political and diplomatic attention in the international
arena and obtain consequently political and economic advantages.
In about three years (1990-93) the DPRK shifted from denying any nuclear
weapon program to threatening the withdrawal from the Non Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) that it signed in 1985. This happened despite some events that should have
partially eased the security concerns of the DPRK. In 1991 the US withdrew all
nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula and the two Koreas signed a joint
declaration pledging “not to test, produce, receive, possess, deploy or use any
nuclear weapons” and “not to possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium
5. As above.
6. See note 1.
7. N. EBERSTADT, “The End of North Korea”, The American Enterprise Institute, Washington DC 1999. 123
enrichment facilities”.8 The DPRK announced her intention to withdraw from the
NPT on March 12, 1993 and the Agreed framework between the US and the DPRK
was concluded on October 21, 1994. During this 19-month crisis there was a major
risk of nuclear proliferation involving a country that is part of the NPT. The risk of
war was also considerably high, as appears from the July 1993 statement of
President Clinton that if North Korea developed and used nuclear weapons, the
US “would quickly and overwhelmingly retaliate. It would mean the end of their
country as they know it”.9
An indisputable merit of the Agreed Framework was exactly the capping of
this serious danger of nuclear proliferation and of a major international crisis, by
freezing the nuclear weapons capabilities of the DPRK at the 1993 level (enough
to construct few bombs, about two).
The provisions of the Agreed Framework (replacement of graphite-moderated
reactors in the DPRK with light-water reactors, delivery of 500,000 tons annually of
heavy oil, disposal of the North-Korean spent fuel) clearly place some economic
burden on the US and on the international consortium (KEDO) that was instituted
for the implementation of the Agreed Framework. But the perspective of a more
peaceful and stable situation in the Korean Peninsula certainly offsets these
financial costs.
But the limits of the Agreed framework (and of KEDO) are intrinsic: the
Agreed Framework is not aimed at addressing the global economic, agricultural
and even energetic problems of the DPRK. It is only aimed at addressing the
specific threat of nuclear proliferation with a compromise solution that keeps the
DPRK inside the NPT. Also it is not aimed at addressing the problems related to the
missile program of the DPRK.
The uncertainties concerning the future of the Agreed Framework are many:
first it is practically certain that the deadline of 2003 for the completion of the LWRs
(Light Water Reactors) in the DPRK will not be met. Moreover, before delivering
key elements that would make the reactors operational, many legal requirements
have to be satisfied, including a precise accounting by the IAEA of all DPRK past
and current nuclear activities. Before the new reactors become operational, many
technical problems have to be addressed, and not minor ones! The present DPRK’s
electric grid is unable to receive the electricity from the new LWRs under safe
conditions. Dramatic improvements should be made that would be expensive and
will take time.
How the DPRK will react, facing the missed deadline of 2003 is yet to be seen.
But it should be evident that the problems related to the implementation of the
Agreed Framework are to be addressed in a more comprehensive approach that
would take other aspects of the Korean crisis into consideration, such as the
missile programmes, economic and political cooperation between the two Koreas
8. See R. COSSA, “The US-DPRK Agreed Framework. Is Still Viable? Is it Enough?”, Pacific Forum, CSIS,
Honolulu 1999.
124 9. As above.
A NEW SILK ROAD?
and more generally the economic cooperation between the DPRK and the external
world.
DPRK’s Missile Programme

The DPRK acquired short range ballistic missiles (SBRM) in the ’60s and ’70s
from both China and USSR. Indigenous production of SBRM’s began at the end of
the ’70s with the Hwasong series. The original military rationale for the production
of such missiles was the need to hit directly the main targets in South Korea. The
Hwasong missiles are modifications and adaptations of the Russian Scuds.
International cooperation with Egypt has been apparently fundamental for the
development of the DPRK missile programme.10
A reorganisation of the DPRK missile production facilities went underway in
the late 1980s. The short range missile Hwasong 6 was the first result of this
reorganisation. It is a missile of about 500 km range with a warhead of about 700
kg. There may have been produced something between 600 and 1000 Hwasong
5/6 missiles of which between 300 and 500 have been sold to foreign countries.11
These countries include Iran, Syria, Egypt, possibly Libya. The price of a Hwasong
6 missile is thought to be about $2 million.12 The production and export of SRBM
has become then an important source of revenues for the DPRK.
The production of Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM) began in the
1990s with the so-called No-dong missile with a range of 1300-1500 km and more
recently with the Taepo-dong missile with a range of 2500 km. In both cases the
weight of the warhead is most likely between 700 and 1000 kg.13 As for the shorter
range missiles there are two motivations to be taken into account for the DPRK’s
production of IRBM: a desire to improve the military capabilities of its armed forces
and the possible advantages deriving from the selling of the missiles and/or of the
related technologies to other countries. In this respect we notice that the Pakistani
Ghauri missile is an adaptation of the No-dong and so is the Iranian Shehab 3.
The next step for the DPRK may be the acquisition of Intercontinental Ballistic
Missiles (ICBM). Already the modified Taepo-dong tested over Japan in August
1998 has apparently a range of about 4000 km. The new Taepo-dong 2 should
have a range of over 6000 Km.
The DPRK’s missiles programmes raised a general concern in the international
community and particularly in the US. The first concern comes from the spread of
SRBM to critical areas like the Middle East where a short range missile has a
“strategic significance”. A second concern comes from the fact that IRBM, and
more so ICBM, are military useless unless the relevant warhead contains a nuclear
10. J. BERMUDEZ JR., “A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK”, CNS Monterey Institute
of International Studies, Occasional Paper, 2, 1999.
11. As above.
12. As above.
13. As above. 125
(or chemical or biological) weapon. A conventional warhead on a missile with a

relatively low degree of accuracy (as is presumably the case of DPRK’s missiles)
will not be effective in war and will be extremely costly.
So the danger derives from the combination of longer range missiles with
weapons of mass destruction. A word of caution is needed at this point. Having a
long range missile and a weapon of mass destruction separately is not the end of
the story: one needs also to adapt the warhead to the missile. This adaptation may
constitute a serious technical problem since one wants the warhead to resist the
heat and the severe stress experimented during the flight. More fundamentally one
has a compatibility problem between warhead and missile that involves the design
of the weapon itself. So even if the DPRK had an intercontinental missile and the
capability to build few [crude] nuclear weapons, it would be premature to cry wolf
and assume that the DPRK would be on the verge of having the capability to hit a
target at intercontinental distance with nuclear missiles.
Concerns about the missile program of the DPRK are now extensively used as
the main motivations to justify the National Missile Defence (NMD) project in the
US and similar programmes for the defence against theatre ballistic missiles in East
Asia.
So we see the beginning of a chain reaction: the missile programme of the
DPRK, the antimissile programmes of the US, a possible increase of the ICBM fleet
of China that may feel its deterrent power to be diminished by a US NMD, a
possible Indian reaction to Chinese actions and again a possible Pakistani reaction
to India.
It is then of paramount importance that a negotiated stop of the DPRK missile
programme is carried on as soon as possible. Already some openings exist on the
DPRK side. The best solution would probably be to carry on an agreement where
the interruption of the DPRK’s missile programmes may be compensated by the
end of the Western sanctions and embargo against the DPRK and by the removal
of DPRK from the US list of terrorism-sponsoring states.14
The problem of the long range missile programmes of the DPRK may be
confronted with an approach bearing some similarity with the approach of the
Agreed Framework. In both cases the solution may lie in a diplomatic setting
where restraints are compensated with reassurance and concessions of political
and economic nature.
Economic and Political Cooperation with North Korea

The recent Summit between the leaders of the two Koreas (June 2000)
highlighted the possibility of a different political cooperation in the Korean
peninsula. Everybody agrees that it is too soon to have overly optimistic
14. L. SIGAL, “Negotiating an End to North Korea’s Missile-Making”, contributed paper to the Forum on
Promoting International Scientific Cooperation in the Korean Peninsula, (Landau Network - Centro
126 Volta and Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Rome, June 1-2, 2000.
A NEW SILK ROAD?
expectations, not to mention prospects of Korean unification. It is also too soon to

evaluate the results of the Summit. The suspicion has been raised that for now the
results are essentially cosmetic in nature. As an example, we notice that even a
relatively easy problem as family reunification (involving at maximum 80,000
people) has been treated with an outstanding degree of bureaucratic stiffness.
But the Intra-Korean dialogue, the cornerstone of the pacification of the region,
is a reality. Interestingly enough, the Summit happened after a period of dramatic
increase of the Intra-Korean trade. From 1990 to 1999 the Intra-Korean trade rose
from a negligible amount to over $300 million.15 South Korea is now the biggest
source of hard currency for North Korea.
If the Intra-Korean economic exchange and political dialogue is the most
promising recent evolution, the cooperation between the DPRK and some
Western states is also important.
Italy and Australia recently recognised the government of the DPRK; this is an
example that could be easily followed by other states. An international Forum on
the Korean Peninsula was organised in Rome by the LNCV (Landau - Centro Volta)
and by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on June 1-2, 2000, just before the
meeting between the two Koreas. The Forum had a wide international participa-
tion of governmental and non-governmental institutions, and was concluded with
an appeal to the international organisations to foster dialogue and cooperation in
Korea (see Annex).
Cooperation and dialogue between North Korea and the countries with
market economies should be promoted. This cooperation should address mainly
different areas of North Korean economic and civic life such as the rehabilitation
of the energy production and distribution infrastructure, the improvement of
health service, the restructuring of agriculture.
In the aftermath of the Summit between the leaders of North and South Korea
in June 2000, the EU needs to reflect on its role with regard to the Korean
Peninsula and with the DPRK in particular. The start of an inter-Korean dialogue
and intensified contacts between the DPRK and a number of other nations have
created a momentum that should not be missed, lest the EU be marginalised. This
is the time to intensify the EU-DPRK political dialogue and to break new ground
for cooperation between the EU and North Korea aimed at the latter’s economic
recovery and development and its integration into the international community.
An Enhanced EU Role in North Korea

There are three main reasons for EU engagement with North Korea.
(1) The need to promote peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, as well
as security in the region. After half a century, the state of war must end. So must
North Korea’s threats to the region and beyond. Isolation will only lead to further
15. See note 1. 127

radicalisation of the regime and more human misery in the country. Promoting
regional and international security is also consistent with the EU policies of the
recent past.
(2) North Korea urgently needs assistance with its social and economic
development. We cannot afford to look the other way even if we may be
dismayed by some of the regime’s policies and its human rights record.
(3) The EU has an interest in taking a stake in the development of the North
Korean economy, which would only be enhanced after unification, with a
combined population of approximately 70 million. The economic vibrancy of the
region as a whole should also be taken into consideration.
Now that North and South Korea are publicly committed to reconciliation
through dialogue and concrete cooperative programmes and that many countries
are seeking to normalise their relations with Pyongyang, EU policy towards the
DPRK should move beyond its present scope, which is limited to a political
dialogue, annual financial contributions to the Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organisation (KEDO) and humanitarian assistance, especially food
aid. By extending the dialogue into engagement through cooperation, the EU
would fall into step with and strengthen the engagement policies of its partners in
KEDO, thereby reinforcing international policy objectives such as DPRK accession
to non-proliferation regimes and its continued moratorium on missile testing. The
EU should also coordinate closely with other countries that have a political
leverage on the DPRK and that have shown a readiness to support it economically,
such as China and Russia. Involving regional countries in an action plan for North
Korea’s economic rehabilitation could serve as an important regional confidence-
building approach which could induce Pyongyang to adopt the necessary policies.
The geographical distance of the EU from Northeast Asia makes it an
acceptable, useful and welcome non-regional partner in an evolving multilateral
process. Continued financial support for KEDO activities is an obvious first option
for providing EU assistance to North Korea. Euratom membership since 1997 has
been highly appreciated by the other three members of the KEDO Executive
Board, the US, South Korea and Japan. The EU Council is likely to extend the EU
contribution to KEDO for 2001-2006 to a level of almost half the US annual
contribution of $35 million.
The Agreed Framework and KEDO have been essential in averting a crisis and
initiating cooperation with North Korea. But they do not provide a framework for
EU policy. Hence the need to look beyond. If current political trends persist,
KEDO need not remain the sole avenue to cooperation with North Korea. In
addition to provide continued support to KEDO, the EU should consider throwing
in its economic weight in order to strengthen South Korea and international efforts
towards integration of the DPRK in the international community.
Given the economic situation in the DPRK and taking Pyongyang’s own
priorities – power, agriculture and infrastructure – as a starting point, EU support in
128 one or more of these sectors seems natural. Among these options a strong case
A NEW SILK ROAD?
can be made for the rehabilitation of the power sector, especially of the DPRK
electrical power grid and/or assistance in the field of energy efficiency. There are
two reasons for this preference. First, power is rightly viewed as a DPRK priority.
The North Korea economy badly needs to upgrade its national electrical power
grid in order to be able to attract foreign investment as well as for domestic needs.
With around 5000 megawatt, annual power generation in North Korea is down to
less than 25% compared to ten years ago. Lack of reliable power has brought
down economic development and accounts for social disruption.
A no less important reason is the need for continuity and consistency. The
rehabilitation of the power sector in the power sector would complement the $4,6
billion investment in North Korea’s energy sector through the KEDO Light Water
Reactor project, to which the EU has contributed 75 million euro since 1996. The
Action Plan would thus reinforce the effect of funds provided to the DPRK by the
EU and its KEDO partners. Interaction between two activities within one sector, for
example the power sector, would add value to both. Beyond being a welcome
downstream complement of the KEDO-LWR project, to upgrade the electrical
power grid in North Korea is also technically necessary for the successful
completion of the LWR, as both reactors will need to be duly tested before their
ownership can be handed over to the DPRK.
Executive Summary of the International Forum on “Promoting International

Scientific, Technological and Economic Cooperation in the Korean Peninsula:
Enhancing Stability and International Dialogue”, Istituto Diplomatico Mario
Toscano, Villa Madama, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome, June 1-2, 2000.
Fostering Dialogue and Cooperation in Korea

The Korean Peninsula is one of the most critical areas of the world, where
long-term hostile relations have been coupled with the presence of strong military
forces, the risk of nuclear proliferation and the proliferation of other types of
weapons of mass destruction, the development, deployment and export of ballistic
missiles. At the same time the economic situation is a source of serious concern:
the gravity of food shortages and of the economic crisis of DPRK as well as other
humanitarian concerns are well known to the international community.
Cooperative security – combining reassurance with reciprocity, possibilities of
cooperation on condition that potential proliferators accept constraints on
weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs – is the most
promising strategy for preventing proliferation and ensuring peace and security in
Northeast Asia. 129
Mutual accommodation through diplomatic action has succeeded so far in

suspending nuclear proliferation in the Korean peninsula. On the contrary,
deploying missile defences – apart from their unverified effectiveness – could
antagonise other countries and promote an arms race.
A change in DPRK’s strategy should be welcomed and encouraged. Defusing
tensions, opening to international cooperation, not using military-related activities
to induce international economic aid, establishing cooperative relations with the
Republic of Korea are all important steps that need to be taken.
In order to maintain peace and security in North East Asia it is essential: (1) to
ensure that the competent authorities of North and South Korea exercise
maximum restraint and in any event, do not rush to military confrontation; (2) to
have DPRK and all the other countries of the region as fully compliant parties of
the NPT, of the CTBT, and of the other multilateral arms control and non
proliferation regimes; (3) to implement the joint (North-South) Declaration on the
denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula; (4) to find solutions for dissuading
DPRK from developing, testing, deploying and exporting medium- or longer-range
ballistic missiles; (5) to advance reconciliation between the two Koreas, to allow
the meeting and rejoining of divided families, to cooperate in order to achieve a
peaceful reunification of the peninsula, and (6) to advance international (political,
economic, scientific) cooperation between the international community and
DPRK. Emphasis should be placed on the improvement of the economic situation
and of the life conditions of people in the DPRK.
The June 12-14 North-South summit meeting has the potential for being one
of the most hopeful developments in Korea since the Korean War. If the two sides
declare an end to their long-standing enmity, that could lead to a period of
peaceful coexistence opening the way to far-reaching changes. They should be
encouraged by the international community to continue and expand their direct
dialogue and to establish a true cooperation.
Multilateral talks may defuse the military confrontation in Korea. New peace
mechanisms could work out detailed confidence-building measures to reduce and
disengage forces heavily concentrated along the DMZ. Arms limitation talks could
lead to mutual steps to reduce military tensions. The role of China and Russia
should be emphasised. The Four Party Talks represent an important forum for
seeking peace and stability on the peninsula. A revitalised non-aggression pact
between the North and the South might be reinforced by international guarantees.
Ultimately, the Korean reconciliation process could culminate in a peace treaty to
formally end the Korean War.
Parallel to this process, the United States and the DPRK could declare an end
to adversarial relations. As a practical step toward that end, the United States could
further lift its sanctions. In return, the DPRK could agree in writing to a formal
moratorium on missile testing.
Japan and the DPRK are moving expeditiously to normalise relations,
130 including recognising their past history. The DPRK could encourage such
A NEW SILK ROAD?
progress by doing its utmost to account promptly for any missing Japanese
nationals.
KEDO remains a cornerstone of security in the Korean peninsula. The role of
IAEA in the region will be extremely important in the future. The international
community must ensure that these international organisations have the means and
the resources to fulfil their missions.
The international community’s stake in Korea is however not limited to non-
proliferation. It could do more both politically and economically to facilitate a
relaxation of tensions. For instance additional countries could establish diplomatic
ties with DPRK (as Italy did) or intensify their present contacts, promote
multinational aid to upgrade DPRK’s infrastructure in energy and transportation,
cooperate in the development of enterprises with a technological basis and
promote sustainable development in agriculture. Such initiatives should be
addressed by innovative multilateral approaches based on the KEDO model. An
important role can be assigned to the cultural cooperation with the DPRK (at the
level of Universities, research centres and cultural institutions) and also to the
exchange of visits for cultural and training purposes. The EU and its Member States
should play their part in this process and strongly support such efforts.
131
A NEW SILK ROAD?
Part III
What IS
ASIA?
135-140/LiMes/Nambiar 6-10-2000 15:29 Pagina 135
A NEW SILK ROAD?
THE INDIAN
BRIDGE by V.K. NAMBIAR
T HE INTERCOURSE BETWEEN INDIA AND

Europe has been virtually continuous over the ages, despite the obstacles of
geography, language and ethnicity. The connections between the Hindu culture
and Mesopotamia, Asia Minor and Greece go back to the earliest periods of
recorded history. The similarity between the social structures as well as the belief
systems of the Aryans in the Indo-Ganges plains and those of Greece were so
close as to reveal shared cultural roots. Yet, historically, India’s primary
contribution to the world has been its unique spiritual perspective into the
meaning of life as well as into man’s quest for deeper expressions of his identity.
Interactions with the outside world, whether eastwards with China or westwards
with Europe, in the realm of values and ideas became evident with the spreading
into these regions first of the Upanishad and later of the Buddhist concepts and
arguments about the nature of the “self”, the provenance of desire and the
transitoriness of the outward appurtenances of our material existence. These
concepts provided the original perspectives of the Indian view of life. Unlike the
scriptural injunctions of most of the great religious traditions outside the
subcontinent, rather than focussing on the certainty of values they stressed their
tenuousness, the need for balance and inward integrity, the continuous inquiry
into the nature of truth which was uncertain, the only certainty being that which is
untrue. They also placed a great value on individual judgement and responsibility.
In their contacts with the outside world in the economic, social or political
sphere, these interactions were more diverse and many-sided. Although ancient
India did boast a mature political tradition based on the Panchayat system of
primitive grassroots democracy, this did not prove to be resilient in the face of the
authoritarian urges of feudal society. The system of agrarian bureaucracy in India
was in some ways less developed than in China, with an entrenched trading
community and a privileged aristocracy that were not even threatened by the
Muslim invasions. The structure of rural society, which was organised through the
caste system, provided a framework for all social activities from pre-birth to after-
life at the village community level, making the role of central government largely
superfluous. Change, innovation and heterodoxy were absorbed without major
social turbulence by the formation of new castes and sub-castes. The fact that this 135
THE INDIAN BRIDGE
system survived the arrival of the Moguls was an indication of its resilience and
absorption capacity. However, in turn, the Mogul structure eventually collapsed
following the dynamics of increasing exploitation produced by its tax collection
system. Unlike the character of society in some parts of East Asia where a section
of the native elite used the economic surplus as the basis for industrial growth, in
India, with the coming of the colonial powers, the foreign conqueror, the landlord
and the money-lender absorbed and dissipated this surplus causing economic
stagnation.
Throughout history, India’s relationship with China has been beneficent
though distant. There has been more giving than taking. With the spread of
Buddhism, India’s cultural influence spread over East Asia both by sea and by
land. The names of Bodhidharma and Kumarajiva became as well known as those
of Fa Xian and Xuan Zang symbolising the intense spiritual engagement between
our two civilisations. Buddhism attracted both the masses and the Chinese
intelligentsia, arriving, as it happened, at a time when the country was divided into
various contending kingdoms engaged in anarchic warfare. With the unification of
the country under the Sui dynasty, the religion adopted from abroad became a
stabilising force within the empire. In due course, Buddhism was, in turn, fused
with Taoism and incorporated beliefs and superstitions of indigenous cults. But
the concept of the Karma was firmly engraved in Chinese thought and found
resonance even after the decline of orthodox Buddhism. The interaction with
China included other important areas like art and trade. As in the case of trade
with the West, incense, fruit, flower and spices were the Indian export products.
From China, Tang silk flowed westwards to India along the legendary Silk Route.
We are told that an Indian scholar tried to introduce the zero and the table of sine
functions into 9th century China. He was apparently unsuccessful in obtaining
Chinese acceptance of these inventions. As far as art goes, however, Chinese
craftsmen showed a greater amenability to absorb a new structure of subject and
style together with the introduction of a new religion. Indian art forms were to
create a profound change in the artistic world of China.
During the Middle Ages there was little or no direct contact between India and
the West. Contact was established in 1498 when Vasco da Gama landed in Calcutta
and launched a new epoch in history. It was only by the end of the 16th century
that a party of English merchants set out for India by the overland route and
reached the imperial court of Emperor Akbar. Shortly after, in 1608 the East India
Company received the permission of Emperor Jahangir to set up a factory in Surat.
This marked the beginning of the British Empire in India.
Coming to today’s world, while it is generally recognised that a shift has taken
place in the global centre of gravity away from the Atlantic to the Pacific Rim and
that the rise of Asia after five centuries of European dominance is an event of
historic importance, it would be premature to declare definitively any decline of the
Atlantic and the Mediterranean. With the growing prospect of a United Europe
136 emerging as an area of renewed growth, optimism and dynamism, this proposition
A NEW SILK ROAD?
INDIA
Srinagar
Jammu
e Kashmir
Himachal
Shimla Pradesh Arunachal
Punjab
Pradesh
Chandigarh
Haryana Sikkim
New Delhi
Delhi
Lucknow Gangtok
Jaipur Assam
Uttar
Rajasthan Pradesh
Patna
Bihar
Gandhinagar Bhopal
Calcutta
Gujarat Madhya Pradesh
Nagaland
Bhubaneswar
Manipur
Maharashtra Orissa Tr i p u r a
Mumbai Mizoram
We s t e r n
(Bombay) Bengal
Hyderabad
Meghalaya
ka
Andhra
ata
Goa Panaji
Pradesh
rn
Ka
Bangalore Chennai
Pondicherry
Andaman
Kerala and Nicobar
Ta m i l N a d u Islands
Lakshadweep
Trivandrum
needs all the more a balanced assessment. Meanwhile the absolute and relative
power of the US shows no sign of decline. What are the implications of such a
possible shift for Asia, particularly for India? Undoubtedly, India can be expected to
benefit from the emergence of Asia. For at least three centuries India has had almost
exclusive links with the countries of Europe, mainly with Britain. It had become
necessary for us to find an appropriate balance between the Atlantic and the Pacific.
The rise of East Asia and the even more spectacular fall of the Soviet Union
have led to the so-called end of history and to the confirmation of the newly
accepted dogma of the primacy of international economics over international
security. Economics is now being viewed as the new catalyst for ensuring security. 137
THE INDIAN BRIDGE
The emergence of global financial markets, of supranational regional groupings

and the pervasive influence of transnational corporations are being accompanied
by new expressions of cross-border crime, by spontaneous and sometimes
unregulated population flows, and by an exponential growth of knowledge
industry as well as of global awareness due to the impact of satellite television.
Amidst these momentous changes, the Old World has collapsed. New mindsets are
needed to cope with these dramatic changes especially in the developing world.
Those who have the greatest information will be able to use it best. Information
flows will be difficult to control. New networks created on the basis of common
tastes and interests will straddle regions and transcend geography. This is likely to
affect the rhythms of traditional societies. Media power has begun to exacerbate
discontent and reinforce prejudices. Where they are driven by purely commercial
considerations, they are difficult to manage. But, side-by-side, barriers of race, caste
and colour are being increasingly challenged. Technology will continue to change
bringing with it a transformation of social relationships. The role and relationships
between state and non-state partners are also changing. As getting rich becomes
glorious around the world, the search for fungible goods – the need to have power
resources that can be converted from one type into another type with minimal cost
or complication (money being the most fungible of assets) – grows in all areas of
enterprise. Within national boundaries there are challenges ranging from
breakaway ethnic movements to growing vocal pressures from subaltern groups
within society seeking greater empowerment. The emphasis on greater openness
and transparency, while laudable by itself, sometimes tends to smother the interest
of the poor sections of society and the underclass. The need for a pluralistic
identity, while undeniable, also results in fears of dominance by oligarchic interest
groups and, at a global level, in the emergence of a new colonialism.
In this kind of international milieu, India cannot be expected to be able to
carve out a role for itself if it is to remain inured to the compulsions of change or
of globalisation. No country can hope to become a great power without a solid
and prosperous economy. Nor can it afford to remain impervious to the demands
of international competitiveness. But the answers are not easy. New strategies are
needed. We must overcome the effects of years of neglect of primary education,
basic health and make effective use of our human resources. Our infrastructure
needs to be built up drastically and ambivalence towards foreign investment to be
overcome decisively. In all these areas the state machinery can and should
function not merely as facilitator or as provider of the fundaments of legal
structure or as bureaucracy but essentially as the arbiter of public good.
China lies at the very heart of Asia. It is poised in time to become the largest
single economic power in Asia and possibly the second largest military power in
the world. Coping with such China will be a big challenge. It is necessary to
sidestep facile assumptions of confrontation whether in terms of a clash of
civilisations or of the more conventional character. For this to be done credibly,
138 India would have to develop the capacity to assert its strategic autonomy and
A NEW SILK ROAD?
civilisation weight not just in a regional sense, but in terms of its larger
responsibilities in the international stage. This can only be done through the
generation of a more confident self-image and an active regional and trans-
regional role. It would also mean tackling basic problems in the domestic
development agenda and the maintenance of systemic strength based on our
liberal, pluralist and democratic values.
India was one of the first developing countries to accredit its diplomatic
mission to the EEC in 1962. The first commercial cooperation agreement with the
EEC was signed in 1973, the first to be signed with a non-associate member
developing nation. The agreement, inter alia, provided for a highly powered Indo-
EEC Joint Commission to sort out periodic trade and commercial problems and to
place long-term trading interests between the two parties on a rational basis. This
was expanded in scope and content in 1981 and a further “third generation”
agreement on partnership and development was signed in December 1993.
Until recently, Asia has been a continent historically neglected by the EC.
However, the new Asian strategy put in place after the Essen Summit in 1994 has
raised Europe’s profile in Asia, promoted enhanced political dialogue, and
generated a sense of urgency in its engagement with this continent. While Europe
has predictably sought to leverage the growth prospects of East and Southeast
Asia, India has remained on the periphery of the EU’s Asian strategy largely due to
the relatively slow pace of the economic reform process in this country. Our
exclusion from the ASEM process to date is a reflection of this lack of urgency
though the winds of change seem to be affecting both ASEAN and Europe. An
expanded ASEM is likely to foster a new balance among the two continents and
North America. As traditional images and stereotypes of India change, we are
viewed less as a backward, conflict ridden and poverty stricken sub-continent in
the throes of natural and manmade disasters. The readiness with which we have
embraced the information technology revolution and the steady transformation of
the policy landscape in India has begun to carry out credibility, and the
institutional strengths as well as the resilience of our civil society show our ability
to withstand the ill-effects of outside induced destabilisation measures. India and
the EU are now building up a strong multidimensional relationship based on
shared interests and adherence to shared principles. The India-EU Summit held in
Lisbon in June this year is witness to the growing importance that both sides have
attached to the relationship. It has provided a unique forum for structured
exchange of ideas on a large number of issues concerning trade, finance,
investments and information technology. The Lisbon Summit declaration on the
“Prospects for EU-India Relations in the Twenty-first Century” and the Agenda for
Action provide both the evaluation and the operational bases for such a
partnership. There is the need to build on this through not only official efforts, but
also more intensive exchanges at the media, business, specialist-academic as well
as political levels, in order to fill the information gap and, at the same time,
contribute with greater sensitivity to each others core concerns. 139
141-148/LiMes/Yamada 6-10-2000 15:29 Pagina 141
A NEW SILK ROAD?
ASIA
VIEWED
FROM JAPAN by YUMIKO YAMADA
T HE G8 SUMMIT MEETING IN OKINAWA HAS

just finished. 1 For the very first time, the Japanese government received the
delegations of the major economic world powers outside Tōkyō or Kyōtō, an
unthinkable event until recently. The demonstrations that marked the arrival of Bill
Clinton reminded the whole world that the presence of the American military
bases since the aftermath of World War II is now opposed by the population of the
island – the theatre of terrible clashes between imperial Japan, an “Asian” power,
and the United States, affirming its leadership in the West. This event induces us to
wonder about Japan’s current position at a geopolitical level: is it really, as the
Americans believe, a mere “place of anchorage” of the Western world in the Far
East? 2 The fact that Japan is the only Asian member of the G8 leads us to pose
additional questions. How do the inhabitants of the archipelago view their
continent and what is the role that they would like their country to play fifty years
after the end of World War II?
Is Japan in Asia?
One of the main characteristics of Japan is its insularity. In addition to the four
major islands, it comprises nearly seven thousand isles and islets. This is the
reason why Japan is separated from the continent and, from a historical point of
view, was quite often left on the fringe of the events. There is no doubt that this
insularity moulded the identity of the Japanese, who often feel a separate people,
even with respect to the rest of Asia. After a period of intensive relations from the
17th to the 19th century with its closest neighbours and the Southeast of the
continent, under the rule of the Tojugawa shoguns, the country withdrew into
itself. With the reinstatement of an open policy from 1854 onwards and, in
particular, during the Meiji age (1868-1912), Japan turned towards the West. In so
doing, even though Japanese identity did not disappear, the country turned its
back to Asia. Naturally, the country as a whole is still imbued with values shared
1. July 21-23, 2000.

2. See Z. BRZEZINSKI, The Grand Chessboard, Chapter 6, Basic Books, New York? 141
ASIA VIEWED FROM JAPAN
by a number of Asian countries. Suffice to mention giri (sense of duty), ninjo

(compassion), or haji (sense of shame) – values of Confucian heritage that remain
part of Japanese culture despite the apparent westernisation of life style. Indeed, in
their private life, most Japanese keep on living like many other Asian people,
sitting on the floor on their tatami, and practising the cult of their ancestors, since
each home is provided with a Tokonoma, a small consecrated space devoted to
this purpose. Nonetheless, the Japanese do not feel likened to their neighbours
and, when asked to which country they feel closest, they generally answer that
Japan is unique and that it may not be compared with any other country in Asia.
The Asian Heritage

In any event, despite its insularity, Japan has been deeply influenced by its
closest neighbours. In ancient times, it imported from China its writing system, its
literature, the Confucian philosophy and the Buddhist religion. At those times, it
was customary for Japanese monks and students to move to the continent to
study. Korea was often a mandatory halting-place in these study tours. It is
reasonable to assume that, most of the time, the Korean peninsula filtered Chinese
influences. In any event, the “Asian” civilisation – basically Sino-Korean – was
introduced in the Japanese archipelago and subsequently “Japanised”. Hence,
going back to the writing example, after having adopted the Chinese ideograms
(that they called kanji) the Japanese developed two phonetic alphabets (kiragana
and katakana) that were unknown to Chinese and Korean people.
How Do the Japanese View Asia?

Keeping into account this “cultural indebtedness” of Japan, but also its
opening to the West that dates back to the Meiji age and that became more marked
since the end of World War II, it seems reasonable to ask how the Japanese view
today’s Asia.
The Japanese historical heritage causes one to think first and foremost – if not
exclusively – to China and Korea. Besides, the presence in Japan of communities
from these two countries is a definite reminder of both their geographical and
cultural vicinity. Quite curiously, what comes to mind is Mongolia, a country that is
generally liked. Sumo, the Japanese wrestling, is assumed to come from there and
the Mongols are believed to have the same physical physiognomy as the Japanese.
The blue spot that newborn babies have on their buttocks is called “Mongol spot”!
Even if it arouses nostalgia for their origins, Mongolia remains a mysterious
country for most Japanese, and those who have visited the country are quite rare.
The same applies to the countries of the Indo-Chinese peninsula. While nowadays
it is certainly easier to go there, there are but a few Japanese who are able to locate
Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia or Burma on a map. Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand
142 are better known given to the important economic relations that Japan has with
A NEW SILK ROAD?
US BASES IN JAPAN
Sapporo
HOKKAIDO
Misawa AB
Sea
U
of Japan
H
S
N
O
NAF Atsugi
H
Tokyo Fit Activities
Yokosuka
Camp Zama
Yokohama
Sagami Depot
Hiroshima Osaka
Yokota AB
MCAS Iwakuni Naval Port of Yokohama

SHIKOKU
Camp Fuji
KYUSHU
Fit Activities Sasebo
North
East Pacific Ocean
China
Sea
OKINAWA-JIMA
these countries. 3 And by now a number of Japanese tourists go there on a regular

basis.
In any event, even though no Japanese disputes the fact that these countries
belong to Asia, they are not perceived as culturally close to Japan – the only
exception being the ancient kingdom of Siam – since they belong to the Islamic
civilisation. The Japanese have the same feeling about the Filipinos, as they belong
to the Christian faith. Indeed, however unconsciously, the Japanese often identify
3. After all, at the beginning of the 1990s, the Japanese Economic Planning Ministry encouraged
Japanese enterprises to shift their investments towards the ANSEA countries. 143
Asia with Buddhism. Traditionally, in the Japanese subconscious, the Indian sub-
continent has not been considered to be a part of Asia. Instead there now are
many that include it in Asia in view of the fact that, although “ethnically” different,
Indians gave birth to Buddhism. Vice versa, no one considers the Middle East,
including Iran, a part of Asia.
On the other hand, the former Soviet region of Central Asia remains an
extremely elusive entity for the Japanese. Some are now including it in Asia, but
this seldom happened prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union. At any rate, with
the exception of experts, no one is able to locate these countries on a map or even
to mention their names.
The great majority of the Japanese agree that Siberia should be “excluded”
from the continent. For instance, they answer nearly unanimously that under no
circumstance may Vladivostok be considered an Asian city, notwithstanding its
closeness to Japan. “Ethnic-cultural” differences draw a definite boundary and,
therefore, the eastern border of Europe is set… in the Far East! Nowadays, out of
the Asian territories belonging to Russia, only the Kuril islands 4 – in Japanese
Hopooryodo, the “Northern islands” – have always been considered as belonging
to Japan and, therefore, to Asia. Owing to some rare form of nostalgia, this applies
also to the Southern half of Sakhalin.
Stereotypes and Prejudices

Given their immemorial historical links with Japan, the two countries that
come immediately into focus when dealing with Asia are China and Korea.
Nowadays, however, the Japanese have ambivalent feelings in their respect. As
mentioned previously, from ancient times until the Middle Ages, the Japanese
went there to study and perceived these countries as a model to be imitated. The
sources available refer to the visit of Korean delegations for shogun successions, a
testimony of the mutual respect that existed between those two countries.
However, from the Meiji age, Japan no longer had the same consideration for
China and Korea. Having opened its boundaries to the influence of the West, the
country aimed to develop its economy and to create a powerful army, with no
potential rivals in Asia. At that time, Japan did not mean to enter into competition
with its Asian neighbours, which in its opinion had already been excelled. Japan
meant to compete directly with Europe and North America. Hence, China and
Korea – the countries that from a historical point of view had transmitted their
civilisation to Japan – turned with the passing of time into the main objective of its
expansionist policy. At that time, a “strong” country needed to have colonies.
Officially, Japan claimed to “protect” its neighbours, by then deemed to be
“inferiors”. The country mentally started to “abandon” Asia, considering itself on the
4. In the Shibya quarter of Tokyo, the associations of refugees from the Kouriles islands, backed by
organizations of the extreme right, are constantly demonstrating to make public opinion aware of
144 their major claim: the restoration of their region of origin to the Nippon archipelago.
A NEW SILK ROAD?
US BASES IN OKINAWA
Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield North Training Area
Central Training Area

Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield
Camp Schwab
Station Torii Camp Hansen
Camp Foster Tengan Pier

MCAS Futenma Camp Courtney
Camp Kinser White Beach
Naval Port of Naha

NAHA Air Base Kadena
same footing with those Western powers with which it ended up catching up. From
then onwards, the continent it was connected to geographically and historically,
appeared to Japan as a series of countries with a varying degree of backwardness,
since none of them was able to compete with the West, regardless of its past might.
At the time of World War I, Soho Tokutomi had formulated Japan’s “Monroe
doctrine” for Asia. He had elaborated the concept of a “sphere of joint prosperity of
East Asia” that, later on, was to warrant the conquests of the Japanese imperialism.
According to this theory, which affected the Japanese in the period between the
First and Second World Wars, Japan was entitled and had a duty to manage Asia’s
problems. The Japanese superiority over its neighbours was justified on the one
hand by the stage of development Japan had already reached at that time and, on
the other, by “supernatural” reasons linked, in particular, to the cult of the emperor.
In 1930, a few strategists of the Japanese imperialism, such as Kanaji Ishihara (1889-
1994), 5 had also anticipated a division of the world between the West, which was
to be dominated by the United States, and the Nippon Empire, ruling over all of
Asia, including the Soviet Union, but with the exception of the Middle East!
5. See EGOCHI KEIICHI, Taikei Nihon non rekish futatsu no taisen, Shogakuran, Tōkyō 1988, pp. 188-189. 145
These were the reasons why, by that time, the Japanese had been viewing the
peoples of Asia with contempt, and they have kept on doing so more or less to the
present day, well after the 1945 defeat. While the postwar development turned
Japan into the second economic power in the world, it has certainly furthered the
persistence of prejudices against the Chinese and the Koreans. Quite often, these
prejudices have been transmitted by families that, still today, dissuade their
children from marrying citizens of the two nearby countries, even if they have
lived from quite a time in the archipelago. The Chinese who live in Japan are
always complaining about their integration difficulties 6 and a few Koreans of the
second or third generation at times feel the need to “Japanise” their name in order
to avoid being the victims of racial discrimination.
If “Chinese” and “Korean” were words with a negative connotation for the war
and “postwar” generations, it should be pointed out that slowly things are
changing. The younger generations are aware of the geographical but also cultural
vicinity of Korea and China, which they no longer forcedly perceive in a negative
manner. The recent economic development of a few Asian countries, such as
South Korea or Taiwan, causes the latter to look increasingly more like Japan. This
strengthens the idea of a common belonging subduing the sense of superiority on
part of the Japanese. We are dealing with a recent evolution but, by now, Asia
seems like it were more accessible and many more Japanese youths are travelling
there, taking advantage without a guilty conscience of their favourable prices.
Over half a century has elapsed since World War II and, as far as they are
concerned, those events are a heritage of schoolbooks. They consider their
grandparents responsible for the tragic war events and do not feel directly
interested in what happened. Prejudices tone down a little at a time, and the
Japanese are less mistrustful of or hostile to their Asian neighbours. After all, the
economic cooperation that is being furthered gives another and more positive
meaning to the expression “sphere of joint prosperity of Asia”.
What View for the Future?

Today, Japan may succeed in attaining with peaceful means what it had
intended at the time of its colonial venture. It may even do so respecting the
integrity of its neighbours and, indeed, Japan would like them to forget its negative
image. Japan is aware of being the only Asian country that, so far, succeeded in
equalling – and indeed, excelling in a few fields – the West, and its neighbours
willingly acknowledge it. At the same time, Japan is the only country in Asia
numbered among and acting as host to the richest countries in the world (G8).
Without saying it plainly, today’s Japan would like to present itself as the “natural”
6. In the 1980s, having held Japanese courses for Chinese students in Tokyo, quite a number of times
I listened to their complaints about the difficulties they were meeting in their integration into the
Japanese society, as much as the latter is imbued with “Asian” (Confucian) values transmitted more
146 often than not… by China.
A NEW SILK ROAD?
representative of Asia with respect to the rest of the peaceful world, provided that
it is actually acknowledged as such by its neighbours.
In the face of such a project, once again Japan needs to confront with its major
rival: China. Japan’s historical model, the Middle Empire, was the victim of
Japanese expansionism during the first half of the 20th century and continues to be
distrustful of it. On the other hand, present-day Japanese regard with astonishment
the spectacular development of China. Indeed, they feel giddy in front of the
potential of this state that, in their eyes, is boundless on account of both its
territory and its population. They are aware that, in the medium or long run, there
is a chance that their big neighbour might catch up with them or even excel them.
If the philosopher Wataru Hiromatsu was right in writing that “it is possible for
Northern Asia to be the major artificer of the future history”, 7 it will be necessary
to take China into account. In the future, Japan may hope to develop a
constructive cooperation with China, allowing the two countries to share a de
facto leadership in Asia. In any event, in order to do so they will need to get over
the contentions inherited from recent history.
7. H. WATARU, “Tohoku Asia ga rekishi no shukayu ni”, Asahi Shimbun, March 16, 1994. 147
149-152/LiMes/Tret’jakov 6-10-2000 15:29 Pagina 149
A NEW SILK ROAD?
TO STAY IN EUROPE,
RUSSIA MUST BECOME
AN ASIAN POWER by Vitalij TRET’JAKOV
S TRETCHED ALONG THE ENTIRE EURO-

Asian continent, Russia has always had to have two foreign policies: one for
Europe and the other for Asia. A digression into the history of these two policies
would be extremely interesting and telling, but for these purposes I will take them
as a historical fact and tradition.
Even as a European country, most of Russia’s territory is in Asia. The famous
saying “A Europe from Brest to Vladivostok” is paradoxical only from the point of
view of geography, not of culture. The Russians who have always or for
generations lived in Asia have never seen themselves as Asian.
Furthermore, many Muslims live in Russia, as well as Buddhists: now 13% of
the Russian population is Muslim, but at the time of the USSR the percentage was
higher. If religion (in this case Islam) is an indication of Asian identity, Asia starts in
the European territory of Russia: in the Northern Caucasus, in Tatarija, in Bashkirija
and in other regions of the Urals and of the Caspian Sea.
Leaving aside Turkey and Azerbajdzhan, whose belonging to Europe is in any
case relative, Russia is not just the only “Asian” country in Europe, but also the
only European country through which Europe spills into Asia and Asia into
Europe.
The frontier between the two civilisation runs in Russia, and over the past few
years has become increasingly conflictual. Asia invades Europe through Russia’s
territory; it invades it biologically. And if Russia becomes weaker, the frontiers of
Europe will shift immediately towards the West, on the line that runs from the
Baltic Sea to the Black Sea.
The subject of the article is not “Europe and Asia”, but this introduction is
necessary. Notwithstanding its national interests in Asia, Russia, for objective and
inevitable reasons, has been forced in the past – and will be in the future – to
sustain the burden of being Europe’s outpost in Asia, to act as a cushion between
the two civilisations, and has done so reluctantly and often hampered by other
Europeans.
Moving on to Russia’s interests in the Asian “super-region”, there are many
serious issues, some of which the Russiam President Vladimir Putin has recently 149
TO STAY IN EUROPE, RUSSIA MUST BECOME AN ASIAN POWER
made public for the very first time. In the past, these issues were confined to
unofficial and non-public debates.
The first problem regards the scarcely populated regions of Siberia and the
Russian Far East, followed by the ongoing and spontaneous expansion of the
Chinese in those areas. Thirdly, the Asian regions are isolated from the centre
and are economically backwards compared to the European regions of the
country. The fourth problem is due to the rich natural resources of the region
that makes it interesting to Russia’s geopolitical competitors. The last issue is the
populated and dynamic China, with which Russia shares 4,000 kilometres of
borders.
Most of these issues should be addressed through Russia’s internal rather than
foreign policies, but any failure of the first will have to be compensated by the
second.
Assuming that Russia manages to develop a more or less positive internal
policy towards its Asian regions, there still are two issues that require further
examination: the economic backwardness of Siberia and of Russia’s Far East, and
China.
It is worth underlining some of the main objectives and priorities of Russian
foreign policy in the Asian sub-region, understanding foreign policy in its broad
meaning and not strictly diplomatically.
(1) The South (the former Soviet republics, now the Southern states of the
CIS): maintenance of partnerships with these states, as allies or even satellites;
economic expansion towards them on the basis of the traditional ties formed
during the Soviet period; opposition to Chinese and especially Turkish expansion
in these countries; contrast of any Afghan-Pakistani threats.
(2) The search for strategic allies in Pacific Asia.
(3) A highly active policy as one of the main diplomatic and economic players
in the Asian-Pacific area, which globally is the sub-region number 1 in the 21st
century.
(4) Competition – even in the form of cooperation – with the hegemony of the
US and of China.
(5) Preparation to face any possible negative consequences of unexpected
developments in China or in its policy towards other states.
(6) Exploitation of the economic and financial potential of Pacific Asia for the
development of Russia’s Asian regions.
How and in what ways can Russia reach success in pursuing such objectives?
The answers are not obvious and would require elaborating alternative scenarios.
But in this article I will limit myself to highlighting what I consider the best
scenarios, leaving aside analysing the alternatives.
First, Russia’s foreign policy towards Asia, in its broadest sense, must become
at least as vigorous and important as its Euro-Atlantic policy.
Second, it is necessary to recover Russia’s military and maritime power in the
150 region to reach the Soviet levels.
A NEW SILK ROAD?
Third, it is necessary to establish exclusive diplomatic, economic and strategic

partnership ties with Japan and India, two key countries of the region, and to
include Siberia and the Russian Far East in the process. In view of the inevitable
reform of the UN, Russia should pursue the case for enlarging the Security Council
to include these countries among the permanent representatives. These countries,
and Japan in particular, should be given exclusive privileges to exploit Siberia and
the Russian Far East together with Russia and in exchange for investments in
Russia.
Fourth, Russia should become one of the patrons of the unification process
between North and South Korea.
Fifth, Russia should respond to China’s economic expansion in South Siberia
and in the Russian Far East by developing a strategy aiming at economic
expansion in all Chinese regions, regardless of their proximity to Russia.
Six, the much talked about idea of building a transport corridor from Europe
to Asia through Russia must be carried out (a Northern Sea route, a Trans-Siberian
highway).
Seven, Russia should have a clear position, develop initiatives and cooperate
with third countries on all issues, be they with regard to the Pacific Asian region
(and in Asia in general) or to the main countries of the area.
Eight, the main Russian cities in the region, Vladivostok or Khabarovsk, must
become political, cultural and financial cities comparable to Tōkyō, Beijing, Seoul,
Shanghai etc. – they must be among the capitals of the region.
All these objectives, and the ways to pursue them, are certainly extremely
ambitious. But Russia has no choice. Should it not achieve something comparable,
it will cease to be an Asian power within the end of the century, for the simple
reason that it will de facto lose most of its territories beyond the Urals.
The crossroads is either a highly proactive policy in Asia or an exit from Asia.
The latter option would not even solve all the problems. Even without its Asian
territories, Russia will never be free of its frontiers with Asia. Here lies Russia’s
biggest problem and the main incentive to do something about it.
151
153-156/occhLiMes/Durand 6-10-2000 15:33 Pagina 153
A NEW SILK ROAD?
A NEW
WORLD by Frédéric DURAND
A LTHOUGH ASIA AND EUROPE BELONG

to the same “Euro-Asian” continental sphere and share a common “Indo-
European” cultural background, Asia keeps on being a geographical area that
defies any easy circumscription by Western Europeans. The area may hardly be
delimited: Eastern Asia, Asia Minor, Central Asia, Southeastern Asia? Furthermore,
at least three major types of representation overlap. There is the one peculiar to
“oriental scholars”, the specialists of the countries of Asia that, nowadays, include
eight to ten thousand researchers throughout Western Europe. There is the one
perceived by the media and public opinion, coloured by exoticism and too often
by the dramatic recent events. And, finally, there is the one acknowledged by
political establishments and economic circles.
Through the latter, which often draws its inspiration from the other two
representations, the Western European view of Asia experienced at least three
major phases since the Second World War and is currently at a critical turning point
with respect to the contemporary world system.
The Surfacing of a Third World Asia and an Asia of Dragons

At the end of the war in Europe and in the Pacific, Europe discovered an Asia,
which, after glittering millenarian civilisations and extensive colonisation,
launched itself with all its might into economic development. This rapidly led to
the surfacing of two Asias. An Asia addressing the West, which had to be backed
and supported to avoid the unchaining of the domino theory that would have
caused these countries to move over towards the other Asia – a Communist Asia.
Hence, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the rising ASEAN, succeeded in attracting
both the attention and the support of the West. These countries offered cheap
labour to relocate a few industries and to supply the European markets with low-
cost products or components. Those were the times when Asia “imitated” the West
and, in so doing, succeeded in attaining a strong economic growth. This was an
Asia that, besides Japan, included four newly industrialised countries – Taiwan,
Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea – having local wildlife qualifications of
dragons or tigers. 153
A NEW WORLD
This success supported the image that Europe had of itself, its strong belief in
the power of its industrial development and social values. For Europe, Asia’s
achievements were a reference point for the countries in Africa, Latin America, or the
Middle East – counter-examples that reaffirmed a “rule” whereby all the Southern
countries would have attained their development by following “its” example.
Such certainties were a bit shaken in the early 1970s, when the US accorded
their political preference to Beijing rather than Taipei. In any event, the potential
significance of the Chinese domestic market warranted this exception. Such
certainties were shaken even more in the early 1980s, with the surge of
unemployment in Europe and the awareness that the Asian subcontractors were
becoming actual competitors. Asia was no longer content with imitating. It had
excelled the model, it was investing in research and development, and it was
innovating, causing concern in such leading sectors as shipbuilding, electronics
and even car manufacturing. Did the development of Asia entail the beginning of
the decline of old Europe? The 21st century was going to be the age of Pacific Asia,
as a few Asian and North American managers were starting to believe.
Asia at the End of the Bipolar World

The close of the 1980s marked the initial turning point in Euro-Asian relations.
The downfall of the Soviet block brought our bipolar world to an end and
strengthened the belief in a triumphing liberalism. By then, only a single model
appeared feasible, and that was the Western model. Paradoxically, the
strengthening of yesterday’s certainties was giving rise to much more concern than
relief. The disappearance of the Communist alternative failed to accelerate the
hegemonic tendency of an America resting on an Asia whose model was
becoming increasingly more Washington or Hollywood rather than the myriad of
discordant European capitals.
Europe met the challenge in a dual manner. From a domestic point of view, it
accelerated the construction of a Union with stronger Community institutions and
a single currency project. With respect to Asia, it launched ponderous programs of
economic, cultural and social cooperation. Without necessarily daring to admit it,
Europe by now needed Asia in order to exist from both a political and an
economic point of view. This period, which coinciding with the Gulf War laid
emphasis on the American military supremacy, witnessed also the onset of
globalisation. Within the latter context, the European enterprises entered a wild
competition to win over the increasingly more important markets in the Asian
countries, which were experiencing two digit growth rates not only in the
traditionally allied countries, but also in a few countries of the former Communist
block, such as Vietnam. On their part, the European countries proved to be ready
at times to come to compromises either to entice the investments of the Japanese
and South Korean conglomerates – a synonym of jobs creation – or to refrain from
154 dealing with such sensitive political issues as East Timor or Tibet.
A NEW SILK ROAD?
If Asia taken as a whole could seem attractive, a map was being drawn
including centres of greater interest and minor spaces, leaving aside problems
related to natural resources. From the point of view of European investors, the
heart of Asia comprised Japan and the four major dragons for economic and
industrial cooperation, as well as “active” China, on account of its formidable
demographic and productive potential. The second sphere of interest included the
dynamic areas of the small ASEAN tigers, particularly Thailand, Malaysia,
Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam, for reasons quite similar to those
applicable to China. Notwithstanding the significance of its population and its
intellectual potential, India was perceived as being relatively self-centred and
seemed to escape these “priority” areas.
Had Europe found the ways and means to establish a long-lasting partnership
with Asia? The 1997 crisis had not been anticipated.
The “Heralded” Turning Point of the 1997 Asian Crisis

Even though most media appeared surprised by the 1997 crisis in Asia, it was
definitely to be expected. In 1991, the burst of the speculative bubble in Japan had
shown to what extent most of the Asian economic progress could be artificial. A
stock exchange overvaluation, an all-out real property speculation had
represented a deceptive part of Japan’s growth. Notwithstanding this initial
warning that had brought the second economy in the world to its knees for
eighteen months,1 showing an astonishing blindness, most Asian countries related
to the West followed the same path. In a number of cases, this was supplemented
by extensive phenomena of corruption and abstraction of public and private
funds. In Indonesia, for instance, everybody knew that the relatives of President
Suharto used to withhold a high percentage of development assistance funds and
contracts. Insofar as it concerned the World Bank loans, withholdings were in the
order of 20%. Notwithstanding the frequent censorship, this was often reported in
the local press and, at any rate, was known to those European investors and
institutions that wanted to take the trouble of acknowledging it. In any event, most
of them preferred to turn a blind eye to it or just enter the “baksheesh” game rather
than running the risk of losing a contract.
Now, apart from the difficulties still being met by a number of countries, Asia
is leaving this crisis behind. In any event, however paradoxical it may seem, we
should consider the development experienced in recent decades by Asia and the
other countries in the South. By contrast with what most Westerners had imagined,
it seems reasonable to state that Asia developed first of all thanks to its own values:
the value of labour, sense of the community, moral rigor – Asian values that are all
too often discredited without due analysis. On the other hand, Asia went towards
failures especially when it pushed to extremes a few Western defects, such as the
1. E. DOURILLE-FEER, “Craquement dans le modèle japanais”, Le Monde Diplomatique,. March 1998. 155
A NEW WORLD
overvaluation of material assets and money or the liberality in the management of

public funds.
Hence, Europe needs close relations with Asia more than ever before. But
these relations need to mature, as they may not be founded on false appearances
or political compromises that are either based on what is left unsaid or
questionable from an ethical point of view. A significant obstacle is hindering the
way at this stage. It is but a fact that Europe finally ignores what Asia indeed is,
and keeps on considering it a reflection of itself, as if Asian peculiar features did
not exist. Apart from the strengthening of their common economic or political
links, outside the limited circle of the “oriental scholars”, Asia keeps on being
mostly alien to Europeans. To them, it is but a far-away representation, fleeting
images of exoticism. The “major discoveries” in school books remain the
prerogative of the Old Continent, unmindful that – a century before Christopher
Columbus – Chen Ho, a Chinese admiral, had sailed the seas with junks that were
twenty-five times bigger than the Santa Maria, moving as far as Arabia and Africa.
A few European circles are beginning to look for support in Asia with a view
to developing common alternative projects. This applies in particular to NGOs and
the German ecology-minded environments, which view new paths for
cooperation in Asia’s social trends and its awareness of environmental problems. A
few European governments, such as Sweden, are working on “Future with Asia”
strategies based on surveys of the economic and political contexts.2 Finally,
considering the matter thoroughly, it is quite likely that somewhere in Asia are the
germs of the other model – the model of a less technical and a more unitary
society that would allow Europe to get out of its identity crisis with respect to itself
and America. Therefore, we need to make an effort and discover them, and not
only in the Asia of short-term economic profitability.
156 2. T. LODEN, Center for Pacific Asia Studies Newsletter, 1999.

159-162/LiMes/Birindelli 6-10-2000 15:34 Pagina 159
A NEW SILK ROAD?
CHINA: ONE COUNTRY,

TWO SYSTEMS SEVERAL
MARKETS (“GO WEST”) by Luca M. BIRINDELLI
C HINA’S ECONOMIC SCENARIO IS OFTEN

described through aggregate data, which hardly reflect the heterogeneous nature
of this huge marketplace.
With a total land surface of 9,600,000 sq. km, with arable land of 940,000 sq.
km 1 representing 9.89% of the total land, China is divided in 4 Municipalities, 2 5
Autonomous Regions and 23 Provinces. China’s GNP in 1999 was of 8,319 billion
of CNY, or 1,002 billion USD.
Last year the Chinese economy continued to evidence a positive trend, albeit
overshadowed by serious concerns, primarily over the structural aspects of the
state owned enterprises and the banking system. Such continuing trend came at a
time of serious regional recession, through which China was able to maintain the
stability of its currency. The Asian crisis had however an impact on foreign direct
investments, especially those originating from the countries affected by the crisis,
as well as on the ability of such countries to absorb Chinese exports.
The completion of the negotiations for the accession to the WTO (as well as
the granting on September 19 of this year of permanent favourable trading status
by the US Congress) are posing new challenges to the Chinese system, which is
now forced to compete in a world where fundamentals are more important than
politics. The establishment of the “rule of law” becomes at this time an absolute
imperative and the objective set for 2010 for its fulfilment may turn out to be, in a
broader historical prospective, the essential prerequisite on the path to democracy.
In this connection, it should be remembered that the decision heralded by Premier
Zhu Rongji, which later prevailed, to join the WTO, has been vehemently opposed
by the conservative faction of the Chinese leadership.
The fight against corruption and the economic liberalisation policy are now
starting to bear fruits, while the government continues to apply a Keynesian
stimulus by increasing public spending in badly needed infrastructure, lowering
1. It should be noted, however, that according to “China Agriculture: Cultivated Land Area, Grain Projec-
tions and Implications”, a study by the US National Intelligence Council published in November 1997,
satellite photography indicates that there might be as many as 140 million hectares of arable land.
2. Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing, which are, from an administrative viewpoint, under the
direct control of the central government. 159
CHINA: ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS SEVERAL MARKETS (“GO WEST”)
interest rates and by increasing the state employees’ wages and unemployment
subsidies.
It should be noted, however, that the vastness of the country and the
peculiarities of the districts are such that China can be hardly viewed, from an
economic perspective, as a homogeneous entity. Prior to examining the existing
differences I would like to state that the author subscribes to J. Fitzgerald’s theory
according to which “the imminent dissolution of China is as old as China’s own
history” 3 but unlikely to be experienced in the foreseeable future.
A concept which has been often studied and described by the economists is
the one of “economic district” applied, in a smaller scale, to regions such as the
Baden-Württemberg, San Diego-Tijuana, Pusan, the Kansai, Silicon Valley, etc.;
such districts, due to their nature, may be enucleated from their overall national
economic context. In a globalizing world however, the national economic context
itself is losing relevance.
By applying this concept to China, the country may be subdivided at least in
four vast economic regions, three of which directly interacting with the coastal
zone and a forth, the West, raising huge and original issues.
The North, extending from Inner Mongolia and Heilongjiang to the Shandong
Province, gravitates on Beijing, the Nation’s capital and its political and
administrative centre, which also plays the role of the North’s economic catalyst.
The region is characterised, in broad terms and with the partial exception of
Shandong, by an economy based on state run enterprises, heavy industry and
collectivised agriculture. Especially in the Northeastern provinces of Liaoning (with
the exception of Dalian), Heilongjiang and Jilin, the influence of the planned,
Soviet-style, economy has been extremely strong until the beginning of the ’90s
and, consequently, the current inadequacy of the state run enterprises is felt more
painfully than elsewhere. The somewhat unsophisticated legal environment and
the often-invasive role played by local administrators in the evaluation, approval
and management of the foreign investments, is more heavily felt.
The region is highly influenced by the presence of Japanese and Korean
business. Foreign investors will often find here state owned partners, faced with
the problem of turning around non performing assets and proposing “bargain
deals”, some of which may well be worth looking into. It is left to the wise investor
to determine those which should be left alone outright.
Shanghai and its vast hinterland which benefits from the Yangtze basin as a
prime communication route, is and has been in the past one of the most dynamic
region, competing with the South in growth figures. This region is characterised by
the coexistence of state owned, collectively owned and, more recently, privately
run light industrial sector alongside with a flourishing agriculture, which has
strongly benefited from the reforms of the ’80s. It hosts some of the major national
3. J. FITZGERALD: “Reports of my death have been greatly exaggerated: the history of the death of Chi-
160 na”, in D.S.G. GOODMAN and G. SEGAL, China Deconstructs, Routledge, London 1994.
A NEW SILK ROAD?
CHINA’S ECONOMIC MACROREGIONS
HEILONGJIANG
JILIN
NEI MONGOL
LIAONING
XINJIANG BEIJING
GANSU
Tianjin
HEBEI
SHANDONG
NINGXIA SHANXI
QINGHAI
JIANGSU
SHAANXI HENAN
XIZANG SHANGHAI
ANHUI
HUBEI
SICHUAN ZHEJIANG
JIANGXI
HUNAN
GUIZHOU FUJIAN
NG TAIWAN
DO
YUNNAN GUANGXI NG
GUA
textile and garments manufacturers (in Zhejiang) and footwear manufacturing

industry (in Jiangsu); the food processing industry flourishes alongside some of
the most fertile soils in the country.
Shanghai, Nanjing and Hangzhou play a pivotal role in the region, with
Shanghai in its own league as the re-emerging financial and service (tertiary)
centre of the nation, building on a revitalised strong light industrial basis. Shanghai
should also be noted for the exertion of strong economic and local political
autonomy through initiatives such as the development of the Pudong area, to be
considered as the testing ground for overtures in foreign-related trade and
financial matters.
The South encompasses the richest province in the country, Guangdong, as
well as frontrunners of the economic growth such as Hainan Island and Fujian.
These areas have largely benefited from the early “open-door” policy as well as
the creation of special economic zones, 4 which have been the testing ground for
economic and legal reforms and absorption of foreign investment in the ’80s.
4. Xiamen, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Hainan. 161
CHINA: ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS SEVERAL MARKETS (“GO WEST”)
The region has a strong and wide industrial basis, focusing on both high-tech
and electronics as well as on labour intensive consumer goods. Over 20 million
emigrants to the neighbouring Southeast Asian nations and North America
constitute an important asset, as they translate both in hard currency remittances as
well in foreign direct investment, which exceeds, in Guangdong, 80% of the total.
Infrastructures and means of communications are the most developed in the
whole of China.
The South, and Guangdong in particular, is day by day increasing its
integration level with Hong Kong, which has historically acted as the doorway to
China; a role which is presently challenged by Shanghai. Private initiative is the
engine of the South’s economy, which is thus better geared to interact with the
capitalist world. Other than the economic factors which are, unavoidably, the
result of a fair degree of generalisation, the prime criteria adopted to determine the
nature of the three coastal areas is the reliance on a common basis of
transportation ways in accessing the sea.
A totally different approach needs to be taken with respect to the Western
provinces. China’s “Western Big Development” project encompasses 5.2 million
sq. km and 300 million people spread across nine provinces and autonomous
regions – Gansu, Guizhou, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Yunnan, Ningxia, Tibet and
Xinjiang. Together, they occupy well over half of China’s area and account for
most of its oil and mineral reserves, borderlands and strategic military installations.
The project includes construction of roads, airports, railroads and a §14 billion
pipeline linking Xinjiang’s natural gas fields to Shanghai, 4000 km to the Southeast.
President Jiang Zemin recently declared the project crucial to China’s stability, the
Communist Party’s hold on power and the “revitalisation” of the Chinese people.
An analogy can be drawn with the American concept of Manifest Destiny and
the taming of its Wild West as well as to Israel’s Jewish settlement in the West
Bank. Even the irrigation technology that the Han settlers use in Xinjiang, is often
Israeli designed.
The region is desperate for capital, ideas and people, but is also faced with
persistent and sometimes violent ethnic unrest. Islam came to Xinjiang in the 10th
century with an Arab invasion. It is largely such unrest (as well as a growing
hunger for oil) dictating the re-approachment policy pursued by the Chinese
leadership with the Muslim world.
Since the early ’50s, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, a
paramilitary organisation that operates farms and factories has moved 2.4 million
people, 90% Han, into Xinjiang and opened up millions of hectares of desert for
farming. In 1948, 75% of Xinjiang population was Uyghur and 15% was Han.
Today, 40% of Xinjiang’s 16 million people are Han.
The development policy of the West, one of the gigantic tasks facing China as
well as one of its top priorities, may well represent an unprecedented opportunity
for foreign investors; its prospects for a success must be sustained, to the extent
possible (including financially) by the developed countries, in order to secure
162 China’s stability.
163-164/LiMes/Tavola Rotonda 6-10-2000 15:35 Pagina 163
A NEW SILK ROAD?
Doing Italian Business in China

Leonardo DINI (BCI), Stefano CELLETTI (ANTIBIOTICS)
Franco CUTRUPIA (Italian entrepreneur)
HEARTLAND Shall we broach the touchy issue of investment in China?

DINI One of the greatest risks in China is the inefficiency of the banking system. It is
impossible to monitor the performances of companies and establish which are the
good ones. So as a bank, we can only take the risk in the country and decide to
trust China – but not necessarily one of her companies. In the long run this cannot
be enough. On top of this, Italy finds it hard to function as an integrated system:
large Italian companies, for example, do not work with Italian banks. Difficulties
also come from SACE (the Italian national insurer of investments abroad) which has
a cumbersome approval procedure. Even the Spanish, who so far have been a
second rate European power in China, work better than the Italians do.
CELLETTI SACE is an old institution, unfit to work in this environment and without
enough experience to work abroad and in Asia. The procedure to grant soft loans is
too long; sometimes it takes over three years, so there is no time to prepare the
market. Some of us have even had the unpleasant experience of receiving the loan
when the business opportunity was gone.
DINI To give an example, we made an agreement with SACE for $150 million in soft
loans, asking the Chinese government to draw a list of reliable clients. But there
were two problems: SACE asked for confirmed letters of credit, despite the fact that
if they are confirmed there is almost no need for SACE’s insurance. Also, Chinese
officials did not want to draw the list of reliable clients, because that would mean
excluding some companies and triggering an explosive situation between Chinese
enterprises, which would be classified almost officially according to their reliability.
CUTRUPIA Non Italian banks are more efficient, providing better financial packages
in less time. Italian banks are unwilling to take risks, while other banks have better
networks able to evaluate risks. Also, other European governments are readier to
share part of the risk. 163
163-164/LiMes/Tavola Rotonda 6-10-2000 15:35 Pagina 164
DOING ITALIAN BUSINESS IN CHINA
CELLETTI While governments should not hand out free money, creating unhealthy
expectations, it still is wrong for companies to take all the risks – these should be
shared, especially when investing in a country like China.
HEARTLAND Do Italian newcomers go to the embassy for help and direction?
CUTRUPIA Not always. The embassy helps but does not solve the problem.
HEARTLAND Is there more coordination between other companies from the European
Union?
CELLETTI Some working groups have been established and they are effective when
there is no real competition between companies. The European Chamber of
Commerce could make up for some of Italy’s shortcomings. In a way through this
cooperation, which could be of growing importance, a piece of Europe could be
made in China.
HEARTLAND What could embassies do?
CUTRUPIA European embassies do not work together: more coordination between
European companies is needed to improve efficiency
CELLETTI At the same time, Italian business representatives come to China and talk as
if they were still in Italy. Here there should be a stronger European lobby. China
envisages a strong relationship between business and politics, so European
businesses should be ready to face the market here in the same way.
CUTRUPIA I am quite sceptical about this approach. I think foreign companies need
to settle in the country and provide a Western service at Chinese prices without
always referring back to Italy. Nor do I believe the tales that Italians are better than
their competitors because they are more flexible and can establish better personal
relations. I have seen many foreigners get down to business and establish better
relations than the Italians. Italy decided to become a long-term partner of China.
The Chinese want to learn and we, as a company, are willing to cooperate. We
have established a services network in Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Shaoxing, Canton
and Hong Kong. This is not a country where one can just come and go. If you want
to make business you have to adapt your company to China.
CELLETTI On this point, the training of junior managers, sponsored by the European
Union, and of Human Resources back at home is important. Italy needs a China
desk at home to convey and understand our difficulties.
164
165/LiMes/Box Donati 6-10-2000 15:35 Pagina 165
A NEW SILK ROAD?
“WE BEHAVE LIKE THE CHURCH” by Camillo DONATI (IVECO FIAT)
“In China one must work following the official guidelines, be able to interpret them and
make sure the business is in line with them. The relevant authorities must be involved
even in choosing partners and they are responsive”. Camillo Donati, 14 years in China
and the only Italian honorary Chinese citizen is a chain smoker, despite all present
prohibitions in the country. Proud of his frank short temper, he boasts it helped in his
dealings with the Chinese: “They appreciate frankness and real respect, and despise fake
mannerism disguising a real prejudice”. “We must contribute to the country’s growth and
development, while looking after the company interests, but the government has to tell us
what to do and where”.
The entrepreneur has to make a special effort to involve the government, and this
involvement must be “spintaneo”, says Donati, using an Italian pun (spinta, push, and
spontaneo, spontaneous). In other words, the push must appear as a spontaneous
government decision.
For instance, his next pet project is in factories for GPL bus engines. These engines could
be installed on city buses, lorries, adapted for large barges to be used more along the
Chinese rivers, as well as work as water pumps in the dry Northwest. These two
developments would fit in with the official plan to build more water canals from South to
North and develop the backward western regions of the country.
“In our effort to settle in China we behave like the Church, which gave up the dogma of the
Latin mass, but saved the spirit of enterprise. We must transfer our know-how in full to
enable the Chinese to do the things they want”, he says. Donati stresses the importance
of not imposing any alien model on the Chinese, but of putting them in the condition to
perform certain tasks according to international standards. “It is a longer path, but the best
recipe for success. If we discuss money with the Chinese, they always agree with us and
make sure that we defend the interests of the company and of the Chinese partner”.
Donati maintains it is also important to distinguish the intentions of the central government
from those of the local government, and have a clear picture of the market needs. In
China, he says, officials were used to distribute rather than sell, but now the market is
growing and one must start to sell.
“China will be the battlefield of the next phase of the industrial revolution, and now it is
important to rally our troops. In other words we must guarantee continuity in the service and
the convenience of assistance even after selling the product. People first look for good
quality and then ask for good post-sales assistance. Now many adults do not have enough
money to buy quality goods, but in the big department stores I see small children asking
their parents for the good and expensive toys. In a few years those kids will want quality”.
At the same time, Donati remembers an official visit to the highly sophisticated Fiat factory
in Turin. The Chinese officials stared at the robots and wondered: “what would we do with
our million workers?”
“We must see the problems of this country in a broader context, put ourselves in their
place and then understand their deepest motivations. It is a long and complicated process
with no shortcuts. Many people go for a few days to Beijing and Shanghai and think they
understood it all. Those trips are useful to get an impression of what is happening, but it is
just an impression. Without a stronger effort, China will be always incomprehensible”.
165
166-168(2b)/LiMes/Autori 6-10-2000 15:36 Pagina 166
ROMANO PRODI - President of the European Commission.

ZHU RONGJI - Prime Minister of the People’s Republic of China.
WANG XIAODONG - Essayist.
ZHANG XIAODONG - Researcher, Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing.
Managing editor of Heartland.
FRANCESCO SISCI - Managing editor of Heartland.
FABIO MINI - General, AFSOUTH Headquarters, Naples (Italy).
ZHANG JIE - Writer. Her books are translated in more than 20 languages.
TOMMY KOH - Professor. Executive Director, Asia-Europe Foundation.
ALISON BROINOWSKI - Visiting Fellow, Asian History Centre, Australian National
University, Canberra (Australia).
MICHEL KORINMAN - Editor, Heartland and Limes. Professor, University of
Marne-La-Vallée (France).
LUCIO CARACCIOLO - Editor, Heartland and Limes.
MARIE-SYBILLE DE VIENNE - Professor, Inalco, Paris (France).
PAOLO COTTA-RAMUSINO - Director, Science and Technology in International
Security Program, Landau Network-Centro Volta, Como (Italy)
MAURIZIO MARTELLINI - Secretary General, Landau Network-Centro Volta,
Como (Italy).
V.K. NAMBIAR - India’s High Commissioner in Pakistan.
YUMIKO YAMADA - Researcher, University of New Caledonia.
VITALIJ TRET’JAKOV - Editor, Nezavisimaja Gazeta, Moscow (Russia).
FRÉDÉRIC DURAND - Researcher, University of Toulouse II-Le Mirail (France).
LUCA M. BIRINDELLI - Italian lawyer, experienced in PRC and Asia-Pacific matters.
166

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001-002/LiMes/gerenza 6-10-2000 15:07 Pagina 2

HEARTLAND is a world partner of LIMES, the Italian Geopolitical Review, published by

Editors: Lucio Caracciolo and Michel Korinman

Managing Editors: Francesco Sisci and Zhang Xiaodong

contents no. 1/2000

PART I WHAT CHINA STANDS FOR

17 WANG XIAODONG - The West in the Eyes of a Chinese Nationalist

PART II FROM ASIA TO ASIA

93 Tommy KOH - ASEM is a Sunrise Organisation

PART III WHAT IS ASIA?

135 V.K. NAMBIAR - The Indian Bridge

159 Luca M. BIRINDELLI - China: One Country, Two Systems,

A NEW SILK ROAD?

Why Eurasia? Why are Europeans rediscovering Asia and Asians

Heartland, what for? This journal is a tool for the dialogue

A NEW SILK ROAD?

A T THE START OF THE NEW CENTURY,

BUILDING BRIDGES BETWEEN ASIA AND EUROPE

A healthy two-way flow of investments contributes to a country’s wealth; this

A NEW SILK ROAD?

THE SILK ROADS

A NEW SILK ROAD?

Don’t Be Pessimistic about the Euro

DON’T BE PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE EURO

HEARTLAND What’s the influence of IT development on China’s politics?

A NEW SILK ROAD?

DON’T BE PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE EURO

(by Barbara Alighiero and Francesco Sisci)

A NEW SILK ROAD?

A NEW SILK ROAD?

T O PROMOTE COMMUNICATION, DEEPEN

THE WEST IN THE EYES OF A CHINESE NATIONALIST

The Oppression of China’s National Interests by the USA

18 1. See for instance J. UNGER, Chinese Nationalism, New York 1996.

A NEW SILK ROAD?

2. MA LIHUA, Fleeting Soul, Writer’s Press, 1994, p. 212. 19

THE WEST IN THE EYES OF A CHINESE NATIONALIST

USA is an established super-power, while China is a growing super-power

The Clash of Ideologies

20 3. See Strategy and Administration, 1996, VI, p. 19.

A NEW SILK ROAD?

THE WEST IN THE EYES OF A CHINESE NATIONALIST

Chinese Nationalism as a Response to Domestic Problems

A NEW SILK ROAD?

Firstly, the Chinese authorities’ encouragement of “reverse racism” was a peculiar

THE WEST IN THE EYES OF A CHINESE NATIONALIST

A NEW SILK ROAD?

However, regardless of whether “reverse racism” was needed at the time or

THE WEST IN THE EYES OF A CHINESE NATIONALIST

Freedom, Democracy and Hegemony 9

A NEW SILK ROAD?

10. HAYEK, The Constitution of Liberty, 1960. 27

THE WEST IN THE EYES OF A CHINESE NATIONALIST

Conclusion: The Prospect of a New International Order

A NEW SILK ROAD?

11. Telecommunication from Reuters on June 19, 2000. 29

THE WEST IN THE EYES OF A CHINESE NATIONALIST

(translated by Yao Ximing)

A NEW SILK ROAD?

T HE FIRST TIME I GOT TO KNOW “THE

GEOPOLITICAL CHANGES IN THE WESTERN REGIONS

The Changes in Geopolitics of the Western Regions since

A NEW SILK ROAD?