Protasis and Problema in the "Topics" Author(s): Demetrius J. Hadgopoulos Source: Phronesis, Vol. 21, No. 3 (1976), pp.

266-276 Published by: BRILL Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4181996 . Accessed: 19/03/2011 17:55
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Protasis Problema theTopics and in

DEMETRIUS J. HADGOPOULOS

The

purpose of this discussion is to show that Mrs Martha Kneale has misunderstood Aristotle's distinction between protasis and
problema in the Topics.

She writes that, according to Aristotle, protasis and problemaare

"both questions and the difference between them ... is merely one of form, ..."'t Then, she goes on to state what, according to her, this

distinction may amount to: the distinction is perhaps that between the thesis proposed for discussion, i.e. the starting-point of the argument, and a question put later to keep it going. We may suppose that the question for discussion is 'Is animal the genus of man?' This is the protasis, the starting-point. In the course of the argument, the questioner asks 'Is it or is it not a property of animals to be self-moving?' This would be a problema.2 After this, she contrasts the use of thse words in the Topics with that found in the Prior Analytics. She writes that there the word 'protasis' "always means a statement and in chapters 26 to 28 of the first book
of that work ... problemna also seems to mean a statement."3 Kneale

thinks that Aristotle has changed his point of view. In the Prior
Analytics he

is concerned to find out how a given proposition can be proved rather than how a given question can be answered either in the affirmative or negative. In the Topics he has always the two disputants in mind.4 Then, she brings etymological considerations in support of her view that the two words have undergone changes in meaning: Protasis is from 7pOw?tvw ('to hold forth or offer') and is therefore something offeredfor considerationat the beginningof the dispute, while problemais from 7pop3&XXo throw forward or down') ('to
I

W. C. Kneale and M. Kneale, The Development of Logic. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1962. p. 34. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid., pp. 34-35. 4 Ibid., p. 35.

266

and is rather something thrown down or out in the middle of the argument, i.e. a suggestion. What is proffered or thrown out may well take the form of either a question or a statement.5 Kneale writes, as we have just seen, that in the Prior Analytics "protasis always means a statement". This claim may be construed in two ways: (i) There is no passage in the Prior Analytics where protasis means a question as it is always the case in the Topics. (ii) Protasis always means a statement in the Prior Analytics, while in the Topics it is sometimes used to mean a statement, sometimes to mean a question. Her claim concerning problema can also be construed in the above two ways. I believe that the second way of construing the above claim is not what Kneale intends, since the general import of what she writes about changes in the meaning of the two words militates against it. So, I shall take it that Kneale claims that in the Topics the words protasis and problema never mean a statement. I shall argue that this view is false. Let us now see how Aristotle draws the distinction. We shall find that Aristotle draws the distinction in more than one ways. In chapter iv of Topics I he writes: 101 b 16 yLvovr&[v yocpox ?oyoLex T&Vnpo-roaeco 7MpL 8 OL WV r.. Tr spo5X0X&a auxXOyLapOt Here the expression ex 'bv sTpo-&asoevis an answer to the question Ex -tLVV`OLXoyot yuvovrou; while O' raX eCarL is an answer to the 7poPX question npoq 7toix o' X6yOL; or Tepir 'tvv oxau),Xoyta[oL;It is clear that protases are those things which a logos consists of, while problemata are those things about which logoi or syllogismoi are constructed. In other words, Aristotle here distinguishes between protasis and problema in terms of their function in reasoning. A problem is that about which we reason, and a protasis is that by means of which we reason. Thus, the protases function as premisses and a problema functions as that which is to be destroyed or defended. Although this is what Aristotle intends at the beginning of the chapter, he goes on to draw the distinction between protasis and problema as follows: 101 b 29 3taEppL ag TO Xzc 7 7cp6,am, '& ?pO7n. out` t?v yxp 'WpO%m5
5 Ibid.

267

ye'o p7*6VTOC, &poic xXL yp'4yejr 4ov ?av

40% )O

OV 07tO7uV OpLU06q ?'lv

av6pc1tou;

ykvo4 a'or''ro5 'vt&pc'rrou; n;p6rocartLy'VrX.

s, 7ro'epov

c6 %OV =7tO'V 8'L7OUV OpLtaF6qb7tLV &v&pc1tou r

We see that, according to this passage, both protasis and problema are questions and the difference between them is one of form, as Kneale writes. The two forms are: Form of protasis. &pX ye ...; ... Form of problema. ou; lto,mpov This formal distinction is not adhered to by Aristotle. Later on, when he draws the distinction between a dialectical protasis and a dialectical problema, he forgets the formal distinction, and he distinguishes between them in other ways. We find examples of dialectical protaseis expressed in the form that had been earlier appropriated for the expression of problemata. For example, when he divides the protaseis and problemata into ethical, physical and logical, he gives the following examples of protaseis: ; 105 b 24 7to6'rpov xxv vav'oVsL n Oin & EA7rt=r 105 b 25 7t6tgpov o xOa,uoq &L8Lsn ou; The above mentioned distinction "appears to be not very important" as Kneale writes, but the way the questioner was asking questions and the way the respondent answered them in a dialectical situation, seems to have been of some importance in ancient times. Aristotle as follows: defines 8Lanx?Lxr-? ?p(coYnl'aL in the De Interpretatione 8'lOXtLX r r s?CaTLV 'nSaLrrI, &OXplCOGE 20 b 23 El o)v I' ?C' L
'g

7tpO't4aCrX'o

&v'cPM&aEG)q

=LL IzOpLOV, OUX

&CX-n&4. etpjtyai
0U18Crtl 9Ca?v

OU Op[LOU Ti% O(VtpMU(, wt(X7&po I ? 7rp6'rafTC oUg' ?Xv aV ?L7) XtQxpcOLaq [LLOX, ed ?G 4t TOmtXo-q 7-epL ocu,rcv. 6aLx 8e 8iArovO6n ?'C aCM?Xn. asZ yap 486a4aL
&Vtpocaegw ?X

?pwrI'ak

rwrEXCac rq7 Epco'Ca7&c OVMO pVVCL. [L6pLov

7rN6'Tepov PO0XVTOC

a)X&x 8EZ 'TOv ?pUTWOC

'

OV To6TO. 30 CpOG8LOp[aGL 7rt6'pov 'r6E ?CFtLVO &Vtpo7OC, This quotation also suggests to us that Aristotle had obliterated the distinction between the form of questions concerning protasis and problema. Protaseis as questions could be expressed in either of the forms mentioned earlier. Now, although Aristotle is concerned with how the questioner should form his questions and how the answerer should answer them, it does not mean that this is all that is involved in a dialectical situation. According to Aristotle, the dialectician, besides being a questioner, is also a auUoyLG6[Levoq, as we shall later see.

268

Even if Aristotle had adhered to his formal distinction, this by itself would not be helpful in determining the function of protasis and problema in the course of a discussion. I believe that Aristotle realized this, and this is why he distinguished between protasis and problema not in terms of their form but in terms of their content as well as their position in the dialectical syllogism. I have already suggested that the difference between them is that a protasis occurs among the premisses of a dialectical syllogism, while a problema is that which is to be refuted or defended. I will now support this by citing further passages from the Topics. Aristotle starts the Topics with a statement of his purpose: 100 a 18 'H
&.e

p&wnpo'aec ev86oRv,
...

r5q 7pxyVovTsxq[A-okov eupeLv, p'

7MpL 7rxv-og ?ol
8'VT

is

8vvao-

,LCiN

CUXoyL'eabOL

7rpopxntaov

We should notice here the expressions '7MpL ... 7rpo,-n,uaxOq and 'e rv8o6rv'. The expression 'Tcrp'. npopXntoroq' answers to the question 7tept 'Tlvoq[o &asX'Lx6k] aunXoyLt~aL; while the expression 'C, 'vsa'ov' ylvovtau; it is answers to the question 'ex r'vv o' XoyoL [aCFUXoyLaG?Lo] clear that the expression '' e"vFo refers to the premisses of the diaWv' lectical syllogism, and, as we have seen, Aristotle had answered the question ?x 'r[VV O'L X6yoL ytvov'rL; by ix tFv rpo'rXQ aewv. At 100 a 30 he writes: &aXxrLx6q ... nxOyLGk &o 6i . vsao,v aUXoyL4Ot6Svo So, he now tells us that the dialectical syllogism consists of protaseis which are ev8ooc. But a dialectical problema is not uniquely characterized as an endoxon:

104 b 1

fIpO6P)Th.oc 8e?rr 86tXexnLXOv

aO0ZKOUGLV

&V p7c0C

...

7t pL

O&Tepe4 u

1J ?VMCtV'(W
CUTOI

A' 7orX?oI
?OW'vOLz.

'roz; ao(poz; oI

ao9o' toZ(

7r0XXOZq I' &X%repOL

Later on, Aristotle writes:

104 b 13 gart a npopXtaro

ymp
et

xOatJv e"CVOLt

etaL

7r6'Tpov

oUrWq9yet
eVOCL s6o r'

O 06o@w oUX

a&

a UXoyUT,LOL (&CtOpf(V so ipI &o'sIrQpv

6,vTwv tyci-

Lvcat?O6youc, 7CbLvoio)
XGV,

xoi 7repL 3v X6yov Xpu' goepv

at &7Coao5vxL, OLOMTa CraeV XX"V

YLXXtOV OLO'SOL

olov 7r6-pov O
-TtL4.

%6atoc aXH&Oq rl

O?U' XOat yo'p

The last quotation

- expressed
7IOTCpOV (T

states that problemata may be both answers

- to the question:
-Y) UX OVur-;
)4

as statements

if there are strong arguments in support of them. Thus, it is clear that either part of an antiphasis may occur as the conclusion of a dialectical 269

syllogism. Aristotle does call these conclusions 'problemata'. Later on, Aristotle defines what he calls 'thesis' as follows: 104 b 19 E6aLq 8a eia-nv t6X4&lq 7aploZoq 'rcv yXpL&WV 'tvO xo'r&
CPLXOaOczV, . . .

24

N 7rep'l Tv koyou

6mvcLov x'.(o0"v

torZq aO0L,
$cfLv

...

Then, he goes on: 105 a 3 Ou 8ac 8ae6 7V

X7COpa?GSLeV

npo5
TsL4 tCv
yXp
9 -

a ou8& 7&aaOv
X6you
-tA

trCFXO7tLV, MXX'iv
xacl v

av
AeV

8CO[v&v

xoXxasCu iq

aLas&5?-Ot
xOCt

7OpOiOUVTEq TOTepOv
t f
At

8sz 't&o

Dok

'Cnav

TuO

*t

yOVeO(c

OCaya7 V tf OU XOXaCe(,)4 akovToct,

8S O? lro'TpoV 7v

XLUV XeUX1J I' OUaOiai

c.

Thus, a dialectical problema or thesis is sometlhing about which one has an &itopca,it is subject of entaxo7tv or 4TreZv, it is something proposed for discussion, it is a ?wp%x or a i.e. that about which one inquires or investigates. It is, in other words, the starting-point of a dispute, it is that which is offered for consideration at the beginning of a dispute. Aristotle writes that a problemaor thesis may be 8uaeMZCEpIog (158 b 16). The "questioner always tries to draw the conclusion which is contradictory to the answerer's thesis." (159 b 2-3). Here 84'atqdoes not mean a question but a statement. There is also another passage where Aristotle clearly distinguishes between p5rotasis and thesis or problema as far as their position in a dialectical logos is concerned: 159 a 3 Oxouv 8& Xav1kveLv, 5'rav aenX,Cp7nro; f n E O-n7rtOV
'r TCOV CLp.tlv&V. 6'a.v

8'

s 7tp6o

7'

a&,L(Ou

'v XUOCL

7tpoTXaLv

spyov 8!'O&6ynVocL f tfvTYaLv, t0 &C'rov '& '7tOLU k ou. ?C y&p p

T05TO 'rXoSyeat&OCL, e
T?pOV

8Ls7topGeLC=v xv TnC7o'Mpov

L X
TU0 cV
rEM aeX

oL6a?L Cp' o'UV

X%L7p04
CL
X?zO0Cr,-

pL.ZLOV 7rpOartx'L

XEe'VOU

ae L, 7rL CT?96 aCLE-TTOV U0

TO

MaTW@V. EL r'OV,

'r

itM 7OLZZV, OU ? 06ov'

86
4avtvov'C

atL yV(p1L4p

)pWv
LY wV

aX?xoyt,rCaaL,

'cp pv r

yVwpyt.()pOV h, 'Tj 86 yupvao6vx

CLVynXLO. Ware YCAVSpOOV ?X 040 'r UZ

o7 ?sTE'V, 'e'rov, (v (Xb6g

i6vov

ePW@VX'L TL XO%L 8LCXOVatL

'rL?VVOL. MH,LGYQOV

In this passage rO 6v 4pj xeripevov is the thesis or problem of the respondent considered as a statement. The function of the questioner is to destroy this thesis or problema by using protaseis which will be accepted by the answerer. But the answerer might demand a discussion
(8Lmksynvat) of some of the jrotaseis
JL?SOV [9pYov] ZpOQ&iL

705 ?V ipyn

too. If le does so, Aristotle writes: XCLflvo'J. But .o ?V &pXn xBtlVQV

270

[`pyov] is to attack the thesis or problema. So, a problema or thesis (a thesis is a problema but not every problema is a thesis) cannot be "a question put later [than a protasis] to keep the argument going" or "something thrown down or out in the middle of the argument, i.e. a suggestion" as Kneale writes. It is not necessary to quote other passages in order to show how Aristotle undeistands the distinction between protasis and problema. I believe that it is clear by now that a problema is ro' v Okp xztpvov or 7poPX-n'v for discussion, while a X protasis is that which occurs in the premisses of a dialectical syllogism, which premisses are brought in support of the contradictory oi the position of the answerer in a dialectical situation. I shall now try to show in more detail that Kneale's claim that Aristotle never uses the words protasis and problema in the Topics in the sense of 'statement' is false. Aristotle defines &xXrxTx-ct nrp&roaCc, as follows: 104 a 8 ?CaTL 8' nporxcar 8LaXzx-rLXY e'po)-CaLq evaoRoq 7&(v 'I tO tOL4 VCOPOL4, [OCt TOVXOLP LV eitat 'roz5TO (X7OO T 7LToLG ToZ5 F.XLat yvpLpCtOC waaoo ... CL6 8 Tpo'asLg

a,

8LOOSXTtLXaL

XOcL

tOa rOZ4 ev8oRoLc q

.LOLM, xaXL ravoctVLL -porev4stvoev,

XOvt

avtrLpTaLv

toz

aOx6OoaLV EVa,OGC

ZIvoct

xaOL OOL

15 80;CML 7-.ep'LTOl4 trrEJVCXeC t lac, 'UpLvacc. Much later, he discusses the form in which the dialectical protases as questions are expressed: 158 a 14 Ou aoxel a? Tv TO xoxt*6Xou 3alMXtsX7 TcpOTaCrL tIVOL otov rL
&ctv &vt4p,7roq,
OuX eLpU%Vteva
t7rL,uCt()V,

7rcaXx,

xeyvtou

&yroCM6v; E'at
0 'r

yap

7tpo6zaCL

8LOCXeXTL*X 7rpO' -V

e7TLV OCt7OXpLv'atGxL VIL ot

TMS 7hpO4 Oe TOL-oWtr t&)V

E'Co-V. &LO OV)

erx(X

Ea- t

av ,u ocAros LOpL'aoc7 acXo, 4.orV e

otoV cc ye
ff

-r&yabo~v o&rxc
I

oucoc, X'ryeocL; tpbo4 yap Ta TOL ?TOC'PM,8LO O&ro &L6 &UrOXPLaC-q XOTMT7)CYOVTL OUCoXp~aOCv-r. TCeLpoCTeOV t~~~~~~ -q 7rpOTreLvFLv tOCg TOLUTOC4; TtO)V 7rpOTOaeGv.
'k I t

This passage accords with that from the De Interpretatione, quoted above, where Aristotle defines aXo%rLx-x epcl-FyTL;. Here he tells us how one should express the LOCxteX& CpOtra-a. Earlier, at 155 b 10, he has said that I0 17tePrrjPaOC 'etv '&Lov ro5 8tczXex-r%. So, it is important for Aristotle how the dialectician should form his questions. But although asking questions is peculiar to the dialectician, he has also something in common with the philosopher or demonstrator, and this is that both of them cuXXoy'L?ovrtox. Both of them employ 271

reasoning but the dialectician reasons from protaseis which are given by the respondent, since the dialectidal situation involves asking questions to another party, while 155 b 11 Txx 8i pLXOc6TC)XxcLM'rouvTL xC41'EuT06v ou8rv tXL, ?&V &TX'
j 8' u o& o 0Jv oa axxoytac L, O (ats Tr6 v5yyu4 evao T0o es ipX xOc 7tpOOpaVT6 9LX .7tOXpLVO6tSVO4 au a6 vov &?X'ia&c cOu8C ev 1 x&v P IL&TOC L 'VOpL La xac y&p O(. e7tLc`T)9LOVLXOL eLVoXL QgL6Ta eX TOUGTV To MveygWu4
LiV

j XOL yvGc)PLL 8tL at,

16

otu?oyLatLoL.

Thus, in contrast to the philosopher or the independent inquirer the dialectician does two different things: he asks a question of a certain form and of a certain epistemologicalcontent. When he gets an answer he goes on to ask another question and so on until he has enough answers from which to draw a conclusion which is the contradictory of that which the respondent admitted at the beginning of the
discussion.

In the Prior Analytics Aristotle draws once more the distinction between a dialectical protasis and a demonstrative protasis. Martha Kneale quotes the passage in which this distinction is found at the beginning of her book. The passage is:
24 a 22
Xta?pet 8U '
0o8eLX7'X7 9V Vorpou

4 CXEXTXJ4, 7rpOTpC6- 'T-7 SL

s.LOpLOU 7%

<tC

4v

M7O83LwXT?LX'

0CtLTpLYa,)W eorLv

(oU, y&p

&poa &?'c XaCukCvt'o 4&7to8EtXVUWV),

&VTvpcaEc? alV.

T 8?

&LOCXSXTLXnXCpCOTTaLM

OU8?v 8i 8LOal L 7tpO 'TOyCVae

'o L7O8aCLXVU)V. 0LY XVL

TOV rXwIpOU axoyL4CLat e

AXOyLa[LOV XQi yap

)PA,)v tL
XOCTOa

0o ?pCi))v

'TLVOq U70CXPXZLV n

UrCspSLv.

ytaxr

l?v

7rp6rxacq

aMc xYo&)
Tp67ov,

oc 'octL,

,nVOg -rOv dpi?Vxvov

&Uro8eXmrtxi elkt[LeCv-n,

0nmoyca[Lc rrnvoq xra 8& ?av &X3 Xffi xLLal Kt 7ruv&(vO0LCv

raL tBo-

,rCo ?4~ O'pX; 67rolk'ccv 0&v EpWTYCK0vTL(aC?1,

&0CxXnx'

cuUoyt

otv

8?

iC4Ou

9c LVOCd&VOU

24 b 12 xocxt CvO8ou,xocI&MbrepToK To7rLxoZq ev tLp7qL.

We see from this passage that both the demonstrator and the questioner argue syllogistically by assuming that some predicate applies or does not apply to some subject. The difference between them lies
in the nature of the premisses that each one
Xaoq3xvet,

as well as in the

fact that the demonstrator (the philosopher in the Topics) does not ask a question as to which side of an antiphasis is to be accepted by
the interlocutor if there is any; he simply Xcxu,paveL one or the other

side of a contradiction whether the student (in case he is teaching) likes it or not. But the dialectician cannot proceed in this fashion. 272

He has to accept the answer of the respondent, and then use it in drawing his conclusion. Thus, dialectical reasoning consists of two activities, as we have noticed earlier:
(i) ?pcotxv: which consists of dialectical protaseis in the sense of 'ques-

tions', and (ii) auEoylaCw.: which consists in drawinga conclusionfromprotaseis in the sense of 'statements'. The dialectical syllogism then consists of protaseis which are gvgoiou, which protaseis are answers given by the respondent to the specific kind of questions put forward by the questioner. This is also the way G. E. L. Owen understands the passage at 24 b 10-13. He writes:
The passage is designed ... to mark off two senses of 'protasis',

both of which occur in Aristotle's account of dialectical exercises though only one was formally introduced at Top. 101 b 29-32. Briefly, the dialectician does ask his yes-or-no questions, called protaseis; he asks until he gets the concessions he needs, concessions which must, if the argument is to be dialectical, be endoxa. These too, recast in the foim of propositions not questions, are called protaseis, and he must 'secure' them and not 'assume' them: ...6 Thus, Aristotle does use the word 'protasis'in the sense of 'statement' in the Topics. The tool of the dialectician is the dialectical syllogism, and the dialectical syllogism is a syllogism, and a syllogism is defined in the Topics as follows:
100 a 25 'EatL
8

aXXOyLtaL64X6yoq RV

4 ',}eVV6CV TLvCav
eLiVWV.

eP6v

-T

vr&)v

XeLttV&vV?e VcVLy(XTc G3UgOLVEL

x74 L%c 'sGv

What in the case of the dialectical syllogism 't,&v'uLare the protases which are endoxa, and which are in the form of statements secured from the answersof the respondent. I think that the word problema also used by Aristotle in two senses is parallel to the ones concerningprotasis: (i) it is a qaestion or an invitation to choose one of a pair of contradictories at the beginningof the discussion. (ii) it is one of these contradictorieswhich the answererhas chosen to defend, and sometimes each one of a pair of contradictories are called problemata Aristotle, as we have seen earlier. by We can also find passages in the Topics where the words protasis and
; G. E. L. Owen, ed., Aristotle on Dialectic. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1968. p. 106.

273

problema are used in the sense of 'statement' only. For example, Aristotle writes in illustration of his statement that 104 a 13 eCa:8e 7rpo'r&aLacns ... xxc 'ocvav XLx' 8LaSXto &VrL(Pa.tV rot
aoxoiaLv

s eV6OLVo4OViCv 7pOT? 6V6pEVv,

itOLFZV, xxi
Cev

the following: &n OeZ 104 a 22 E'L C`v3o,ov 8L ro' ?Couq yap U
7rOLCV eV8oOOV. 'ea'L
D'lq cp o', x0r "Vr at xoc' &vLpov v

6'T oU 8?zxMxcq

VcXV7nOV
6'

?L'V Ont aL

XOCX&)47rOLCLV rOUg

or

*,7 on O' ou

xx xiOi

7rtoLv.

So, according to Aristotle, the following statements are dialectical protaseis:

aeL '76q
OU 'tO?o4

(pXOUq eU 7rOLSV.
?pLXOUq XM-XG4 7rOLeLV.

We also find the following statements called problemata at 108 b 34 by Aristotle:

7triac 8ov'
-T 'yOCf-6v.

oije,Lor

r;Bov &yao&,Yv.

sa-T aq yx4oCv. 0V-J M aovj OUXayalo(V. Now, Martha Kneale's comments on the passage at 24 a 22-24 b 12 make it obvious that she understands there the dialectical protasis to be a dialectical premiss.7 This might be brought as an objection against my construing her statement "the word protasis (in the Prior A alytics) always means a statement" as "there is no passage in the Prior Analytics where protasis means a question as it is always the case in the Topics", and as supporting the second way of construing her statement, which is "Protasis always means a statement in het Prior Analytics, while in the Topics it is sometimes used to mean a statement, sometimes to mean a question." Even if this objection is a telling one. I still believe that her view that the woi d protasis in the Prior A nalytics is always used in the sense of 'statement' is false. At 24 a 22-24 b 12, where Aristotle distinguishes between syllogistic, demonstrative, and dialectical protasis, he does use the word protasis in the sense of 'question': 8& Cx?X6nx [7tp6'OTMa] 8 ?pc' aLs ocV?L9p&a? ?a'nV.

ecra'

7ruv,vop.&v(O,uV SpCOYlGL4 8i &caBkXTMx [7rpo6MaLq] avTLcpOaso)d...

There are also some passages in the second book of the Prior Analytics, where, although not explicitly stated, Aristotle does use protasis in the sense of 'question'. We read:
64 a 33 AeV 8di xxTSOrvoeLIv CvOeeTOCL X,osc SL?v o{U-ro 'T0C OcwXEtL,U0C .LVOCL VCLV, UaOU,MCOV XOCLTOCLV (,nep eL O,UV txaXv ?7'rf VfBV
7 Kneale,

p. 2.

274

.e<Ucocv 'cv& ,iS n

aE
8L'

ouaoCV (67rZp oCx

auxoyEamatML

COAY X EavLvsL), 9=L

a&'Tpov, W e ?V

a Mxwv

TFCav PCq

Tom:xoZcv ?Xa4ev* ?xzrn

Part of what Aristotle says here is that it is possible to infer one of a pair of contradictories by means of further questions (ipwr?-Ta). Since he talks here in the manner of the Topics, and since it is not possible to infer anything by merely asking questions without getting any answers, ?piiotcx is used in the sense of a dialectical protasis in both senses given earlier. Thus, Aristotle not only uses the word protasis in the sense of 'question', but he also uses the word spcrra (in the Prior Analytics) in the sense of protasis. In chapter xix of the second book of the Prior Analytics Aristotle discusses how to escape and employ counter-arguments, and this discussion is also in the manner of the Topics. Concerning how to escape counter-arguments he writes: 66 a 25 Hpo 8s To PY'6 xnau;Akoy[,eaAa= napwr7nTpeov, 6sav avru 76v
auvmepqcaaL

rcv

epcra

tov ?O6yov, orcU sun8on aL TMUTOV eV

7CpOT0'CaeaV, &CeLaf7rp TMOLq YLVsTCL, ZLOV

taOLeV 6&tLaVeU [AaOU aUXXOyLaC rXTO VOV&XLq 7 Xey6'jevov.

ou

It is clear that in the above passage protaseis are the answers given in the form of statements. But Aristotle uses protasis here in the sense of 'statement' because he has in mind the opponent as being a otUoyL6o6uvoq, one who has to infer a certain conclusion from a set of answers. The oroyLGO,6svoqis not interested in proving the conclusion in Kneale's sense of 'proof': "to prove a proposition is to infer it validly from true premisses". Aristotle's use of the word protasis here is in line with his understanding of the word as having two senses. When the opponent ?p(ri -TO6v Xoyov, what he is doing is asking questions which are dialectical protaseis in the first sense of the word. Thus, I believe, Aristotle has not changed his point of view. He still uses the word protasis, whenever the occasion calls for it, in the two senses found in the Topics, and explicitly stated at the beginning of the Prior Analytics. It is also false to say, as Kneale says, that in the Prior Analytics Aristotle "is concerned to find out how a given proposition can be proved". Aristotle is interested in the Prior Analytic to find out what forms of statements follow from other forms of statements, rather than in the proof of statements. His interest in the proof of statements or rather in the demonstration of statements as found in the Posterior A nalytics. Before I conclude, I will say a few things more about protasis. 275

Ammonius writes that the distinction between the 7trQ (in the De Interpretatione) and protasis, is the following:

VTLx0q

?,6yoq

13, 24

86X9Xpel

y'p 7p60xLCC &oP0v'rtxoG5 X6yow 7a(

OXV0CPVrLX6;

eV yap 7tp6-

Tocat. 70XVTCaX(XL OUX'eKlV 7Cp6tXaL Yeivra ytLapLu5

XOyO, &LV

Xoyo; np6OcaLg ka'tv. X*' t6 8O

.8

eu'V

8e &7rGopoVrtvLx6 t y&p OC OMcTVTLY.O ?6yoq

oGu 7ra

yLVeTML pTO'aL4,

otav 6epogmao-

Later on, he also writes: 13, 36 ouv ?v tiv TX fp. Ep'.zpwlqeoc; Xo?you4 &Cocp0vLUxou VSL8 xesyevxad4'0U"ok,evT6cia 8e rodgX6youcq FspincauXXoyLautv 14, 1 eIX6Tg iX?e 0&v oU'atvpmv [Ltv-V STpOTCaCWV 7rcpovXoctPCwe,
7rOLiVaoXTO, VTUX 8t OpLtet 't 7o're EaLV np6OaTC

...

So, according to Ammonius, o &Cro av-x0q ?6yoq - that logos which can be true or false - when it stands by itself is not a protasis. 'A7tocLVTLX64 Xoyog becomes a protasis when it is understood as part of a syllogism, when it becomes part of a syllogism. A protasis cannot stand by itself, a protasis is &ot avTLx0q X6yoqviewed in the context of an inferential proces, its character is relational. In view of Ammonius' remark, we may give an explanation as to why Aristotle uses the word protasis in the sense of 'question'. If a questoin is asked simply for the sake of getting some information only, then it would not be aprotasis, but when questions are asked for the purpose of securing answers, which will be used for drawing conclusions, then they become protaseis. In conclusion, I may say, that my claim that Martha Kneale has misunderstood Aristotle's distinction between protasis and problema could have been made by Alexander of Aphrodisias, Ammonius, Grote, Ernst Kapp, G. E. L. Owen, and others, since I believe that they have understood Aristotle correctly concerning the points discussed above.

University of Oklahoma

8 Ammonius, In Aristotelis Analyticorum Priorum Librum I Contnzentarium. Ed. M. Wallies. (Commentariain Aristotelem Graeca, iv (vi).) Berlin, 1899. p. 13 9 Ibid., pp. 13-14.

276