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Background
The January 1986 overthrow of President Tito Okello, an ethnic Acholi, by the National Resistance Army (NRA) of south-west Uganda born Yoweri Museveni marked a period of intense turmoil. The NRA in their efforts to liberate the entire country meted out a lot of atrocities on the people of Acholi. This act spurred some Acholis to resist the medieval acts. The Acholi are sometimes said to have feared the loss of their traditional dominance of the national military; they were also deeply concerned that the NRA would seek retribution for the brutal counterinsurgency, particularly the actions of the army in the Luwero triangle.[6][7] By August of that year, a full-blown popular insurgency had developed in northern regions that were occupied by the new government forces.
Timeline
Early history of the rebellion (1987 to 1994)
In January 1987, Joseph Kony made his first appearance as a spirit medium, one of many who emerged after the initial success of the Holy Spirit Movement of Alice Auma. Former Uganda People's Democratic Army commander Odong Latek convinced Kony to adopt conventional guerrilla warfare tactics, primarily surprise attacks on civilian targets, such as villages. The LRA also occasionally carried out large-scale attacks to underline the inability of the government to protect the populace. Until 1991 the LRA raided the populace for supplies, which were carried away by villagers who were abducted for short periods. The fact that some NRA units were known for their brutal actions ensured that the LRA were given at least passive support by segments of the Acholi population.[8] March 1991 saw the start of "Operation North", which combined efforts to destroy the LRA while cutting away its roots of support among the population through heavy-handed tactics.[9] As part of Operation North, Acholi Betty Oyella Bigombe, the Minister charged with ending the insurgency, created "Arrow Groups" mostly armed with bows and arrows, as a form of local defence. As the LRA was armed with modern weaponry, the bow-and-arrow groups were overpowered. The creation of the Arrow Groups angered Kony, who began to feel that he no longer had the support of the population. In response the LRA mutilated numerous Acholi whom they believed to be government supporters. While the government efforts were a failure, the LRA reaction caused many Acholi to finally turn against the insurgency. However, this was tempered by the deep-seated antagonism towards the occupying government forces.
2 Following the Operation North, Bigombe initiated the first face-to-face meeting between representatives of the LRA and government. The LRA asked for a general amnesty for their combatants and stated that they would not surrender, but were willing to "return home." However, the government stance was hampered by disagreement over the credibility of the LRA negotiators and political infighting. In particular, the military had learned that Kony was negotiating with the Sudanese government for support while talking to Bigombe, and felt that Kony was simply trying to buy time.[8]
At a second meeting on 10 January 1994, Kony asked for six months to regroup his troops. By early February the tone of the negotiations was growing increasingly acrimonious, and following a meeting on 2 February, the LRA broke off negotiations stating that they felt that the NRA was trying to entrap them. Four days later, President Yoweri Museveni announced a seven-day deadline for the LRA to surrender.[8] This ultimatum ended the Bigombe Avengers Initiative.
The conflict forces many civilians to live in internally displaced person (IDP) camps
Lord's Resistance Army insurgency was killed in battle on 12 August 2006.[23] The government and the LRA signed a truce on 26 August 2006. Under the terms of the agreement, LRA forces will leave Uganda and gather in two assembly areas protected by the government of Sudan. The Ugandan government agreed not to attack those areas. LRA rebels had begun gathering in the assembly areas by mid-September.[24] Talks continued to be hindered by demands and counter-demands. Meanwhile, the government began a process of creating "satellite camps" to decongest the main IDP camps.[25] In broader context, the government of Southern Sudan viewed the talks as a means of ridding itself of a foreign army that was complicating its delicate relationship with the Khartoum government. The request by the Ugandan Government for ICC to suspend war crimes indictments against leaders of the LRA was condemned by international human rights groups but largely supported by leaders and civilians within northern Uganda.[26] By mid-2007, thousands of IDPs had moved into the decongestion camps. However, the populace remained cautious about the prospect of a peace deal, with many refusing to return to their ancestral homes before a definitive end to the insurgency.[27] Following a suspension in the peace talks, the Juba Initiative Project enabled the resumption of the talks in May 2007, thanks to the efforts of the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General for LRA-affected areas, Joaquim Chissano. The talks were again mediated by the Government of Southern Sudan, but with the support of the United Nations and logistic facilitation from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).[28] On 20 August 2007, Uganda declared that it was seeking legal advice on setting a war crimes court.[29] In November 2007, an LRA delegation led by Martin Ojul journeyed to Kampala to restate its commitment to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Ojul later led the delegation on a tour of northern Uganda to meet victims of the insurgency and ask their forgiveness. However, reports surfaced that LRA deputy commander Otti had been executed on or around 8 October 2007 over an internal power struggle with Kony.[30]
Lord's Resistance Army insurgency On 12 May 2012, Ugandan soldiers with the African Union brigade captured a senior LRA leader in the Central African Republic, Caesar Achellam, a veteran rebel commander with the rank of Major General. Because he was a leading military strategist for the LRA, Achellam's arrest signified a considerable setback for Joseph Kony's fight to evade capture.[38][39] On 6 June, the UN secretary general, Ban Ki-moon, released an initial report covering the activities of the LRA from 2009 to 2012. The report itself stated that "at least 45 children have been killed and maimed" during this time period and at least "591 children, including 268 girls have been abducted". Though it was noted by Radhika Coomaraswamy, the UN special representative on children and conflict, that the "actual numbers of abductions is much higher, these are just the ones we are aware of". It was also stated in the report that the LRA is currently made up of between 300500 fighters, with around half of them being children.[40][41]
Effects
War violence experienced by abductees Witnessed a killing Tied or locked up Received a severe beating Forced to steal or destroy property Forced to abuse dead bodies Forced to attack a stranger Forced to kill a stranger Forced to kill an opposing soldier in battle [42] 78% 68% 63% 58% 23% 22% 20% 15%
Forced to attack a family member or friend 14% Forced to kill a family member or friend 8%
The insurgency was historically confined to the region known as Acholiland, consisting of the districts of Kitgum, Gulu, and Pader, though since 2002 violence has overflowed into other Ugandan districts. The LRA also operated across the porous border region with Southern Sudan and most recently into the northeastern Ituri Province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The plight of the affected people has received little media coverage in the developed world. Not until April 2004 did the UN Security Council issue a formal condemnation. A 2005 poll of humanitarian professionals, media personalities, academics and activists identified the conflict in the north of Uganda as the second worst "forgotten" humanitarian emergency in the world, after the conflicts of the neighbouring DRC.[43] The U.S. government estimates that up to 12,000 people have been killed in the violence, with many more dying from disease and malnutrition as a direct result of the conflict. Nearly two million civilians have been forced to flee their homes, living in internally displaced person (IDP) camps and within the safety of larger settlements, sleeping on street corners and in other public spaces. The problems of the camps have been expatiated by the government ordering villagers into the camps on pain of being classified as rebels and on occasion shelling those villages who refused to relocate.[44] While many abductees are taken to carry items looted from raided villages, some are also used as soldiers and sex slaves. The group performs abductions primarily from the Acholi people, who have borne the brunt of the 18-year LRA campaign. The United Nations estimated in the mid-2000s that around 25,000 children have been kidnapped by the LRA since 1987. However, several pieces of research have concluded that the figure was significantly higher. In June 2007, UC Berkeley's Human Rights Center researchers worked with reception centers in northern Uganda to compile a database of 25,000 former abductees that went through reception centers.[45]
Lord's Resistance Army insurgency By triangulating data from different sources on the number of former abductees, the research conservatively estimate that the LRA has abducted 24,000 to 38,000 children and 28,000 to 37,000 adults as of April 2006. The research further found that while women represented about a third of all the abductees, they tended to stay longer with the LRA compared to men. Women are forced to serve as sexual and domestic servants. According to a survey of 750 youth in Kitgum and Pader, at least 66,000 youth between the ages of 13 and 30 have been abducted. One-third of all boys and one-sixth of all girls had been taken for at least one day.[42][46] Of these, 66% of males were taken for longer than two weeks, while the equivalent number for females was 46%. If a female was gone for more than two weeks, there was a one in four chance that she had not returned. Males were again found to be taken for longer periods of time on average, with two in five males that were abducted for more than two weeks not having returned. The number of abductions was greatest in 2002 and 2003, perhaps in retaliation for Operation Iron Fist. However, the average age of abductees has risen from about 13 in 1994 to nearly 18 in 2004, coinciding with the rise in number, and fall in length, of abductions.[42][46] While the LRA now appears to consist of less than two thousand combatants that are under intense pressure from the Ugandan military, the government has been unable to end the insurgency to date. Ongoing peace negotiations are complicated by an investigation and trial preparation by the International Criminal Court. Meanwhile military operation is going on. The conflict continues to slow down Uganda's development efforts, costing the poor country's economy a cumulative total of at least $1.33 billion, which is equivalent to 3% of GDP, or $100 million annually.[47]
"Night commuters"
At the height of the conflict, each night, children between the ages of 8 and 14, referred to as "night commuters" or "night dwellers" would walk up to 20 kilometres (mi) from IDP camps to larger towns, especially Gulu, in search of safety. To avoid abduction by the LRA, every night as many as 40,000 children were fleeing their homes in the countryside to sleep in the relative safety of towns. Known as "night commuters", they seek refuge overnight at churches, hospitals, bus stations and temporary shelters before returning home again each morning. Bacause of this phenomenon, united under the banner of peace, religious leaders from different denominations staged a one week solidarity demonstration by sleeping in the streets with the children. This singular act created massive awareness of the conflict to the world.
Awareness
Initiatives to raise international awareness for these children included the "GuluWalk" and the work of the Resolve Uganda. Night commuters are also the subject of documentaries such as Stolen Children, War/Dance, and Invisible Children. The Invisible Children documentary sponsored the Global Night Commute, an event similar to GuluWalk. On 29 April 2006, over 80,000 youths from around the world converged on urban centers in 130 major cities around the world in solidarity with displaced Ugandan children. The Invisible Children organization also raised awareness for those in the Internally Displaced Camps (IDPs) through its "Displace Me" event held in 15 cities across the US on 28 April 2007. Over 68,000 people participated in the event which required participants to sleep outside in "homes" made out of cardboard, similar to those in the IDPs. Another program, The Name Campaign, asks people to wear nameplate necklaces imprinted with the first name of one of the thousands of abducted children as a means of raising public awareness.
Lord's Resistance Army insurgency Danny Glover and Don Cheadle have both been vocal advocates on behalf of the children of Northern Uganda. On 5 March 2012, the Invisible Children organization posted the Kony 2012 video on YouTube which had an immediate massive impact.[48][49][50] As of 17June 2012, the film had over 91 million views on video-sharing website YouTube.[51]
Sources
Allen, Tim."Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord's Resistance Army", African Arguments Series, Zed Books, London, 2006. ISBN 1-84277-737-8 Behrend, H. (M. Cohen, trans.) Alice Lakwena and the Holy Spirits: War in Northern Uganda, 198597, James Currey, 2000. ISBN 0-8214-1311-2. (Originally published as Behrend, H. 1993. Alice und die Geister: Krieg in Norden Uganda. Trickster, Munich.) "War in Northern Uganda: The Holy Spirit Movements of Alice Lakwena, Severino Lukoya and Joseph Kony (19861997)", in Clapham, C. ed. African Guerrillas. James Currey, Oxford, 1998. De Temmerman, E. Aboke Girls: Children Abducted in Northern Uganda, Fountain, 2001. ISBN 9970-02-256-3. (Originally published as De Temmerman, E. De meisjes van Aboke: Kindsoldaten in Noord-Oeganda. De Kern, 2000. ISBN 90-5312-146-3.) Doom, R. and K. Vlassenroot. "Kony's message: a new koine? The Lord's Resistance Army in Northern Uganda," African Affairs 98 (390) 1999: 5 to 36 Eichstaedt, Peter. First Kill Your Family: Child Soldiers of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army. Lawrence Hill Books. 2008. ISBN 978-1-55652-799-9 Gingyera-Pincywa, A.G. "Is there a Northern Question?" in K. Rupesinghe, ed. Conflict Resolution in Uganda, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 1989. Jackson, P. "The March of the Lord's Resistance Army: Greed or Grievance in Northern Uganda?" Small Wars and Insurgencies 13, no. 3 (Autumn 2002): 29 to 52. Ofcansky, T. "Warfare and Instability Along the Sudan-Uganda Border: A Look at the Twentieth Century" in Spaulding, J. and S. Beswick, eds. White Nile, Black Blood: War, Leadership, and Ethnicity from Khartoum to Kampala. Red Sea Press, Lawrenceville, NJ: 195210, 2000. Pham PN, Vinck P, Stover E. "The Lords Resistance Army and Forced Conscription in Northern Uganda.", Human Rights Quarterly 30:404411, 2008 Vinck P, Pham PN, Weinstein HM, Stover E. Exposure to War Crimes and its Implications for Peace Building in Northern Uganda. Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) 298 (5): 543554, 2007 Ward, K. "'The Armies of the Lord': Christianity, Rebels and the State in Northern Uganda, 19861999", Journal of Religion in Africa 31 (2), 2001.
References
[1] JAMES C. MCKINLEY JR. (1 April 1996). "Uganda's Christian Rebels Revive War in North" (http:/ / query. nytimes. com/ gst/ fullpage. html?res=9B0DE2DA1039F932A35757C0A960958260& sec=& spon=& pagewanted=1). New York Times. . [2] Ruddy Doom and Koen Vlassenroot (1999). Kony's message: A new Koine? The Lord's Resistance Army in northern Uganda. 98. Oxford Journals / Royal African Society. pp.536. [3] "Interview with Vincent Otti, LRA second in command" (http:/ / www. irinnews. org/ InDepthMain. aspx?InDepthId=58& ReportId=72472) and " A leadership based on claims of divine revelations" (http:/ / www. irinnews. org/ InDepthMain. aspx?InDepthId=58& ReportId=72445) in IRIN In Depth, June 2007 [4] International Criminal Court (14 October 2005). Warrant of Arrest unsealed against five LRA Commanders (http:/ / www. icc-cpi. int/ pressrelease_details& id=114& l=en. html). Retrieved 10 June 2008. [5] BBC NEWS | Programmes | From Our Own Correspondent | Forgiveness for Uganda's former rebels (http:/ / news. bbc. co. uk/ 2/ hi/ programmes/ from_our_own_correspondent/ 3951277. stm) [6] Doom, R. and K. Vlassenroot. "Kony's message: a new koine? The Lord's Resistance Army in Northern Uganda," African Affairs 98 (390), p. 9
External links
Lord's Resistance Army (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/lra.htm), GlobalSecurity.org Invisible Children (http://www.invisiblechildren.com/), advocacy group and documentary about LRA's child soldiers News about Uganda (http://www.irinnews.org/frontpage.asp?SelectRegion=East_Africa& SelectCountry=Uganda) from the UN Integrated Regional Information Networks Compiled recent news articles about Uganda (http://allafrica.com/uganda/), AllAfrica.com Situation in Uganda (http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases/current_situations/Uganda.html/), International Criminal Court Uganda page (http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpCountries)/ 04678346A648C087802570A7004B9719?opendocument&count=10000), Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre Human Security in Northern Uganda project (http://www.up.ligi.ubc.ca/index.html), University of British Columbia (extensive links from before mid-2004) Survey of War Affected Youth (SWAY): Research & Programs for Youth in Armed Conflict in Uganda (http:// www.sway-uganda.org/) Publications (http://refugeelawproject.org/resources/papers/workingpapers/) of the Refugee Law Project, Makerere University, periodic reports on human security and forced displacement in the north "A Case for National Reconciliation, Peace, Democracy and Economic Prosperity for All Ugandans" (http:// www.km-net.org.uk/conferences/KM97/papers_htm/casefor.htm), outlines and defends the LRA's political views.
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