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51

India and China are the two oldest continuing civilisations, each with the quality of
resilience which has permitted them to survive and prosper through the ages. These two
countries are, according to an Indian vies, going concerns - tough social organisms able
to overcome the vicissitudes of history. AH the same, there is most striking difference
between the two. The body of literature on the Sino-Indian conflict is dialectical in
nature. During the 25 years after the traumatic and political humiliation meted out by
China in October 1962, India steadily rebuilt its military power. Though India had
superiority in manpower and mobility on land but China's modern military strategy
ousted it from the ikld. In 1988, political and economics uncertainties stalled the growth
of India's strategic forces.

Now two circumstances have arisen that could push India back to the relative inferiority
of the 60s. The first is the startling economic growth of China, while India moved
hesitantly toward liberalisation and a free market economy, China has sped ahead. The
result, a compound nine per cent growth of 15 per cent annually in southern China, where
a third of the country's population lives. Insofar as China's economic growth is just
starting and the reforms first begun in the South will be allowed to spread, it is quite
likely that by 2002 China will have a per capita income three times, and by
2010, perhaps four times that of India, even allowing for an enhanced Indian growth
consequent upto economic deregulation. Second, China's military technology tie-ups with
Israel means that the Chinese weapons will cease to be the laughing stock of the world.
Insofar as the explosive Chinese growth and access to foreign currency has come at a
time when India is reeling under cogent financial constraints and a stringency of foreign
exchange, China will soon surpass India in military technology. In future, with increasing
funds, China will also be able to remedy its greatest shortcoming along the Indian border.
Starting in 1985, the Chinese armed forces were overhauled by Deng Xiaoping as part of
his "Modernisation Programme."

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51

hkierceSved strength in the coming years. There has undoubtedly been y a significant
reduction in tension between the two countries after the ' Sumdurang Chu incident
(1986) which almost exploded into a fullscale war. The Sino-Indian joint working group
and their mutual efforts were reviewed during the Chinese President's visit to India. Both
the countries decided measures, including reduction of troops, shifting of border posts in
increase the distance between them, prior intimation of military exercises and passive
handling of air intrusions on either side.

China watchers point out that Beijing is presently mainly concerned with its economic
development and realises the need to maintain non-acrimonious relations with its
neighbours. It has, therefore, stepped up contacts with the ASEAN countries, with Japan
and Russia. China's desire to 'buy' peace with India should be seen in this light.

Whatever may be India's ambitions or intentions for the next two decades, she cannot
effort delusions of grandeur on the one hand or escape from the realities of her size and
potential on the other. It is impossible for her to achieve globai power status in these two
decades, even if she desires it. Jawahrlal Nehru had a grand vision of India and China,
two of the largest countries of Asia, working together for peace and stability in the region
and the world. It was a grand concept, but the mistake Nehru made was to assume that
the Chinese also thought the same way. They did not! But nobody could disabuse Nehru,
who held on t his view up to the very end, till the war in 1962.

That war finally shattered his illusions and, perhaps, also speeded up his death. It is not as
if there were no indications earlier
- of China's truculence toward India. In 1950, during China-Tibet ruction, India had made
a feeble representation about it. But China reacted reluctantly, criticising India as having
imperialist designs. A few years later, in 1954, India negotiated the Agreement on Trade
and intercourse with the Government of India came across China's maps which showed
Arunachal Pradesh, in the Eastern Sector, and Aksai Chin, in the Western Sector, as part
of Tibet. Eventually, India raised the question with China and protested tenaciously. In
reply, China said that these are old Kuomintage maps. When the Agreement on Trade and
Intercourse with the Tibet region of China was signed without getting the McMohan line
settled with China, Nehru regarded the line as "clear and precise, and continued to
believe that the border was settled for all practical purposes. On August 9, 1971, when
India signed an agreement of peace with

Russia, it caused rage of China and the United States over India China, however issued
an ultimatum to India.

During the Rajiv era, tension between the two countries increased when India protested
over China's support to Pakistan. There were two major setbacks, however, relating to
India-China and India-Sri Lank relations. The first was a missed opportunity and the
other a messed up operation. While the latter is treated below, the former had provided an
opportunity to move towards a settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary problem. The
whole issue was dealt with in a cavalier manner without a proper understanding of the
issue involved, with the net result that China understood India as a cheat

Sino-Indian relations have taken different turns and twists in the past. In the early 1950s,
the idea of Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai represented the hyperbolic and conspicuous
reality of their relationship in the international arena. This co-operation between China
and India seemed to have a torch-bearing impact on the newly emerging countries of the
1950s and was also pregnant with wider implications in the arena of international politics.
But due to the divergence of opinion over certain issues, the relationship between these
two powers became not only competitive but also conflictual in the early 1960s. The
pattern of Sino-Indian relations has been disturbing during the 1970s and 1980s. India
and China have now adopted step-by-step approach to the objective of defusing tension.
The first step has been what we have recently witnessed, following President Jiang's visit
to India. The next step will be their mutual understanding on several border and
international issues.

As India and China compose their differences, the renewed respectability of panchsheel
after a quarter century of disputes, raises some hopes that a broad convergence of
interests may again be resurrected to subvert their future socio-economic goals. More
important, it is expected that an accommodation of the kind envisaged above would be
conductive to enlarge the area of agreement between India, China and Pakistan by the
very fact of minimising the scope of US influence in the region.

There is no gainsaying that while the extent of Sino-Indian interaction is limited as

present, the scope of improvement, while linked to the progress made over the boundary
question, would be shaped by several other ingredients. The logic of the regional
distribution of power would mean that India and China would remain as rivals in the
future.Any analysis of military threat to India from China must necessarily be coloured
by the current geopolitics;! situation and