Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 11 (1998) 6773

Gas explosion modelling of FPSO

V.H.Y. Tam a*, R. Lee
a

BP Exploration U.K., Chertsey Road, Sunbury on Thames TW16 7LN, UK b Brown and Root, UK

Abstract A Floating Production Storage Off-loading (FPSO) can be divided into four areas each with distinct characteristics of gas explosion development. The application of three generic types of gas explosion model is discussed. Suggestions are given for possible development of empirical and phenomenological models and the pitfalls associated with more exible CFD codes are discussed. Experimental evidence and results of simulation show that there exists a critical cloud size, which we called runaway length, above which gas explosion could develop rapidly leading to damaging over-pressure. The success of control measures need to take account of the runaway length, e.g. an effective measure could include diverting a gas leak towards an area with a larger runaway length. The main structural surface on FPSO is the hull which tends to be strong. Drag loading on pipework, equipment and grated decks could be more signicant than simple over-pressure load. 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved
Keywords: FPSO; Gas explosion; Design; Critical runaway length

1. Introduction Floating Production Storage Off-loading (FPSO) installations are increasingly being used in offshore U.K., particularly in the new production region west of the Shetland Islands. As far as the U.K. Safety Regulations are concerned, FPSOs are xed production facilities (Renwick, 1997), and therefore are subjected to the same safety case regulations as for traditional xed jacket platforms. Much of our experience in the application of gas explosion modelling so far is in process and wellbay modules, and process decks on xed jacket platforms. These areas tend to be congested and conned. Supercially, FPSOs appear to be fully open, less conned and therefore should pose less of an explosion hazard than a conventional xed jacket platform. Indeed, we were aware of a misconception in the industry that severe gas explosion could not occur on FPSOs on the grounds of their deck being open. Similar arguments had been put forward for relatively open platforms that operate in the shallow water of the Gulf of Mexico. As we shall see later, connement is just one of the many para-

meters that affect the severity of major gas explosions on FPSOs. High gas explosion over-pressure is indeed possible on an FPSO. However, its potential impact is probably one of the main differences between a FPSO and a xed jacket platform. The purpose of this paper is to review differences between xed jacket platforms and FPSOs, in particular, the application of existing types of gas explosion models. The discussion will be restricted to generic model types. The paper will also discuss the following: (a) the main impact of gas explosions on FPSOs, (b) appropriate explosion scenarios, and (c) some of the options available to control and minimise the consequences of gas explosions on an FPSO. Examples will be given to illustrate some of the points made in this paper using calculations based on the BP Schiehallion FPSO. It is worth noting that the FPSO technology is still developing and much of the discussion in this paper is necessarily based on a snapshot of the current FPSO technology.

* Corresponding author.

09504230 /98 /$19.00 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. Printed in Great Britain. PII S 0 9 5 0 - 4 2 3 0 ( 9 8 ) 0 0 0 0 6 - 0

68

V.H.Y. Tam, R. Lee / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 11 (1998) 6773

2. FPSO and xed jacket platform The main differences between FPSOs and xed jacket platforms lies in the space available and the technology associated with a movable riser connection platform. 2.1. Fixed jacket platforms Gas explosions on offshore platforms tend to occur in congested and conned modules. Fixed jacket platforms tend to have relatively small footprints. This results in multi-deck construction. The platform is segregated into small areas protected by re and blast walls. The result of all these is that individual hazardous areas are relatively conned and congested. Natural ventilation may need to be supplemented by forced ventilation. 2.2. FPSO Contrast this with a FPSO. Space is not an issue in most cases as this is dictated by the amount of storage required (usually large), hence equipment tends to be arranged on one level raised above the main deck. It is possible to nd examples where only a small percentage of deck area is used, e.g. the Ashland Oil (Nigeria) Tanker. Generally, a footprint area available for equipment is large. It is instructive to compare available space with that of a xed jacket platform. The BP Schiehallion FPSO has an area for oil production of about 200 m long and about 50 m wide. This can be compared with a large platform, such as the BP ETAP Central Processing Facility Platform (CPF) of similar production rate. The entire process area on the ETAP CPF could be accommodated in about 60% of the free deck area on the BP Schiehallion. Supercially, based on this broad-brush comparison, the issue of gas explosion should not be as problematic as for a xed jacket platform. For example, unlike xed jacket platforms, areas are not normally segregated. Ventilation tends to be good and in a predictable direction (bow to stern). However, the factor that exacerbate a gas explosion on a FPSO is the potentially larger volume of gas involved. Further, if we look at a FPSO in more detail, we can see that not all areas are open and well ventilated, e.g. ventilation in the area between the deck of the ship (cargo oil tank top) and the process deck can suffer from relatively poor ventilation. FPSOs can be divided into four areas as far as gas explosion development is concerned. It is expected that certain groups of explosion model would be applicable to some areas and not to the other. Before we discuss this, it is worth recapping the range of gas explosion models available and their intended applications.

3. Generic gas explosion models All mathematical models were developed for a limited range of applications, and if they are applied correctly then they should give reasonable results. However, if the models are used beyond their intended purpose then results will be misleading. The main factor that determines whether a model is right for a particular application is the type and range of data from which the model is developed or calibrated. One common misuse of empirical models in the late 80s was the application of a range of explosion models designed to predict explosion over-pressure in a small paint drying oven to large offshore module (Tam and Simmonds, 1993). The commonly used models in the U.K./Norwegian Continental Shelf were developed primarily for xed jacket offshore production platforms. There are many papers (e.g. OTH Report, 1994) which describe individual models in detail, so they will not be discussed here. The discussion will be limited to the range of calibration data. The three main class of explosion models are: 3.1. Empirical It is a set of correlations that t to a set of experimental data which consisted mainly of simple boxes, simple arrangement of vent and simple arrays of pipe as congestion. The application of this type of model is therefore limited to these geometries. 3.2. Phenomenological With the application of some science, the range of application can be extended beyond the range of the original dataset. Virtually all the phenomenological models are still based on some box shaped connement. However, with some ingenuity and good knowledge of the model, it is possible to extend the application somewhat. For example, Piper (1997) extended the application from a square box geometry to one based on cylindrical geometry. 3.3. Computational uid dynamics (CFD) CFD models make use of the basic equation of ow (Navier Stoke equation). Experimental data are used to develop and calibrate sub-models that feed into the basic Navier Stoke equations, e.g. interaction of turbulence level with combustion. So theoretically, this class of model can be applied to any venting geometry, equipment and pipework layout. However, two factors which may inuence the applicability of a CFD model: (a) the model may have been adjusted to t a particular set of experiments, and (b)

V.H.Y. Tam, R. Lee / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 11 (1998) 6773

69

the data used to calibrate the sub models may not be valid for the intended application. While the former can be inferred by studying the validation work carried out by the code developer, the latter pitfall can only be avoided by users who have intimate knowledge of the code. In addition, there are other complications, such as numerical effects, to resolve. In short, the three types of model vary in complexity and range of application, and require different level of expertise to operate them effectively.

connement, and take account of congestion aligned along the direction of venting rather than across. Some of these data had been collected already (Hjertager, 1985; Johnson, private communication, 1997). Because of the connement, the severity of a gas explosion is determined by the level of venting. High over-pressure can result if venting is limited or blocked by an explosion in the turret above (i.e. Area 1). Overpressure duration will tend to be long, and fairly uniform within the moonpool (see Fig. 1). 4.3. Area 3: process area (above process or production deck) This is an open but fairly congested area. This is beyond the range of application of empirical and most phenomenological models currently used for offshore application. As connement is limited, the primary mechanism to develop a gas explosion is congestion. Experiments (Harris and Wickens, 1989) and our work based on CFD models show that there exists a critical ame run length beyond which explosion over-pressure could rise rapidly. We will call distance the runaway length. If we carry out an experiment in which we gradually increase the size of the gas cloud in a large process deck, the maximum over-pressure will increase gradually with the length of the gas cloud. Beyond a certain distance, the over-pressure will increase rapidly (see Fig. 2). It is therefore important to quantify this runaway length. 4.4. Area 4: between tank top and process deck Apart from its size, this area most resembles a process area on a conventional offshore platform. There is connement on the deck (tank top), and wave wash-over on the side and the congested process deck on the top. There

4. FPSO areasaccording to application of gas explosion modelling In terms of gas explosion characteristics, a FPSO can be divided into four main areastwo in the turret and two in the process area. In some FPSOs, the turret is totally open and located outside the vessel, in which case, there is minimal gas explosion risk in the turret. In the harsh environment of the North Sea and the Atlantic Frontier region, FPSOs tend to have a large turret located partly above and partly within the hull. The discussion here will assume the latter form of FPSO. 4.1. Area 1: turret This is a structure providing a stable quasi-stationary platform (i.e. it is xed to the seabed by anchors and carries risers and emergency shut down valves) which allows the vessel to rotate in line with resultant environmental local forces (e.g. tide, etc.). The requirement to rotate about an axis means that pipework and equipment is typically arranged cylindrically about the turret axis, i.e. along the radius or the circumference. In many cases, weather protection is installed, e.g. wind wall. There is some similarity with offshore modules in that there is signicant connement leading to directional explosion venting. The main difference, however, is in the cylindrical layout and venting direction. It is possible to envisage that existing phenomenological models can be adapted to operate in this geometry. However, appropriate data will need to be collected and existing models will need to be modied. 4.2. Area 2: turret moonpool Like the turret area, the moonpool is laid out according to a cylindrical co-ordination system. This area is very conned: bounded by the sea at the bottom, the ships hull on all sides and partially blocked by the rotating deck above. If we discount the cylindrical nature of this area, an appropriately calibrated empirical model is expected to be applicable. The main hurdle for its application lies in the calibration data set. They need to be for cylindrical

Fig. 1. Schematic diagram showing the over-pressure as seen by an observer located in the turret. There are two componentsthe slowly varying curve represents over-pressure generated by an explosion in the moonpool, and the sharp spike is due to an explosion in the turret. The relative position of P1 and P2 depends on the location of ignition source.

70

V.H.Y. Tam, R. Lee / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 11 (1998) 6773
Z (m)

60

1.0

0.6

20 X (m) 65 100 100

0.1

Fig. 2. Schematic diagram showing the variation of maximum overpressure with the length of a gas cloud. Maximum over-pressure increases gradually as cloud length increases. When the runaway length is reached, maximum over-pressure increases rapidly.

(barg) 1.0

is high level of congestion in the form of tank top pipework and connections for equipment pallets above. The concept of runaway length in the Process Area is applicable here too. For the same level of congestion, it is expected that the runaway length is shorter in this area than in Area 3.

Time (s) 1.0 1.2 1.4

4.5. Mix and match areas In real situation, it is expected that a gas explosion would not be restricted to one single area. Due to differences between these areas, it is possible to predict qualitatively the development of a gas explosion in a gas cloud covering two or more areas. Two examples are given below:

Fig. 3. The results of a simulation in the form of over-pressure contour map. The initial condition is that a gas cloud covering one-third of the moonpool and half of the turret. This gure shows the occurrence of two explosions, and the resultant over-pressure time curves.

5. Discussion

5.1. Modelling issues 4.5.1. Turret and turret moonpool (Area 1 and 2) Due to the different rate of explosion development in these two areas, an observer on the turret is expected to see two distinct explosions, a long duration explosion in the Moonpool and a short one in the turret area (see Figs 1 and 3). This would be true irrespective of ignition location which affects only the relative positions over time of maximum peak over-pressures of the two explosions. 5.1.1. CFD model From the discussions above, CFD models are the only generic type of models sufciently exible to be applicable in all four areas. However, there are some new issues which a user needs to be aware of. Many of these issues arise because of the large volume associated with a FPSO and limited computing power, resulting in less than ideal computational grid. 5.1.2. Numerical boundary effect Edges of calculation domains behave like boundaries and create reection of pressure waves. Because of the relatively long ame propagation time, it is possible that reected over-pressure wave could interfere with a propagating ame, leading to unexpected results (see Fig. 5).

4.5.2. Tank top to process area (Area 3 and 4) As the runaway length is shorter in Area 3 than in Area 4, one would expect two distinct pressure waves travelling away from the ignition location. A pressure wave below the process deck with a less intense one above and slightly ahead (see Fig. 4).

V.H.Y. Tam, R. Lee / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 11 (1998) 6773
Y (m) 455 450 445 440 435 430 425 420 415 410 405 400 395 390 385 380 375 370 365 65 Y (m) 455 450 445 440 435 430 425 420 415 410 405 400 395 390 385 380 375 370 365 70 95 120 X (m) 0.2 1.0 1.8 95 120 X (m) 0.2 0.8 1.3

71

Fig. 5. Schematic diagram showing the impact of incorrectly set up of boundary conditions. An explosion is travelling from A to B, maintaining a constant over-pressure of 1 bar. At position A, an over-pressure wave travels towards the boundary, reect back as 0.5 bar and reach position B at the same time as the propagating gas explosion. This leads to misleading results.

5.1.4. Geometric details Some gas explosion models are sensitive to the level and distribution of congestion, as shown in a recent Fire and Blast Engineering for Topside Structure Project, Phase 2, SCI Technical Note (Steel Construction Institute, 1996). It is therefore important that the most detailed and accurate layout information available is incorporated into the model. Because of the large size of FPSOs, this often represents a signicant effort. 5.2. Control and management of gas explosion hazards 5.2.1. Scenariorealistic scenarios In the majority of FPSOs, there is no re and blast barriers to limit the size of the gas cloud. The conventional worst case used on offshore platforms (Tam and Langford, 1994) is not realistic in that a gas cloud covering the entire process and turret area on a large FPSO often requires an inventory in excess of that available. An assessment of cloud size is needed based on signicant leak sources. Figure 6 shows the results of a CFD calculation showing the extent of a ammable gas cloud for a steady large release of 40 kg/s. This release could easily ll up a conned offshore module, but only cover a relatively small area on a FPSOmuch of the gas escapes away from the congested process area. 5.2.2. Inherent safe designcontrol measures The implication of the discussions above is that effective measures to control the severity of a potential major gas explosion on a FPSO consist of two elements:

Fig. 4. The results of a simulation in the process area (Area 3 (top) and 4 (bottom)) in the form of over-pressure contour map. This gure shows that (a) the over-pressure is of limited extent, near the location of the ame and (b) the over-pressure in Area 4 (bottom) is higher than that in Area 3 (top).

5.1.3. Gridinguse of stretched grid In many CFD models, ame is not explicitly tracked; combustion is assumed to occur uniformly within a control volume or numerical cell. If the control volume is not a cube, then there is a tendency for the ame to move faster along the direction where the cell is elongated. As above, this could yield unexpected results.

72

V.H.Y. Tam, R. Lee / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 11 (1998) 6773

Fig. 6. Showing the results of a CFD simulation of the dispersion of a large gas leak. The size of the gas cloud is shown by the shaded area and represent a concentration contour of half LFL.

(a) limit maximum cloud size to below runaway length (b) eliminate or minimise gas cloud accumulating in Area 2 and 4 on a FPSO, e.g. by removing or minimising potential leak sources in these areas, or directing potential leaks away from these areas. 5.2.3. Inherent safe designpassive measures In terms of practical measures, some of the features that can be incorporated include: (a) minimise inventory (b) reduce cloud size by re and blast walls (c) large separation distance between congestion blocks to reduce the size of each congestion block to less than the runaway length (d) control leak directions. For example, in the BP Shiehallion FPSO, the collar deck construction in the turret will prevent, as far as reasonably predictable, a potential downward facing release into the moonpool and the I tubes are of welded construction below the collar deck. This minimises the possible formation of a ammable gas cloud within the moonpool area. Similarly, in the process area, all large pipes have been kept above deck and anges/valves near the deck eliminated in order that the formation of a ammable gas cloud in the area between the process deck and the tank top is minimised. 5.2.4. Active measures (a) Ship aligned away from wind: Results of CFD calculations show that pointing vessel slightly from the wind (say 10) can reduce the size of gas cloud on deck signicantly. On Schiehallion, for example, the cloud size shown in Fig. 6 was reduced by over 35% through orientating the FPSO 10 off the wind. In practice, as FPSO tend to current-vane rather than wind-vane, this wind offset occurs naturally without intervention in most weather conditions. (b) Water curtain to limit cloud size and location. This also has the benet of weakening a propa-

gating gas explosion, effectively increasing the runaway length. However, its implementation should take account of slow activation time, its impact on potential ignition sources, etc. 5.3. Impact of gas explosions One of the major differences between a FPSO and a xed jacket platform is the way gas explosions impact on structures and equipment. An explosion in an offshore module would exert high over-pressure loads on walls, deck and ceiling. This could cause signicant distortion resulting in damage to pipework and equipment, and could possibly lead to direct impairment of the temporary refuge (TR). Hence the important parameter for determining explosion consequences is maximum over-pressure. The same is not true for FPSO. Due to the inherently strong structure of the vessel and the distance between the process plant and the TR, it is unlikely that a blast could lead to direct TR impairment. The important loading on a FPSO is due to drag from the venting gases. Maximum over-pressure is not as critical as a xed jacket platform because (a) with the exception of the Area 2 (turret moonpool), the duration tends to be short and the extent of over-pressure is limited, and (b) main structural surfaces are few and tend to be very strong. The explosion generates loads on equipment, pipework and grated deck through drag of venting gases (Corr and Tam, 1997). This could lead to a more general release of inventory, particularly well uids, and a subsequent re could lead to TR impairment. This can, however, be managed effectively by re hazard management which is the subject of another paper. Maximum over-pressure load on a FPSO is important only if runaway length has been exceeded and there is a risk that the hull of the vessel could be breached.

6. Summary FPSOs differ from conventional xed production platforms in construction and layout. There are four areas in which a gas explosion develops with distinct charac-

V.H.Y. Tam, R. Lee / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 11 (1998) 6773

73

teristics. The turret moonpool tends to be conned and its explosion characteristics are determined by limited venting. This results in uniform over-pressure inside with a relatively long duration. In the process area, the main driver is congestion. Over-pressure tend to be of short duration and of limited extent in space. There is a potential that empirical models and phenomenological models are applicable to certain areas on a FPSO. However, appropriate data will need to be used to calibrate them, particularly, taking account of the effect of equipment alignment and rounded wall surfaces. CFD codes are inherently more exible than both empirical and phenomenological models and are applicable to all areas of a FPSO. However, it is important to recognise that they were developed for conventional xed offshore platform applications. Users must ensure that basic assumptions of the CFD models are still valid for their applications and that numerical effects are removed. The main structural surfaces on FPSO are surfaces on the hull which tend to be strong. It is important to consider drag loading on pipework, equipment and grated decks. As the process area is large on FPSOs, there is a potential for a very large ammable gas cloud to develop. Both experimental data and modelling simulations show that maximum over-pressure increases with cloud size in the process area. If the size of gas cloud exceeds a critical size, the runaway length, explosion over-pressure would rise rapidly with increasing cloud size. Therefore, it is important to identify the runaway length and take measures to reduce maximum cloud size to below the runaway length. Effective control measures to limit the severity of a major gas explosion should consist of two elements:

reducing the size of the gas cloud, and minimising leakage in the turret moonpool and the space under the process deck. Examples of these measures include: (a) minimise inventory, (b) re and blast walls, (c) large separation distance to reduce each congestion block to less than the runaway length, (d) control leak directions, (e) ship aligned away from wind, and (f) water curtain to limit cloud size and location and increase runaway length.

References
Corr, R. B., & Tam, V. H. Y., (1997). Gas explosion generated drag loads in offshore installations. Fire and Blast Engineering Conference, ERA Technology, London. Harris, R. J., & Wickens, M. J., (1989). Understanding vapour cloud explosionsan experimental study. Institute of Gas Engineers, Communication No. 1408. Hjertager, B. H., (1985). Computer simulation of turbulent reactive gas dynamics. Modelling, Identication and Control, 5(4). OTH Report, (1994). A survey of current predictive methods for explosion hazard assessments in the UK offshore industry. Offshore Technology Report, OTH 94 449. Piper, D., (1997). Explosion modelling of an FPSO turret. Fire and Blast Information Group Technical Meeting, London. Renwick, P., (1997). Fire and Explosion Issues for FPSOs, Fire and Blast Information Group Technical Meeting, London. Steel Construction Institute, (1996). Interim technical information release by the Joint Industry Project on Blast and Fire Engineering for Topside Structures, Phase 2, Steel Construction Institute. Tam, V. H. Y., & Langford, D., (1994). The design of the BP Andrew platform against gas explosion. Fire and Blast Engineering Conference, ERA Technology, London. Tam, V. H. Y., & Simmonds, S., (1993). Effects of equipment layout and venting geometry on the consequences of gas explosions. SPE Production and Facilities.