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Fill up on API 2350

API 2350 is a recommended practice that prevents petroleum storage tanks from being overfilled. It is developed by the American Petroleum Institute (API) as part of a suite of standards and guidelines covering the operation of petroleum terminals. Overfill prevention is extremely important when considering safety and environmental aspects overfills lead to product losses that need to be contained and, as the December 2005 incident at Buncefield shows, can also lead to catastrophic results. Tank overfills can be effectively reduced by developing and implementing practical and safe operating procedures for storage facilities and by installing certain equipment and scheduling maintenance programmes, including training for employees. API 2350 covers overfill protection for aboveground storage tanks at petroleum facilities - including refineries, terminals, bulk plants and pipeline terminals - that receive Class I liquids from mainline pipelines or marine vessels. The Buncefield explosion resulted from an tank being overfilled during a pipeline delivery of gasoline. Scope of the standard The second edition of API 2350, in force up to 1996, was specifically limited to petroleum facilities with aboveground storage tanks receiving Class I liquids from mainline pipelines or marine vessels. API 2350 was consistent with the National Fire Protection Associations NFPA 30 standard at the time. This recommended practice did not, however, apply to aboveground storage tanks with less than 600 gallons (2,270 litres) capacity or to aboveground storage tanks with more than 600 gallons capacity used to receive Class II or Class III liquids. The exclusions also included aboveground storage tanks containing non-combustible liquids and other non-petroleum products and aboveground storage tanks containing Class I liquids received from anything other than mainline pipelines or marine transfer. It did not apply at all to underground storage tanks. A third edition of API 2350, published in January 2005, redefined the scope of the standard. It was specifically limited to tanks associated with marketing, refining, pipeline and similar facilities containing Class I or Class II petroleum liquids. The recommended practice still did not apply to underground storage tanks; aboveground tanks of 1,320 gallons (5,000 litres) or less; tanks integral to a process; tanks containing Class III or noncombustible liquids; service stations; and loading or delivery from wheeled vehicles. Although the scope was expanded, the minimum capacity was still too low, as the industry learned later that year when the Buncefield disaster occurred. More specifically, one of the statements in the final report of the Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board (MIIB) was: The paramount need is to ensure the integrity of the primary means of containment, i.e. to make sure that fuel does not escape from the vessels in which it is normally contained. Evidence suggests that the protection system which should have shut off the supply of petrol to the tank to prevent overfilling did not operate. Impact of Buncefield The Buncefield MIIB in March 2007 published a series of recommendations on the design and operation of fuel storage sites. The first in a list of four reports, it made a number of recommendations to industry and other government departments, including the following dealing with the provision of overfill protection equipment. 1. The Competent Authority and operators of Buncefield-type sites should develop and agree a common methodology to determine safety integrity level (SIL) requirements for overfill prevention systems in line with the principles set out in Part 3 of BS EN 61511. This methodology should take account of: -the existence of nearby sensitive resources or populations; -the nature and intensity of depot operations; -realistic reliability expectations for tank gauging systems; and -the extent/rigour of operator monitoring. Application of the methodology should be clearly demonstrated in the COMAH safety report submitted to the Competent Authority for each applicable site. Existing safety reports will need to be reviewed to ensure this methodology is adopted. 2. Operators of Buncefield-type sites should, as a priority, review and amend as necessary their management systems for maintenance of equipment and systems to ensure their continuing integrity in operation. This should include, but not be limited to reviews of the following: -the arrangements and procedures for periodic proof testing of storage tank overfill prevention systems to minimise the likelihood of any failure that could result in loss of containment; any revisions identified pursuant to this review should be put into immediate effect; -the procedures for implementing changes to equipment and systems to ensure any such changes do not impair the effectiveness of equipment and

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Fill up on API 2350 | HCB

systems in preventing loss of containment or in providing emergency response. 3. Operators of Buncefield-type sites should protect against loss of containment of gasoline and other highly flammable liquids by fitting a high integrity, automatic operating overfill prevention system (or a number of such systems, as appropriate) that is physically and electrically separate and independent from the tank gauging system. Such systems should meet the requirements of Part 1 of BS EN 61511 for the required safety integrity level, as determined by the agreed methodology (see Recommendation 1). Where independent automatic overfill prevention systems are already provided, their efficacy and reliability should be reappraised in line with the principles of Part 1 of BS EN 61511 and for the required safety integrity level, as determined by the agreed methodology (see Recommendation 1). 4. The overfill prevention system (comprising means of level detection, logic/control equipment and independent means of flow control) should be engineered, operated and maintained to achieve and maintain an appropriate level of safety integrity in accordance with the requirements of the recognised industry standard for safety instrumented systems, Part 1 of BS EN 61511. 5. All elements of an overfill prevention system should be proof tested in accordance with the validated arrangements and procedures sufficiently frequently to ensure the specified safety integrity level is maintained in practice in accordance with the requirements of Part 1 of BS EN 61511. 6. The sector should put in place arrangements to ensure the receiving site (as opposed to the transmitting location) has ultimate control of tank filling. The receiving site should be able to safely terminate or divert a transfer (to prevent loss of containment or other dangerous conditions) without depending on the actions of a remote third party, or on the availability of communications to a remote location. These arrangements will need to consider upstream implications for the pipeline network, other facilities on the system and refineries. How the US responds Recommendations 3-5 reflect our firm view that to ensure integrity the sector must move towards installing independent overfill prevention systems at sites handling large quantities of highly flammable liquids such as petrol. We welcome indications that API Code 2350 is also moving in this direction, the Board said in its initial report. The fourth edition of API 2350 is expected to revise the definitions, the classification of tank operations, the Levels of Concern established, the Standard versus Recommended Practice and the ANSI Standard. There are many potential areas for API 2350 Guidance and Earl listed these in his presentation: -tank examples layers of protection -tank fill and drain valves (chain and lock) -firewall (bund) -firewall drain valve (chain and lock) -risk management appendix -grading away from tank -metering in and out charts and computer -staffing (onsite and offsite) -appendix on equipment -automatic shutdowns Automated Overfill Protection System (AOPS) -procedures and training -tank inspection -site security -SIL 1 and SIL 2 There have been some recent developments in the UK where tank gauging systems are to be automated. High integrity, high-level alarms are to be installed, and will be set to stop filling operations where the guidance shows this to be necessary. Also, for substances that can create a vapour cloud, an independent high integrity, high-level alarm system shall be provided. This shall be linked to an automatic emergency shutdown system or diversion of the flow to a safe place if not promptly acted on, where the guidance shows this to be necessary. The recent changes in the draft API 2350 have included the number of categories being reduced from four to three. It has also stopped trying to force fit SIL into 2350 and has replaced it with an AOPS Baseline. For more information on the latest updates concerning the Buncefield recommendations go to: www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk/index.htm.
October 2008 American Petroleum Institute (API) Send to friend Buncefield storage

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Fill up on API 2350 | HCB

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