The Need for an Electoral Reform

By Ramon T. Ayco
November 2007

I. Introduction
Elections are integral to democratic governance. It is one of the most important ways citizens can
participate in decisions that affect their lives and hold their representatives accountable for
results. Through the mechanism of elections, politicians are held accountable for their actions,
and are compelled to introduce policies that are reflective of and responsive to public opinion.

There are three main functions of elections in a democracy. First, they are a means for people to
choose their representatives and/or leaders in legislative and executive branches of government.
Second, elections are a means of choosing governments; indeed, in many (though not all) parts
of the world, elections are primarily a contest between competing political parties to see who will
control the government. Finally, elections confer legitimacy on the political system. Especially
since the end of the Cold War and the emergence of democratic governance around the world,
elections have become an essential element in constituting a legitimate government.

Elections are the paradigm of enforceable accountability: when a government fails to live up to
the needs and desires of the people, the people can throw it out of office. No form of
accountability is more direct, no form of participation is more egalitarian.

But elections cannot be equated to democracy as a whole. Building a democracy is much more
than regular, competitive and transparent elections, vital as these are. What happens before and
after elections is equally important, as is the capacity of voters to demand that electoral processes
are translated into genuine democratic gains for the population.

In the Philippines, there is a popular saying that “there are two types of candidates in elections:
those who win and those who get cheated by their opponents.” Nobody, or very few candidates,
are courageous enough to admit that they lost in election, and they are capitalizing on the fact
that election in the country is really fraudulent.

The past 60 years of the Philippine history already has a reputation of electoral fraud, proven or
otherwise. It is just that no one ever gets caught or punished. Analysts assert that the people have
always been desensitized to their politicians cheating during elections. Accordingly, people
generally doubt their leaders' mandates. The people are often suspicious of the winners,
especially in close poll results, but do nothing. Constituents generally allow their leaders,
assuming proven acts of cheating, to get away with it until the scandal erupted.

One of the recent incidents of electoral fraud in the Philippines involves no other than President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (PGMA) in May 2004 elections in the well known “Hello Garci
Scandal”.1 And just like any other politicians accused of cheating, she just simply denied doing
it. What she only admitted was the fact that she was really the one in the cassette tape talking to
former Commission on Election (COMELEC) Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano. And for this,
she just made a televised public apology saying “I’m Sorry!”. And that’s all.

Whether PGMA is guilty or not -- which is one of the principal bases for a series of
impeachment cases against her -- the need for electoral reforms in the Philippines is real.

II. Historical Background

Elections and other democratic institutions were primarily imported into the Philippines from
Western models.

During the Spanish colonialism, Spain introduced elections and municipal elections, not with the
interest of democracy but rather to impose order. By supporting one of the political candidates,
they increased factionalism, subtly teaching Filipinos to use government for personal ends not
public good (Paredes, 1989).

The emergence of institutions such as constitutional law, the secret ballot, the referendum,
political parties and legislature in the Philippines was a product of American colonialism. Hence,
colonialism became the defining force in the emergence of democracy in the Philippine nation-
state. The Philippines as a conquest colony underwent political development predicated on the
interest, influence and power of the colonial authorities (Paredes, 1989: 2-4).

After establishing total control of the Philippines by 1901, the American colonizers governed
their newly acquired territory through the appointive Philippine Commission under the
supervision of the United States governor general. The commission performed both executive
and legislative functions, with token Filipino participation, until 1907.

The Philippine Commission enacted Acts No. 82 and No. 83, providing for the organization of
municipal and provincial local governments. A limited electorate (only male residents of
municipality who own properties worth at least P500) was given the right to elect the municipal
president (mayor), vice-president and the council. Provinces were governed by a three-member
board, headed by a governor who was indirectly elected by the municipal councilors in the
province. Thus, the provincial elections of 1902, 1904 and 1906 were reflections of municipal
politics (De Guzman, Reforma and Panganiban, 1988; Franco, 2000; Hutchcroft, 2000).
Consequently, ‘from local elections in 1901, to legislative elections in 1907, and presidential
elections in 1935, the Americans built electoral politics from the municipality upwards, thereby
entrenching provincial families in both local and national offices’ (McCoy, 1994: 12).

1
The scandal involves incumbent president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, who allegedly rigged the 2004 national
election in her favor. It began in June 2005 when audio recordings of a phone call conversation between President
Arroyo and then Election Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano allegedly talking about the rigging of the 2004
national election results, were released to the public. The "Hello Garci" tapes suggested that Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo used members of the Commission on Elections, Philippine National Police, and the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to manipulate the result of the 2004 presidential elections.
Philippine party politics, at that period, was characterized by clientelist interactions between the
Filipino politicians and their American colonial patrons. Characteristic of most colonial regimes,
the Americans implemented a system of indirect administration utilizing dependable native
clients. The measure of success for an American colonial official was their ability to cultivate
and manipulate effective local clients in implementing American policies. Thus, electoral
campaigns were neither venues for the discussion of social issues nor mass appeals for voters,
but negotiations between national political personalities and the provincial landowning elites
(Grossholtz, 1964; Tancangco, 1988; Paredes, 1989).

Elections in the Commonwealth

The 1935 constitution that established the Philippine Commonwealth provided for a presidential
form of government patterned on the United States model. The constitution originally introduced
a unicameral National Assembly, but an amendment in 1940 re-established the bicameral
legislature, which remained until 1972 (Hartmann, Hassall and Santos, 2001). The right of
suffrage was granted to all Filipinos who were: (1) 21 years and above; (2) able to read and
write English or Spanish; and (3) residents of the Philippines for at least one year and of the
municipality in which they proposed to vote for at least six months prior to the date of the
elections. It also provided for the extension of the right of suffrage to women. By 1939, all
existing election laws were consolidated into an Election Code (Commonwealth Act No. 357)
that empowered the secretary of the interior to supervise all types of election. However, for the
purpose of insulating the electoral process from partisan politics, a constitutional amendment
was passed and approved in a plebiscite to create an independent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) (Tancangco, 1988: 82-83). Five elections were held in the Commonwealth period:
the presidential and legislative elections of 1935; the local elections of 1937; the legislative
elections of 1938; the local elections of 1940; and the presidential and legislative elections of
1941.

American colonial rule left the country with a weak central state during the Commonwealth era.
It had to contend with dispersed local centres of power that possessed varying degrees of
autonomy all over the archipelago. At the heart of these power centres were the landed elites
who had the uncanny ability to survive both war and peasant rebellion. The introduction of an
electoral system for electing public officials provided the landed elite with a venue to consolidate
and expand their power. The landed elites or ‘oligarchs’, through their control of the Congress,
transformed themselves into a national oligarchy that successfully repulsed the government’s
attempts at land reform. Thus, democratization of economic resources in the country was
prevented (Rivera, 1994: 112-114).

Elections after the granting of independence

When the Americans granted independence to the Philippines, the rivalry between the two
parties — the Liberal Party (LP) and the Nationalista Party (NP)2 — dominated Philippine
2
During the American colonial period, there were two major parties – the Nacionalista Party (NP) and the
Progresista Party (PP). The NP was formed on 12 March1907 as a merger of several nationalist movements and
organizations pushing for Philippine independence. The PP was formerly the Partido Federalista – the country’s
first political party organized in 1900 by a group of prominent, mostly Manila-based ilustrados to push for the
politics from 1946 until 1971. Both took turns to capture the presidency and controlling both
chambers of Congress. The Liberals won the presidential elections of 1946, 1949 and 1961. The
Nacionalistas won them in 1953, 1957, 1965 and 1969. However, despite their regular political
intramurals,3 the two parties were identical in their elitist structures, social make-up, and policies
(Lande, 1996).

There were 14 senatorial elections in the post-war period. These included the regular and mid-
term elections between 1946 and 1971. The LP dominated the first three (1946, 1947 and 1949),
while the NP continuously won the most number of seats in the succeeding five elections (1951,
1953, 1955, 1957 and 1959). Interestingly, the party that captured the presidency also won the
most senatorial seats. Hence, the LP managed to regain its dominance in 1961 when it won the
presidency. The election of 1963 was the only time that both parties split the seats equally at four
each. Again, the NP captured the most seats in 1965, 1967 and 1969 under the Marcos
administration.4 After the notorious Plaza Miranda bombing,5 the LP nearly swept the senatorial
race of 1971. The mid-term senatorial election of 1971 was the last free elections in the
Philippines as Marcos declared martial law the following year and abolished Congress.

Elections under Marcos dictatorship

The declaration of martial law by President Ferdinand Marcos in September 1972 halted all party
activities and intra-elite competition. Elections were cancelled for the first six years of martial
law. In 1978, election was held for members of the Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP).6 However,
the revival of electoral politics under the Marcos authoritarian regime greatly restricted genuine
party competition.

Marcos began to institutionalize one-party dominance with the organization of the New Society
Movement (Kilusang Bagong Lipunan, KBL) in 1978 (Tancangco, 1988). On the other hand,
various opposition groups in the country established new parties. However, most of these parties
were organized as regional parties that fielded candidates for specific regions instead of a

annexation to and statehood within the United States (Liang, 1970; Tancangco, 1988; Lande, 1996). The Liberal
Party was formerly the ‘liberal wing’ of the NP that formally split off after an intense leadership struggle in 1946.
3
In Philippine journalistic parlance, ‘political intramurals’ refer to political contests or competitions.
4
Ferdinand Marcos was elected first to the House and later to the Senate as a staunch member of the Liberal Party.
He became president of the LP and the Senate, but switched to the Nacionalista Party to become its presidential
candidate in 1965. He won that year and made history in 1969 by being the only president ever to be re-elected.
5
Plaza Miranda in Quiapo, Manila was the Hyde Park of the Philippines, where political gatherings and rallies
were common in the pre-martial law period. On 21 August 1971, grenades exploded at the LP political rally
injuring candidates and party leaders, and killing some innocent by-standers. The opposition accused Marcos, who
in turn pointed to communist insurgents as the culprit.
6
The Marcos Constitution (Article XVII of its Transitory Provisions) replaced the Philippine Congress with an
Interim National Assembly. However, the Interim National Assembly never saw the light of day as amendments
to the charter were made in 1976 replacing the Interim National Assembly with an Interim National Legislature
(Interim Batasang Pambansa, IBP).
national constituency. The emergence of regional parties was an indication of the consolidation
of the dictatorial regime and the splintering of opposition forces (Wurfel, 1988).

The KBL continued to dominate succeeding electoral exercises such as the 1980 local elections,
the 1981 presidential election and the 1984 Regular Batasang Pambansa (National Legislature)
elections.7 The Marcos regime also introduced barangay elections in 1982 to replace the pre-
martial law barrio as the basic unit of local governance. In addition, elections were held in 1979
and 1982 for members of the autonomous Regional Assembly in Mindanao (Regions IX and XII)
in an attempt to placate the separatist movement led by the Moro National Liberation Front
(MNLF).

The Marcos regime allowed these electoral exercises to give itself a semblance of political
legitimacy. However, it utilized its authoritarian powers to manipulate the electoral rules and
institutions. For example, Presidential Decree No. 1296 (the election code that governed the
conduct of the 1978 elections) allowed the block voting system which counts the vote for a party
as a vote for all the individual candidates in the official ticket. The system gave the KBL
undue advantage since it was the only party capable of mounting a nation-wide campaign. In
addition, the system was prone to electoral fraud since it was easier to stuff ballot boxes with
pre-filled ballots (Tancangco, 1988: 96).

In the wake of the massive outpouring of protest and discontent following the assassination of
opposition leader Benigno Aquino Jr. in August 1983, the leading opposition parties participated
and performed relatively better in the May 1984 Batasang Pambansa elections. The opposition
was led by the United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO) and the Partido
Demokratiko Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan (Philippine Democratic Party-People’s Power, PDP-
Laban).

In an effort to again demonstrate his political legitimacy, Marcos called for a snap presidential
election in 1985. Corazon C. Aquino, widow of the assassinated opposition leader, was the
presidential candidate of the united opposition. Massive cheating by the administration triggered
a failed military coup that led to a people’s uprising at EDSA.8 The ouster of Marcos
dictatorship in February 1986, and the subsequent dismantling of its authoritarian infrastructure
have resulted in the restoration of formal democratic institutions that include the pre-martial law
presidential form of government with a bicameral legislature.

III. The Current Electoral System

Under the 1987 constitution, the president and the vice-president are separately elected by a
direct vote of the people through simple plurality nationwide. Both serve a term of six years. The

7
Marcos lifted martial law on 17 January 1981 with Presidential Proclamation No. 2045. This was followed by the
election of members to the Regular Batasang Pambansa on 2 May 1984, in accordance with the 1973 constitution,
as amended. Unlike the Interim Batasang Pambansa whose existence was transitory, the Regular Batasang
Pambansa was envisaged as serving as the institutional national legislature.
8
Epifanio de los Santos or EDSA is the name of the major highway that cuts across metropolitan Manila.
president is not eligible for any re-election while the vice-president sits one term out after
serving for two successive terms. Since 1935, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has
administered all electoral exercises in the Philippines.

The Philippine Congress consists of the Senate and the House of Representatives. Half of the 24
senators are nationally elected at large9 every six years through simple plurality. At least one
term out is imposed on senators who have served two consecutive terms. On the other hand,
members of the House of Representatives are elected from single-member districts every three
years. This electoral system, combined with a personality party system, grossly over-represents
the largest parties and excludes minor parties. The inclusion of proportional representation
(implemented through a party-list ballot) in a small portion of the lower chamber is an attempt to
shift the focus from personalities to political parties (Wurfel, 1997).

The 1991 Local Government Code provides for the election of local government officials. The
governor, vice-governor, city mayor, city vice-mayor, municipal mayor, municipal vice-mayor
and barangay chairman (village chairman) are elected at large in their respective areas. Elections
are conducted through simple plurality every three years. Likewise, members of the local
legislative assemblies such as the provincial board, city and municipal councils are elected by
district and plurality vote. However, members of the village assembly are elected at large in
their respective areas. Representatives and local government officials are allowed a maximum of
three consecutive terms before they can again seek re-election.

The constitution drafted under the Aquino administration provides for the development of a
multi-party system under a presidential form of government. However, in spite of the emergence
of several political parties in the post-Marcos era, these parties have been unable to transcend
traditional modes of political contestation. Thus, they continue to be ineffectual in addressing the
fundamental socio-economic issues plaguing Philippine society.

Soon after the downfall of Marcos dictatorship the following elections were held: the 1987
congressional election; the 1988 local election; the 1992 synchronized election which combines
the presidential, congressional and local elections; the 1995 Congress Elections; the 1998
synchronized election; the 2001 mid-term election which was held in a highly charged political
atmosphere after the sudden fall of the Estrada administration; the 2004 synchronized elections;
the 2007 (May) mid-term elections; and the 2007 (October) barangay and SK (Sangguniang
Kabataan) elections.

However, although the dictatorship was ousted and free elections have been re-established, the
realization of full democracy in the Philippines is still far from reality. As said earlier, building a
democracy means much more than regular, competitive and transparent elections, vital as these
are. What happens before and after elections is equally important, as is the capacity of voters to
demand that electoral processes are translated into genuine democratic gains for the population.

What happens after the downfall of Marcos dictatorship is the revival of pre-martial law politics
commonly known as traditional politics or “trapo” which characterizes graft and corruption,
dominance of political dynasties, patronage and/or clientilist politics, personality politics,
9
In Philippine legal jargon, ‘at large’ refers to election by plurality formula instead of proportional representation.
turncoatism, etc.. And the elections themselves are still very defective of which fraud and
violence (with 3Gs — gold, guns and goons) are still prevalent. We don’t have to go far to
illustrate this. The very last elections, the 2004 and 2007 elections, are enough examples for this.

Problems in COMELEC

Although we can sight many electoral irregularities and anomalies, fraud and violence in the
2004 and 2007 elections in general, most of which were just ordinary happenings in the past
elections, it is good to focus now on problems besetting the COMELEC. These will show that
there is really a big space for the commission of electoral fraud. These may clarify that an
election scandal as scandalous as “Hello Garci Scandal” could happen.

The facts and information below (on 2004 elections) came primarily on monitoring work
conducted by National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), in cooperation with
Consortium for Elections and Political Processes partners, the International Republican Institute
(IRI) and International Foundation for Electoral System (IFES). Their representatives were
present in the Philippines from April 25, 2004 through July 31, 2004 and followed political
developments in the country during the pre-election, Election Day and immediate post-election
periods.

For the 2004 elections, COMELEC was responsible for administering national, provincial, and
local elections in more than 216,000 precincts. Fifty-five thousand candidates vied for the
support of 43 million voters10 for a total of 17,700 positions: president, vice president, 12 senate
seats, 265 members of congress, 53 party list representatives, 79 provincial governors, 758
provincial board members, 115 city mayors, 115 vice city mayors, 1,500 municipal mayors,
1,500 vice municipal mayors, 1,288 city councilors, and 12,017 municipal councilors.

Several issues in the pre-election period related to voter registration, COMELEC’s plans
for its own “Quick Count”, Commission appointments, and staff preparation and training
generated anxiety among voters and candidates by creating opportunities for fraud. COMELEC’s
handling of these issues contributed to a lack of public confidence in the Commission’s ability to
conduct an election free from fraud.11

Appointment of Interim Commissioners

When the impartiality of COMELEC is questioned, the focus is mostly on the commissioners
themselves, who are believed to hold political allegiances, particularly to the presidency. It is has
been alleged that the presidential appointment of commissioners is actively used by the
incumbent to influence the electoral process. President Arroyo appointed five of the current

10
COMELEC reports the official number of registered voters as 43,536,028. .

11
A Social Weather Station poll conducted 10 days before the election showed 60 percent public confidence in
COMELEC, but only 27 percent in its Chairman Benjamin Abalos. Just days before the election, the archbishops
of Manila and Davao, along with retired Cardinal Sin, publicly expressed a lack of confidence in COMELEC.
seven commissioners. This includes the then COMELEC chairman, Benjamin Abalos,12 who was
previously a politician and allegedly intends to run for office again.

Accused by some of being a politician and not an impartial administrator, the chairman is widely
considered to be uninterested in management of COMELEC and is continually under attack from
other stakeholders and the media. In a public survey conducted just before the 2004 elections, the
chairman received a very low approval rating, while COMELEC as an organization fared better.

There is also a perception among election stakeholders that incumbent commissioners have used
their station for personal and political positioning by using the electoral appeals mechanism for
political leverage.

Aside from the COMELEC chairman, the circumstances surrounding the appointment of two
new COMELEC commissioners were also questionable. In February 2004, President Arroyo
appointed Vigilio Garcillano and Manuel Barcelona, Jr. as commissioners to COMELEC to
replace retired Commissioners Ralph Lantion and Luzviminda Tancangco. These appointments
were made while the Congress was in recess and the Committee on Appointments could not
meet to vote on the appointments. Members of the political opposition argued that the
Constitution prohibits the appointment of temporary or “acting” commissioners to COMELEC
and because Congress was in recess at the time of the appointments and could not vote on them,
the appointments were by definition temporary in nature and therefore, unconstitutional.13

The opposition further noted that the constitutional injunction against temporary appointments to
COMELEC was designed to protect the body form political pressure because COMELEC
commissioners serve staggered terms to prevent any one President from appointing a majority of
the commission. With the appointments of Garcillano and Barcelona, President Arroyo had
appointed five of the seven COMELEC commissioners.

The Arroyo administration defended its authority to make the appointments and noted that the
Constitution grants the President the power to make appointments during the recess of Congress.
The government argued that such appointments, while only effective until either rejected by the
Committee on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress, have been ruled
permanent in nature by the Supreme Court because the President is prevented from removing ad
interim appointees until rejected by the Committee on Appointments.14

12
On 1 October 2007, Benjamin Abalos resigned as chairman of the COMELEC. He was accused of bribery in open
Senate Session by businessman Joey de Venecia (son of the House Speaker) and Secretary Romulo Neri, formerly
Director General of the National Economic Development Authority. The said anomaly involves millions of
dollars in bribes to help a Chinese firm, ZTE, win a $329 million contract to build a nationwide broadband
network for the Philippine government. It was (Nueva Vizcaya) Rep. Carlos Padilla, in his privilege speech in the
house of representatives, who made the first expose linking COMELEC Chairman Abalos to the ZTE-NBN deal
and called for a congressional investigation.
13
Malaya News. Angara: Interim COMELEC Appointments Violate Charter, February 13, 2004.
14
Id.
Despite the criticism of the opposition, the two new appointees took their posts and served as
commissioners for the May 10 elections.15

Failure to Automate the Election System

The Election Modernization Act of 1997 authorizes COMELEC to create an automated election
system for the process of voting, counting votes and canvassing/consolidating the results of the
national and local elections. The Act also authorizes COMELEC to procure the appropriate
materials and services necessary to create and maintain such a system.16

COMELEC initially intended to implement the automation during the May 11, 1998 presidential
elections, but decided against full implementation at that time and limited the automation to the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).17

In October 2002, COMELEC adopted Resolution 02-0170 which set forth a modernization
program for the 2004 elections. In January 2003, President Arroyo issued an Executive Order
allocating three billion pesos to fund the automation program. Later that month, COMELEC
outlined procurement and bidding procedures and began accepting applications.

On May 16, 2003 COMELEC awarded the automation project to Mega Pacific eSolutions Inc.
Immediately following the award, several individuals and entities challenged the award on the
basis that there were “glaring irregularities in the manner in which the bidding process had been
conducted.” The case eventually went before the Supreme Court which ruled in January 2004
that COMELEC awarded the contract in “inexplicable haste” and without adequately observing
mandatory technical and legal requirements. The court also noted that COMELEC accepted
delivery of the computer hardware and software from Mega Pacific even though it had failed to
pass eight “critical requirements designed to safeguard the integrity of the election.”18

15
Allegations of partisan politics surrounding the two new commissioners re-surfaced when a challenge was made
to Ferdinand Poe’s ability to stand as a candidate for President. Petitioners sought to have Poe disqualified
because they alleged that he could not be considered a Filipino citizen because his parents were not married at the
time of his birth and his mother was not a citizen of the Philippines. The matter was originally brought before
COMELEC and that commission ruled in favor of Poe, though Commissioners Barcelona and Garcillano, along
with Commissioner Florentino Tuason, voted to disqualify Poe. The three Commissioners each submitted a
dissenting opinion that was part of an appeal to the Supreme Court asking it to overturn the COMELEC decision
and disqualify Poe. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled 8-5 in favor of Poe’s candidacy, but the controversy
surrounding the Commissioners actions in supporting Poe’s disqualification coupled with the circumstances
surrounding their own appointments to the Commission bolstered the growing public perception that their
appointments to COMELEC were political in nature.
16
Election Modernization Act, RA No. 8436 (1997).

17
Due to the failure of the machines to correctly read some ballots in one town, COMELEC later ordered a manual
count for the entire Province of Sulu.
18
Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines et al. v. Commission on Elections, et al. Phil. S. Ct. No.
159139, January 13, 2004. The critical areas in which the Mega Pacific automated technology failed to safeguard
the integrity of the election included: 1) Failed to achieve the accuracy rating criteria of 99.9995 percent set-up
by the COMELEC itself; 2) Unable to detect previously downloaded results at various canvassing or
The Court voided the contract with Mega Pacific and noted that COMELEC’s actions in
awarding the contract “cast serious doubts upon the poll body’s ability and capacity to conduct
automated elections.”19

Faced with an abbreviated time period within which to finalize election preparations,
COMELEC officials briefly considered continuing with plans for an automated election system
and using the computers and software supplied by Mega Pacific in spite of the Supreme Court
decision on the matter. In the end, COMELEC accepted the finding of the Court and proceeded
with preparations for manual balloting, counting and canvassing.

Not only was the failed automation attempt particularly damaging to COMELEC’s reputation, it
left open continued opportunity for fraud in the election process. Many opportunities for fraud
are found in the manual counting, tallying, and canvassing efforts. The practice of “dagdag-
bawas,” or “shaving and padding,” is possible because of the vulnerabilities of numbers to
human intervention. Although technology is no guarantee that fraud will be eliminated, one of
the main reasons for computerizing the election process was to minimize those opportunities for
intervention. As noted above, COMELEC failed in this crucial effort to follow simple bidding
processes properly. In addition, it also ignored the parameters of what aspects of the process
were to be computerized. Rather than purchasing stand-alone machines, as the law mandated,
COMELEC invested in networked computers, which were also more vulnerable to manipulation.
These failures of judgment, particularly when taken into consideration with the loss of three
billion pesos spent on the failed automation effort, further eroded the public’s trust in
COMELEC.

Voter Registration and Voter Lists

The accuracy and readiness of the voters’ list merited serious concern in the run-up to the
election. COMELEC launched an effort to “validate” the current voter list, which entailed using
1.2 billion pesos of technology to combine information from the old locally-maintained lists with
current voter biodata in an effort to remove multiple registrants, the deceased, or those de-
activated20 from the list. But COMELEC was only able to validate about 5.7 million voters
before it had to suspend the effort in order to concentrate its limited resources on digitally
processing the new information. It was unable to restart the validation process due to a lack of
funds, and was then faced with trying to combine the validated and non-validated lists. These
complications meant that the voters’ lists, which were legally required to be posted in February,
were not made available to the public until about a week before the election, and long after
opportunities for redress were gone.

consolidation levels and to prevent these from being imputed again; and 3) Unable to print the statutorily required
audit trails of the count/canvass at different levels without any loss of data. Id.
19
Id.
20
By law, voters who have failed to vote in the past two elections are de-activated, or dropped from the list. Voters
are supposed to be notified of this status by mail sufficiently in advance of the next election so that they can re-
register if they so choose.
COMELEC asserted that the failure to make the voters’ lists public in the mandated time frame
did not actually impede anyone from checking on his/her status based on the fact that voters
could check and update their registration status at any time,21 but most citizens were not aware
that it was possible to do so. NAMFREL (National Citizens’ Movement for Free Elections) and
PPCRV (Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting), as well as local inter-agency task
forces of government offices, civil society groups, and others, tried to help COMELEC clean the
lists, but such efforts were only successful in some areas. To further complicate matters, in the
absence of new lists from Manila, many local election officials continued to use the original
locally-maintained registries. As a result, it was not clear on which of the three possible lists of
names a voter’s name had to appear in order for him/her to be allowed to vote, nor was it clear
what decisions COMELEC had made to determine eligibility to vote in the event a voter’s name
was not on the most recent lists.

Moreover, when the lists were finally released in late April, the number of total voters had
increased to 43.5 million, an increase of more than seven million people since the 2001
election.22 This represented an increase far larger than that accounted for by population growth
rates. Some areas reported an increase of as much as 22 percent. The number of names on the
voters’ lists in some areas, such as Cotabato, reportedly surged in the days before the elections.

In addition to the list issues, some voters had been reassigned to vote in different precincts.
Although COMELEC must send precinct reassignments to voters through the mail, few voters
got such notifications. Others simply waited until the lists were posted, but in some cases, that
was not until election-day itself. All of these registration, verification, and notification factors
contributed to a lack of confidence that the voters’ lists accurately represented those who were
entitled to cast ballots, or would ensure that those entitled would be able to do so.

Lack of Training for Election Officials

COMELEC’s work is carried out by staff members and Board of Election Inspectors (BEIs). The
staff members are civil servants and are generally regarded as competent and dedicated. To some
extent, though, they suffer from a lack of standardized training. Many do not have copies of
COMELEC’s manual of general instructions and they do not regularly participate in retraining
programs to learn about new procedures. NDI encountered significantly different interpretations
of rules and procedures from COMELEC staff members, which suggest that such procedures are
not uniformly understood. Local COMELEC officers interviewed by NDI uniformly complained
of being short-staffed. One officer explained that out of the electoral period, his office could
function smoothly with four staff members. During the election period, however, the workload

21
Continuing Registration Act, RA 8189, 1996. This Act provides that: “All registration records/computerized voter
list in the possession of the Election officer, the Provincial Election Supervisor, and the Commission in Manila
shall, during regular office hours, be open to examination by the public for legitimate inquiries on election related
matters, free from any charge or access fee. Id. at sec. 41.
22
Total number of registered voters for the 2004 election as reported by COMELEC was 43,536,028. COMELEC
Website, http://www,comelec.gov.ph/stats/2004stats.html . In 2001 the total number of registered voters was
approximately 36,000,000 and in 1998 the total number of registered voters was 34,163,465. This is an annualized
increase in registered voters of 4.6%. The population growth rate in the Philippines is between 2.2 and 2.3% per
annum.
demanded at least four times that, but it was increased by only two staff members. COMELEC
also faces difficulties when it transfers local-level officials to different areas only about a week
ahead of the election. Some COMELEC officials suggest this is done in order to avoid any
partisanship, but there are also serious practical difficulties associated with changing officials at
the last moment.

BEIs are responsible for overseeing the balloting and tallying. Most are local school teachers
who have previously served in this capacity, and it is their involvement that helps increase public
confidence. But serving as a BEI is extraordinarily taxing: they must appear the day before the
election to collect the necessary materials, most are expected to work for a minimum of 24
straight hours on election day, and some have to endure the harassment of party-watchers or
candidates when, out of sheer exhaustion, they make errors in the tallying process. For this, they
are paid between one and three thousand pesos (US $20-60).

The teachers were among those disappointed by the failed modernization effort, given that it
would have made their participation unnecessary. In the 2004 elections, some areas had to recruit
almost half of their BEIs from local college graduates or professional groups, as many veteran
BEIs found excuses not to serve. Many claimed to be the distant relatives of candidates; in one
area, NDI was told that a family of teachers had persuaded a relative to run for local office solely
for the purpose of making the teachers ineligible as BEIs.

Training for the BEIs in advance of the 2004 elections was much the same as it had been in the
past. It focused on the legal and procedural aspects of the election, how to protect the integrity of
the process, and how to set up a polling station for maximum efficiency. These trainings tend to
be conducted as lectures, rather than interactive exercises, and given the higher percentage of
first-time BEIs, the training might not have been especially effective. Moreover, although
COMELEC officials said that the BEIs were trained by the middle of April, most were actually
only trained in the week prior to the election.

COMELEC’s Quick Count

COMELEC’s efforts to undertake its own Quick Count became one of the most contentious
issues in the pre-election period. Quick Counts are conducted as a means of verifying the
integrity of official data by obtaining information from that source at the lowest possible level,
then following the count to the national level to ensure that no fraud has taken place in the
tallying and canvassing processes. In the past, a Quick Count has been conducted by NAMFREL
as an unofficial but necessary check on the integrity of COMELEC’s counting. Observers were
understandably surprised to learn that the official election body intended to undertake an
unofficial count alongside an official count. COMELEC had planned to send results by VSAT23-
automated transmission of the municipal results to the national level, skipping the provincial

23
Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) -- a two-way satellite ground station with a dish antenna that is smaller
than 3 meters (most VSAT antennas range from 75 cm to 1.2 m). VSAT data rates typically range from
narrowband up to 4 Mbit/s. VSATs access satellites in geosynchronous orbit to relay data from small remote earth
stations (terminals) to other terminals (in mesh configurations) or master earth station "hubs" (in star
configurations).
level and hoping to minimize fraud in the count. Yet questions were almost immediately raised
about whether COMELEC, which is entitled only to announce official results for congressional
and local races, would share information about the presidential and vice-presidential results.
Moreover, it was duplicative of NAMFREL’s work. Serious concerns were raised about the
prospect that COMELEC’s Quick Count results would not, as most unofficial counts do not,
ultimately agree precisely with the official count. Should those figures turn out differently, were
people to believe the official or unofficial COMELEC count?

The opposition KNP Party in conjunction with other political parties and NAMFREL took the
matter before the Supreme Court in late April, arguing that COMELEC had no mandate to
conduct a Quick Count.24 The Supreme Court did not issue its decision barring the Quick Count
until less than 48 hours before the polls opened, and observers noted the presence of COMELEC
technicians in the far northern and southern reaches of the country setting up transmission
systems on May 9. One local candidate wondered why such resources had been spent on this
effort rather than on fully cleaning the voters’ lists.

The 2007 mid-term elections

In the last 2007 mid-term elections, many of the defects in May 2004 elections still prevail. The
following is a part of Bantay Eleksyon 2007’s Final Report on the 2007 Elections:
In 2007 mid-term elections, an estimated 30 million voters voted, out of the official list of 45.5
million voters, a 66-percent voting percentage. There were many reports of confusion and
difficulties in matching voters to their precincts, the presence of numerous ineligible names in
the voters list, disenfranchisement of a significant number of voters, and questions on the
abnormally high percentage of registered voters compared to the voting population. There were
even reports that the national voters list issued by the COMLEC has a high level of inaccuracy.

The overseas absentee voting (OAV) showed a very disappointing result, with only 504,122
registered voters out of the possible three million-plus qualified voters. Of this figure, only
65,699 voted—a measly 14% of total OAV registered voters. A major effort is needed to turn
this situation around and render credible the whole OAV concept.

More than 87,000 candidates contested for the following positions: 12 senators, 220
congressional district representatives, 55 party-list representatives, 81 provincial governors, 118
city mayors, 770 provincial board members, 1,510 municipal mayors, 1,314 city councilors, and
12,092 municipal councilors. The vast majority of these positions have been filled up.

The canvassing, for the main part, proceeded and produced proclamations in most places. The
election results were accepted by the people in most places, although there were pre-
proclamation and post-proclamation protests by losing candidates in many areas.

As expected, there were a lot of problems regarding the technical and procedural conduct. These
included printing errors, anomalies in the voter lists, delay in delivery of election documents,

24
Two days before the election, the Supreme Court ordered COMELEC to halt plans for its own Quick Count of the
May 10 election results.
loss of (or stolen) election documents, shortage and unilateral transfers of election personnel,
including deputies and members of the Board of Inspectors (BEIs) and Board of Canvassers
(BOCs), insufficient training of election personnel, and anomalies in handling election
documents.

However, a worrying aspect of the conduct of the electoral process is the crescendo of
allegations of partisanship of COMELEC personnel. These were voiced even before the
election period started right up to post-proclamation period. This indicates a very low level of
trust and the low credibility of the institution and its personnel not only among the losing parties
and candidates but also among the people themselves.

The credibility of the results so far in the senatorial contest (with 11 out 12 winners proclaimed)
is high and nobody contests the results. However, the contest for the 12th position is proving
problematic for the COMELEC, particularly when it chose to canvass the controversial
Maguindanao Certificate of Canvass (COC). This particular COC has been rejected by all
election monitor for having suspicious provenance and the many questions on the conduct of
elections in the province.

The same uncertainty attends the party-list election, with no party-list organization being
declared winner (as of this writing). The announced COMELEC decision to use the Supreme
Court-decided “Panganiban formula”25 in ascertaining the party-list seats each winning party-list
group is entitled is also facing opposition from some of them.

Bantay-Eleksyon 2007 recorded 295 incidents of various irregularities in the electoral process
and violations of electoral laws in the areas it monitored. Of these, 119 are election law
violations, 74 are cases of electoral fraud, 64 are cases of election personnel inefficiency, 43 are
cases of electoral violence, 34 are cases of intimidation, 18 are cases of harassment, and 7 are
cases of violation of non-election laws.

As a sample, these figures support the projection of much higher incidents of irregularities and
violations of election laws. The figures are generally uniform throughout the country, pointing to
the deficiencies of the electoral system itself, including the administration of election.

The manual system of election that was implemented in the 2007 elections has failed to stem the
tide of electoral fraud and other irregularities. The COMELEC has a big contributing
responsibility in its laid-back attitude to prosecution of offenders. The credibility of the entire
electoral process is thus compromised.

25
The Panganiban formula is named after retired Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban who came up with it when he
was then an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Under the formula, a group that gets at least 2 percent of
party-list votes win one seat but only the top vote-getter among party-list groups gets the maximum three seats in
the House of Representatives. The additional numbers of seats are computed by dividing each group's total votes
by the number of votes received by the "first party," or the top vote-getter in the party-list race. The quotient is
then multiplied by the additional numbers of seats gained by the "first party" beyond the 2 percent minimum.
Previously, party-list seats were allocated under the "2-4-6" formula. Then, a group that gets 2 percent of party-list
votes wins one seat; a group with 4 percent, two seats; and a group with 6 percent or more, the maximum three
seats.
Election Administration

The COMELEC, in so far as it undertook the preparations for and supervision of actual electoral
processes, did its job adequately. Unfortunately, this is overshadowed by its failings in terms of
transparency, implementation of election laws, independence and non-partisanship, and
efficiency. Its various immediate attempts at institutional reforms so far have not produced any
significant improvement. This basically guarantees that its problem of credibility will not be
solved nor alleviated by its conduct in these elections.

From the start of the 2007 election period, the COMELEC labored under a very low level of
public trust. The last published survey of the 2006 SWS Enterprises Survey conducted from
February-April 2006, indicated that the COMELEC suffers a -59% net sincerity rating in fighting
corruption.

Its refusal to conduct an investigation into the Garcillano affair has also led to many calls for the
resignation of COMELEC commissioners, and questions on its fitness to administer elections.

To its credit, the COMELEC initiated some reform measures in connection with the 2007
elections, including a code of conduct for its personnel, training seminars, and modules for
guidance of the voters and the Board of Inspectors. To a certain extent, it also opened its doors to
the public with new websites and accreditation of various monitors and media people.

In relation to its work, the whole organization worked successfully to prepare for and conduct the
elections as scheduled in the vast majority of areas nationwide. The overseas absentee voting
registration and voting were conducted without a hitch.

However, there are areas where the COMELEC failed miserably. The most visible of these is in
the areas of enforcement of election laws. Across the archipelago, candidates and their campaign
people brazenly posted their campaign materials wherever they see fit, often before blind eyes of
local COMELEC officials. Whatever grandstanding of COMELEC officials regarding the
common poster areas, it is a fact that no one has ever been prosecuted, much less convicted, on
this particular violation.

The use of media was also supposed to be regulated. Minutes allowed for television and radio
had been limited by the Fair Elections Act. COMELEC reinterpreted this law in the 2007
elections as on a per region basis, effectively expanding the allowed time. Although this is a
more restrictive policy than the one in the 2004 election which was on a per station basis, still it
permitted senatorial candidates to splurge on TV ads, endangering the violation of another law
on restrictions on campaign spending. The latter also earned the dubious distinction of another
unenforced law by the COMELEC.

The COMELEC defended its inaction on election law enforcement even as it recognized its
authority to act motu propio on cases of violations. Its spokespersons reason that they require
complainants even in motu propio cases. This laid-back attitude basically points to a lack of
political will on the part of the COMELEC and contributes in a decisive manner to the
proliferation of electoral fraud, electoral violence and other electoral anomalies that degrade the
free and fair character of the Philippine electoral process and Philippine democracy itself.

Yet, it is a fact that, in the 2007 elections, many cases of protests over electoral fraud involve
COMELEC officials and personnel. This also contributes in a big way to the minimal credibility
of the institution in many areas. This also points to the possible partisanship of COMELEC
personnel in the actual conduct of the elections, including canvassing. A case in point is the
proliferation of “honest mistakes” in the various election documents when questions were raised
on their correlation with election documents from precincts and municipal or city canvass.

In many cases, it was only the vigilance of the citizenry that prevented electoral fraud. The
COMELEC unfortunately did not perform this function in the main and in fact became a target
for watchdogs itself.

IV. The call for electoral reforms

We have to acknowledge the fact that he whole political system in the Philippines needs to be
reformed. We have to eradicate graft and corruptions, dominance of political dynasties,
patronage or clientilist politics, personality politics, turncoatism, and all the evils of what we call
traditional politics or “trapo”, if we want real democracy to be realized by the Filipino people.

Reforming political system or political reform as a whole is a heavy task and will take a long
period of time to be fully accomplished.26 But within this heavy task, we can accomplish an
urgent task which is electoral reform, and electoral reform is a part, a very important part, of
political reform. As a matter of fact, electoral reform can serve as an opening door or a catalyst
for political reform as a whole.

In our call for electoral reform, we have to be specific and exact in our target. We have to
pinpoint objectives that are achievable at least up to the next coming elections (2010) and, for the
meantime set aside those objectives that can be accomplished only for the long term.

Aside from the government, there are many organizations and institutions that are calling for
electoral reforms. Each of them has a list of recommendations of what are to be reform in our
electoral system. The following came from the lists we gathered:

1. The COMELEC needs to be revamped from top to bottom as the vital first step in
bringing back the credibility of the institution and reform the electoral system. Among
the first steps here is the weeding out of political appointees who do not have the
necessary impartiality or skill competency for the work of the COMELEC and the
appointment of new competent commissioners with reputation for integrity, have
management skills, and capability for undertaking reforms.

The appointments from the President and requiring approval from the Commission on
Appointments would need “the collective responsibility of the people, especially the civil
26
As a matter of fact, radical activists believed that political reform in the Philippines is impossible without the
fundamental change of society as a whole.
 society, to monitor the process of selection, appointment and confirmation” for “serious
efforts to de-politicize and professionalize the bureaucracy.”

It is also crucial to delimit the powers of the Presidency, which have proven capable of
abusing electoral institutions, rules and processes for partisan interests.

2. Election modernization should be implemented. This means the implementation of an

automated election system in time for the 2010 elections, modernization of Comelec
infrastructure, and training of Comelec personnel and public education on the modernized
system. There should be broad-based and transparent discussions on what type of poll
automation is appropriate and how it is to be piloted and implemented. At the same time,
a trouble-free, fully transparent and acceptable bidding process must be in place.

By automating the country's electoral system, we hope that the usual problems that come
with elections such as the difficulty in finding one's precinct, stressed out teachers,
electoral fraud and "a predictable aftermath of a slow count" can be solved, once and for
all.

3. Cleansing and publication of the voters’ list long before the day of election.

4. The dirty conduct of elections, as (vote) buying, padding and selling, as well as election
violence have embarrassingly become systematic and threaten to become a cultural
element of our elections. The COMELEC should be given the necessary capability to
enforce election laws and prosecute election violators. If possible, the government should
hold those responsible for anomalies in past elections and the recently concluded ones
accountable to the people. Good career people in the COMELEC can be the catalyst for
the renewal of the institution.

5. The government should immediately confront the problems of anomalous election

practices in ARMM and elsewhere, the problem of warlordism and the phenomenon of
massive and organized cheating, because it is of the scale that can affect the national
elections.

5. A review of laws affecting the electoral system. The party-list law should be amended in
the light of lessons learned not only in the 2007 elections but in earlier elections. The
political party reform bill should be passed by congress immediately so as to strengthen
the political party system. The overseas absentee voting law needs to be revisited to
ensure its full implementation in the next elections. Measures to educate overseas
Filipinos should also be devised and carried out. Other laws that need urgent attention are
laws on political dynasties, the “legal” entry of nuisance candidates, and the formulation
of an agenda for institutional reform.

The Omnibus Election code should be amended to reflect the requirements of election
modernization as well as to address the weaknesses and loopholes of the present electoral
laws.
 6. The development of mechanisms for deepening the political education of voters (e.g.
Pinoy Voter’s Academy and Gabay Halalan), fostering public accountability of
politicians to the electorate (e.g. Bantay Pangako) and sustaining coordinated political
engagement especially among the youth, the citizens’ groups, and Church-based
organizations (e.g. VforCE).

8. Citizen participation in the electoral process should be heightened and made on a

continuing basis in order to make effective Philippine democracy.

VI. The Reform Movement

The COMELEC, as the constitutional body tasked with administering elections is expected to put
electoral reforms on the agenda (besides Congress) as one of its institutional functions. But
COMELEC has no credibility as an initiator of reforms because its own officials have been
implicated in several failures and anomalies. As pointed above, the COMELEC needs first to be
revamp.

In the first place, COMELEC has to answer many questions like, for example, why the fact-
finding investigation of the Hello Garci scandal was not pursued by the Commission and why a
new Commissioner (Sarmiento) had to take it upon himself to ask the Commission to carry on
with its own self-assigned investigative task? Is the inefficiency of the COMELEC in the recent
election – the usual consequence of an institutional flaw or was this all feigned and planned?
Were the anomalies in the printing of election materials a result of inefficiency or of a plan -- this
appears to have been a prerequisite to the selling of ballots and election returns on the day of
elections and during the canvassing of votes. Were the delays in the public release of the
Computerized Voters' List that resulted in the massive sale of CVLs without COMELEC receipts
a result of institutional inefficiency or of a plan; and what of the numerous double-entries of
registered voters in the project of precincts, etcetera.

The power to appoint the Chairman and members of the Commission rests on the President with
concurrence from the Congressional Committee on Appointments. After the Garci scandal this
presidential power should at best be seen as an anachronism. Expect that issues against the
mechanism and process of appointment will add fuel to the discourse for electoral reform. It is
critical to pose two questions: can electoral reformers intervene in making the mechanism and
process of appointment transparent, consultative and criteria-based, in the immediate term? How
far can substantial electoral reforms be pushed in the long term?

Without the necessary pressure from the civil society, chances are nil that Congress, Malacañang
and Comelec can seriously initiate and push the realization of substantial electoral reforms.
These institutions may finally come out and implement a computerized voting and counting
system in 2010 but fundamental problems in election rules, conduct and supervision remain.

The disposition and capacities of political parties; popular political formations; the academe,
media, business, church and organized reform groups are decisive in the aggressive push for
electoral reforms. It seems that the impetus will come from nowhere else. There is an urgent and
important need for electoral reforms but the reform base and constituency appear to be very thin.
We have seen how electoral reform movements become prominent during elections. Most of
these, however, demobilize after that.

There is a need for various electoral reform movements to weave the threads of their different
initiatives into a coherent movement; come out with comprehensive and concrete reform
proposals and shape various forms of campaigns and lobbies until reforms are realized.
Congress stays as the bailiwick of anti-reformers but there is that potential working with
“electoral reform blocs” among legislators – whether of the opposition or not. It is important and
it might be possible, that local politicians with hard-earned wisdom concerning our problematic
electoral rules can be drawn into the electoral reform movement. The likes of Governor Grace
Padaca, Governor Ed Panlilio, Mayor Jesse Rebredo, among others can contribute to
invigorating the advocacy for reform.

As early as April 2002, in fact, a summit of electoral-reform stakeholders had been convened
jointly by the Comelec; the Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments, Revision of
Codes and Laws, and Electoral Reforms; the House Committee on Suffrage and Electoral
Reforms; and the Consortium on Electoral Reforms, a civil-society coalition of 42 national
organizations.

The summit produced a legislative and action agenda of electoral reforms. Among these was the
passage of bills on political-party reform and campaign financing, overseas absentee voting,
local sectoral representation, amendments to the party-list law, and a ban on "turncoatism." The
summit participants also agreed on structural reforms of the Comelec, citizen-voter education,
constitutional reforms through a constitutional convention, and strengthening of the electoral-
reform network of civil society.

A month later, the first national conference of Philippine political parties adopted the summit's
resolutions in its own declaration. This positive response by the major political parties led to the
rapid processing of electoral-reform bills through both houses of the 12th Congress. By 2003,
there was already an overseas absentee voting law, while other pieces of legislation aimed at
similar reforms were in plenary deliberations or had gone through committee deliberations.

Since Philippine elections were re-introduced in 1987, aspiration for genuine and substantial
electoral democracy has always been a fool's hope. The policy environment for electoral reform
remains dim and complicated but there is no other recourse but to steadfastly hope and push.

-o0o-
_______________________________
References:

1. Electoral Politics in the Philippines; by Julio Teehankee

2. Electoral Systems and Processes; United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); January
2004

3. Report on the 2004 Philippine Elections; by National Democratic Institute for International
Affairs; August 2004

4. CEPPS Philippines Election Observation Program Strengthening the Electoral Process; IFES
Final Report; August 2004; Authors: Peter Erben, Beverly Hagerdon, Thakur, Craig
Jenness, Ian Smith

5. Final Report on the 2007 Elections; by Bantay Eleksyon 2007; July 3, 2007

6. After the Elections, Before Electoral Reforms; by Patrick Patiño; Institute for Popular
Democracy; 25 June 2007

7. CBCP Calls for Electoral Reforms and Revamp; Melo Acuña; CBCP News Online; July 9, 2007

8. Philippines Presses For Automated Elections In 2010; by Komfie Manalo - AHN

Correspondent; AHN Media Corp; May 20, 2007

9. CBCP Pastoral Statement on the 2007 National Elections; ANGEL N. LAGDAMEO, D.D.;
Archbishop of Jaro; CBCP President; CBCP Documents; July 8, 2007

10. Restarting the Political and Electoral Reforms Train; by RAMON CASIPLE; i Report;
Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism; 2010 political predictions

11. Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia