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Dialogue: The Confucian Critique of Rights-Based Business Ethics

CONFUCIANISM-BASED RIGHTS SKEPTICISM AND RIGHTS IN THE WORKPLACE

Adam D. Bailey

ABSTRACT: Must even Confucian rights skepticsthose who are, on account of their Confucian beliefs, skeptical of the existence of human rights, and believe that asserting or recognizing rights is morally wrongconcede that in the workplace, they are morally obligated to recognize rights? Alan Strudler has recently argued that such is the case. In this article, I argue that because Confucian rights skeptics locate wrongness in inconsistency with the idea of "Confucian community," Confucian community should be viewed as a moral ideal. I then argue that Confucian rights skeptics ought to act in a manner that is consistent with this ideal, even when the ideal has not yet been realized, just as Kantians ought to act consistently with the Kantian kingdom of ends ideal. Accordingly, contrary to Strudler, I argue that Confucian rights skeptics need not concede that they are morally obligated to recognize rights in the workplace. This conclusion suggests the need for inquiry into the metaphysical foundations of these conflicting views. However, such inquiry is commonly thought to lie beyond the scope of philosophical business ethics proper. I conclude the article by suggesting a number of reasons for business ethicists to consider rejecting the prevalent narrow conception of the scope of the discipline.

HE WESTERN RIGHTS-CENTRIC MORAL VIEW, whicb holds tbat persons have certain rights by virtue of being persons (and ascribes to a particular conception of rights wherein freedomin the sense of individuals being largely selfdirectingholds a central place among the various rights), and that recognizing and respecting such rights is of utmost moral importance, is resisted by some who ascribe to other moral views. For instance, Alan Strudler (2008: 68) points out that some, on account of their Confucian beliefs,' are skeptical of the existence of human rights. Further, he notes that some such persons believe that it is morally wrong to assert or to recognize rights because doing so is inconsistent with "Confucian community"a particular conception of a "flourishing community" in which, for one, persons do not place their own interests above those of the group (2008: 69, 70, 75, 81n7).^ Strudler (2008: 79) argues that within the context of the modem workplace, even persons holding such a view of rights (who will be referred to herein as "Confucian rights skeptics") "must admit" that they are morally obligated to recognize rights.^ Strudler's conclusion would not be surprising were it based on the assumption that persons do have rights and therefore the Confucian skeptical position, by not recognizing this, is mistaken. However, his conclusion is surprising because he assumes that this Confucian moral view (I will refer to it as the Confucian skeptical
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2011 Business Ethics Quarterly 21:4 (October 2011); ISSN 1052-150X

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view) is, in terms of philosophical soundness, on par with the Westem, rights-centric moral view (2008: 73), and even grants that it is wrong to assert or recognize rights when it is the case that Confucian community obtains (2008: 77). How can Stmdler consistently hold that the Confucian skeptical view is philosophically on par with the rights-centric view, and that those who adhere to it have a moral obligation to recognize rights in the workplace? After all, to do so would seem to be to defer to the rights-centric view, and such deference seems unjustified if the Confucian view is philosophically on par with the rights-centric view. Strudler attempts to achieve consistency by arguing that Confucian community does not obtain in the modem workplace, and thus that no harm is done (Confucian community is not undermined) by rights being asserted and recognized therein (2008:16-11). Accordingly, on the assumption that the type of respect and dignity that is available to persons when Confucian community obtains is not available in the modem workplace (because, as he argues, Confucian community does not obtain therein), and on the assumption that a certain sort of respect and dignity does arise when rights are recognized, Strudler concludes that managers ought to recognize the rights of workers so as to at least provide them with "the highest kind of dignity available . . . in the peculiar context of the workplace": that which obtains when they are treated as possessors of rights (2008: 77, 79). In developing his argument, Stmdler (2008: 69) notes that in the Confucian skeptical view, an act is wrong if it is inconsistent with the idea of Confucian community, just as in Kantian ethics, an act is wrong if it is inconsistent with the idea of the kingdom of ends. While it is widely believed that the Kantian kingdom of ends is an ideal, in this article, I argue that Confucian community must also be viewed as an ideal so as to enable wrongness to be located in inconsistency with it. I then argue that Confucian rights skeptics (or "Confucian skeptics" for short), like Kantians, ought to act consistently with their ideal, even in cases, such as in the modem workplace, where their ideal has not yet obtained. Accordingly, I argue that those who, on account of their Confucian beliefs, are skeptical of the existence of human rights and believe that asserting rights is morally wrong need not concede that they are morally obligated to recognize rights in the workplace. The article proceeds in the following manner. In the second section, I set forth Stmdler's argument, as well as his attempt to Unk, analogously, the Confucian skeptical view to Kantian ethics. In the third section, I further probe the similarities and differences of the Confucian skeptical view and Kantian ethics so as to show that Confucian skeptics need not concede a moral obligation to recognize rights in the workplace. The fourth section concludes. While in this article my analysis focuses on Stmdler's argument, it has implications that extend beyond the debate regarding Westem and Confucian views on rights in the workplace. My claim that Confucian right skeptics need not concede that they are morally obhgated to recognize rights in the workplace suggests the need for inquiry into the metaphysical foundations of the Westem and Confucian views. However, such inquiry is often thought to lie beyond the scope of philosophical business ethics proper. I conclude by suggesting a number of reasons for business ethicists to consider rejecting the prevalent narrow conception of the scope of the disciphne.

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STRUDLER'S ARGUMENT Strudler notes that the Confucian skeptical position can be seen as "formidable" (2008: 67), even by Western philosophers who take for granted the existence of rights, once it is recognized that the sort of dignity that is available to persons where Confucian community obtains is not available to persons who "think . . . in terms of rights" (2008: 72), and that the sort of dignity that is available to persons whose rights are recognized and respected is not available to persons where a Confucian community obtains. The Confucian skeptical position is thus formidable because it appears that "the ideas of a good life for Confucians [of this sort] and Western liberal rights-advocates are quite incommensurable," presenting a considerable challenge to those who would seek to persuade Confucians skeptics that they have reason to recognize workplace rights: that of "making the case that [the Western rights-centric] way of life is in relevant ways better than the Confucian's" (Strudler 2008: 73). Rather than undertake this challenge, Strudler adopts the following strategy. First, he concedes that within a Confucian community, it is wrong to assert rights, since doing so is inconsistent with Confucian community (2008: 77). However, he argues that due to the centrahty of "economic considerations" in the modem workplace, it is not the case that Confucian community obtains therein (2008:16-11). Accordingly, he claims that in the modem workplace, it cannot be the case that recognizing rights undermines Confucian community. Thus he claims that in the modem workplace, "[t]o the extent that one resists recognizing rights . . . out of concem that doing so is inconsistent with [Confucian] community, one has no reason to resist recognizing rights" since, given that Confucian community does not exist therein, one "degrades nothing by asserting rights" (2008: 77). Further, Stmdler (2008: 71) notes that when rights are recognized, it is the case that persons need not be servile and merely submit to being mistreated by others, and thus that rights being recognized provides persons with a certain sort of dignity. Therefore, given that the sort of dignity that is available when Confucian community obtains is not available in the workplace anyway, this rights-based dignity "regains its luster" (Strudler 2008: 77). Accordingly, on the assumption that we ought to "accord people the highest kind of dignity available," Strudler (2008: 79) claims that, in the modem workplace, "even a Confucian must admit that doing so requires recognizing rights." To illuminate the Confucian position for an audience which includes many Westem philosophers who are unlikely to be familiar with Confucianism, Strudler (2008: 69) suggests that it has a "counterpart" in the "Kantian tradition.'"* He suggests that the Confucian idea of community can be seen as corresponding to the Kantian idea of a kingdom of ends (2008: 69). Further, he suggests that just as for the Kantian the wrongness of an act lies in its inconsistency with the kingdom of ends idea,^ for the Confucian, the wrongness of an act lies in its inconsistency with the idea of Confucian community (2008: 69).'' In the following section, by further probing the analogy with Kantian ethics, I develop an argument for the claim that Confucian skeptics need not concede that they have a moral obligation to recognize rights in the workplace.

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KANTIAN ETHICS AND THE CONFUCIAN SKEPTICAL VIEW The Kantian idea of a kingdom of ends is an ideal:^ it is a conception of a society wherein all "give" (legislate) and act in accordance with universal moral law, where each "treats himself and all others never merely as a means but always at the same time as ends in themselves" (Kant 1997: 41). Therefore, Stmdler's claim that the kingdom of ends is a counterpart to Confucian community implies that Confucian community is an ideal, a conception of an ideal society as it would be were all to perfectly comply with the demands of (Confucian) morality. Further, that he holds that both the kingdom of ends and the Confucian community ideas give rise to verdicts of wrongness that hold categorically suggests that he recognizes them both as being ideals. That is, that they are ideal conceptions, rather than, say, merely acceptable or permissible or suitable conceptions seems to be theoretically required, given the central role that Stmdler holds that inconsistency plays in determining wrongnessgiving rise to wrongness in a "categorical" or universal manner (2008: 69, 77). For anything less than an ideal conception, it would be implausible to hold that inconsistency could play such a decisive role. To see that this is so, suppose one were to invoke a less-than-ideal conception of Confucian community instead of an ideal conception. For instance, suppose one were to rely on a conception of Confucian community as merely the sort of society that actually obtains in Confucian cultures that have not been "cormpted" by Westem, individualist, rights-based thinking. Is it plausible to claim that acting in a manner that is inconsistent with such a conception of Confucian community is categorically wrong? It seems difficult to even conceive of how one could act in a way that is inconsistent with such a conception. For instance, if the ideal conception is used, acting inconsistently with Confucian community would consist in treating the group as if it is not of fundamental moral importance by, say, placing one's own interests above those of the group. But by definition, a less-than-ideal conception would be a conception wherein at least some persons, at least at times, do not perfectly comply with morality and hence at times do, for instance, place their own interests above those of the group. If this were not the case, then it would not be a less-than-ideal conception. But then it would be implausible to hold that acting inconsistently with a less-than-ideal conception is categorically wrong, for that would entail that since such inconsistent behavior actually obtains in the conception, it could be categorically wrong to put one's interests above those of the group, or it could be categorically wrong to not put one's interests above those of the group, depending on which acts (those consistent with the ideal, or those inconsistent with the ideal) one references. Hence, it seems that the only plausible conception of Confucian community that could yield categorical verdicts of wrongness on grounds of inconsistency is an ideal conception. Therefore, we have reason to conclude that Confucian community is an ideal akin to the Kantian kingdom of ends. Next, it can be noted that while the Confucian skeptical and Kantian positions are similar with regard to wrongness being a function of inconsistency with an ideal, a fundamental metaphysical difference exists between them. In the Kantian ideal of

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the kingdom of ends, individuals are held to be fundamental, and the primary locus of moral worth. The ideal communitythe kingdom of endsis one in which all persons are treated thusly, never merely as a means but rather as ends in themselves. To act wrongly is to treat persons otherwise. (From this perspective, a central moral problem is that people tend to put themselves and their own interests ahead of those of other equally valuable individual persons.) In contrast, in the Confucian ideal of community, the group is held to be fundamental, and the primary locus of moral worth. The ideal communityConfucian communityis one in which the group is treated thusly, wherein persons do not place their own interests above those of the group (Stmdler 2008: 81n7).* To act wrongly is to treat the group otherwise. (From this perspective, a central moral problem is that people tend to place their own interests above those of the group.) If it is accepted that this fundamental metaphysical difference exists between the Confucian and Kantian views, and if it is accepted that Confucian community is an ideal, the resources necessary to critically examine Stmdler's (2008: 11-78) argument for the conclusion that even Confucian skeptics have reason to recognize rights in the workplace are in hand. Strudler's argument can be set forth as follows: 1. Asserting rights is inconsistent with the Confucian community ideal. 2. To act in a way that is inconsistent with the Confucian community ideal is a categorical wrong. 3. Therefore, asserting rights in a Confucian community is a categorical wrong. 4. Confucian community does not obtain in the modem workplace. 5. Therefore, one degrades nothing by asserting rights in the modem workplace. 6. Therefore, the Confucian community ideal does not provide a reason to resist recognizing rights in the modem workplace. Now I will sketch the basic Kantian argument that is as similar as I can make it to the stmcture of Stmdler's argument while remaining consistent with the Kantian ethical view: 1. Not treating persons as ends in themselves is inconsistent with the Kantian kingdom of ends ideal. 2. To act in a way that is inconsistent with the Kantian kingdom of ends ideal is a categorical wrong. 3. Therefore, not treating persons as ends in themselves is a categorical wrong. Here it becomes clear that Stmdler's argument depends on the qualifier of "in a Confucian community" in the third premise. That this qualifier is problematic can be seen once it is recognized that such a qualifier would be unacceptable were it to be used in the Kantian argument. For instance, consider the Kantian argument set forth in a form that is stmcturally identical to Stmdler's argument: 1. Not treating persons as ends in themselves is inconsistent with the Kantian kingdom of ends ideal. 2. To act in a way that is inconsistent with the Kantian kingdom of ends ideal is a categorical wrong.

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3. Therefore, not treating persons as ends in themselves in a Kantian kingdom of ends is a categorical wrong. 4. A Kantian kingdom of ends does not obtain in the modem workplace. 5. Therefore, one degrades nothing by not treating persons as ends in themselves in the modem workplace. 6. Therefore, the Kantian kingdom of ends ideal does not provide us with a reason to resist persons being treated merely as means in the modem workplace. Kantian philosophers would reject this argument because in it the wrongness of acting in a manner that is inconsistent with the ideal is made conditional upon the ideal obtaining, but in Kantian ethics, wrongness is not contingent in this manner. That is, in Kantian ethics, the ideal can be seen as providing a picture of how persons are morally required to act in all cases; persons are to act in a manner that is consistent with the ideal regardless of whether it obtains or not. It would be odd, and would evident a misunderstanding of Kantian ethics, to claim that not treating persons merely as a means is not required if it is the case that the kingdom of ends ideal does not obtain. Accordingly, if Confucian community is an ideal (as is the Kantian kingdom of ends), as I have argued that it must be if wrongness is to be located in inconsistency with it, Strudler's argument should be seen by Confucian skeptics as being mistaken, just as Kantians would hold that the structurally identical Kantian argument is mistaken. That Confucian community does not obtain in the modem workplace should then be seen by them as irrelevant to the moral status of a particular act undertaken therein, just as, for Kantians, the fact that the kingdom of ends does not obtain in the modem workplace is irrelevant to the moral status of a particular act undertaken in the workplace. If recognizing rights is inconsistent with Confucian community, then Confucian skeptics should reject recognizing rights in the context of the modem workplace just as Kantians should reject treating persons merely as a means in that context. Therefore, contrary to Strudler's claim, I argue that it is not the case that "even a Confucian [skeptic] must admit" that he or she is morally obligated to recognize rights in the workplace (2008: 79). To the contrary, a Confucian skeptic should refuse to recognize rights, just as a Kantian should refuse to treat persons merely as a means. CONCLUSION While Strudler claims that Confucian skeptics can and ought to accommodate Westem views regarding respecting and recognizing rights in the workplace, I have argued that this is not the case. So long as they hold that, metaphysically, the group rather than the individual is fundamental, and that the good life is that in which an individual accepts this and acts accordingly, they ought to resist the Westem idea of rights, even within the context of the modem workplace. Therefore, it is not the case that one can concede the Confucian skeptical position and still hold that rights nevertheless ought to be recognized in the workplace. Given the structure of the Confucian skeptical and Kantian ethical views wherein wrongness is located in acting

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inconsistently with an ideal, Confucian skeptics should recognize, as Kantians do, that they ought to act in a way that is consistent with their ideal, even if, as in the case of the modem workplace, their ideal has not (yet) obtained. To do otherwise would be to relinquish the possibility of achieving Confucian community, and the good hfe (as set forth in their ethical view) without sufficient reason to do so. However, to many it may seem odd to believe that, say, Ann, who holds the Westem rights-centric view has reason to assert, respect and protect rights in the workplace, but Ben, who is a Confucian skeptic, has reason not to do so. What ought business ethicists to do when confronted with plausible moral views that are so inconsistent in their implications? One option is to adopt what can be termed the parochial pragmatic strategy. Those who think that their view is correct but who recognize that as the conditions of the world are, it cannot yet be implemented, would be inclined to adopt this strategy. Patricia Werhane (2010) suggests that business ethicists should take this approach. She suggests that in the short term, those holding the Westem right-centric view should be "content" to be "satisficers," while, at the same time, work to "change political climates of cormption, domination, patronage, and protectionismclimates that interfere or preclude going forward with the adoption and practice of [Westem rights-based] principles everywhere" (Werhane 2010: 700). A problem with this approach is that until it can be shown that we have reason to reject the Confucian skeptical view (as well as other plausible views that are in confiict with the Westem rights-centric view), such parochialism is unwarranted. A second option would be to adopt what can be termed the skeptical pragmatic strategy. Those who are skeptical about arriving at a conclusion that one view is more correct than the other, but nevertheless want to make the best of the situation, would be inclined to adopt this strategy. Here, again, Werhane's suggestion to be content to be satisficers seems apt. Stmdler's approach to the question of respecting rights in the workplace seems to illustrate such an approach (although it should not be inferred from his analysis that his approach is rooted in skepticism; that he grants that the Confucian skeptical and Westem rights-centric views can presently be seen as being philosophically on par does not entail that he believes that they will not in the future be shown to differ in plausibility). Following this approach, business ethicists would seek to accommodate both views as far as possible, and then seek to devise some sort of practical compromise regarding what is presently irreconcilable. A problem with this approach is that, at least with respect to some moral views (such as the Confucian skeptical and Westem rights-centric views), such skepticism is unwarranted, given that sufficient inquiry has not been made so as to determine whether or not they really are equally plausible. A third option is to adopt what can be termed the intellectual deference strategy. Those who believe that it may be possible to discover that one of the views is more correct than the other, but believe that such work lies outside of the scope of business ethics proper, would be inclined to adopt this strategy. Were business ethicists to adopt this approach, they would first seek to determine if philosophers working in other, more abstract areas have done work that speaks to the question at hand, and, if not, hope that they will carry out such work sometime in the near future, and

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possibly even seek to encourage them to undertake such work. However, such a view seems unwarranted, given that we do not have sufficient reason to believe that such "upstream" work should be viewed as being outside the scope of business ethics. A fourth option is to adopt what can be termed the intellectual engagement strategy. Those who believe that it may be possible to discover that one of the views is more correct than the other, and who are willing to seek to arrive at such a conclusion themselves (so as to, for one, enable them to address a question that is of importance for understanding morality in the business sphere), would be inclined to adopt this strategy. Thus, for instance, where it seems that the point of divergence between the Westem rights-based view and the Confucian skeptical view appears to be in their differing underlying metaphysical foundations, a business ethicist who pursued this approach would undertake a philosophical examination of the comparative plausibility of these foundational assumptions. Given the aim of this article, I will not seek to set forth a comprehensive list of options, or to provide a conclusive argument for the superiority of one option over the others. However, I want to suggest that the fourth option (the intellectual engagement strategy) warrants consideration by philosophical business ethicists. To do so, I will pose, and briefly respond to a number of questions. I hope that this will in tum facilitate more rigorous inquiry on this issue. Why not expand our conception of the scope of business ethics so as to include the intellectual engagement strategy? After all, (systematically) deferring to the thought of others is not generally believed to be a characteristic virtue of philosophical thought. For instance, doing so is not what we strive to teach our students to do. Should we not set an example for them on this front? Why should business ethics not also be viewed as being a willing and ready springboard for inquiry in other areas, such as moral and pohtical philosophy, epistemology and metaphysics, in addition to being a discipline that applies the findings of philosophical inquiry undertaken further upstream? To illustrate, suppose that Chloe asks Dan and Elle whether all persons have reason to respect rights in the workplace. With this question in hand, Dan draws upon Kant's ethical theory and works out a sound argument for the conclusion that all persons have reason to respect rights in the workplace.^ Elle, however, draws upon Kant's ethical theory, and Confucian ethical theory, finds that these theories yield incompatible answers, identifies their differing metaphysical foundations at the root of the incompatibility, and then develops a compelling argument showing that we have reason to reject the underlying metaphysical assumptions of both theories, and that we have reason to accept a pluralistic view wherein both the individual and the community are held to be of fundamental moral importance. Why should we deem Dan's analysis as falling within the proper scope of business ethics, but tell Elle to take her "impractical" and "lacking-in-relevance" analysis elsewhere?'" It seems odd to, on the one hand, believe that we should test and reflect on our assumptions, and, on the other, view such reflection (which, recall, is without a doubt rooted in business ethics) as being beyond the scope of business ethics. Such a view seems to do violence to not only how we do and ought to think; this sort of compartmentalization is not conducive to the central philosophical task

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of achieving greater coherence among our beUefs, of "impart[ing] systemic order into the domain of relevant data" (Rescher 2001: 19, 93). Philosophy is a reflective undertaking. Reflection, at least in the short-run, is "impractical." However, my suggestion is that business ethicists entertain the possibility of considering that at least all philosophical analysis that begins with morally hued business phenomena falls within the scope of business ethics proper, whether it involves offering moral guidance for those who are confronted with such phenomena," or involves the working out of difficulties that arise in the process of seeking to arrive at a coherent and plausible view such as warrants being offered as moral guidance. Do we really want to say: "come all ye who are willing to try to apply the work of the deep thinkers, welcome to our discipline," and "stay back ye deep thinkers, ye impractical folk?" Should not business ethicists be willing to undertake inquiry in whatever direction is necessary for coming to a better understanding of morality in the business sphere? If our conception of the proper scope of business ethics were to be expanded in this manner, it is not as if business ethicists would need to "reinvent the wheel." For instance, there are a number of examples in the broader philosophical literature where concrete problems in military or medical ethics have served to enable progress on the more abstract, fundamental questions of ethics. As an example, Thomas Aquinas's (1981: II-II, q. 64, a. 7) consideration of a particular act of self-defense lies at the root of the development of the principle of double effect. Further, we find that the consideration of concrete cases of abortion,'^ organ transplantation,'^ and treatment of malformed newboms,''' in the field of medical ethics, and in other areas of life, runaway troUey driving,'^ overweight caving companions,'^ rescues and foreign aid,'^ and such, to be fruitful ground for making progress on questions that are central to understanding more general moral questionsquestions that have implications that extend beyond the particular concrete case. Why not expect the same to arise from upstream theorizing regarding the issues that vex business ethicists? Given continual worries over the viability and intellectual respectability of the discipline of business ethics,'* it is worth taking time to consider the fact that the scope of business ethics is not carved in stone, and hence can be expanded. Such an expansion could, among other things, serve to increase the vitality and intellectual respectability of the discipline, draw more people into the discipline, increase the quality of work that is produced by business ethicists, and enable the practical guidance that is offered to managers and governments to be sufficiently grounded so as to better warrant acceptance. The old saying, "what gets measured gets done," is apt here: even if upstream philosophical work will facilitate progress on the questions that are at the core of business ethics, it may be that business ethicists will be unlikely to undertake it if it is not the sort of work that is "measured," or even if such work does not "measure up" with respect to more mainstream work, when it comes to career-impacting decisions such as hiring and promotion.

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NOTES
I thank Alan Strudler for stimulating my thinking on these issues, and for providing me with thoughtful and generous encouragement. 1. Much scholarly discussion has surrounded the question of whether Confucianism can be viewed as being compatible with a Westem conception of human rights. See Bauer and Bell 1999, de Bary 1998, and Sen 1997. In this discussion, I do not address this question. 2. Strudler (2008: 69) is careful to make it clear that this skeptical position is not "the" Confucian position, but merely one among others, noting that "a distinguished and infiuential tradition in contemporary Confucian scholarship defends rights and finds them consistent with Confucian ideas." However, the debate over the consistency of rights and Confucianism has not been settled. Citing Mehmet 1999, as well as Shun and Wong 2004, Hsieh notes that "[w]ith respect to human rights . . . there is debate as to whether the concept itself has a place in certain traditions of moral thinking, such as in the East Asian context" (Hsieh 2009: 265). 3. Recently a number of attempts have been made to comparatively examine Confucian and Westem (liberal) ethical views. See Sungmoon 2009, and Wei-ming 2002. 4. The interpretation of Kant offered by Strudler is a plausible one. Nevertheless, there is ongoing controversy over what the best interpretation of Kant is. For instance, refer to the following: Cummiskey 1990, Dean 2008, Glasgow 2007, and Timmermann 2006. 5. Technically, Kant's locates wrongness in inconsistency with the moral law, and the idea of the kingdom of ends derives from this, being an ideal in which all persons act in accordance with the moral law (Kant 1997: 40-41). Given that the kingdom of ends is an ideal wherein all act in accordance with the moral law, moral verdicts based on inconsistency with the moral law, or inconsistency with the kingdom of ends ideal, will necessarily converge. Therefore it is acceptable for Strudler to claim that wrongness is located in inconsistency with the kingdom of ends ideal. 6. Because wrongness is rooted in inconsistency rather than consequences, Strudler (2008: 69) claims that both theories are deontological. 7. As Kant (1997: 41) notes, the kingdom of ends is "admittedly only an ideal." 8. This contrasts with the view labeled "moral individualism" wherein, among other things, it is "den[ied] that there is some supra-individual 'social entity' whose good is the object of rational social principles" (Mack 2010: 58). 9. But while this is the common view of "applied" ethics, it greatly oversimplifies the subject, and may be dubbed a mere "caricature" (Arnold, Audi, and Zwolinski 2010: 561). 10. I am not addressing the question of whether, say, EUe's analysis warrants publication in a business ethics journal. Rather, I am addressing the question of whether it should be deemed as being business ethics, rather than, or in addition to, say, moral philosophy. This question has important implications for the career prospects of business ethicists, as well as for questions of bow tbey should be using tbeir time, as well as the resources of their institutions (which at times are schools of business rather than schools of philosophy). 11. For such a guidance-based view of business ethics, see Brenkert 2010: 703. As Arnold, Audi, and Zwolinski (2010: 559) point out: "The field of business ethics emerged as a species of applied ethics, akin to the field of bioethics . .. with the explicit intention of using philosophical reasoning and ethical theory to provide normative guidance for business policy and public policy regarding business." 12. Thomson 1971. 13. Foot 1994b. 14. Richardson 1990: 303-05. 15. Foot 1994b. 16. Ibid. 17. Foot 1994a; Singer 1972; Wasserman and Strudler 2003. 18. See the various comments on the state of the discipline in part 2 of the "Twentieth Anniversary Forum" of Business Ethics Quarterly 20(4) (October 2010).

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MORALITY WITHOUT RIGHTS

Alan Strudler

ABSTRACT: In this discussion I explore challenges to a particular Confucian system of morality that generally eschews reliance on rights. I argue that such a system may at the same time both assert that there are moral problems with rights and assert that it is acceptable to invoke rights in limited contexts. Adam Bailey has objected that the position I defend is inconsistent. I answer Bailey's objections.

IGHTS TALK PERVADES BUSINESS ETHICS. Scholars argue that the moral problem with sweatshops is their abuse of worker rights (Amold and Hartman 2006); that recent United Nations work on human rights, in the Global Compact, marks a large step forward in developing a decent intemational moral culture that will improve the plight of working people (Carasco & Singh 2008); and that an ambitious agenda of assigning worker rights to favorable working conditions threatens their more basic right to choose the terms of employment (Maitland 1989). Perhaps, nonetheless, rights are more a cultural artifact than a mark of moral progress. In recounting his experience working on a British govemment committee examining obscenity policy, the infiuential moral philosopher, Bemard Williams (1986), tells of an expert who explained First Amendment implications for obscenity law. After the expert finished his testimony and left the room, perhaps in response to puzzlement felt by Committee members, a British lawyer said, "I think I should explain something to the Cotnmittee. Americans believe in rights." As the British lawyer suggests, there may be better ways to see moral problems than through the lens of rights, which has become our way of seeing moral problems. Confucian thought contains a possibility. In an earlier article I argued that enthusiasm for rights in busi-

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