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Interview of Philip Zelikow

9 a.m.
Wednesday, Octobers, 2003
K Street Office

Participants:

Commissioner Fred Fielding

Commissioner Jamie Gorelick
Dan Marcus (Lead Questioner)
Warren Bass
Mike Hurley

Introductory Note

We suggest mentioning for the record the fact that this intervjewJs-being^onducted off of
open sources and that we have not^et reviewed anyjpatefiaiTrom the transition team itself.
Nor have we yet been able to review tr^n|itiQR-rnaterials requested by EOP 3. Should we
find additional material that bear^onrthewitness^s testimony, the Commission reserves the
right to recall him for anotheflnterview.

You may also wish to note that, at Dr. Zelikow's own request, he has been pkced under
oath.

Questions

Biography

yum background.

What is your current position? -

V^tJr&t rr 6^7tmnn.uL. *•
How were yotrseiscted to~Be~E«ejuitt-ve Director o:
appointment 3S
Rice, have •intment?

Please summarize government posts you've held.

HaW^u/servfed on .acflyxOtheTcommKSiohs?^.^

Political Involvement

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ived with a political campaign?

In late 2000 and early 2001, did you have a role in the transition to the Bush administration?

What was your specific job? To whom did you report?

How were you selected for that position?

You spoke repeatedlyfexTeporters about Rice (and once atout USTR-designate Zoellick)
during the transition pericJcVoffering favorable quotes for a significant number of profiles.
(Your other public comments during thatjine period were limited to quotes about a movie
on the Cuban missile crisis for wh^fe^u were a consultant.) You were also widely thought
to be in the running for an^dmlnistratioh^Qb, as reported in The WashinganPcst

Did you want to wtffk on the Bush NSC? If so, in wfeat^agacity? And if so, what became of
those aspirations? Were you ever offered a job (either full- o?pai^time) in the Bush
administration, at any point?

What formal or informal relatio: ou feel entirel-free

to reach-tmflattering-cenelusi
have any concern that re^ehin^funflattering conclusions >ur ability to hold jobs
in current or future^clministrations?

Do you have any views on the Family Steering Committee's allegations of conflicts of
interest? Did you consider these or similar arguments before accepting the position as
Executive Director? Did anyone raise these or similar arguments while you were being
considered for the job? What steps, if any, did you take to avoid both conflicts, ethical issues,
and the appearance thereof?

Transition Mechanics

What is the legal status of a transition team? Is it part of the Executive Office of the
President? To whom does it report? Who pays its salaries? Where are its offices? Who
pays for office space?

Who else was on the NSC transition team?

How long was the transition team in existence?

What were your responsibilities on the transition team? Were you the head of the team?

Who assigned you these responsibilities? How were they arrived at?

Were you in fact given "marching orders", in terms of how you should conduct your work?

To whom were you to report your findings?

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In what format did you report your findings/assessments/recommendations?

Eje-yrju retain a copy'oftfaesc? Who else might have axopy?~"

Where are documents and records produced by the transition team kept?

When the,
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to fprocure transition team materials?

National Security Priorities

Condoleezza Rice, now the National Security Advisor, published an article in the
January/February 2000 issue of Foreign A/airs entitled "Promoting the National Interest,"
which outlined the foreign policy and national security priorities of a possible Bush
administration. What were those priorities?

Did you share these priorities?

Were you involved in drafting the article?

Where was terrorism on the list of priorities?

NB: terrorism folk last in Rice's aiowd list of rmjor priorities, and isithout dear reference to al- Qiida and
a heaiy emphasis on state sponsorship. Rice wrote: "A rnzricanforeign policy in a Republican administration
should refocus the United States on the national interest and the pursuit of'keypriorities. These tasks are

* to ensure that A merica 's military can deter uar, project power, andfifjit in defense of its interests if
deterrencefails;

* to promote economicgrowth and political openness by extending free trade and a stable international
monetary system to aUcomnitted to these principles, including in thewestem hemisphere, which has too often
been ne^ectedas a lital area of U.S. national interest;

* to renewstrong and intirmte relationships with allies who share A rmrican wines andean thus share the
burden cf promoting peace, prosperity, and/reedom;

* tofoots U.S. energies on comprehensive relationships isith the big powers, particularly Russia and China,
that can and mil mold the character of the international political system; and

* to deal dedsiiely wth the threat of rogue regimes andhostile powers, ishich is increasingly taking the forms
of the potential for terrorism and the deielaprnent of weapons ofrmss destruction (WMD)."

Did you think that was high enough? Did you ever make recommendations or offer an
opinion about how high a priority terrorism should be? Where would you have ranked it
with such other major foreign policy issues as China, NMD, Russia, the Balkans, the Middle
East peace process, Iraq, and so on?

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Did you, like Rice, see state-sponsored terrorism as the main terrorist problem facing the
United States? Did you ever argue— before the election, during the transition, or early in the
Bush administration— that transnational terrorism, including al-Qaida, was more worrisome
than state-sponsored terrorism? Did you and Rice ever discuss the issue?

Did you ever advise the Bush campaign regarding terrorism?

Did you ever give advice about terrorism to the Bush administration after the transition but
before 9/11?

Did you think Rice's foreign policy worldview was too steeped in Cold War assumptions?
Did you think she overemphasized state power, as a traditional balance-of-power realist, and
underrated the threats from failed states and transnational networks? If so, how did you
express that concern?

Did you hear other policymakers discuss the briefings they'd received about UBL, al-Qaida,
or CT? Did they agree with the briefings they were receiving from outgoing Clinton
administration officials? If not, what was the substance of the disagreement?

Did you witness any discussions among the incoming team about how high a priority CT
should be? Was a distinction made between state-sponsored and transnational terrorism?

Were terrorism-rekted recommendations that you made not taken onboard?

Briefings

Were you aware of outgoing National Security Adviser Berger's reported statement to Dr.
Rice to the effect that al-Qaida would occupy more of the Bush administration's time than
any other issue?

Were you aware of any Pentagon briefings that mentioned— or failed to mention— military
options against UBL, Taliban, or al-Qaida targets?

Were you involved in any discussions about possible responses to the attack on the U.S.S.
Cde? If so, did you offer any views? What views did others offer? Were these views in any
way memorialized?
-\
Did you see any other CT-rekted briefings?

How did the incoming Bush team or your transition team respond to CT briefings from
Ckrke and TNT?

The TNT Directorate

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In your work on the transition team, did you review the transnational threats directorate
(TNT) headed by National Coordinator Richard Clarke?

During the Clinton administration, a FDD specifically made Clarke a principal on

counterterrorism issues. Did you think that was appropriate? Were you involved in
deliberations on the wisdom of Clarke's principal's status? ~

Why did Clarke lose his PDD-enshrined principal's status? How was that done? Who made
that decision? What were the reasons for it? Did you approve of the move? How much did
it have to do with personality, policy, and priorities (respectively)?

What reaction did Clarke have to this change?

Given that regional issues generally drive the USG, did you make attempts to ensure that
cross-regional issues like terrorism were well-represented5 Did you think Clarke's loss of
principal status would help or hinder that effort?

Was the downgrading of Clarke's status in effect a "signal" that CT would not be strong?

Did you think Clarke was doing a good job on counterterrorism? What was your critique, if
any? Did other transition officials think Clarke was doing a good job on counterterrorism?
What was their critique, if any? Did you subscribe to that critique?

Was Clarke being forced out— put out to pasture on cyberterrorism?

How important did you think Clarke's office was? Did you think it had enough institutional
clout to perform CT duties effectively?

Did you meet with Clarke? How many times? Can you summarize your discussions with
him?

Did you meet with any of Clarke's subordinates, such as Roger Cressey? Any others?

How many people were working on counterterrorism in the Clinton administration's NSC at
the time of the transition? Did that number seem about right, too many, or too few to you?
Did your colleagues, including Rice, have views on this?

What conclusions did you reach about Clarke's shop? Did you recommend that TNT staff
be cut, added, or reassigned5 Did you recommend that it receive more resources, fewer
resources, or remain the same?

With whom did you share these conclusions?

Did you review whether Clarke's individual staff should continue working in the new NSC?
Did you recommend that any of them be let go? Who, and on what grounds?

Did you speak to others in the interagency about Clarke's management of counterterrorism?
What did you learn?

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What report did you make concerning this to your superiors?

Was Clarke's personality perceived as an impediment to what the Bush administration hoped
to accomplish on counterterrorism? Who held that perception? What views did— and do—
you have on Clarke's personality?

Did you at anytime assess that the counterterrorism issue had been given too high a priority
and should be downgraded? Did you ever recommend, endorse, or say that CT should get
fewer staff or resources?

Did you recommend cutting back on Clarke's staff?

Did you recommend reducing or shifting the NSC's lead role in managing counterterrorism?

NSC Structure
/>
Did you have discussions with any current EOF officials regarding the size and structure of
the NSC before you began your work on the transition team?

If so, please describe these discussions.

Did you use a particular blueprint for how the NSC should look5

Did this blueprint influence how you looked at the way the NSC was structured?

Richard Clarke was an extremely hands-on manager in the NSC Did an activist, operational
NSC comport with your model of how the Bush administration's NSC should function?

Did such a model comport with how Rice/Hadley envisioned the NSC?

Given that the NSC staff under Bush emphasized "coordinating" rather than "leading," who
was supposed to "lead" on CT? Given the weakness of other places, was this plausible?

Did you make other recommendations about the shape and structure of the NSC?

What were some of the significant recommendations with regard to the NSC that you made?

Documentation

Do you retain any notes or transition-related emails from your time as transition staffer?

Did you produce any memoranda or papers on restructuring the NSC or on CT policy?

Do you still hold these?

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Did the Bush transition team ever memorialize in any way its views on terrorism? How
would we find those documents?

Does anyone else retain copies of any memoranda or papers you produced?

Who else should we speak to on these issues?

Excerpted Background Material:

Copyright 2000 Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.

Foreign Affairs

January, 2000 / February, 2000

SECTION: Campaign 2000; Pg. 45

LENGTH: 6922 words

HEADLINE: Promoting the National Interest

BYLINE: CONDOLEEZZA RICE is Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and

Professor of Political Science at Stanford University. She is also foreign policy adviser to
Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush.

It takes courage to set priorities because doing so is an admission that American foreign
policy cannot be all things to all people -- or rather, to all interest groups. The Clinton
administration's approach has its advantages: If priorities and intent are not clear, they
cannot be criticized. But there is a high price to pay for this approach. In a democracy as
pluralistic as ours, the absence of an articulated "national interest" either produces a fertile
ground for those wishing to withdraw from the world or creates a vacuum to be filled by
parochial groups and transitory pressures.

American foreign policy in a Republican administration should refocus the United States on
the national interest and the pursuit of key priorities. These tasks are

* to ensure that America's military can deter war, project power, and fight in defense of its
interests if deterrence fails;

* to promote economic growth and political openness by extending free trade and a stable
international monetary system to all committed to these principles, including in the western
hemisphere, which has too often been neglected as a vital area of U.S. national interest;

* to renew strong and intimate relationships with allies who share American values and can
thus share the burden of promoting peace, prosperity, and freedom;

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* to focus U.S. energies on comprehensive relationships with the big powers, particularly
Russia and China, that can and will mold the character of the international political system;
and

* to deal decisively with the threat of rogue regimes and hostile powers, which is increasingly
taking the forms of the potential for terrorism and the development of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD).

One thing is clean the United States must approach regimes like North Korea resolutely and
decisively. The Clinton administration has failed here, sometimes threatening to use force
and then backing down, as it often has with Iraq. These regimes are living on borrowed time,
so there need be no sense of panic about them. Rather, the first line of defense should be a
clear and classical statement of deterrence -- if they do acquire WMD, their weapons will be
unusable because any attempt to use them will bring national obliteration. Second, we
should accelerate efforts to defend against these weapons. This is the most important reason
to deploy national and theater missile defenses as soon as possible, to focus attention on
U.S. homeland defenses against chemical and biological agents, and to expand intelligence
capabilities against terrorism of all kinds.

Finally, there is the Iranian regime. Iran's motivation is not to disrupt simply the
development of an international system based on markets and democracy, but to replace it
with an alternative: fundamentalist Islam. Fortunately, the Iranians do not have the kind of
reach and power that the Soviet Union enjoyed in trying to promote its socialist alternative.
But Iran's tactics have posed real problems for U.S. security. It has tried to destabilize
moderate Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, though its relations with the Saudis have
improved recently. Iran has also supported terrorism against America and Western interests
and attempted to develop and transfer sensitive military technologies.

Los Angeles Times

View Rekted Topics

December 18,2000, Monday, Home Edition

SECTION: Part A; Part 1; Page 1; National Desk

LENGTH: 1491 words

HEADLINE: THE PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION;

RICE'S SOARING CAREER HITS A NEW HIGH

BYLINE: NORMAN KEMPSTER, TIMES STAFF WRITER

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"She has a nice combination of three kinds of experience: scholarly intellectual knowledge,
real experience working in government and responsibility for administering a large
institution," says Philip Zelikow, director of the Miller Center at the University of Virginia.
He worked with Ms Rice at the White House and co-authored with her a book on the
unification of Germany.

Mr Zelikow dismissed suggestions that Ms Rice may suffer from hubris, the intellectual
arrogance that has brought down generations of "best and brightest" government officials.
"She is pretty level-headed," he says. "She never displayed an overly large ego, elbowing
people out of the way. She never had that kind of reputation at all."

Copyright 2000 San Jose Mercury News

All Rights Reserved
San Jose Mercury News (California)

December 18,2000 Monday MORNING FINAL EDITION

SECTION: FRONT; Pg. 12A

LENGTH: 1397 words

HEADLINE: RICE'S CHARM, DIPLOMACY KEY TO HER SUCCESS BUSH'S

NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER HAS SHOWN ABILITY TO IMPRESS AND
THEN DIPLOMATICALLY GET HER WAY

BYLINE: JIM PUZZANGHERA, Mercury News Washington Bureau

"Her style is not a confrontational style. She doesn't go into a situationtrying to establish that
she's a stronger, better, smarter person," said Philip Zelikow, who served with Rice on the
National Security Council staff. "It's friendly and amiable. There are times when she puts a
little zing into her remarks. She does have a temper, but she manages it very well."

Former colleagues said one thing that enables Rice to relate to others is a broad range of
interests. She is an accomplished pianist, devout Presbyterian, as well as an intense sports
fan.

"She can walk into a church and go up to the pulpit and give a sermon, then walk out the
door and give a briefing on ICBM throw-weight. And when that's done, go give an address
to the Stanford alumni and finally sit back with the football coach and talk about the new
offensive game plan," Zelikow said.

The Washington Post

December 18,2000, Monday, Final Edition

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NAME: CONDOLEEZZARICE

SECTION: A SECTION; Pg. A01

LENGTH: 2475 words

HEADLINE: For Rice, a Daunting Challenge Ahead; Adviser Must Steer Leader Whose
Foreign-Policy Outlook Is in Progress

BYLINE: Steven Mufson, Washington Post Staff Writer

"She can walk into a gathering of almost any kind and instantly find a poised way of
handling herself, whether in a one-on-one meeting with a Russian marshal or a church group
in Palo Alto or a corporate group," said former NSC colleague and book collaborator Philip
Zelikow, now a University of Virginia professor.

Copyright 2001 The Christian Science Publishing Society

Christian Science Monitor (Boston, MA)

October 10,2001, Wednesday

SECTION: USA; Pg. 3

LENGTH: 1115 words

HEADLINE: At the table of war, a trusted voice of caution

BYLINE: Francine Kiefer Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

DATELINE: WASHINGTON

"She has crisis experience," says Philip Zelikow, who co-authored a book with Rice and
worked with her on former President Bush's European team. "She was at the epicenter of
some of the most fast-moving, turbulent, and complicated diplomacy of the last 20 years."

At the same time, Rice's mentor and boss, then-national security adviser Brent Scowcroft,
involved her informally in the Gulf-War discussions. And it's often overlooked that an early
stop on her government career path was at the Pentagon, working for the Joint Chiefs of
Staff on nuclear strategy.

Meanwhile, her professional background may not include terrorism per se, but no one else
in the administration has much experience with it either, Sandy Berger, former national
security adviser to Bill Clinton, has noted. Mr. Berger spent considerable time briefing Rice
on terrorism during the transition.

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Her expertise - and her longstanding friendship with both Presidents Bushes - made her an
easy choice as foreign-policy tutor for the Texas governor in his presidential campaign. The
personal relationship is important, says Mr. Zelikow, because "in stress, you [the president]
turn to people you know you can trust."

The Washington Times

December 18,2000, Monday, Final Edition

SECTION: PART A; Pg. Al

LENGTH: 2213 words

HEADLINE: Academia, national security posts prepare Rice for key position in Bush inner
circle

BYLINE: Nicholas Kralev; THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Philip Zelikow, Miss Rice's former White House colleague with whom she co-authored a
highly acclaimed book on German reunification, dismissed the notion that some of her jobs
might have been the result of affirmative action.

"Those jobs were too big and important to be just given out," he said.

The Washington Post

December 15,2000, Friday, Final Edition

SECTION: A SECTION; Pg. A39; THE FEDERAL PAGE; IN THE LOOP

LENGTH: 882 words

HEADLINE: Bush Team, a Hunger for Staples

BYLINE: Al Kamen, Washington Post Staff Writer

For example, our copy of "Germany Unified and Europe Transformed," a book by Rice and
former National Security Council colleague Philip Zelikow, has a fine picture of a number
of youngish-looking Bush I advisers at his summer residence in Kennebunkport, Maine.

Vice President-elect Cheney's there, along with Powell, as well as Zelikow, who's teaching at
the University of Virginia and may be on his way back to a top foreign policy slot.

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Copyright 2001 The Financial Times Limited

Financial Times (London,England)

January 12,2001, Friday London Edition 3

SECTION: THE AMERICAS; Pg. 11

LENGTH: 593 words

HEADLINE: THE AMERICAS: Zoellick faces daunting task of building trade bridges

BYLINE: By EDWARD ALDEN, STEPHEN FIDLER and RICHARD WOLFFE

Philip Zelikow, who handled European affairs for the National Security Council when Mr
Zoellick was at the State Department, said: "He has the ability to be the best USTRthe US
has ever fielded."

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