DIGESTS DIRECT BRIBERY (Art.

210)
MARIFOSQUE vs. PEOPLE Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari, which assails the September 23, 2002, decision and the January 3, 2003, Resolution of the Sandiganbayan finding petitioner Nazario Marifosque guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of direct bribery, defined and penalized under the 2nd paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner averred that said money was not for him but as reward money for the police asset who demanded that he be given 350 pesos per cylinder tank. Petitioner further averred that he was only collecting on behalf of the police asset and that he already gave an advance of 1,000 pesos to said asset and only collecting the balance of 4,800. The Sandiganbayan rendered a decision convicting petitioner of direct bribery, with an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 3 years, 6 months, and 5 days of prision correccional medium and maximum periods as the minimum and 7 years, 8 months, and 9 days of prision mayor minimum and medium periods as the maximum and a fine of 3000 pesos. He shall also suffer the penalty of special temporary disqualification. With the motion for reconsideration having been denied, he filed this appeal before the Supreme Court. Issue: - Is the act of petitionerreceipt of the sums of money for delivery to his assetconstitute an offense defined and penalized under 2nd paragraph of Art 210 of the Revised Penal Code? - Did the Sandiganbayan err in convicting the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of direct bribery? Held: Petitioner cannot feign innocence and profess good faith since all the indicia point to his guilt and malicious intent. Petitioner did not introduce his asset or mention his name to Yu So Pong or his daughter at the time of the illegal transaction. His claim that he previously gave 1000 pesos to his asset, which purportedly represented a partial payment of the reward money, was not corroborated by his asset. One of the arresting CIS officers testified that petitioner attempted to give back the money to Yu So Pong when they were about to arrest him, which showed that he was well aware of the illegality of his transaction because had he been engaged in a legitimate deal, he would have faced courageously the arresting officers and indignantly protested the violation of his person, which is the normal reaction of an innocent man. His solicitous and overly eager conduct in pursuing the robbery incident, even though he was no longer on duty, betrays an intention not altogether altruistic and denotes a corrupt desire on his part to obtain pecuniary benefits from an illegal transaction. The petitioner's persistence in obtaining the monetary reward for the asset although the latter was no longer complaining about the 1000 pesos that he supposedly received earlier. Thus, the Sandiganbayan did not err in giving full weight and credence to their version of the events. Petitioner's conviction must be affirmed. The act of receiving money was connected with his duty as a police officer. With regard to the fine, the amount of the fine is erroneous. Paragraph 1 of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to paragraph 2

thereof, provides that if the act does not constitute a crime, the fine shall not be less than 3 times the value of the amount received. Evidence shows that petitioner received an aggregate amount of 5800 pesos. He should, therefore, be ordered to pay a fine not less than 3 times its value, which is a fine of 18000 pesos.

MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS OR PROPERTY (Art. 217)

AGULLO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN Facts: Elvira Agullo was convicted for malversation of public funds. The information against her provided that she wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, convert and misappropriate for her own personal use and benefit the public funds she had in her possession in the amount of Twenty Six Thousand Four Hundred Four Pesos and 26/100 (P26,404.26), belonging to the government of the Republic of the Philippines, to the damage and prejudice of the latter Agullo pleaded not guilty. She admits the amount that was lost but she advances the defense of a fortuitous event. On the day that she was carrying the amount, she suffered from a stroke and was then brought to the hospital by a Metro Tacloban aide. Agullo maintains that the money could have lost or stolen. Aside from establishing that there was a cash shortage the prosecution did not present any other evidence that Agullo used the money for her personal benefit. Issue: WON Agullo can be convicted for malversation of public funds? NO Evidence presented against petitioner in this case do not fulfill the test of moral certainty and may not be deemed sufficient to support a conviction. Records reveal that evidence for the prosecution consisted solely of the Report of Cash Examination, dated 14 July 1986, which was presented by the prosecution to prove the cash shortage in the amount of P26,404.26, on petitioner Agullos accountability as Disbursing Officer of the then MPWH. Likewise, the prosecution presented the Letter of Demand[27] dated 14 July 1986 signed by Auditing Examiner III Ignacio Gerez. The prosecution opted not to present a single witness to buttress its bid for conviction and relied merely on the prima facie evidence of conversion or presumption of malversation under Article 217, paragraph (4) of the Revised Penal Code: ART. 217. Malversation of public funds or propertyPresumption of malversation X X X The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses. Court has consistently ruled that the presumption of conversion in Article 217, paragraph (4) of the Revised Penal Code is by its very nature rebuttable. The presumption under the law is not conclusive but disputable by

satisfactory evidence to the effect that the accused did not utilize the public funds or property for his personal use, gain or benefit. If the accused is able to present adequate evidence that can nullify any likelihood that he had put the funds or property to personal use, then that presumption would be at an end and the prima facie case is effectively negated. The absence of funds is not due to the personal use by the accused, the presumption is completely destroyed; in fact, the presumption is never deemed to have existed at all. The Sandiganbayan undoubtedly disregarded or overlooked certain evidence of substance which, to a large extent, bear considerable weight in the adjudication of petitioners guilt or the affirmation of her constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise. Upon thorough scrutiny of the evidence adduced by both prosecution and defense, we hold that petitioner Agullo has satisfactorily overcome and rebutted by competent proof, the prima facie evidence of conversion so as to exonerate her from the charge of malversation. To this end, petitioner presented evidence that satisfactorily prove that not a single centavo of the missing funds was used for her own personal benefit or gain. Tabuena vs Sandiganbayan Issue: Tabuena and Peralta appeal the Sandiganbayan decision dated October 12, 1990, as well as the resolution dated December 20, 1991 denying reconsideration, convicting them of malversation under Article 217 of the RPC. Facts: On January 10, 16 and 30 year 1986, TWENTY FIVE MILLION PESOS (25), TWENTY FIVE MILLION PESOS (25), and FIVE MILLION PESOS (5), were withdrawn (from PNB extension office) respectively by principal accused, Luis A. Tabuena, General Manager of the Manila International Airport (MIAA). This purportedly as partial payments to the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), for unpaid obligations. All the above withdrawals were done by way of cash placed in peerless boxes and duffle bags, laded on a PNB armored car and delivered on the same day to the office of Mrs. Gimenez (secretary of Pres. Marcos), to which she issued a receipt only on the last day of delivery January 30, 1986 (5 million). Why did Tabuena withdraw the said amount? What authority allowed him to withdraw the amount? It was an order by President Marcos: 1) over the phone 2) another by way of memorandum (see below) Gathered from the documentary and testimonial evidence are the following essential antecedents:

Then President Marcos instructed Tabuena over the phone to pay directly to the president's office and in cash what the MIAA owes the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), to which Tabuena replied, "Yes, sir, I will do it." About a week later, Tabuena received from Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez, then private secretary of Marcos, a Presidential Memorandum dated January 8, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as MARCOS Memorandum) reiterating in black and white such verbal instruction, to wit: "Office of the President of the Philippines Malacaang January 8, 1986 MEMO TO: The General Manager Manila International Airport Authority You are hereby directed to pay immediately the Philippine National Construction Corporation, through this Office, the sum of FIFTY FIVE MILLION (P55,000,000.00) PESOS in cash as partial payment of MIAA's account with said Company mentioned in a Memorandum of Minister Roberto Ongpin to this Office dated January 7, 1985 and duly approved by this Office on February 4, 1985. Your immediate compliance is appreciated. (Sgd.) FERDINAND MARCOS."[4] It must be noted that there were no payments made to PNCC by MIAA for the months of January to June 1986. Based on the following findings, which will be listed below, the Supreme Court acquitted Tabuena and co-accused Peralta, the dispositive portion says: Final decision of this case; held: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, herein petitioners Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo M. Peralta are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of malversation as defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Why did the court acquit the accused? (herein petitioners, Tabuena and Peralta). 1) On the reason of good faith, a valid defense in a prosecution for malversation for it would negate criminal intent on the part of the accused.

Tabuena had no other choice but to make the withdrawals, for that was what the MARCOS memorandum required him to do. He could not be faulted if he had to obey and strictly comply with the presidential directive, Marcos was undeniably Tabuena's superior. 2) Tabuena did not have to observe all auditing procedures of disbursement (all disbursement above 1000 should be made in check, payment of all claims against the govt. had to be supported with complete documentation) Tabuena did not have the luxury of time to observe all the procedures of disbursement considering that the MARCOS memorandum enjoined hi "immediate compliance", with the directive that he forward to the president's office the P55 Million in cash. 3) The Sandiganbayan made the finding that Tabuena had already converted and misappropriated the P55 million when he delivered the same to Mrs. Gimenez and not to the PNCC. It must be stressed that the MARCOS memorandum directed Tabuena "to pay immediately the PNCC, through this office, the sum of 55M pesos" Tabuena did exactly as the memorandum ordered, he was acting in good faith when he delivered the money to Mrs. Gimenez. 4) Even assuming that the sole purpose of the Marcos Memorandum was for the personal benefit of those in power, still, no criminal liability can be imputed to Tabuena Why? For the very simple reason that no conspiracy was established between Tabuena and the real embezzler/s of the P55 million. 5) Finally, the most compelling reason of all is the violation of the accused's constitutional right to due process. The court revealed its biased nature during its numerous questioning over the witnesses (Monera, Peralta, and Tabuena), alarmingly even exceeding the number of questions of the cross-examiner. In addition the questions of the court were in the nature of cross examinations characteristic of probing, confrontation and insuation. "A trial judge should not participate in the examination of witnesses as to create the impression that he is allied with the prosecution"

ILLEGAL USE OF PUBLIC FUNDS (Art. 220)

Abdulla vs. People April 6, 2005, 455 SCRA 79 Facts: Petitioner Norma Abdulla is the president of the Sulu State College. As the president

and head of the administration, she allegedly paid the terminal benefits of the other employees of said college instead of giving the allotted money authorized by the Department of Budget and Management to be distributed to the 34 secondary school teachers as payment for their salary differentials. Furthermore, it was alleged that this incident was motivated with intent to gain. Proper charges were then filed and petitioner was sentenced guilty of technical malversation by the Sandiganbayan. The ruling was based on Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, which criminalizes the illegal use of public funds. In her appeal, she argued that the public funds in question, having been established to form part of the saving, had therefore ceased to be appropriated by law or ordinance for any specific purpose. Issue: Is petitioner guilty of technical malversation? Ruling: No. The Supreme Court, in its decision, provided the essential elements of the crime of technical malversation, defined in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, as follows: 1) that the offender is a public officer; 2) that there is public fund or property under his administration; 3) that such public fund or property has been appropriated by law or ordinance; and 4) that he applies the same to a public use other than that for which such fund or property has been appropriated by law or ordinance. In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that the third element was not satisfied as the authorization of DBM of the use of the allotment for the payment of salary differentials of secondary school teachers is not an ordinance or law contemplated in Article 220 thereof. The use of the remaining amount for the payment of the terminal leave benefits cannot hold her guilty of the alleged technical malversation. It was also noted that petitioner did not commit an unlawful act when she paid the obligation of the Sulu State University to its employees, in the form of terminal leave benefits since the employees were also legally entitled to receive such benefits under the Civil Service laws.