Você está na página 1de 8

CARNEGIE

E N D O W M E N T F O R I N T E R N AT I O N A L P E A C E
POLICY
BRIEF
78
February 2009

Palestine and Israel: Time for Plan B


N at h a n J . B r o w n
Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
S u m mary
n The international effort to achieve a two-state solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict has come to a dead end, at least
for the present.
n Things can—and might well—get worse unless the United States and other outside actors couple a realistic view of the
present with a serious effort to push for a more promising future.
n The first step in a new diplomatic approach must be to establish a cease-fire that builds on the common interest of both
Israel and Hamas to avoid fighting in the short term.
n A new cease-fire should be clear and perhaps even written; mediators (whether Arab or European) must be willing to
make an agreement more attractive to both sides to sustain (Hamas can be enticed by some opening of the border with
Egypt; Israel will demand serious efforts against the supply of arms to Hamas).
n The second step must be an armistice that would offer each side what they crave for the present—Israel would get
quiet and a limit on arms to Hamas; Palestinians would get open borders, a freeze on settlements, and an opportunity
to rebuild their shattered institutions. Such an armistice must go beyond a one-year cease-fire to become something
sustainable for at least five to ten years.
n Finally, the calm provided by the armistice must be used to rebuild Palestinian institutions and force Palestinians and
Israelis to confront rather than avoid the choices before them.

The new Obama administration has already coax their societies toward the necessary com-
found that its ability to inspire optimism at promises; deep (and often quite justified)
home and abroad is colliding with bitter reali- mutual mistrust; political disarray on both
ties in the Middle East. Honeymoon feelings sides; deliberate actions to impose realities that
cannot overcome the growing realization that would make a two-state solution impossible;
the international effort to achieve a two-state and disillusionment stemming from the feck-
solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict has lessness of past U.S. efforts.
come to a dead end. The problem is not the Although the Obama administration has
solution itself—it still holds some attraction for inherited a nearly spent diplomatic process,
many of those involved—but the realities on some tools are still available. Israel and Hamas
the ground and the utter collapse of a diplo- refuse to acknowledge each other’s legitimacy
matic process that ignored those realities. The and reject negotiations over a settlement, but
obstacles are all too well known: leaders who they do negotiate (however indirectly) over
lack the ability or the willingness (or both) to short-term arrangements. Both have shown an
2 POLICY BRIEF

interest in some kind of a cease-fire—Israelis to Arab or European) must be willing to make it


prevent rocket fire on a widening swath of the more attractive to both sides to maintain (Hamas
country and Hamas as a way to resume the con- can be enticed by some opening of the border
struction of its party-state in Gaza. with Egypt; Israel will demand serious efforts to
Acknowledging and working with existing halt the supply of arms to Hamas).
realities must not, however, mean accepting them Such a cease-fire would be more difficult to
as permanent. The existing situation is not only conclude than the last one. Both sides have dug
short on security and justice; it is also unstable. themselves into strong public positions on what
Things can—and might well—get worse unless it must include. Israel wants a prisoner exchange;
the United States and other outside actors couple Hamas wants an open border. The increasing
a realistic view of the present with a serious effort difficulty of negotiating arrangements reflects an
Nathan Brown, a professor of to push for a more promising future. important general lesson: everywhere it turns,
political science and inter- But for the present, they should stop banging the United States must struggle merely to recover
national affairs at George their heads against the obstacles to an immediate things that it could have had earlier for a much
and comprehensive solution of the Israeli– lower cost and much less effort.
Washington University, is a
Palestinian conflict. Instead, it is time for Plan B.
distinguished scholar and
Step Two: Broaden the
author of four well-received
Step One: Properly Cease-fire to an Armistice
books on Arab politics. Negotiate a Cease-fire Even if diplomatic efforts could address some of
Brown brings his special The first step in a new diplomatic approach the shortcomings of the earlier cease-fire, lead-
expertise on Palestinian must be to establish a cease-fire that builds on ers of both sides would still view another clash
reform and Arab constitu- the common interest of both Israel and Hamas as inevitable. Both sides will continue to argue
tionalism to the Endowment, to avoid fighting in the short term. among themselves over whether they are paying
and his research interests If Israel and Hamas both desire a cease-fire, a high long-term cost for a short period of peace
why did the last one, which began last June, col- and quiet. Consequently, it is critical that any
also include Egyptian and
lapse so spectacularly in December? The June short-term cease-fire be accompanied by inten-
Palestinian politics, legal
cease-fire was indirectly negotiated and unwrit- sive efforts to turn this into a workable medium-
reform in the modern
ten; the two sides had different interpretations of term armistice. The Bush administration squan-
Middle East, as well as de- what were essential and what were incidental dered the quiet provided by the last cease-fire on
mocratization. Brown’s most and conditional elements. Hamas wished it to meaningless and futile diplomacy among weak
recent book, Resuming Arab hold for a defined period, include the West Bank, and lame-duck leaders on the Palestinian and
Palestine, presents research and lead to an open border with Egypt. Israel Israeli side.
on Palestinian society and rejected the first two conditions and gave unwrit- There is a precedent for such an arrange-
governance after the estab- ten (and only barely spoken) hints on the third. ment—the armistice agreements negotiated
In effect, the two sides vaguely codified rather between Israel and its Arab neighbors at the close
lishment of the Palestinian
than resolved critical issues. And both fretted of the 1948 war. An armistice between Israelis
Authority.
that the cease-fire offered short-term quiet in and Palestinians would recognize that the con-
Brown was previously a
return for a high long-term cost. Israel worried flict is not resolved but would build a series of
scholar in residence at the that Hamas would only grow stronger, while arrangements that both sides could live with for
Middle East Institute. He has Hamas worried that the blockade of Gaza would an interim period. Each side would get what it
recently been a member of become a permanent state of siege. craves now—Israel would win quiet and a limit
the international advisory The cease-fire that ended the fighting in on arms to Hamas; Palestinians would earn open
committee on drafting the January—actually the two unilateral cease-fires, borders, a settlement freeze, and an opportunity
Palestinian constitution and since Israel and Hamas declared separately that to rebuild their shattered institutions.
they would stop fighting—is even more skeletal Despite the existential nature of the conflict,
consultant to the UNDP’s
and undefined than the one it replaced. there is reason to believe that both sides might
program on governance in
A new cease-fire should aim to correct some actually embrace such a medium-term arrange-
the Arab world.
of these defects. First, it should be clear and per- ment. But here we come to an odd feature of the
haps even written. Second, mediators (whether idea of an armistice. One might expect it would
Palestine and Israel: Time for Plan B 3

be radical Hamas that would have to be con- between Israeli- and Palestinian-controlled areas
vinced to freeze a situation it abhors and Israel are hardly politically neutral, this armistice will
that would not mind entrenching a situation in be difficult to arrange. Hamas proposes the 1967
which it clearly has the upper hand. But the lines, which Israel rejects. Israel might offer the
positions are actually reversed. Hamas has called security zones sketched out in the Oslo Accords,
for a version of an armistice and Israel rejects it. but those zones were supposed to be both tem-
The reason is clear: Hamas insists an armistice porary and steadily expanding, even within the
be limited in time, and Israel fears that the life- context of those interim agreements; moreover,
span of the armistice might be exploited to Hamas rejects the accords.
change the situation for the worse. A workable But there are deeper problems than geogra-
armistice would have to assure Palestinians that phy for an armistice. Both Israel and Hamas will
it is not permanent and Israelis that their posi- have problems convincing the other of honest
tion will not deteriorate while it holds. intentions, though for different reasons.

Finding the bottom line Short-term credibility


Hamas has indicated its willingness to negotiate Over the short term, Israel’s credibility problems
a “hudna,” or armistice, for years. But its terms stem from its past insistence on retaining the
have been vague and unrealistic, fueling Israeli ability to act unilaterally in accordance with its
suspicions. Whenever Hamas has spelled out own interpretation of agreements. This pattern
what a hudna means, its demands have been has been consistent since the founding of the
high—most notably including full Israeli with- state—Israel has been hostile to outside monitor-
drawal to the boundaries prevailing before the ing, especially if it is accompanied by any muscle.
1967 war. Further, Hamas’s hudna is explicitly Its negotiators worked successfully to exclude any
temporary (though its proposed length varies meaningful dispute-resolution provisions from
with the speaker). In short, the idea sounds to the Oslo Accords, avoided the anemic ones that
Israeli ears less like a generous offer of a modus were included, blocked any robust third-party
vivendi and more of an ill-disguised and omi- monitoring since that time, and unilaterally
nous tactical pause. Hamas’s proposals require ended past cease-fires when it believed they were
concessions that Israel would not award Fatah violated (such as in 2003). Given its overwhelm-
and offer less in return—an armistice with a ing military edge and existential concerns, Israel’s
sunset clause instead of a full peace. unilateralism is understandable but it will lead its
Clearly, Hamas’s current hudna proposal does adversary to look for external guarantees.
not meet Israeli needs. But the bottom line of Hamas’s short-term credibility problem is actu-
Hamas’s negotiating position has never been ally less severe than Israel’s. Even those Israelis most
tested. In all likelihood, its leaders themselves do skeptical of Hamas admit that it has kept its com-
not know precisely what they would accept. In mitments more faithfully than Fatah ever did. The
fact, they would probably argue vociferously major question over the short term is whether
among themselves. A short-term cease-fire would Hamas would enforce any agreement on the shad-
allow international diplomatic muscle to put owy world of armed groups and factions in the
Hamas to the test and devise an armistice that Gaza strip. It was a similar problem that led most
would be more realistic. Israeli leaders to turn against Yasser Arafat. Hamas,
Such an armistice must go beyond a one-year by contrast, resisted any pledge to enforce its under-
cease-fire to become something sustainable for at standings on others for a considerable period, but
least five to ten years. To work for that period, it when it finally relented, it actually showed a will-
must credibly offer something to both sides that ingness to prevent cease-fire violations.
they desperately want—for Hamas, the ability to
operate freely in Palestinian areas, and for Israel, Long-term issues
the ability to live free from fear of attack. Since The problem for the long term is that the inten-
the only possible sets of demarcated borders tions of the two sides appear to be all too clear
4 POLICY BRIEF

and clash fundamentally. Here Hamas may be mistake—Israeli settlements and Hamas arms.
the more difficult party. The movement’s own Here international actors would have to go
words suggest that the purpose of a hudna beyond negotiating an agreement to participating
would not only be to get the Palestinian house in enforcement mechanisms (such as monitoring
in order in domestic terms but also to redress settlements, inspections of goods going into Gaza,
the imbalance of power with Israel. Thus, any and efforts against smuggling). Hamas would
armistice would have to address the issue of need assurance that the armistice would not be
arms to be attractive to Israel. used as an opportunity for some of those same
Similarly, Hamas would need to be convinced international actors to arm Fatah to the teeth.
that Israel was not using the armistice to impose In some areas the United States can be most
long-term changes. The chief long-term concern useful by offering encouragement from the side-
for Palestinians has traditionally been Israel’s lines. This is especially true with regard to medi-
burgeoning settler population. Surprisingly, set- ation. There are strong signs of willingness by
tlements sometimes seem less an issue for Hamas many actors in Europe and the Arab world to
than they were for Fatah, since Hamas views the play the role most U.S. leaders would prefer to
1967 lines as temporary. But Hamas leaders avoid. Until the last months of the Bush admin-
probably still need a genuine freeze on settle- istration, the United States either discouraged or
ments to convince Palestinians that they are not grudgingly stood aside as such offers were made.
selling out the national cause in order to retain The Obama administration could easily correct
political power. this mistake by strongly endorsing such efforts.
International diplomacy does have cards to
play in addressing these issues. It can, of course, Overcoming the taboo
sweeten the pot for both sides. But it must also be Of course, endorsing such mediation would run
tough on two critical issues that have the poten- against the long-standing taboo on negotiating
tial to make the armistice seem like a strategic with Hamas. In its opening days, the Obama

Moving toward an armistice

June 2008 cease-fire Proposed new cease-fire Proposed armistice


Status Unwritten Perhaps written Written

Negotiation Coordinated, unilateral Openly mediated Openly mediated;


perhaps directly negotiated
Duration 6 months (Hamas); 1–2 years; renewable 5–10 years; renewable
indefinite (Israel)
Prisoners No prisoner exchange Limited prisoner exchange Release of remaining Palestinian
prisoners if international monitors
agree Palestinian obligations have
been fulfilled
Geographical scope Gaza only Gaza only Gaza and West Bank

Borders and crossings Gradual lifting (Hamas); no Open for basic supplies Full movement but transfer
commitment (Israel) of weapons banned
Monitoring of crossings Unilateral by Egypt and Israel Involvement of Ramallah Internationally monitored
government and EU
Israeli settlements Building increased No formal restrictions Full freeze; internationally
monitored
Palestinian governance Two Palestinian governments, one Two Palestinian governments, one Reconciliation of the two
in Gaza and one in West Bank in Gaza and one in West Bank governments; elections within
three to five years
Palestine and Israel: Time for Plan B 5

administration has already reaffirmed the policy. out hurting each other for five to ten years, it
Like many taboos, this one obscures thinking must then turn its attention to longer-term
more than it clarifies it. It leads to confusion in efforts. The problem with a modus vivendi is
three ways. that whatever stability it might achieve in the
First, the original rationale for refusing to nego- medium term would be unsustainable in the
tiate with Hamas is that doing so would encour- long term. Although the arrangements would be
age terrorism. That argument has long been over- tolerable indefinitely for one side (Israel), they
taken by events. Negotiations with Hamas are would not be for the other. Hamas’s leaders—
countenanced primarily when it attacks civilian supported by virtually all Palestinians—would
targets—it was only Hamas rocket fire on Israeli not allow such a situation to become permanent.
towns that induced Israel to negotiate a cease-fire. Sooner or later, they would work to shatter the
Strangely, Hamas is treated as a full pariah now arrangements and resume the conflict.
only in those cases when it tries to practice regular For that reason, the Obama administration
diplomacy rather than blackmail against civilians. must also start paying attention now to some of
Second, the newer rationale for diplomatic the key long-term issues. It is pointless to attempt
isolation of Hamas is to avoid legitimating the to negotiate a two-state solution as if there were
movement. Here we are flattering ourselves. a viable Palestinian leadership, no Hamas, no
Hamas would likely show ambivalence toward Palestinian civil war, and no ongoing settlement
direct contact with Washington. Its leaders’ activity. But there is still every reason to keep an
desire for international dialogue is real but not eye on the long-term goal of such a long-term
desperate. An international opening would force settlement and act on its behalf by following two
Hamas to work hard to assure its followers that general guidelines:
it had not sold its soul for international recogni-
tion (as it charges Fatah did). In any case, 1. Rebuild the Palestinian Authority,
Hamas’s real source of strength is its domestic taking Palestinian institutions and
support, not its diplomacy. Palestinian democracy more seriously
Third and most significant, the argument No long-term solution is possible without a via-
against “engaging Hamas” completely misses the ble Palestinian leadership able to make authori-
point of what is necessary. The important ques- tative decisions for all Palestinians. An armistice
tion is not whether the United States enters into would provide an opportunity to rebuild the
formal discussions with Hamas, but what the Palestinian Authority. The problem is that past
United States says and does when other coun- efforts in this regard have focused on two issues
tries attempt to speak with Hamas. On this that are ultimately secondary—technical com-
point, the Bush administration itself quietly petence and strengthened security services.
shifted last year when it endorsed Egyptian These reforms will be ephemeral unless sup-
mediation between Fatah and Hamas. ported by the right political conditions.
An even more important question involves The real first step in reviving the Palestinian
the American attitude toward negotiations Authority will have to be Hamas–Fatah recon-
between Israel and Hamas. Or rather, that was a ciliation, difficult as this may be. In 2006, Hamas
more important question. It has already been was eager for a unity government. In 2007, the
answered. Those negotiations, while indirect, are movement was coaxed into one. In 2008, Hamas
well underway. It is too late to close that barn pulled out of talks that were leading in that
door. The question is whether to make a virtue direction. In 2009, its leaders allege that Fatah
out of the necessity of declaring it open. betrayed them in the fighting in Gaza. And their
contempt is no longer limited to Fatah as a party.
Step Three: Use the Respite Hamas no longer recognizes Mahmoud Abbas as
If the Obama administration—along with its Palestinian president and increasingly hints that
partners in Europe and the Middle East—finds it will build an alternative to the PLO, the last
a way to have Israelis and Palestinians live with- fig leaf of Palestinian unity.
6 POLICY BRIEF

To turn back the clock, the international com- this deepens the split without resolving it. To
munity—perhaps most importantly, the United expect such forces—even if they answer to
States and Egypt—must apply carrots and sticks, Abbas—to defeat Hamas is to ignore the lesson
showing both generosity and a heavy hand. of Lebanon of what professionalized military
Again, tough diplomats will discover that they and security forces can and cannot do in a deeply
have many cards to play. The Palestinian Author- divided polity. They cannot singlehandedly sus-
ity desperately depends on international support tain a government whose legitimacy is so widely
to pay salaries and stay solvent; Egypt and Israel questioned simply through a broader sweep of
control every single point of entry and exit for arrests or a brief showdown in the streets. Worse,
goods and people; and both Hamas and Fatah the effort to arm Abbas alone would certainly
still compete against each other to show Palestin- make Hamas strive desperately to obtain its own
ians that they can govern effectively—something weapons, undermining the armistice.
neither can do without international help. The goal must be to force Palestinian leaders
But reconciliation is a first step, not a final to present their people with real long-term polit-
one. The eventual goal should not be power shar- ical choices, not merely to have unity for unity’s
ing; that would only be a recipe for paralysis. sake. Indeed, this point can be made more gen-
erally as a guideline for diplomacy.
Given its overwhelming military edge and existential
2. Force all parties
concerns, Israel’s unilateralism is understandable,
to begin making choices
but it carries the cost that its agreement to a set of
Faced with options, both Israelis and Palestinians
interim arrangements is unattractive to an adversary have a habit of selecting “all of the above.”
unless there are some external guarantees. International diplomacy should be aimed at
forcing the parties to make choices rather than
Instead, power sharing should give way to the avoid them.
possibility of alternating in power. In other After deliberating for a decade over whether
words, Palestinian democracy must be revived. to emphasize politics or “resistance,” Hamas
Right now, neither Hamas nor Fatah wants an finally decided when it entered the 2006 elec-
election without an assurance of the result. tions that it could choose both. International
Fatah–Hamas reconciliation must be based on diplomacy has allowed them to continue on this
an eventual return to constitutional rule and rou- path. To be sure, there have been fairly clumsy
tinely free elections. It is difficult to imagine such international efforts to exclude Hamas as a polit-
a development without heavy international sup- ical actor in internal Palestinian affairs unless it
port and a pledge that there will be no attempt met certain conditions. But the means used were
(as there was in 2006) to overturn the result. either dubious and weak (such as manipulating
International actors will have to regard Palestinian the electoral law) or draconian (extreme fiscal
political institutions—municipal governments, pressure and arming opponents). The require-
the judiciary, independent bodies, the electoral ments that the Middle East Quartet asked
commission, and perhaps even important civil Hamas to meet were so drastic—and so far
society groups—as bodies to assist, support, and beyond what had been demanded of other par-
professionalize. Past efforts have too often been ties—that Hamas came under no pressure from
anemic and aimed at a particular partisan and its various constituencies to make a choice.
short-term political result (such as undermining Rather than ask Hamas to capitulate immedi-
Arafat or ousting Hamas). ately, a wiser path is to make it feel that it can
And there is no point in starting this interna- avoid compromise only at great cost. More sus-
tional effort by focusing primarily on the secu- tained and steady pressure—though more mod-
rity services. That effort—well underway at erate in means and ends—would be far more
present—is aimed not at reform but at ensuring likely to succeed. International diplomacy can
that Hamas cannot outgun its opponents. But shift toward intermediate benchmarks; it can
Palestine and Israel: Time for Plan B 7

emphasize Hamas’s actions rather than its ideol- incompletely, in its closing months. The most
ogy; and it can insist that Hamas not obstruct dramatic—if little noticed—evidence of this was
diplomacy rather than require the movement to the U.S. endorsement of Egyptian mediation
enthusiastically participate in it. The effort must efforts between Hamas and Fatah.
be to squeeze Hamas slowly into weighing its So the Obama administration can move toward
options rather than quixotically demanding the policy outlined here without making a U-turn.
immediate submission—and to expose the move- But such movement may be slow and difficult,
ment to popular repudiation if it fails to decide. and so may encounter three serious obstacles.
Israel as well has preferred an “all of the above”
approach. Its leaders pursue negotiations while
they expand settlements. They parry domestic
International diplomacy should be aimed at forcing
criticisms by hard-line statements and actions, the parties to face choices rather than avoid them.
while hinting at forthcoming compromises to
international interlocutors. They weaken the First, the United States, like all actors in this
same Palestinian leaders they call partners. The conflict, has a disastrous habit of accepting offers
United States has avoided confrontation with its only after they have been taken off the table.
close ally on such matters (especially settlements), Many of the ideas proposed here (e.g., Hamas–
calculating that there is little reason to force the Fatah reconciliation and elections) no longer
issue and risk undercutting an Israeli government hold the same attraction for the parties that they
that might be forthcoming in other areas. did earlier.
The failure to decide makes sense on a day-to- Second, the policies proposed not only collide
day basis. Most leaders prefer to defer divisive with political sensitivities but also with legal
actions. Over the short term, Israeli leaders (like restrictions. The Obama administration is lim-
their Palestinian counterparts) have been adept ited in its ability to deal with any parts of the Pal-
at simultaneously pursuing war, peace, negotia- estinian Authority that answer to officials from
tions, and violence. They create facts while Hamas. A 2006 law bars using funds for diplo-
insisting that everything is negotiable. matic contact with the organization and ends all
Over the long term, however, the choice of assistance to any ministry controlled by Hamas.
“all of the above” undermines some options and Third, and perhaps most significant, for all
closes others off altogether. Once again, sus- the problems in their strategic visions, the lead-
tained moderate pressure may be the key: com- ers of the two sides can sometimes be tactically
municating unequivocally to Israelis that they adept. For most on the Israeli right, and for most
will incur a price by undercutting international of Hamas’s leadership as well as its rank and file,
efforts and to Palestinians that “resistance” is an the policies advocated here will be regarded—
alternative to other forms of politics. with some justification—as a set of traps designed
to force them to change their preferences and
Conclusion: Is This a goals. Neither Palestinian nor Israeli leaders are
Realistic Proposal? likely to stand still while they are maneuvered
The path described here purports to be based on into positions they seek to avoid. The Carnegie Endowment
reality, but is it realistic? Can the United States But the argument for this policy reorientation normally does not take
reverse course in such a dramatic way—focusing is not that it is certain to deliver peace. It is only institutional positions on public
initially on bare-bones short-term arrangements that it is likely to allow Israelis and Palestinians policy issues; the views presented
and looking then to a medium-term armistice to live together for a time, during which—with here do not necessarily reflect
rather than hewing to an approach centered on a significant international effort—the conflict can the views of the Endowment, its
two-state solution in the near term? Can be led to evolve into more tractable forms. n officers, staff, or trustees.
Washington endorse Palestinian reconciliation
and try to bend Hamas rather than break it? © 2009 Carnegie Endowment
In fact this is precisely where the Bush admin- for International Peace. All
istration was moving, however fitfully and rights reserved.
www.CarnegieEndowment.org

The Carnegie Endowment


RESOURCES
for International Peace is a
Visit www.CarnegieEndowment.org/pubs for these and other publications.
private, nonprofit organiza-
tion dedicated to advancing
Can Cairo Reassemble Palestine? Nathan J. Brown, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, Web Commentary, November 4, 2008, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/cairo_
cooperation between
palestine.pdf.
nations and promoting active
President Obama and Middle East Expectations, Amr Hamzawy, Marina Ottaway,
international engagement by
Gamal al-Ghitany, Salah ad-Din al-Jourchi, Khaled al-Hroub, Mustapha al-Khalfi, Carnegie
the United States. Founded Endowment for International Peace, Policy Brief no. 74, January 2009, http://www.
in 1910, Carnegie is nonparti- carnegieendowment.org/files/obama_middle_east.pdf.
san and dedicated to achiev-
Gaza After the War: Egypt’s Equities and Limitations, Michele Dunne, Testimony Before
ing practical results. Building the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, February 12, 2009, http://www.carnegieendowment.
on the successful establish- org/files/0212_dunne_egypt.pdf.
ment of the Carnegie
Pointers for the Obama Administration in the Middle East: Avoiding Myths and
Moscow Center, the Endow- Vain Hopes, Nathan J. Brown, Web Commentary, January 23, 2009, http://www.
ment has added operations carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22662&prog=zgp&proj=zme.
in Beijing, Beirut, and Brus- Sunset for the Two-State Solution? Nathan J. Brown, Carnegie Endowment for Interna-
sels to its existing offices in tional Peace, Policy Brief no. 58, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/pb58_brown_sun-
Washington and Moscow. set_final.pdf.

1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW


Washington, DC 20036

Cert no. SW-COC-002251

POLICY
BRIEF
78

Você também pode gostar