Anti-bandit war, By Col. J. C. Urray, was made to do whal il was capable of doing-no more was needed to gain victory. Opposing each other in the conflict were two vastly diUe,'rn lorce. The gll l' n d / as. Never stronger than 20,000, opemit'd solely as light mfantry wllh little su.pport from
Anti-bandit war, By Col. J. C. Urray, was made to do whal il was capable of doing-no more was needed to gain victory. Opposing each other in the conflict were two vastly diUe,'rn lorce. The gll l' n d / as. Never stronger than 20,000, opemit'd solely as light mfantry wllh little su.pport from
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Anti-bandit war, By Col. J. C. Urray, was made to do whal il was capable of doing-no more was needed to gain victory. Opposing each other in the conflict were two vastly diUe,'rn lorce. The gll l' n d / as. Never stronger than 20,000, opemit'd solely as light mfantry wllh little su.pport from
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PAm' nI the Anti-Bandit War . " By Col 1. C. "Iurray
Under Papagos the Anny was made to do whal il was capable of doing-no more was needed to gain victory Synop.iI: The camjJaign with th r. murder 0/ isolated o{ficia/s and the bf.'ali/lg or fheateniug of righi-wing ciliu1ZS 01 prominence, Next came allacks on small uillages (.Inti on larg('r Gendarmerie detachments, Then, ill lY'17, till: l}aTldils began. to try to hold certain areas to -proted supply rou.tes and they played their tnwlp card- the 01 the " Provi. shma l Democmtic Government," Opposing each other in the conflict were two vastly diUe,'rn L lorce. f, Tlte G)'uk Government tronp.f, nu.m- bni,lg 265,000 by the end of [hI' tl'llT, received m.ateria l aid and mililn.ry advice fmm the United States and Britain, and in the final campaigns wrre able fo make use of supporting, arms. The gll l' nd/as. on the other hand, never stronger than 20,000, opemit'd solely as light mfantry wllh little su.pport }rom artillery and morla.rs. Bul thl: CQlllf'Sl tl i rH 1101 as one-sid"l as It appears. It took time lor' the Creek GOVl:nmHml to orKaniu its onl1Y into a cohesive fighting fora. Thl! gUl!rrillas, li{!. hlly and u11II1Ipeded by ser.Jiu fll/its (Jr territorial responsibility, had good mobility in a tacti sense and a high degree 01 (luibilit)" Every man UltM a fighter and bands had nO solt rCtll". As long as the tailored 'hl!ir tn.ctic.{ /.0 the forces and arms at their disposal, 'hey hrfd the l()hip hand. But when to hold ground find pn)/ec/ their supply rOfl.tes they were ;dQ9rred 10 failure . Field Marshal ,4.l.exaMer Papago., Commandu.i n-chieJ Greek Army Part III COMBAT EFFICIENCY THE .[ t:I(M "co)'1 EJ-' . ' lCtf.:,\C"r" (IS used hl:,re embraces suth facwl"s as lraining, ronlma.nd and staff func tioning, d isci pli.ne and morale, Any judglllel1l. un the training of the "Democratic Army" depends up- on the frame of rderence. By onho- dox standards it W; IS deficient in al- most every respect. Obviously, how ever. such standards are n(lt appro- pri<llt:. Gllcrrilla warfare ha\ been liule rali nnaii1.ed by the armies of duly governments, For example, until recently the U. S. Army Field Service Regulations de- voted only eight: paragraphs to the subject. HislOriGllly. guerrilla war- [are has been a practical an largely rebuilt from the ground up whereve.r the need for it arose. In recent years it has oct!n emhraced hy inl ernation- al Communism ;1$ a tactic of revolu- tion, and the employment of partisan "ar lale by lhe 101'0:.) III inlt:rllrltiona l ( ,1J1lI1l1U ni 'i lll will ill li llie 1",llT !Hore dkcli vc ;ulI i-g IH' ni ll:t tl ot II ill l", \11 (;r('('ct' ,In' " lh'llloll' ;l l ic did 111)1 h;IH' tt) ,lart fro", the hegin- nin}.! ill lilt' develllr"llt'llt oj t<te- Lil '. [I 11,1' ahh: lO dl";nl' "POll a va, 1 (" pnHlicl1 eXI)(: ric nce. 0 1 il , hael '><:rved \\'jt ll FI..\\ the ol("llpatiulI, hill a ,ta1Hlald III p ,' Iri':llI w;II' brc hdd "('(>n I.kveiopecl ullcler 'rito III TIl(> lIew .\rIl \\" h;1I1 cxpt:n p;II' li ,a n TIl(' 0 1 (;)'('('Cc l){,lIC' tited Inll)! tlwil ('xperic'IICc. 1':"idt' lHe w:. " l. 11 the l ' lIi(cd :-":aliu\B ClIlIIlIlis!>ion Con- FrrlllliL'1 1111 lhal " iel. I'd Itl t' fl Inlm I.l1l ' )'rlugec', who fled , 1(10" tlie hOHlt'l" lol1owin).{ the alloni\' l' 1C" 'ollll ion in Crct'ct:, II'eu' lrailH"d in 1411('lrill;, w;lllan; in Yug l )' :-. b , i;( :1LIt! Alhani;!. 11\ YUWhla\'ia, SI:I\ " p(';,\';'ing (;rec\.;.s '\t'rt :tllllChcd tlil"('( Ily {(1 till' _\rm)' for Iraill illg. Tht' Cmnllli"jvll eXcllll ill t d copit, 01 1I1;llIlIal, ill 11 1(' ( ... lcr":: lan- 1I."l'd l or tl ll'ol l ' l ital :lI\ d jll:U ' lil"al ill )..;ucnilla warb rc ill hOlh YUJ!.()!>I;"'ia :llld ,-\Ihalli ;1. Final- l y. il \fa,> )eponed lh:ll /ll ior I() (he IOI"lIl :tl ioll 01 thl' "COH'1 !1l11cnl o f fl"tT (,rt'etC" (;(' lu'I",1I :"liltli, :1 Yugo- sial" ill gUt'lrilla w.Jrlillf' , di n'etcd o perations rrom Skol'ljl'. Commanders Gut'lTilb (hCIl, wt'rt: no t witholtt theol <.' li(;11 lrnining in rill .. \I' a .-rint: , lJIIl IhcI C \,'cn: [c\\' lhl'm thclll. They were pr;IClital ,oldicl ,declt'd tor their lO dum:, FOIilurc Wi h ;'H. ceptt' d :" c\-idcllC col illfoll\pe' \('1111' and tht: I(';tlkr \I'ho lailed W:\.') ICI'I"ICcI , The telllpo O( operatio n, \I a.. ) 111 It t ilal all iIlIOl1'1>t:It:nt le'lder "';" ,onn II LIl t' \t;IIItr, \I'cre llualilied h) .ll ll.1 expt'riellcc ill gucrrilla IIarblft, t he) wen' It'>, lor ortho- dox \l"ar t. tre. "I"b .. t:HI III (jl)1l ;1 \I' hith Ikl'l'lIdctl UpOIl the !"orlllati oll 01 l:ngl'l lIllit '\ ilnd tIP()U th .. at\()llljnll (II tOll\"('lllillllal ulili (;tuil'. ll'IHlctl to deprivc lhe " PCIlIOCFllic Army" o f Icaderl1,hip ;ulr'l";1I(" to its Fighteri The of the rlghtel varied IWI\II'("11 ,,' il le limi ts. Somt ..... ere as IITII '1llil lilit..:d :l:. )'C"g:Ijtl, lrainill).!; LIS the thal is, experiell c(' in l:.L:\S. tl"aining in the $:neJli tes and CXI)Cl leIH e ill the field. Ot hen fe ll Llr ,hon of Ihi .. , p:lItin!larly lOlI'art! sister Irr,incil ;11 Alb"lIiu IQ fi ;r/ll /lim in Gree.C'f' the end o ( the war. Tn'lilling- in ,he s;\telliles was continued for lie'" reo Cl"uib, blu the journey t.here long alld oftC' lltilll l:S impracticable, Thus training was given locall y in loo$el y organized training ct"nters. and some )'I ' ITUlb n:ccived their onl y training in the h:tnds themsetv("s, l ' his train- \1';\5 minimal. ranging downward Irom 1\1'0 monlhs to almost nothing. For example, rC{Tui! s utkclt al K;tn.lh ils:J were giV(' n oli l y 15 d<i)':-' tra ining prim to lheir partkip<ilion in lilt' au;)r\.;. o n KarpelL,ioll. Since 1I111 ('h ur the lilll!' was devoted to po litica l illdol'trinalion, miliulry train ing' could ha\'C indtldcd lillie mOIl- thal\ lht.' dCIlICl"lh of fieldcra(t and hasic \I'('apons il1slruClion, Perhaps lhe lIelil and most cxtensi.ve traini ng CIIllC rmm associalion \\'ith vetera ns on the joh. The guerrilht who sur \ ' ivecl I>c<.:ame bauie .... ise, Policy problems of the guerrillas and their influence on morale 11" lile impression has been {Tea led lilal the policy and of the Commu nists ""as flrm and sleadfast ill all times. il has been ttnimenti o nal. Whik a clcta il ed analysis 01 guerri lla and guerrilla mor a le praniGlblc, some imlic.alioll u r the ("()Llfusion whi ch beset the guerrillas efforts C.a. n lie given, Per- haps an outli ne o( Ihc Mac.:edonian probkm is the best stanin){ poinl. ;\S this was chronic. The Macedonian issue For ('enlUri cs the ,Irea d elloled h,' Ihe n(t{llC rdacedonia has been ton'l by racial strife. The ruled tht.: an.::! for hUTldrctb o f Toward lhe end of thc 19th c:emury Serb. "!ld Creek foughl for control or tllc awakenillg pOlitic .. 1 of lilt" gillUpS ill ' hahiting the area. After lh e Balkan hrollghl the f'lId of Turkish rule, nlll in'ahle minority tit the various group" continued ttl exi!>l. When, Wodd War 11, the ott 1I1);lIion o( \'ugo,lavia brought RlIlj.{:lri:ln troops into Maccuonia they werc not ll!lwel ('01111;'11. The Blligarians. hO\\'(' ver , hC14an to alienate the newly acquircd ;Ireas hy a poli('y of denationali za- tion. TiLO, lea(h: r o{ the Communist pani$;u\ movcment in Yugoslavia, saw an opponunily for Comillunism to make capital fr om this rcaclioll
to Bulgar policy. Tilo's "iew thal the exploilalion of the Macl'donian problem be undertaken by his p:lny did Hal find illllllc.:diate I:l\"or with the Comintern. That hod), fell thaI this al"<:a h'IIJ been pilrliall y OI.t'lll'it'd hy Uulg.,rian lIOOPS, it morc properly ue worked b)' Bulgarian Communists. HO\\'e"(T, ;u the Yug'os lav party ;u hi en:d ,lI'iking ebe where, the Com intern reviseu its de dsion and entnhted dt:vdoptnents the .lre:1 to the Yugosl .. l\ Comlllu, nlsts . Svew/;tr Vuknlanovi cTempo was dirl"cted hy Tilo to t:lke ch;lrge. His progr:tln was The Commu- nist Pany would idt:nlif), ilself with Mace- donia would occome one of the a u tonomous rqlUbli c.:s of a new federal Yugosla\' ii' , or, \\'as sumetimes vaguely hillled. :., full independent st<lte. It woultJ incl ude lcnitory of Creecl'. Hulg;u'ia, as well as Yugo- slavia. approvetJ . Tiw's power was growing and some of (he peoples of lhe ilrea accepled the idea with In th e :<pring or 19-13 agrecment on joint actioll between Yugosb,' Clnd Crcek in ("tTtain areas wa) worked (Jut, uUt tJifficuilit:s de- veloped rcguding the Slav minority along the bonier. Their 10)'rlll)' unnrt;tin. When the Bulgars over ran the nrea in rear of (he Germa n Army. these Slavs h"d discovered thelllsel vc .. 10 hc good "Mulgars. This brought them mnny adva ntagc;.;;. In ('on 1 1"": to their Grc.:d ncighbon, tht\' hC{ :IIHe nllt slIhjt("( people but liberated hrmhcr<j. BUl in the spring of the wind was changing. The Allies wert their gr ip on thec:l.\{ern allti 1.-iLI.':,> parti san Illo\'cmem had :l program (or a unit ed .\Lltclluni" ulldcr SO"iet auspicc... P<:rh" ps this li eld it more promising flilme. The C,eek Communist toward the issue Creek. Communist le.ulers pated this transformation with mixed feeliu),;:s. The Inore n,uinnally- miLlded C;n'c1h cOlLld 110l 100xive the Sl:t v n,inoritips fOl thei l' ('arl), t.\oP(Il I:>: .} or the BlIlgOlrs, ;tud \'il;wed thei l' (olJ" crsiol1 to the ,,' illl '"Va!) a COllllllunist .. I;l\ Imperia lism any bctter for G"eect' than Rulg;tr FaS<' ism? :\"ever. lheles!), the urgt'cl the lor mmion of Slit V detachment.. \,ith thdr own t'ommallil ch under the genelal t!irenion 01 [LAS. 1I ELAS did llOl slu'ceed, Ihe Slav dewch llIell ts could 1Jl' withdra ..... n to Yugo slavia to pn.' p:.t IT tor Ihe {hrust thi4t wou ld de tach Greek Mac.cdonia fl otH C;reece and bring il L1ndt'r control. Thai the CreC'K woult! ever agree (0 such cr ippling loss or Ll' ITi tory, or be suffiliently loyal to the revoluLionary move ment to bear the ouium or at!vIIGIl' ing 'illch an unpopular '!love \fa, doubtful. The satellites unite on the Macedonian issue In Lime TilO hecame the undis pUled ruft-r or fe, ull i ted Yugosl a ,i;1. lnver Hodja ill .A.lbanitl became his protege. llimiU'ov took control ill Uulgtl l iit . I laving the mutual hond or Communism, Yup,mb\"ia and Bul- gal ia buried old :t lld rCilche(1 a ("Olllmon poli..: y on .\-f ace t!onia . Bulgaria would ,upporl a Cret\u'" .\laredoni ::1 al< a 'P .. n or Yugoslavia . Vugoslavia \\"11 111 11 sup- port .. s daim to Thr,u-e. ill exch.mge for L!II: lillle}"", 10'" of Bul gari:tn Macedonia. Guerrilla leadership is adjusted to " internat ional" view :\It:anwhik the COlllllIUui!)t Part y in Gret(c did not lare wcll. Ha \'ill/.; led its lollowers int o the .. honivt: rcvolution 01 n ecell10cr 194<1 , it had no alter ll ;,ti ve hut to .. ppl y 10 Com- in the s;uell ite neighbors l or support. Asylum, sll pplies aud train ing \\"(' IT provided the ,cruget:s Il om (;n'l"IT. Dinni on o f the Communi::!1 Pan), ill Grccc.:e rema ined in Creek however, nlllil May 1947. At tha ltilllC ,ontrol sudden ly laken over b)' satellite personnel. These occurred ("OIl(Uf' rend y \\lit h lhe advent of U. S. inlet e.)t in Greece: They suggest recog- niti on hv lh e Cominform that the Grc.d P<tny was 110t all ,uleqll;nc inst rume nt anu thaI suc- ress in lhe gllerri ll n wa r demall(led dirt'ction be passl'd to otl ,," 1" hands. By vilille of their geograph ical position. lhi " task naturall y fell 10 Yugoslm'i:J , Bulgaria anti Alba nia . The ll Mllmpl ion of power in the Greek CUllll11unist Party by satellite LCtUI.(>T oJ a gup.rrilltf blind per')()I111el constituted a ')l' ldc- ltlent hel \feen lI iltl Onali sm ill1<1 in- Lernalioll:rli slll in the Creek Com munist hi t r;,rdIY. Grce ks who:-.c na llOl,a li.) II' a gt'lluine inLer II ;Hwn ... 1 approach to the pl-obl em ,li !llinaICci ffom of illllut;l1f"e. rhus IKITty i<'acll"rship t(Ju !t! with equal facili t y for t he uJI1Lrol of or fur the d(,' !;J(hllll' llt 01 from Gret:ce. Since Ceneral Markos, who b<.'camt: co mmander of the " De mocrati c Anny" in n t'Ccmber 19 11i, un- affeeted by thC'$C t hanges. it can be assumed that he was in h"nnollY with developments. Influence of peace offensives of USSR The policy problems of tht: guer- rilla were not exdusi\'ely local in charancl'. Greece a microcosm in ",hirh were clupllcared to some eXlCIll the de"c1opments in the macrocosm ot East-West relations. Thus, on occasion, the guerrilla lille was brought into h<lnnony \"iLh Soviet errons to :lppe:.r reasonable, On 10 September General Markos put forwiud Lenns on .....,hich he W:lS " prepan-d to t:OIne to an Ag:-tin in June 1948, Rulg<Jria indicated a LO resume negotiations with Greece. Albania slated that relations with Tito was read Out of the Cominform 'IS a dt'yiatjolli5L The development, however, appe.:lred to have no im mediate CUt:Cl upon the' guerrilla war. Tiro, though stallding his ground firmly, was <luelllpling a reconciliation with the Cominform. He had nothing to gain by alienating it further by precipitate :lclion in the Gl'eek maUcr. he may even have entertained lhe idea of ctlminuing to suppOrt the guerrilla war on his own inili,Hive in the in tert'st of Yugoslav Communism. /\ s for the leaders i.n Greece, they awaitcd dc,elopments. WOFd went out to the bands that there was to be p....u-. -I"" rroop ...... kepi In ."" darlc Greece could be improved. The propaganda line shifted from biuer attacks against the Army LO a plaint that persecutions inspired in Greece hy the U. S. must hait. Zachariades, leading Greek Communist and rigid adherent of the ?\,(oscow Ii ne, reo appeared at the headquaners of the "Govcmment of Fret: Greece" and Ihe Markos Junta Jaunched a peace offensive, broadcasting ' offers to ne- gOliate peace terms, This was in June, however, and the return of Zachariades and Yugoslayia's omis sion from the peace offensive were indications of what was in the wind. Tito-Cominform rift, guerrilla leadership re-adjusted In July an event took place which must have seemed little short of catastrophic to the guerrilla leaders. no discussion wncerning Tito or his relations with the Cominform or with bandilry, Til o's effons at re(:ol1(:i1iation met no success. There was no advantage to him in continuing to support the bandit war in the interests of the Cominform, alld it was hccoming evident to him that he could nOt do il in his own interests. Not only were his resources required at home now that he ('ou ld no longer get sup- plies from the USSR, but he could use assistance from the West in any prolonged struggle with the Comin- form. Such help would not be forth- coming so long as he aided guer- rillas. Yugosla\' :lid to the guerrillas waned. By January 1949 supplies from Yugoslavia had fallen off to a mere trick Ie. A few weeks laler, on 4 February, General Markos and others of the guerrilla leadership " resigned." It is not clear whether Markos resigned voluntarily because of Yugoslavia'S growing detachment or whether he was fQl'ccd out. One version is (hat a decision was laken at a General Assembly in the VitSl area to form an Independent :\Jatedonia La include all or a por- lion of Yugoslav Macedonia. Thus an autonomous Macedonia, which I\ad been Tito's inspiration, was to be turned against him. Markos and others opposed this development anll advocated that the "Democratic Army" reorganize into small groups to ca rry on a war for which guer ritlas were suited. As a result they were removed from power and placed under detention, Inasmuch as many of the guenillas were fol- lowers of Markos, the report was circulated that his removal resulted from illness. I n this fashion did guerrillil movement adjust itself to the Cominform ri(t, control passing to ' Cominformoriented leaders as op- posed to those oriented toward Yugoslavia . Yugoslav assistance grew less until July, when Tito announced the closing of the frontier. Mean- while, the Cominform attempted to djrect the guerrilla war through Al- bania and Bulgaria with increased panicipati on of other satellites, but the key positi on which had been Yugoslavia'S could not be filled. Moreover, if Tito's influence in the "Democrati c Government" had been purged, the Cominform was unable to penetrate Yugoslav Macedonia. The Slave-Macedon ian Army ex- pecled to spring into life as a result of the Cominform indorsement of an Independent Macedonia did not malerialize. Greek reaction, toO, W<l$ unlavorable. The leadership might be internationalist in its views. but there was wide di scontent with this idea among the rank and file. Guerrilla morale That changes in policy and leader- ship of this magnitude c.-Quld have failed to affect the moral e of the "Democratic Army" seems most un- likely, There are in the sum of its efforts indications that it was moti. va ted by a kind of desperation rath- er than a conviction of urgent, im mediate, historical purposefulness. And yet it kept going. The answer lies in the strict discipline of the Communi!'>t leaders and the fan thal the "fighlers" were kept in ignorance of developments. For example. the removal of :\Iar- los, whic:h signalized the elimi.na- lion of Yugoslav influence in (he guerrilla movement, arouseu only an undercurr-elll of dissatisfaction with- out troublesome activity on the pan of adherents. The great mass of the guerrillas was carried along by the leaders and by a deluge of propaganda concealing adverse developments or rationalizing them in the light of the party line. There were two orders of morale among the guerrillas. The first was the morale of Ihe hard-core Conllnu- nist. Initi;llly, a high proportion of the guerrilla.s were o( this cast. but with the increase of forced recruit- ing there arose a morale problem. The morale of the (orced recruit, while not necessarily low, was of a different onler. It df:pended upon lhe amount of his po'litical indonri- nation_ \Vhen the new reo cruit was stnl across the borders for indoctrination. -When this couldl not be done, his indoCtrination was carried out in Greec. e. This training being incomplete, continuous propa- ganda had to be carried on within the bands in order to leep up morale. :\lore time was spent in this type of activit), than in military training. A good percentage of forced recruits favorably to indoctrination, but few became zealots. Beginning early in 1949 the op- portunities for the of recruits decreased sharply because of the increasing aggressiveness of the Army whic:h lept guerrilla units on the move. The new, limited mining was scarcely adequate to convert a forced recruit into a hardened guer- rilla who could endure the rigors o( guerrilla life without complaim. As 1949 ,,'ore on the leaders had more and more diffic:ully in maintaining morale. By July, probably the ma- jority of the 18,500 guerrillas would have surrendered if given a chance; and by the time of the Vitsi and Grammos baules, guerrilla morale was at the lowest ebb since the start of the war. The Greek Nationa' Army Those who are inclined to regard the Gte..ek. Army tolerance for its early showing in the allli-guerTilla war would do \\'ell to turn b;lrk the pages to (he year 1940. The results anained in six months of combat with the Italian Army afford a stril ing manifestation of combat efficien- cy. FacLOrs wbich went into it were: A well (I"ailll'd regular Army as a nucleus for expallSioll. Trained reserves. Competent commanders and staff officers. High national morale, universal and lrllSlinting public support and outstanding lombat esprit. These fauors were di ss ipated in the period between the Greco-Italian war and the war with the guerrillas. Unlike the Navy. which withdrew from Greece during the occupation and acquired valuable experience in the ;\Ieditcrranean. the Army was unable lO withdraw and was forced to surrenc.ier in Greece. (ollowing which it WitS dissolved. A Greek Army of the Middle East was formed in Egypt but few Army personnel were able to join it. The force was so sma ll that few officers received training or experience of value. Moreover. the force was not well- disciplined and it saw combat onl y at EI -Abmein and Rimini . Conse- quently. (rom April [941 to the sum- mer of 1915, the Greek Army (for all pranical purposes) was nonexis lent and eluring this lime much of its know-how was dissipated. An Army dissolved for four years is not rebuilt in a day, and efforts started in 1945 did not progress rapidly. Early efforts were devoted primarily to administrative mallers - the aClivation of units, procure menL nnd issue of uniforms, weapons and equipment, the recovery and restoration of facilities and the re- establishment of services. Training proceeded slowly and the guerrilla activity of the faU o( 1946 found an Army unprepared for active opera- tions. In an effort to speed up train li ng and to provide small units spe- cially trained ,in anti -guerrilla war- fare, the British Military Mission pushed the formation of Commando units, but even this prog-raITl moved slowly. In April 1947 the Army started its first large-scale offensive, and from that time onward its units were so engaged that training was thought to be impracticable. Moreover, there was on the part of officers. who had A, forc.ed recruifing guerrilla morale went down long becn deprived at command re- sponsibility or who had it thrust upon thelll without adequat e prep- aration, a Jack of .--rpprccialioll of tbe importance o( Iraiuing, panin, . larly in (Ire units. There \\;\:) a lend- ency to h:c:] that training within a unit which had already seen active combat enlailed a los", of bee for the ullit and il s personnel . This in- difference to unit training Wn$ not discouraged by the policies ot the Briti sh Militarv MissioJl. His Government . which gave suppOrt to the legal govern- ment ot Grecce in Deccmher 19H, was critici7.ccI sharply for its "inter- vention"' in Greek affairs. There after it becamc semitive to further involvement. It would suppl y the Arroy, advise it on lcdmiGtl and or ganizational mat[crs in the ,H Iraining- ccnters. but il would nOl risk operational advice or the auachment of advi.'\ors to field Consequently, liule unit or field training was condllcted until th e fall oJ 19'J8 when it was initiated Ilmler the aegi s of the U, S. Mission. The Britjsh :\filitary .. iolL did assist at training centers and schools where basic individual ano technical training was gi ven. the Army had' been formed so rapid- ly that few of its personnel. had bene- fited Crom sue h tf.lining. The ract thal the hrst c"llups were old reo ::.ervisu who h,tl i had basi(; tfaining prior to the war mitigaled this cir- CIlIll,'aIllC. \V,.i k thi) W;lS an advan- tage initially, it $uhstcluently bccame a disadnlllage. These "old" resel Vi S1S weI'(' lound to be indfcni\"e in field s(,f\'icc. In the spting of El-!8 wa'l; no plall hy which lh(!se older Olen w uld he repl:lccd by youuger In fact, the prevailinl{ ("cil ing Je(t Itll spate tor tht' tfaining of replacemellts. To meet this siUl:Jtion a temponlr), of 15.000 was approved. In order 1.0 get the great (.; t <I. 1ll0U Ilt uf nCh' hlood during Ihe period of the increase. Ihe lengt h oC recruit tr:lining \': IS rc- duced (mm 17 to eighl, and final1) six weeks. This was emirel), in<"lde (Iuate, considering that liule training could be expttu."(1 once these men reported lO thei r units. By the eno o October, nearl y 50,000 o( these halftrained repl acemen ts had been distributed to the combat units. It may be said, then, that lhe level o( training in the Army lIever ex ceeded individual training; and that as the older reserves were replaced. the Icvel of individual training was becoming less sa tisfactory. In view of this, interest developed in the previollSly neglected field of unit traini ng. T o stop the w<l.r to im- prove training was nOt to be con sidered, but some things could be done (0 alleviate the situation with out inted ering unduly with [he cou rse of planned operations. In .July 1948 a training section was es tablishcd in the U. S. Military Mis slon to encourage unit training. The illili ,1I plUg!";"" W,IS not far reaching. nor it particu larly ("c fective. li S grcatcst value. 1clY in its recognition of the problem. Eight dl:mollStT;:!.tion I'lttlOOlh were formed. These were lr:lillcd in thc presenta lion of seel ion and platoon comba t problems. A platoon was then as signed 1O each of the Anily di\' isions. There it presrnled its demonstra tions to units o ( the division as op- erations permitted. the pre:s(' nt;)lion of \eries of tactical exercisc), Ihe and platoons of the unit umlt'r training repealed them. Frt'llut:ntl), lhe time allowed \\'"s insuffidt' llt, but most of the units had completed the exercises in one form or ;lIlother prior to the opening of the final campaign. At the end o( the revitalization program. recruit training was ex tr uded to 17 weeks. Thus the need for small unit trainiJlg in field units wa .. no urgellt, in the summer of 19'19 the hitherto ne glected field of comp'lIlY and baltal ion exerr ise.'i W<"IS opened up. Such unit's as could be sp.-.red ..... ere made available for this training- which was conducted wilh the assistance of U. S. field teams. At.:romplishmen ts werc limited because of operational commitlllcnt!!. in preparation for the August offensive. H o ..... ev er. the groundwork was laid for morc ex tensive field training following the successful conrimion or the cam- paign. Thi s survey gives an indication of the st<t.le of uainillg which was reo Rected in the Army's combat effi ciency. It would be incorrect to leave the impression that the limjted ventures in unit and fi eld training - to Irain alter fombal IDa. to lo.e lace made during the last yea r of the war m,ttle a signifi GlIlt contribution to victory. Infantry still performed less effi.cien d y than could be desired at the attack in Vitsi in August 1949. Howevcr, the efforts WCI'e of value. The Greek has an active and inquir ing mind and, if he is made to see the value of something, he is not slow in adopting it. The efforts of the field teams, arousing the interest of the soldiers, combined with the command interest which led to the acceptance of the program to per suade the Army as a whole that train ing was impon<tnl. Returns on this program will be fou nd in the present and futUJ"e efficiency of the Army. leadership and morale As the Army enjoyed a sur-:riority of 10 to I in men and materials. its prOlonged inability to eliminate the raises a question as to the qualit y of its direction. Win the ineffectiveness of the Army tbe re- sult of failure of commanders to employ effect ively the forces placed al their disposal? Did the absence of effectiv{' leadcrship prolong the wtlr? To some extent these questions must be answered in thc affirmative. A lack of competen t and aggressive commanders plagued the Army in 1947 and 1948. A comparatively low stan<i<ud of professional training was not the only cause of command failures. Important too were a cer- tain lack of discipline and the abo sence of <t strong "wi ll to fight." Non-military influences in the Army 1n some countries effective consti tu. tional barri.ers havc heen established bctween military power and domes- tic politics. Others ha ve been less successful in this respect. Greece has been among the latter. Personal relationships between individual miiit;)ry offiters and political leaders were not uncommon, and many mili- tary officers had channels bypassing the Army command and the War Ministry through which they could reach the Government. ' Moreover. the Army command, which owed iu tenure to the Government. could not dinegard the wishes of the po litical figures who made it up. Thus, the militar y command's conLrol over the Army tended to be circum- scribed by political considerations. These nonmilitary influences d (n lcd .\ nll)' dT\( it'll' dmilll; the Sl:lgc5 o f t he ami -ba ndi l war. Incompetent (:ould not be di!l char;.;t.'d \,' jth()tll g()v(:l"IIllIl"lu ;.li a<.:tioll, and thi!'. ,,";1'; difficult to ob- lain. A, tlempt:. t o remove officns wen.! prOjtl' u'tI ill!o Lilt: rca 11 11 o( poliljn wllnc they were nOl smccp- t ible o f a sound The in- ability 01 the Ann)" to )TJ1l()\'t' in- cfllnpetcUl OInd in)'lI hord in,Hc officen:; 1t' lIIkd 10 ues lroy for aUlhor- ity. .<iuhorelill J.te commanders occa- siona ll y (our. - de nt th;ll nu great mi:. lorrune would accrlle to them throllgh their railul'e to ollt,y, T o the hJ.hir ot h;tl l- in the execution of fi eld orders whi c. h pl'e\;liled in 1947 a nd 1918. nt;IY be allrihuted o f the Army's lac k o f Politi cal inAuences also aJTei:lcd the conduct of o perations. Follow- ing the I!H7 campaig n, the Army \\" ,l s forccd by potitical pressure LO it'\ (orces to proviue Pl"OtlX tion for \'a riou'i (owns and \'illagl's, Thi :-i of the in sla t ic h' -:urisons left tht' gll crrilb rree to lOam ulllllol e.qcc\ . Wht.'ll t il <: ,-\nll Y attC' lll pted to o rel er into the field or to coni cntrale the m fo r 1lI<t jor operations, plt)(eSlS wel c made by political rqJl'eo;e ntali vcs fro m the a reas fr om whi l II thc pro tecti on was being slri ppeel . Thesc pro tests calOe down on the War and on several occhiollS brought the ca ncell a tion 01 pl :H1ned opel'<Hi ons , The effect of thi s upo n the cond uct o f the war can scarcely be ovcr-I..'., li mated, The glllT rill :h could ha\'e been eliminated by continuous press ure, b ut thi s J.Jl"es- sure could no t be exerted by troops dispo\,tl ror stal ic cl erc- lIsc_ The Army did not es<.:ape this predica- me nt u nlil the N:ltional Ddl'nse Corps was formed , Had a ,ak u la led risk wi th respect to thc ci vil com1Jlunit y been ac- ceplf"d whi.le Ihe /\nny went after the b;' lldits, they could have been 1"1111 to earth very Illuch ea rlier . It !l ignin' :1 nt ' that the NDC - formed til free the Anny fr o m defensive (111I; ('s , W;I " progressIvely re- l it'ved fro m sit ch duties as soon as Army o ffen sives retlul:ed the capa- hilit ies o f the guerrill as, 111 effect, the NDC beca me a 50,000 increase in the of the Al'my_ Had nrm milit ary direct ion over t he Army bec ll esta bli shed at an e(l rlier d:llc, th is illCl'e:lsc mi ght not ha ve Iiccn rcquired. shortcomings in commanders and staff officers An Army's most valuablc ".ssel is Ihe p.-ofessiollal educati oll ut ilS uffi cer corp.", T his asset, which is !l ub- j<:n Hl diS!li p:uion jmt :15 ;m: the ollier ,lsseLs IIf the .. \ JIII \, is the lIlost dilfi<':lIit to recovcr. It i:t' a mallCt' not of mon ths but of years. The prolcssionat uffic'ers uf the ,>I' e-war pcriod were l10t numerOllS, ,\Ian ), of thclll ht'caruc Gts llalri es in lht.' \\':I I"S wi th Jt ,tl y and J\[,my good ollict.'J"s 1fl<Ide un .. ncpl:1hle aftt'r Ille liiJel"alioll hc- cause of their ass()ci:!tion with the EL.\S for ces. Most of (he remain ing offi c.ers ..... ere Sf'p;lralet! i"rom thei r professioll .. nel from the rt.'!ll>onsibilili elo of ('om- lliand for more t han fOil I' ,cars. Thll s the :\nn)' needed a of time ( 0 reesuLlish o ffit.er corps. This it was not gr;lIlled , The ,\rlll Y was railed lIpon to tala ;' the fi eld even before it W,IS fully orga ni7cd , Thl.'l"c WCI'C, rherdo,-e, ShOft COlllilios . r 10 pro essional (Iualifi.c- alions a!llong commanders and Staff offi ccrs whi l' h tended to reduce the effc.:Clj\'CnesJi of tht., ,\rlll Y in its earlit"!" Clp, ' ratioos, These were manifest in . recognition .1nd application of the basic principles of war . For example, the initi:ttive w:u sll"t',sed. It was not a lways tha t decisive results coul d be olHailied onl ), by offcll 'i ivc :Inion, The prin- ciple o f economy o f (orce rega rds stalic garrisons was Ion).; 1I1.'),;"lectc-d. The impo rlance of W:lfi not always ap preciatcd. and reconnais- sance and secur il Y measures were ohen Slighted , The lactical ilHcgrity of troop units was not always re- spected and there were numerous instances of piece'lIlealin){ of forces in formati o ns whi ch had no adt'- quale mechanism of contro l and no recogn izable chain o f command, . henl'(' no ("I)JIlInand Adequate were not ail'oays J1l;'tintained. Co-ordinJ.tion between units {n.:t.jLlenlly left llHI(:h LO be d(,l- sired. and were: somct imes per- mitled t o drift into act ion withnul a d ear-cut plan, Less than optimum in the use of military Staffs in exer- cising the responsi bili ties of com, mand. sometimC$ res ulted from in- adequa te underSlanding o f naif principles and A\'ail- An army'. greale.. Que' - prQfe .. ionaUy compe,pn' officer. able.., illtllli;;t'lic c wa:, nOl ll::.ed in the preparation at plam. CUl1lhnt informa ti on was 1I0 t a!\\'ays both verticall y find Comh:H orders \\' ('1'<.: sonu.: rillles vague and indeflililc and $uhj r' c t to multi p le inu.'rprela tioll . Finally, .;taH offiCl 'ls we n ' ofH II col l<llera l duti es or SlH:h !lallln; <h to limit effect ivc performance o( their primary dilli es. In the fidd of ac..hnini., tLlti on, Ihe rcspoll .... ihility of cCH11IlIa nd a, reo gards comfort and welfare ol t he individual sold ier nOt sufficientl y stressed. There was a tenden cy 10 ll egleCl supply and mailllenance di s- cipline. The "will to fight" A factor which contributed 10 the ineffectiveness of the Army, along with the slaw o( it , uaining and defi cien cies in the proh::.sional quali rlCations of its offi cer corps, in the earli er effort , was the lack of a slrong " will to figh!." This lack of offellsive spirit, whi ch was com pounded of lll<J ny clements, ff'{l upon i tself. Pro longed 1;11 k of !o ut" cess developed a sense of frus trnt ion and (utility. The Army CHile 10 bel ieve that it W<lS clIgagcd in a Sisyphc:J11 lask. The s:l mc opera lions were repealed ag'ain and again, an d t here was no elld in \ Vhat W<lS the good of sacriflcin;..;' men and ef- fon in a bold atlnck w sei ze fi n ob- )(,fl ive, \\'hen it waS Lt'rla ill lhal the o bjt,,-ctiw' wOl1ld ha\'e to he ag;,in next mOllth or next ycar? T his fceding 01 hopdc5S1lcs.s reached its nndir whell thoughts of \ lewr )" hy the early S oC l hc I!Jl8 c lI lI!Ja igll, were d:ls hcu LO the gTollncl by the gucr- r illa defense of the Vit si area. An othf'r yc<t r of \\, ;11' had passed and t he end \ \'as Il() nearer, T he situa- tion appeared no be tter than at th e 01 the campaign. Thi5 IHalign<lm thing received nouri shment from other Among thcm was the lack of disci- pl ill e. ' I 'he h;!hit of q uesti oninp; ordrr<; , \\' bi ch \ ,': IS mClIlionrd c;lrli.C'f, allcned the Army's confidence ill its colllllland ;Hld leadership. .\ spi ri t of indl'( i,ioll W<l S [O.Herl'd which mi.lil'lled :tg-ai nst ;lclion. T o take ion involves the ac of ri sks .. \ miscalculation 01<1 )' '! t'Slilt en I;tilure ;lIU( ccnsure. Since the handits seldom attacked a large military fom1 3tiol1 , a com- mander who tC1l11fhri/l'd redured hi s chances of mak ing an rrror. The ill:!cti on of a COUlInandt'r might have tli sa!itl'ous clfens upon ;\ clmpflign, but if there were 110 error" of com on his pan, it ,,'as difficult to pro('cell ag:-.imt him, Consequent. Iy. lhe rOIllTll;ll1cic-r s S(lIil el ill1(,s showed a tende ncy to wait lor the guerrilla .... to ca ll the LUes, Failure to take the initiati ve produced k;,lr of the enemy's capabi lities and weak- ened conlidence on the pan of the .\nny as 10 it s own capabilili6. Thi s lack of complur. selfconrldence led the Arm}' to wavcr in its belief of ultimat e vi ctory. This wea kening of confidence in ultimate vi ctor y was nOt confin ed to the nnITow rlehl of military opcra- h exte nded into the wider field where tht! objcni,'c was the of sccurilY and ceo nomic wl' ll-bei ng for the people of (;.I"('('(..e. Thl' had SII C ce(' dcd in (Te:ui ng a silllalion ullder IIhi( h the (;ove rnment's dlcnive IIC,:o; S was IWlIlpered . If tl'le wa, inl ;lpahle of consol idating: such gains the Arll1)' might make, why g'o on wit h it? \Vhy make fruit less sacri li('es? Why nnt "pe,ace a t :lny pri((''' now, inste;\C! of lat er? The soldier who had less than l confi dence in the ultimatc olltcome had jl('r.mmd gTi('v:l HCCS \\'hich re- duced his spirit. The origi. n<ll call-ups wcn' of the older c1a:s.ses who fought in the \\'ar with h a!y. As there was I'or a long lime no r('placement program, these tllen had no prospect of relief-only <l vis la of a sLJ ccession of military until they Slopped a hul- let or s lepped on a mine. Quite apart from the soldier's feeling that he was being call ed upon to risk life and limh whil e younger men watched frolll t he sidelines, was his concern for hi s family. Many of these older men were marr ied and their pay was so low that their families li ved on the verge of starvation. Fina lly, there were some active Communists in the Army and a widespread tolerance o( varying de grees oC Communi st ideologies. Eco- nomic conditions in Greecc produced many ci tizens. Commu nist teachings, once driven under- ground by Mecaxas, gained consid er- aule currency during the occupation and resis tance. Many so1diers and even officers were mildly lolerant o( Communist ideologies and possi bl y even sympat hcLic toward the guer- rilla COlUse. To evalunte this factor one must recall that the issue be tween Soviel ex pansioni st Commu- nism and Democracy had not been clearly defined. By gaining control oC the movement duri ng Worl d War II, the Communists had ident ified themselves with the de- (eme of Greece. Thus lhey had King Paul visit s the frolll ga ined ;h adhel{' \Ii' 1):lI,iIHic Greeks. It wotl ld takt' tillle luI' Ihelll to remglli.o,: the (h:, j' ::; cd SiUl.l li oll- 111 ;lt l he IlII 100Ign lought lur Gl eere :lIul freedom, bUl fo r the Kremlin a nd sl:wery. The wcakt'lled prodlll'l 01 Ihese llI any filt tors, mani- rested i belr in in a dis- incli n.atiull to COlile to real with l he enemy. In t he soldi('r, il l"CSult<:tI in lhe ttegc:nenllion of t he baltle i n w a P"t) tl'actefl fire lighl fi ()ll1 \\hi .1I till' ;;uerl ilia was ahle to :11 wi ll. There W;JS 110 leal eHon lo <"iOSt \,jth h ll11 lO secure hi, dnII IHlilJ1\ The ll et result was incl cd .. i'e au ion. The appointme nt of General Papagos as Commander -in-Chief Efforts made Ihe Britis h ilnd Americall l\'f i",iolls prior to 19'19 lO persuadc thl' Cflvernlll C' lll to g ive the Arm)' :l fn'e I'ein in the ('ondu Cl of operat ions, alit! to e rH"our;lge Ihe Army to t ake more anion were not 100 prO( h H." l iq:, It was not un til lhe d,lI"k weeks or Ihe Vitsi slalemale or 19-18. when na liooal morale rtl'oI'Pc.'f..I to an " II-lime low. thal the Co\'ernmenl took a subslan, tial step 10 impl ove the si lUation, I n Ocwht r. Primt' Mini ster Sopholl- lis General Al exander Papngos propoSII1.!{ Ih,1l ht" al'cept supreme cOll1l l1<1011 or the C;rl'ek land forces. Gener:!1 rilp:lgn..:, although hole.!- ing a n honorary appointment in th e Court. ""as in military relirement at the t ime, IJrior to ,.vorl d W:)r II he had been Chier o f the Armv Gene ra l Sta ff, U pOIl Greece's in\' oln:IlIl'1I 1 in (ha t WiI.r he iJCGll lle Comm"nder-in Chief of the Army, In Ih is cap<l cil v he had directed ,t he Ann y ill the wa'r aga i nst hal y, The Gnman uuupa- tion of Greece and his impri.sonmenl ill GeI"l U,IIl )' dcpri ved t he gencnll. until a hlter c.bte, o( a full ul 101 lhi, :,e r vin.', his Il, ililary re(JUla lioli \\' <15 C':-tabl i"hed <lnd he ttnivel- !:I .lily 1t::!:I penu.! as .. patriot. Gencr<l l Pitpagos (JiLl not immedi- :Jl el)' <lCl t'(H th\: GoVernlOelll 's pru- posal. He I {"p li t,,, lkll he lOIIlt..! J o ,'0 only il t ('I 1:l ill wen; ;u'-- (cpted by the Govcrnment. TJlesc includeu, <l IlIOtlg o the r Ihill oS, Ih\.: e:'>ublishtllent 01 his juris. tli . I i OIl as Commander-illCh ic! with powC!!' to d irect o pelat io ll ), to dc( i(le all jll ilLll ... ) pertai ni ng 1O milit<lr y olg:a ll il:atinll <lIHI to post <I ud officers, He \CIS 1O have the right to !'l'("alt (0 a(livt: d ut y any l e t ired offi- ,'er. \\'Ill'IT,Ll 110 I'etired officers were to be )"et:l) lIetl without h is ilpproval. The Govt. n llilellt, a ller long (Ie \;le, these provi!:los, The iml ;t nn', whe re it i!:l possible to pu t a flllg'er Oil le<l<i c l"ship and ils va llie ill a crisi) are r<lre r lhan mili- (<If)' hi Slu1 wou ld have us believe: thl' role el the COlll lllander is oft en e)(ag-ge raled . Hm P"p:lgos had quali- hcalion ... h:hich wCI'e newed at this time, H;i\' illg refuwd to accept the pOSt ilS CO\l]mander-inChief unlil far. re"c h ing commitments as to hi s au thor ity had been lllaLie, he was in a position to ex en " lil m d ireCli011 o n Ihe condUCt 01 mililary oper a- tions, Such dil'enioll was needed at this time to ex ploit fully the many favorab le factors in the silllc1 ti o n whi ch hOld been c rea ted by U. S. as- sistance, Ihe falli ng out of T ito and d,C Cominform, and ,he increasing re<'og-niti o n o( t he true nature o f the gll erri ll a wa r in Greece, No dC\'c\oplllcm could h;we been more fonuitous t han th e appoi nt- me n I of Papagos. Improvemenls in the e HeCLi'"l'IlC'Ss o f the Am\" ,,c,.'i"e already lIudcf\\"'ly "lid the 'iJf',\; in, ning's ol decisi\t, action were notilt' , ,lllle, Huwl'vt:f. it ,," l/. P:qx lgus who (oll,!ilit\;Ij( II and Ihe Al"luy l(l the fmilion of iu po-- lellti a lities, Ht' tliscip lilll' in Ihe . \1111 )" hy l il (' rClllm' :J i or II11"Uilabl c: Offi !Tr" He strc,,<,d ' lni o ll <l ntl ordered Iht" Grec k .\rillcd FOin' s illto :t 01 Idf<' Il :- ive opera ti ons h'hich d e priw'd the guen ill .a ol the iniliati'l' and afforded h illl no res l>il e. li e the guerri lla .. 11 0 opponull it" 10 n'- cr uit re pl acement s for bailie ,asualties. h ut h:.nicti unt il Ihey were driven f l"l)lI1 Clt:cce, lJnt\<'J" Pap;lj.\o,", the \\ a\ !;!,al ":lnLzed illto "Cl ion . Its m:lOpowcr \\' as not iucreased, ils trai nlng ",.is lIot gre:lIl y improved <lnd ""Ol'i no significa1l1 incre,lse in Cfl'l ip- lIIent. The Army silllph m:lde to do what it \\' as cap<lhk 01 lining. and no more th;lll t his W,b then needed to g .. in Ill(' "icw!")'. Seven mont hs "rler the appoilllllll' lll of P<lpagos as COlllmander-ill,Ch ief the wa r was :-I t an cnd, Contributions of U. S. and Britis h Military Missions the apl' "int' llf' llt fir Pctp:t gos, lhe fllnflion, vi' lhe U, S. and British Mil i tary "ions came illlo their own <IS a 1U(';l ns of the effu-il' lh Y 01 the Arm)" T he missions provided <1 meclt;llli .,nl lJ y wh ich {all ib il'l tile: Army tl o\\ 11 to di vision le, 'el could be brought to the .. uellti on of the Commallder-in,Chie f, a long wil h im pania l .. <ivl(e and re n:lIIll1l'll(lati(lIh {or illl prllvl' Il HlltS. The vallie of the missions depended not onl y upon their acccptnn("e but upon lhe :.hi l- ity of the CCllIIIHi mlerinChie f to implell,c llt lheir recommendat iollS. Papagos had . p!"i or to his appoint mf' nt, 'iought lO res l r in the intlul'JWC of the mi ssions, Ho wC':ver. (ollowing his :'ppoioilltem he (\"ery inui ca tion o f nppreciating the V;dUl' o ( thell" services. Moreo\'er. unlike his predecessors he was capable o f im- plemenlil ' J{ lheir rec()llllTIC' lld:lt io ns. His su(cess was Llue in no :\:nall part to lhe manner in h' hi ch he accepted the advice and rcnllnJlll'lld :l!ions the U, S. and Briti sh Mission,\, a nd m"de full use or the m, 'l'BE ANTI-BANDIT WAll. By Col J.C. Hurray PAll.T IV the Anti- By Col J. C. Murray Synopsis: The Ihree-year conflict had drawn Ollt sina 1946 with Ihl! j!uerrilla.r, li/{hll)' equipped and unimpeded by lerri lorial responsibility, holding the in i{intivt: . . " s long as the guerillru lailored their tadics to the forces Q7Ut arms at their disposal they held the whip-hand. But. when established the "provision al Democratic Govt'm. ment" and tried to hold grollnd to proteel their supply Toul es the)' were doomed ',.0 failure. In addition t o theiT tactical blunder, Ihe guerrill4S .re u ived (Ina/her heary blow when Tit a split with the Comin rj orm, and finally closed the Yugoslav border 10 guerrilla
III til e meantime, moving slowly, the Greek Govunment had marshalled ilf f orces and wlt h mofulQ/ Old and military 'aivl ,r from the Un Ited Stal ef fi nd Bn/flln had finally budt -tiP its forces to 265,000 well equ.ipped troops. Even so, war d ragged on becau$t! tile Government f orces lacked coJ,,:siveneu and their movements were mflrked by inded a(lion. Th en in 1949, General Alexander Papagos came ot/ t of reti remen t to accept the post of supreme commander of Cruk land ! orceJ. Seve n months after his appointment the war wa..r at an end. Bandit War Part IV DISPOSITION OF FORCES THItll GEOGRAPHICAL FACTORS enter prominently into a tion of the disposition of These are the frontier. the rains and the sea. The influence of me sea and its importance as a means of communication are dis, cussed later. The frontier mav he regarded as the source of the as weU as the greatest aHy of the "Dem- ocratic Army" in prolonging it. The mountains. too, were an asset of in- etimabie value to (he guerrilla!>. Without them the war in Greece could scan-ely have been sustained. Fl'OIttier Between the Dardanelle5 and the head of the Adriatic the coastline of Europe is either mountainous or a narrow coastal pIain hacked by mountains. There are few passes through the mountains. and the ports owe their importance to their position near passes which connect the hinterlands wilh the traffic lanes or the Mediterranean. As land rOutts leading to the Adriatic from Bul- garia and southern Yugoslavia are long and poor, these seek. an ourlet to the nearby Aegean. By lb possession of :\facedonia and Western Thrace, Greece controls these nawral (raffic routes, Conse- quen[ly. Bulgaria and Yugmlavia ha\'e al ..... cast en\ious eyes on the ports of Salonika and Alexandtoup- olis. on the of the Axim and Strimon and the Gap. The Soviet Union. (00, is inter- ested in this area. The Sovietization of the central Ballans would be of greater value to the USSR if the productivity of the region were fully developed. and this would be aided bv access to the through the nearby Aegean ports. important, however. bringing this coastline within the Soviet fold "would isolate Turkey from Europe and male It easier for Russia to achieve her ancient ambition of gaining free access to the ranean hy seiling the Dardanelles. The present northern frontier of Greece is a composite product of the fin.t and second Balkan wars, the Greco-Turkish 'war, \Vorld War J and the subsequent treaties. It has almost no desirable characteristics. From an ethnological standpoint, there are seeds of disrord in the racial minorities srattered through- Out the atea. The weakness of the frontier from an economic standpoint Jies in the fan [hal Yugoslavia and Bulgaria are interested in free access to the Bulgaria in lar seek." access to the Aegean coast, 'filitarily, the prewm frontier com- pletely satisfies no one. Yugoslavia and Bulgaria lend to regard the coastal region to the south as. a bridgehead of their Jones. \\'as not Salonika used as .a base for an expeditionary foree of ';00,000 during Wurld \\'ar f, and were not plans made for irs for that pur" po,e during World \Vat fI: From the Handpoint of Ihe Greeks. defense of the frontier co; ;t HCl"cuiem wk., From the Adriatic lO the Turk isb border the frontier more than 700 milC$. If Creece's eight wartime divisions were dis- posed along the border, the average divisional frontage would be 100 miles, But its length is only a part of the problem" The trace of the frontier, running from one end to the other through a maze of moun tains, has no defensive strength. To the north lie other moun rains per mitting defeme on successive post lions. bur. the coastal plain to the south affords no such possihilities. Thus, the historic routes between the Aegean and the central Ralhr. .. which cross the {ronlier in the val leys of the- Strimon and the Axio<i and at lhe Monastir Gap. prejudice defense of (he frontier from tht south far more than from the north. Long and defem-hely weak, lhe bor- der is also inaccessible. Except near the routes just named, it is remote and communication with it is. almost nonexistent. Orthodox military for, mations cannot operate there and mountain unit ... can move and be supplied only with An additional disadvantage to the Greeks in defending the fromier ;s that the eastward projection has no depth" The sea coas[ lies only a few miles from the fmntier, and in thi .. region laleral ('ommunkatiom on land are limited to one road and one railroad, bOth \ uJnerahle to anad ... Relations between Creece an;J adiacent countries Xorth of the frontier lie Albania, Yugo)i;nia and R(l!garia.:111 of which came under Communist nomination following the withdrawal o ( the German occupation forces. Relations between these l'ounlries and Greece were nOl harmonious following the war. Buigarian troops holtl o("cupied Gree(e eluring the war ami post occupation feding was high. Com- nl1l1li ns in all Ihrec s<ltclliles were c'oOlrilllllillg to the unrest in Greec-e in orner to expand the sphere of the Cominform. In July HJ.!5 the Lhree satellites simu ltaneously a propaganda campaign dire("[ n i at GreCl'e, The Yllgoslav Govermil cm sent a strongly worded nOle 10 the Greek Governmen t denouncing imag inary violations of [he bo rder and cruelti es to Slavs in Greece. Shortl y thereafter. Alban ia presented a si milar nOle relating LO the Chams in [pirus .. thelie aniow. seemed to indicale the or a plot agaillSl the inlegril \' o r lhe [ronLier. the Rightest press of Athens reo 5J>onded Wilh claims on the terri tories 10 the north, On July !1 the Yugosia,' alld .\1- hanian C.U\-crnme nts formed a of alliance, Communique .. j'Slied ;11 (he time indi cated (hal it w,,' cl i rerled prirn;1riJ y again<iL lorc'("(t:' . . h this agil;niou "'enl fnrw;u d Lhe l' SS R, ;IS H propaganda 1l!()\'C, in- ll"od w cd till ! Creek [)l"tJh!t:1l1 LO lhe SeCUril\' COlliHil or t he l-uilCd Xa- I ions l;y a C OI uplaint thaI ill (;1 \'l'll' \I"('re ('I lliangerilll; world !Je;l((". Foll owin),{ rC'icn;on of pro1t"'L li 1(:" Ukra ni;.Ul \ Iini strr 01 FOH' il-:,l1 .. ,II.Iil ' (ol1'lplaillt"d In the Securil\' COII II("iI in .-\ugust Ihat the poli('Y 1111 ' Cl'cel<. (;o\"ernment haci proolll . .:nl a ,ilu:uiol1 in t he Ralkam which thn';ll {,llcd \\'orlri peace. In Ihe to Creeei' 'ITlll hnlne "(111 On Decelllher (;n'('( took lhe inili:l' ri"e ;11](1 n'qllc,Led the Sl'("lll'ity COIlII' (il ((I inH'Lig.lLc rll t' !II;IHt'r of the 'lIpplill h ljlll-{ ]>IIJ\' iderl the C reek lillll' the l.OIlIlCil 10l"Jllcd .1 10 III;!kc iHi OIHlh"' IICl t inll"' l ig:llilill. In J'\O\TIII- her HlI lg;l ri: I ;lI\d (; lllert"d illlo ilil :dli :llll'e \1 ili('h w;u follm,vd a .)i1l1i l;! )' trealY hl'",een nul:': :l1 i;1 ;llld ,\Ibania. TIlt" Jilin 1\"(::1"C t.hen rlc:n' Jy dr<ll rn, :1 11<1 \"hen the b;lndit s on 21 De("ell1, Ger 1017 :lllnOllnCt'd :'I "Gon: rI11llt:Tlt of Fn( CI C' c{e," tht, an nounrt' lOent was 'I' i th en t hllSi :l"m in AI hani;\ . ;lml TIIII:,::t ria. <l nr! MI,. .. : ,Iae IoMl road &caJ dangerow i\;l tiomti COlllmiuers rl Jr Aid lO t he Cred:. People were (ol"luetl. :\rt,;ttl whi le. the Uni ted Nali ons )i oll h<lri reponed l haL ' Yugos!:nj;) :lnd, LO a k sst'r extem, Albani " ;111 ([ Blli gari a have supported (he glleI ' l'ill ,1 w:lrrure ill Gre('ce." The Mountains Greece is composed of mountains with small, inl errn oll- l ane valleys, The Pindu'lli oaend southeastward rrom the AI l w tian border 160 mi le<; to lhe GuH of Korin t h, A southw:!ni ex tensi on rises in the Peloponnese. The range in width from 10 l O fiO lLS maximum hC' igtll is 7,50() fn ' L ;Illd it mmliulles ;1 nC:lrly perfect barri cr to CCtst-wC's t ("ommllnic:lI ioll the ,-\lbani :m horder awl the Gulf of Kori mh. Pa<;..<;, how('vt"1". the haTTit"T in nnnh celllTal CrC-I'I 't' :11 :tn elC'\-at ioli of a ho lll 5.000 reel. Ground Hl O\'emenl :lnY\"here i n Iht, Pilldm limi ted b, de-cp, n:lITO\I' h:,\"ing- fe\\' Hood pi aim. ,-\nnLhl' l" mOIl!1t:1ill \fOUllt, V crm i (J 11 - 01 ylll I' ll' -- Pel inn, a ;)rc a long- the lI'nLern Ilr the ACg"e;ln of Salnnib. Tt I"('at illLinn at its wnt h el n e-x l n 'l nit y to join with the Pindm r; lIlg l' o f Thessal y Pbill . A wil le pla Te' all thi s with the Pindus north of !he same plaill. A lo ng- lhe nonhern CoaST o rhe Aegea n, the Rhodope Mountains from Bulgaria illto eastern '\ facedonla ann Thracc, ,.vh ile not hi gh as lhe Pillt)us thi s range, too, I , and rugged. HecallSe of t bese mount ains and ot her'S o{ Jesser signi fi cance. move mel1 t ill Gree("e is channeli led alo ng the fcw roules rollowing lhe p"sse.\ which connect the intermontane val- leys, Elsewhere, particularly i n the grc;tt areas can be reached only on 'fnot or by mule. for m:lliollS (annot ojlerate in these ;mn Lhey h:\ve tr<ldilionallv enjoyed freedom from (he pol ice po wer of the various gov, h:l vc c:ontrolled thc' t erritory t h roughou l i,,. compli catcd hi:. (o r\. \ t a n y o f (hcs:e h a\'C' heell ;1'\'11 for f.;cl H'ra ti nns hy banrli c, a<; 01'<'1 :I ting :1110 Guerrilla dispositions The fir st ;Jetivity of th(' bands wa" nlllfil1<.: d l() the nonherrl hordel', Here fli t h'111ds enj oyed ;, t:H"l i('a i such as iii rare!y g- i\ 'l'n to ;'\ny beJlig-crelll. could Hill he dl'ci"i i\'c1y eng-agc(!. Wher. evc,' tht' }' h"cre hard prelised, the), ... impl y wilhdr(:w across the "urn lit "'as stopped hy the hordtlr guards nf IIlot' satellites while the guerrillas p,"epan:d to reappeal' a t a new point, or at rhe sallie poim tlfter the Governmcnt forces had with- dra ..... n . This unnculral t.:ontluct on the pan of thc lIeighuol"ing COUll- tries was one of (he poi nts that the Greeks complained ahollt ill their petition to the Uni ted Nations. The case of the Greek GO\"I.:rn- ment in estahl ishing th('se LKt ... hI'. fore the Pnited Nations IUC,iU- diced hy a Communist propaganda ca mpaign designed to create the iIll- preSSion that unrest in Gn:en:: W;IS not tOnfined (Q the lIorder an:,IS hut spread over all Greece. This neatl"tl an impression that the war had a widespread (haracter which was scarcely consistent wilh tht' faus. Meanwhilc the ComnnllJists pene- lraled into south amI <.:e lll,, t! Greece in order to stir tip opposi ti on to the c.o,erll111ent in order ( 0 leud sup pon to their propagant';t tampaign. The Pindlu Iletwel'n \Iet- wvan and the Gulf uJ Korinth and the range hetween \'ennioll and Pelion pro,ided perhaps a dozen areas sui table for gllen'iJ la vpeya- I ions. IThe,. were pWl('ned' by lh('ir From them it was possible within a few hums 1(1 raid vi!lages on the p!':tins and har:lss the roads winding- the narrow valleys, i\lo\,(!llIent from onc arca t.u another was compal':tlin:ly ea.;;,, par- ti cularly at night. 1 !Jcse <Ire,,:>, \\Tn: organil.ed il:o. b;lSCS 01 openlliolls. hut the bands were [lot ("olllmiu(.'d 10 their defense. rhe) [ollowl'I.l gllcr t'ill a lanirs here. JIlo\'ing frotll area LO area 10 avoid hong (,llgaged. The estahlishment of concentra- lions in snmll and cellu:ti Gn:ece involved an adt li cional ("()lnmi lmCllt on lhe jliJrt of the guerri lla h igh commiuld .. \ lille ot comnltlnicOl li ons by wllich !oupplies could be for- wanlt:d LO concentrations was essential. As the Government forces w ntroJled the established routes, the Pindus rall g<: was used lor this p ur- p{)se. An ar'i'a of tht northern Pin, lIus had to be secured to prOtecl lht' point ;H \\ hich supplits could be moved frot ll .\I bania or Yugos lavia into Greeu [or fonvarding via lhe Pindus rOLHl:. To meet this require- mem the thcm- ielves to tht deftoll e of the base areas l( Grammos nnd Vi tsi. Although tlternal(;s til the Pindus route were ;ometimes used, this decision re- mained a ke),w)ne of their stralegy until the tnd of the war. 'Vhcn the base areas were threat- e]leri the guenillas redoubled their harassing attacks elsewhere lO divert Government forces from that front. During the I the great- e'i t e.ffort was Illade in lhe Pelopon- nest' when' there had been little previous ani\i ty. BeclUse few Gov- ernment troops werc in that area t he \,ere very successful. 'Vhen lhe Army delayed sending rein(orn:- lllelll.S !oevcLd dt:J'JU licli fro III th e Pdopollllese withdrew from lhe GO"l'rlll1lellt. Thl' policy of non- reillfolTtlllellt waS followed. ho,",,'- t' el, until the swlcm .. tlc in "iLsi be- (";1111<: winter.IJolilul. wllt:n an o\'er wht:!ming rOnT [Q lhe Pdo- \lnllllc.'ie. The gutlrillas had grown by that (ime 10 a strength of ='.500, hut (iwir was unfavor- able. The naval patrol in til t Gull of Korillll! pn:vclIlr.:d their escape to the lll tli nialld and the guenilltls i n lhe l'c!oponllese were Iiquit.iated in early 1949. The of concentra- tions in sOUlh and central Greece ;lnd lhe iJase: areai in the northern Pilldus did not 1I1edn that the other .lrr.:as along the northern fronlicr wert iI1:.. niv;ued. On Lh e contrary, perhaps six mountain regions adja- cent lO Yugoslav ia and Bulgaria were 11SI.:d intCl"mittelltly as operat- ing lJaM:s. ;Iml approximatel y one fihh o f the total guerrilla stre nglh was disposed there A gn;<lL ,H.lvall- tagr.: enjQ)'l!d by lhe guerrillas oper- ;Jling in j\raCt:uonia aMi Thrace was their 'lbility to mO\'e from are<l. to area ullder cO\er uf lhe frontier. YlIgosla\"ia ()(:cupied a cemral posi- tion in this cover ed rOUte uf com- Illunicalions. The Tiro-Cominform rift, then'fore. with the resultant dU10ure of the border, was a serious blow as regards the disposilion of die guerrillas. In the 1948 campaign the guer- rillas were able to oppose (heir main strenglh 10 the Army first. in the Gralllnlos a nti subsequently in the Vitsi region. In 1949, through occu- pying bOlh areas simultaneously they allowed their forr.:es to be split. The Army conducted iu rom:e ntration so that the guerrill as were unable to determine where the main effort was lU be made. Follov,,jng a holding <l.[(ack in Grammos the attack delivered in Vitsi. The operation was compleled so (Iuidd y that no reinforcement \ClS possible. Thc Vil'ii force Wit S so disorganized and demoralized Ihm it was unable to reinforce th e Gra11l 1110S position, The guerri ll as had mmmiued the [rllal error of allo\\ing their forces 1(1 lie divided. They had perhaps .I uticipated Lhat they wou ld he able 10 shi ft {orccs frOll! oll e area to the oUler a.,' Lhe y had in 191tL Their ill ahili ty to do so tOlllribllled lO th t ir dcIe<ll. Di spos itions of the Army As of 1911' tht.: .\nllY was org..lLI - i1.cd inlo all Army Command and l \\'0 The [ouller was loc:l ted at Volos: lhe latter a t and Saloni ka respecl ively . .'\l this time -.. 01 ..... - - - --,..;..--- - .Ic i . w, sr. (our divi ions and twO btil,rade1 assi gned to one corps were in l ' hcss., ly. Epmu and cent ral 1\f;-.t"C'donia. Three di\'isi ol1s ami independent brigade as signed to the other corps wen: InCHed in CJ.J(cm Murcdolli.J. :wd Thratt. tl nd fou r bri- gades Wt l e diJposr<i' in sOUlhcrn reece and 1h(l Prlop(ll1nesc. Subse qucnuy a third corps \\b 3Ctivatcd The nsignmcnl ot (:0"P-' :m.:ali and the disposition o( troops .... ari ed thcre:tr,CI' ill an:ordallcc with opera- requirements. Greece has (hrcl: major lilles of land c:ollllllunic3ri ons. One parallels the Pind", n Hlge on the west 10 con neet the: Gulf o( Korinth with the Al batl ian border. A second. passing bt:lween the Pi nLius and fhe Pdion T;'luge, conncel llib with SaJonika, the Monaslir Gap and (he si ngle li ne or e:" sl-\ ... rnmmunica- D lions. The lhird folluws the nort..h :o hore of (he Aegean p:ua llcling the northern fronti er. T he major ity or the towns are SilUaLed on ur lIear these three routes. 'Vilh l.he guer- exerc- ising a prcQrious but tenacious conlfol over the mount.ain ;1fC:as of tbe Pindus range. the ermion-Pelion range and along Ute nonhern borders of Macedonia and Thr:lce. Ihe5c routes and Ihe towm 'Kauered along them were eXlremely
vulnerabL From operaling bases in the moun Ii_ins the guerrillas could readily to harass them at any pOilU. The war, therefore, de- veloped as a war without a fixed irOnto Early efforts to arrest guerrilla activity LOok the form of putting om fires. That is, the Army responded to allacks by counter-attaeks which came lOa late, by pursuits which were too leisurely to maintain con- tact, and by local searching opera- liollS. Uncoordinated reactions of this lype accomplished lillie as the guerrinas attached no importance to any particular area. ''''hen attack.ed in one area they moved to another, sometimes ollly to relllril to the first as soon <IS the Government (orces had withdrawn. By April 1947 a major co-ordi- nated deilnng operation was laid on. Jt was designed to drive the ban. dits from the Gulf of Korinth nonh. ward to the frontier after ..... hich the fronlier was to be sealed. This effon failed through bad liming, poor co- ordination and lack of aggressive. ness. During its course the guerrillas became a(:li"e that the Army was forced to cancel plans for a winter campaign and look to the protection of the civil community and its lines of communication. For [his purpose troop unilS were dispersed widely. Had troop units so dispersed been employed in local clearing opera tions in accordance with a co-ordi nared plan, it might have been as dteClive as a general clearing opera- tion. But co-ordi nation was Jacking and the troops in place of engaging in aClive opera Lions established Slatic defenses of towns aud awaited devel- opments. This. of course, did nOt seriously interfere with the guerrilla program as there could never be enough LTOOpS to defend all areas by such passive efforts. the guerrilla m;aimained the ini(ia- tive. This Hcated a demand for more defensive forces and prevented the concentration of Army troops for operations until the National De fense Corps had been formed. Through the organization of the National Defense Corps the Army was able to concentrate enough lroops to undertake another major clearing operation. As the extent and importance of sa tellite aid to the guerrillas was recognized. the U. S. Aill: 4,000 mule, came late,. idea of first seizi ng the northern border and thus isolating the guer rillas from their sources of supplies and replacements must have been considered, However, the concentra- tion of the major portion of the Army in nonhern Greece would have exposed sOlllhern and ce ntral Crt'eee dangerousl y_ Moreover, once the frontier had been seized il must be garrisoned a nd troops so em- ployed would nOt have been avail- able for the subsequent clearing operations. Once again the opera- tlon was de:ooigned to proceed from south to lIorth. The operation wem well initially and the guerr illas ..... ere driven back upon their lines of communication until they reached the Crammos area. Here a front ..... as established. \Vhe n it was broken they retired to the Vicsi area where anolher front was established. The Army could not drive the bandits from this posi. tion and the frollt a srale mate. \tfeanwhile the guerrillas, hav- ing filtered through the Army lines. resumed operations in sOllth and central Greece. particuJady in t.he Peloponnese, This required the Army to redispose its forces to mop up its rear before ' it could resume operations on the fronL Three divi. sions were left to contain the guerril. las in the base areas. Guerrilla activi- ty elsewhere prevented the reconcen tralion of the Army on this front for several months. A third south to north swe.cp brought the main strength of the Army against the main area of Vitsi and Grammos in August 1949. The ensuing ballie. in which lhe Army's only disadvantage was the defensibility of the terrain, lasted only a lew days. Olll-jllg these operations the dis- positions of the Army afforded it excellent communications. Its troops and supplit's moved free I,. between (he located ports of Perllesa. The advantage accruing to Piraeus. Volos. Corinth, Palras and the Army through Government con trol of the sea was matched by it!i conlro! of land communi,;a tiolls be (Ween [he ports a nd major in- land bases at L:uisa. Kosani loannina and such forward bast:s as FIOf'ina and Argos Orcstikan. The Army, therefore. enjoyed a high de- gree of Rexibility. It could concenu'ate and support brgc forces in almost any area in Greece. pro- vided the guerrillas did not stir up too much (rouble elsewhere. Comparison of dispositions and summary Owing to the disposition of forces factor the guerrilla had the advant age of good terrain (or e \'asion and fol' defense. The northern frontier. behind which he was able to condll('t all manner of military activity in areas denied lO the Army. \lias a par ticular advantage. This was (<tncd Jed in part by Yugoslavia's decreas ing support following [ht: Tito- COlninform split. Outside the north- ern bases areas. where tbc Army con trolled the routes of communication and the guerrillas operated from adjacent and inter \'ening l1louruaill areas. the war developed as a war without a fronl. Here the Army' s control of communications gave it stratcgic f1cxibility and taClical i ng power. \ 'Vhc!lever Anny forces ventured off the established routes, as they to engage the guerrilla, rhey fonnd the terrain (he greatest obstacle. The guerrilla had superior observation, the ability to execute rapid tactical movements and the ubility to interpose terrain obstacles between himself and the Govern- ment forces. The guerrillas' control of com- munications outside the base areas was of a low order. This inAuenced adversely his ability to concentratt forces and to supply them, par. ticulad), during a protracted engage men t. This disadvantage was mini- mal so long as the "Democrati c Army" conducted guerrilla-type op erations using small bands. Jt grew in significance as the bands formed inlo banal ions. brigades and divi sions. SUPPLY AND EVACUATION The "Democratic Army" General The supply si tuation of the "Democratic Army" HI;}Y bf dcscril.lf'd in terms of oV('rall availability of 'illpplies and their distribution. The twO were cloi'dy interrelated . The guerrillas were supported by foreign aid, hut not all supplies were imponed. In fact, the quantities of supplies ;lIld equipment involl, .... ed were relatively small, hut rhi s small quantity of sllpplies was still essen- (ial to lhe conti nuance of Ihe guer- rilla movement in Greece. Requirements The l'. S. soldier uses each da), of (,()Illbat pounds of supplies, in- ( Iud ing: 6 pounds of 1'3 lioIlS, 6 pounds of eq uipment, 5 pounds of fuel and oil and 20 pounds o[ am- munition. Had the guerrillas used supplies on a comparable: basis their 25,000 men would have needed a million pounds ()I' four hundred 2V2- ton truckloads daily. Needless 10 say, they did not use supplies on this scale. The a\'erage guerrilla was inured 10 hardship. His need's were lew. He was sa ri sfied with a diet of bread, milk, cheese, lamb and goat. Such items as salt, sugar, mffe.c and tobac- co \\'e.re difficult to come hy and were sometimes missing. His equipment compri sed boats, dothing, a blanket, a knife or baronet and a firearm. Medical supplies, while negligible on a pro rala basis. didl in the aggregate (ol1$l ilUte a signifir:al1l quamity. The amJIIllnilion carrif'd on the indi- vidual was 20 to 30 rounds, while 200300 ",'e,"C carried (or machine guns. Owing to this low initial allowa nce and the difficully of eC- (e<"ling r6upply in combat, ammuni li oll wa!i used sparingly. The mine! hO'i'l' cver, was used extensively. In consi dning ammunition rt quiremellls, a distinction must be madc between troops operating with in the defended base areas and those operating t'lsewhere. The nllmb!!r of artillery, AT and AA guns and hea\')' mortars in the former areas in- creased requirements there. Omil ting this special case, the daily reo suppl y for the average guerrilla did not exceed fi ve pounds m:tde up as ollo\\'s: l'alions- 3 pounds, equip- ment-I pound and ammunition- I pound, a total of 5 pounds. Sources of supply As regards sources of supply, a distinction must be made again be- [ween guerrillas operating in south and c.entral Greece and those operat- ing in I he region of the northern frontier, particularly within the dc fended base areas. Guerrillas sca t tered over thousands of square mile), in the former areas were ahle co procure a high proportion of sup- plies locally. Virtually all rations were so ohtained. Foodstuffs were procured by requisition upon peas- ants living within bandit-controlle.d an'as. In addition, raids were madt: III)on towns and to obtai n food, and it was common practice for the g'tlcrrillas to drive off flocks of and goats for later consump' lion. Other sources were raills upon .. tores of lhe Army and Gendarmerie. and Communist supporters in the larger towns sometimes sent food to the hills_ Difficulties in geuing such supplies pasl the authorities pre vented the last named becoming a ma jor source. Other supplies, 100, could he oh. lained loca lly. Clothing. weapom and a mmunit ion in sig nifi ca nt quantities were secured by raids on Arroy and Gendarmerie stores, but a more lucrati ve source was the armed civilians who frequentl y sur rendered their weapons when COn fronted by strong opposi tion. Arms and ammunition were sometimes taken in hattI e, and on occasion de serters from the Army carried their arms over to the guerrillas. 1 n addi - tion. wag in supply discipline and often leCt ammunition sc,lltet'ed over positions. Local procuremen t. however, did not satisfy handit requ irenlen ts for equipment and ammuniti on. The major portion ()f items and clothing came from the sa tellites. Transportation was by mule trains sent norlh by thc hands to pick up their supplies. The most commonly used suppl y routes followed the Pj ndus rnnge. However, the Ver- mion-Pelion range was used 10 some exten t, and efforts were sometimes made to use other areas such as MOll rgana wes t of the Pindus.
Terrnin: the Guerrilla'. greate.1 a .. et Alter Ihree yel,,. 01 fighling-a return to rwrmlllcy The requirement lor transpori probably varied between one and two pounds per day for each guer- rilla opera liDg in and central Greece. This stems insignifical1l, but neither the supplies nor their quanti ty were insignificant. Without these supplies, which could not be ob tained locally, the guerrillas could not function etlectively. They were vital, therefore, to guerrilla opera tions. Fi ve thousand guerriHas ill' sou th and central Greece would have used 50 to 100 animal loads dail)'. Taking 120 lililes as the distallce from the base <l re<ls to the users, the lurn around lime was in the neigh horhood of two Thus. 700 to 1400 animals would have heen em, ployed constantly in this traffic. even il no allowallcc is made (or in transit. These wel'e allllillly quitl- high. J"'ulc trains were intercepted frequently by rhe Air Force or Arm)' units and damilged or destroyed. The problems involved in organ i/ing the J'Uulillg and protection of the suppl)' trains mm'ing between Ih<: base areas and the bands in cen tral and s()ulhern Greece were many. They were greatcst when the Arnly ",,'as active. During such times the bandits were expc,\ding more sup plies than normally. They were forced to aballdon Slores which cou ld not be carried. Tht:)' were unahle to requis.ition supplies tn arcas lhrough which thc)' might p:lssing. as thi s took. lime and provided information to the Army. Similarly raids upon (Owns or Army Slores were imprac- ticable. Finally. the mule trains from lhe north had greater dilliculty in getting through. and nOt infre lJuently the L<lllds were unable to keep their rendelvous with such trains. On top o thi!), greater num bers o( c<lsuahies required eV<tl'wltion to the nonh. On many occasions, bands expcri(:nced local and tempo- rary slwnages or supply due to (hc,;(; factors. Dilring lhe 1949 campaign. however, lhe operations of the .\ rm)' so reduced the cffectiveuess or the guerrilla supply s)'stem as to render it incapable o( meeting the mini- mum of the bands in soulll and central Greece. FOI' the hands operating near lhe nonhern frontier the patlcrn of the: supply operation was differenl. In Macedonia and Thrace-rich agri- (ultur<ll Jami..-th>: procurement of fo<Xlstutb. was no problem. Other da'-Sts of !lupply could be distributed so easily (rom the border that the dependelKe of the guerrillas upon local procurement Was reduced, A greater proportion of clothing, arms and ammunition came from the ate1lites than was the ca5E: in south and central Greece. In the defended bases 01 Vil.!ii and GrammO$ the guerrilla$ exercised complete control and aU rC$Ources of the region were at their disposal. There J, linle agriculture in these areas lhough, and as the demitv of troops \\;as high not all rations be procured .. locally. Likewise, there were few local li()urces of anns, am- munition and clothing. 1)' the support of 10,000 guerrillas in the base areas might ha\ie required as much as 50,000 pounds of sup' plies daih:, but delivery and distribu- tion wert comparalh"ely easy. As the pro\'ision ot .soup- plies the satellites was iUegal, it was conducted clandestinel" outside the base areas where traim the border under the cm'er of darkness and at remote points alcng the fromier. The bulk of the supplies, however. crossed the fron tier on the routes coyered bv the "itii and Grammos positions. Roads leading from Yugoslavia and Albania intQ these areas could accommodate not onJy animals but cans and motor yehides, and, since were pro- tenet! b,' the fortified areas ;outh or the bonier. the bandits enjoyed great freedom in [heir The receipt, storage and i distribu* tion of supplies for 10,000 bandits whhin the base areas and the for- wardi':g of supplies for 5,000 bandiu in routh and central Greece resulted in the acculHuialioQ of various logistical activities in the areas. Located there was the Director of the Central Ordnance of General Headquarters. There were exlmh'e food depots where the food was stored in houses on the oU15k.irts of ,-ill ages. Ammunition was stored in the open on the slopes of hiHs on both sides of roads where it was acceiSible. Among {he logisti- cal installations were (ailor shops, shoemaker shops. armories. saddlen. a base post office and a hospital. Other ;05raiJations included an Offi een'school, two training camps with a capatit) o{ 300 men each and a camp for prisoners of war. Sahllli'" .iII Vinually all hospital facilities in the routhern pan of the satellites were filled habitually with bandi{ wounded. Many camps were main- tained {or refugees from Greece. At !iOme of them rebel 6ghten were trained and with amu prior LO their departure for Greece. Not too much is kno,m concc:nting the me<:hanism through which aid "'-as provided. It is hud to deter- mine what roles the governmenlS played in this program or how much was done by the "iodeties of a nee to the Greek people." \"here Communism had only just emerged from a fe"oJutionary movement 10 become the Government. the line between official and quasi-0f6cial ac- tivity is indistinct. Non-military sup- plies may have been colle<:ted and moved (0 the frontier by [he several "committees for aWSlance to the Greek.s," but certainly an lOCieties of this nature ",,ere Government-spon- 5Ored. Purely military su ppJin. in all probabiHty '\\'ere provided direct- [he Th. Tito-Cominform rift Yugoslavia occupied a key pmi* lion in the provision a[ foreign aid '0 <he Greek guerrilla>, It had pivotal position geographically. Bul- garia was remOle from the area of greatest guerrilla activity. Yugoslavla Jay between Albania and Bulgaria. than that It completely .ur- rounded Albania 50 that the latter had no access to the USSR or other satellites except via Yugoslav terri tory. As the Gramm()$ area was adjacent to Albania, supplin moved to Greece through <his area h.d to paM through Albania. but this does not mean they had their WUKe there. On the con- trary, the gtea[er pan came from YugO!iavia. The Vitti position could be reached from either Albania or Yugoslavia. Prior to January 1949 [he bulk. of supplies, entering Vitsi came from Yugoslavia. During the month of January, however, suppliet from Yugosla"ia declined to atmost nothing and virtually aU supplies reo ceivcd after that date came from Albania. This and the low levels in certain dasses of supplin found it, the Viui and Grammos p(nltions after [he col1apse of [he guerriJb. defenll SUggeslS (hal the Tit<t-CominroTl rift so affected the supply or the "Democratic Anny" tJ'at was. by Ihe spring of 1949, no long. capable of carrying on operation .. 0 the scale of 1947 and 1948. Inti .... this may have been the proximal cawe of the guerrilla colla!"", TIl. CneIt N.HotuI A"", Supplies and were pm vided the National Army 011 du basis of authorized tables of equip ment. These tables provided fe\\ luxuries and were in some cases to( spare. The British had been unabh to meet all requirements. but thr m()$[ essential combat supplies ant" equipment had been provided. Wid U. S_ aid [he Army WlU completeh equipped by the middle 01 194. Thereaher procurement wudesigu(t: <0 k .. p it so equipped and supplied and to meet the requirements by increatel in the forces or in thel .llo .... nce&. Supply shortages pro!',. bly never aeriously affected the com bat efficiency of the Anny_ If so, rt was in any case fully equipped anti supplied according 10 the acceplt:d standards by the middle of t9-lt'l Thereafter there ..... ere no !ignificalll shortages. As regards the distribution of &UI" plies, <he Army had been h.nd; capped prior to the inception of the U, S, aid program by shor<g'!!'" in motor transport. \Vhen these shortages "'-ere made up it ""as dh, CQ,-ered that too much reliance had been placed upon motOTJ and that there was a greater Tequiremen t for animal transpon, one U. S. mission in the organization and training of animal transport and in <he 'umm .... of 1948 placed orden for mules. In June 1949 all infan try battalions were placed on the mountain unit establishment and all \'ehidn were withdrawn to the brigade mOlor transport platoon, Supplementing the animals organic to the units. 12 mule tranlport com' pania were organized. While these changH in the organization of trans- port increaSC'd the flexibility of tht, Arm) in its anti-guerrilla warfare, it would scarcely be neceuary to take the view that the Anny had previous ly been handicapped in iu oper. dons by inadequate meana for the transportation and distribution o{ supplies. 1'BE ANTI-BANDIT WAR By Col J.C. Murray PART V By Col J. C. Murray the Anti ConcluaioD AIR FORCES ON 10 AUCUST 1949 THE AIu.cy launched i15 long-awaited attack in the Vi lSi area. From the 6ru, light aircraft were over the area searching for, and attacking targelS in assisting the ground advance. By nightfall 169 sorties had been flown, higher by 63 than any other day in the waf The average daily sortie rate during the five days of the VilSi operation was 126. Again on 24 August, when the Army started the Jast large-scale at- tack of the war in the Mt. Grammos area, air was active. Following a day o[ sustained air operations by Spit- fires and C47 convened bomben. the newly fanned Helldiver (SB2C) Squadron, flying an JS-plane forma- tion, made its debut in combat. During the period 24 to 29 August, planes supported the Grammos at- tack with 826 sorties. During the six-day period perhaps 250 tons of bombs, rockets and napalm were de- Jivered against the guerrillas. The victory in Vi lsi was a result of {he effectiveness of artillery and air support and to a piece of unex- peCted luck in the unopposed occu- pation of a key terrain fearure by a group of CommandOs. The partici- pation of air in the Grammos battle was no le:s.s effective. While the:se two inStance!/. are not representative of the air effort throughout the anti- bandit war, they do afford at one time it useful measure of what was aa:omplished and an indication of what might have been accomplished. Air i pport of ..... "" toKes It is a truism today thal successful ground operations cannol be con- ducted without air superiority. But air superiority alone merely frees ground forces from the eilects of enemy air action. This favorable :here a new Grttk Air Force came into being. The Hellenic Bomber Squadron was employed, as a part of the RAl'. primarily in long range patrols in the Mediterranean. The Greek Air Force was not prepared by its wartime experience for its role in the anti-guerrilla war. Until late 1946 operational con- trol of the Greek Air Force remained under the RAF. while tive control was exercised by the Greek Air Staff, When it became necessary to employ the Air Force goi.... the bandits, the RAF "'lin- au1 program was instituted, Pattem of lir Ictioft By this time the pattern of air actioo was developing. Air opera- tions against the guerrillas were of two general types. The tint con- sh.ted of air operations aimed at "isolation of the battlefield." ever. an Greece was a batrlefield and the objective of such operations was simply the destruction of guerrilla forces. The $e(:ond type of air action was direct support of ground troops . Three techniques were employed Bandit War The defeat of the guerrillas w ......... de pouihle by their departure from proper guerrilla organization, and by 80 doing, they opposed weakness to 8tre"lrtb condition can be exploited tully only II the air has ,be capability 01 eflecti,,'ely supporting the ground forces. No one questions the neces- aity of achieving air superiority nor the value of interdiction. However, at such time, when aircraft can be employed most effectively in the di rect support. there must be an effec- tive technique for the delivery of such support, In Greece the infantryman paid the forfeit for past neglect of the dO:St: support problem. There was no aerial war, Control of the air was achieved by defaulL The primary- indeed the: only task of the Royal HeHenic Air Force-was the attack of ground targets either independ entlyor in conjunction \'toith gr9und units. While: independent attacks were of great value. there were many occasions when aircraft could have been employed most ad .... antageously in direct support of ground troops. Destruction of guerrillas by any and all means was the objective, and the air effort must be Valu,ned in this lighL ,\Va$ the air et(ort. complete with its manpower and material problems. warnnted by the results? In seeking the answers. familiarity with the background of the RHAF i$ essential. History and composition of RHAF Follo""'ing the Allied withdrawal from GrC'e(:e in 1941, many Greek ainnen made their way to. Egypt quished operational controL This forced a reorganilation of the Air Force. At this time it consisted of 58 obsolete aircraft and approxi- mately 291 pilots (all veterans of war service; no pilot training had been undertaken since the liberation). An order was placed with the UK for 250 war-surplus aircraft. Deliv. ery was expedited because of the bandit waf and was completed dut ing the summer of 1947. This order included Spitfire fighters. Wellingron bomben. C.41 transports and liaison craft. The WeHington bomber was found to be inoperable in Greece, and they were grounded. The middle of 1947 then, found the RHAF with a strength of about 5,000, or which 400 were flying per" sOnnel. Its units were: two fighter squadrons of Spitfires, one liaison squadron of Harvards (T -6), Austen and L-Ss. one transport squadron of C47. and AruolU, one refresher Bigh' of Spitfires and other types; and one projected fighter squadroo. Aircraft on hand were sufficient to support thee squadrons; training 01 pilotS had been resumed and some 50 cade .. had fwl completed ad vanced training in England. Schools were established to train pilots. chanics and electrical. hydraulic, air- frame and signal technicians. Train- ing was conducted under the vision of the RAY De1egation. sisting of 15of6cen and ISO men. It was at this juncture that the U. S. in conducting the first type of tions, Fif$l. there were pre-planned strikes on targets localed in by ground intelligence or by aerial pholography. The second. armed re- connaissance. was nor-many COIl- dueled only when information catcd the probability of finding a profitable largel. as .. ben I:atp;< enemy formation was mown to be on the march in a given locality. The third technique. and the one most commonly employed, was to loca'. targe .. by the employmenl of reconnaissance aircrafl. These re- mained on station until the arrival of strike aircraft to guide them ooto the largel. Independent air operamo. A high percentage of the total air effort went into attacks of this type. They were delivered against trt.lOpl on the march. in bivouac or in con- centrations for attack 01' defense. They were delivered against bandit headquarters, bandit-held towns. supply installations and defensive posicions. They tended to restrict daylight movement of guerrillas. They harowed his concentrations and punished his forces during with drawal from action. Tbe only ing facton to this ipdependent air campaign were the availability of pilou.. suitable aircraft and the difi.. culty of target identification. TJ:iese operations were being conducted over Greece. not hostile territory,
Cuerrilitu, haggard and haraned -lhe tables hatllurned Such shortag .... s had, in Greece. a grC:Hcr significance lhan they might h:we had in a more highly imJU5' trialized coulIlry where sk.illed pt:.- sOllllcillli15ht have been dr:tfted from induslry .lnd where could have supplied (he L/cililics equipment. I\'ot ill Green:. Indusll'Y wuld supply fc\\' of the skiJls required hy the Air Force .. \ir- craft lechniLians had fO be trained and lhe n\'eragc recruit had h:ld lillie prnious experiellce which would aid in him into a lcchui t.:a l spccialisL (he con- st11l ction of ;1ir6elds exceeded the C:d - o( the post-war economy of Litllc cou ld b..: done with rcspt'ct to the procuremenl o f equip- mCIH and lhe dc\-clopmcol of f:u.:i li- tit's except through the British )oris- sinn. Unforlunately, the nef'd for air power coincided in with tht: Government"s di scovery that it could no longtr bear the financial burden of aiding Greece. A pro gram of aircraft procurc;ment was initialed and supported until the li. S. coult.! ta ke over the re_sponsi - bilil,Y. While it was an adequa te initia l program so far as numbers of aircrnft were concerned, the spare pan; j>1"O!-;T!\nl did not discoullt suffi- the maintenancc cap.lhiliLies of the RHAF and the air effort soon 5uffert:d as a rc!>"Uit. t i. S. assumption of rlllanciaL re- spollsibi li ty. nine momhs after tbe eml oC flritish aid. did not result in any hilid new air program. The re- for lhe orga nizalion and tritining of die RHAF (which implies thl' arrcpt::wce of Ll high degree of for its performance in baltle) remained for lhe most part with the RAF Delegation, whereas the rcsponsihiJit)' for providing lhe IlleanS was vestel1 in the American Mi ssion. A similar arrangement was found to be satisfactory as regards the Navy where the prior provision hr the British of long.l ife capital items was the domi ll am considera- tion. As the .'\ir Force. how- ('vcr, it scn icf' wlu:rc material is a paramoullt and where equipnlclIl consists of relatively com plica ted OInd short li,ed items, it is ullsouncl to separate responsibility ror perform:llll...e ion hall ic from con- tml of the material means to im. prove that performance. The RAF Delegation was in the unfortunate position of being responsible for lhe opera ting efficiency of the RHAF, while the U. S. Mission was in a posltion to monitor any recommen- dation for its improvement entailing the expenditure of funds. This ex pl"L"!lSC\ the relationship in the worst lC.:rms and may be mislead- ing. The fact remains that indeci- sion and hate measures are inherenc in any such division of responsibi l- ily. Some of the factors wbich mili- lateel agailHl getting maximum re- turn from the air enort have been enulll cr:Hetl <1bove. The)' induded lack of aggressive hadt>rship. Com- munist iufiltralion. separation of re- sponsibility from comrol of the Illeam to acmmplish the missi on and the illadc:qtlilcy of the existing nuclem to effen a rapid and efficient expansion. The last nantcl1 com- prhed a host of shortages of all kill th: pilots. technicians. facifilin. equipment <llId know- how. There " ere '1(llIi(ioll<.l 1 C01llrihutOI,)T fact'JI"S. which wcre: (I) the limited suit ability of aircraft, the of effeni\' e and (3) lim- il ed {"(lIllprdu:n.llioll of the GIIXlbHi lies of close suppon aircraft. Limited suitability of aircraft Except for the C.'17 COI\\"Cl"lcn bom,her. tlte Spilfire was the only ai r- C1";.fl a,aibhle [or the aLlC1c k of grou nd targets lIllli! jmt five before the war was terminated in lhe sl'lolld CrallllllOs ballie. It was then Ihat Ihe Sfl2C m:lde its debut. Thi s event prcsaged a vast impro,e- mell l in tht eITeui\"elles5 of air oper- adom just as the cufl'lin dropped. Forty-nine SB2C!> "'ere purch.lSed' from surplus stock!! o( Ihe U. S. Na,' Y" A comparison of the charac- terislics of this aircraft and the Spil. fire indicatcs how fOrluitous this de- velopment was. The Spitfire had limited enl1uranct:. limited ammuni- tion capacity, limited nbil ity to lo- cate the target :)Ol1 gre:ncr vulner- ability 10 groulld fire. 'While lhe SB2C 'vaseqllipped with dive brak.es. enabling it to make a steep.angled l1ive attack and a structural design which permitted highangle rocket firing and sll"iifing. Ihe Spitfire had limited ability to atrack a ground larget at an effective altitude and in an effective ang'le of glide. The Sn2C: had an al1dilioilal ;ld,;ulI:lge in low stall speed and in iu ahility to take off and land on short runways. From this brief comparison it is apparellt that a lIIuch hiHlter rcturn could have been obt:tint:<l {rom the air effort had a more suitable type been available 10 RHAF carlier. Conspicuous by its ahsenee from the arsenal or the RHAF Wa!> the light homber. In Augusl 19'18, the RHAF (:onvened a certain numher of C47s inlo bombers. Obviousl)" it could not equal in performance a designed {or Ihis purpose. Air -ground technique The rul1imentary character of the air suppOrt technique in use at the time was disclosed in the Romcli opertltion jn April and May 1948. In that operation, in which lhrfe divisions and supporting Iroops, as well as some Commando and NDC units. were employed over many hun- dreds of square miles of area, only live c:c l' ;cIJif.: 01 (fil l, "ilCr;Ii( \q'lC: av:\il ;Ibl e III lli e j,),]l/lIlld IIllih."1 hn(' werc e lllpll Jyc.; d Ipll \\ iLil Lll(" :IWIlIIL IJ:lllal iOI1 \ , blll :It IJI igadc alld hC:ldqu:lll <: r, . Vl:lli( 1t:"llllJlllltl"d ra tli 'l' \1('11; I)J lil[ll: fir Ill) v;clll(" ,ilIfT tlrt "Y wc re )"f 1:1111'IJIIll(l" il i , IIflt 1] 11(1<-1 [hnc 1'00/ I 1" " "'"lIi e and poor IIU-, lf h 0 1 [:'II-;t:t' :wel flu"udl y 1(1)01'""' In;(lu("'HI )' lIull iflCel til <: c UOIl. 0, ..... ;" 111'11<: [hall ;J d<:ruiell fY ill , oruI IIIIllic;tlioll'_ It j, all indi - (;]lioll "r thc 1,1( k 01 or nJOlrIlandcr,. Oil lhl" alld ill til e dir :dike, or the..: 01 IIl <: air we:ll,oll " Il .. e..:vj(1cncc thal the (;xi, tillg" air p(Jlellli;tl \\"<1<; lIlll IJc inJ..{ lully dt:vcl0l'cd" \1,,1(" ovcr, IOllg :1'" (hi.., (OIHlilioll IT lIIaill <:d 1I]{'rc I'";",, I IJ:lIl( (" thai the ad\':J III ;q,{C o( lllfll"(" ('xlI"lI",i\(" (Os" 1'II Iitaiion HI lhl: l-\ue..:nill:I\' I. y ,I J.; n::llt:t" diu] I ill lilt" :tir wou ld 11<: r<:: di lt:d" It lat c ill I' I-Ix I,d oll" till" more dd(OC"" ill Ihi, lioll h,,,) h(1.: 11 (OH"I("( tltl. 0\11111-' 1';1( l. ;.ir '"I'I'"n \iJ.;ll;d lI11il S lllOJ(' wi de ly d i!ouihlll Cl 1. Hilt (;\' c.: n 1I1t".; n til(' I, asi .. "f t1j,lri hllti oHo fllle 1'(01' lir igade, wilh a a t I he el;v; , ;,," hc<tdquancr" w,,, in,l(lcqll;ltl"" Fail - ure to rrovide air sign:!1 unils to the COJl)ntill1t!O ,l',roups prior 10 the of 19'19, Ilr to an"c pt ,til of the of tht: r' Iiding forces, to "dt! to tht: evidenre lh;H the air pOlential wa'i 1I 0l rll\ly arpreciated. Thc Commando gr"oups had hec: n <; antiguerrilla for ces" They were c llIl'l (ly<:d, h owever, in mi'isiom which 'i.Carccly justified the o f special uni ts. The Briti sh Mission ativocaLed th:l t they he r eorgani l.cu as pursuil forces (0 range widel y and rapidl y through the moulllainouc; coun try in pursuit o ( the elusive guerrilla" They were 10 hc air supported, air supplied and, insofar as practicable, airborne nnd air transported. T he union of the capabilities of tact ica l air with those of the raiding forces would have multiplied thei r effeClivcnesso Such a union might we ll have produced the most effec- tive synthesis of means for conduct i ng nea rly all phases of the nnti- guerrilla war. except toe deli berate .. Hack oC fortified areas. Summary "I 111 "11 " \, 01\ , I , igllilil a lit C:J ilurc 10 \1\lIalilt" the whi( It lay III 1111 1("1 ("X ld"i l:n ifll) f,] lil t" \\(\Ikll( "" !ll Ihe j.!,llCI I ilb 0- hi, 1;ll k !II ail ,llld po,iti\'<: Ill c, n" to flllld l: ll ir. F:Jld lY t<:(iJlli(lun \\'el"e {"IUIIIl{"d 1)( "(, 111" " 01 thi, taillllC as lI"(:n: ;1I "'!1 ]Jl/!1 1 !I1ainl (:llallll.:, th<: (oIHi/llll'd "'" o j :lilC i",dl 01 liluiled ;Jllt! ,III thc othc) Jaetors wili , h 1(J III J(,d (" eel c" ora rul! return (III ih ill\(;\ IW<: 1I1 jll tll <: :tir. It ...... as biluH.:, tOil, whic II IJrc\Tlt t<:d the ;.t IOt:lli h ll t il IIII' a il 01 :c grcatcr [lIn', lion "I Ihl o tot:ll <: lIorc III jUdJ.; IHCltl tuday it HlIl q 1,," kl'JII ill lIIiHCI Ih,lt the plan. Ili ll).\ III I II] t ;' !!li -J.; !l c rrilJ:. war ("{)II . III :1 ,, (II C I",,, jl)!! 01 thrce "nlllla) (;11111' ,11).\11 pt;"I". ( "; 11 h of ...... hie h WCiS Army raitiin:,: purries c:xpc("l( "d 10 "t' ("oluiuslve" This, toupln l willi (hc that aid funds \"CI"(; "jI \H lljll iawd fI]] ,III annual wi(h liltliled ;",uralllC of fur- ther ('oll lln; ( IHc lIl.s. did nol promote IOllgoll..'rl ll ,,1""lIing. : \II }O substallti<ti int.T<:; I'C i ll lhc 3il.c o r improvcment in the dlcoivene'\.., of (he Air Force c() uld nOI havc bee n effec.:teu within the span o f a few monlhs. H.<ttl the ullimale extent a nd dur;)tion of hos tilitics heen when the b<tn- dits rlrst became activc in 1946 or in 194 i. plallning for the Air Force mighl have been approached in a diHc r<:nt manner. The fOTt:go lJlg discl.lssion in no way the great advances in the of the Air Force be- tW("CII PHfi :!lId I !H!), J"nJlll :lllIIm t IUlthillJ,{, til t Ail Flm c dcvc! " IljJ<:(1 til Ilu o poinl \111(' 1<: it {I, uld dcli vcr d ll"lti v(: /\lthotll!,l , Ihe 111111111(:1 f,l 1I0w II ,lIul Ihc Illllliher 01 tl) lh oj I>olllh\ tlruppcII do Ilot ill th(: IlI'I(:lvcs i udi ( ;Jl C thc (Ir ail" J.;t: JlUilU" progn."" /];H/ beet] madc in IIlhl"l" ell<:c lil"{:ll(:"'s of thc RHAF Wa., (lIle 01 lhl: clIO( i,i v(." fanor, in IIl <: Vil,i alld
NAVAL FORCES Pattern of naval operations in the anti-guerrilla war There no ..... a r at durillJ.; the g ue rrill;l uprhing:" Hn ..... evcI, Ill) 1lllIHhc r (If ll]ell ("(JII. U"jhUh:d mUlt! IH tI .. : IIhim:'lc vic- .. Jupported by RHN LOry tha n lhme o( the Royal Hel- leni c N a vy. Its rol<.: was Ilot a dra mati c one. On an average of about Caul' t imes a week.. ships were cd led upon to d e liver p,unrlre ashore 10 assist in the defc m(' or a bcl('<lgucred COilS tOil vill age ()I" to an Army unit operating ne:ll" tll<: OCttimes guerrill :ts would or captu re a caiq ue and it would he n ecessary ror the Navy to go ill pllr of it. Somc limcs a I1;)V,11 la nd- ing pa rty would be put ashore to inveslig:,ue reponed g uerrilla activ- ityo Freq uentl y, Army raiding panics were embarked and landed to make such searches or to make ancillary landil1gs in conjunction with larger op erations ashore. On one occasion ,
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Ruonlllrllcrion: lJabotage had taken. it, toll the I,-as ca lled upon to par- ticipat e in a hlrgc-IiGtl a mphibious landing. The da) -lo-f.by dudes of ,he RH:\ ','cn: the pat rolling of Gl"e( i;ln II and the provi!ol on o( sea uOl mpon for l he 1II()"cmem o( tmop" tlnd slJppiiC's. Thus the 1'\avy m ... i11l a ined {oll ll vi o( Lhe !>t"fI$ sur rounding Lreccc, denying lhose \fate" t the gt, r rri ll as. By pro\' id- ing sea it in the fILII exploitation of lhe ;tth:1l1Iagcs which accrued to Ihe thro ugh ils LOllllnand or the sea. Recent history, size and compo!>ition of the Royal Hellenic Navy T he ::'\a\'Y at the inception of hos- tili ties was in better shape than e ilher the .. or the Ail' Force. Unlike thelll, it had been able 10 withdra \\' most of its forces \\'hen Greece fell to the Germans. Thus it h<td, on r c; lUrn [0 Greece ,,'j th the exil e gO\'erument, a good nucleus o( experi enced ;lnd ratings. The \\'arlirnt: lic I\'i th the Royal :'\a\'\' 'Ll' lll a inta i ned. . .... British :"\lal:".1 )[i::..sion has estab in Gteece and the LTK lo<tned Greece enough ships to lIl e t; l its re quircllIents: 1.1ter, additional ships, particularl y l)pes, These ... hips IIelt h:If(Uy fir>; ! li nc and their upk('cp requ ired COIHinuous maime- nalH.C - i! SCI iotls liisadYalltage since the r.c-nH:IIlS hold '1abOl:lgcd the reo pair f"dlil ies of the X:\I' Y on their withdraw",l from Cn:ece. The ships, ne\'enheless, were adequate [or their me during the ;Illtii);mdit W<lr. The number of allocatcd to the i'\avy was nOt great, bUl it was adequate. Up until the lime t he U. S. took ovrr its logis ti ca l support the strength o[ the RHN W:\5 about 12.00U. In early 1948 thi s was in- c.rea.!)cd fronl 12,000 LO 13,500 in order to permit an increase of patrol - ling and number of ships available for the tl'<lnspon i ng of troops and supplies, Value of control of sea communications The auvantages the Government enjoyed through its monopoly of nin ;,tl pO\\'er w(' re of great signill . c<t nn:, for Greece is ui stinctl y mari- liml:. Except for its long, nonhern floillier il is insu lar. lls highly in- dented co;:mline is nearly 2,000 miles in lellgth, and no inl and point is more than 75 miles from thf' sea. It is bisected by the Gul[ of Corinth \\ hi ch lIli:lhs Pel oponnesus, south of the Gulf, an i,l:lnd by itself. The Grecian island", moreo"er, constit ute .1 substantial portion of (hc total ter- ritory. Becillise of its maritime charac.:lt"r, an d bc( ause oC its poor land communications, the sea has been especi:,lly import a nt to trans- ponation and cOlllmunica[ions in Grcccc. The wictesprt"ad use of sea transpOrtatjoll, in 111m, has reslLlled ill the neglcCt of lanel communica- tions LO such ;In extent that even be- fore \Vf)rld War II no significant militLlry could ha\le been toncilu.:lcd without reCOUr'ie to the sca. During the occupation the rail and road .. udl a'i tht")' were, wcre rc nli(:T(.: d by sahotage::. Re had .\can:ely hefore the more program of 'I .. hot:tge 'ponsorcd by lhc was inaugurated, L'uller thc,,; <in.um- control of lhl: wa ttrs sur Greece afforded all almosl decisive ad\'antage, in (Oll( n:te lernu it meant thal lhe gO\'t"rnment could move ils troops and freely [mill OTIC part of Gn.:C({; to another, \\' hich gav(, iL grecu mohili ty. The "Del1l()(.r;llit Army," on the other hand, \\,<1<, rC'Ilrined to land transpon <1nd was deni ed strategic mohilil)' . 11 may be said that the (aClor of I..Ommand of the se:. has bcen as signed LOa much imponanu', since rhe guerrillas had no na\'al capabili. ty. True, but it wa'i herallsc lhal eapabilit)' W.h denied them by the Navy. Save for the Navy, the guerril. las cOldd have gained and a limited conlrol 01 the sea lanes. Tha t they could get of ;"lny of the hundreds of Cliques whi ch ply lhe walen sUITounding Greece \I'as often demonslrated. Had they heen able to operate (ho:,c the coursc o[ lhe war would have been very different. I nstan(cs of at- tempts to use from Albania [or Sllpply purposcs occurred in the Peioponnesm in Seplember 1948, Had there heen no I'estraining in- Ouence in the form of a Grec:k l\"avy, it is e\'en possible that armed \lesse\s might ha\'e found their ,,'ay into guerrilla hands. Patrolling was carried out to en- force shipping and sailing regula. lions, :md suspicious veS$Cls wert taken jmo custody for ill\lestiR:ltion. Some o( lhe specific objecti\'es of patrolling directed against the guer- rillas 'were : (I) Pn:"enling escape (2) Prc\'eilling reinforcement CS) Pre\'eming resupply (4) Pre"enting reinfestation of cleared areas (5) I so lating gucrrilla concentrations (6) Keeping the Communi.st virus froll) spreading to areas whi c.h had not been affened p.-e'o'iously by PT{" \-ellling the mO"f'lllcnt of agenh and organizers (7) Guarding the islands around Greece on which priwners of war were interned, U.ited S_ assistance to RHN Since the Greek. :-':avy was meeting its operational requirements with the equipment then on hand, the tJ. S. Naval Group. upon its arri\'al in Greece in the summer of 194i. de- duced that its miMion could be ful- filled by pJ'Oviding the minimum supporr. An exception (.0 this policy was made in the case of six patrol crah procured from U.S, naval sur. pluses to permit an extension of paltolHng. The Navy Group sored the repair and construction of the facilities of the damaged 1'\3\'31 Ba.se at Salamis Island. as thes.e were required to enable the Navy to keep its ship$ operating. Assistance was given to the development of training facilities at Sacaramanga """hieh were required in order to bring training standards to an acceptable level. As a result of this pollcy to limit expenditures, the end of the ... 'at found the Greek Xav", with no better equipment than it started with. whereas both the Ann\' and the Air Force had. for all practical purposes. been completely re-equipped. CONCLUSIONS On the political. psychologicaJ and economic frollts. facton which con- tributed to the defeat of the riHas were; I. The British .nd U. S. Procram. .f aid to GlftCe The presence o[ British ltOOpS in Greece at the onset of guerrilla op- erations exercised a re5training ftuence on the USSR and the lites. preventing direct intervention in Greece and open aid to the guerw riHas. U. S. patticipation strength- ened this restraining inDuence. The British and American aid programs sustained the government of Greece and enabled it to mobilile, equip and supply large military forces. ""hile at the same time Slaving off the collapse o[ the national economy. American interest, moreo\'('r, tended to fill the vacuum when UK alone could no longer provide sup- port on the required scale, American assistance Was provided O'n such a scale as to improve the morale of the Greek nation by giving it hope that peace might be restored and thai a degree o[ e<"onomic stabilin' might be once again achieYed. 2. n. Tito-C:-inlwm rift Yugoslavia held a phOlal geo- graphical position among the three !.3tellile countries along Greece', northern frontier, YugotJa\' Com- munism quite naturally. Iherefore, had taken the lead in the directed aggTe$$ion against Gree<:e. The Tito-Cominform rifr hroke down the mechanism to provide support to the guerrillas and resulted in a division "'ilhin the Ie.denhip ot .he guerrilla.. Al- though this dh'ision was raoh'Cd in favor of the Cominfonn. the rilt tended to deprive lhe guerrilla move- ment of the conviction of immediate purposefulness. Moreover. the lishment of a new mechanism for providing omislance to the guerrilla! was scarcely practicable owing to the ley geographical posi.ion 01 Yugo- The full implications of the Tilo--Cominform rift were nOt felt imrnediately. but were experienced progressively from the faU of 1948 until July ]949. at which time the Greek.ugosla\' border was dosed by order of Tho. Tbe Tito-Corninform rift was. to some extent, a product of British and American aid to Gree<e. Had Tho felf that the guerillas could win in Greece with attendant encirde- ment of YugO!ilavia Communist g<wernments, it is doubtful that he would ha\'e had the courage to stand his ground in (he dispute with the Cominronn. Thus. the Tito-Cornin (orm rih which aided Greece in the antibandit war was itself, to a cer- tain extent, it by-product o[ British and American aid. particularly the lauer. On the military front, facton con- tributing to the defeat of the guer- rillas were: The ,ppointm.nt of GeM,,1 IS Commlnder in Chief (If the Govemmlftt Forces The appointment of General Papagos resulted in the fuller de- \"{;Iopmcnt of the combat potential or the Greek Anlled Forces, By the relier and di'imissal of unsuitable commanders and b,' emphasiLing (ontinuous. aggressiH> offensive oJ)" er.:uion, against the guerrillas, Gen- eral Papagos used the eXlsting miH tan fOfCe5 more effenh-eh.. There no increaM' in {he >,[rength of th(' armed forces during his tenure. Jr ''''it.'' tbat {he for(("$, as they existed; were used more effectively. Continuous pres- sure kept the guerrillas on the move. inDicted heavy and af- forded them no opportunity fo re- supply or replace casualties. Thus. their relative combat power 1y declined during the six months period which pIeded their final coll.po<. The PapagO$ appointment brought the pJanning and advisory function of fhe U. S. and British Missions inw their o""n as {acton contributing CO the vkwry. n. T'tIo-C:-holorno rift The Tito-Cominfonn rift reduced the amount of military aid available 10 .he guerrillas. By January 1949 supplies furnished through Yugo- slavia had fallen oft to a mere trickle. There are indications that small anus and artillery ammunition may have gone into short s.upply prior to the final (ollapse of the guerrilla op- erations. The finat bJow to the guer- fiHas which resulted from this rift was the dosing of the Greek.\'ugo- day frontier in July 194!1 This de- prl\,M the guerrillas of the effe({il.'e use of approximately 30 percent of their fighters and denied them the use or rhe regions north of the frontier as a protected manem'er area, Supply shortages and man- power 1000se!> resulting from the Tito- Cominform rift may its 6calion as the proximate cause or the guerrilla coHapse, The ""mal .b.tndonme.t of guerrilb tatOO by lite "Dtmocratic Anny" The tendenc\' of the "Democratic Army" during }'948 and 1949 towards a mllitarr ",'hich depended lor its S\l(cess upon the organilation of Jarger formations and the employ- ment of military lactics, im- plied a growing reliance upon mili- tary Coree alone. Vnder the existing condition!'. such development played into [he hands o[ the go\'ern- menl The guerrillas were op- posing weakness to strength, The decisi\'e defeat of the guerrillas made possible by their depanure from proper guerrilla organilation and tactin in their effort to ddefHI the base areaSc along the northern fromier and the gathering of their one-tilltt: Somali hands into larger (onnatiom, ranging in she up to Ihe di\"isJon. - , INSTRUCTIONAL SUPPORT BRANCH' - 1 st Specia! Forces Schoo; - t I- d :; -t f , , ". ' . ,