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Locke and the "Dissolution of the Ego" Author(s): Ernest Tuveson Reviewed work(s): Source: Modern Philology, Vol.

52, No. 3 (Feb., 1955), pp. 159-174 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/435542 . Accessed: 15/02/2013 08:20
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LOCKE AND THE "DISSOLUTION


ERNEST TUVESON

OF THE EGO"'

1 This paper is part of a study of aspects of Locke's influenceon theoriesof art and on writersin the eighteenth century.
2

the men of lettersof the eighteenth Locke was 'the philosopher,' century, somewhatas Aristotlehad been for the schoolmen."2The duo of Newton and Locke always appears as the revolutionary heroeswho dominatethe beginnings of the "modern"age. Yet it has been the case with both that much of theirinfluence on creative artists, as well as on ideas about art, remainsobscure,for,like the largerpart of an iceberg,it lies beneaththe surfaceofthings.In the present paper I shall tryto suggesta fewpointsof that influence, on the "new concentrating model" ofthemindwhichemerges, by implication as well as explicitly, from Locke's writings on the mentalprocesses. Therewillbe no attemptto enterintothe oftechnical manyand vexatiousproblems and psychology, but ratherto philosophy see the effects that Locke's epistemology produced on the commonman's idea of himself and hisfellows: thatidea which, of most poets,novelists, and even necessity, criticswere to use as the basis and much of the verymaterialof theirworks. A reasonforthe actual effectiveness of Locke's system-its abilityto win almost universalacceptance withina few years, as opposed to the enmity and uproar Hobbes stirredup-is the fact that, like

IT

I. THE NEW MODEL HAS

OF THE MIND

been said that "for Addison, and

chap. xi, sec. 1 (firstpublished, 1934). The comprehensive study of Lockian influences is Kenneth MaceenthCentury(New Haven, 1936). For substantiation of statements in the text about the triumphof Lockian epistemology,referenceis made to MacLean's work.
[MODERN PHILOLOGY, February, 1955]

Basil Willey, The Seventeenth Century Background,

Lean,

John Locke and English Literature of the Eight-

the GloriousRevolutionitself withwhich he had much to do, he compromised. He succeeded in producinga theoryof the mind whichretainedwhat most men desired while it excluded,seemingly, what theyfeared. There weretwo extremes to be mediated. One was thefamiliar, crudemechanism of represented byHobbes. The philosopher Malmesburyhad made an overhastyatall dreams, temptto explainall sensation, all thought,in termsof purelymaterial, physiologicalchanges in the body, produced by particlesof matteroutside impingingon the matter of the organism. Connections of these impressions,produced in fortuitous sequences,give riseto all our notionsof relations.According to his theory(to which he himselfdid not strictly adhere), thereis nothingelse: no separatesoul, no livingbeingat the heart of it all, aware of itselfand of its awareness. It was all verymaterialand mechanical and, the age rightly felt,false. This was an age ofextremes in philosothe mind phy. The problemof bringing intorelation witha physical worldwas becoming steadily more acute. Some, like Descartes, resortedto the desperate expedientofa radicalsplitbetweenphysical and "pure" intellection; he "imagination" idea could,he says, have onlya confused as image of a chiliagon, for example, whereashis mentalconception is clearand distinct: "And thus I clearly recognize that I have need of a particulareffort of mindin orderto effect the act ofimagination, such as I do not requireto underof mind stand, and this particulareffort the difference which clearly manifests

159

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Hobbes had After character. exists between imaginationand pure in- transcendent and his the best versionof theory and imagin- written Thus perception tellection."3 Locke wrote yearsbefore ing had become divorcedfrom"thought" less thantwenty the draftof his Essay concerning -and this in the age that was witnessing the first John Smith dethe great renascenceof the senses in the Human Understanding, forfaithin and reli- clared: "That that Mental facultyand call forobservation, is so we judge and discern ance on facts as revealedby seeing; and, powerwhereby beinga Body,that it mustretract indeed, in many ways Descartes's own farfrom from all Bodily operaitself if and withdraw markedly, systemofnaturecontributed to this result. The Descartes tion whensoeverit will nakedly discern indirectly, of the mindled to "hypotheses"-- Truth."4 Like the CambridgePlatonists theory of the participation he stressed attempts to make perfectmental con- in general, structs,on the basis of some sense data, the humanmindin the divineone. In the The highest knowledge,that of the Deity, which would solve all difficulties. mind,forexample,could by "pure" intel- imaginationcan only breathe a "gross lectionarriveat a completesystemof the dew upon the pure Glass of our Undereven of ordiof standings."All knowledge, Newton'scelebrated universe. rejection of as mustfinally be thought hypotheses typified the distrust that narythings, greetedthis kind of thingand, by impli- somethingfar removed from sensation, cation, this kind of epistemology.Des- even thoughit may be initiatedby sense ofthe "vortices"soon experiences. cartes'sown theory was an alA resultofthisdisagreement became an object of scorn. Hobbes was right in assuming that men wished to most unbelievable confusionand comLord withthe "phantasms"ofthe plexityin the area of epistemology. workdirectly for of example, in a power in the mind. No longer Herbert Cherbury, imagining Locke tries to unwork to which were they content with the traditional refers, ininto which the knot view that the "phantasms" merely tangle perception, and thoughtas a whole had spire,so to speak, the mind to create its knowledge, has manybrilliant own "intelligible"ideas: the mind must got.5Whilehis treatise which Locke did not do justo the restricted with and be workdirectly insights-to it is almost unreadable tice-nevertheless the real which sensations world, represent alto a few the worldin whichwe actuallylive. patientspecialists, and, except another most incomprehensible.The weakest was formostthinkers Yet there and Platonists and equally impelling,even though ap- pointabout the Cambridge their of their was those mind need. The generalpersuasion parentlycontradictory, as livingand moral in obscurity.Their attempts to solve the must be preserved As an problemsof epistemology werehopelessly the sense of having responsibility. the deNot without reason did manyof unusable. extreme perhaps,against reaction, their volumes their of neo-Plainflux an on contemporaries regard sense, pendence tonic opinions stressed more than had as cloud castles. Yet thiswas the timeof the riseof the the divine,and hencesuprascholasticism 4 The Immortality of the Soul, chap. iii, in The Cammind's the of nature knowledge sensory, bridge Platonists, ed. Campagnac (Oxford, 1901), p. and ethics.Even 120. of God, religious truths, SDe veritate, trans. Meyrick H. Carre (Bristol, took on a mentaloperations the ordinary
ophy, trans. Elizabeth Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (Cambridge, 1931).

aMeditation

VI of Meditations

on the First Philos-

and hy1937). On the attitude toward Descartes see my article, "Swift and the Worldpotheses JHI, XI (1950), 54 ft. Makers,"

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"new philosophy,"with its rejection of occult qualities in the physicaluniverse. were wonder,the transcendent, Mystery, and esout ofkeepingwiththe newspirit, going out of fashpecially was authority oftheplanetsno longer ion. The hierarchy had any reality,and yet a hierarchical conception of the soul still held sway. Atomism was beingrevivedas thebasis of physics,and the whole systemof "matter" and "form"whichhad prevailedfor and to whichthe phiso many centuries losophy of the mind was necessarilyattunedwas antiquated.The neweremphathe sis was not on theself-existent "form," but on the processesof matfinalreality, ter describedby natural laws. This new was givingmen a feelscience,moreover, a sense of and security, ing of certainty whichhad the greatorder, understanding to a large extentbeen lackingin the first The sense of dissolupart of the century. ofaimless triumphant, tion,ofmutability fluxat the heart of things,of skepticism destroying, which Spenser, Donne, in their Browne,and many othersreflect variousways,was giving way to a triumph of "common sense." Newton seemed to the completethe work of re-establishing cosmosin a provable,universal, and, best of all, comprehensible system. The relias Newtonand ofsuchscientists giousness Boyle showed,too, that the new model of the universe would prove more surely than ever beforethe existenceand wonMaker. of a beneficent derful government Yet the work was incomplete.Men's restsupon in theuniverse senseofsecurity It besides cosmology. anotherfoundation is necessaryfor them to have a correYet thiswas notaepistemology. sponding Newton'sworkhad evenafter blylacking, been largelycompleted.It is really very to guess what the average,fairly difficult about man of 1690 thought well-informed the operationsof his mind. No doubt he

Aristohad some kind of watered-down telian notions,but we can suspecthe felt with them. We a vague dissatisfaction as to whatthesame kind have no problem about ofman,a fewdecadeslater,thought the mind: his ideas were substantially thoseof Locke. For Locke's workgave to and to many succeedhis contemporaries the preciousgiftof a coing generations herentand understandable way ofvisualof theirintellects. Not izing the working fact is the evidence, the least remarkable that with which one meets continually, everyone appeared to have read someUnlike Freud in thingof Locke himself. our own time, whom few seem to have read to any extent, although this is a "Freudian" age, Locke was knownin his ownwords.The reasonis that his system, was one like that of the new philosophy, mindscould grasp,at that quite ordinary least in main points. The great wave of optimism and vigorous self-confidence that moves so remarkablythroughthe eighteenthcenturyperhaps owes somethingof its impetusto thisfact. Locke's new model of the mind conservedand unitedthe elements whichthe age desired. The rejectionof authority, were represented the faithin experience, by the rejectionof innate ideas. Propositionsdo not come packaged,so to speak, nordoes themindhave potentialthoughts waitingto be broughtout by experience as the developerrevealsan exposed film. On the otherhand, there is no cumbersome attempt to explain all thoughtby "local motions"in the body,as in Hobbes -no "decaying sense" or the like. The solutionwas to give to the mind,not the ideas,but thepowerto make ideas. Henry More had suggested something partlylike this.Thereis in the soul,he says,a "powin a "boniform er" manifested Faculty," the very "Eye of the Soul." Thus the is a matthinking power,it is suggested,

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us do diversely ourorgans, the affect He regarded surround ter of seeing relationships. and is forced theimpressions, to receive this perception,however, as something mind avoidtheperception ofthose ideasthat transcendent;it has to be attained by cannot are annexed to them 25]. [Essay, II, i, the "Eye" is there spiritualpurification: in every soul but must be cleared of its This is a way ofembodying in epistemoloearthyblindness. says, gy theprinciple that,as Shaftesbury Locke, also, makestheprocessofthink- man is made fornatureand notnaturefor in matter ing a matterof seeingand "considering" man. The soul is not a refugee wordwithhim. In the center from -a favorite a higher orderbut a functioning part some- of the visible cosmos. The impression of the mind he places an observer, of like a virtuosooftheBaconian type, themindas a part ofnatureis further enthing who takes all the experiencedata avail- hancedby a parallelofexperience withthe atoms: and analyzingthe facts concourseof the indivisible able, classifying into orderly groupings.The process is thesight and touch often take For,though natural. Locke preservesHobbes's plan infrom difthesameobject, at thesametime, for bringing experience directly into ferent and ideas;as a manseesat oncemotion thegap between"phan- colour; bridging thought, in and warmth thehandfeels softness tasms" and "species." The stuffof all the samepieceof wax; yet the simple ideas in the samesubject, are as perideas is sensations,which are called the thusunited in as come distinct those that bydifferfectly "simpleideas." The use of the same term ent senses 1]. [Essay, II, ii, and forthe comforthe simplesensations whichhe called "modes," and It follows, plexwholes, then,that thingsexist,not as Thus the essencesin the mind,but as conglomerathe like,is extremely significant. of tions of entities; the atoms of thought simple ideas, arisingfromthe effects physicalobjects withouton the organsof unite to formthe objects of the mind,as the body, are conveyed,Locke says, by do thoseofmatter to form theplanetsand the "conduits of the nerves" directlyto heavenlybodies. "theiraudience in the brain-the mind's Anothersource of simple ideas is the (as I may so call it)."' "reflection"of the mind upon its own presence-room These simple ideas are irresistible;we operations. Again, reflection like all have no controlover whichones we shall thought meansconsidering "perceptions": receive or use. Thus Locke maintained which from the other Secondly, fountain, naturewhichis char- experience before that humility with furnisheth theunderstanding acteristicof the program of the Royal ideas,is,--the of oftheoperations perception Society: our own mindwithin as is it employed us, to the abouttheideasit has got;--which These simpleideas, when offered operations, onandconsider, thesoulcomes toreflect can no morerefuse when the understanding mind, the understandings withanother whentheyare imprinted,do furnish to have,noralter, norblotthem out,and makenewonesitself, set of ideas, whichcould not be had from can refuse, alteror obliterate things andsuch thana mirror areperception, thinkwithout; theobjectsset be- ing,doubting, or ideaswhich theimages knowing, reasoning, believing, and all the different As thebodiesthat willing, fore it do therein actingsof our produce. Understanding, II, Essay concerning the Human II, i, 4]. [Essay, ownminds
6

iii, 1. All citations fromthis work, except as noted, are taken fromthe edition of A. C. Fraser (Oxford, 1914), and for convenience in reference are given by book, chapter, and section. Citations from The Conduct of the Understandingare taken from The Works of John Locke (12th ed.; London, 1824), Vol. II.

The mind, then, is always the observer, even when the object is its own actions,
which "pass there continually.
. .

like

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visions." The purelyintelligible, selves as passive; but so Locke thinksof floating whichhas been divinethe noetic,accordingly has the nature of theunderstanding, visible and is made up of the ly endowed as a living power with the something of experiA sourceofthevogue abilityto studythe continuum atomsofexperience. at ences and to reflect on them,arriving for personification in eighteenth-century whichpresenta reasonably Hope, combinations poetrymay be here. To personify to pre- accurate facsimileof externalreality.It Fear, or Melancholyis not merely sent a poetical fictionbut to give some possesses, too, the final test of a living in that it can refuseto "consider." of those "floatingvisions" of thing, impression itself.Locke Thus did Locke bringthe mindcompletethe mind as it contemplates forthiskind of in- ly into the naturalorderwhilepreserving dwelton the necessity and and it is not illogical that thesenseofits ownintegrity, vitality, trospection, poetryshouldtake up thiskindof "reflec- self-awareness. a satisfactory image of Constructing tion," under the formof "reverie,"as a the mind was a problemthat obviously sourceof subjects. within themind gave Locke some difficulty. The attentive observer At one time in terms on immediate- he talks of the understanding -the understanding-goes out oftheseatomsofexpe- that recall the camera obscura. External ly to construct that Locke calls and internal riencethe combinations he says, "are the sensations, ofknowledge the "complexideas." Here it is important onlypassages thatI can find not merelyto grasp the formalimportof to the understanding": Locke's statementsbut to visualize the as I candiscover, arethe as far Thesealone, it. Only windows image ofthe mindas he describes by which lightis let intothisdark so can we appreciate the fact that this room; is not formethinks the understanding shutfrom systemis by no means purely"mechanis- muchunlikea closetwholly light Cassirervoices a common withonlysomelittleopening tic." Professor left,to let in or ideas of that "reflection, as externalvisible resemblances, view whenhe remarks would the pictures coming understoodby Locke, is formedentirely thingswithout: and lie but staythere, on the patternof sensation.It is not an intosucha darkroom found it so as to be upon orderly occasion, active,but a purelypassive principle .... much would resemble the understanding very The mind behaves towards ideas like a of sight, to all objects of a man,in reference resistnorchange and theideasofthem mirror whichcan neither [Essay, II, xi,17]. nor extinguishthe images that arise in it."' Locke does indeed regardsensation At first, it wouldseemthatthisis another as passive; so muchhe grantsthe Hobbes version of Hobbes's mechanism. The side. But the "looking-glass" analogy "pictures"apparently enterthe darkroom shouldnot be carriedtoo far.Locke's own and formthemselves as sensationoccurs, use of the word "consider" is indicative. and the combinations appear to be pasThe mind, in contemplatingthe ideas sive. But the words"and lie so orderly as which it receives,acts as the Baconian to be foundupon occasion" give quite anobserver I have mentioned. When we otherimpression; fortheremustbe someor an image in a mir- thing, endowedwithpowersofactingand studya photograph ror, noting details and comparing one decidingof its own,to "find"the pictures with another,we do not think of our- when needed. What Locke really is de7 Ernst Cassirer, The Platonic Renaissance in Engof the underscribinghere is the setting (Austin, Tex., 1953), land, trans. J. P. Pettegrove standing.And even the "pictures" ultip. 63.

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matelyhave an ironyoftheirown,as will CambridgePlatonists,to make the mind appear; for,alas, even theydo not always a sort of persona,a fullyequipped perand the will "stay there,and lie so orderlyas to be sonality.The understanding foundupon occasion." Locke seems to regard as beings, not Anotherimage of the mind is clearer. automatons, but not fully equipped This one, which has been mentioned be- "souls." The properword is the one he the sensations as conduct- uses, "powers,"dynamicand self-guided, fore, represents ed "fromwithoutto theiraudiencein the but not internally motivated. as I The complexideas, then,even themost brain,-the mind's presence-room, ofthe subtleand seemingly likethe may so call it." Locke, the intimate inexplicable, first Lord Shaftesbury, and even the was, ofcourse, per- "modes" of power,infinity, of-not refined fectlyfamiliarwith the levees of great idea of God, are composed whichretain men, and he must have realizedfullythe from-discreteimpressions, implicationsof this figure.The under- their respective forms, however much standingis seen as a judge, seated majes- they may seem to be fusedin the mind. ideas be- These impressions he thinksofusuallyas ticallywithinits presence-room, it fortheir before ingushered disposal;like pictures.Locke, unlikeHobbes, has little a ruler,it is powerfuland autonomous, to say about the imagination per se. One but it depends absolutelyon its people; reasonis that thevisual imagination, on a withthemit is a potentate, without them simplelevel,permeates his system, forit is it is nothing. Unlikea sovereign, and however, the verymediumof all apprehension it cannotstirfrom its chamber, and it can- thought.It is indirectly the subject of all not reject the intelligence it receives; it discussion. he fallsintousHow naturally cannot go abroad to discover,it cannot ingtheword!The understanding, he says, undertaketo rangebeyondsense through ordinarily composesthemostelaborateof the wide expanse of nature,and it must ideas, the "mixedmodes,"by "enumeratbelieve implicitly what it learns ing and thereby, as it were,setting before perforce its retainers, from even thoughby shrewd our imaginations all those ideas whichgo it may to some extentget be- to the makingthemup, and are the concomparison hind the sensations, as when it deter- stituent partsofthem" (Essay, II, xxii,9). mines that colors do not really exist in Locke, to be sure,recognizes that simple nature.And thereis a hintthat the ideas ideas ofsensationcome in through all five themselves be spoken (and more) senses,but onlysightis really can,notimproperly, of as living; for if the impressionsare vivid to him,and seeing,as he says speis the operationof thought.A nothingbut mere looking-glass pictures, cifically, how can they have "audience" in the principalsource of error, for example,is "presence-room"? "obscurity"-caused eitherby failureto Yet it is equally truethat we mustnot observe attentivelyor by lack of light. overratethe independence and extentof The worldof the mind shouldbe flooded illumination whichreveals the understanding. Locke objected to the witha brilliant term"faculties"as meaningto stand for the ideas clearly: "some real beings in the soul that perThe perception of the mindbeingmost formed those actions of understanding aptly to thesight, bywords explained relating and volition" (Essay, II, xxi, 6). His ob- we shall best understand whatis meantby jection reallyis to the tendencyof older clear and obscure in ourideas,byreflecting on in theobjects philosophers, especially,one suspects,the whatwe call clearand obscure

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what sense the age that followedLocke, whosephilosopher he was, is the "Enlightunderstand, enment";and we cannotfully either,much of the purpose of the poets who inheritedthese ideas. "To lay the naked ideas on whichthe forceof the argumentation dependsin theirdue order" It followsthat correctionof errorin -in simplestterms,the arrangement of opinion is largely a matter of bringing the pictures-this is the essential;once it morelightto bear on men's ideas and of is done, men can hardlyfail to conclude makingpeople see and want to see. Argu- aright. What gloriousprospectsfor the mentationas generallyunderstood-dis- future thisdiscovery seemed,to suchmen cursive thought,with propositionsand as Jefferson, to open up! as repchainsofintellectual relationships, Even abstractionis explained in this forinstance, resented, by the syllogism- way. The wordis likelyto be misleading; is of littleuse and may be harmful: we thinkof something like "intellection," a mindthatcan rea- pure thought,wherebythe images are God has given[men] become in the strictsense of in methods of transmuted, beinginstructed son,without To thinkof it so is nottaught to the word "intelligible." theunderstanding syllogizing: ithasa native to is, however, reason in the Lockian age, most erfaculty rules; bythese or incoherence of its roneous. For an abstraction,Locke tells the coherence perceive them without any us, is nothingother than a "particular right, ideas,and can range Tell a country idea," that is, a sensation, such perplexing repetitions. separatedfrom and all others thatthewindis southwest, gentlewoman whichmay comeassociatedwith andliketorain, andshe theweather lowering, it in experience, taken as the representaherto willeasilyunderstand it is notsafefor of a tive number of similarsimple large go abroadthinclad in such a day, aftera in forms ideas whatever those ideas may connexion sheclearly sees theprobable fever; themselves be combined. Locke's stateand clouds, ofall these, wind, viz.,southwest in of ment the 1671 the Essay is draft and taking danger wetting, relapse, cold, rain, valuable: ". .. theidea ofwhite inthose especially them ofdeath, without together tying and cumbersome of several in the mindwhichstandsforall thewhite fetters artificial the mind, that anywhere that clog and hinder syllogisms, exists,and the wordwhite whichproceedsfromone part to another which stands for that idea, thoughboth without them;and the these in theirexistencebe but particular quickerand clearer which she easily perceivesin things,yet as representatives probability or in their thingsthus in theirnativestate wouldbe are universals."8 The insignifications were managed quite lost, if this argument in figure and mode volvementsof poetryin this conception and proposed learnedly are great.The "abstraction"neverceases 4]. [Essay, IV, xvii, to be a particular image; thereis no need Thus Locke constructedan acceptable to use metaphor as a means of giving whichenabled men to carry imagisticformto pure idea. The art of epistemology out the revolt against scholastic en- presentingthe universal consistsin the Baconian- skill with which the writer or speaker that characterized tanglements this selectsthe preciseimageswhichthe mind ism. And unless we fullyunderstand matterofsimpleseeingby a clearlightas * Essay concerning the Human Understanding, ed. in Rand (Cambridge, 1931), p. 119. we cannotfullyunderstand reasoning,

ofsight. which tous that discovers Light being we givethenameofobscure visible to objects, thatwhich to is notplacedin a light sufficient and colours discover to us thefigure minutely in it, and which, in a whichare observable wouldbe discernible better light, [Essay,II, xxix, 2].

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and century so to speak,intothegeneral. cal studyof the seventeenth willmultiply, that notion werethe endingof the The epithetperhaps is intendedat times before and the revelato help give this sense of the individual the universeis geocentric tionthat the heavenlybodies are not "inimage as the essenceof the universal. the simple corruptible."Out of Locke's philosophy Once themindhas combined ideas-whether theyhave come associat- two conceptions,of comparable imporor whether ed in originalexperience they tance, about the nature of man were to have been shapedlater-they have a pow- emerge. One was the proposition that men erfuland almostunbreakableconnection, redesirable and be both which can a fact know, not reality,but theirown experiis called ence only. "Truth," Locke goes so far as Once an idea, a picture, grettable. nothing appear in an estab- to say, "seems to me to signify up in the mind,others lished sequence. When Thomson writes, but the joiningor separatingof signs,as to agree or disagree the thingssignified let Peru the ages Yet another." with one through her own ruin in her bowels breed, Deep thatherblissbetrayed,9 men had assumed that the object of all The yellow traitor is objectivetruthstudy,of knowledge, a poetic use of this prinhe exemplifies that of objects or the transcendwhether ciple. The "yellowtraitor"sets in motion ent ideas, ofwhichthe realworldis but an the wholetrainof ideas, gold,the cruelty Locke, on the representation. imperfect of the conquerors seekingit, etc., just as assertedthat the essencesof all the statementabout the southwestwind contrary, that what we can thingsare unknowable, set in motionthe sequenceofpropositions is theideas we and knowthrough through in Locke's for the countrygentlewoman most acute of the have. JohnNorris,one illustration. ofthe Essay, statesthe ofthe earlycritics So a new model of the mind had been issue thus: "I verymuchwonderthat our formed:a model new in its whole rather Author professingin the Title of the workfor thanin theparts,but an inspired Chapterto discourseof Truth in general, in Sterne's all that. Locke had written, of that Truth too which and particularly phrase,the "historyof what passes in a has been the Enquiry of so many ages, man's own mind," and that historywas his Discourse of Truth shouldyet confine acceptedeagerly by menas diverseas Ad- ofWordsand Truthof without Thoughts, dison, Jonathan Edwards, Pope, and the least mention of Objective Truth. Hutcheson. With the new model came a Which indeed is the principal kind of the whichwas to underlie senseofsecurity Truth."'o Panofskyspeaks of the process glorioushopes forutopia and perfectibiliwas ofreality whereby "the veryprinciple It now rety ofthe age ofthephilosophes. to thesubjectivehumanconsciousshifted mainsto suggestsome of the longer-range Norris clearlyshows the process and ness."'11 ofLocke's epistemology consequences under way. The mind that cannot look to showhowand whyhe is one ofthemost out of the windowof its dark room,that makersof that temperwe call important sees only the "pictures," must, indeed, "modern." as truth.In the knowits own impressions II. TWO POINTS OF THE LOCKIAN whose obliterature, long run, therefore,
REVOLUTION

Two revolutionary conceptsabout the universethat came out of the astronomi-

V, 11. 23 ff. Cursory Reflections on the Essay concerning the Human Understanding (London, 1728), p. 26. 11 Studies in Iconology (New York, 1939), p. 229.
1o

9 "Liberty,"

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AND THE

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ject is and must always be the imitation became a proofof this divinelyordained of reality, very naturally underwenta adjustmentof the mind to reality.That If truth is thejoiningor our experience shift ofattention. of color,heat, and the like which ideas should be of represent separating signs, purely subjective and yet so as impressions, then the studyof truthis reliableis an evidencethat man's nature the studyofthemind.This does notmean has its own laws, as firm and predictable a "flight fromreality,"or escape to the as those that governthe planets. as it Thomas Aquinas, describing this type ivorytower,but ratherthat reality, is feltand knownby men,mustbe found of epistemology, rejectedit, among other withinratherthan without.It is a mis- reasons, "because the thingswe undertake, of course,to confuseLocke's posi- stand are the objects of science;therefore is merely the inteltion with solipsism;the mind has a high ifwhat we understand and ligiblespeciesin the soul, it would follow withreality, degreeofcorrespondence we are not abandoned to completely pri- thateverysciencewouldnotbe concerned vate worlds. But our apprehensionsof with objects outside the soul, but only realityare privatein anothersense,forit with the intelligiblespecies within the is our sense,the quality of our awareness, soul."12 What has prevented this denoueIt is not sur- ment,so far as what we call the physical that must inevitablydiffer. is the invention of prisingthat therehas been a steady drift sciencesare concerned, in literature, fromthe eighteenth century the experimentalmethod, whereby the of manyindividualsin a conoftheworld impressions on, towardthe contemplation as seenby themindrather thanof"truth" trolledsituationcan be exactlycompared; thestate ofmind and the absorptionof the mind into naperse; and consequently has assumed great importance. Nor is it ture has changedthe characterof "intelstrangethat therehas been an absorbing ligible species." But in the realm of huinterest in abnormal conditions of the manisticknowledge his prediction has not will been withoutrealization, reasonsforthisinterest that concernis mind;further ratherabout thingswithinthan outside appear later. Such a theory seemto throw into the soul. might chaos the whole world of thought;yet it The second point of the Lockian revowas the philosophy of an age of objective lutionconcerned the questionof personal science.The paradoxmay be explainedby identity. Locke's opinionwas that "selfis certainfacts. There was the intensecon- that conscious thinking thing,whatever victionthat all naturerepresents a great, substancemade up of, (whether spiritual harmoniousorder,in whicheach part is or material, simple or compounded,it ordainedto play its appropriaterole ac- matters not)-which is sensible or concording to its own "laws." The mind, scious of pleasure and pain, capable of as a part ofthat orderly and so is concerned therefore, nature, happinessor misery, mustbe thoroughly as far as that consciousness exadapted to the physi- foritself, cal realm in whichit exists.To reconcile tends" (Essay, II, xxvii,17). The pivotof the many aberrationsof mind with this the "self," therefore, is the awarenessof is one of the problemsof easiness or uneasiness, a state of mind presupposition the age and underliesShandyism.Thus ratherthan a single"self" as an essence. the revival of the distinctionbetween There is not any self-contained, immate"primary"and "secondary"qualities,far 12 Summa theologica,trans. Fathers of the English fromupsettingthe situation,in the end Dominican Province, Q. 85, Art. 2, Obj. 3.

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and to the personality, rial soul necessary the power the "ego" is the understanding, of apprehendingin its dark room, toas theygroup withthe impressions gether or are groupedinto theirpatthemselves is thesum ofthe terns.The ego,therefore, and theideas whichcometo it durmatrix which is to ing the course of a lifetime, changing say that the ego is a constantly thing.If Socratesand the "presentmayor of Queensboroughagree" in identityof consciousness-that is, in the awareness of the same sensations-they are, Locke assuresus, the same person;but

the cosmic hierarchy.It might weakly and blandishsubmitto the importunities suchas the mentsofthe "lower"faculties, to have forever passions;but it continued a separate and substantialindividuality, and clearlymarkedas that ofone as fixed of Boyle's atoms. It is in this sense that Hamlet uses the wordwhenhe cries letnotever losenotthynature; O heart, bosom. The soulofNeroenter thisfirm of Nero that It is not the "consciousness" he means,and the phraseprobablyhas a more heavily metaphoricalforce for us than it did for Shakespeare,to whom it do meant a character,an individual being and sleeping if the same Socrates waking not partake of the same consciousness,with fixed,willed tendenciesapart from is notthesame his experience. and sleeping Socrates waking for person.And to punishSocrateswaking transferred the clear Locke, in effect, and waking Socrates whatsleeping thought, identityfrom the ego to the separate Socrates was neverconscious of,wouldbe no ideas. so fixed elements, They are thefixed than to punishone twinfor moreof right, as endures. The personality memory long he knew whathis brother-twin did, whereof itself is a shiftingthing; it exists, not 19]. nothing [Essay, LI, xxvii, a lifetime as an entity, but althroughout This radical opinion greatly excited most from hour to hour. For Socrates It did not really wakingyesterday Locke's contemporaries. and Socratestodaymay for Locke, unlike be different challengeimmortality, as the sensationswhich conHobbes, insistedon the realityof future stitute the contentof the consciousness and his con- and therefore rewards and punishments, of personality change. The understand- onenessoftheselfis that ofa river, cept of the livingand willing and in as did thissense "streamofconsciousness" ing did not destroyresponsibility, is an Yet accurate phrase, howeverpoorly it may Hobbes's purelymaterialmechanism. Locke's criticsfeltthat it did something describe the actual process of experito the whole encing. strange and revolutionary What did it do? idea of the personality. is a source of that Locke accordingly Only now, perhaps, after many genera- phenomenonof modern thought which tions can we see the full meaningof the Mr. Krutch has termedthe "dissolution change and see how fullythe apprehen- of the ego," whereina "fluid" replacesa sions may have been justified. "hard-core" individual personality."3 The traditionalidea of the mind en- "The Christian,and to an almost equal visioned the soul living,like Spenser's extentthe classic, conception of the 'perin her castle. The soul sona' or ofthe 'ego' seemsto have been of Alma, as mistress self-contained a fullyconsciousunity,of a soul captain, was a definite, integrated, in a continuous diplo- bornwithus at birthand perhapscreated dealing personality, withtheworld.It had withmaticmission by God. It is an ultimate,even theultiand decided by in itselfall potentialities 13Joseph Wood Krutch, "'Modernism" in Modern its will whetherto ascend or descend in Drnama (Ithaca, 1953), p. 84.

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matecontinuous reality persisting through evaluates and condemnsHamlet's action hisrevenge whenhe sees the time."'4 It is against such a conception in postponing that Locke's protests about assuming that King praying;Hamlet's action,according the soul is a "substance," against assum- to the earliercritic, is "atrociousand horing that thereare facultieswhich act of rible."'5On the contrary, Coleridgesays, themselves withinthe mind,are directed. this action merelyis "part of the indeciIn line with Locke's opinions,too, is the sion and irresoluteness ofthehero,"which to the fact that Hamlet is a fact that such a writer as Proust,accord- is attributed is too strong. ing to Mr. Krutch, "gives us the sense personin whom"reflection" thatthecharacters are notat any moment The criterionof the scene, then, is the what theywereat any previoustimeand state of mind ratherthan the motivesof that the conception whichhe first formed the protagonist. Coleridge'sown analysis, whenhe heard about themis much more evenin itsphraseology, showstheLockian in ancestry. real thanthe manifestations ofthe underThereis a disorder enduringly the fleshwhichfromtime to time he en- standing. ofreality The directimpressions counters."As in Locke, the impression is are too weak, so that "the external world, theenduring fact,and thethemeofProust and all its incidentsand objects, were in theirin- comparatively is the recallof the impressions in dim, and of no interest tegrityfrommemoryinto the arena of themselves, and.., began to interest consciousawareness. in the mironly,whentheywerereflected The consequencesforliterature, as has ror of his mind." Coleridgeassumes that been suggested,were important.Goethe Shakespeare's subject is realityas it aptheorizes,in WilhelmMeister, that the pears in Hamlet's mind, not "truth" in hero of a novel is more properlyacted and of itself. Such criticism shows anotherfacet of upon than acting.In otherwords,the reto its experi- the "dissolutionof the ego." It does not sponse of the consciousness of personality; just as ences, ratherthan the experiences objec- involvedissolution is the properfocusfor realityis not abolishedbut moved into a tively considered, as a concrete different Let us consider, the writer. locale, so personalitydoes not ofthe opinions about cease to be, and one mightsay that in a example,thehistory fromthe kind of sense personalityis a modern concept. Hamlet. The transition of the earth,by the criticism represented by Doctor Johnson Justas the reduction to an insignifito that represented systems, by Coleridge is one new astronomical concern withthe actionsofa charac- cant speckled to a greatupsurgeofinterfrom in est in thissame insignificant interest withprimary terin a situation, planet,so the theirmoral evaluationand consequences, reductionof the ego into innerresponses to a situationas led to an absorbing withreactions to concern in the self-in interest in the public ac- the individual,the unique self.The charit evolves. The interest in states of actersofShakespearebeginto step off the tions is succeededby interest theirevolutionand stage and to assume lives of theirown in mind of a sensibility, feltfromwithin."Char- people's imaginations the impressions onlyafterthe revoacter" for and of itselfbecomes an ade- lution I have described.It is not strange are made to reconstruct the quate theme for the imaginativewriter. that attempts revealstheopposition "early life" of Hamlet, for example-an himself Coleridge of viewpoints. Johnson,he points out, 15 Coleridge's Shakespearean Criticism, ed. Raysor
14 Ibid.,

p. 83.

(London,

1930), II, 196.

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that would have been of no inenterprise terest for audiences of the seventeenth to psychoanalyze Lady Attempts century. Macbeth or Hamlet fall into the same To us, the heirsofLocke, Hamcategory. and the let seemsto be his mentalhistory; and principally, drama tends to be, first To not actionbut personality responding. know it we must know the whole story, the lurking the preconsciousbeginnings, impressionsbeyond the range of conscious thought,motives of action to be found in the totalityof the fluidbeing. Above all, we desireto be carriedout of our chambers of consciousnessinto another'sexperience, to see his realityas it appears to his consciousness;and literature can accomplish this result better the than any othermedium,by arranging so skilfully that it is as if we impressions from within the "ideas" wereexperiencing whichgo to make up anotherself.
III. THE INSURRECTION AND THE PROBLEM IN THE DARK ROOM OF CONSCIOUSNESS

It may be objected that much of what has just been said goes farbeyondLocke. Where do we find explicitlystated the problemof what has made the character? The modernview, at least that according is that to Freudians,Mr. Krutchremarks, and the conductof the in"the character dividual depends,not upon his own free choice, but upon the experiences,trauto whichhe has been matic or otherwise, and especiallyto those whichhe exposed in infancy."1" This conception, underwent so extremely stated, does indeed go beyond Locke, but not so far as we might suppose. To be sure,it is quite incongruous withthe centraltheoryof the underversions whichLocke in thefirst standing, of his Essay seems to treat merelyas a sortofthing, the center complete finished, and the dominating powerof "consciouss16 Krutch,

p. 85.

ness" to the point of being coextensive withit. But even in the first, 1690, editionof the Essay thereare intimations of someEven herehe stated thingquite different. that children beginto receivesimpleideas as soon as theylive, perhapseven in the even womb,and that thoseideas remain, thoughthe mind "awakens" only much later (Essay, II, i, 22). Norrispointedout the contradictionthat this observation of consciousness. poses forLocke's theory Here we see a hintof the dilemmawhich was to growon him: consciousness is the essentialcondition ofexperience, but does not consciousness contain something beyondthe awarenessoftheunderstanding? Are there not deposited in memory "ideas" that emergeto influence us, even though we may not even "remember" havingsuch experiences? Thus there was a disturbance in Locke's sense of self-satisfaction afterhe had publishedthe first editionofhis great work.It musthave seemedto himthathe had reduced the problemof the human mind, which by his time had become so confusedand so hopelesslyand sterilely complicated, to good sense and order. Questions that had long puzzled men's heads untiltheyached,such as thenature of the soul, intellection, definitions offacor ulties,and the like,had been simplified the new model of swept away altogether; the mind was one that could give confidence to men as theywentforward intoa newage ofthatintellectual freedom which representedLocke's other great enthusiasm. Yet within so shorta timeas four years, Locke's correspondence shows, he began to realize that the new model was not complete. In the fourthedition of 1700 muchearlier)thereap(althoughwritten peared the celebrated chapter"Of the Association of Ideas." It transformed the

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character of the work. For Locke had arenotall ofkin, come tobe so united in some thatit is veryhardto separate realized that the pictures in the "dark men'sminds, and the they alwayskeepin company, room"oftheunderstanding do not always them; one no sooner at time comes into the any lie so orderly as mightbe desired,and we but its associate with understanding, appears feel the stirrings of uneasinessabout reare it; and if theyare morethantwowhich volt in that narrowplace. thusunited, the wholegang,alwaysinsepaLocke had, of course,realizedthat hurable,show themselves together [Essay,II, man thought is ofteninaccurate, obscure, xxxiii, 5]. confused.His purposein writing the EsThere are severalimportant features of for say,in fact,was to lay thefoundations this the irrational condescription. First, correct howideas true opinionby showing ofideas go together, so faras the and false are really formed.He had at- nections tributedthe commonfailuresof ideation mechanismof making complex ideas is in a mannersimilarto "true" to lack of "light," failureto attend care- concerned, the trains ofideas, whether thoseof ones; of ideas, to physifullyto the distinction Bacon or those of the most eccentric hucal defects, or to simpleprejudice,or failure to extend mental horizons.Most of morist,associate and appear in the same these-all, in fact,exceptforphysicalde- way, and bringingup one recalls the fects-can be corrected by self-discipline. others.Again,no one is exempt;madness He had attemptedsimplyto give a more appears, not as a conditionof the mind reasonable and simple account of cogni- whichis sharplyand obviouslyseparated thehealthyone,but onlyas a matter ofthe from tion,retaining, however, something of degree. Third,the associationsof ideas old assumptions about Alma in her castle are usuallyformed by or tracedto extereven if he failedto realizethat fact. nal conditions over which we have no conWhat he appears to have understood later was that the mind includes much trol, but which exercise an irresistible more than the cabinet wherein under- powerover the mind.Finally,theseassostanding sits, making dispositions and ciationshave a lifeoftheirownand occaconclusionsfromits pictureswith a cer- sionally come, usually unwanted, from taintyguaranteedby divine poweritself. theirown worldinto the properrealm of Round about thisworldofthe clearlyout- the mind. And when they do erupt into or the area of conlined and brilliantly illuminated is a the understanding, scious are likelyto exerawareness, they land of ideas, not merelydormant murky cise an on conduct. influence important in memory and not subject to the control The "case histories" must be (they of the governor, or at least not continuthe first of which among very these) so. Locke faced this problemin the ously Locke are essential to underpresents on chapter "association," which he destandingofthesepoints.He citesthe case finesas follows: of a man who, as a child,has heard from Some of our ideas have a naturalcora foolish maid stories which connect and connexion onewith respondence another; it is theoffice and excellency ofourreason to "ideas of goblinsand sprites"with darktracethese,and hold themtogether in that ness. The resultis that "possiblyhe shall union and correspondence which is founded in never be able to separate them again so their Besides there is an- long as he lives, but darknessshall ever peculiar beings. this, otherconnexion of ideas whollyowingto afterwards bring with it those frightful chance or custom; ideas,that in themselves,ideas, and theyshall be so joined,that he

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can no morebear the one than the other." place withall the posse. In such a case, a Here we have an association made in "puppet" seems to be appointed for his and he is so absorbedwith childhood,perhaps by incidentsthe man entertainment, cannot consciouslyremember-even the watchingit in his secret cabinet that he it is not trulyan does not even hear the discourseof the nursemay be forgotten; association producing"opinion," for the company. No wonderhe devotes one whole secon the man may notbe aware ofany belief subject,but he is acutelyaware of an un- tion of the Essay, and much space in the easiness when he is alone in the dark. In Conduct, that "this to the solemnwarning in our mindsof ideas, in another example, a man associates his wrongconnexion of one loose and independent pain or sicknesswith a roomin whichhe themselves and productive the connection is irrational, "yet another"is so important, suffered; when the idea of the place occurs to his of such great evil, that "perhaps thereis mind,it brings..,. that of the pain and not any one thingthat deservesmore to themin be looked after." Here we encounteran displeasurewithit: he confounds his mind,and can as littlebear the one as authenticnote of "modernism."For, if the other." Again, there is no conscious we consider the nature of the "depth association,lurk- studies" whichLocke essays,we see that opinion,but a powerful in reoflowerfaculties ing outsidethe lightedcabinet,is capable the old conception of producinga very real state of mind. volt against higherones will not do. The Similar associations,Locke says, are the factis that the wrongassociationsare the sources of prejudices and superstitions resultof the mind'sresponseto its world. formany,ifnot most, What Mr. Krutch has pointedout about and are responsible could the "modern"view ofthe irrational of the sorrowsof history. on the matterenhancedits be applied withoutmuchstrainto Locke: Reflection saneorinviewa manis either In theolder In The Conduct of theUnderimportance. by thelightof writtenafterthe Essay, Locke sane-sane if he liveschiefly standing, it. But whatis still ifhe rejects insane with the problem. reason, deals moreextensively new psychology" "the called sometimes he The fullcontrolof the understanding, It disdistinction. down this breaks sharp writes,is probably the most important in thelives often thatrationality covers plays in life,"and thereis scarceany thing thing of what are called normalpeople a much harderin the whole conductof the underAt the smaller partthanwas onceassumed. standingthan to get a full masteryover sametimeit discovers do thattheabnormal sec. 45). He gives several of not act in a merely it" (Conduct, randomunintelligible the grotesque-comic examplesof the fail- manner. as in their is method There madness, ure to master the understanding,ex- there in likemadness is alsousually something sane. The disof thetechnically amples which have in them a germ of themethod ofdegree.17 is a matter Shandyismand provide one explanation tinction for the attractionLocke had for Sterne: When Locke comes to considerwhat can "in- be done about these unnaturalcombinathere is, forinstance,a troublesome ideas" whichtake tions of ideas, he can only concludethat trusionof somefrisking possessionof a man's head, so that some "when this combinationis settled, and will whileit lasts,it is notin thepowerof reaor a scrap ofpoetry, "trivialsentence, sometimes getintomen'sheads,and make son to help us, and relieveus from the efsuch a chimingthere, that there is no fectsof it. Ideas in our minds,whenthey ofit." Or a passion may take over are there,will operate accordingto their stilling 17 ofthe a man's mindas ifit werethesheriff Ibid., p. 20.

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natures and circumstances"(Essay, II, ing, cannot communicatethis sense of The impression "is theseparate xxxiii, 13). With the last sentence, he character. deals thefinal blow to thewholetradition- possessionof each, and not in its nature al conception it is an imperfect of the natureof personality transferable: sortof inand personal responsibility. Locke's em- stinct,and proportionably dumb." Here rather is part ofthe rationaleforthatrevolution phasis on the part of environment than the innerwill in the shapingof the in the subjectmatter, and henceultimateselfplaces himin the "modern"world.To ly of techniquesof literature, which has "take care" ofthe associationofideas,we been discussed in the second section of find,is a matterof seeing to it that the thispaper. To achievesuch a "language," mind does not receiveor make the false withall it involves,has been a continuing associations;and that is largelya matter problemof literature. of lookingto education,to the influences Not until afterthe middleof the nineon childhood. teenth centurydoes the word "unconIt would seem almost inevitablethat, scious" seem to make an appearance.Yet after reachingthis point, Locke should in the pictureofthe mindthat E. S. Dalsuggestthat much could be done by way las, a pioneerin the use of this wordand of fishing the associationsout of the re- concept, there is littlethatmight presents, cesses beyond the immediateawareness not have been derivedfromLocke's theand subjecting themto the kindofhistori- ory. cal reconstruction he makes in the case of Outside consciousness there rolls a vasttide the man who associates goblins and the oflife, which evenmore is,perhaps, important thelittle isleofourthoughts which dark. Then the falseassociations, inspect- to us than ourken .... The thing to be firmly ed under the clear light of the under- lieswithin worlds is,thatweliveintwoconcentric standing, mightlose muchof theirpower. seized of inner of which we are thoughts,-an ring, To take thisstep,however, was to require and which be described as conscious, may ilalmost two centuries. an outer ofwhich we are unluminated; one, It was a longtimebefore there was even and which as in conscious, maybe described the word "unconscious," although it is the dark.Between the outerand the inner implicit in Locke's discussion. Maurice ring,between our unconscious and our conMorgann made the point that what we sciousexistence, anda constant there is a free call characterarises froma multitudeof but unobserved traffic for ever carried on. whichare outside of and un- Trainsof thought impressions are continually to passing from thelight intothedark, andback relatedto the understanding. To appreci- andfro, thedark intothelight. When thecurrent ate the true natureof character-that is, from of flows from within our kento bethought the real real sourcesof action-therefore our it is we weknow yond ken, forget gone, it, is outsidethe scope ofthe Lockianreason: not what has become of After a timeit it. "The Understanding seems for the most comes backto us changed and grown, as ifit part to take cognizance of actionsonly, a newthought, were andweknow notwhence and from theseto infer motives and charac- it comes.19 ter;but the sense we have been speaking It has been remarked that Locke, of proceedsin a contrary course; and dedoes not referto predecessors strangely, termines of actionsfrom certain first prin18 "On the Dramatic Character of Sir John Falwhichseem whollyout staff," in Eighteenth Century ciplesofcharacter, Essays on Shakespeare, of the reach of the Understanding."'" It ed. D. Nichol Smith (Glasgow, 1903), p. 219. Morfollows that language,whichis construct- gann's essay was published in 1777, although written 19Ir. The Gay Science (London, 1866), I, 207. ed to expressthe ideas ofthe understand- earli

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who postulated some kind of "associa- Locke's frequent use of language and tion," most notably Hobbes, who had images which indicatethat the ideas act made the accidental connectionsof im- of themselves.If associations are made and remainpassivepressionsthe veryprincipleof all knowl- outsideconsciousness edge and thought. Aside from the fact ly in memory, awaitinga call, the unconthat the pious Locke no doubt had no de- scious is obviouslya much more limited sire to be associated with the Leviathan, thingthan what we now thinkof as the he had good reason to believe that his "unconsciousmind." But Locke implies was reallysomething principle new,how- many times that the associations are a evermuchit mightin detailsresemble the morecomplex matter. He does givea physolder ideas. For Locke's association is iological explanation for these combinafromthat of mechanistic tions,but mostly quite different he writes as ifexperiencIt is not a mereautomatic ingtheideas from within. withpsychologists. And,from of impressions, connection as ifan adding in, these associationsappear to be volunmachinewerebeingset up. He alwayshas tary "ganging" of ideas; in this sense, I the sense of a living being, with certain suspect,he meant "association." So with innatebiologicaltendencies, in the playful,"frisking" ideas that set up responding a myriadofways to a worldwhichaffects the annoyingchimingin our heads. And it in an infinite numberof ways. In the so with the mysterious forceof passion, centeris a living,organizing power,con- that seizes our minds as if it were the The ideas appear to the experiencpatternswhichto a highdegree sheriff. structing to thoseofthe external to be endowedwiththe correspond world; ing consciousness but its area is notsharply and the powerofdecisionand motion;one "comes defined, boundariesexpand and contractwiththe into the understanding" and the others, of the creatureas it feelsvari- his "associates," insist on comingalong. exigencies ous statesofmindand as theenvironment A backstairsclique is intriguing, or peris the haps merely changes.The personality potentially havingfun,whilethe serious whole world of sensations existingin a work is going forwardin the cabinet. state ofconstantly tensions. Simi- There is no suggestion in Locke that pershifting like the necessitari- haps the deeplycreativeworkofthemind larly,thereis nothing anismso characteristic ofmechanistic psy- also is done in the dark area outside the chology.Rather,Locke in effect puts the cabinet; such a notionis part of that rewholequestionoffreedom on a new basis. volt againsttheunderstanding withwhich The mind is not simplyfreeor not free; Locke had no sympathy. But, givena difbut decisionis a productofa whole,vastly ferenttemper,the conclusionis easy to complexstate of the tensions,of certain reach. In any event, no one afterLocke naturalvariationsin temperament, and of can ignore the greatareas outside"awaredeeply hidden associations manifesting ness"; the preoccupation of "modern" themselvesin relation to consciousness. man with what is beyond consciousness, The mind is neithera persona existing and, behindthat preoccupation, the sense withinthe body nor a meremachine,but of his experience as constituting the very stuffof his self,are implicitin the new something unique. The account of associationis not com- model of the mind. plete unless we consider the force of UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

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