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Running head: APPLYING ALLISON'S MODELS

Soo Yeon Chang Applying Allison's Models College

APPLYING ALLISON'S MODELS Abstract

This paper discusses application of three models of foreign policy that were described by Graham Allison in his article Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Although author focuses on a specific case of Cuban missile crisis in explaining his models, defined analytical tools are nevertheless can be applied in broader context of foreign affairs and decision-making. Therefore, an analysis of US foreign policy toward Syria is discussed in this paper using Graham Allisons conceptual decision-making models. After careful analysis of Allisons Models and provided articles concerning Syria it was found that at the current moment the most appropriate model describing the decision in this case is the Rational Policy Model.

APPLYING ALLISON'S MODELS Brief description of Allisons models Model 1: Rational Policy.

Analysis in Rational Policy Model (Model I) assumes that decisions made and actions taken by actors or states are rational in their nature. This model is also trying to explain an issue evaluating goals and objectives, options, consequences and choices available for a particular action. Consequences constitute benefits and costs in terms of strategic goals and objectives (Allison, 1969). As this model is a kind of game of selecting all available choices, the rational agent selects the alternative whose consequences rank highest in terms of his goals and objectives (Allison, 1969). Thereby, according to Model I governments select the action that will maximize strategic goals and objectives (Allison, 1969). Objectives, choices, opportunities, calculations and threats are seems to be the key words in this model. Weighing all pros and cons and choosing value-maximizing option an analyst may predict the most plausible actors actions. Model 2: Organizational Process While Rational Policy Model focuses more on a broader picture, Organizational Process Model (Model II) attempts to evaluate organizational characteristics that form and produce perceptions, opinions and courses of action. Model II stresses that the organizations decisions matter more then individuals choices. Thereby, Organizational Process Model is trying to explain how organizations make decisions and behave, and how such decisions are implemented. In accord with Model II, foreign policy is the result of organizations behavior. Allison argues that the actor is not a monolithic nation or government but rather a constellation of loosely allied organizations on top of which government leaders sit (Allison, 1969). Organizations operate according to their pre-established procedures and routines. Organizations standard operating procedures and programs do not change dramatically over time due to organizations own cultures. But organizations do change.

APPLYING ALLISON'S MODELS Learning occurs gradually, over time. Dramatic organizational change occurs in response to

major crises. Both learning and change are influenced by existing organizational capabilities (Allison, 1969). Organizational Process Model reflects restrictions that organizations place on available to decision makers choices. Assuming that objectives and goals are well specified, Model II bounds choices based on pre-established standard operating programs and procedures Model 3: Bureaucratic Politics Bureaucratic Politics Model (Model III) analyzes individuals and tries to predict possible course of action or outcomes based on this analysis. This model views the foreign policy process as a competitive game or bargaining among players with separate and unequal power over particular pieces and with separable objectives in distinguishable subgames (Allison, 1969). Unlike Rational Policy Model and Organizational Process Model, Bureaucratic Politics Model studies decision as the result of the game which is played by governmental leaders. Thus, in order to explain why a particular governmental decision was made, it is necessary to recognize the games and players involved in the decision making process. Model III assumes that there is no unique utility function and no single decision driven by rational choice as it was found in Rational Policy Model. Pulling and pushing are the key elements of politics, and players who have more power will win and determine decision making process. Allison considers key decision-makers which hold critical positions and therefore they have great impact on organizational action. The key individuals are bargaining in order to find a compromise, which result is the selection of alternatives that have support of a key group of individuals.

APPLYING ALLISON'S MODELS Allison asserts that Model IIIs explanatory power is achieved by revealing the pulling and hauling of various players, with different perceptions and priorities, focusing on separate problems, which yielded the outcomes that constitute the action in question (Allison, 1969).

Description of relevant actors and their preferences/demands in the situation (Syria) In order to apply Allisons models to Syrias case it is necessary to investigate all the relevant actors, as well as study their preferences in current situation. President Barack Obama stands under the pressure of different factors and circumstances. On the one hand, USA can not tolerate genocide and killing large numbers of Syrian people (Clement, 2012). Some opposition Senators continue to enforce that the United States has a responsibility to involve itself in the Syrian rebellion (Bumiller, 2012). On the other hand, there are a lot of issues that should be taken into account in order to make the final decision and to choose among possible scenarios. With American troops only recently withdrawn from Iraq and still in Afghanistan, the president is loath to engage in new military actions, especially one with few advocates (Baker, 2012). Anyway, currently all the possible options come to more financial sanctions against Syria, military intervention, creating safe havens inside Syria for civilians, arming the Syrian opposition, humanitarian airlifts, the establishment of a no-fly zone and naval monitoring of Syria (Bumiller, 2012). By now, US officials can not afford the direct military intervention to Syria taken into account four challenges: the risks in attacking Syrias plentiful and sophisticated Russianmade air defenses, which are located close to major population centers; arming a deeply splintered Syrian opposition; the potential for starting a proxy war with Iran or Russia, two

APPLYING ALLISON'S MODELS

crucial allies of Syria; and the lack, at least so far, of an international coalition willing to take action against the government of President Bashar al- Assad (Bumiller, 2012). Creation and maintaining of protected safe havens inside Syria for civilians will require serious contingent of U.S. ground troops (Bumiller, 2012). Moreover, there is a risk of attacks on such safe havens by Syrian Army. It is also necessary to take into consideration that Syrias integrated air defenses are advanced and arrayed in densely populated areas on the countrys western border, meaning that even with precision bombing, civilians nearby would probably be killed (Bumiller, 2012). Thereby, all the military options developed by the Pentagon involve a serious commitment of resources (Baker, 2012). Therefore, "currently, the administration is focusing on diplomatic and political approaches rather than military intervention." (The Cabel, 2012). The opposition to President Bashar al-Assad remains splintered, and so far no clear leaders have emerged. There is no defined rebel army holding territory that would be helped by airstrikes (Clement, 2012). Pentagon is also concerned with Iran and Russia, Syrias most important allies. Russia proceeds supplying Syria Army with arms and vetoing a United Nations Security Council resolutions calling on Mr. Assad to resign (The Cable). Iran has recently flown into Syria small arms, chiefly rocket-propelled grenades, as well as technological equipment and highranking experts to assist the Assad government in interrupting social media communications and the internet (Bumiller, 2012). There is also no NATO, Arab League or United Nations support for international force against Syria.

APPLYING ALLISON'S MODELS Finally, polls this year show little support for getting U.S. troops involved in Syria and the only proposal for Syrian action that gained majority support in the Fox survey was providing humanitarian aid (Clement, 2012). Thereby, applying Allisons models, one can find that the Rational Policy Model would suggest that it would not be reasonable to start a new war in Syria without support of electorate and international coalition. The Organizational Process Model would argue that President Barack Obama will face difficulties in securing support to spread out troops to Syria, given that such decisions would have to go through the House of Representatives and

the Senate. The Bureaucratic Politics Model, would suggest that neither the Democrats no the Republicans would commit political suicide by voting for going to war against Syria considering current US public mood.

Model that better describes the decision in current situation To my mind, analysing data given in provided articles it is possible to make a conclusion that the Rational Policy Model suits better to describe the plausible decision in the case of Syria. Using available information one can clearly describe national goals and objectives, options, consequences and choices available for a Syrias particular action. As for the goals and objectives, they consist in the termination of massacre and violence in Syria. At the same time, one can single out the possible options to attain these national goals and objectives: financial sanctions, military intervention, creating safe havens, arming the Syrian opposition, humanitarian airlifts, etc. Analyzing given information, it is also possible to evaluate consequences of each alternative course of actions. One can see that military intervention would lead to high victims among civilian Syrian and US soldiers, arming the fragmented Syrian opposition

APPLYING ALLISON'S MODELS would lead to the escalation of a civil war, creating safe havens would probably provoke Syrian Army to assault them and on and so forth. Therefore, at the moment the only value-maximizing rational choice is diplomatic actions and an intensification of financial sanctions against Syria. Thus, the Rational Policy Model indeed suits better to describe the plausible decision in Syrias case.

APPLYING ALLISON'S MODELS References

Allison, G. (1969). Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis. The American Political Science Review, 63(3). Baker, P. (May 30, 2012). For the White House, a Wary Wait as Syria Boils. NYTimes.com. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/31/world/middleeast/for-the-whitehouse-a-wary-wait-as-syria-boils.html Bumiller, E. (March 11, 2012). Military Points to Risks of a Syrian Intervention. NYTimes.com. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/12/world/middleeast/us-syria-intervention-wouldbe-risky-pentagon-officials-say.html Clement, S. (June 1, 2012). Syria: Will Americans support military action? The Washington Post. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/behind-thenumbers/post/syria-will-americans-support-militaryaction/2012/06/01/gJQA7EJk6U_blog.html Debate over Syria intervention takes shape. (July 3, 2012). The Cable. Retrieved from http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/03/07/debate_over_syria_intervention_t akes_shape

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