Proceedings of ICE

Civil Engineering 162 May 2009 Pages 4451 Paper 800053

doi: 10.1680/cien.2009.162.5.44
disaster engineering; failures; geotechnical engineering

Keywords

Forensic landslide investigations in Hong Kong

MSc, DIC, FGS, Eurlng, FHKIE, MICE, CEng

Ken Ho

is chief geotechnical engineer at the Hong Kong governments geotechnical engineering office

MEng, MHKIE, MICE, CEng

Tony Lau

Serious landslides have occurred in Hong Kong from time to time with loss of life and significant socio-economic impact on the community. The systematic landslide investigation programme implemented by the Hong Kong governments geotechnical engineering office has proved to be an important asset-management tool in contributing to enhanced landslide-risk management and professional practice. This paper reviews the evolution of forensic landslide investigations in Hong Kong and presents the framework of the systematic landslide investigation programme, together with the key lessons learnt.
Hong Kong has a mountainous terrain with natural hillsides covering about 65% of the land area, approximately half of which have gradients greater than 30 (Figure 1). Rainfall intensities can be high, with 50mm/h and 250mm/day not uncommon. The significant increase in population post-World War II necessitated major urban developments involving extensive cutting and filling for civil engineering and building works. Of the 57 000 sizeable man-made slopes registered in the governments slope catalogue, about 39 000 were formed before the introduction of territory-wide geotechnical control in 1977. The acute slope-safety problems faced by Hong Kong are the result of dense development in a hilly terrain, high seasonal rainfall and a large number of vulnerable man-made slopes and marginally stable natural hillsides.

is senior geotechnical engineer at the Hong Kong governments geotechnical engineering office

BEng, MHKIE, MICE, CEng

Jonathan Lau

is geotechnical engineer at the Hong Kong governments geotechnical engineering office

Figure 1. Dense urban development on hilly terrain in Hong Kong natural hillsides cover 65% of the land area, approximately half of which have gradients greater than 30
C I V I L E N G I N E E R I N G

Forensic landslide investigations in Hong Kong

Geology and landslides in Hong Kong

On average, about 300 landslides are reported in Hong Kong every year. Given the dense development, even a small landslide in close proximity to buildings or roads can result in casualties. Since the late 1940s, the death toll arising from landslides has been over 480 (Figure 2). The government set up the geotechnical control office in 1977 renamed geotechnical engineering office (GEO) in 1994 as the central body to regulate slope safety in Hong Kong. Over the years, the GEO has developed and implemented a comprehensive slope-safety system to manage landslide risk.1 Geology The geology of Hong Kong is described in detail by Sewell and Campbell.2 The two dominant rock types associated with areas of high relief in the urban areas of Hong Kong are granitoids and volcanic rocks (Figure 3). The granite is extensively weathered, with highly variable depths of silty-sandy saprolites, often with corestones left behind in the matrix. The volcanic rocks consist mainly of coarse tuffs, fine tuffs and rhyolite, which are usually fine grained and have a blocky structure. Relict joints are preserved in the saprolitic zone, with joint spacings of typically 0.51 m in granite and less than 0.25m in volcanic rocks. Steeply dipping intrusions in the form of dykes (e.g. dolerite, porphyry) are not uncommon, as are kaolin veins that may be a product of weathering or hydrothermal alteration. Extensive bodies of colluvium may be present at the lower hill-slopes as a result of accumulation of debris from past mass movements. The colluvium is up to 30 m thick in places, which commonly consists of boulders, cobbles and gravel in a matrix of sand, silt and clay, and is prone to the formation of soil pipes as a result of seepage erosion. Failure of man-made slopes Systematic records of reported landslides have been kept by the GEO since 1984. The corresponding landslide database contains some 6500 reported landslides on man-made slopes that have been inspected by professionals from GEO as part of the emergency-response system. The nature and failure mechanisms of landslide hazards in man-made slopes are discussed by Wong et al.3 and Martin.4 The majority of the landslides in Hong Kong are shallow, typically less than 3m deep. On average, about 90% of the reported failures are less than 50m in volume. Natural terrain landslides The natural terrain in Hong Kong is susceptible to shallow landslides, which are liable to

develop into mobile debris flows along drainage lines or local topographic depressions. For the purposes of risk assessment and risk management, the common types of natural terrain failures can be distinguished as n open hill-slope debris avalanche n channelised debris flow n mixed debris avalanche/flow along topographic depression. In the 1990s, an inventory of about 30 000 landslides on natural hillsides in Hong Kong was compiled by the GEO on a geographic information system (GIS) platform, based on
160 140 120

even a small landslide in close proximity to buildings or roads can result in casualties
600 525 450 375 300 225 150 75 0

100 80 60 40 20 0 1954 1958 1948 1960 1952 1950 1956 1962 1964 1974 1980 1966 1982 1968 1970 1972 1976 1978 1984 1986 1990 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 1988 1992 2004 2006 2008

Figure 2. Over 480 people are known to have died in Hong Kong as a result of landslides since the late 1940s

Figure 3. Simplified geological map of Hong Kong

Cumulative number of fatalities

Establishment of geotechnical control office (GCO)

Number of fatalities

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interpretation of high-level aerial photographs, taken at 2400 m or above. A separate inventory comprising about 1900 large historical natural terrain landslides has been compiled from interpretation of aerial photographs and hillside geomorphology. Recently, GEO compiled a more comprehensive enhanced natural terrain landslide inventory (ENTLI) using low-level aerial photographs, taken at lower than2400m, which contains information on about 105 000

natural terrain landslides (Figure 4). As hillside failures can occur over a considerable distance from a given facility, a good appreciation of the characteristics and causes of the different types of hillside failures, together with the mechanisms involved in landslide initiation and debris run-out, is important when assessing risk. An improved understanding of natural terrain landslides has been achieved through investigation of indi-

Figure 4. Example screen shot of the enhanced natural terrain landslide inventory, which has information on around 105 000 landslides

vidual landslides as well as through regional landslide studies. The available landslide data have proved invaluable in developing rainfalllandslide correlations for natural terrain landslides5 and provided the basis for landslide susceptibility analyses6 and back-analyses of the mobility of landslide debris.7 Studies of natural terrain landslides have also allowed site-specific as well as global quantitative risk assessment to be carried out.8,9 Wong and Ho10 illustrated the diverse range of modes and mechanisms of slope failures and debris run-out associated with different hillside instabilities. The complexity of failure initiation and debris run-out of natural terrain landslides is further highlighted by the severe rainstorm in early June 2008, which triggered some 1500 natural terrain landslides. Some of these caused havoc to the community (Figure5). The 4 h duration rainfall of 384mm had a calculated return period of over 1000 years. According to the preliminary information obtained from satellite imagery as well as aerial and ground surveillance, approximately 110 mobile channelised debris flows with debris run-out distances greater than 200m occurred. The severity of the rainstorm is illustrated by the fact that some 20% of these mobile debris flows had run-out distances greater than 500m, with the run-out distances of the four most-mobile landslides being greater than 1km. In comparison, the ENTLI records only one debris flow with run-out distance exceeding 1km and 12 cases with runout distances between 500m and 1km for the period 19242006.

Evolution of landslide investigations

Forensic landslide investigations in Hong Kong have long played a key role in advancing the governments knowledge of slope performance and landslide mechanisms in weathered rocks. However, the arrangements for conducting landslide investigations have evolved with time. In the 1960s, local academics were involved in studying landslides. For example, the severe rainstorm in June 1966 triggered some 500 landslides resulting in significant loss of life and socio-economic consequences, and an overview was carried out by So.11 Lumb12,13 conducted technical investigations of selected serious landslides in the 1960s and 1970s. Additionally, consultants were engaged by the government to investigate specific landslides, such as Ching Cheung Road in 1972. The landslide disasters in the 1970s prompted a different approach to landslide investigation. The government appointed a commission of inquiry to investigate the two fatal landslides in 1972. A consultant was also engaged

Figure 5. Approximately 110 landslides with debris run-out distances greater than 200 m occurred in the June 2008 rainstorm seen in this case reaching a highway

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Forensic landslide investigations in Hong Kong

to assist in the technical investigation of the 1972 Po Shan Road landslide (Figure6). In the case of Sau Mau Ping in 1976, the government convened an independent review panel comprising six international landslide experts to conduct the forensic investigation. Since its establishment in 1977, the GEO has played a leading role in conducting investigations of serious landslides using in-house staff. These included studies of selected fatal landslides, such as the boulder fall at Kings Road in 1981, for submission to the coroners court, and landslides triggered by severe rainstorms, for example May and August 1982, May 1992 and November 1993. The Tsing Shan channelised debris flow in 1990 was a near-miss and highlighted the potential risk posed by natural terrain landslides to the community (see next section). In the early to mid-1990s, the GEO continued to carry out forensic investigations of all fatal landslides, at Baguio Villas and Kennedy Road in 1992,14 Cheung Shan Estate in 1993,14 Kwun Lung Lau15 and Castle Peak Road in 1994,14 and Fei Tsui Road16 and Shum Wan Road in 1995.17 For the forensic investigations of the 1994 Kwun Lung Lau landslide and the two fatal landslides in 1995, an external independent reviewer was engaged to review the technical investigations that were undertaken by GEO.1820 The Kwun Lung Lau disaster aroused considerable public concern (see later section). In October 1994, the legislative council voted to set up a select committee to inquire into the circumstances of the landslide and the related issues, only the second select committee in Hong Kongs 150-year colonial history,21 in parallel with GEOs technical investigation. The systematic landslide-investigation programme was introduced by the GEO in 1997 and it has been integrated with the governments HK$25 million landslip-preventivemeasures programme22 since 2000. The average annual cost of systematic landslide investigations is about US$ 3 million, which is approximately 3% of the annual programme expenditure. The programme is being implemented with the assistance of consultants managed by the GEO. Some of the milestone landslides in recent years that prompted much improvement to landslide risk management and slope engineering practice in Hong Kong are presented below.

failure was in the form of a relatively smallscale (350 m) rock topple and rock/soil slide in the source area on the steep upper reaches of the natural hillside. The failed material travelled over an exposed sheeting joint and entered the streamcourse below, developing into a channelised debris flow along the steep drainage line that was infilled with loose bouldery colluvium. Given significant entrainment of loose

material along the drainage line, the volume of landslide debris reached approximately 19000m. The run-out distance of the landslide was approximately 1 km, with the debris encroaching on a vacant building platform. Had the housing development proceeded as per the original plan, the consequences could have been very serious. The findings of the landslide investigation are documented by King.23 The event highlighted that the scale of a

Figure 6. The 1972 Po Shan Road landslide, in which 67 people died

Tsing Shan channelised debris flow, 1990

On 11 September 1990, a massive channelised debris flow occurred on the eastern flanks of Tsing Shan (Figure 7). The failure was triggered by relatively light rainfall with a return period of less than 3 years. The initial

Figure 7. The 1990 Tsing Shan channelised debris flow travelled I km and reached a volume of 19 000 m3 fortunately it destroyed only building plots rather than completed buildings

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natural terrain failure may not necessarily be related to the rainfall severity, especially where the site setting is unfavourable and vulnerable to significant entrainment. It also emphasised the difficulty in predicting the locations and mobility of natural terrain landslides and the need to consider low-frequency, high-magnitude natural terrain landslide hazards in risk assessments.

The mobility of the debris flow has been back-analysed using different numerical models by a number of parties over the years, including Hungr et al.24 and Kwan and Sun25 (Figure 8). Considerable advances have been made in respect of the understanding of the mechanics and dynamics of natural terrain landslide initiation, processes and debris movement.

Kwun Lung Lau landslide, 1994

The 23 July 1994 Kwun Lung Lau landslide (Figure 9) involved the sudden collapse of a 100-year old masonry wall that was in good maintenance condition and previously subjected to a safety-screening study by the GEO. The full height of the masonry wall, together with the slope above, failed. Some 1000m of debris was released, killing five people and seriously injuring three others on the footpath below. The masonry wall had a maximum height of 10.6m and a base width of 0.8m (which was only about one-fifth of that shown in the drawings approved by the Building Authority in 1965), that is a slenderness ratio of more than 13. This was exceptionally slender compared with typical masonry walls of a similar construction in Hong Kong (i.e. slenderness ratio of less than 4 for well-proportioned masonry walls). The findings of the technical investigation are presented by Wong and Ho.26 The investigation established that the failure involved buckling and brittle collapse of the thin masonry wall. The collapse was triggered by subsurface infiltration from defective buried drainage systems, which saturated and weakened the soil mass. The state of knowledge at that time was that old masonry walls would fail in a ductile manner following deformation for some time. However, the Kwun Lung Lau masonry wall was in a good condition and yet it failed suddenly with little sign of deformation or distress. The actual failure mechanism of the slender masonry wall was very different from the previous understanding and the assumptions made in conventional stability analyses. Numerical analyses using the distinct-element computer program Udec predicted that the masonry structure would fail in a complex mode (Figure 10). The masonry wall was found to bulge initially at about mid-height, accompanied by overturning of the portion of the masonry below this level. Such deformation modes combined to lead to tensile failure and consequential sudden reduction of the shear strength of the mortar joints. Once failure of mortar joints was initiated, the wall deformed rapidly with instability developing in an uncontrolled manner, resulting in brittle fracture of the masonry wall and failure of the ground behind. Such a complex failure mechanism was not considered in conventional retaining-wall analysis, which was unsafe in the case of a thin masonry wall. As a result, local professional practice for assessing stability of old masonry walls was duly revised. The Kwun Lung Lau landslide also highlighted the critical importance of leakage from underground water-carrying services on slope stability. Transient seepage analyses were carried out to assess the contribution of the different sources of water in saturating the ground behind the masonry wall. The analyses estab-

Debris depth: m 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5

Figure 8. Simulation of the 1990 Tsing Shan channelised debris flow using 3d-DMM

Figure 9. The 1994 Kwun Lung Lau landslide involved the sudden collapse of a 100-year-old masonry wall, killing five people

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Elevation: mPD

22 20 18 16 14 12

22 20 18 16 14 12

Ching Cheung Road landslide, 1997

In July and August 1997, three successive large failures occurred on a soil cut slope above Ching Cheung Road, which is a major urban trunk road. The first two collapses occurred in July 1997, which culminated in the major failure on 3 August 1997. The scales of the failures were 500, 700 and 2000 m respectively. The August 1997 landslide (Figure 11) completely blocked a 50m section of the road and trapped a vehicle, fortunately with no casualties. The trunk road was subsequently closed for about one month until completion of temporary stabilisation works to the slope. The slope comprised up to six batters with a maximum height of 47 m and a typical slope angle 4550. The geology was complex and comprised predominantly weathered granite, with basalt dyke intrusions up to 1.3 m thick, which were weathered to clayey silt and have a relatively low permeability. Extensive erosion pipes, up to 250 mm in height, were present throughout the weathered profile. The hydrogeology is complex piezometric monitoring prior to the 1997 landslides showed that the groundwater response in the weathered profile took weeks to develop fully following heavy rainfall. The subject slope had a history of past instability prior to the 1997 landslides. A major landslide of about 7500 m in volume occurred on the cut slope in 1972 during road widening, and a shallow landslide occurred on the upper part of the slope in August 1982. Both the 1972 and 1982 landslides were delayed failures in that instability occurred several days following cessation of rainfall. The slope was subsequently upgraded by the government to the required safety standards in 1992. The upgrading works comprised local slope trimming and drainage improvement.

Figure 10. Numerical analysis of the 1994 Kwun Lung Lau landslide revealed a complex bulging failure not considered in previous stability assessments: (a) at calculation cycle no. 25 000; (b) at calculation cycle no. 30 000; (c) at calculation cycle no. 60 000; (d) at calculation cycle no. 75 000

Figure 11. The 2000 m3 Ching Cheung Road landslide in 1997 closed a trunk road for a month

Elevation: mPD

lished that the subsurface seepage led to the wetting up of the loose fill behind the masonry wall. The induced settlement of the loose fill probably led to distress or rupture of a foulwater sewer running across the upper part of the landslide area. This resulted in substantial saturation of the retained groundmass leading to the collapse. Following the incident, a new code of practice on inspection and maintenance of water-carrying services was issued by the government to upgrade professional practice in the investigation and maintenance of underground water-carrying services.27 Professor N. R. Morgenstern18, the independent reviewer engaged by the Hong Kong government, advocated that, among other things, a more integrated perspective should be adopted for slope stability studies. In response to this recommendation, the GEO launched a systematic landslide investigation programme in 1997.

(a)

26 24 Elevation: mPD

(b)

26 24 22 20 18 16 14 12 Elevation: mPD

Masonry wall

22 20 18 16 14 12

Masonry wall

(c)

26 24

(d)

26 24

Masonry wall

Masonry wall

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The investigation established that the 1997 landslides were probably caused by the build-up of adverse transient groundwater pressure, following the severe rainfall in early July 1997 and the preceding months.28 The failures occurred at the location of a buried drainage line below a sizeable upslope catchment where concentrated groundwater flow was likely to have resulted in higher groundwater levels than that in the surrounding area. The previous instabilities probably resulted in some local weakening of the groundmass and contributed to the development of the extensive erosion pipe system in the slope. The landslides highlighted the inherent uncertainties in ground investigation and stability analyses of slopes in weathered profiles. They also emphasised the vulnerability of unsupported soil cuts to adverse geological features and hydrogeological conditions, which are difficult to account for fully in the engineering geological model. A pragmatic approach of adopting more robust design solutions, such as soil nailing and retaining structures, is called for.29

n improved understanding of the progressive nature of many large-scale landslides n influence of movement mechanisms on debris run-out n role of subsurface water for example perched water, seepage pressure and damming and uncontrolled surface runoff in triggering landslides n significance of adverse geological structures and hydrogeological features n the need to cater for local minor failures in slope design and detailing n the importance of a robust slope design to cater for inherent uncertainties in geological and groundwater conditions for example, soil nails are more robust than an unsupported cut. In addition, landslide investigations have contributed to making technical advances in the assessment of debris mobility, evaluation of annual failure rates of different slope types which serve as inputs to quantitative risk assessments,31 and refinement of the rainfalllandslide correlations for landslip warnings. Lessons learnt from slope failures A key observation of the systematic landslide investigation programme was that the failure rate of engineered slopes that is slopes that have been processed by the slope-safety system is not as low as previously perceived.32 With regard to major failures of 50 m or more of engineered slopes that are not sufficiently robust, such as unsupported cuts, the key contributing factors are as follows n use of inadequate geological models leading to unrealistic stability analyses, for example stability-critical features such as adverse relict discontinuities, sheeting joints, and kaolin-rich seams not properly considered n adoption of inadequate hydrogeological models in slope design leading to underprediction of transient groundwater pressures n progressive slope deterioration and displacement not duly considered. The key problems with respect to minor failures (less than 50 m) of engineered slopes are as follows n uncontrolled surface water flow n inadequate slope maintenance n poor detailing of slope surface protection and surface drainage provisions n local weaknesses in the groundmass. The above diagnosis emphasises the need to improve design practice and slope detailing and thus enhance the reliability of engineered slopes. Key areas that warrant attention include

n inadequate engineering geological input during investigation, design and construction review leading to the adoption of inadequate geological and hydrogeological models n insufficient attention to the history of instability n inadequate consideration of overall site setting in an integrated perspective n uncontrolled surface runoff n poor detailing in slope drainage provisions n inadequate slope maintenance.

Improvement in slope-engineering practice

Lessons learnt from systematic landslide investigations have contributed to enhancing the professional practice in respect of both manmade slopes and natural hillsides. Examples of improvements made in manmade slopes include improved detailing for surface and subsurface drainage provisions, soil-nailed slopes, together with improved technical guidance to enhance the robustness of engineered slopes.29 Landslide investigations have also led to an improved understanding of the complexity of modes and mechanisms involved in natural terrain landslides.32 The improved technical know-how has in turn contributed to enhancing natural terrain landslide risk management. Improved technical criteria and guidance for study and mitigation of natural terrain landslides hazards in Hong Kong are summarised by Wong.6 A new rolling programme, known as the landslip prevention and mitigation programme, was launched by the GEO in 2007, to dovetail with the current programme upon the completion of its current phase in 2010. Under the programme, expanded efforts will be made to tackling systematically vulnerable natural-terrain catchments posing a risk to the community in a risk-based priority-ranking order, in addition to man-made slopes.

Landslide-investigation programme
The main goals of the systematic landslideinvestigation programme30 are n identification of slopes in need of early attention under the slope retrofitting programme before the situation deteriorates to result in a serious problem n improvement in the knowledge on landslide causes and mechanisms n reviewing the performance of the governments slope safety management system to identify areas that warrant improvement n providing evidence in respect of serious landslides that may involve coroners inquests, legal action or financial dispute. Since the introduction of the programme in 1997, some 3000 landslide records have been examined, and approximately 200 landslide studies have been completed. In addition to the study reports for the individual landslides, an annual diagnostic report is prepared which augments the annual factual report on rainfall and landslides. The diagnostic report seeks to make observations on overall trends, consolidate key findings and make recommendations to enhance the slope engineering practice. Thematic studies are also carried out, such as reviews of soil-nailed slope failures and landslides during construction. Enhancement of technical knowledge The key findings and lessons learnt are available from the governments slope safety website (http://hkss.cedd.gov.hk). Examples of advances in technical knowledge as a result of landslide studies include

Discussion and conclusions

The systematic landslide-investigation programme has some similarities to the UK Standing Committee on Structural Safety (Scoss), which was established by the Institution of Civil Engineers and Institution of Structural Engineers in 1976.33 The common theme for both programmes is on identifying the key lessons to be learnt and promulgation of the lessons to the code drafters and profession. GEOs programme covers all reported landslides in Hong Kong and thus the totality of the problem is better appreciated, with suitable focus being directed to those significant failures through detailed investigations. Experience has shown that the lessons learnt are not necessarily

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confined to technical aspects but can also cover risk management, as well as the administrative and regulatory framework. It is of the essence that the post-failure investigations are undertaken by personnel experienced in forensic engineering to ensure that the studies are sufficiently rigorous and insightful. Much has been learnt from landslide investigations in advancing the understanding of slope failures and enhancing the slope-engineering practice. Whereas slope failures can

be a bitter experience, landslides have proved to be an important asset from which engineers can learn how to better prevent similar failures in future. The key is to have a suitable framework for the profession to capture the lessons that need to be learnt. This includes the undertaking of rigorous investigations, promulgation of the findings and prompt updating of technical guidance and professional practice. The systematic landslide investigation programme has proved The Japan Landslide Society, 1972, 9196. 13. Lumb P. Slope failures in Hong Kong. Quarterly Journal of Engineering Geology, 1975, 8, 3165. 14. Chan Y. C., Pun W. K., Wong H. N., Li A. C. O. and Yeo K. C. Investigation of Some Major Slope Failures Between 1992 and 1995. Geotechnical Engineering Office, Hong Kong, 1996, GEO Report No. 52. 15. Geotechnical Engineering Office. Report on the Kwun Lung Lau Landslide: Volume 2 Findings of the Landslide Investigation. Geotechnical Engineering Office, Hong Kong, 1994. 16. Geotechnical Engineering Office. Report on the Fei Tsui Road Landslide of 13 August 1995: Volume 2 Findings of the Landslide Investigation. Geotechnical Engineering Office, Hong Kong, 1996. 17. Geotechnical Engineering Office. Report on the Shum Wan Road Landslide of 13 August 1995: Volume 2 Findings of the Landslide Investigation. Geotechnical Engineering Office, Hong Kong, 1996. 18. Morgenstern N.R. Report on the Kwun Lung Lau Landslide: Volume 1 Causes of the Landslide and Adequacy of Slope Safety Practice in Hong Kong. Geotechnical Engineering Office, Hong Kong, 1994. 19. Knill J. Report on the Fei Tsui Road Landslide of 13 August 1995: Volume 1 Independent Review of the Investigation by the Geotechnical Engineering Office. Geotechnical Engineering Office, Hong Kong, 1996. 20. Knill J. Report on the Shum Wan Road Landslide of 13 August 1995: Volume 1 Independent Review of the Investigation by the Geotechnical Engineering Office. Geotechnical Engineering Office, Hong Kong, 1996. 21. Legislative Council of Hong Kong. Report of the Select Committee on Kwun Lung Lau Landslip and Related Issues: Volume 1 Report. Hong Kong Government, 1995. 22. Tang M. C., Ho K. K. S., Chan T. C. F. and Chan N. F. The landslip preventive measures programme of the Hong Kong SAR Government reflections on achievements, advancement and lessons learnt in past 30 years. A Commemorative Volume Published in Conjunction with the 40th Anniversary of the Southeast Asian Geotechnical Society, Kuala Lumpur, 2007, 337359. 23. King J. P. The 1990 Tsing Shan Debris Flow. Geotechnical Engineering Office, Hong Kong, 1996. Special Project Report No.SPR6/96. 24. Hungr O., Sun H. W. and Ho K. K. S. Mobility

to be an important asset management tool to ensure that maximum benefit can be derived from studies of failures.

Acknowledgements
This paper is published with the permission of the head of the geotechnical engineering office and the director of civil engineering and development, Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. of selected landslides in Hong Kong - pilot backanalysis using a numerical model. Proceedings of the HKIE Geotechnical Divisions Annual Seminar on Geotechnical Risk Management, 1999, 169175. 25. Kwan J. S. H. and Sun H. W. Benchmarking exercise on landslide mobility modelling runout analyses using 3d-DMM. Proceedings of the 2007 International Forum on Landslide Disaster Management, Hong Kong, 2, 945966. 26. Wong H. N. and Ho K. K. S. The 23 July 1994 Landslide at Kwun Lung Lau, Hong Kong. Canadian Geotechnical Journal, 1997, 34, 825840. 27. Environment, Transport and Works Bureau. Code of Practice on Monitoring and Maintenance of Water-carrying Services Affecting Slopes, 2nd edn. Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 2006. 28. Halcrow Asia Partnership. Report on the Ching Cheung Road Landslide of 3 August 1997. Geotechnical Engineering Office, Hong Kong, 1998, GEO Report No. 78. 29. Ho K. K. S., Sun H. W. and Hui T. H. H. Enhancing the Reliability and Robustness of Engineered Slopes. Geotechnical Engineering Office, Hong Kong, 2003, GEO Report No. 139. 30. Ho K. K. S. Recent advances in geotechnology for slope stabilization and landslide mitigation perspective from Hong Kong (Keynote paper). Proceedings of the Ninth International Symposium on Landslides, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 2004, 2, 15071560. 31. Ho K. K. S. and Ko F. W. Y. Application of quantified risk analysis in landslide risk management practice Hong Kong experience (Keynote paper). Proceedings of the First International Symposium on Geotechnical Safety and Risk, Shanghai, 2007, 1, 352. 32. Ho K. K. S. and Pappin J. W. Geotechnical failures in Hong Kong. Proceedings of the HKIE Geotechnical Divisions Annual Seminar on the Geotechnical Advancements in Hong Kong Since 1970s, 2007, 213224. 32. Chan Y. C., Wong H. N. and Pun W. K. Breakthroughs in slope engineering in Hong Kong. A Commemorative Volume Published in Conjunction with the 40th Anniversary of the Southeast Asian Geotechnical Society, Kuala Lumpur, 2007, 321335. 33. Carpenter J. SCOSS: safeguarding structural safety for 30 years. Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers, Civil Engineering, 2007, 160, 123130.

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1. Chan R. K. S. Challenges in slope engineering in Hong Kong. Proceedings of the 16th Southeast Asian Geotechnical Conference, Malaysia, 2007, 137151. 2. Sewell R. J. and Campbell S. D. G. Geochemistry of coeval Mesozoic plutonic and volcanic suites in Hong Kong. Journal of the Geological Society, 1997, 154, 10531066. 3. Wong H. N., Ho K. K. S., Pun W. K. and Pang P. L. R. Observations from some landslide studies in Hong Kong. Proceedings of the HKIE Geotechnical Divisions Annual Seminar on Slope Engineering in Hong Kong, 1998, 277286. 4. Martin R. P. Geological input to slope engineering in Hong Kong. Proceedings of the Conference on Engineering Geology HK 2000, Institution of Mining and Metallurgy, Hong Kong Branch, 2000, 117138. 5. Ko F. W. Y. Correlation between Rainfall and Natural Terrain Landslide Occurrence in Hong Kong. Geotechnical Engineering Office, Hong Kong, 2005, GEO Report No. 168. 6. Wong H. N. Natural terrain management criteria Hong Kong practice and experience. Thirty Years of Slope Safety Practice in Hong Kong, Geotechnical Engineering Office, Hong Kong, 2007, 446453. 7. Kwan J. S. H., Wong T. K. C. and Ko F. W. Y. Development and applications of debris mobility modelling in assessment of natural terrain landslide hazards. Proceedings of the HKIE Geotechnical Divisions Annual Seminar on the Geotechnical Advancements in Hong Kong Since 1970s, Hong Kong, 2007, 241247. 8. Wong H. N. and Ko F. W. Y. Landslide Risk Assessment Application and Practice. Geotechnical Engineering Office, Hong Kong, 2006, GEO Report No. 195. 9. Wong H. N., Ko F. W. Y. and Hui T. H. H. Assessment of Landslide Risk of Natural Hillsides in Hong Kong. Geotechnical Engineering Office, Hong Kong, 2006, GEO Report No. 191. 10. Wong H. N. and Ho K. K. S. Observations from studies of natural hillside failures in Hong Kong (Keynote paper). Proceedings of the Symposium on Slope Hazards and their Prevention, Hong Kong, 2000, 207212. 11. So C. L. Mass movements associated with the rainstorm of June 1966 in Hong Kong. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 1970, 53, 5565. 12. Lumb P. Landslides in Hong Kong. Proceedings of the First International Symposium on Landslide Control,

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