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Can Social Dialogue Be a Social Coordination Mechanism? Social Dialogue Policies in Chile between 1990 and 2010
CLAUDIA CERDA BECKER Universidad Central de Chile HERNN CUEVAS VALENZUELA Universidad Diego Portales

This article explores social dialogue (SD) as it relates to systems theory. A brief historical overview of Chilean SD policies between 1990 and 2010 precedes analysis of employer and union leader discourse on the topic of SD. We suggest that although SD condenses positive projections, and consequently is valued by the parties involved in labor relations, concrete instances have encountered obstacles related to legitimization and institutionalization of SD. We propose that the primary factors diminishing the probability of communication are the semantics governing each partys perceptions, each partys hetero-references, and negative expectations of its counterpart. Nevertheless, SD could become an appropriate social coordination mechanism for an increasingly complex, democratic society.
Keywords: Social Dialogue, Coordination Mechanism, Chile, Systems Theory, Social Dialogue Policies 1990-2010, Industrial Relations, Niklas Luhmann. Related Articles in this Politics & Policy Special Issue: Luckhurst and Zavala de Alba. 2012. Introduction to the Special Issue: Governance, Democratization, and the World Economic Crisis. Politics & Policy 40 (5): 735-739. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2012.00388.x/abstract Palonen. 2012. Transition to Crisis in Hungary: Whistle-Blowing on the Naked Emperor. Politics & Policy 40 (5): 930-957. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2012.00389.x/abstract Zavala de Alba. 2012. Toward an International Implementation of Public Policies in Human Rights: A Necessary Step in Every Democratization Process for Advancements in Economic and Social Rights. Politics & Policy 40 (5): 783-801. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2012.00385.x/abstract

Politics & Policy, Volume 40, No. 5 (2012): 904-929. 10.1111/j.1747-1346.2012.00380.x Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. The Policy Studies Organization. All rights reserved.

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Este artculo explora el Dilogo Social (DS) y su relacin con la teora de sistemas. Una breve revisin histrica de las polticas de DS chilenas entre 1990 y 2010 precede el anlisis del discurso de los patrones empleadores y lderes sindicales sobre el DS. Nosotros sugerimos que aunque el DS condensa proyecciones positivas y en consecuencia es valorado por las partes involucradas en las relaciones laborales, las instancias concretas han encontrado obstculos relacionados con la legitimacin e institucionalizacin del DS. Proponemos que los principales factores que disminuyen la probabilidad de la comunicacin son: la semntica que rodea la percepcin de cada partes y las hetero-referencias de cada partido y las expectativas negativas de cada contraparte. Sin embargo, el DS se podra convertir en un mecanismo de coordinacin social apropiado para una democracia cada vez ms democrtica y completa. Social Dialogue as a Social Coordination Mechanism Like many contemporary societies, Chile faces the difcult challenge of reconciling conicting values. On one hand, democracy, human rights, and popular sovereignty represent some of modernitys most signicant political achievementsso much so that it would be difcult to nd anyone willing to argue against those concepts today. On the other hand, those achievements are somewhat threatened by the functional differentiation of partial systems, which operate on self-referential dynamics and logic. While this concept is also modern, it has little to do with the aforementioned political principles (Dunsire 1996; Willke 2006). The description of this modern paradox presented by Helmut Willke (2006, 184), one of Niklas Luhmanns most distinguished disciples, is worth citing in extenso.
Political democracy must be excluded as a model for general social guidance if we do not wish, against the logic of functional differentiation, and against the very logic of modernity, to impose the primacy of politics over other functional systems. In turn, all non-democratic forms must be excluded if we do not wish, again against the logic of modernity, to regress in terms of human rights and individual diversity.

Many deny the preceding dilemma because it is only grudgingly that we recognize the political systems relative inability to coordinate social complexity. As a result of the democratic states failure to coordinate increasing complexity through hierarchical, centralized, public, deliberate intervention, new forms of coordination have emerged. These new forms incorporate the logic of partial systems, which operate on self-referential dynamics and logic (Dunsire 1996; Lechner 2007; Mascareo 2010; Willke 1993, 2006). This leads us to ask ourselves, in terms borrowed from intervention theory and the theory of contextual guidance (Mascareo 2010; Willke 1993): in a society without a

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privileged center, how can any form of convergence or coordination, which guard against the dissolution of society and the centrifugal tendencies of parties involved in labor relations, be achieved? This article examines whether social dialogue (SD) among the government, the labor force (henceforth, workers), and employers could be a social coordination mechanism that counteracts those centrifugal tendencies. In agreement with Willke (2006), we suggest the following: on a scale smaller than that of partial systems, there are a series of interconnected decision structures, which are more or less institutionalized as systems of deliberation uniting the socially relevant parties, facilitating coordination, and converging the different systems logic and the parties different codes. Specically, we propose that bipartite or tripartite instances of SD at the national, regional, and company level could lead to decentralized, democratic, and respectful social coordination of the divergent positions held by the parties involved in labor relations (hereafter termed the parties). In principle, binding SD would allow a certain degree of structural coupling, easing management of the increasingly complex economy, businesses productive activities, and their effects on the environment.1 Our premise is that in an increasingly complex society, SD couldunder certain conditionsbe a mechanism for effective coordination between parties involved in labor relations.2 The rst section of this article expands upon the concept of SD, examining it as a form of labor relations governance that functions as a coordination mechanism for deliberative bodies. The second section assesses SD experiences in Chile during the four administrations led by the center-left coalition, the Concertacin de Partidos por la Democracia (The Concert of Parties for Democracy: hereafter referred to as the Concertacin). The third section presents discussion of the problem and the articles general theoretical perspective, while the fourth section describes the collection and data analysis methodology. Through qualitative data analysis, the fth section argues that the primary factors diminishing the probability of communication are the different semantics governing union leaders and employers perceptions, and each partys expectations of their counterpart. The data reveal that, while dialogue condenses positive projections, and is consequently valued by the parties, concrete instances of SD in Chile have encountered problems related to the probability of communication, legitimization, and institutionalization. The nal section provides recommendations and asserts the importance of SD, as well as its potential as a social coordination mechanism that is appropriate for an increasingly complex democratic society, like Chile.
1

In Luhmanns (1990) work, the concept of structural coupling refers strictly to momentary couplings between partial social systems, or between a partial social system and a psychic system. Here the concept is used with a certain exibility to account for instances of coordination. 2 Social collectives can be considered organizational systems.

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The Concept of Social Dialogue The International Labor Organizations (ILO) broad denition of SD includes the diverse processes and practices of the various countries. This general notion is narrowed by Ishikawa (2004, 3), who notes that
SD comprises all types of negotiation, consultation or mere exchange of information between, or among representatives of governments, employers and workers on issues of common interest relating to economic and social policy.

Depending on the intensity of SD, it can assume any number of the following forms: exchange of information, consultation, collective bargaining, or political consensus. In the last form,
[r]epresentatives of employers, workers and governments have developed a reex for acting in a concerted, multifaceted manner to address all major national economic and social policy issues through consensus (Trebilcock 1994, cited in Ishikawa 2004, 3).

Latin American authors like Patrone (1997), Ermida (2007), and Seplveda Malbrn and Vega Ruiz (2000) suggest that SD is an imprecise concept. They acknowledge the existence of various perspectives but assign different goals and objectives to the concept. Patrone (1997, 3) notes that
[s]ocial dialogue is a relatively new and exible expression, without univocal meaning. Its ambiguity is the result of the great variety of social dialogue experiences which have shaped different meanings. These meanings are very similar, but their limits remain undened.

Depending on duration, scope of issues, type of interaction, and so forth, instances of SD can pursue various purposes and assume a number of forms. To that effect, multiple authors make useful distinctions between SD in socioeconomic and labor contexts, and SD in political contexts (Campero 1997; Ermida 2007). Similarly, Seplveda Malbrn and Vega Ruiz (2000, 1) noted that SD occurs at the micro level when it is aimed specically at collective bargaining in a certain economic sector, company or group of companies, and at the macro level when the objective is
economic and social development through agreements promoting strengthened social institutions and a state at the service of all its citizens; through formulation and execution of state policies in the areas and on the issues addressed through dialogue.

In an interview with the authors, Campero (2008) asserted that SD can be understood as a method for creating and favoring conditions of governability, an

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essential political tool for generating decisions with some degree of consensus or, at least, limiting catastrophic dissension. It is a mechanism that is separate from, but complementary to, parliament. SD comprises all forms of relations between parties that are not open conict. It can include collective bargaining, various more-or-less institutionalized information and consultation mechanisms, participative and voluntary forms of labor conict resolution, participation at the company, sector, or national level, and instances of social consensus, such as bipartite and tripartite social contracts or framework agreements (Ermida 2007, 3). SD has a larger political dimension related to citizenship, politics, government, democracy, and society as a whole (Ermida 2007, 5). It is an essential instrument in a pluralist democracy. Our approach to the concept of SD places it within the broader social coordination mechanisms framework and conceptualizes it within Luhmanns systems theory. Despite its imprecise denition, the concept of SD is useful for focusing our observations on a set of cooperative processes between parties. We support the notion that when SD is understood as a mechanism of social coordination in formulation of public policy, it takes on an obvious political dimension. We also agree with Morgado (2008), who describes SD as a means of promoting reconciliation of interests that are not just different but often contradictory. SD contributes to bringing sides closer, and creates a more or less institutionalized opportunity for cooperative communication where the parties nd resonance and opportunities for irritating3 the systems and organizations involved. Naturally, each party will do so on the basis of its own self-referential, operationally closed logic. There is a series of communication in labor relations that claries why the parties are predisposed to be irritated by the communication inherent in SD. Distinctionssuch as capital/work, employer/employee, company/ union, business owner/worker, capital-intensive production/labor-intensive production, prot/salary expense, expense/investment, and productivity training/employability trainingrepresent conict between workers and employers. However, such distinctions are simultaneously interdependent and mutually necessary to a partys identity and the eld of labor relations. In this
According to Luhmanns theory of self-referentially closed systems, the environment of a system can inuence it only when it produces problems ordisturbances that, in their turn, are re-elaborated internally by the system in its own terms. Coherent with Luhmanns autopoiesis paradigm, the Germanterm Irritation (usually translated as irritation into English) keeps a strong biological sense, somehow capturing the idea that social systemssimilar to biological organismcan adapt to their environment only throughinternal processes. Hence, although irritation may start through events taking place in the environment of the system, it can never really occuroutside the system. In other words, although irritation begins in the environment through an event, it becomes a challenge or problem through its encounter with some structures of the system and acquires its full meaningonly thanks to an internal construction of the system. However, this should not mean that irritation always succeeds in changing the system; furthermore, maybe the most common result is its failure. See Corsi and others (1996) and Luhmann (1990).
3

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regard, SD is an opportunity for communication between parties with positions that are not only different but often in contraposition and tension. Social Dialogue Experiences in Chile Chiles history reveals that SD can be advantageous. Since the return to democratic rule, there has been interest in promoting SD at the national, regional, sector, and company levels. This interest has been reected in multiple dialogue initiatives led by each of the Concertacin administrations (Morgado 2006). The Patricio Aylwin Administration (1990-94) Chiles political transition was the result of a series of agreements reached through asymmetric negotiations between authoritarian government forces and opposition parties. Among the most noteworthy of those were the Constitutional Referendum (1989), an agreement that established the conditions for democratic elections (1989), and a series of socioeconomic accords. These last included the so-called Acuerdos Marco [Macro Agreements] (1990-93), a series of tripartite framework agreements that established fundamental guarantees for a post-Pinochet market economy and a cautious, but valued, tax reform. The Acuerdos Marco was part of a strategic design of growth policies that favored stability in the rules of the economic game and social peace, integration into world markets, formation of human capital, and promotion of private investment. The agreements also included a formula for calculating minimum wage. The rst Acuerdo MarcoChile, una oportunidad histrica (Chile, a Historic Opportunity)held that the solution to Chiles social problems lies in asserting its capacity for growth and economic dynamism (Cortzar 1993). Although many analysts have emphasized this socioeconomic aspect of the Acuerdos Marco (Vial 1995), it is relevant to note its broader political motivations for social peace and reconciliation. The following is representative of the parties intertwined socioeconomic and political motives, and desire to overcome past divisions and build a plentiful future.
Perhaps the country has never been in a better position to take on the purpose sought throughout its history (reconciliation of development, equity and democracy). This is the consequence of a series of factors. One of those is a commonality shared by all: the countrys desire to live in reconciliation, peace and sustained economic growth and social development (Cortzar 1993, 141).

Naturally, the process of reaching agreements and social consensus was not based on nave altruism. It involved intense struggle and strategic positioning. Interestingly enough, the process resulted in employer, labor, and political legitimization of the systemic differentiation between politics and economy,

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which had originated during the military regime.4 Consequently, the rst instance of SD was eminently political in that the 1990 Acuerdo Marco involved the most important union leaders, key representatives of capital, and the newly elected government. In other words, it convened the gures with the power and ability to threaten the systems somewhat precarious stability, which was held together by painstakingly achieved consensus for the common good. The Framework Agreement was a fundamental part of a set of political and socioeconomic agreements designed to produce and maintain that which former minister and the architect of the Chilean transition, Edgardo Boeninger (1997), called the virtuous circle of governability, encompassing institutional stability, economic progress, and social peace. Across the board, the parties adopted conciliatory attitudes to foster the process of sustained development, which demanded basic consensus regarding the economic and political system. It was believed that such consensus was the only way to diminish the inherent uncertainty in the transition process (Foxley 1995). In this sense, SD was a strategic objective of the new government. The Aylwin Administration was determined to ensure that sectors that seemed irreconcilable would be able to transition peacefully from an authoritarian regime into full democracy, with peace, in both the social and labor realms (Foxley 1995, 12). Like Campero (1997), we identied a series of SD initiatives during the transitional period that promoted consensus as a governability issue and primarily focused on reaching agreements between the parties. A second phase included some more instrumental initiatives. During that phase, consensus was reached on more specic issues, including the mechanism for adjusting minimum wage. Finally, it is important to note that while the labor reform initiatives were addressed in a tripartite and bipartite manner, complete consensus was illusive. Thus the Patricio Aylwin Administration initiated political dialogue with parliamentarians from his party as well as the opposition. While this dialogue was based on the progress made at the tripartite level, it was agreed that the nal decisions would be made at the political level (Campero 1997, 75). As a result, Congress passed four bills of law pertaining to employment contracts, job stability, labor organizations of national level, labor unions, and collective bargaining. The Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle Administration (1994-2000) During the Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle Administration, tripartite agreements, like those of the previous administration, were not achieved. While the administration called upon the Central Unitaria de Trabajadores [Unitary

It is somewhat paradoxical that this systemic differentiation was instigated by an eminently political decision by authoritarian political power to make the economy autonomous of political authority.

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Laborers Central] (a national-level labor union, hereafter referred to as the CUT) and Confederacin de la Produccin y el Comercio [Production and Commerce Confederation] (a national-level employer organization, hereafter referred to as the CPC), it was unable to effect similar agreements (Campero 1997). However, the administration did create the Foro de Desarrollo Productivo (National Productive Development Forum), a permanent, multiparty panel with presidential advisory functions. The panel was comprised of representatives from the government, the CUT, the CPC, and other labor and employer representatives appointed by the president. Renowned members of the political, social, and academic communities were also invited to participate. In reference to the Forum, Campero (1997, 85) noted that
[t]he less political nature of this initiative assuaged employer reservations, which were rampant during national pacts [Acuerdos Marco]. For union representatives, the Forum provided an opportunity to debate the issues of production restructuring, employment, training, etc. in a context with less emphasis on negotiation than that provided by the Acuerdos Marco. The presence of specialists, including politicians, diversied the interlocutors, thereby introducing more elements for dialogue and diminishing the emphasis on negotiation.

The results of the Forum included the creation of Centro Nacional de la Productividad y Calidad (National Center for Productivity and Quality, CNPC for Spanish acronym); proposals for an unemployment protection system (PROTAC for Spanish acronym); and progress, at the tripartite level, on the labor aspects of the Plan de Igualdad de Oportunidades para las Mujeres (Equal Opportunities for Women Plan). Despite those accomplishments, lvaro Garca, minister of economy during the Eduardo Frei Administration, noted during that period that
[d]ialogue was hindered, to some extent, by insufcient technical support in matters outside the work context and scarce representation of the SME sector. At the same time, it has been noted that the degree of institutionalization of the Forum and other national and regional instances was insufcient for ensuring interconnected, mutually committed follow-up to the centralized and decentralized dialogue. (Morgado 2006, 24).

Campero (1997) also points out that both union leaders and employers began to assert their interests and needs more adamantly, since they had been deferred during the transitional administration. Labor leaders argued that, while postponing their demands in favor of political and social stability had been legitimate during the prior period, there was no justication for continuing to do so under the new administration. This position hindered the possibility of dialogue and agreement.

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The Ricardo Lagos Administration (2000-06) One of the Ricardo Lagos Administrations rst initiatives was the creation of the Social Dialogue Council. Representatives from employer and union organizations were invited to participate and advise on social and economic matters. The issues addressed were labor reform, unemployment insurance, women and the labor market, and institutionalization of dialogue. Progress was only made on the latter two issues. One of the Councils most noteworthy accomplishments was the creation of the National Womens Bureau. The bureau promoted various issues, including childcare, labor reform, access to training, promotion of entrepreneurship, and a bill of law to outlaw sexual harassment (Morales et al. 2007). Despite the aforementioned progress, the Council dissolved in August 2001, when slow economic growth and rising unemployment led to a rupture in labor relations, leaving institutionalization of SD in Chile incomplete. Due to the difculties formalizing SD, a tripartite, sectoral, or territorial approach was favored over ofcial or formal dialogue. Under this approach, numerous smaller scale round tables were established to address specic and timely issues (Morgado 2006). The Michelle Bachelet Administration (2006-10) During the Bachelet Administration, various advisory councils were created. The most noteworthy in the area of labor relations were the Presidential Council on Pension Reform (2006) and the Presidential Council on Work and Equity (2008). These two councils were responsible for developing political and technical proposals to be presented to the president, and were referred to during Congressional legislative processes. While the proposals were not binding, they guided the various decision-making instances (ILO 2008). Additionally, a tripartite decent work national agreement was signed in November 2008. The government, the CUT, the CPC, the business community, and the ILOs Subregional Ofce for the Southern Cone of Latin America ratied their commitent to deepen tripartite exchange and SD (ILO 2008). On May 6, 2009, the National Agreement for Employment, Training and Labor Protection was signed. The national, tripartite agreement protecting employment was designed to mitigate the impact of the world economic crisis and position Chile to face contraction of the international economy. It was signed by labor, employer, and the government representatives, and led to six concrete measures, primarily designed to protect employment. The measures also sought to have medium-term impact by increasing productivity and improving human capital. To that end, employers were expected to increase productivity, avoiding termination costs. Workers would also improve their skills and abilities, leading to improved wages and employability. The agreement aimed to positively impact unemployment rates, expectations, and economic growth (Ministerio del Trabajo y Previsin Social 2009, 1).

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Discussion of the Problem History suggests that while the Concertacin administrations demonstrated interest in promoting SD, their efforts did not generate the types of lasting instances that would suggest consolidation of the practice (Espinoza 2003; Miranda 2006; Morgado 2006; Nuez 2006). Malva Espinoza (2003, 21) observed that the Concertacin-led SD policies, tripartite instances, and their results were a weak practice that resulted in limited progress and recurrent setbacks. Moreover, Nuez (2006) pointed out that SD has not addressed fundamental issues, such as workplace inequality. On a more positive note, Morgado (2006, 25) asserted that while SD has been neither constant nor vigorous, it is still advantageous as it has allowed the climate of labor relations to evolve from predominantly conictive to greater social peace. Likewise, Miranda, ILO director, noted that while SD has not been institutionalized in Chile, various decentralized and focused instances have been developed within certain productive sectors (Aravena 2006). Miranda also observed that SD has been viewed positively in Chile despite its limited development (Ministerio del Trabajo y Previsin Social 2006, 21). As demonstrated, experts agree that, despite diligent efforts, instances of SD have lacked continuity consolidation, the breadth of issues addressed through SD has been limited, and the practice itself has failed to become institutionalized. The issue of SD seems to revolve in and out of the Chilean social and political agenda.5 Thus research into the obstacles to implementing and institutionalizing instances of dialogue is of social and practical relevance, as it could contribute to improving SD policies and initiatives. One of the purposes of this article is to provide some theoretical background based on Niklas Luhmanns theory of social systems and Helmut Willkes theory of contextual intervention that enables SD-related observations and interventions. While Luhmanns language, concepts, and principles are challengingeven for readers familiar with his workthe challenge is a reasonable price to pay given the particularly revealing light that his work sheds on the problem under analysis. Methodology The article began with an apparently simple empirical question: what are the distinctions and expectations6 made or held by each party that hinder SD? Our research included second-order observation to study the observation of observers [participants] and their respective observations (Arnold 1998, 1).
5

In the 2009-10 presidential race, the Concertacin candidate, former President and Senator Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, included the issue of SD in his political platform. 6 According to Luhmann (1990), expectations are relatively stable condensations of meaning that guide communication (see also Corsi et al. 1996, 79).

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The second-order observer is not limited to observing what his/her subjects note or describethe what was observed? They can also capture the schemas of difference that mark participants observations and delineate distinctions (1). In other words, by observing sets of descriptions, the second-order observer can combine viewpoints and identify what their subjects, in their partialities, cannot see, i.e. identify latent structures (1). This article was performed in three steps. First, the recognition, from the members viewpoint, of the signicant distinctions validated by the members themselves (Arnold 1998, 4) was surveyed. Then, the participants individual communication was described and analyzed to propose patterns that reconstruct, at an abstract level and with greater generality, the semantics of the organizational systems in which the communication occurs. The methodological approach is supported by Arnolds postulate that each systems distinctions can be identied on the basis of language. He asserts that the schemas of difference that determine conceptions and constructions of reality can be extracted from subjects stories, sentences, and words (3). To apply this general criterion, structural discourse analysis was performed (see e.g., Martinic 1992, 2006). Through analysis of qualitative content, individual and/or group discourse was separated; the distinctions and binary semantics in each partys communication were identied and regrouped by theme and sub-theme. The referential frameworks, upon which the universe and facts acquire logical coherence for the parties, were reconstructed. The parties use those referential frameworks to regulate their perceptions and expectations of themselves and others, and their relationship with the universe and with others. In Luhmanns words, they are used to distinguish between self-reference and hetero-reference.7 The data were gathered from two homogenous focus groups in Chiles Coquimbo region: one focus group was comprised of union leaders and the other of employers. To explore the factors that could be diminishing the probability of SD, the sample also included employers and union leaders who had not participated in instances of regional dialogue. The results are not statistically representative of the reality of SD in Chiles heterogeneous work environment; however, that fact does not diminish the general value of the conclusions derived. The experiences of parties involved in labor relations in the Coquimbo region are not accidental. They are representative of the social forces and most general operating logics at work on the set of social systems. Empirical Approach to Social Dialogue Theory The following sections explore two factors that possibly diminish the probability of SD: the parties divergent discourse and operating logics, and the
7

Hetero-references are the systems descriptions of its environment. Self-reference and hetero-reference are the fundamental distinctions upon which all self-referential systems identify, internally and in its own terms, the difference between system and environment (Luhmann 1998, 406).

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negative expectations that each side has of its counterpart (hetero-reference) in the labor relations context. The Parties Operating Logics The data revealed that while dialogue is valued by union leaders and employers alike, their conceptualizations of SD differ based on each partys discourse and operating logic. It is not surprising that the parties have different approximations, conceptualizations, and expectations regarding implementation of SD, its function, and expected results, as each reads and selects communications based on their own distinctions and parameters of understanding. Union leaders conceptualize SD as a tripartite instance in which they can be heard. Furthermore, they expect those instances to generate some impact. The desire to exert greater inuence through SD is apparent in the following statement by a union leader (Focus Group-Union Leaders 2008), who described SD as having real instances in which to give our opinion. If we make an observation, knowing that it will really be taken seriously, Lets discuss this law again. Considered within the broader context of the conversation, the preceding quotation suggests a distinction between real dialogue (which has an eventual impact) and the dialogue that the union leaders had experienced (which does not produce impact or transformational change). Another union leader expanded upon the necessity of taking workers into account in SD: to correct the laws of our country, representatives of those who need to use them, the workers, need to be there, with voice and vote (Focus Group-Union Leaders 2008). The desire to inuence decision making at the political level is frequently expressed through the distinction of real dialogue, as exemplied in the following quote: an instance [of SD] would be real if there were people like us present, with the right to vote, when laws are voted on or amended (Focus Group-Union Leaders 2008). Union leaders conceptualize SD as occurring not only at the company levelwhere the majority of employers place itbut also at the national leadership level, with parliamentarians and policy makers. Moreover, union leaders evaluate the effectiveness of dialogue according to the possibility that it will impact reform and laws. They emphasize the binding nature of decisions reached through SD. From the union leaders perspective, SD is an opportunity to seek improved labor conditions. To that end, they see labor organizations as fullling a fundamental role insofar as they represent workers interests through SD with parliamentarians and employers. Meanwhile, employers see SD as a tool for increasing productivity, as is exemplied in the following Focus Group employers statement: workers have interests and the company does, too. If those interests are reconciled in the best way possible, the companys productivity will increase and workers will be happier. So, they will produce more (Focus Group-Employers 2008).

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Table 1. Schemas of Difference that Dene Social Dialogue (SD)

Union Leaders Emphasis on ofcial dialogue with parliamentarians and policy makers Binding dialogue Impact legislation Objective: to improve labor conditions Unions as an instrument for dialogue

Employers Emphasis on intra-company dialogue Dialogue as information exchange Within the current legislative framework Objective: to increase productivity Unions as contrary to SD

Employers dene SD as an intra-company dialogue that allows interaction and exchange of information, and seeks mutual benet. Employers noted that dialogue is not just for individual benet, but for mutual benet. While they recognize that it stems from the need to pursue the common good over individual interests, it seems that the primary objective of dialogue is to allow the company to achieve its goals. Employers also sustained that SD should take place within the regulatory framework of the Labor Code, and that it [should] not be confused or politicized (Focus Group-Employers 2008). They noted that under those terms, agreements could be made within the connes of the current law, and the ability to produce signicant changes would be limited. To that end, one employer (Focus Group-Employers 2008) stated:
[d]ialogue must be undertaken within the framework of the existing labor legislation. Neither the company nor the workers can make demands that surpass legislation. In other words, I think going beyond what is legal is not very realistic.

Employers dene SD as occurring between employers and nonunion workers. They conceive union organization as contrary to SD. On that issue, one employer (Focus Group-Employers 2008) stated: today, I think it [union organization] is a result of poor SD. When theres a union leader, I associate that with SD having been conducted poorly. Table 1 summarizes the primary differences in conceptualizations of SD, as presented by union leaders and employers. The preceding table demonstrates how each of the systems functions under a different logic. Each system plays its own melody and listens to its own music (Willke 1993, 27), acting autonomously in relation to the environment. In that context, Willkes (1993, 13) words become relevant: because of their own self-referentiality, complex social systems refer to themselves rst. They react to their own states and perceive their environment only very selectively, as determined by their own criteria of relevance. Thus it is apparent that the opacity of each systems language to the other impedes possibilities of coordination (Mascareo 2008, 5), generating distrust between the parties. Each party becomes suspicious of the other partys

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motivation and true intentions for participating in instances of SD. Based on each partys discoursewhich is synthetically represented in Table 1it is possible to suggest that both union leaders and employers can be conceived as social systems that reproduce self-referential communication articulated within the logic of meaning of each actor. According to our ndings, this diminishes each systems probability of transformation, limiting the possibility of developing SD. Each of the systemsemployers and union leaderspoints out aspects that, according to their own semantics and operating logic, are not conducive to SD. While employers have a strong managerial schema of distinction, union leaders have a more political view based on the notion of social demand. Whereas employers conceive union leaders focus on demands as an impediment to SD, the latter cite employers managerial approach to SD as a problem. Consequently, irritation of each system and selection of communication in SD occur on the basis of previously established schemas of difference. Three interrelated consequences have emerged. First, only those divergent variations that do not threaten the stability of each system of communication are incorporated and stabilized. Second, the probability of incorporating new divergent variations with the ability to transform each system of communication is diminished. Third, each system ends up fundamentally reproducing its own schemas of difference. Therefore, while SD could still potentially produce divergent variations and irritations, both unions and employers have a unique way of dening the concept of SD according to their own specications. Existing communication thus tends to nd a place within the reproduction of each system. In each case, the partys denition of SD ends up reinforcing its own operating logic. So, one could suggest that workers perceive SD as a new form of making demands because it allows them to advance the workers cause, while employers see SD as a tool for increasing productivity and a new form of control inasmuch as they propose that employers should establish the basic parameters for dialogue because only in this way the coherence between SD and the rms objectives is secured. Self-Reference/Hetero-Reference The second factor diminishing the probability of SD is the negative expectations that each party has of its counterpart. The analysis of the parties discourse revealed that these negative expectations are constantly reproduced and conrmed, hindering any possibility of cooperation and understanding between the parties. Analysis of focus group data allowed each groups characteristic observations of their environment, specically the hetero-references of their counterpart, to be gathered. Tables 2 and 3 detail the union leaders and employers angles of observation, hetero-references, schemas of difference, and practices. We have focused on those schemas of difference and practices that are representative of the expectations that hinder SD.

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Table 2. Employers Schemas of Difference and Practices

Angle of Observation E M P L O Y E R S

Type of Observation Heteroreferences

Schemas of Difference Employers (Employer expectations of workers) Workers are less capable.

Practices Employers

Workers are like children.

Workers are resentful/only concerned about their own interests. (Employer expectations of current union leaders) Union leaders are incompetent. They take advantage of their positions.

Paternalistic attitude A lot of the time I see that the company is many things to the workers, not just a pay check. Sometimes I help them with other types of things. When it comes down to it, we are the parents. Who else are they going to turn to? If you earn Ch$200,000 a month, youre not going to ask a bank for a loan. Zero-sum relationship Maybe I dont understand his position and he doesnt understand mine. Hes seeking his own prot and Im seeking mine.

Union leaders always have partisan interests.

Union leaders are synonymous with confrontation/use coercion, pressure, and threats.

Insults/Delegitimization Generally, the laziest bastard is the union leader. So, now hes happy because he gets to go to Santiago. Im talking about symbolic cases. The laziest one, that lazy bastard was the leader. Distrust Theres always a political party behind a union leader and that makes me a bit suspicious of what he/she is after, what he/she wants. Aversion to unions/actively avoiding union organization The company where I work is a national company, a big one, and theres no union. Obviously, the company has worked for that.

Tables 2 and 3 show the primary schemas of difference and practices that inuence communication between parties. The tables show how this particular type of communication acts as a perceptual lter that the parties involved apply to self (self-reference) and their counterpart (hetero-reference). It is evident that an unfavorable impression of their counterpart is a commonality between the

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Table 3. Union Leaders Schemas of Difference and Practices

Angle of Observation U N I O N L E A D E R S Type of Observation Heteroreferences Schemas of Difference Union Leaders (Expectations that union leaders have of employers) Employers are our adversaries. Practices Union Leaders

The employer has the power/establishes the conditions.

Employers abuse their position/mistreat the workers.

Employers use fear, threats, and retaliation.

Confrontation We have to keep ghting against them [the employers], not because we want to, but because they have made it that way since the outset. Fear makes workers passive People cant quit and tell them where to go [question them] because theyd be left without a gig [a job]. Confrontational attitude of union leaders Id stand at the door of the bank with a sign, yelling and making a scene. Workers produce less Its a vicious circle. On one hand [employers] treat us poorly and if the worker can, he/she will try to work less, sometimes maybe even unconsciously. Its a consequence . . . [implicitly referring to mistreatment]. Workers are fearful of organizing into unions The workers are skeptical of joining a union, the fear. They [employers] want to rule with fear.

different systems, which suggests that these negative perceptions are central to the type of relationship that is established. Employers assert that workers are less capable and resentful. Similarly, union leaders claim that employers are unt and abuse their position. They perceive employer relationships as abusive and synonymous with confrontation, referring to employers as the other side. Union leaders also view employers as using fear and threats. In what follows, we deepen our analyses of each partys negative expectations of their counterpart to identify the obstacles that hinder SD. To that end, structural discourse analysis of the employers and workers statements will be conducted to uncover the deep meanings that these produce according to their context and schemas of difference (Martinic 1992, 5). Figures 1 and 2 summarize the expectations of employers and union leaders, respectively. The selection of statements presented in each gure has been done on the basis of their typicality or representativeness of their respective schemas of difference.

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Figure 1. Employer Expectations of Workers and Union Leaders

Figure 1 presents in the horizontal axis expectations concerning the level of competence or incompetence of workers and leaders. Our analyses reveal that, from the perspective of employers, the level of competence is seen as a necessary condition for constructive SD. Employer discourse also reveals a distinction between nonunion workers perceived as a positive gure, and current union leaders conceived as a negative gure. Interestingly, these hetero-references are alluded to without making the self-reference of employers explicit. The following patterns of expectations, which structure employers hetero-references, emerged when employee union involvement was crossed with perceived level of competence. Quadrant B (which crosses competence with nonunion workers) is the most favorable representation. Here, employers recognize that workers sometimes notice and know what is missing (Focus Group-Employers 2008), reecting employers positive valuation of nonunion workers and acknowledging that they can be competent in their functions and tasks. Quadrant A (which crosses incompetence with nonunion workers) reects valuations that are both positive in that the workers are not unionized, and negative in that they are perceived as incompetent. In this context, employers expressed a perceived lack of commitment and productivity, asserting that workers dont care [about their work] because they will get paid at the end of the month any way (Focus Group-Employers 2008). Quadrant C (which crosses incompetence with current union leaders) represents two negative

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Figure 2. Union Leaders Self- and Hetero-reference

valuations, which are evident in the insults used to describe the current union leaders (the laziest bastard was the leader, Focus Group-Employers 2008). Thus it is possible that employer discourse reinforces the delegitimization of union leaders as potentially valid interlocutors. Finally, Quadrant D (which crosses competence with current union leaders), represents ambivalent discourse in that it presents a positive valuation: competency, together with negative valuations of current union leaders. Interestingly enough, employer discourse does not include any manifest representations of this, although as the gure shows, it is a logical possibility. This absence could reect a lack of counterexamples with which to refute the predominately negative impression that employers have of current union leadersnamely, that they are incompetent and unt for their position. It is evident that employers negative expectations are primarily focused on current union leaders, not workers in general. While employers acknowledge the possibility that workers can be competent, their expectations of current union leaders reinforce discourse that highlights only negative aspects. This process of reinforcement becomes an obstacle to establishing any type of dialogue, as the current union leaders are not recognizedby employersas valid interlocutors. Figure 2 illustrates union leader expectations, crossing the relationship between the parties (vertical axis) with treatment of workers (horizontal axis). Analysis of union leaders discourse reveals, on the basis of the codes therein, that they necessarily assume an adversarial position when referring to

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employers. Hence, in this case, the hetero-reference of union leaders is always established in an antagonistic relation to their self-reference. When the variables are crossed, Quadrant B (which crosses union leaders with good treatment) illustrates the most favorable representation. It presents the self-reference of union leaders, who assign themselves the role of defending, counseling and supporting workers. The quadrant reects a certain degree of closeness, and the type of interaction that union leaders perceive occurs between the union and workers. Quadrant A (which crosses union leaders with mistreatment) reects the logical possibility that combines the positive valuation of union leaders and the negative valuation of mistreated workers. This representation was not found in union leader discourse, which highlighted their commitment to and defense of workers, without reference to potential mistreatment of union members or workers, in general. Quadrant C (which crosses employers with mistreatment) represents employers who mistreat their workers. These two negative valuations are reected in the statement [t]hey always have to trample all over the workers (Focus Group-Union leaders 2008). That statement could reect the aggression and lack of respect perceived by workers, or abuse of authority in employerworker interaction. Finally, Quadrant D (which crosses employers with good treatment) represents a negative valuation insofar as it refers to employers, together with a positive valuation insofar as it refers to good treatment of workers. This representation is reected in the statement Wed have meetings with him [the employer] in the mornings and hed say Hope all goes well, guys, which indicates close employerworker interaction (Focus Group-Union Leaders 2008). However, throughout union leader discourse, every time a positive characteristic of any employer was mentioned, disappointment was expressed. The following afrmations are representative of those disappointments: those things can be done, but it depends on middle management. Middle managers are the worst. They shouldnt exist (Focus Group-Union Leaders 2008). Another similar expression gathered is: youre lucky if the [manager] who is there now says hi in the morning. They dont value younot even as a human being. Thus union leaders positive perceptions of employers and the relationships that can be established with workers do not endure over time. Something always ruins them. This disappointment reinforces their negative expectations of employers, creating a vicious circle, characterized by learned hopelessness.8 Figure 3 synthesizes each partys perception of its counterpart. It illustrates how the parties condensed expectations constantly reproduce and conrm negative expectations of their counterpart. To that effect, mirror-image expectations, which are reciprocal points of view that one party in a conict holds of the

Learned hopelessness is the psychological state that is produced when events are perceived as uncontrollable and nothing can be done to change them. The uncontrollable is precisely what causes hopelessness (Vinaccia et al. 2008, 133).

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Figure 3. Hetero-references in Labor Relations

other party . . . in which the same virtues are applied to self and the same vices to the other party (Myers 2004, 303), emerge. Deutsch (1973 in Myers 2004, 303) notes that mirror-image expectations are characteristically self-conrming: if A expects B to be hostile, A can treat B in such a manner that As expectations will be fullled, thereby creating a vicious circle. In that sense, labor relations have historically included communication based on negative, disparaging expectations of the other party, which impedes selection of any variation that diverges from the previously established. This diminished probability of selecting any divergent variation reinforces the parties perceptions of the impossibility of change and the hopelessness of establishing a new form of labor relations. Paths toward Encouraging Social Dialogue This nal section examines whether plausible paths toward SD exist. It seems appropriate to expand upon Willkes theory of contextual intervention as a guide to foster SD as a social coordination mechanism. As illustrated, the theory of contextual intervention can be understood as self-direction of autonomous systems, as long as intervention seeks self-regulation of the system, which consequently reinforces the systems own structure, its operational

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closure and autonomy from its environment (Mascareo 2008, 7). Public policy on SD has to accept, as a condition of its success, that systemic communication ignores, and at best, irritates what seems relevant and when that improbable probability becomes probable, it is understood within parameters that only it can understand (3). Thus public policy encouraging SD has to be able to seduce and irritate the parties from within their own parameters of understanding. In that regard, Willke (1993, 32) argues that
[s]ystemic discourse as a shared game between autonomous players, each with divergent operating logic, does not seek consensus rst. Rather, it rst seeks dissension [what makes necessary to distinguish] the extent to which a certain discourse will be met with consensus and to what extent it will be met with dissent, more specically: how consensus based on fundamental dissent is possible.

This is highly relevant to the issue of SD. Today, SD is primarily viewed as the ability to reach agreements through consensus between the parties involved in labor relations. However, as a consequence of the parties different semantics, each partys negative expectations of the other parties within the social system, and a lack of central coordination of social complexity, such consensus remains illusive. In order for SD to become a mechanism of coordination, and not just a formal discourse without real and institutional effects, an opportunity needs to be created for both the interplay between the autonomous systems and also for dissent to be expressed. It is important to recognize that
between functionally differentiated systems, fundamental consensus on discourse cannot be reached because there is no truth or generalized righteousness. There is only the possibility that different truths can be related. It is important to understand that agreement is not necessary for coordination and guidance. Informed selection of each system-specic option, which in their selectivity, refer to each other [is sufcient] (Willke 1993, 33).

Furthermore, intervention that promotes SD as a social coordination mechanism should reconcile: increased differentiation and autonomy of labor and employer organization systems, with forms of virtuous coupling between the two. This type of integration requires self-observation by the systems (organizations), based on the system/environment difference, which seeks better adaptation through control of the way the system operates. Self-observation (reection) introduces information into the system (organization) and encourages continuous monitoring of the systems state, contrasting its current state with alternative states of its own operations that could potentially be selected, thereby favoring transformation. The data reveal multiple examples of the parties ability to self-observe (reect), instances in which they propose their

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own, not just their counterparts, need to change. Contextual intervention could also support these reective processes to generate processes of self-description that allow observation of the identitys effects on the environment (Mascareo 2008; Willke 1993). Promoting reection within employer and union organizations could thus boost the organizations autonomy and improve their understanding of their effects on the environment. This understanding could generate a platform upon which those same parties could establish the rules of their interaction and the principles of validity (Willke 1993). SD would certainly be an interesting alternative for social coordination and post-regulation governance, when the following conditions are met: rst, all the parties should perceive SD as a shared and socially legitimate strategy for resolving signicant labor relations issues. Second, it should encourage logic of coordination between the parties of a relatively institutionalized, autonomous, and differentiated structure. Third, its communicationand labor policiesshould make sense to the parties involved. Fourth, communication needs to distinguish between relatively consensual issues and more conictive issues. Fifth, vetoes cannot be used to impede treatment of conictive issues. Sixth, SD policies should encourage reection by the parties. Finally, when backed by political decisions, SD could potentially work as a compensatory institution (Dunsire 1996) within the economic system, characterized by the co-referentiality of the parties role antonyms. Such policies should maximize the parties cooperative mechanisms of relating, over the long term and on the basis of their coevolutionary structural coupling. About the Authors Claudia Cerda Becker (MA, Universidad de Chile) works at the Faculty of Political Science and Public Administration, Universidad Central, Santiago de Chile, and can be contacted at claudiacerda.becker@googlemail.com. Her research interests are in contemporary sociological theory, industrial relations, labor unions, social policy, and the interface between gender and labor issues. Until 2010, she worked as a policy advisor for the Chilean Ministry of Labour and Pensions. Hernn Cuevas Valenzuela (PhD, Essex University) is a lecturer at the School of Political Science, Faculty of History and Social Sciences, Universidad Diego Portales. Av. Ejrcito Libertador 333, Santiago de Chile (email: hernan.cuevas@udp.cl, hcuevasster@gmail.com). His research interests are in interpretive policy analysis, governance, and governmentality; Latin America and democratization; industrial relations; citizenship; theories of elites; and post-structuralism and discourse theory, and discourse analysis. In recent years, he has been conducting research on Chilean political elites and citizenship. His recent published work has focused on citizenship and health social movements, and discourse theory.

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