RIGHTS OF PERSONS UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION In the evening of October 16, 1991 of Puerto Princesa City in the presence

of Clara Agagas a Gerry Galgarin, uncle of accused Edward Endino, suddenly and without warning stabbed Dennis Aquino repeatedly on the chest. Dennis was able to momentarily free himself from the attacker however from out of nowhere Edward Endino appeared and fired at him. Wounded and bleeding he was able to sought refuge inside the Elohim Store. Clara with the help of some onlookers took him to the hospital but he died before getting any medical treatment. According to the autopsy report of Dr. Josephine Goh-Cruz, cause of death was cardio-respiratory arrest Title: People of the Philippines vs. Edward Endino (at large) and Gerry Galgarin, accused-appellant G.R. No. 133026, February 20, 2001 Facts: secondary to hypovolemic shock secondary to a stab wound which penetrated the heart. On October 18, 1991 an information was filed against them however both accused remained at large. On November 19, 1992 Galgarin was apprehended by the Antipolo Police. He remained in their custody until he was fetched by the Palawan Police. On their way to the airport, they stopped at the ABS-CBN television station where accused Galgarin was interviewed by reporters. Video footages of the interview were taken showing Galgarin admitting his guilt while pointing to his nephew Edward Endino as the gunman. The case against Galgarin was established through the testimony of Clara who said that she was with the victim standing outside the Soundlab Recording Studio, a barhouse owned by him when Galgaran attaked him and as he was escaping Endino a spurned lover who harbored ill-feelings towards her and Dennis, shot Dennis. Her testimony was corroborated by the victims neighbor Anita Leong who testified that a little past six o'clock in the evening of 16 October 1991 Galgarin together with a companion went to her house looking for Dennis. She instructed them to proceed to the Soundlab Recording Studio as Dennis might still be there. A few minutes later she heard a gun shot and instructed her daughters to duck, she waited for her 7 year old daughter Josephine whom she ask to run some errand to come back, soon enough she heard her daughter crying and knocking at their door and told her that Kuya Dennis was shot and stabbed. Josephine confirmed her mother's testimony and even said that she had seen Gerry Galgarin stab her Kuya Dennis and she could remember Gerry very well because of the mole below his nose. However, in the trial, Galgarin claimed that he did not take part in the slewing of Dennis and that on October 14, 1991 he was with his Common-law wife who gave birth to their first born and that he had stayed with her till October 16, 1991. He also disowned the confession which he made over TV Patrol and claimed that it was induced by the threats of the arresting police officers. He asserted that the videotaped confession was constitutionally infirmed and inadmissible under the exclusionary rule provided in Sec.12, Art. III, of the Constitution. The trial court however admitted the video footages and his alibi rejected. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial courts admission of videotape confession is invalid as it violates his Rights under Sec. 12, Art. III, of the Constitution. Ruling: No, the court finds the admission of the videotaped confession proper. The interview was recorded on video and it showed accused-appellant unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession does not form part of custodial investigation as it was not given to police officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public. Furthermore in his TV interview he freely admitted that he had stabbed Dennis, and that Endino had shot him (Aquino). There is no showing that the interview of accused was coerced or against his will. Hence, there is basis to accept the truth of his statements therein. However this court shall remind the lower courts to be extremely cautious in admitting similar confessions for there is the probability that the police in connivance with unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt to legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions and place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an offense on television. Such a situation would be detrimental to the guaranteed rights of the accused and thus imperil our criminal justice system. A word of counsel then to lower courts: we should never presume that all media confessions described as voluntary have been freely given. This type of confession always remains suspect and therefore should be thoroughly examined and scrutinized. Wherefore the court finds the accused galgaran guilty of murder with treachery sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of Dennis Aquino in the amount of P50,000.00 as compensatory damages and P72,725.35 as actual damages and that accused-appellant is further ordered to compensate the decedent's heirs P50,000.00 as moral damages for their emotional and mental anguish. Costs against accused-appellant.

PROSECUTION HAS BURDEN TO PROVE WARNINGS Title: People v. Nicandro G.R. No. L-59378, February 11, 1986 Facts: Herein accused was arrested through an entrapment plan by the police. She was arrested for violating the Dangerous Drug Act. As provided in the information she is being tried for selling four sticks of marijuana cigarettes, marijuana flowering tops wrapped in a piece of newspaper, one roach marijuana cigarette and marijuana seeds and ashes contained in a white plastic bag, which are prohibited drugs. Upon being investigated and after having been duly apprised of her constitutional rights, appellant orally admitted having sold the four sticks of marijuana cigarettes and the ownership of the

marijuana flowering tops taken from her pocket, but refused to reduce her confession to writing. In convicting the appellant, the trial court relied partly on her alleged oral admission declaration during the custodial investigation. ISSUE: Whether or not her admission is admissible. Ruling: No. it was not because it violates the rights of the accused as provided in Section 20 of Article IV of the Constitution(now Art. III, Sec. 12) which reads No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence. When the Constitution requires a person under investigation "to be informed" of his right to remain silent and to counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. As a rule, therefor, it would not be sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution. He is not only duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitled; he must also explain their effects in practical terms e.g., what the person under interrogation may or may not do, and in a language the subject fairly understands. (See People vs. Ramos, 122 SCRA 312: People VS. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2.) In other words, the right of a person under interrogation "to be informed" implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective communication that results in understanding what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be said that the person has been "informed" of his rights. Now, since the right "to be informed" implies comprehension, the degree of explanation required will necessary vary, depending upon the education, intelligence and other relevant personal circumstances of the person under investigation. Suffice it to say that a simpler and more lucid explanation is needed where the subject is unlettered. As it is the obligation of the investigating officer to inform a person under investigation of his right to remain silent and to counsel, so it is the duty of the prosecution to affirmatively establish compliance by the investigating officer with his said obligation. Absent such affirmative showing, the admission or confession made by a person under investigation cannot be admitted in evidence. As broadly stated in the Miranda case and quoted with approval by the then Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in People vs. Caguioa, supra, ... the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial investigation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. The accused is acquitted on the basis that her guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Note: Waiver of right against self-incrimination is not effective unless made knowingly and intelligently.Like other constitutional rights, the right against self-incrimination, including the right of a person under investigation to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right, may be waived. To be valid, however, a waiver of the right must not only be voluntary; it must be made knowingly and intelligently (People vs. Caguioa, supra), which presupposes an awareness or understanding of what is being waived. It stands to reason that where the right has not been adequately explained and there are serious doubts as to whether the person interrogated knew and understood his relevant constitutional rights when he answered the questions, it is idle to talk of waiver of rights.

CUSTODIAL PHASE OF INVESTIGATION:POLICE LINE UP/PARAFIN TEST Title: People v. Amestuzo (ALBINO BAGAS y DALUHATAN, accused-appellant)

G.R. No. 104383, July 12, 2001 Facts: At about nine-thirty in the evening of February 22, 1991, a group of eight armed men wearing masks entered the house of complainant Perlita delos Santos Lacsamana at Sacred Heart Village, Kalookan City and robbed the said premises of valuables in the total amount of P728,000.00. In the course of the robbery, two members of the gang raped Maria Fe Catanyag and Estrella Rolago, niece and employee, respectively of complainant Lacsamana. Albino Bagas, Valeriano Amestuzo, Federico Ampatin, Dioscoro Vias and four other accused, whose identities are unknown and who are still at large up to the present, were charged with the complex crime of robbery in band with double rape. They were all convicted and was sentenced to Double Reclusion Perpetua and that they are solidarily liable in indemnifying the Lacsamana as well as the two raped victims.

Accused-appellant Bagas rendered his appeal before the supreme court which is mainly based on (1) the alleged deprivation of his constitutional right to be represented by counsel during his identification, (2) the trial courts error i n giving due weight to the open court identification of him which was based on a suggestive and irregular out-of-court identification, and (3) the trial courts improper rejection of his defense of alibi. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not his right to be represented by counsel was violated during the court/during the line up) identification.(out-of

2) Whether or not the trial court erred in giving due weight to his out-of-court identification. Ruling: 1) No, the accused was not denied of his right to counsel. The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation starts when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements. Police line-up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage. This was settled in the case of People vs. Lamsing and in the more recent case of People vs. Salvatierra. The right to be assisted by counsel attaches only during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed by the accused during identification in a police line-up because it is not part of the custodial investigation process. This is because during a police line-up, the process has not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory and it is usually the witness or the complainant who is interrogated and who gives a statement in the course of the line-up. The fact that he was brought out of the detention cell alone and was made to stand before the accused by himself and unaccompanied by any other suspects or persons does not detract from the validity of the identification process. 2) Yes, the court finds it erroneous for the lower court to have find the out-of-court identification as admissible. In resolving the admissibility and reliability of out-of-court identifications, we have applied the totality of circumstances test enunciated in the case of People vs. Teehankee which lists the following factors:

xxx (1) the witness opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification process.

The out-of-court identification of herein accused-appellant by complainants in the police station appears to have been improperly suggestive. Even before complainants had the opportunity to view accused-appellant face-to-face when he was brought out of the detention cell to be presented to them for identification, the police made an announcement that he was one of the suspects in the crime and that he was the one pointed to by accused Ampatin as one of culprits. The fact that this information came to the knowledge of the complainants prior to their identification based on their own recall of the incident detracts from the spontaneity of their subsequent identification and therefore, its objectivity. . The policemen told the complainants that accused-appellant was one of the suspects. This incited complainants to an emotional frenzy, kicking and hitting him. Albino Bagas is acquitted of the crime charged. Note: The Court has held that where an accused sets up alibi as a defense, the courts should not be too readily disposed to dismiss the same, for, taken in the light of all the evidence on record, it may be sufficient to reverse the outcome of the case as found by the trial court and thereby rightly set the accused free. Though inherently weak as a defense, alibi in the present case has been sufficiently established by corroborative testimonies of credible witnesses and by evidence of physical impossibility of accused-appellants presence at the scene of the crime. Alibi, therefore, should have been properly appreciated in accused-apellants favor. >his co-workers testified so support his alibi wherein said worker locked the only possible passage or entrance of the factory to which he and other workers were sleeping in to avoid the loss of materials and that at the time the crime was perpetuated he was still working in the factory till 10pm to be exact, the accused who pointed him as one of the culprit admitted in court that he did it out of fear from the police who had hit him and another co-worker of Bagas saw when the other accused was shouted at by the police for not being able to find a man named Mario and so he just pointed out to Bagas out of fear that he might get hurt. Title: People v. Piedad G.R. No. 131923, December 5, 2002 Facts:

On the evening of April 10, 1996 Mateo Lactawan was mauled by a group of men namely Niel Piedad, Richard Palma, Lito Garcia and five others. His wife Luz Lactawan witnessed the crime as she was called up by Fidel Piquero to help Mateo. She saw Niel hit Mateo on the head with a large stone. Then, Lito approached Mateos side and stabbed him at the back, while Richard hit Mateo in the face. Mateo was rushed to the East Avenue Medical Center where he later died because of the injuries he sustained. The police were able to apprehended Lito and a certain Luis Rodel. Richard and Niel, meanwhile, were surrendered to the police station by their parents. Accused-appellants denied the charges against them and gave a different version of the incident. The trial court finds the accused Niel Piedad and Lito Garcia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua while Richard Palma is acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. Accuse Niel Piedad however claims that the trial court erred in admitting and relying to the incourt identification of accused-appellant when it was tainted by a pointedly suggestive and fatally flawed pre-trial identification. ISSUE: Whether or not committed an error in admitting and relying on the in-court identification of the accused. Ruling: No, the lower court did not commit an error. Neils claim that pre -trial identification was suggestive due to the absence of a police lineup is more theoretical than real. Both Luz Lactawan and Fidel Piquero knew him already before the incident. Hence, the witnesses were not identifying persons whom they were unfamiliar with, where arguably, improper suggestion may set in. When the accused were presented before the witnesses, they were simply asked to confirm whether they were the ones responsible for the crime perpetrated. The witnesses did not incriminate the accused simply because they were the only ones presented by the police, rather, the witnesses were certain they recognized the perpetrators of the crime. Besides, there is no law which requires a police lineup before a suspect can be identified as the culprit of a crime. 11What is important is that the prosecution witnesses positively identify the persons charged as the malefactors. 12 In this regard, this Court finds no reason to doubt the veracity of Luzs and Fidels testimony. Both suspects(Neil and Lito) were positively identified by the witness as the people who had inflicted wounds to Mateo which led to his death. The lack of counsel during the pre-trial identification process cannot be availed by the accused as a defense either. The right to counsel accrues only after an investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and commences an interrogation aimed at a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom the police would then propound questions which tend to elicit incriminating statements. The presence of counsel during such investigation is intended to prevent the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. In the case at bar, however, accusedappellants did not make any extrajudicial confession or admission with regard to the crime charged. While Niel and Lito may have been suspects, they were certainly not interrogated by the police authorities, much less forced to confess to the crime imputed against them. Moreover, the rights accorded an accused under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution applies only against testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the accused is proposed to be examined, as was done in this case presented to the witnesses to be identified. Accused-appellants were not thus denied their right to counsel. The Regional Trial Courts decision is hereby affirmed. RIGHTS OF PERSONS UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION Title: People v. Garcia G.R. No. 138470, April 1, 2003 Facts: Artemio Garcia, Jr. and Regalado Bernabe were charged with the crime of Carnapping with Homicide as defined in Republic Act No. 6539. It is alleged in the information they have unlawfully took from the driver Wilfredo Elis a brand new Toyota Tamaraw FX owned by Fernando Ignacio. During the commission of the offense they assaulted and stabbed Wilfredo Elis in different parts of his body causing mortal wounds which directly resulted to his death. Both of the accused were found guilty by the trial court and were both sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua. They filed an appeal one of the errors they raised is that the trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant Bernabe on the basis of his alleged admission of the crime to private individuals. Bernabe further claims that (a) he did not make such admission; (b) the admission made by Garcia should not prejudice him; and (c) assuming he made such admission, it should be excluded for having been made under duress and intimidation. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the Ber nabes admission to Cortez and Ignacio. Ruling: No, the court did not commit an error in admitting Bernabes admission to the crime. Records show that both Garcia and Bernabe admitted to Cortez and Ignacio that they were responsible for taking the vehicle and killing the victim. They first admitted it on December 24, 1996 when Cortez visited them, when they were subsequently visited by Cortez and Ignacio on December 26, 1996 only Garcia admitted to the commission of the crime while Bernabe kept quiet. In the case of People v. Andan, it was held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime.

What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, and not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Hence, appellants voluntary admission to Cortez that he and his co-accused conspired in killing the deceased when the latter opposed their plan to sell the vehicle is admissible as evidence against him. Furthermore, accused appellant Bernabe failed to refute the extrajudicial confession made by Garcia imputing him to the commission of the offense. Rule 130, Section 32 of the Rules of Court provides that an act or declaration made in the presence and within the hearing or observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true, and when proper and possible for him to do so, may be given in evidence against him. . As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, he cannot invoke his silence during this crucial moment as his right. He ought to speak and failing to do so, his silence weighs heavily on him. Thus, it was not accusedappellants Garcias admission that prejudiced accused-appellant Bernabe, but his own silence when it was such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true. Wherefore, the trial courts decision is affirmed. CUSTODIAL PHASE OF INVESTIGATION:POLICE LINE UP/PARAFIN TEST Title: People v. De Guzman G.R. Nos. 98321-24, June 30, 1993 Facts: Ricardo de Guzman y San Pedro, Vicente Jimenez y Bustamante, Joseph Cailang y Suan, Ruel Baclayon y Gellemer, Leopoldo Cailang y Suan, Alex Barreto, Constantino Villanueva y Hermogenes, Victor Nuez, Jr. and Celso Bustamante were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu with three counts of murder and one count of frustrated murder. On April 4, 1989, Major Antonio Carteciano was driving his private jeep toward Camp General Arcadio Maxilom. With him in the jeep were his wife, Lorna Carteciano, who was seated beside him, his mother-in-law, Juanita Ricaplaza, his 13-year old son Reiser, his brother, Francisco Carteciano, Jr., a neighbor, Engr. Jose Bantug, Jr., and Bantug's daughter, Jennifer. Except for Major Carteciano and his wife, the rest were seated at the back of the jeep. On their way gunshots were fired at them in succession, hitting Major Carteciano, Francisco Carteciano, Jose Bantug, and Lorna Carteciano. The jeep came to a full stop, several gunmen emerged from their hiding places and approached the jeep. Accused-appellant Victor Nuez, Jr., demanded from Lorna Carteciano her husband's firearm. Lorna pleaded that there was nothing to give, offering instead her valuables. Thereupon, accused-appellant Nuez fired at Major Carteciano point-blank, hitting his head which was resting on Lorna's lap Then the gunmen hijacked another jeep and took off. As a result of the, shooting, Major Antonio Carteciano, Francisco Carteciano, and Engineer Jose Bantug died. Lorna Carteciano was seriously wounded, and would have died were it not for the timely medical assistance rendered to her. On April 7, 1989, 15 persons were presented to Juanita Ricaplaza and Lorna Carteciano where in both of them identified Victor Nunez as one of the participants in the shooting. During the trial Juanita Ricaplaza, Lorna Carteciano, and Reiser Carteciano positively identified him as one of the shooter and the one who shot Major Carteciano, in the head. The other 8 accused were acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt, while Victor Nuez was found guilty. He was sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the three criminal case filed against him.while in onother criminal case he was also found guilty and sentenced to the minimum of prision mayor to Reclusion temporal to its maximum and to further indemnify the offended party Lorna Carteciano. Nuez claimed that his arrest was illegal and that he was deprived of his right to counsel when he was subjected to a paraffin test without the assistance of counsel. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was deprived of his right to counsel when he was subjected to a paraffin test without the assistance of counsel. Ruling: No, the accused was not deprived of his right to counsel for at the time that he was subjected to a paraffin test he was not under custodial investigation. The right to counsel attaches only upon the start of an investigation, that is, when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the accused. At such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation. The court finds that the conviction of the accused-appellant was established beyond reasonable doubt therefore the appealed decision is hereby affirmed. Note: When Nunez pleaded guilty in his arraignment he is estopped from questioning the validity of the arrest. Any irregularity attendant to his arrest was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and by participating in the trial (People vs. Rabang, 187 SCRA 682 [1990]). Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error. The witnesses also positively identified the accused, so he cannot question the credibility of the witnesses.